14

REEDS MARINE ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

STEALTH WARSHIP
TECHNOLOGY

Published by Adlard Coles Nautical

an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3DP
www.adlardcoles.com
Copyright Christopher Lavers 2012
First published by Adlard Coles Nautical in 2012
ISBN 978-1-4081-7525-5
ePDF 978-1-4081-7553-8
ePub 978-1-4081-7552-1
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pgauguin(a.k.a. ExLib) :

The LORD lives!

Praise be to my Rock!
Exalted be God, the Rock, my Saviour!
2 Samuel 22:47 (New International Version UK)

D3pZ4i & bhgvld, Dennixxx & rosea (for softarchive)

Stole src from http://avaxho.me/blogs/exLib/

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CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION

IX
X

1 RADAR
Early Radar Stealth
SR-71
Measuring Stealth
Maximum Detection Range (MDR) and Radar Cross Section
Stealth Approaches

1
6
8
11
13
19

2 VISIBILITY
Dazzle Camouage and the First World War
Origins of Camouage

30
30
36

3 INVISIBLE FUTURES
Radar Metamaterials
Optical Metamaterials

52
54
59

4 INFRARED
Infra-red Heat Reduction
IRCS Contributors
The Laws of Infra-red Emission

66
66
71
78

5 MAGNETIC SIGNATURE
Magnetic Stealth
Degaussing Ships Hulls

82
82
86

6 THE ACOUSTIC THREAT AND OTHER SIGNATURES

Acoustic Noise
Various Environmental Factors
Active Sonar
Passive Sonar
Sonar Comparison
Cavitation
Future Acoustic Technology
Bioluminescence
Wake Eects
Extremely Low-Frequency (ELF) Signature
Likely Future Cross Sections
Biologically Inspired Design
Emissions Control Policy

95
95
97
98
99
100
102
103
104
105
108
108
109
111

viii Contents
7 MODERN STEALTH SHIPS
Sweden
United Kingdom
Italian and French Destroyer Variants
United States of America
India
Russia
France
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Germany
China

114
114
119
128
130
132
133
134
136
136
137
138

8 FUTURE NAVAL STEALTH PLATFORMS

Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier
A Brief History of the Build So Far
Radar and Weapons Systems
Embarked Fleet Air Arm?
Carrier Construction
HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08)
UK FSC or Type 26 Frigate
Weapons and Systems
Modular and Flexible
United States of America

141
142
144
146
146
147
148
149
151
151
152

SUMMARY

158

APPENDIX: KEY SHIP FACTS

160

GLOSSARY

167

ANSWERS TO NUMERICAL QUESTIONS

169

IMAGE SOURCES

170

INDEX

171

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the following: Mr John Mc Crae for permission to use Type 45
Destroyer HMS Daring images at various construction stages; Mr Andrew Valente,
Combat Index Webmaster, LLC, Naples, Florida, USA for archive imagery access; and
Mr Kjell Gthe, of Kockums Sweden, for Visby stealth corvette pictures and extensive
material about the class. I would also like to thank the meticulous manuscript checking
and copy editing provided by the editorial services team at MPS Limited, Chennai.
I appreciate the BBC Radio 4 Material World team for letting me loose to talk live about
stealth concepts before disappearing on air (24th April 2008), which rst set me on the
path to this book, and the Institute of Physics and the Institute of Materials which both
published early crafting of stealth ideas in 2008 and 2009.
I would like to thank my family motivators and in turn encourage them: Helena for
her work with the disadvantaged of Mexico City, Sam for achieving Ten Tors Gold
and teaching in Tanzania, Sara-Kate for her warmth, and care in Guides, Matt for his
application of talents and introducing me to football and Ben for his love of learning
and stories. I thank them for the few hours of reality each day! Your values and passions
add meaning to my life. I thank my parents for motivating me in the past, believing
I could learn to read even when my teachers said I wouldnt! Finally, I especially thank
Anne, my wife, for her patience and encouragement; you are the true love of my life.
To all and one I thank you.

INTRODUCTION
The missile navigating by inertial guidance approached with swift self-assurance
the end of its 200 nautical mile pre-programmed journey, and after rapid target
conrmation with its passive thermal imager reaches its objective to devastating
eect. The target, oblivious of its peril, until the nal moment of impact, could do
nothing to counter this fatal blow.
Christopher Lavers

The scenario outlined above is not ction; it is the real high-technology cutting edge
of naval warfare today. For this reason, surface warships incorporated with stealth
technologies take an increasingly vital role to ensure platform survival. Stealths
principal aim is to make naval ships invisible to an array of increasingly smart detection
systems such as sonar and radar, combining ways that lower a platforms emissions and
those which eliminate reected radiation, thus reducing detection range and threat
vulnerability. This book seeks to communicate the latest interesting developments
in stealth technology to a wider audience and to explore the paradigm shift stealth
represents in terms of warship design. It will focus on the transformational change in
naval architecture, which is simplistically represented in the shape of modern warships,
and dwells less on just providing lots of information or technical detail. Stealth Warship
Technology will also discuss in a little detail something of the history of this subject.
In this book, I will provide an opportunity to develop a better understanding of the
specialist practical issues and skills required in this naval sector. Some opportunity for
basic numerical analysis and problem-solving are included at the end of each chapter
for the more mathematical reader. However, the book is designed for those with
a limited mathematical background in mind; it is my objective to communicate the
fundamental principles of the subject to the many and not to provide tricky maths
problems to solve for the few.
I will discuss several ongoing themes or issues throughout the book: surveillance,
signature and cross section reduction as well as certain aspects of electronic warfare
(EW). Surveillance entails an examination of both radar and infra-red non-imaging
target detection systems as well as the latest visual and thermal imaging systems. The
developments in high-resolution radar imaging cannot be underestimated in their
signicance at the beginning of the twenty-rst century to future platform survivability.

Introduction xi
Signature and cross section reduction consideration will investigate the various applied
techniques that have been utilised to date and those which are likely to be employed
to make ship targets less visible to current (and future) generations of surveillance
systems. The topic of EW elicits a double-edged response from the informed reader.
EW involves the role of largely passive electronic support measures (ESM), the listening
devices which need to be coordinated with further electronic countermeasures (ECM)
(various active and passive techniques available), and is both our best friend and, being
also used by an equally surveillant enemy, perhaps our greatest foe.
The aim of this book is to uncover the unto now secret area of stealth warship design
and the broader aspects of stealth technology using available public material and to
stress the importance of materials used in the warships construction with information
that already exists in the public domain, and how this inuences all of a modern naval
platforms design parameters. Paradoxically, all the basic stealth concepts are easily
accessible on the Internet, with a variety of stealth-related companies discussing their
products in some detail. To a physicist or engineer who knows what they are looking
for, even YouTube videos can now provide signicant intelligence on both systems
and their capabilities and mode of operation, saying nothing of the ability of modern
mobile phones to provide a wealth of additional information and inuence, as seen
in the Arab Spring of 2011. A working title for this book was initially Electromagnetic
threats to warships, but this not only fails to grasp the full extent of warship threats
which encompass the traditional role of radar and visual detection, as well as nightvision devices and thermal imaging capability, but also does not address the acoustic
underwater signature of the ship platform and other less well-known detection methods
such as magnetic signature, bioluminescence, and wake and so on. It must be stressed
from the outset that there has been a signicant paradigm shift in warship design in
the past two decades, which has been rather to move away from the view that it is
simply nice to incorporate stealth into warship design as something of an aordable
extra if possible. Instead stealth is now seen to be the critical component around which
the warship is designed, and is certainly the case for the DD(X) Zumwalt-class surface
combatant. However, it is the very cost of stealth that has made the Zumwalt a victim
of its own stealth success, and mitigated against the future of the programme, in favour
of a more traditionally tried and tested warships. The shift in emphasis towards stealth
in current platforms is evidenced through the radical transformation of platform design
between the RN Type 23 frigate and the latest stealth Type 45 Destroyer HMS Daring
as well as the La Fayette-class frigate and Swedish Visby stealth class corvette built
by Kockums.
An able reader or student should be able to describe, discuss and analyse the ways in
which modern and often highly complex sensors and communications systems can

xii Introduction
have their performance degraded by hostile activities. We will consider the various
design techniques which might be incorporated to negate the eects of these activities
and to reduce likewise the overall probability of a ships detection.
Clearly stealth is only a part of the story, as a stealth warship cannot provide the same
sense of intimidating power projection o the coast of a potential enemy if they do not
know that you are there, and neither can stealth ensure platform safety and integrity
once the rst salvo is red. Obviously there is still a signicant role to be maintained
in terms of self-protection of a platform, and the increased cost that stealth brings to
the value of the ship asset is only likely to increase the required investment in ships
defences, be they long- and short-range missile defence systems, a close-in weapon
system (CIWS) or gun as well as various soft-kill methods at the ships disposal. Stealth
can actually provide a range advantage over a variety of sensor systems, and the
reduced signature provides a suciently fuzzy picture that an enemy may at best
detect you but will be quite unable to classify the threat correctly.
According to Merriam-Websters Online Dictionary, stealth (pronounced: stelth) is
derived from the thirteenth-century Middle English stelthe; akin to Old English stelan
to steal, with several related meanings.
1 a archaic: theft b obsolete: something stolen
2 the act or action of proceeding furtively, secretly, or imperceptibly the state
moves by stealth to gather information Nat Hento
3 the state of being furtive or unobtrusive [and in the context we will be
considering]
4 an aircraft-design characteristic consisting of oblique angular construction
and avoidance of vertical surfaces that is intended to produce a very weak
radar return
Stealth technology is also known as low observable technology (LOT) and is a subdiscipline of ECM, which covers a range of techniques used not just with aircraft, but
includes ships and missiles, in order to make them less visible (ideally invisible) to radar,
infra-red and other detection methods.
There are also issues presented by the class of threat that the stealth warship has
been constructed to deal with, as the most likely asymmetric threats that will present
themselves to warships in the near future are the small (and ironically stealthy) fast
boats manned by pirates, insurgents or terrorists, like those who caused damage to
the USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The USS Cole was the target of a terrorist

Introduction xiii

Figure I1 The USS Cole (DDG 67) is towed away from the port city of Aden, Yemen, into open
sea by the Military Sealift Command ocean-going tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) on 29 October
2000

attack in the port of Aden in October 2000, during a scheduled re-fuelling. The attack
killed 17 crew members and injured 39 others, demonstrating that even a heavily
armed high-tech platform is still vulnerable to relatively simple threats (Figure I1).
As the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote in his The Art of War, dating back to
450 BC and the worlds oldest treatise on military strategy, All warfare is based on
deception, and certainly warships stealth and signature reduction techniques play an
increasing component in that deception today. Stealth can generally be regarded as any
technique used to reduce reected sources of radiation, mostly with passive measures,
whilst signature reduction involves methods designed specically to reduce a ships
own emissions methods which are largely active. In reality, though, the terms stealth
and signature reduction are used fairly interchangeably. The oldest and most successful
recorded reference to deception before the modern era is that illustrated in the book
of Judges (67) concerning Gideon who with 300 men, trumpets, torches hidden in jars
and precision timing at the change of the enemy guard routed a much larger force.
15

When Gideon heard the dream and its interpretation, he worshiped God. He
returned to the camp of Israel and called out, Get up! The LORD has given the
Midianite camp into your hands. 16Dividing the 300 men into 3 companies,

xiv Introduction
he placed trumpets and empty jars in the hands of all of them, with torches
inside 19Gideon and the 100 men with him reached the edge of the camp
at the beginning of the middle watch, just after they had changed the guard.
They blew their trumpets and broke the jars that were in their hands. 20The
3 companies blew the trumpets and smashed the jars. Grasping the torches
in their left hands and holding in their right hands the trumpets they were
to blow, they shouted, A sword for the LORD and for Gideon! 21While each
man held his position around the camp, all the Midianites ran, crying out as
they ed.
You could even regard this as the rst example of coordinated, network-centric
warfare! Certainly the desire for invisibility until the nal moment of attack has been
a key inuence in how warfare has been conducted since ancient times. The military
quest for invisibility appears in Greek mythology: Perseus helmet and Gyges ring both
rendered their wearers invisible, useful when ghting monsters, and also formed the
basis for the One Ring in Tolkiens famous trilogy The Lord of the Rings. However, such
abilities no longer belong entirely in the realm of fantasy or science ction such as
Star Trek, as these days the worlds armed forces can draw on sophisticated stealth
techniques to hide themselves from their enemies. Stealth technology seeks to render
military ships, vehicles, men and aircraft invisible to modern detection systems, such
as radar and magnetic sensors, by reducing the levels of reected radiation whilst at
the same time lowering the crafts own emissions (Figure I2). I will examine the various
applied techniques that have been, and are likely to be, employed to make a platform
less prone to detection. Certainly if these techniques are applied successfully, eective
targeting, although perhaps not impossible, will be highly unlikely, whilst at the same
time countermeasure systems will attempt to deny the enemy the tactical use of the
electromagnetic spectrum (and acoustic spectrum) whilst retaining ones own use of
military spectral capabilities.
When it comes to an aircraft carrier or large battleship, this is no mean feat. Stealth
works hand in hand with precision, and it is no accident that stealth aircraft today
use precision-guided munitions to great effect. Stealth also works in partnership
with modern decoy systems, as the harder it is to see the real target, the more likely
that a decoy system will be selected as the chosen target because of the larger more
attractive signal it may provide. We will start our discussion of stealth with radar, a
sensor many readers will be familiar with, followed by the visible spectrum, infrared spectrum, various other spectra and finally an examination of modern stealth
ships themselves.
For me, the real issues of stealth are not driven by academic interest alone but in terms
of considering the safety provided to a vulnerable crew at sea and the preservation and

Introduction xv

Figure I2 Various signatures and cross sections CR Lavers

security of our personal and national freedoms won at great corporate and individual
cost. If I may paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, I anticipate that for the crews of these
ships in future conicts, with the vast amount of dedicated research that has gone into
UK stealth warship design, never before will so much be owed by so few to so many
for their survival and perhaps the continued security of our nation and its traditions
as well.
It is as true today as in yesteryear that [i]t is on the Navy under the good providence
of God that our health, prosperity and peace depend (Britannia Royal Naval College
motto, above the main college doors).

This page intentionally left blank

RADAR
[A]head towards London I saw a small, tight formation of bombers completely
encircled by a ring of Messerschmitts. They were still heading north. As I raced
forward, three ights of Spitres came zooming up from beneath them in a sort of
Prince-of-Waless-feathers manoeuvre. They burst through upward and outward,
their guns going all the time. They must have each got one, for an instant later I
saw the most extraordinary sight of eight German bombers and ghters diving
earthward together in ames.
John Beard, Battle of Britain, 1940 [1]

The story of modern radar and with it the radar technology to counter its eectiveness,
stealth, is where we will begin, arising as it did out of the rearmament of Nazi Germany
in the 1930s and the signicant expansion of the German Luftwae. The British
government was alarmed at the rapidity of these developments and soon realised that
an aircraft warning system had to be developed and quickly deployed in the likelihood
of imminent war. In January 1935, Sir Robert Watson-Watt was asked whether radio
waves might be used to detect aircraft approaching the shores of England. Sir WatsonWatt wrote a brief memorandum to the Air Defence Subcommittee of the Committee
of Imperial Defence to promote developments of radio direction nding (DF). Based
on this letter and the supportive eorts of Sir Henry Tizard, a concentrated radar
development programme began in England. In 1937, a prototype radio DF station (later
called the Chain Home (CH) system; Figure 1.1) was built at Bawdsey Research Station
for Royal Air Force (RAF) use. The CH station operated at a relatively low frequency of
22 MHz, and was able to detect propeller-driven aircraft at a modest 3,000 m elevation
and under good atmospheric conditions as far away as 150 km in ne weather but,
due to absorption of radar energy by weather fronts and rain, substantially less in

2 Stealth Warship

Figure 1.1 Chain Home command

poor weather. Nonetheless, due to radars dramatic ability to increase detection

range beyond the visible horizon and to provide a degree of positional information,
by September 1939, at the outbreak of war some 20 CH command stations were fully
operational. The radar equipment used in the Battle of Britain was developed by a group
of dedicated scientists initially based at the National Physical Laboratory in Teddington
(still providing measurement standards to this day). Under the guidance of Sir Robert
Watson-Watt (Figure 1.2), they were not only able to detect reected radio waves from
moving bomber aircraft but were also most importantly able to develop a system of
practical operational procedures for using it.
This approach was vital and probably rst realised by Sir Henry Tizard, who had been
chairman of the committee on the scientic study of the defence of Britain that was
responsible for launching Watson-Watt on the radar path. To tackle the problem, Tizard
obtained use of the RAFs No. 32 Squadron stationed at Biggin Hill in Kent. They carried
out a series of trials using the rst CH radar system, developing the control procedures
to intercept unsuspecting targets such as civilian Dutch KLM airliners, but kept the radar
emissions directed well away from Lufthansa ights to avoid alerting the Germans! The

Radar 3

Figure 1.2 Sir Robert Watson-Watt

Figure 1.3 German Heinkel He 111s which went into service in 1937

4 Stealth Warship
procedures developed during this experiment were those later used by British aircraft
controllers during the strategically important Battle of Britain fought ercely from the
summer of 1940 well into the autumn (10 July31 October 1940) (Figure 1.3).
This was indisputably the rst modern example of a network-centric warfare, where the
assets of a signicantly depleted RAF were able to be accurately vectored to intercept
German bomber aircraft. This uncanny ability of the British RAF to intercept German
Luftwae sorties led the Germans high command to gain the false impression that
Britain had a much larger air force and was partly responsible for the abandonment of
the planned Nazi invasion of Britain (Operation Sea Lion). It was this combination of
the hardware and operational software in use that made radar so vital and successful
to the British. The German failure to achieve its objective of the complete annihilation
of Britains air defences, or indeed an outright surrender, is rightly considered a critical
turning point in the Second World War and stiened British determination and deance.
The basic principle of radar, or more strictly echo location, is quite simple. Visible
light, of which we are all familiar, is but part of a wider family of waves which form the
electromagnetic spectrum (Figure 1.4), covering waves such as X-rays, gamma rays and
ultraviolet radiation which all have more energy than visible light and also waves of
longer wavelength, such as infra-red (heat), radar and very low-frequency (VLF) waves
used to communicate with submerged submarines.
If these electromagnetic waves are sent in the form of short pulses which strike an
object with a at surface, some of the wave energy transmitted from the radar will be
reected back to the radar receiver, similar to the optical dazzle observed from solar
glint o a sunlit window on a sunny day (Figure 1.5).
If the elapsed time t, from the transmission of a short radar pulse to the time the echo
is received, is measured, the wave speed allows the contact range to be calculated
accurately. As electromagnetic waves all travel at the same speed of light in vacuum,
and only a little less in our planets dilute atmosphere (c = 3 108 m s1), the distance
they travel may be given as follows: distance = ct. Hence contact range R, which is half
ct
.
the total distance, is given as follows: R = __
2
For example, if the elapsed recorded electronic time from pulse transmission to
reception is one thousandth of a second (or 1 ms), the radar range from the transmitter
to the reecting target will be as follows:
(3 108 1 103)
_________________
2 m or 150 km distance

This relationship is used frequently in pulse radars to measure contact range, and the method
is often referred to as pulse delay ranging. Other important radar parameters include
the transmitted radar frequency (denoting the energy of the wave), the pulse repetition
frequency or PRF (the number of pulses transmitted per second) and the pulse duration.

Radar 5
Frequency (Hz)
1019

Wavelength

Gamma-rays

0.1
1
0.1 nm

1018
X-rays

1 nm

17

10

400 nm

10 nm
1016
Ultraviolet

500 nm
100 nm

1015
Visible

1000 nm
1 m

Near IR
14

10

600 nm

10 m

Infra-red
1013
Thermal IR

100 m

12

10

Far IR
1000 MHz

1000 m
1 mm

11

10
UHF

Microwaves
1010

500 MHz

1 cm

Radar
10 cm

109
VHF
7-13
100 MHz

Radio, TV

FM
VHF
2-6

50 MHz

1m
108

10 m
107
100 m
106

AM
1000 m
Long-waves

Figure 1.4 Electromagnetic spectrum

Transmitted pulse

Reflected echo

Figure 1.5 Pulse delay ranging CR Lavers

700 nm

6 Stealth Warship

Early Radar Stealth

Modern warship radar stealth materials have much to thank concepts developed for earlier
stealth aircraft. In Nazi Germany during the 1930s1940s, two visionary aircraft designer
brothers Walter and Reimar Horten developed a large number of aircraft, including aheadof-its-time proposals for a strategic bomber, envisaged as carrying a German-developed
atomic bomb into the very heartland of America. The Horten H. IX designated the Horten
229 (Figure 1.6), fortunately developed very late towards the end of the Second World War,
was built by Gothaer Waggonfabrik and structured around the use of radar absorbent
glues and very low radar reecting materials. It incorporated an extremely unusual low
cross section ying wing concept, making this the rst ying wing powered by a jet engine.
The at prole of the aircraft made it more dicult to see against a cloud-lled sky than
a conventional aircraft, and the more streamlined approach reduces aerodynamic drag
to some extent, improving endurance or the range of the aircraft. The Horton project
was given the personal approval of German Luftwae Reich Marshal Hermann Gring,
with the intended performance requirements to carry 1,000 kg of bombs a distance
of 1,000 km with a speed of 1,000 km hr1, exhibiting the typical high-performance
standards expected from German engineering of its time. The aviation ceiling was
intended to be 15,000 m (49,213 ft). Ironically the ying wing concept, the actual
aircraft and some of the engineers fell as the spoils of war to the victorious allies and
was subsequently developed by Northrop in the United States of America on its YB-49
after the Second World War and the low observable ying wing was born.
The idea of radar stealth was not alien to the British scientic establishment, who at the
same time had also begun to experiment with early forms of radar absorbent material or
RAM on its warships and also on the Canberra PR3 photographic reconnaissance aircraft of
the early 1950s. The Canberra was developed from the B(2) light bomber as a replacement
for the Mosquito PR34 reconnaissance aircraft, which had been used extensively during
the Second World War. The RAM-coated Canberra aircraft were a much needed post-war
response to the U-boat radar absorbing snorkel tubes developed by the German Navy. The
next signicant step forward in developing radar stealth technology is generally accepted
to have taken place in 1954 when Kelly Martin at Lockheed was tasked by the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a covert spy plane (the genesis of the real Project
Rainbow which I will mention later), leading to the rst U2 Soviet overight in 1956.
The U2 had a network of thin wires with spaced ferrite beads (somewhat akin
to an abacus) which absorbed energy and included specially fabricated ceramic

Radar 7

Figure 1.6 Horten H. IX designs

Figure 1.7 Shuttle heat tiles CR Lavers

8 Stealth Warship
wing leading edges, made of breglass and honeycomb plastic, skimmed or nished
with heat-resistant breglass. Such developments in ceramic heat-resistant tiles have
continued over the decades and led eventually to the technology being deployed
on the series of US space shuttles (Figure 1.7), and which when damaged led to the
devastation observed on the shuttle Columbia (1st February 2003). The U2 aircraft was
a rst step along the path of focused stealth aviation.

SR-71
The next step was the United States Air Force (USAF) order for a reconnaissance version
of the A-12 Oxcart, originally designed for the CIA by Clarence Johnson at the Lockheed
Skunk Works in December 1962, in the wake of a U2 lost over Russia and the infamous
show trial of Gary Powers in Moscow. Originally named R-12, it was later renamed SR-71
(Figure 1.8). The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was rightly
concerned by the advances in Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Certainly
by the early to mid-1970s the Cold War was in real danger of going hot, with Soviet

Figure 1.8 SR-71

Radar 9
nuclear testing and arms proliferation apace. There was a genuine climate of fear of
the perceived Soviet missile build-up. The SR-71 was longer and heavier than the A-12.
Its fuselage was lengthened for additional fuel capacity and for increased range. A
second seat was added to the cockpit and further reconnaissance equipment included
intelligence sensors, a side-looking radar and a photo camera. The SR-71 Blackbird rst
ew on 22nd December 1984 and was nally retired from USAF service in 1998. The
mission intent of the SR-71 was to provide the same sort of reconnaissance capability
provided by the U2 programme, but it had the unique advantage with its Mach 3+
speed that if an enemy surface-to-air missile was launched and subsequently detected
the aircraft could simply accelerate to outrun the missile! Thirty-two SR-71s were built,
with none of them lost to enemy action, although 12 aircraft (a rather high number)
were destroyed in a variety of accidents. Since 1976, the SR-71 has maintained its
ocial record as the fastest air-breathing manned aircraft in the world.
Lockheeds F-117A Nighthawk (Figure 1.9) was the rst operational aircraft to fully
exploit stealth and was intended primarily to penetrate heavily protected environments
at night with precision and accuracy. Named after the Nighthawk, a nocturnal bird,
the likely time for deployment is intimated from the start. Competition for this rst
fully stealthy defence contract was extremely erce, with bids submitted from both
Lockheed and Northrop. Lockheeds winning Have Blue design was based on several
sophisticated models of rotating plates in two dimensions. In 1975, Kelly retired and

Figure 1.9 F-117A

10 Stealth Warship
Ben Rich succeeded him to lead the think tank of brilliant aeronautical engineers
designing the undesignable. Rich lobbied to get Lockheed into contention for the
stealth design, having been surprisingly overlooked in spite of their successes with
the U2 and SR-71. In 1975, Lockheeds Advanced Design and Skunk Works prepared
a proposal for the Experimental Survivable Testbed (XST) programme. This Lockheed
XST programme was named Project Harvey after the 1950 movie Harvey, staring James
Stewart, about an invisible 6 ft rabbit that could only be seen by Stewart. Dick Scherrer
was the Project Harvey programme manager and Leo Celniker the manager for the XST
proposal, which led to the Hopeless Diamond model.
Skunk Works engineers began working on an aircraft which would have a vastly
reduced radar cross section (RCS) compared with existing jet engine aircraft that would
make it all but invisible to enemy search radars but would still be able to y and carry
out combat missions in various Cold War, long-range strategic nuclear scenarios.
It had generally been accepted since the inception of the jet engine, with its metal
intakes and metal supporting frame, that aircraft would always be easy to detect with
radar because of strong reections from at metal surfaces. The objective of the Skunk
Works team was to take this rule and to turn it on its head. Alan Brown, a brilliant English
engineer, was given the task to lead the group trying to reduce the RCS created from the

Figure 1.10 Comparison of the two best known stealth platforms, the B2 and the F-117A, can
be very illuminating

Radar 11
intakes. He found that a breglass grid absorber reduced the RCS signicantly. He named
this grid, tongue-in-cheek, the Roach Motel, after a US-bug-killing advert of the period
with the classic line The Roach motel roaches check in but they dont check out!.
The key technique the Skunk Works team developed to counter this immutable fact
became known as faceting, in which ordinary airframe smooth surfaces were broken
up into multiple triangular at surfaces. These many surfaces were then arranged so
that the majority of the radar energy incident on the aircraft would be scattered away
from the aircraft at unexpected angles, leaving little energy, if any, to be reected
directly back into the enemy radar receiver. All lines and surfaces were designed with
shallow inclination to the radar using huge mainframe computers with a memory found
in most hand-held calculators today. There were so many surfaces that it took months
to model the at diamond shape which had no aerodynamics. The challenge was to cut
bits out from the at diamond to create a delta wing aircraft, which provides the United
States with a global outreach and a lead in technology over the Soviet. At this time, the
majority of radar systems developed relied on a radar whose antennae would not only
transmit the outgoing pulse but would also be responsible for gathering the weakened
reected wave. Subsequent development of bistatic radar (where a radar transmitter
and radar receiver are in two separate locations) and multistatic radar (where there are
multiple separately located radar receivers) have provided further renements of these
earlier solutions.
An additional reduction in stealth ghter RCS (Figure 1.10) was obtained by
covering the whole aircraft surface with RAM. However, the downside of faceting on
aerodynamic surfaces was that it tended to produce an aircraft which was inherently
unstable about all three of its major axes roll, pitch and yaw!
The programme had the highest level of security; even the buildings where the research
team worked had no windows, and only a minimum number of government people
knew of the programme. Only a few of the Lockheed sta even knew the programme
existed. The intent was to build two aircraft, one to test its ying qualities (which
appeared for some to be very questionable) and another to test its stealth attributes.

Measuring Stealth
James Clerk Maxwell (18311879), a Scottish physicist who conducted revolutionary
work on electricity and magnetism, had in the previous century derived various
equations that predicted in a clear way how a regular body of a given shape would

12 Stealth Warship
reect or scatter electromagnetic waves. With the help of a 1966 paper Method of
Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diraction published by a Russian physicist Pyotr
Umtsev at the Moscow Institute of Theoretical Physics (and now at the time of writing,
running a small one-man company Electromagnetics Research in Los Angeles), a paper
which was largely ignored in the then Soviet Union, two Skunk Works engineers Bill
Schroeder and Denys Overholser gured out the key maths behind stealth control
surface design. Schroeder sketched an aircraft with no curved surfaces at all, except
those of relatively small radius, with straight edges to its wings and tail surfaces. It was
as if a diamond had been cut into the crude outline shape of an aircraft, albeit a fairly
unaerodynamic looking one. Schroeder took the problem to Denys Overholser, an able
software engineer who could think outside of the frame of what already existed. Using
the number-crunching capability of an at that time state-of-the-art Cray computer,
Overholser developed a computer program that modelled scattering from Schroeders
new and peculiar faceted shapes, and predicted their theoretical RCS. However, it would
not be satisfactory to stop with just the output of unvalidated computer models, but in
true engineering fashion it required testing to prove the validity of these models. From
the computer program, engineers created a 10 ft wooden model dubbed the Hopeless
Diamond, which was taken to a secret outdoor radar test range in the Mojave Desert
near Palmdale. The model was mounted on a 12 ft pole, and the radar dish placed
1,500 ft away. Apparently, if the anecdotal test reports are to be believed, the site radar
operator could not see the model on the radar until a black bird landed right on top of
the model. The radar detected the bird but not the aircraft scale model!
Some introduction needs to be made to the often quoted size of a target on a radar
system. Unlike the familiar size of an object that we can see in the visible part of the
electromagnetic spectrum and physically measure with a metre ruler, things are not
quite so obvious in other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. The size of a targets
image on radar is measured by its RCS, often represented by the symbol and is
expressed in square metres. However, this area does not equal its geometric area. A
perfectly conducting sphere of projected cross-sectional area 1 m2, that is, diameter of
1.13 m, when measured on a test rig will be found to have an RCS of 1 m2 (or as close
as likely to occur within experimental error!). A test aircraft returning twice as much
energy as the test sphere would be said to have an RCS of 2 m2. Similarly a square at
plate of area 1 m2 will have an RCS of = 4A2/2 = 13,982 m2, where A is area and is
the wavelength at 10 GHz if the radar is set to transmit pulses perpendicular to the
at face [2]. At onormal incident angles, energy is reected away from the receiver,
thereby reducing the RCS. So a small plate can generate a massive echo signal or RCS
on the enemy radar display.
Consequently, by appropriate choices of material, shape and size, a typical ghter
aircraft having an actual area of 10 m2 when directly facing the radar system could

Radar 13
return much less energy than the echo energy returned by a test sphere returning an
RCS of even a few square centimetres, thus bearing no relationship to the actual area
of the plane in real life. The inherently unaerodynamic brick shape of the Hopeless
Diamond was superseded by the continuous curvature approach of the B2, a larger
aircraft yet with a smaller cross section and with a shape lending itself to a more
aerodynamic platform.

Maximum Detection Range (MDR)

and Radar Cross Section
An individual search radar sets MDR depends upon several factors such as transmitted
power, the targets reecting properties, the antenna or aerial size and the receivers
sensitivity. The MDR is given by simplifying the standard radar range equation, to nd
the maximum range a radar will detect a chosen target of a given size [3].
_______

PGtotAe
MDR = _______
(4)2S

min

Here, P is the average transmitted power, G is the antenna gain, is the RCS of the
chosen target (a measure of the contact size seen by the radar beam), tot is the time
the contact is illuminated by the radar beam, Ae is the eective size of the receive
antenna and Smin is the minimum signal energy required for detection by the receiver.
Any change in these parameters will change the MDR. Generally speaking, wave loss
increases with increasing frequency and so MDR will fall. Clearly, the ships search radar
has control of all but the elusive RCS of the chosen target. However, from the radar
operators perspective trying to counter stealth, a suitable combination of these ve
factors can counterbalance a moderate reduction in the airplanes overall RCS. It is quite
possible for a re-control radar, with a highly directional beam (or high gain antenna)
and a moderately high power level to track stealth aircraft and even potentially engage
them successfully as evidenced by the F-117A taken down over Bosnia (believed to
be due to a modied surface-to-air battery SA3 or SA6 and initial intelligence of the
planned ight path, which was thought to be similar to a previous ight). It was also
believed subsequently that with the Soviet help and clever algorithms the Serbs had
used the radar to detect the lack of aircraft reectivity against its background. The
aircraft was destroyed on 27 March 1999 during the NATO bombing of Serbia after
the aircraft was shot down in combat 25 miles west of Belgrade, with pieces shown
on Serbian TV. There have been at least six notable incidents of stealth aircraft losses,
including a very public black jet loss at the Baltimore air show in September 1997 with

14 Stealth Warship
an aircraft disintegrating in mid-air and crashing to earth in an urban area. Miraculously
no one was killed. However, the most potent threat since the Vietnam War to any aircraft
lies in the realm of infra-red heat-seeking systems which we will briey consider later.
Interestingly, it was believed that Serbian forces had received considerable help from
Russian intelligence ocers regarding the downing of the F-117A and were quick to
swarm over the remains of the aircraft looking for surviving salvageable parts, including
bits of rst-generation US stealth materials. Russian interest lay in the subsequent
analysis of the frequency-dependent response of such stealth materials in order to nd
frequencies or, one might say, weaknesses, in response for which the F-117A would be
more vulnerable to detection.
In addition, the radar range equation shows that
__

MDR 
4

So a 16-fold reduction in RCS will only result in a meagre halving of the platforms
overall MDR. It is thus obvious why there is so much emphasis to signicantly reduce
the RCS (to produce even a moderate reduction in MDR), and the RCS of a modern
stealth ghter (or bomber) really needs to be equivalent to a very small bird for it to
operate in the way that it does currently. The relationship between MDR and RCS can
also be exploited to help make decoys operate more eectively. The concept of a decoy
here is the same as that for luring or enticing a person or animal away from an intended
course, typically into a trap. The decoy is designed to provide a more attractive target
to the targeting enemy missile. In the case of radar, several passive radar decoys exist
on common naval warfare usage, some even having the ability to break the lock of an
already successfully locked on radar-guided missile.
One such radar decoy, cha or Window, was originally developed by the British during
the Second World War and is a radar countermeasure which when launched from a
small rocket will spread a cloud of small, thin pieces of aluminised nylon or metallised
glass bre which will appear as distracting or confusing alternative targets on the radar
operators display screen. The use of Window proved extremely important during the
Normandy D-Day landings where cha was used to confuse the defending Germans of
the intent of the embarked maritime allied forces. An alternative radar decoy involves
the use of permanently oating deployed corner reectors, just larger versions of those
used by merchant shipping and private yachts to show up better on radar due to their
strong direct reected signal; however, a permanent xture that reects well, even if it
is towed along behind a ship, is not necessarily a particularly good idea as it will give
the enemy an approximate location of a possible target which it might otherwise not
have. A more practical arrangement involves the timely launch and deployment of an
inatable corner reector, which will provide a large alternative RCS only as and when

Radar 15
required in the close vicinity of the ship. Many navies of the world now possess the
ability to launch cha rounds routinely.
In any case, the ship would be well advised to turn to face a threat rather than sitting
broadside as this will enable the ship to not only be in a better place to ready its own
weapons and layered defence but will also be operationally reducing its RCS at the same
time. For example, a stealth frigate with a cross section of perhaps 2,500 m2 broadside
on could have a bows cross section when facing the threat of as little as 400 m2. Such a
manoeuvre will aid the eectiveness of any deployed cha as this is then hopefully the
source of the largest reected radar signal. These sort of changes in cross section are
often best expressed in engineering notation in terms of decibels:
S

2
dB = 10 log__
S
1

where S2 is the nal or second signal level and S1 the original signal level we are
comparing it with. In this case, dB = 10 log(400/2,500) = 7.96. The minus sign in
7.96 dB shows there has been an overall signal loss or negative gain. The received radar
echo power is nearly 8 dB down compared to the broadside return. This is expected as
only a small fraction of the transmitted electromagnetic energy will be reected back
from the smaller tilted bows of a ship and its forward-facing superstructure rather than
the large at sides of the ship.
In 1977, Lockheed received a contract from the Defence Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) for the construction of two 60% scale test aircraft under the project
title Have Blue. Shortly after, the Have Blue contract was transferred over to US Air
Force System Command control and became black, with all information about it being
highly classied and restricted to those only with a legitimate need to know. Outside of
a few people at Lockheed and the Defense Department, no one in fact knew that Have
Blue even existed!
The two Have Blue aircraft were built at Lockheed in a few months. With so much
hinging upon the development of new and as yet unproven stealth technologies, the
intention was to design the rest of airframe as conservatively as possible, which also
helped to reduce the development time and avoid unnecessary suspicions of what was
really going on. The rst was intended to evaluate its ying characteristics, whereas
the second was to evaluate the platforms all critical radar signature. Existing o-theshelf components were used where feasible. The engines used were a pair of standard
General Electric J85s, mounted in the enclosures above the wings. The main landing
gear was also taken from a Fairchild Republic A-10, and various y-by-wire (FBW)
components were borrowed from an F-16 whilst the instrumentation and ejection
seat were taken from a Northrop F-5. Have Blue aircraft had the same general shape

16 Stealth Warship
as that which would later become familiar with the F-117A, except that the rudders
were located forward of the exhaust ejectors and angled in rather than out. The leading
edge of the semi-delta wing was swept back at a daring 72.5. The wing featured two
inboard trailing edge elevons for both pitch and roll control. There were no aps or
speed brakes but fortuitously an ejection seat was provided!
The Have Blue aircraft were equipped with the latest FBW ight controls that had been
adapted from the existing F-16 system airframe. However, the system did have to be
modied to handle an aircraft that was unstable about all its three axes (the F-16 is
unstable only about the pitch axis). The problem of designing a stealthy system for
airspeed measurement had yet to be solved, but an inertial navigation system provided
enough speed data for test purposes when aircraft probes were retracted. The ight
attributes of the plane were heavily controlled by advanced computer software
such that the plane can be thought of as almost ying by itself, with the pilot largely
managing the systems and checking critical factors such as fuel, time, speed and so
on. Once committed to its initial attack axis, the plane was locked in to complete its
bombing run.
Two prototypes were built at a modest cost of US$37 million. Lockheed workers
assembled the Have Blue aircraft in a cordoned-o area in Burbank, California, beyond
the prying eyes of the general public and indeed most Federal employees. Neither
aircraft received an ocial Department of Defence (DoD) designation, nor did they get
a USAF serial number. However, Lockheed gave each aircraft its own serial numbers,
1001 and 1002. The rst example (1001) was nished in November of 1977. In order to
keep the project away from spying eyes, the Have Blue prototype was then shipped
out to the Groom Lake Test Facility in Nevada (so-called Area 51) in high secrecy for
test ights in a remote area of the Nellis test range complex, a good location for testing
secret aircraft. A camouage paint scheme was applied to make it hard for unwanted
observers at Groom Lake to determine the aircrafts shape. The rst ight of the Have
Blue took place in January or February of 1978 (the exact date is still classied), with
Lockheed test pilot William M. Bill Park sitting at the controls. Flight test of the Have
Blue initially went smoothly, and the FBW system functioned well. Landing speed was
relatively high (160 knots) and as expected because of the lack of aps or brakes in the
platforms construction. However, on 4 May 1978, Have Blue prototype number 1001
was landing after a routine test ight when it hit the ground a little too hard, jamming
the right main landing gear in a semi-retracted position. Pilot Bill Park pulled the
aircraft back into the air and tried to shake the gear back down. However, after his third
attempt failed, he was ordered to take the aircraft up to 10,000 ft and eject. Park ejected
successfully, but in the process he is reported to have hit his head and was knocked
unconscious. Since he was then unable to control his parachute during descent, his

Radar 17
back was severely injured on impact, but he did survive. However, his injuries prevented
him from continuing his test pilot career, and he was unfortunately forced to retire from
ying. The Have Blue aircraft, incidentally, was destroyed in the crash.
Have Blue 1002 arrived at Groom Lake shortly after the loss of 1001. It took to the air for
the rst time in June 1978, with Lt Col. Ken Dyson at the controls. From the mid-1978 to
early 1980, Lt Col. Dyson ew more than 65 dierent test sorties, testing the response
of the aircraft to various radar threats. The Have Blue prototype 1002 proved to be
undetectable by all airborne radars except the Boeing E-3 AWACS, which could acquire
the aircraft at only short range. Most ground-based missile tracking radars could detect
the Have Blue only after it was well inside the minimum range for the surface-to-air
missiles with which they were associated could engage. Neither ground-based radars
nor air-to-air missile guidance radars could lock onto the aircraft, and it was found
through experience that the best tactic to avoid radar detection was to approach the
ground radar threat head on, presenting the Have Blues small nose-on signature.
Application of RAM to the airframe proved to be rather dicult, and ground crews
had to seal all the aircrafts joints thoroughly before each and every ight. Early
F-117A RAM came in linoleum-like sheets, cut to shape and bonded to the skin to
cover large areas. Doors and access panels were carefully checked and adjusted for a
tight t between ights, and all gaps were lled in with conductive tape and covered
with more RAM. Paint-type RAM was available, often called radar absorbent paint
(RAP), but it had to be applied by hand. The paints used were and are generally toxic
to human (and indeed animal species). Even the gaps around the aircraft canopy and
the fuel-ller door were lled with RAM paint before each ight. Ground crews would
check that all surface screws were suciently tightened, as even one loose screw in
an access panel could potentially make the aircraft show up during radar signature
tests. Consequently, meticulous attention to detail was the signature of the aircrafts
success, from the honeycomb RAM on the wing edges, inlets, exhaust, nozzles, holes to
door seals, which increased the demands on the supportive ground crew sta beyond
that normally required for normal non-stealthy military aircraft. The aircraft had six
skin layers, absorbent adhesives, tapes and putty, and sub-elements of ferromagnetic
coatings in a high dielectric plastic. Although this method is used in naval design, the
B2 and the F-35 (Lightning) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) use enhanced software prediction
methods to create radically dierent aircraft shapes than the much earlier, and simpler
by comparison, F-117A. Have Blue 1002 was nally lost in July 1979 during its 52nd
ight with Lt Col. Dyson still at the controls when one of its J85 engines caught re.
The re became so intense that the hydraulic uid lines burned through, and Lt Col.
Dyson was also forced to eject, with the loss of the 1002 prototype as well. The result
was that within 8 months both aircraft were gone! Nonetheless, the value of stealth had

18 Stealth Warship
been proven. As a further note, it should not be a great surprise to the more thoughtful
reader that the reporting of unidentied ying objects (UFOs) in this vicinity has been
a common occurrence since this time of early stealth ghter testing. Fortunately for
the Lockheed team they had already gathered about 90% of their evaluation data to
green light the project. The loss of aircraft at an early stage, with the civilian arm of
Lockheed going through a lean period, would almost certainly have meant a deletion
of the programme, and a loss of the worlds rst true stealth ghter.
The Air Force awarded a contract to the Lockheed Skunk Works to develop the
Senior Trend aircraft, with the secret top brass nding US$340 million of covert funds
to allocate to it. Initial F-117s were delivered in June 1981, with only the facetted
intersecting plates of its radar reducing airframe hinting to the informed observer at
its potent stealth features. This project was shrouded in secrecy, probably rivalled only
by that of the Manhattan Project team that developed the atomic bomb and led by
Robert Oppenheimer. From 1982, the 4450th Tactical Group operated the F-117 from
its Tonopah Test Range. This covert facility enabled the development and production
of F-117 to continue far from watchful eyes. Under the cover of testing new weapon
systems on attack planes, which were indeed own up and back from Tonopah, the
ight crews ew the aircraft under the cover of night, which during the daytime
were kept hangered to avoid detection by satellite imagery and other advanced
Soviet technologies. Even the hangers cost 200 million to ensure the highest level
of security. In October 1989, the 4450th became the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing, which
continued to operate F-117s through its rst combats. In December 1989, two of the
black jets participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama. During this US invasion,
Panamanian general Manuel Noriega was deposed, with Guillermo Endara sworn into
oce as president-elect. The aircrafts were originally meant to target barracks loyal to
Noriega, but at the last minute the target was switched (fortunately for the Panamanian
troops) to drop two 2,000 lb bombs on the elds next to the barracks to demonstrate
United States air superiority. Due to the media portrayal of dropping bombs on elds
that followed, US Congress was initially critical of the cost involved: US$8 billion for 59
planes and spares.
Following the Desert Storm campaign where the F-117A Night Hawk stealth ghters,
just 2% of the attack force, dropped 40% of the bombs F-117s were fully integrated into
the Air Force arsenal. By mid-1992, the F-117 Wing transferred operations to Holloman
Air Force Base in Alamogordo, New Mexico and re-designated the 49th Fighter Wing.
The F-117 Nighthawks rst ight took place in 18 June 1981 and conducted USAF service
from 15th October 1983 to its recent retirement in April 2008. Fifty-nine F-117A aircraft
were built at a cost of US$111.2 million per aircraft! The USAF retired the F-117 primarily
because of its introduction of the F-22 Raptor and also of the impending introduction

Radar 19
of the F-35 Lightning II, both aircraft oering increased capability and improvements in
stealth technology. A nal interesting story of the F-117A lies in the F designation itself.
Early on, after the F-16 cockpit had been chosen for the small stealth bomber, it was
realised that no ghter pilot worth his salt would switch to a B designation (bomber)
from an F designation (ghter). Hence the need to label the plane with an F designation,
although it has no ghting ability or defences of it own other than its stealth!

Stealth Approaches
In simple form, radar stealth consists of three basic techniques that should be used to
complement each other:
1. Materials should be incorporated into the ships superstructure and outside
surfaces that have a very low radar reection coecient, such as plastics, carbon
composites or glass-reinforced plastic (GRP). Surprisingly perhaps Nelsons agship
HMS Victory, in spite of its extensive mast rigging (Figure 1.11), would have a
relatively low RCS by modern ship standards!
2. RAMs usually foams which can be overlaid with specialist paints are also generally
included where possible. Simple RAM cancels any threat or enemy reected waves
destructively with the application of quarter wavelength coatings. Multiple RAM
layers, a little like the structured layering seen within plywood, can also be applied
to provide destructive cancellation across a broader range of wavelengths. Surface
paint may also add carbonyl iron ferrite spheres so that incoming radar waves
induce alternating magnetic elds in the surface paint, converting radar energy
into heat. This type of paint is often referred to as iron ball paint. Conductive
transparent coatings also allow the designer to have the exibility to introduce
controlled shapes that can deect radar waves so that they do not even enter a
ships bridge windows and then reect o in a dierent direction away from the
roving eyes of the enemy radar. Gold and transparent indium tin oxide (ITO) are
also frequently used.
RAM is usually composed of a combination of dielectric and ferromagnetic materials.
Dielectrics can be thought of as slowing waves down, whilst ferromagnetic materials
will absorb them. A high-frequency, anti-reection coating on a low-frequency,
wideband structure will absorb most of the energy, analogous in some ways to a
peacocks feather where constructive interference coatings rest on a black broadband
absorber giving the peacock its familiar appearance (Figure 1.12). However, whilst the

20 Stealth Warship

Figure 1.11 HMS Victory CR Lavers

Figure 1.12 Peacock feather CR Lavers

Radar 21
peacocks black feathers absorb the low-frequency wideband structure, the RAM top
coating will interference destructively cancelling reected radar waves. The composite
RAM consequently has both narrow and wideband absorbing features (Figure 1.13).
Typical narrowband response is seen in red, whilst a broadband response is observed in
blue. Although the narrowband RAM has a very precise absorption, and also the largest
reduction in reected signal, this is only really useful if it exactly matches a known radar
threat, which in reality is rarely likely to take place. A small sacrice in the reected
signal reduction means that broadband RAM can operate across a wider range of
frequency and is thus more likely to cover the range of likely radar threats.
To determine the ideal thickness of the narrowband RAM, we must rst nd where the
optimum reduction occurs in terms of frequency. For the narrowband RAM illustrated
above, optimum reduction occurs at a frequency of about 7.5 GHz, so if the frequency
is equal to 7.5 GHz and the wavelength = c/f = 0.04 m or 4 mm, the RAM thickness
ideally should be of this wavelength, equal to 10 mm or 1 cm. However, using RAM
does not work for all frequencies as RAM size will become too large and consequently
too heavy as we go to lower frequencies as the wavelength increases. There is some
oset as cancellation is for the internal lossy screen of wavelength thickness and not
the free space wavelength, but nonetheless size limits the RAM that can be applied,
especially to aircraft (xed wing, rotary and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)) or missile
platforms.
This use of RAM or the so-called Salisbury screen is perhaps the rst anti-radar, antireective concept, described in 1952 by Salisbury and was applied to subsequent ship RCS
reduction. There have been many renements over the years, but the principles remain
essentially the same today as that rst used in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) Radar Laboratory in the Second World War, and the technique was named after

Reduction in reflected signal/dB

10

20

30
4

Figure 1.13 Composite RAM CR Lavers

10

11

12

/GHz

22 Stealth Warship
him. This provides a simple way to use the resistive Ohmic loss mechanism in layered
absorbers. The Salisbury screen consists of a sheet of resistive material, /4 thick, placed
over a ground plane (the metal bulkhead surface of the naval warship to be concealed);
the quarter wavelength dielectric that will be absorbed; and a thin lossy screen. Magnetic
loss mechanisms are intrinsically narrowband. To obtain more bandwidth, you need to use
multiple layers of absorber separated by dielectric spacers, somewhat akin to a multilayer
plywood structure indicated earlier, or modern multiple layer anti-reection coating. The
isotropic dielectric constant of the spacers controls the maximum bandwidth of the design
where the lower permittivity results in an increase in the working bandwidth. Foam and
honeycomb spacers give a physically thick sandwich structure. To achieve a composite
skin, you can use breglass and absorbing layers and even injection mould the whole thing
as a complete carbon-bre composite as the structure will be heavily carbon impregnated
anyway. In principle, from previous experimental research, the dielectric constant is actually
a three-dimensional dielectric tensor conguration, which means that there is the ability
to tailor-make dierent absorbing properties in the three principal axial directions [4, 5].
The principle is this:
The incident wave (made up of parallel beams) is split into two (equal in intensity)
waves of the same wavelength (Figure 1.14).
The rst wave is reected by the exterior surface (the thin lossy screen), while the
second beam travels through the dielectric and is reected by the ground plane (which
is the inner layer of the Salisbury screen).

Lossy screen

Incident radar wave

Reflected radar wave

Ground plane

Dielectric
/4

Figure 1.14 Salisbury screen CR Lavers

Radar 23
Ideally, if the magnitudes of both the reected waves are the same and the phases of
the two waves are exactly out of phase, the two waves will interfere and cancel each
others electric elds.
From interference theory, two waves that are coherent interact, and they will combine
to form a single output wave. Furthermore, if the peaks coincide, the output intensity
will be the sum of the two intensities. However, if the two waves are completely outof-phase, both intensities cancel each other out (this happens when two waves are
oset by half a wavelength). The second wave travels twice the distance (the path
across to the ground plate and back towards the exterior thin lossy screen), for a total
path distance of half a wavelength. Thus the two waves cancel each other, and nothing
should be detected by the enemy radar receiver. Even if this is not quite achieved
in practice, the residual level of signal energy should be well below that required to
exceed the threshold of most search radar systems. High dielectric constant makes the
wave paths travelling inside the material generally independent of angle of incidence
so that one can get internal behaviour that is broadly the same as a function of exterior
angle. The internal thickness required does not necessarily become too unwieldy in the
rst instance as actual thickness required is equal to o/(4R), where o is the free space
wavelength and R the dielectric constant (permittivity) of the material itself.
There are some disadvantages with this quarter wavelength approach. First, Salisbury
screens work well for only a narrow portion of the radar spectrum, making it vulnerable
to multiple radar protected areas and indeed modern spread spectrum radar
technology. Another possibility is the Dallenbach layer a homogeneous lossy layer
backed by a metal plate and two key multilayer systems: the Jaumann absorber and
graded dielectric absorbers (materials with properties that vary across the layers like
modern graded-index multimode optical bres). A second problem is the thickness
of the screen itself; radar wavelengths are typically of 1 mm to 10 cm thickness, so
at longer wavelengths, the thickness will indeed become unreasonably large. Because
of the likely horizontal and distant nature of most seaborne search radar threats,
and refraction eects (the signicant lowering of the speed of wave propagation),
destructive interference is maintained over a wide angle range. There is considerable
interest in developing tuneable microwave composite materials incorporating
ferromagnetic microwires, which would have the potential advantage of being able to
tune to the threat during the relatively long search pulses which are radiated and then
maximise active cancellation [6].
3. Ship geometry is also a critical factor. So-called dihedrals and trihedrals (where
two or three surfaces, respectively, meet together at 90) must be eliminated at
all costs. Both of these geometries will strongly reect radar energy over a wide
angular range directly back to the search radar. Especially troublesome are the

24 Stealth Warship
trihedral corner reectors which are used to enhance radar returns from small
vessels (Figure 1.15). On older warships, without the foresight of stealth, the
simplest practical solution is to remove these corners by welding angled plates into
place, whilst new ships like the Type 45 and Visby stealth corvette are deliberately
designed with no compromising 90 angles present.
Problematically, ships also need to use radar, which themselves reect waves. One
solution to this problem places radar behind movable panels. Lockheed adopted this
approach in its development of the Sea Shadow (Figure 1.16).
The Sea Shadow developed by Lockheed is a 563 t, 164 ft-long vessel with twin
submarine-like hulls, sloping sides and a at roof, and was until recently the
demonstrator for the proposed Northrops Zumwalt DDX Destroyer. The Sea Shadow
was a ship test bed platform developed in the 1980s by the US Navy to test advanced
propulsion and radar signature reduction technologies. The Sea Shadow was kept
hidden within a oating barge during the daytime (Figure 1.17).
The secretive Sea Shadow came out initially only at night under the cover of darkness
(Figure 1.18). Nonetheless, although designed with a low RCS, the vessel carried corner
reectors like the one indicated in Figure 1.15, which would be positioned on the upper
deck surface so as to avoid collision when crossing shipping lanes (Figure 1.19).
This prototype was used as a conceptual model for the stealth ship in the Bond lm
Tomorrow Never Dies, having a characteristic less-cluttered upper deck to reduce radar

Radar beam

Trihedral surface

Figure 1.15 Corner reector CR Lavers

Radar 25

Figure 1.16 Sea Shadow under way

Figure 1.17 Sea Shadow in dock

26 Stealth Warship

Figure 1.18 Sea Shadow emerging

returns and a very low visual prole. This reduction in unnecessary upper deck machinery
and radar returning features is often collectively described as radar microgeometry,
and minimising this microgeometry is referred to as radar contouring, tumble home or
purpose shaping. It should be added here that the maritime environment, unlike the
dry desert skies above Nevada, is not the best environment for stealth materials. RAMs
can also absorb water, which aects its properties. A thin layer of water can also build
up on the RAM deployed at sea, and this layer can return an increased radar signal! So
development of hydrophobic water hating coatings is also vital at sea.
In the Bond lm, physical damage to the hull of the stealth ship vastly increased its RCS
to the point where it could be detected and then targeted a practical point worth
bearing in mind at the design stage of future real stealth warships. Even if a modern
stealth warship is covered with the very best radar stealth technology available, its nal
RCS is likely to remain high in comparison with a missile or aircraft platform. In theory, an
enemy radar system operating across a broad range of frequencies with suciently high
power output and conveniently placed receivers would be able to spot such a vessel.
In practice, however, radar power is generally limited and ships often have just one
receiving antenna and use a very narrow range of frequencies. As a result, by applying all
of these techniques, ships can be made extremely dicult to detect with radar, although
not totally invisible. However, it is relatively easy to make a small Visby stealth corvette
invisible to radar, much harder to make a Type 45 Destroyer undetectable and almost

Radar 27

Figure 1.19 Sea Shadow in San Francisco Bay

impossible to make a large aircraft carrier disappear on radar. It is, of course, not always
stealth that is the most important feature; for example, it is dicult to envisage power
projection with an aircraft carrier that no one knows is actually there!
One further point to discuss is that shaping does not necessarily oer stealth advantages
against low-frequency radar. If a radar wavelength is roughly twice the size of a target, a
half-wavelength resonance eect generates a signicant constructive in-phase return.
However, a long wavelength radar may detect a target and roughly locate it but will not
be able to identify it, and without location information it will also lack sucient weapon
targeting accuracy. The Chinese Nantsin radar, for example, has the capability to detect
rst-generation stealth platforms in the radar frequency range below 2 GHz but does
not possess the systems integration necessary to provide useful information to other
re-control radar systems. The use of multiple receivers, and those physically separated
from the transmitter, a so-called multistatic radar option, oers considerable research
promise. Much of a platforms stealth comes from reecting o-board transmissions in
a variety of directions other than that of a direct return. Thus detection is best achieved
if radar receivers are spaced apart so that the time delays in detected deected radar
energy are used to triangulate the location of a stealth target. A third possibility is the
observation of moving holes in radar return, as say a B2 aircraft moves its way past

28 Stealth Warship
the usual strong returns of a coastline or mountainous region, especially prominent if
the aircraft were to be detected from an airborne radar itself at high altitude.
One key advantage of stealth that cannot be argued against is the benets of stealth
force package size as opposed to a conventional attack package. A conventional strike
package will usually include a number of defence suppression aircraft, several ghter
escorts and fuel tankers to support the activities of even one bomber versus a single
stealth bomber. Conceived at the height of the Cold Wars tensions to outwit the Soviet
enemy, this aircraft above all others put stealth, as it were, rmly on the radar screen of
new technologies. For further reading, a number of recent popular articles on stealth
are included in the references, albeit with some personal bias [7, 8]!

Chapter Reections
1. Consider a picture of a platform like the Type 42 destroyer and think about how
you might redesign the platform to reduce its RCS whilst retaining its overall
shape.
2. From a radar perspective, compare dierences in B2 and F-117A design (see
Figure 1.10).
3. Consider the narrowband RAM frequency response illustrated in red in Figure 1.8.
Over what frequency range does RAM have a greater than 10 dB reduction in
cross section (two signicant gures)?
4. What is the ideal thickness of RAM for an 8.5 GHz frequency India-band radar
threat (two signicant gures)?
5. If the MDR of a conventional warship broadside (beam on) is 100 km, calculate
the new MDR if a warship is redesigned with a 40 dB RCS reduction. Hint:
Consider relative changes in the MDR formula (one signicant gure).
6. If the MDR of a conventional warship broadside (beam on) is 100 km, calculate
the new MDR if a warship is redesigned with a 20% power reduction and a
10% gain reduction. Hint: Consider relative changes in the MDR formula (three
signicant gures).
7. If a frigate was just detected beam on at a MDR of 45 km, what range would it
be detected bows on to the threat radar if the bows RCS is less by a factor of 30
compared to its RCS at 90? Hint: Consider the MDR formula as an aspect angle
calculation (two signicant gures).

Radar 29

References
1.

Beard, J (2000), Battle of Britain, 1940, EyeWitness to History, www.eyewitnesstohistory.

com.

2.

Knott, E, Shaeer, J and Tuley, M (1993), Radar Cross Section, 2nd ed. Norwood, MA: Artech
house, p. 231. ISBN 0-890006-618-3.

3.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar.

4.

Lavers, CR (1991), Optical mode characterisation of the conguration of a thin ferroelectric

liquid crystal cell under an applied electric eld, Journal of Modern Optics, 38(8): 14511461.

5.

Lavers, CR (1990), The optical dielectric tensor conguration in aligned ferroelectric liquid
crystal cells, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK.

6.

Makhnovskiy, D, Zhukov, A, Zhukova, V and Gonzalez, J (2008), Tunable and self-sensing

microwave composite materials incorporating ferromagnetic microwires, Advances in
Science and Technology, 54: 201210.

7.

Lavers, CR (2008), Stealthy materials, Material World, December, pp. 3335.

8.

Lavers, CR (2008), Invisibility rules the waves, Physics World, March, pp. 2125.

VISIBILITY
[F]or it is light that makes everything visible.
Ephesians 5:14 (New International Version)

Dazzle Camouage and the First

World War
In the absence of radar, the rst recorded use of naval stealth appeared during the
First World War when Britain attempted to hide its naval ships by painting them grey
to blend them into their background, with limited success as many Allied vessels
were subsequently lost in the North Atlantic. Huge numbers of ships were sunk by
the German U-boats, which by April 1917 was running at an unprecedented rate (as
torpedo attacks on British ships sank nearly eight per day). Something had to be done.
In 1917, with the Navy desperate for a solution, naval reservist Lt Norman Wilkinson
devised a bizarre dazzle camouage paint scheme, using colourful and abstract
cubist patterns to paint ships with coloured blocks and stripes so that vessels would
appear to be blurred into a complex background of changing sea, sky and coastline.
Norman Wilkinson CBE (24 November 187831 May 1971) was primarily a British
marine painter, and was the rst credited with the proposal to use disruptive patterns
in naval camouage. Wilkinson was born in Cambridge, attending Berkhamsted
School and St Pauls Cathedral Choir School, London. His early art training took place
near Portsmouth and Cornwall, and at Southsea School of Art, where he was later a
teacher all closely connected with the sea. He then studied with seascape painter
Louis Grier and by the age of 21 was rmly interested in maritime subjects. During the
First World War, while serving in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, he was assigned

Visibility 31
to various submarine patrols from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, and at the beginning
of 1917, he found himself based in Devonport, Plymouth conducting minesweeping
operation. In a moments inspiration whilst in Plymouth, he devised a cunning way to
respond to the submarine threat by confusing the aim of the submariner.
After initial scepticism, Wilkinsons plan was nally adopted by the Admiralty Board,
after tests with SS Industry (a merchant ship employed previously on regular runs
between Plymouth and Queenstown), and he was placed in charge of a secret naval
camouage unit housed beneath the Royal Academy of Arts in London.
There, he and his team of associated artists created a variety of dazzle camouage schemes,
which once applied to small-scale miniature models were then tested by experienced
naval observers and then subsequently prepared as blueprint construction diagrams
for actual painting of ships in dock. Anecdotal remarks by Alan Raven, an authority on
camouage used by the United States during the Second World War, suggest that HMS
Alsatian was the rst ship to be dazzle painted, some time in August 1917.
In 1918, Wilkinson was briey assigned to Washington, DC where he supported the
US Navy establish a similar unit (headed amongst others by Everett Longley Warner
himself, an American Impressionist painter). During the Second World War, Wilkinson
was once again assigned to camouage development and research, but this time not
in the dazzle painting of ships, which was no longer given the same priority, but in the
visual concealment of airelds.
Wilkinson realised that optical illusions can be created by a variety of methods, including
the use of both horizontal and vertical lines to accentuate or confuse features. Detection,
be it visual, thermal or radar, is largely about contrast. Can I see the object as distinct from
its background (Figure 2.1)? Clearly some situations make it much easier to see an object
than others (Figure 2.2). Clothing, airframe, ship or vehicle with the same colour as the
background forms the basis of concealment. The addition of multiple coloured patterns
which are also found in a complicated environmental background will be even less likely
to be detected and forms the basis of disruptive and dazzle camouage. There have even
been some serious attempts to make aircraft invisible; the German air force developed
a transparent monoplane in 1913 and with light colours could only just be detected at a
height of 900 ft. Thus cloaked with visible stealth (although still detectable by ear), the
aircraft would y over an enemy and drop its ordnance. The advent of radar surpassed
the concerns presented by visual detection to aviation on its own. The eye (a sensor) and
brain (signal processor) provide an extremely complex system worthy of a book in its own
right, and is actually a combination that at times can be surprisingly easy to fool; yet it
can achieve the resolution of two parallel lines 1 mm apart when viewed at a distance of
3 m, limited only by the 2.5 mm separation of colour light sensitive cones in the retina.

32 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.1 Conventional black and white contrast CR Lavers

Figure 2.2 Khaki contrast against a khaki background CR Lavers

In addition, the fog of war or smoke has been used for generations to make it dicult
for a target to be seen, as the scattering and absorption decrease the overall contrast.
The use of modied smoke at sea, for thermal camouage, has certainly been the
subject of sea trials in recent decades.
It is perhaps quite unsurprising that the F-117A Nighthawk is painted black and own
at night to avoid strong contrast conditions that might otherwise arise. There are also
some additional factors which mitigate against stealth ghter ight operations taking
place during the day in spite of the aircraft being painted black. Basically the higher the
altitude, the more light is scattered from below onto its underside. So to prevent
this extra spot of glint from being visible against the dark background of near space,
the darker the sky behind the stealth ghter, the darker must be the under surface

Visibility 33
shading. Consequently, we get the bizarre scenario that the black SR-71 and U2 aircraft
can look brighter than the background sky when cruising at 70,000 ft due to this
intense scattering. At lower altitudes, the sky is itself brighter and there is less light
scattering below the aircraft, so a lighter colour here would provide the least contrast.
However, there is greater fuel eciency and hence endurance or range to be gained by
ying above most of the thick dragging atmosphere, and hence extreme altitude is a
preferred ight characteristic.
Furthermore, it is not the glint that may reveal the aircraft in daylight, moonlight or
starlight, even if the distances of actual detection may be relatively small, but the
streaming white contrails, trailing out behind the aircraft and potentially lasting
from some tens of minutes to several hours, and when spread out or dispersed may
be several miles long and many hundreds of feet across. Fortunately at high altitude
the air is generally too dry to form contrails, whilst at low altitude the air is, however,
far too warm. The dangerous contrail zone is typically from 20,000 to 60,000 ft, so
stealth aircraft need to ight well outside of this range, usually on cruise above
70,000 ft [1]. One also needs to consider fully the eects of sunshine, skyshine and
earthshine eects across both the visible and thermal bands to optimise the specic
ight operations which will change with changing weather conditions and on almost
an hourly basis [2]. Hence the preference of pilots to y under the cover of darkness.
Dazzle camouage, known as Dazzle painting or Razzle Dazzle, was a camouage paint
scheme used extensively during the First World War and to a lesser extent in the Second
World War. Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, show HMS Argus and USS Charles S. Sperry.
HMS Argus (in Figure 2.3) displays dazzle camouage typical in 1918.
HMS Argus was a British aircraft carrier that served in the British Royal Navy in
the period from 1918 to 1944. She was originally converted from an ocean-going
liner which was under construction at the outbreak of the First World War to
become the worlds first example of what is now considered to be the standard
design for an aircraft carrier. HMS Argus had a full-length flight deck that allowed
wheeled aircraft to both take off from the flight deck and then land again. After
commissioning, the ship was involved for several years in the development of the
optimum design for future Royal Naval aircraft carriers, various types of arresting
gear and the development of the general operational procedures needed to
operate multiple aircraft together, and how to conduct flight activities within
fleet operations. Argus was briefly deployed during the 1920s and then placed
into reserve. The ship was subsequently recommissioned and partly modernised
just before the Second World War and after many operations off the Western
Mediterranean, North Africa and Malta (as well as periods in Russian waters and
Iceland) was finally sold in late 1946 and scrapped in 1947. The pattern applied

34 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.3 HMS Argus

Figure 2.4 USS Charles S. Sperry (DD-697) shown here in dazzle camouage (June 1944)

here appears to be randomly orientated different sections of zebra stripes, where

the black-and-white stripes are intended to break up the overall outline of the
ship and stop the bridge observer with binoculars on a warship from identifying
another ships characteristic outline.

Visibility 35
Somewhat later than the First World War HMS Argus, the USS Charles S. Sperry
(DD-697), an Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer, was named after Charles Stillman Sperry,
the commanding ocer of the Yorktown. The Charles S. Sperry was launched on 13 March
1944 and commissioned on 17 May 1944, reporting then to the Pacic Fleet. After a
brief training period in the Hawaiian Islands, Charles S. Sperry joined the fast carrier
force, TP 38, in December 1944. For the duration of the war, she sailed in the third group,
sometimes designated TF 38 or TF 58, and engaged in a variety of successful operations
during the Second World War, particularly near Okinawa and in the Philippines. Sperry
sailed with TF 58 again in February 1945, as the force began its work in preparation for
the costly invasion of Iwo Jima for which Sperrys forces oered direct support during the
assault landings at Iwo Jima. Twice, on 19 February and on 2021 February, the carrier
force came under sustained air attack from the enemy, but anti-aircraft re from the USS
Charles S. Sperry and several other screening ships (combined with evasive manoeuvring
and a protective smoke screen) prevented substantial damage to the vast concentration
of American ships. Upon completion of the Second World War and successful operations
in both Okinawa and the Philippines, she was lastly actively involved during the Korean
War, sustaining only minor damage during return of re, and after sale to the Chilean
government was nally scrapped by the Chilean Navy as recently as 1990.
Dazzle camouage would seem an unlikely camouage technique, as it would appear
to actually draw attention to the ship rather than hiding it, but the technique was
developed after the Royal Navys failure to develop other eective means to disguise
ships in all weather conditions. Various trials conducted with Wilkinsons help
demonstrated that the dazzle camouage technique actually worked in practice.
Dazzle did not conceal the ships as such but made it dicult for the enemy to estimate
their speed and heading. Wilkinsons idea was to disrupt the visual rangenders used
for naval artillery. Its intention was confusion rather than concealment. An observer
would nd it dicult to know exactly whether the stern or the bow was in view, and
it would be dicult to estimate whether the observed vessel was moving towards or
away from the observers position. Crude rangenders of this period were based on
an optical mechanism to calculate range. The operator would adjust the mechanism
until two half-images of the intended target lined up in a complete picture. Dazzle
made this hard to achieve because clashing patterns looked abnormal when the two
halves were aligned. This became especially important when submarine periscopes
included rangenders into their latest suite of sensors. The dazzle pattern usually
included a false bow wave to make correct estimation of a ships speed dicult.
The camouage expert is also trying to fool the innocent observer in a number of
other ways, besides the heading error just mentioned, such as by introducing redder
colours that produce a measure of invisibility at sunrise or sunset, crucial periods
when a ship is most likely to be observed because of the rapidly changing ambient
light conditions, and where possible the use of land background patterns for littoral

36 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.5 RMS Olympic

vessel operations (such as the Swedish Visby stealth corvette) helps the probability of
successful concealment.
There are, of course, several serious problems encountered with the use of xed dazzle
camouage patterns, not least of which is the fundamental problem that as a naval
vessel makes passage from one ocean to another it will encounter denite changes
in general illumination and weather patterns. For example, the lighting and weather
conditions in the North Atlantic winter are quite dierent from those of the relatively
settled Mediterranean and Gulf; a ship making passage from one such region to the
other in the course of its maritime operations will not necessarily be able to go in for
a ret and be repainted in the camouage design best suited to that area. It should
be noted that it was not only navies who used dazzle camouage during the First
and Second World Wars but also merchant shipping and commercial passenger liners
converted into troop ships, neither of whom wished to be sunk by the unerring accuracy
of the German torpedoes. Hence ships like RMS Mauretania and the RMS Olympic of the
White Star Line (sister to the ill-fated Titanic and Britannic liners) utilised dazzle-painted
camouage or zebrage patterns (Figure 2.5) to accompany naval camouaged vessels.
To give the general public a sense of these war painted Second World War vessels,
HMS Belfast was recently (1999) repainted in the Second World War original dazzle
camouage design.

Origins of Camouage
What we see and what we think we see are not the same thing because of the ability
of camouage to fool the mind of the human observer. In military terms, camouage
has always been of considerable use to the military since warfare began, often with

Visibility 37
an element of deception added as well (ask King Priam or Gideon), but it denitely
became a vital part of modern military tactics after the increase in accuracy and rate of
re of weapons during the late nineteenth century. Despite the benets of camouage,
until the twentieth century armies still continued to wear very bright colours with
bold designs, for a variety of reasons, including intimidation and to allow easier
identication of ones own combat units in the fog of war. As discussed previously,
the intention of camouage is to disrupt an outline by merging it into its surroundings,
thus making a soldier on land or a ship at sea harder to spot and consequently harder
to hit if detected and targeted. In nature camouage is a way of using protective
colouration that will conceal an animal being distinguished from its surroundings by
a predator. The reader is invited to look at the breadth of cryptic camouage and also
its link to the principles of animal communication; for further detailed work on this
subject, see Bradbury et al. [3].
In practice it is a soldiers uniform which makes him indistinguishable from his
surroundings. The British Army rst adopted khaki operationally in India after 1857,
surprisingly late after their experiences in the American War of Independence where
the red tunic made the typical English solider a highly visible target. The high casualty
rate of the British in India forced them to dye their traditional red tunics to more neutral
or drab tones, initially a muddy tan called khaki from the Urdu word for mud. Similarly
the Russian-Japanese War in 1905 led the Russian army to change their long-held
views of visibility and developed a grey form of khaki. Likewise most of the worlds
armies during this period took up a form of khaki that would best help them to use
camouage eectively in their own particular environments. With the First World War,
there was a nal end to elaborately bright and embellished uniforms, except for certain
ceremonial duties. This was truly the commencement of the rise of khakis, particularly
greys, browns and greens, which were introduced to match the demands of modern
military operations, aecting everything that was worn.
Camouage became well established in land warfare by the end of the First World
War and unlike naval camouage developed much further during the Second World
War. The level of sophistication used then was such that camouage netting was even
successfully deployed in North African Allied campaigns alongside various inatable
tank decoys to provide convincing troop deployment locations to confuse Rommel
and mislead his German forces.
Current technology has facilitated the development of various computer-generated
camouage schemes, for example, CAMOGEN [4], and there is considerable
international collaboration in camouage, concealment and deception, including the
development of thermal camouage to minimise heat detection [5]. As well as
the use of vertical and horizontal lines is the use of splinter camouage, breaking up

38 Stealth Warship
the overall outline so the brain cannot recognise the target, as exemplied by the
Swedish Visby stealth corvette, and Norwegian patrol craft, which is especially useful
in a brown water (littoral) environment in close proximity to a highly fractured fjord
coastline or amphibious assault.
Camouage face paints are also needed for inserted amphibious forces (and land
forces) even for quite dark skin because natural skin oils reect strongly, especially
from the forehead and cheekbones, and these need to be painted dark. There are also
other areas under the eyes, nose and chin which are naturally shadowy areas and must
be painted lighter to reduce overall contrast. Traditionally there are three common
colour schemes:
1. loam and light green for vegetation and woodland,
2. sand and light green for desert, and
3. loam and white for snow-covered regions, such as the Arctic.
It should also be noted that visual face paints of themselves do not necessarily
minimise the heat radiated by the human face. Typical heat or infra-red human power
levels are surprisingly high, being in the range of 200400 W, with output level rising
considerably above this quote gure during strenuous activity.
Contrast of an object or target against its background also changes between the
dierent wavebands. In Figure 2.6ac, you can see three identical views of the mouth
of the river Dart taken at Dartmouth castle in the visible, near infra-red and thermal
bands in the autumn [57].
Vegetation, for example, appears very bright in the near infra-red (just beyond the
visible end of the spectrum), whilst appearing quite dark in the visible (red) image
showing marked change of contrast. The change in appearance between spectral
bands is most apparent for the castle gun emplacement roof, which is turfed with grass
(bottom right), and the moss on the roof of the Tower Cafe (centre foreground). The
implication of this for the modern armed forces is extremely important. Current military
camouage must take into account the reectance of vegetation in both the visible and
the near infra-red as the latest generations of night-vision image intensier (II or I2)
technology is sensitive to the near infra-red part of the spectrum. The correct use of
netting, particularly by the army for concealment in the visible spectrum, will not on
its own guarantee that an object such as a vehicle will blend equally successfully into
its background in the near infra-red as it does in the visible! Hence modern camouage
chemistry research must incorporate eectively synthetic versions of chlorophyll A
and B to match the netting and camouage clothing to the inherent properties of the
broad range of natural vegetation. Interestingly animals with strong pigmentation in

Visibility 39

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.6 River Dart taken in the (a) visible, (b) near infra-red and (c) infra-red thermal view
CR Lavers

the visible will also retain this characteristic in their skin well into the band of the near
infra-red, as seen with the Hartmanns zebra; Figure 2.7 [6, 7]
The strong reectance of vegetation in the near infra-red gives the image a
characteristic snowy appearance, but no snow is present in the image! Note with
the zebra the orientation of stripes is at odds with the stripes from other parts of its
body. It is imagined that in a herd of zebra, one individual animals disruptive pattern

40 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.7 Hartmanns Zebra, Paignton Zoo CR Lavers

overlaps with a number of other animals and will not only provide a dicult time for
predators to see them in the rst place but will also create a number of virtual false
targets at the critical time of committing an attack formed from overlapping bits of
several animals.
A simple contrast formula often used across any chosen spectral band, whether visible,
near infra-red or thermal, is dened as follows:
(target intensity background intensity)
Contrast = __________________________________
(target intensity + background intensity)
For example, if a thermal camera measures a target intensity of 0.5 W m2 from
a person at a range of 10 m, and the background intensity is 0.25 W m2, the
contrast = (0.5 0.25)/(0.5 + 0.25) = 0.25/0.75 = 1/3.
Contrast will usually range between 0 and +1 maximum positive change, and a
minimum value of zero, found by substituting a background value equal to 0 or
a background value equal to the target value, respectively. Maximum and minimum
values can also be established by the use of dierentiation.
Wilkinson used not only black-and-white patterns but also colourful cubist patterns
(Figure 2.8) to confuse U-boat captains, denying speed and heading accuracy, with the
possibility that broken outline patterns could prevent a human operator detecting a
ship at all. Rapidly a team of artists painted over 4,000 merchant and naval vessels

Visibility 41

Figure 2.8 The Normandy landings 6 June 1944. HMS Uranus and HMS Jervis in the
early morning with landing craft waiting to go in; painting by Norman Wilkinson, held at Britannia
Royal Naval College CR Lavers

with various stripe styles, blocks and disrupted lines. It was such a success that by the
end of the war less than 1% of dazzle-painted ships were sunk. After the First World
War, there was a gradual decline in dazzle camouage with a focus on deep ocean
operations, usually with just grey paint. However, with twenty-rst-century emphasis
on shallow water operations (littoral), various navies are reconsidering disruptive
camouage, of which the Swedish Visby stealth corvette is an example (Figure 2.9).
In coastal waters, dazzle camouage can even prevent ship detection, especially if
suitable netting and naturally available materials (e.g. trees, foliage) are used.
Another problem to avoid detection in the visible is optical glint, which can be very
dramatic at times but is strongly angular dependent (Figure 2.10a and b), making it a
nuisance issue for successful concealment.
The smallest change in solar elevation, particularly near dawn and dusk, over as short a
period as a minute can go from little or no dazzle at all, to an intense directly reected
glare, and then back to minimal reection again. Bright reections from the bridge
windows of ships and lookout binoculars are also now routinely minimised with modern
multiple layer anti-reection coatings, using the /4 destructive interference principle
(i.e. thickness = /4). For example, to eliminate a reected wavelength of 400 nm

42 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.9 Visby stealth corvette Kockums

(end of the visible blue spectrum), the ideal anti-reection coating should be of this
value, that is, 100 nm, deposited easily by modern vacuum deposition techniques of
appropriate material. Anti-reection coatings are especially vital where passive binocular
observations by inserted Special Forces or paramilitary operations could otherwise give
away their own potentially vulnerable and potentially unsupported positions.
Dazzle camouage is entirely passive once painted patterns cannot be readily
changed without repainting. Active methods involve altering ship appearance in near
real time to confuse enemies. Active camouage or adaptive camouage is actually a
group of related technologies which permit an object to blend into its surroundings
by use of panels or coatings capable of altering their optical appearance, colour,
luminance and reective properties. Active camouage has the capacity to provide
near perfect concealment from visual detection. One example where this proved
extremely valuable during the Second World War was in the eorts to defeat the
U-boat menace, the same threat that nearly crippled the Allies during the First World
War. Aircraft trying to target surfaced submarines had a very dicult time because a
German lookout posted with binoculars could easily spot the dark silhouette of an
incoming aircraft a considerable distance from the submarine, promptly diving to

Visibility 43

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.10 Change of reectivity of 12 incidence CR Lavers

the relative safety of deep water and thereby escape the worst aects of near surface
depth charges going o. By 1940, US researchers made aircraft eectively invisible
by adjusting the brightness of the lights tted on the leading edges of the wings to
successfully hide aircraft from the U-boat lookouts, preventing them from responding
in time. In this way, Project Yehudis Avenger bombers reduced detection to as little as
2 miles from the surface contact.
A more modern variation on this idea was incorporated into the two F-117A
prototypes which utilised distributed optical bre lighting on its wing surfaces to

44 Stealth Warship
minimise contrast against the background skies, but after both of these prototype
aircraft crashed the technology was abandoned. In 2005, it was reported that the
European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), a well-known defence-related
company, was working on developing similar technology that could make planes or
missiles invisible to the naked eye. According to Juergen Kruse, then head of EADSs
camouage technology unit, We are examining new technologies with which ying
objects more than 800 metres away cannot be seen And our goal is a plane that
cannot be detected over great distances. These new technologies, if developed, will
probably use light-emitting diodes or active plastic coatings to allow planes to adapt
optically to their surroundings, mimicking the approach taken by chameleons in
nature. These developments combined with the use of small micro air vehicles (MAVs)
will potentially provide a revolutionary new capability for both tomorrows war
ghters and other possible civilian applications, especially in urban environments.
Their combination of small size and high manoeuvrability should enable them to
operate within close proximity to specic sites of interest and in highly cluttered
environments.
Real-time adaptive camouage has for a long time been suggested as a really
valuable means to disguise a military vessel or vehicle against its background. In
2007, there was a brief urry of media excitement when a tank was made invisible
on Salisbury Plain in the United Kingdom. This feat was achieved by using cameras
linked to projectors to beam an image of the surrounding background landscape
onto a special surface on the tank. A major drawback of this technique is that it
requires a projector to be installed in a position itself likely to come under attack.
A chameleon suit based on this idea was demonstrated several years earlier in
Japan, and the concept might have some tactical value in the future if the platform
itself monitors its background and adjusts active displays or optical materials on its
vulnerable surface direction. A mock-up of an Abrams tank is shown with laptop
self-projection capability or a full optically active skin (Figure 2.11), perhaps a
practical option.
The Visby, already a very stealthy corvette, would be virtually invisible if this approach
were applied, but would still possess a signicantly visible wake at high speed, as seen
in Figure 2.12.
Developments in infra-red electronic camouage are perhaps further ahead of their
visible counterparts with the development of BAE Systems Adaptiv stealth technology.
To the naked eye, a tank still looks like a tank, but with an array of hand-sized, hexagonal
tiles covering the anks of a tank the vehicle can be turned into a large thermal infra-red
screen. Each tile is eectively an active thermal pixel enabling a tank crew to choose the
image it considers appropriate on the tank so that enemy forces scanning a battleeld

Visibility 45

Figure 2.11 Abrams future optically active skin CR Lavers

Figure 2.12 Modied future Visby with active skin CR Lavers

46 Stealth Warship
with thermal sensors may be fooled into thinking they are looking at something else, a
tree, bushes or even a sheep or car. Such technology is also applicable for aviation and
maritime applications, particularly for littoral maritime operations [8].
In 1888, an Austrian botanist named Friedrich Reinitzer examined what are now known
as cholesteric liquid crystals. He found that cholesteryl benzoate had two melting
points. At 145.5C it melted into a cloudy liquid, and at 178.5C the cloudy liquid became
clear. He wrote to Otto Lehmann who examined the cloudy uid and reported seeing
crystallites. After his discovery, Reinitzer did not pursue liquid crystals further; Lehmann,
however, had encountered a new phenomenon and began to make observations
with polarised light. The intermediate cloudy phase can ow, but features under the
microscope convinced him he was dealing with a solid. Lehmanns work was expanded
by Daniel Vorlnder who, until his retirement in 1935, synthesised most of the liquid
crystals then known. However, these remained just a scientic curiosity for almost
80 years. In 1969, Hans Kelker then synthesised a substance at room temperature with
a nematic phase N-(4-Methoxybenzylidene)-4-butylaniline (MBBA) composed of rodlike molecules which tended to have a preferred alignment direction on average. The
next step to commercialising liquid crystal displays (LCD) was George Grays synthesis of
chemically stable substances with low melting temperatures, that is, room temperaturestable liquid crystal materials. In 1973, with Ken Harrison and the UK Ministry of
Defences (MOD) Royal Signals Radar Establishment (RSRE, Malvern), Gray designed new
materials resulting in rapid development of small area LCD electronic products, which
have subsequently led to many of the large area at screen displays we have today.
Encapsulated liquid crystals and colour-changing electrochromic panels may provide
an alternative possibility for relatively low power consumption with large-scale
ship operations. Small voltages applied across very thin liquid crystal cells are able
to create large reectivity changes (Figure 2.11) [9]. It is the strength of the electric
eld which is responsible for the ability to reorientate certain classes of liquid crystal
molecules. These molecules can selectively rotate the plane of visible incident
light polarisation from one direction (without an applied electric eld) to another
direction (with electric eld applied). The strength of the electric eld, E, is found
to have an approximate value using the expression E = V/d, where V is the potential
dierence in volts and d is the thickness of the liquid crystal layer. In this way, a small
electric eld across a very small liquid crystal cell can provide a very high electric
eld. For a voltage of 6 V and a liquid crystal cell of 6 m thick (6 millionths of a
metre), the electric eld = 6/(6 106) = 1 mV m1, a surprisingly large gure and
one of the reasons that liquid crystals were developed in the United Kingdom for
military applications, besides the wide number of civilian applications that have
arisen through technology transfer.

RSS reflectivities

Visibility 47

0V
2V
4V
6V
8V
10V 12V

Incident angle

Experimentally recorded RSS reflectivities as a

function of applied DC voltage for the ferroelectric
liquid crystal SCE8 at room temperature

Morpho wing with (left) air superstrate and

(right) acetone superstrate

Figure 2.13 Voltage dependent reectivity CR Lavers

In Figure 2.13 (left), we see large reectivity changes with only small voltage variations
applied. Combined with natural photonics structures such as buttery iridescence,
liquid crystals could alter reectivity in a more controlled yet dramatic manner for stealth
technology applications (Figure 2.13, right). Here we see the striking wavelength-specic
high reectance from the ordered non-metallic (though metallic looking) diraction
grating structure on a butterys wing (such as Morpho rhetenor), with air only above the
wing (coloured blue) and, in the second image on the right, with a ne spray of acetone
applied to the surface (coloured green). The observed spectral reectance changes
dramatically as the acetone evaporates, going from green back to blue again. These
exciting naturally occurring materials and structures may help to develop the real-time
adaptive control of colour, using biological photonics. Nature exhibits a broad range
of materials and nanostructures which successfully control an animals appearance, in
some cases with active photonic processes, for example, the cuttlesh (Figure 2.14).
The study of structurally generated colour in animals is now fast becoming a fascinating
research area. Complex shell and scale photonic band gap (PBG) nanostructures, in
marine and terrestrial animals, provide a vast potential for the man-made manipulation
of perceived colour. In some butteries, for example, ultra-long-range visibility up
to 2 km has been attributed to nanostructures formed by discrete multilayers of air
and cuticle. In other species photonic structures are designed to produce strong
polarisation eects. Some optical systems employ photonic crystals to produce partial
PBGs, with bright colours reected, or uorescence inhibited, over specically dened
angle ranges. In principle, from the perspective of modern optical technology, these
two-dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional (3D) periodic or repeating structures
are potentially able to manipulate the ow of light in all possible directions [10, 11].
This approach may with the use of high-speed digital computer processing and design

48 Stealth Warship

Figure 2.14 Cuttlesh

be applied to most maritime threat spectral wavelengths, from the relatively short
ultraviolet wavelength to longer radar wavelengths, and the detailed studies of natural
systems, including butteries, are now yielding a better understanding of possible
structures for the future [12, 13], especially for metamaterials, introduced in Chapter 3.
Nano-structured zinc oxide replica wing structures have been routinely produced
using Ideopsis similis butteries in China [14]. My colleagues and I briey have
investigated the gold/palladium deposition onto Morpho wings as a template for
voltage-controllable liquid crystal cells. However, liquid crystal layers applied directly
to the natural wing grating stop the photonic structure operating eectively through
the presence of strong random scattering. Other possibilities involve trying to create
heat-absorbent structures using coated templates. Man-made photonic structures
with constructive interference in the heat bands may be incorporated into spacesuits
or desert garments to reduce heat eects. As far as a buttery is concerned, heat
radiates or is lost into its wings from its body in the absence of a strong solar heating
source. Iridescence has little or no benet at such heat wavelengths as buttery
photonic structures create modest visible blue interference ashes but absorb
heat poorly. However, brown wings have greater light absorption yet weak thermal
absorption, so light is absorbed generating heat! Man-made absorbing materials will
improve light absorption whilst simultaneously resulting in materials with increased
thermal absorption. Man-made photonic structures may be designed to have low light
absorption and low light-to-heat transfer. Depending on the interference structure on

Visibility 49
the naturally absorbing biochrome layer, little or much heat may be reected from
a designer surface. Liquid crystals oer not only the proven realisation of voltagecontrollable optical changes but also temperature-related changes as well, across a
range of wavelengths [15].
Of course butteries are able to use their ability to open and close their wings in and out
of sunlight to stabilise their temperature and thereby inuence the heat transfer from
air to wings and subsequently from the interface between the wings to the body. We
were able to image the circulation structure of the swallowtail buttery for the rst time
using a radiometrically calibrated thermal camera, with the circulation heat patterns
appearing as dragon y wings on the otherwise black upper wing surfaces (Figure 2.15).
Ships are also in an interesting position, existing at the interface between the abovewater and below-water environments, and may be viewed not only from above (by
aircraft or satellite) but also from below (from submarines or unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs)). Practical issues of the upwelling and downwelling of visible light from
the above-water environment mean that there is a perceived threat to not only surface
moving vessels from above but also below the water for submarines operating in a
shallow water environment. This problem is very similar to that discussed earlier for
operation of a high-altitude aircraft ight and its colouration when viewed from below.
This requires the development of sophisticated submarine camouage schemes

Figure 2.15 Thermal image of swallowtail buttery showing its wing circulation patterns
CR Lavers

50 Stealth Warship
for littoral operations in a similar way that the Visby stealth corvette has adapted its
paint schemes to reect their unique operations amongst complex fjord coastlines.
Most underwater camouage schemes experimented with to date tend to involve a
combination of blue-and-black stripe congurations, red being a wavelength that is
rapidly attenuated or reduced in even moderate depth of water.

Chapter Reections
1. Consider the visible target square seen below against its background. If
contrast C = (a b)/(a + b), where a is the target intensity, It = 1.5 W m2, and b is
the background intensity, Ib = 1.0 W m2, what is the value of the contrast (one
decimal place)? What are the conditions for maximum and minimum contrast?
Suggest ways in which the contrast may change.
2. Consider the strong markings on the Hartmanns zebra in Figure 2.7 in the near
infra-red. What consequences do these near infra-red spectrum and visible
absorptions have in the far infra-red? What are the implications of this for
military operations?
3. Calculate the maximum relative change in reectivity between 0 and 10 V
applied across the liquid crystal electro-optical device illustrated in Figure 2.13
for various incident angles. Does the angle of incidence make a signicant
dierence to this relative change?
4. For a thickness of 10 m and an applied voltage of 12 V, what is the magnitude
of the electric eld produced (two signicant gures)?
5. For a near infra-red wavelength of 900 nm, what is the ideal thickness for
a transparent coating of indium tin oxide to minimise any reected infra-red
(three signicant gures)?

Visibility 51

References
1.

Sweetman, B (2004), Lockheed Stealth. San Jose, CA: Zenith Press.

2.

Shripad P Mahulikar et al 2009 Study of sunshine, skyshine, and earthshine for aircraft
infrared detection, J. Opt. A: Pure Appl. Opt. 11, 045703.

3.

Bradbury, JW and Vehrencamp, SL (1998), Principles of Animal Communication.

Sunderland, MA: Sinauer.

4.

Stroud, C, Sutherland, R, Wilson, M and Filbee, D (2005), CAMOGEN A method for

generating optimized camouage schemes, Journal of Defence Science, 10(1): 1017.
Unlimited theme paper.

5.

Olsen, FB (2005), Methods for evaluating thermal camouage. Norwegian Defence

Research Establishment, Kjeller, conference paper, 33 pages, approved for public release,
report number: A946654.

6.

Lavers, C, Franks, K, Floyd, M and Plowman, A (2005), Application of remote thermal

imaging and night vision technology to improve endangered wildlife resource
management with minimal animal distress and hazard to humans, Journal of Physics:
Conference Series, 15: 207212. Sensors and Their Applications XIII.

7.

Lavers, C, Franks, K, Floyd, M and Plowman, A (2005), Application of remote far infra red
thermal imaging and night vision technology to improve endangered wildlife resource
management with minimal animal distress and hazard to humans, Proceedings of the
Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Society Annual Conference, with the NERC
Earth Observation Conference, Measuring, Mapping and Managing a Hazardous World,
69 September, Portsmouth University, Portsmouth, UK.

8.

Michell, S (2011), The Invisibility Cloak, Rusi Defence Systems, autumn/winter, pp. 8081.

9.

Lavers, CR (2008), Stealthy materials, Material World, December, pp. 3335. Institute of
Materials.

10.

Krauss, TF, DeLaRue, RM and Brand, S (1996), Two-dimensional photonic-bandgap

structures operating at near-infrared wavelengths, Nature, 383(6602): 699702.

11.

Russell, P St J (2003), Photonic crystal bres, Science, 299(5605): 358362. (Review article.)

12.

Vukusic, P and Sambles, JR (2003), Photonic structures in biology (PDF), Nature,

424(6950): 852855.

13.

Kinoshita, S, Yoshioka, S and Kawagoe, K (2002), Mechanisms of structural colour in the

3Morpho buttery: Cooperation of regularity and irregularity (PDF), Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 269(1499): 14171421.

14.

Zhang, W, Zhang, D, Fan, T, Ding, J, Gu, J, Guo, Q and Ogawa, H (2006), Biomimetic zinc
oxide replica with structural colour using buttery (Ideopsis similis) wings as templates,
Bioinspiration & Biomimetics, 1(3): 8995.

15.

Lavers, CR (1991), Wavelength characterisation of ferroelectric liquid crystal cells, Japanese

Journal of Applied Physics, 30(4): 729734.

INVISIBLE FUTURES
I will take the Ring, he said, though I do not know the way.
Frodo, The Council of Elrond from The Lord of the Rings, JRR Tolkien

Active cloaking plasma shields may protect naval warships in the not so distant future.
Certainly Soviet aircraft plasma antennae are known already to have the ability to
substantially reduce radar reections, deecting waves around combat aerial platforms.
Plasma antennae, like commonplace neon lights, do not reect radar energy when
switched o. Consequently they are very stealthy, unlike some of the older and large
reecting metal radar systems used by the Royal Navy during the Falklands Conict.
When a radio-frequency (RF) electric pulse is applied to one end of a neon tube, the
energy from the RF pulse ionises the gas molecules inside the tube to produce plasma
which can strip away the outermost electrons from their parent atoms. The high
electron density of these relatively mobile (or free) electrons within this plasma makes
it an excellent conductor of electricity, just like a metal, whilst in this energised state,
the enclosed plasma can readily radiate, absorb or reect electromagnetic (EM) waves.
However, unlike a metal reector, once the applied voltage across the plasma device
(or neon tube) is switched o again, the plasma very rapidly returns to being a neutral
gas (or mixture of gases), and the antenna, in eect, disappears. It has been suggested
that plasmas could form the basis of a compact and stealthy upgrade to the heavy,
bulkhead-mounted, metallic phased array radars used today on the US Navys Aegis
cruisers and other vessels, and some American work has been reported in this area.
Despite the obvious technical diculties of designing an actual plasma stealth device
for modern combat aircraft, there are already claims that such a system has already
been created, achieving some degree of stealth success in Russia from as early as 1999.
In January 1999, the Russian ITAR-TASS news agency published an apparent interview
with doctor Anatoliy Koroteyev, director of the Keldysh Research Centre (FKA Scientic

Invisible Futures 53
Research Institute for Thermal Processes), where he talked in some detail about a
plasma stealth device developed by his own organisation. The Institute for Thermal
Processes is one of the top scientic research organisations in the world in the eld of
fundamental physics, and his comments cannot be quickly dismissed or discounted.
The Journal of Electronic Defense reported that plasma-cloud-generation technology
for stealth applications which had been developed in Russia could reduce an aircrafts
radar cross section (RCS) by a factor of 100.
According to this June 2002 article, the Russian plasma stealth device was reputed to
have been tested previously in test ights onboard a Sukhoi Su-27 IB ghter-bomber,
reporting that similar research into applications of plasma for RCS reduction was also
at that time being carried out by Accurate Automation Corporation (Chattanooga,
Tennessee) and Old Dominion University (Norfolk, Virginia) in the United States, and
by Dassault Aviation (Saint-Cloud, France) and Thales (Paris, France). The Sukhoi Su-27
is a twin-engine manoeuvrable ghter aircraft intended as a direct competitor against
American fourth-generation ghters, with a 3,530 km range or endurance, heavy
armament, sophisticated avionics and quoted high manoeuvrability. The Su-27 most
often ies air superiority missions, but can perform almost all combat roles. The Su-27s
closest US counterpart is realistically the F-15 Eagle.
Plasma, like the earths magnetosphere (which is a magnetic shield around the earth
protecting it from solar ares and harmful radiation storms), could generate invisible
shields extending around a ships exposed upper surfaces, also protecting it from
advanced particle beam weapons and high-energy RF weapon systems currently
under development. Particle beams are essentially near-light-speed weapons and are
much more dicult to control and point than laser weapons. Particle beams are strictly
a line-of-sight device and once red cannot be redirected.
Particle beam research work is ongoing at various laboratories worldwide, in particular
at the Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratories, Kirtland Air
Force Base (AFB) and the White Sands Test Range in the United States. There are several
reasons for the interest in particle beam and laser weapons, as they are both able to
deliver all their energy directly onto the intended target. Second, they do not waste
signicant energy on having to deliver a conventional missile only a small percentage
of which will be the actual explosive ordnance. Third, the speed of ight is so rapid that
even if the initial ring is o-target, the target can within seconds be exactly aligned
along the targeting bore-sight.
Although plasma antenna technology is still in its infancy, the US Navy has been
working on developing plasma antenna systems for almost two decades. It was
certainly hoped that plasmas could form the basis of a stealthy upgrade to the heavy

54 Stealth Warship
Aegis passive phased array radar. Microwave beams from these arrays of antenna
elements can be steered electronically towards multiple targets whilst still conducting
search, navigation and other radar operations. Such a radar is said to be multifunctional
because it can perform several dierent tasks at the same time. It was believed that
such plasma antenna technology controlled by strong magnetic elds would create
a more precisely focused microwave beam technology. However, to function well, the
resulting beams needed to be steered accurately in two dimensions, and this was not
achieved, so the US Navy nally cancelled the research programme. Current upgrades
are likely to be based around the use of lighter active phased array systems such as the
Sampson radar on the Royal Navys latest stealthy Type 45 warship, which has been
evaluated at White Sands Missile Base in America for upgrade suitability.

Radar Metamaterials
In the future, invisibility may become possible in certain specic narrow parts of the
EM spectrum. David Smith at Duke University, Durham recently demonstrated the
rst microwave invisibility cloak, leading to the intriguing possibility that perhaps
one day very soon a radar cloak could be developed that will prevent an enemy radar
seeing metallic objects, using metamaterials that could hide ships or missiles from
enemy radar [1]. Metamaterials are a very recent but exciting area of research around
the world. Metamaterial-engineered composites are tailored to have EM properties
not found in nature, and they share many similarities with photonic crystals, which
have periodic structures that permit only certain wavelengths to pass through them
whilst preventing others. Metamaterials are articial composite materials exhibiting
extraordinary physical properties which are not observed in natural materials and
have a huge potential for military and civilian optical and acoustic stealth applications.
Unlike photonic crystals, metamaterial features are much smaller than the functional
wavelength the cloak is intended to operate at (Figure 3.1).
So-called articial meta-atoms are sub-wavelength resonators and have a size of
/10 or less, so the metamaterial medium appears to be uniform or homogeneous
at the wavelength scale. If materials are considered to be either metals (conducting)
or dielectric (insulating), an interesting representation can be given and plotted as a
function of magnetic permeability and electric permittivity (Figure 3.2).
It is useful to dene the meaning of dielectric, permeability and permittivity at this
point. A dielectric is an electrical insulator that can be polarised by an applied electric

Invisible Futures 55

Rod (Inductance)
Wavelength

Split-ring
resonators
(Capacitance)

Circuit board

Figure 3.1 Metamaterial features CR Lavers

Magnetic permeability
Optical magnetic materials
Stealth applications

Metals

Dielectrics

1
1

Electric permittivity
High-index materials

Double negative materials

Index n < 0, negative
refraction backward waves
Right-handed conventional material

+10 degrees
10 degrees
Left-handed metamaterial

Figure 3.2 Magnetic permeability versus electric permittivity CR Lavers

eld. When a dielectric is placed in an electric eld, electric charges do not ow through
the material, as in a conductor, but move a little from their average equilibrium positions
so that positive charges are displaced towards the eld and negative charges shift in

56 Stealth Warship
the opposite direction. In electromagnetism, absolute permittivity is a measure of how
an electric eld aects, and also is aected by, a dielectric medium. The permittivity ()
of a medium describes how much electric eld (or ux) is generated per unit charge.
Less electric ux will exist in a medium with a high permittivity (per unit charge) due
to polarisation eects. Hence, permittivity reects a materials ability to transmit (or
permit) an electric eld to pass through the medium. In SI units, permittivity, , is
measured in farads per metre (F m1), = r0, where r is the relative permittivity of the
material and 0 = 8.85 1012 F m1 is the vacuum permittivity. Similarly permeability
explains a materials ability to support a magnetic eld or ux within it. It is the degree of
magnetisation that a material acquires in response to an applied magnetic eld so that
the more conductive a material is to a magnetic eld, the higher its permeability. In SI
units, permeability is measured in henries per metre (H m1). The permeability constant
(0) is the permeability of free space and has a dened value of 0 = 4 107 H m1.
Further applied marine electromagnetism issues are to be found in a recently revised
book on the subject [2].
If magnetic permeability is plotted against electric permittivity, then the region
of interest is the south-west quadrant where magnetic permeability and electric
permittivity are both negative. One of the unusual properties here is that a wave
will undergo backward refraction, for example, a wave incident from the left at an
interface between another conventional material region will be refracted down by
the same number of degrees that a conventional material region would refract it up
(see Figure 3.2). Various combinations of permeability and permittivity values give rise
to classes of materials with ordinary properties and also regions where materials have
unusual properties (the red region). Using materials that have such negative values
may make it possible to take optical images of objects smaller than the wavelength
of visible light, to probe DNA and viruses, for example, and accelerate developments
in photo-nanolithography (allowing etching of ever smaller electronic devices and
circuits) and for new types of antennas, mobile phones and computers to be fabricated.
Photonic crystals are repetitive periodic structures designed to aect the motion of
photons (light) in a similar way that the periodicity of a semiconducting crystal aects
the motion of electrons passing through them. Photonic crystals occur naturally
and have been studied for the past 110 years or so and contain regularly repeating
internal regions of both high and low dielectric constant photons travelling through
the structure, or do not, depending on their wavelength. Wavelengths of light that
are allowed to travel through are known as modes, and groups of these allowed or
permitted modes form bands. Forbidden bands of wavelengths are called photonic
band gaps (PBG). This phenomenon is based on diraction, with the periodicity of the
crystal structure being half the wavelength of EM waves, that is, varying from 200 nm
periodicity for 400 nm radiation (blue) to 350 nm periodicity for 700 nm (end of the

Invisible Futures 57

Figure 3.3 Opal

red visible spectrum) for photonic crystals in the visible spectrum. However, repeating
regions of high and low dielectric constants must have these dimensions. This makes
manufacture of optical photonic crystals very complex. An example of a naturally
occurring photonic crystal is the gemstone opal; its colours are essentially a photonic
crystal phenomenon based on Bragg diraction of light from the crystals lattice planes,
which is composed of minute spherical crystals of metastable silica (or cristobalite;
Figure 3.3). Another photonic crystal is found on the wings of some butteries, such as
those of genus Morpho discussed earlier towards the end of Chapter 2.
Before 1987, one-dimensional (1D) photonic crystals in the form of periodic multi-layer
stacks had already been studied extensively. In fact as far back as 1887 Lord Rayleigh
(12 November 184230 June 1919) showed that such systems have a 1D PBG, with a
range of high reectivity, known as a transmission stop band. Today, such structures are
used in diverse applications, from highly reective coatings to highly reective mirrors
used in laser cavities. Lord Rayleigh (born John William Strutt, third Baron Rayleigh) was
not only one of the most inuential scientists in British history but also one of a rare few
of high nobility who achieved fame as an outstanding scientist.
In the late 1960s, scientists began to propose what might happen if a material had a
negative refractive index, causing it to bend light in the opposite direction compared
with ordinary materials. Then a detailed theoretical study of 1D optical structures was

58 Stealth Warship
performed by Bykov in the early 1970s [3], who speculated as to what could happen
if two-dimensional (2D) or three-dimensional (3D) periodic optical structures were
used, although at this time beyond current technical fabrication capabilities. However,
practical demonstration of 2D and 3D structures also had to wait until the publication
of two key academic papers in 1987 by Eli Yablonovitch and John Sajeey on photonic
crystals [4, 5]. Both papers concerned high-dimensional periodic optical structures or
photonic crystals.
Because of the diculty of fabricating these structures at optical scales, as already
mentioned, early studies were made in the microwave regime, where photonics
structures can be built on more accessible centimetre scales, because of a useful
property of EM elds known as scale invariance solutions to Maxwells equations
which have no natural length scale and solutions such that centimetre-sized structures
at microwave frequencies are the same as those for nanometre-sized structures at
optical frequencies. For example, if the ratio size of the structure (d) to the wavelength
() is given as d/, then for a 3 cm structure at a wavelength of 6 cm the ratio of 0.5
is the same as that for a 300 nm structure examined at a wavelength of 600 nm (red
wavelength).
In 1991, Yablonovitch demonstrated the rst 3D PBG in the microwave regime [6].
In 1996, Thomas Krauss made the rst demonstration of a 2D photonic crystal at
optical wavelengths [7]. Although such techniques are still to mature into widespread
commercial applications, 2D photonic crystals have found commercial use in photonic
crystal bres (known as holey bres because of the air holes that run through them).
Photonic crystal bres were rst developed by my colleague Philip St John Russell in
1998 [8] at the Optoelectronic Research Centre (ORC), Southampton, with whom Sergio
Barcelos and I worked on optical bre surface plasmon resonance (SPR) sensors [9, 10].
Holey bres can be designed to possess enhanced properties over (normal) optical
bres, such as reduced dispersion (spreading) of laser pulses in the bre.
Development of 3D photonic crystals is slow, as there are no readily applicable existing
techniques from the semiconductor industry for 3D PBG materials. Another strand
of research that has been trying to construct 3D photonic structures is that of selfassembly essentially allowing mixtures of dielectric nanospheres to settle out of
complex colloidal solutions or even liquid crystal phases.
Smiths rst microwave metamaterial was composed of peculiar periodic patterns of
rings and wires on a former background of bre glass. Metamaterials have a negative
refractive index, bending light towards the normal, so that at centimetric wavelengths
microwaves incident on the cloak bend around it, so an observer sees waves pass as it
were through empty space.

Invisible Futures 59
Almost all materials in optics, such as water or glass, have positive values for both
electrical permittivity and magnetic permeability. However, some metals (such as silver,
gold and aluminium) have negative permittivity at visible wavelengths. A material
having either, but not both, permittivity or permeability negative is opaque to EM
radiation, so appearing highly reective (metallic) and often coloured. The refractive
index of materials is given by N = ( ). All transparent materials have positive
values for both and . However, for man-made engineered metamaterials with < 0
and < 0, this will still produce a real positive N value. The consequences of this are
quite profound; for example, if we just consider Snells law, that is, N1 sin 1 = N2 sin 2
and if N2 is negative, light rays will be refracted on the same side of the normal on
entering the material!

Optical Metamaterials
Engineers at Purdue University were the rst researchers to create a material that has
a negative index of refraction in the near infra-red (NIR) wavelengths of light that are
used for telecommunications, a step that should lead in future to better and faster
communications and imaging technologies. This work represents a milestone because
it demonstrates that it is possible to have a negative refractive index in the optical
range, which increases the likelihood of harnessing this phenomenon for optics and
communications, said Vladimir Shalaev, the Robert and Anne Burnett Professor of
Electrical and Computer Engineering. The material consists of tiny parallel nanorods of
gold that conduct clouds of electrons called plasmons with frequencies of EM radiation
in the NIR part of the EM spectrum. The wavelength size of this NIR light is very close
to 1.5 m (1.5 millionth of a metre), the same wavelength used for current generations
of broadband bre-optic communications. This is the most important wavelength for
communications, relates Shalaev.
The exciting thing about these newly engineered nanorods is that they are able to
reverse the process of refraction, which occurs as EM waves bend when passing from
one material to another and is caused by a change in the speed of light propagation.
Scientists measure the bending of radiation by its index of refraction. Refraction causes
the bent-stick-in-water eect, when a stick placed in a glass of water appears bent
when viewed from outside. Each material has its own refractive index, the N described
earlier, which predicts how much light bends in that material and how much the speed
of light slows down while passing through it. All natural materials, such as glass, air and
water, have positive refractive indices. For example, if the index of refraction is dened

60 Stealth Warship
as N = c/v, where c is the speed of light in vacuum and v the speed the light travels in
a particular medium, we can assign various refractive index values to dierent media.
Consider light travelling in vacuum; then clearly N = c/c = 1 and the refractive index of
vacuum is 1. In air, where light travels a little less than the speed of light in vacuum,
the refractive index will be a little greater than 1. For light travelling in water, where
the speed v is about (3/4)c, N = c/(3/4)c = 4/3 or 1.333 approximately. More about basic
wave properties, such as refraction and reection, are covered from the view point of
the marine engineer elsewhere [11].
In 2000, Sir John Pendry at Imperial College London theorised that slabs of such
material might create a superlens that would improve the quality of medical imaging
technologies [12]. In theory, such metamaterial lenses could compensate for the
loss of light that inevitably occurs as an image passes through a lens or compound
(multiple) lens system. Lenses and imaging systems could be substantially improved
if this lost light (or evanescent light) were recovered. An imaging system with a
combination of normal positive refraction and negative refraction could potentially
restore the lenses imaging ability. The rst real superlens having a negative refractive
index provided a resolution three times better than the theoretical diraction limit
and was demonstrated at the University of Toronto by A Grbic and GV Eleftheriades
in 2006 [13].
Various research groups have now successfully fabricated metamaterials of tiny metal
rings and rods, all having a negative refraction index. Purdue researchers created the
rst metamaterial with a negative refractive index in the NIR [14], just beyond visible
light, demonstrating the feasibility of applying the concept to communications in the
rst instance but opening the possibility for future sensing and stealth applications and
visible light operation (Figure 3.4).
The material, created by Purdue engineers, conducts clouds of electrons or plasmons
with a frequency of light in the NIR, the same wavelength used for bre-optic
communications. Each rod is about as wide as 100 nm and 700 nm long.
The challenge was to fabricate a structure that would have not only an electrical
response, but also a magnetic response in the NIR range, Shalaev said. Gold
nanorods conduct plasmons, moving as if they were a single coordinated object
instead of many millions of individual separate electrons. Light from a laser shone
onto the nanorods induces an electro-optical current in the tiny circuit. Each rod
is only about 100 nm wide and 700 nm long. These rods basically conduct current
because they are a metal, producing an effect we call optical inductance, while
a material between the rods produces another effect called optical capacitance,
Shalaev said.

Invisible Futures 61

Figure 3.4 A eld-emission scanning electron microscope image showing tiny parallel
nanorods of gold
Note: Gold is the rst material that has a negative index of refraction in the wavelengths used for
telecommunications, a step that could lead to better communications and imaging technologies.

The result is the formation of a very small electromagnetic circuit, but this
circuit works in higher frequencies than normal circuits, in a portion of the
spectrum we call optical frequencies, which includes the Near Infra Red.
So we have created a structure that works as kind of an optical circuit and
interacts eectively with both of the eld components of light: electrical
and magnetic.
The research was funded by the US Army Research Oce and the National Science
Foundation. Although many researchers are sceptical about developing materials with
a negative index of refraction in optical wavelengths and then using them in practical
technologies, I think the challenges are mainly engineering problems that could
eventually be overcome, Shalaev said. There is no fundamental law of physics that
would prevent this from happening.
The combination of rods (with inductance L) and rings (generating capacitance C)
provides the LC component of the metamaterial circuit which interacts eectively
with both the electrical and magnetic eld components of light. Shalaevs early work
achieved a negative refractive index of N of about 0.3 at 1.5 m wavelength with a

62 Stealth Warship
double periodic array of gold nanorods. In 2006, David Schurig and David Smith at
Duke University successfully hid or cloaked a central copper ring by surrounding
it with concentric rings of metamaterial 1 cm high and 12 cm across. The rings were
sandwiched between two plates so microwaves could only travel through the cloak
in the plane of the rings so this is a very controlled geometry and not immediately
applicable to the unobliging radar beams which can originate in a warfare environment
at any moment from completely unexpected directions.
In spite of cautious scepticism of developing visible optical metamaterials, in March
2003 professor Harry Atwater reported his success in constructing a nanofabricated
photonics material that creates a negative index of refraction in the blue-green region
of the visible spectrum where the powerful Argon-ion laser operates. This report in
Science Express was followed in 2009 by his demonstration of a single-layer, wideangle negative-index metamaterial at visible frequencies which was insensitive to
polarisation operating over a 50 angular range [15].
Optical and radar metamaterials may provide some useful steps for the radar
designer to engineer ships invisible to human observers and radar, but this is an
enormous technological challenge even for a relatively small radar spectrum (typically
0.5100 GHz), let alone the entire threat EM spectrum of the modern battle space. Even
if such a cloak could be built, its military applications for large-scale stealth reduction
would be severely limited by its own size and weight, since a missile, for example, cannot
carry a heavy cloaking or screening device. Nonetheless the concept of photonic band
pass gap structures allows for the construction of waveguide structures, such as those
recently developed by the Chinese [16].
A more simplistic solution might be found by using the natural elements to our
advantage. The proposed US adaptive water curtain technology (AWCT) is intended
to deect and scatter enemy radar waves away from the searching radar system, thus
reducing the ships RCS (Figure 3.5).
The AWCT system consists of highly conductive sea water pumped up and sprayed
in a fashion that eectively creates an angled radar reective spray curtain around
the ship for a short period of time, a little like a fountain in the middle of a garden
pond. Water spray use is already common place in both civilian-operated re boats
(which can project high-pressure water streams several hundred feet into the air
using powerful marine diesel water pumps) as well as in naval application of water
sprays to wash o potentially harmful biological, chemical and other threats from the
upper deck surfaces. Water spray can also defeat electro-optical systems and has been
reputedly used against short-range incoming terrorist speedboats. The use of many
adjustable nozzles could allow the overall shape of the curtain to be controlled and

Invisible Futures 63

Figure 3.5 AWCT system

allow windows of opportunity to operate the ships own radar and sensors, and re
various guns and missiles between descending screening curtains of water. Existing
pump technology for the control of multiple pumps after some adaptation could be
capable of generating a faceted variable angled curtain that could help to reduce the
RCS and help to defeat the dangerous sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)
threat, of which the supersonic Exocet and Harpoon are two well-known, radar-guided
missile threats. The former was especially deadly during the Falklands Conict during
the 1980s. However, as all marine engineers will know, sea water is extremely corrosive
and will readily set up electrochemical reactions between unprotected metal surfaces
(particularly between dissimilar metals). So design of the nal system will require
careful practical considerations.
This brings us back to a story that has long been circulating concerning Project Rainbow.
In the autumn of 1943, according to some accounts, the US Navy succeeded in making
a ship invisible, both to the naked eye and to radar systems. The USS Eldridge, so the
story goes, was part of an experiment dubbed Project Rainbow now more commonly
known as the Philadelphia Experiment which sought to test invisibility technology
that used EM elds to bend space and time. Some witnesses have claimed that they
saw the vessel disappear from view for several minutes, and it has even been suggested
that during this time the Eldridge was teleported from the US port of Philadelphia in

64 Stealth Warship
Pennsylvania to Norfolk in Virginia, some hundred miles down the coast. This story is
now recognised as being a hoax, with ocial Navy records placing the USS Eldridge
nowhere near Philadelphia during that part of 1943. The Philadelphia Experiment
may have turned out to be a hoax, but real developments in stealth technologies are
proving to be just as interesting. Ironically the US Navy recently announced its new
high-temperature superconductor degaussing facility to be based in Philadelphia. An
example of truth being stranger than ction!?

Chapter Reections
1. It is desired to create a photonic crystal using the phenomenon of diraction.
What should be the desired periodicity of the crystal structure if the wavelength
is intended to be 632.8 nm (three signicant gures)?
2. If the periodicity for a photonic crystal is 200 nm, what is the intended wavelength
(one signicant gure)?
3. For a wavelength , what should the periodicity of the complete metamaterial
structure be if it repeats 10 times over one wavelength spacing?
4. A diraction grating of 9,000 lines per centimetre is used with white light.
(a) How many orders of spectra will be seen for the nth-order diraction
d sin = n?
(b) If the white light is now replaced by a helium-neon (He-Ne) laser operating
at 632.8 nm, at what angle will the rst-order diraction maximum
be observed if the spacing d is now reduced to 1,800 lines per centimetre
(two decimal places)?

Invisible Futures 65

References
1.

Rahm, M, Schurig, D, Roberts, DA, Cummer, SA, Smith DR and Pendry, JB (2008), Design of
electromagnetic cloaks and concentrators using form-invariant coordinate transformations
of Maxwells equations, Photonics and Nanostructures Fundamentals and Applications,
6(1): 8795.

2.

Lavers, CR (ed.) (2008), Reeds Volume 6: Basic Electrotechnology for Marine Engineers.
London: Adlard Coles Nautical.

3.

Bykov, VP (1972), Spontaneous emission in a periodic structure, Soviet Journal of

Experimental and Theoretical Physics, 35(2): 269273.

4.

Yablonovitch, E (1987), Inhibited spontaneous emission in solid-state physics and

electronics, Physical Review Letters, 58(20): 20592062.

5.

John, S (1987), Strong localization of photons in certain disordered dielectric

superlattices, Physical Review Letters, 58(23): 24862489.

6.

Yablonovitch, E, Gmitter, TJ and Leung, KM (1991), Photonic band structure: The

face-centered-cubic case employing nonspherical atoms, Physical Review Letters, 67(17):
22952298.

7.

Krauss, TF, DeLaRue, RM and Brand, S (1996), Two-dimensional photonic-bandgap

structures operating at near-infrared wavelengths, Nature, 383(6602): 699702.

8.

Russell, P St J (2003), Photonic crystal bers, Science, 299: 358362. (Review article.)

9.

Barcelos, S, Lavers, CR, Zervas, M and Russell, P St J (1993), Mode-selective bre coupling
using long range surface-plasmons, LEOS Annual Meeting, pp 177178, 15th19th
November, San Jose, CA.

10.

Lavers, CR, Mosedale, S, Itoh, K, Wu, S, Murabayashi, M, Mauchline, I, Stewart, G, Ross, I,

Shar, E and Qi, Z (2004), Planar optical waveguides for potential military and clinical
sensing applications, Journal of Defence Science, 9(2):6981.

11.

Lavers, CR (2011), Basic Electromagnetic Wave Concepts for Engineers. Rayleigh, NC: Lulu
Enterprises, Inc.

12.

Pendry, JB (2000), Negative refraction makes a perfect lens, Physical Review Letters
(American Physical Society), 85: 3966.

13.

Grbic, A and Eleftheriades, GV (2004), Overcoming the diraction limit with a planar lefthanded transmission-line lens, Physical Review Letters, 92(11): 117403.

14.

http://web.ics.purdue.edu/.

15.

Burgos, SP, de Waele, R, Polman, A and Atwater, HA (2010), A single-layer wide-angle

negative-index metamaterial at visible frequencies, Nature Materials, 9: 407412.

16.

Huang, Y, Feng, Y and Jiang, T (2007), Electromagnetic cloaking by layered structure of

homogeneous isotropic materials, Optics Express, 15: 1113311141.

INFRA-RED
All warfare is based on deception.
Sun Tzu, translated from The Art of War (c. 5th century BC)

Infra-red Heat Reduction

At the height of the Cold War during the 1970s the emphasis of stealth and detection
shifted once more with the deployment of a new generation of missiles that could
passively home in on to the very hottest areas of a target by detecting and tracking the
infra-red heat radiation given off. The US Navy had tried and failed to develop heatseeking devices during the Second World War (one such project was Polaroids Project
Dove), and it was not until the Vietnam War that they became common place. The US
Air Force (USAF) first acquired its heat-seeking AIM-4 Falcon and then the more widely
recognised AIM-9 Sidewinder.
The Hughes AIM-4 Falcon was the first operational guided air-to-air missile to enter
service with the USAF, and the development of this guided air-to-air missile began in
the mid-1940s. Hughes aircraft was initially awarded a subsonic missile contract which
was superseded by a supersonic requirement in 1947. The original purpose was for
a self-defence weapon capability on bomber aircraft, but from 1950 it was decided
that it should be used on fighter aircraft instead, especially in an interception role.
The Sidewinder meanwhile was named after the heat-sensing ability of the pit viper
(Figure 4.1).
The AIM-9 Sidewinder is a heat-seeking, short-range, air-to-air missile carried by several
modern fighter aircraft and more recently by modified gunship helicopters. The missile
entered service with the US Navy fairly early on in the mid-1950s, and various variants

Infra-red 67

Figure 4.1 US Marine Corps Lance Cpl Leander Pickens arms an AIM-9 Sidewinder missile
on a FA-18C Hornet

and upgrades remain in active service with many air forces worldwide after five decades
of active service, testifying to its relevant potency today. The USAF also purchased the
Sidewinder after the missile had been developed by the US Navy, and it is perhaps with
the Air Force that it is more usually associated through the medium of film.
The Sidewinder is the most widely used missile of all time in the military of the West,
with over 100,000 missiles produced for the United States and for over 25 other nations,
of which approximately 1% have actually been used under live combat conditions.
The AIM-9 is one of the oldest (and consequently least expensive) and successful
air-to-air missiles to date. Not a bad record for a missile that was originally designed
to be a straightforward platform upgrade. It has been reported that the design goals
for the original Sidewinder were to produce a reliable and effective missile with the
electronic complexity of a radio and the mechanical complexity of a washing
machine goals which were well accomplished in these early missiles!
Current versions of the AIM-9 (the Mach 2 AIM9-L Super Sidewinder weighs a modest
85kg with an 11.4kg fragmentation warhead) are improved on their original design,
although these are currently being replaced by the advanced short-range air-to-air

68 Stealth Warship
missiles (ASRAAM), with higher reliability from having solid state electronics which can
enable guidance to be smarter at discriminating targets from clutter and with greater
resistance to jamming. Nonetheless, both of these missiles are extremely potent and
provide a very strong case for the continued use of flare decoys as well as for the
development of various laser-based countermeasure systems, such as Nemesis, which
are being introduced.
Heat-seeking missiles typically use a detector made from a semiconductor such as
lead sulphide, in which incident heat, or infra-red photons, change the resistivity of a
semiconductor material.
Such heat-seeking missile technology is generally bad news for naval warfare, as
warships once at sea emit significant amounts of heat, so reducing their carbon
footprint is essential for several reasons. Ships radiate or lose heat from their exhaust
plume, funnels, vents, open hatches, recently fired guns, recently embarked helicopters
and other features. These platform emissions are radiated into the environment, and by
virtue of the atmospheres transparency these heat wavelengths may be detected over
very great distances. Add to this fact the problem that thermal heat sensor systems
operate passively (they do not transmit heat or any other radiated signal themselves),
and thus unlike active radar provide very little warning, if at all, of imminent attack
without the use of sophisticated warning receivers.
Ships, however, are easily detected as warm platforms against cold seas and skies,
which enable enemy sensors to detect or guide missiles to intercept with relative ease.
Unlike vehicles and troops on land, there is no simple cover at sea, and no use is to be
made of different natural materials.
Fortunately current generations of heat-seeking missiles are non-imaging, in that they
do not see the world around us with clear images. A heat seeker will detect an intense
blob of heat and will target this; thus it is relatively easy to defeat a heat-seeking
missile with a more attractive hot source of heat if there is enough time to deploy
the decoy source. Heat-seeker missiles will target the middle infra-red (MIR) band of the
electromagnetic spectrum in the range between 3 and 5m, that is, 3 to 5 millionth
of a metre, whilst true thermal imagers watch and scrutinise in the range of 814m,
somewhat further in wavelength with reduced scattering when compared with the
MIR band, although the atmosphere is overall less absorbing in the MIR.
However, recent developments in materials and system design will soon provide a new
generation of 35m imagers which will render current heat-seeking countermeasures
less effective unless significant improvements are made. The middle band threat is
currently combated by taking practical methods to reduce the heat from the operation
of diesel and gas turbine engines (200500C).

Infra-red 69
Infra-red emission can generally be divided into two parts: the so-called infra-red
cross section (IRCS), which is the total emitted power from a target, and the infra-red
signature (IRS), which is the targets detailed distribution of heat emitters. If a ships
IRCS is sufficiently reduced, it will enhance the overall effectiveness of the ships decoys,
such as the use of pyrotechnic phosphorous flares or those of magnesium/aluminium
design. Such a flare not only produces a bright white flash to the human observer,
which may last for several tens of seconds, but also produces copious amounts of heat,
tricking the heat-seeking missile into thinking it has acquired a real, hot ship target.
Imaging sensors, however, can see both the IRCS (the intense bright signal) as well as
the ships detail (its signature), allowing for the possibility of actual image and target
(platform) identification. To avoid identification, it is thus vital to reduce both the IRCS
and to blur the signature.
Passive ship heat detection depends on several important factors, such as the level
of energy actually emitted towards an infra-red detector and on the propagation
conditions, conditions which can change extremely quickly in a maritime environment.
Infra-red band absorption by atmospheric molecules is also highly wavelengthdependent because of the vibrations of common molecules with three atoms such as
water and carbon dioxide. Light sand combined with sea salt spray also provide further
additional factors.
As stated previously, warm ships are relatively easy to detect against a cold sea and an
even colder sky background, so warm ships will be easier to detect in the Arctic and
Antarctic waters rather than in the relatively warm seas of the Caribbean, for example.
However, a ship may also be detected as its air-cooled ships plating can on occasion
appear much colder than its background. This phenomenon arises as follows. Cold
sky reflections (with clouds typically at temperatures between 30 and 40C) can be
reflected from a ships metal surfaces if improperly angled (metal surfaces are still good
reflectors at these thermal wavelengths) and will then be in danger of showing up
with a strong contrast difference. Of course, appropriate tilting of the superstructure
can help take this risk into account, but the reader must be reminded that any change
of tilt must not compromise the superstructure tilt that has already been introduced to
reduce the probability of radar detection.
In the 35m band (or so-called short-wave region of the electromagnetic spectrum),
various hot objects include propulsion units exhaust plumes, uptake and funnel
surfaces. This band has a relatively high contrast but generally poor edge definition,
like a bright light source against a poorly lit background, something which is easy to
detect on a dark night, but it is not easy to identify actually what the light source is. Is
the source a man with a torch or a vehicle approaching with one defective light?

70 Stealth Warship
Most sensors in this band are of the non-imaging heat-seeking type, only being capable
of detecting and tracking a targets IRCS. The 814m band (by comparison referred to
as the long-wave band) will cover a range including room temperatures and is able to
detect very small differences in temperature, a point I will return to later in this chapter.
Manually or automatically operated thermal imagers can now examine a targets IRS to
produce extremely high-definition pictures. Very hot sources may dominate the emission
of the 814m band, but the emissions of other parts of the ship (cooler parts) are still
close to the intensity of its hot parts. High contrast of lower temperature areas means that
high-resolution detectors are sensitive to variation of temperature or emissivity, allowing
features to be identified in imagery in a similar way to that obtained from near infra-red
(NIR) night vision goggles. Modern thermal imagers are also able to incorporate false colour
representation and the difference between black and white (more commonly associated
with firefighting applications). Modern thermal imaging cameras (TICs) often include
various false colour palettes, which designed empirically around the eye of the human
observer are best able to detect certain things under specific environmental conditions. The
use of false colour modes can appear quite dramatic at times. Because of the absorption
properties of different surfaces, heat can be absorbed by surface patterns and re-radiated
strongly even when the surface appears visibly dark, producing a negative of the visible
scene. Consequently strong colours are generally discouraged in platform design as the
dazzle camouflage or zebrage features of the visible warfare in the First World War will
otherwise still be visible in the infra-red as well. This concept is echoed in the thermal
characteristics of the zebra whose visible stripes pattern is still observed under strong
sunlight (black-and-white and false colour images, Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively) [1].

Figure 4.2 Black-and-white palette CR Lavers

Infra-red 71

Figure 4.3 False colour palette CR Lavers

Different display modes are used to help reveal specific target features and usually
involve different digital signal-processing computer software algorithms to maximise
detectability. Digital data may also be exported via a data link from a camera, maximising
the availability of information for other users.

IRCS Contributors
Gas turbine exhaust plumes are the biggest IRCS contributor usually operating
between 300C and 500C at full power. Gas turbines provide power to drive a ships
main propulsion shaft. Energy is added to the gas stream in the combustor, where
fuel is mixed with air and ignited. In the combustors high-pressure environment, fuel
combustion will increase the gases temperature. These combustion products are then
forced into the turbine section. In the turbine, the relatively high velocity and volume
of heated gas flow is directed over the turbines blades, spinning the turbine which in
turn powers the compressor.
These exhaust gases then leave the ships funnel forming a vertical plume, which as
it expands begins to cool in temperature. Plume shapes and temperatures will tend
to vary with the different engines and operating conditions, with different operating
platforms having relatively well-defined visible plume characteristics. These optical

72 Stealth Warship
plume recognition characteristics will tend to be carried over into the thermal imaging
part of the spectrum as well.
Although gases are generally quite poor infra-red radiators, as the plumes
themselves contain extremely hot carbon particles which can radiate extremely well,
they are easy to detect. Cold air blowers are introduced to reduce the metal uptake
temperatures and to turbulently mix hot plume gases with further cold air as quickly
as possible so the plume disperses in the shortest possible time interval. However,
one consequence of this temperature reduction is that soot-filled gases can under
some circumstances fall back onto a ships upper decks and increase the rate of
corrosion as well as coating the surfaces with less stealthy residues which needed to
be removed.
Engine exhausts are often separated from the funnels outer casing, attempting
to reduce surface temperatures further, but even sunlit reflections from a ships
superstructure can produce relatively strong long-wave reflections, which are also in
the far infra-red (FIR) band (Figure 4.4). There is, of course, the deceptive possibility of
creating false sacrificial hot engine compartments, which could provide an obvious
target for an anti-ship, heat-seeking missile. However, it is usually practical to position
engine compartments at or near the waterline, so the sea surface can provide some
measure of masking against a sea-skimming missile. Alternative approaches can be
taken; for example, the Swedish Visby stealth corvette, which will be discussed in much
more detail later, is designed so that its exhaust heat output is positioned at the stern
of the vessel and consequently masked by extensive spray.

Figure 4.4 HMS Kent, far infra-red CR Lavers

Infra-red 73
Exhaust ducts are unfortunately very good high-temperature radiators, so most ducts
are positioned vertically so that they are only visible to high-flying aircraft or in recent
years potentially from satellites as well. At low look angles, however, those usually
associated with surfaced submarines, patrolling ships and most missiles, vertical
ducts are almost invisible. Some auxiliary exhaust ducts are horizontal under rare
circumstances, and it is usual to place screen baffles in front of them in this case.
A recently embarked helicopter or missile blast screens just after firing are also likely
to produce transient emissions which may betray a ships presence, so placing a
helicopter inside its hanger and closing the hanger door as soon as possible are good
precautionary measures to take. It should not be forgotten that a vehicle, aircraft or
ship may still be detectable with thermal sensors many hours after the engine has been
switched off!
As IRCS is mainly used by heat seekers in the 35m band, most techniques historically
have been aimed with the focused intent to reduce radiation from very hot objects,
such as a diesel engine exhaust, as most of the heat radiated will be associated with
these hot sources.
In summary, at this point, oddly shaped air blowers can reduce funnel temperatures
and mix exhaust gases with cold air. Equally hot compartments may be insulated from
direct thermal contact with the hull, whilst high-temperature ducts point up, making
them hard to see from the normal viewing direction.
As infra-red emission is a surface problem principally, coating ships in low heat
emitting or low-emissivity paint is a vital requirement as it will reduce the IRCS
significantly. Painted objects will frequently behave much like black bodies in terms of
their infra-red emission. Emissivity can be as high as 99% efficient or =0.99 (1 being
the maximum value for matt paint), whilst normal oil paints are also rather good
infra-red emitters, so tailored designer spray-on low-emissivity paints have been
developed for modern naval use and other temperature-sensitive applications, whilst
at the same time incorporating radar absorbent particles to minimise the radar cross
section (RCS) and having the appropriate visual colour to combat visible detection!
In this way, emissivity can be reduced from typical oil paint values of 0.920.94
to provide an approximately sixfold reduction in emissivity, for example, about
0.150.17. Emissivity is also highly relevant to the consideration of reflected sunlight
and infra-red, as recent sources in the public domain suggest that conventional paints
reflect about 60% of the heat incident on them, though newer low infra-red greys
(as found on USN F-14 and F-18) can reflect as little as 5% to 15% of the radiation
incident upon them. It is known that a well-polished aircraft canopy may reflect
enough energy for a lock-on in the thermal band to be achieved, as well as providing

74 Stealth Warship
a noticeable visual glint to other aviators, thereby losing one of the key elements of
warfare, namely, surprise.
Scintillation (atmospheric sparkling) can also be caused by local variations in the
atmospheres refractive index due to variations in atmospheric temperature (e.g. the
flickering of distant images as seen above a hot road) (Figure 4.5).
This effect is not particularly important for modern guidance systems, as the
apparent changes in the targets position will get smaller as the weapon approaches
the target. However, there is now widespread use of such weapons, and there is also
an increased likelihood that the emergence of asymmetric conflicts in the vicinity
of proxy third-world nations will create a market for a rapid proliferation of heatseeking weapons, and the theft of legitimate arms sales by bands of armed pirates,
predominantly but not exclusively off the east coast of Africa, may provide future
problems for maritime users.
Modern heat seekers contain an optical filtering device, allowing the transmission of
some wavelengths whilst suppressing others. The principal reason behind the use of
filters in guidance systems is the necessity to suppress strong background infra-red
radiation, usually the dominant component being reflected solar energy or thermal
radiation from the earths surface which will enable the missiles guidance system

Figure 4.5 Dartmouth, Devon on a hot summers day! CR Lavers

Note: Note the shimmering effect and the total internal reflection of the car from the road surface.

Infra-red 75
to successfully (or otherwise) discriminate between various parts of the targets
signature.
Optical filters in these applications fall into two broad groupings, absorption filters
and interference filters, and operate in a very similar way to our discussion of radar
absorbent material. Absorption filters are characterised by wide bandwidths of overall
transmission and are usually employed to suppress large regions, typically sunlight.
Interference filters can be designed with extremely narrow bandwidths and very
good transmittance. They can also reflect unwanted energy instead of absorbing it.
Consider several layers of transparent material, the layers having alternating refractive
index. If we pass heat through these layers, it will be partly reflected at each interface
between the layers, with alternate interfaces reflecting in and then out-of-phase.
Passive infra-red absorbing materials (IRAM) have been developed, following many of
the same arguments as for RAM. However, work on active infra-red camouflage is also
well under way with an actual system already on the market, the BAE Systems Adaptiv
stealth technology system. The system is currently designed for a tank covered in an
array of hand-sized, hexagonal tiles covering the tanks flanks which can be turned
into a large thermal infra-red screen. Each tile is a single active thermal pixel enabling
a tank crew to decide upon the thermal signature it considers most appropriate so
that enemy forces scanning a battlefield with thermal sensors may be fooled into
thinking they are looking at something else, a tree, bushes or even one of their own
tanks. Such technology, as stated earlier in Chapter 2, is also quite applicable for
aviation and maritime applications, particularly for littoral maritime operations, where
a warship might indeed want to appear thermally like an innocent fishing vessel [2].
Another interesting way of reducing the IRS for aircraft is to incorporate a non-circular
tailpipe, by changing the tail slit shape to a more two-dimensional structure (see the
B2 Spirit tailpipe, approximately 6in. high and 2ft 6in. across). This is done in order to
minimise the overall exhaust cross-sectional volume whilst at the same time trying to
maximise the mixing of the hot exhaust gases with cooler ambient air. Often, cooler
air is also deliberately injected into the exhaust flow of aircraft to increase this process.
Sometimes, the jet exhaust may be vented above the wing surface to shield it from
observers below, the likely threat direction, as in the B2 Spirit. However, venting excess
heat energy above does mean that other platforms at even higher altitudes (potentially
sensitive satellite-based platforms) could be able to detect this emitted heat, although
current satellite resolution would be insufficient to achieve more than a transient
detection of a very large aircraft or ship over one or two detector elements at best.
As mentioned earlier, ships have both an IRCS, which is essentially the total
emitted power, and an IRS, which reveals the distribution of heat. Early heat-seeking
missiles were equipped with non-imaging sensors that detect short-wave (35 m)

76 Stealth Warship

Figure 4.6 Dartmouth Castle, Devon CR Lavers

infra-red radiation and which could detect just the IRCS. The short-wave band provides
good contrast but poor definition, thus making it easy to spot hot objects such as a
pyrotechnic flare that had been launched near a ship. Ships can avoid being detected
by missiles using non-imaging systems simply by reducing the infra-red radiation
emitted from hot objects such as the engine exhausts.
Now, however, missiles are also being developed that include imaging sensors that use
both the short-wave and the long-wave (814m) bands, the so-called dual-colour
sensors. The long-wave band covers room temperatures in very fine detail, so that
these sensors can generate high-definition images of relatively cool objects or scenes
(Figure 4.6).
Such images reveal individual features of a target, thus allowing the missile to
distinguish between a ship and a decoy. For a ship to avoid being identified as a
target by a missile with this type of sensor, it must blur its IRS as well as reduce its
IRCS. This is difficult as the quality of modern thermal imagery, especially those taken
by commercially available cameras at close range, is now extremely high (Figure 4.7).
In part to counter such advanced threats, we have seen the introduction of Directed
Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) using stroboscopic directed pulses of heat from a
hot source or high-power laser systems. Such countermeasures sit outside the scope of
this particular volume.
The most distinctive features of a ships thermal signature are its hot exhaust
plumes (mostly composed of carbon dioxide, partly combusted carbon monoxide
and a small amount of water vapour). Although these gases do not radiate heat well
themselves, they contain hot carbon particles, which radiate infra-red energy very
efficiently. Some suggested methods involve the removal of the partially combusted

Infra-red 77

Figure 4.7 HMS Enterprise, thermal image taken with commercially available thermal
camera CR Lavers

carbon using carbon scrubbers, in a similar way to those used on modern power stations
to minimise their carbon footprint. Electrostatic scrubbers operate by imparting an
electrical charge to the carbon sooty particles, which can be attracted to an oppositely
charged electrode collector before they leave the power plant chimney or ships funnel.
Spraying water onto the ships upper decks has also been proposed as a way to reduce
and blur the IRS of future generations of warships, but this is likely to increase the RCS
because the water spray produces radar clutter, and this approach would have to be
used with great care.
The most sophisticated investigations have also considered the reflections of external
sources off of platforms, the most prominent being earthshine, sunshine and skyshine
on overall aircraft performance. Earthshine is especially emphasised because of its
significance in low-altitude aircraft missions and infra-red imaging studies. Comparisons
of IRS contribution of aircraft rear-fuselage heated due to internal and external sources
show that they have varying strength for 35m (MIR) and 812m (FIR) bands [3],
whilst estimation of infra-red signature levels (IRSLs) for jet engine aircraft operation
is crucial for the design of effective infra-red countermeasures and low observable
engines [4]. IRSL prediction models like NIRATAM and SPIRITS incorporate solar
reflection and earthshine.

78 Stealth Warship

The Laws of Infra-red Emission

Infra-red radiation is emitted by all objects above absolute zero; however, the amount
emitted, and its wavelength distribution, depend on the bodys absolute temperature
T and its emissivity . Emissivity is the actual emission from the surface of a body,
compared with that from an identical perfect radiating source or black body, at the
same temperature. Consequently, a black body will have a maximum emissivity value
of one, and a perfect insulator will have an emissivity value of zero. Many objects closely
resemble a black body in their infra-red emission. For consideration of energy and the
relationship between radiated heat and temperature, it is important to use the correct
temperature scale. Although centigrade is quite appropriate for most purposes with
100 equal steps between the melting point of ice and the boiling point of water, a block
of ice at 0C still has a considerable amount of energy. If all the energy within the block
of ice could be extracted, the temperature of the ice block would fall considerably.
Eventually when all the energy from an object has been extracted, the object will sit at
the bottom of the energy scale and correspondingly at the bottom of the temperature
scale. This absolute zero of temperature is at 273C approximately, and to convert
from degree Celsius to the Kelvin scale (in K and without the degree symbol!) it is
necessary to add 273, for example 10C on the Kelvin scale will be 10+273=283K.
There are three important properties of radiating bodies of which a ships target will
radiate significant amounts of heat:
1. The wavelength (peak) at which the peak of emission occurs can be expressed by a
relatively simple function of absolute temperature T, and is found using a formulae
known as Wiens displacement law, named after the German physicist Wilhelm
Wien (18641928):
2,900
peak = _____ m
T
For example, for a hot aircraft exhaust at 800K, the peak wavelength of emission will
be found very close to 3.6m, whilst a person at room temperature (with a skin surface
temperature of about 27C) will have a Kelvin temperature of about 300K and a peak
wavelength of emission of 10m, right in the middle of the range of modern TICs used
in the FIR to detect missing persons and for surveillance.
This has a huge implication on the correct choice of sensor and infra-red band
to monitor. Physicists and engineers will often plot the intensity distribution of

Infra-red 79
thermal radiation with wavelength to obtain a series of curves or black body
curves.
2. The radiated intensity I is given by the following equation:
I = T 4 Wm2
where I is the power per unit area in Wm2, is the emissivity, is the StefanBoltzmann
constant (5.67108Wm2K4) and T is the temperature in Kelvin (K=C+273), as
previously mentioned.
Note of caution: The StefanBoltzmann constant uses the same symbol as that already
encountered with RCS. They are, however, quite different quantities and should not be
confused. Different technical studies often use the same symbols for different quantities.
Consequently, we can establish both the peak emission wavelength and the target
intensity. However, in terms of contrast, a ship will be hard to detect if its thermal
intensity Iship is the same as the background sea intensity Isea.
Furthermore, if both the emissivity and temperature of a platform can be controlled,
this will have an implication on thermal maximum detection range.
3. Small changes in temperature will actually give rise to large changes in overall infrared emission. This can be demonstrated by considering the equation for intensity
given in Point 2 above.
If I = T4 Wm2, then it is clear that the relationship between radiated intensity and
thermal temperature is reflected correctly in the following inequality:
I T4
Consequently, IT T 4.
Now if we increase the temperature of an object by 10%, the same inequality must hold
true for the new temperature, where I1.1T is proportional to (1.1T)4.
Now dividing one inequality by the other we arrive at the equation I1.1T /IT=(1.1T)4/T 4,
which can be rewritten as I1.1T /IT=(1.1)4/14=1.464.
Finally, rearranging, I1.1T=1.464IT . This means that a 10% increase in temperature will
result in a 46.4% increase in radiated intensity, which is a relatively large increase in
intensity for a relatively small increase in temperature!
Clearly the importance of infra-red stealth is never likely to be far from the stealth ship
designers mind and will always have to be taken into account.

80 Stealth Warship

Chapter Reflections
1. Consider the contributions of heat on board a ship and how they could be
minimised.
2. What are the consequences of incorporating IRCS reduction measures into the
warship design on the RCS of a stealth ship?
3. A Visby stealth corvette is visually camouflaged and moored next to the shore
in a fjord near Gothenburg. The thermal intensities of the corvette and the bank
vary significantly as a function of time. A reconnaissance aircraft fitted with a TIC
took infra-red photographs of the Visby and adjacent coastline at dusk (1,615
time t0) with the Visby clearly detectable against the coastline.
For the next few hours, the intensity variations of the corvette and the bank are
given by Ifjord= Ifjord (t0)e1t for the fjord and Iship= Iship (t0)e2t for the ship, where
Ifjord(t0)=100Wm2, 1=1.1hr1, Iship(t0)=230Wm2 and 2=4.2 hr1.
Examination of photographs taken at a different time showed that the ship
could not be discerned from the fjord. Question: At what time will this occur
(nearest minute)?
4. During an Atlantic storm, a man has fallen overboard from a ship. He initially has
a surface temperature of 23C. Find the following:
(a) His initial peak emission wavelength (two significant figures).
(b) The mans total radiated intensity; his emissivity is 0.93 (one decimal place);
=5.67108Wm2K4.
(c) After a period of time, the mans intensity falls so that he is no longer
distinguishable against the sea (sea surface has an emissivity of 0.97 and a
surface temperature of 8C). To what value has the mans temperature fallen
(two decimal places)?
(d) What is the mans new peak emission wavelength (two decimal places)?
5. By considering the contrast equation C = (a b)/(a + b), where a is the target
intensity It and b is the background intensity Ib, respectively, find the value of Ib
for which there is no contrast.
Using differentiation, show the maximum contrast conditions, by differentiating
with respect to a and b separately.

Infra-red 81
6. If I=T4Wm2, using differentiation and small change approximation, what will
the change in radiated intensity be for a 0.1K change at a temperature of 300K
(two decimal places)?
7. What measures could be taken for a target such as a ship, as illustrated in
Question 3, to make it less visible against its fjord background in the FIR, and
what might be the possible consequences of these actions upon visible and
radar band detectability?
8. Thermodynamics shows us that if we heat an object it will generally expand,
and consequently both its volume and surface area will be expected to increase.
If radiated power = AT4 W m2, by how much would the area of a warship
platform have to change to compensate for a similar magnitude of positive
changing temperature? Is this a feasible stealth method?

References
1.

Lavers, C, Franklin, Mr P, Franklin, Mrs P, Plowman, A, Sayers, G, Bol, J, Field, D, and Shepard,
SM (2008), Recent applications of passive thermal imaging to evaluate wildlife parameters
remotely and a new active thermal technique for non-destructive testing of delicate
biological samples, Proceedings of the Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Society
Annual Meeting.

2.

Michell, S (2011), The Invisibility Cloak, Rusi Defence Systems, autumn/winter, pp. 8081.

3.

Gebbie, HA, Harding, WR, Hilsum, C, Pryce, AW, and Roberts, V (1951), Atmospheric
transmission in the 1 to 14m region, Proceedings of the Royal Society (London) Series A,
206(1084): 87107.

4.

Morris, TA, Marciniak, MA, Wollenweber, GC and Turk, JA (2006), Analysis of uncertainties in
infrared camera measurements of a turbofan engine in an altitude test cell, Infrared Physics &
Technology, 48(2): 130153.

MAGNETIC
SIGNATURE
Now my eyes are turned from the South to the North, and I want to lead one
more Expedition. This will be the last to the North Pole.
Ernest Shackleton, 18741922

Magnetic Stealth
Another important detection risk for ships is the magnetic distortion they create in the
earths own magnetic eld. Ships can be thought of as basically large metal objects
which concentrate the earths relatively weak magnetic eld within them, creating
stronger distortions or magnetic anomalies which potentially have the ability to trigger
the release or detonation of magnetic mines. Warships are now able to reduce these
magnetic distortions to suciently low levels so that these magnetically triggered
mines cannot detect them, for example, by magnetising the ships hull in the opposite
direction to the earths magnetic eld, cancelling out the eect. Reverse magnetisation
is normally achieved using hull-embedded electromagnets, but it is also possible to
design warships from non-magnetic materials such as glass-reinforced plastic (GRP),
vitally important for minehunters.
For several thousand years, it has been known that magnetite or lodestone if suspended
by a thread will come to a rest in a roughly northsouth geographical direction and is
an example of a natural magnetic material used by both the Chinese and Scandinavian
Vikings for navigation purposes. It is also known that a piece of non-magnetic iron can

Magnetic Signature 83
be converted into a magnet by stroking it in one direction repeatedly using an existing
magnet. Certain materials like iron and steel can be relatively easily magnetised
by moving them through the earths magnetic eld, whilst other common metallic
materials, such as copper or aluminium, cannot be magnetised.
The region of space inuenced by a magnet can be visualised by considering the
concept of the magnetic eld. For example, if a bar magnet is covered by a sheet of
paper and iron lings then sprinkled onto paper, the iron lings will reveal lines that
can be traced from the magnets north pole to its south pole (Figure 5.1).
These lines of force or lines of ux show clearly the direction of the magnetic force at
that point. Several key ndings can be made about these lines of ux.
1. Lines of ux never cross.
2. Lines of ux are always continuous.
3. Lines of ux will always take the shortest possible path.
4. Lines of ux which are parallel and in the same directions repel each other, for
example, when two magnets are brought together with north poles adjacent.
Quantitatively, if a unit area at right angles to the lines of ux is considered, practical
numerical denitions and terms can be made.
Lines of ux collectively can be said to constitute a magnetic ux (symbol , from
the Greek letter phi) which passes through the area. Flux density is the value of the
magnetic eld at any point, and is obtained from the following expression:
ux
Flux density = ____
area

Figure 5.1 Magnetic eld of bar magnet

84 Stealth Warship

ETR

IM

I METRE
P

Figure 5.2 Spreading lines of ux exiting a magnet

Figure 5.2 illustrates the lines of ux exiting a magnet and passing through an area of
1 m2 at 90 to the magnetic ux. The symbol for ux density is B and its unit is the tesla.
The tesla is named after Nikola Tesla (18561943), an ethnic Serb whose revolutionary
developments in the eld of electromagnetism in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries formed the basis of alternating current, wireless communications
and radio. The following expression links ux, measured in weber, with the ux density,
measured in tesla.
Flux = ux density area or (Wb) = B (T) A (m2)
For example, for a relatively strong magnetic eld of 3 T across an area of 0.5 m2,
Flux = 3 0.5 = 1.5 Wb
In magnetic materials, a magnetising force (H) will produce a ux density (B), the
magnitude of which depends upon the type of material in the magnetic circuit (e.g. air,
steel, soft iron etc.). In free space and most non-magnetic materials, the ratio between
H and B is a constant value, such that the ratio B/H for free space is as follows:
0 = 4 107 H m1
For any material, the ratio of ux density to magnetising force is called the absolute
permeability () and is also measured in henries hy per metre (H m1). Thus,
B
= __
H
However, the relative permeability R is important to note, and typical values can be
found in standard tables of constants [1]. This is the ratio of the ux density produced

Magnetic Signature 85
in a magnetic material to the ux density which would be produced in air by the same
force, that is,
absolute permeability
Relative permeability = ______________________
permeability of free space

R = __
0
Or rewritten as = 0 R
The result of this is that permeability dierences in magnetic materials will tend
to concentrate any magnetic eld lines present such that these eld lines might be
described as preferring to stay and be drawn into the magnetic media rather than in
any non-magnetic media. This is not so dissimilar to the way in which light prefers to
travel within a high-refractive index media such as glass rather than propagate or travel
in a low-refractive index media such as air when it is incident above the critical angle.
This concentrating of the magnetic eld lines can be described as a magnetic lens
whose concentrating ability is determined by the relative permeability of the material in
question. For example, for some materials such as iron, nickel and cobalt, this value can
be extremely large (ranging between 1,000 and 2,000). For some specially constructed
materials, the value of the relative permeability can be even higher, with two specialist
materials nanoperm (a cobalt-based magnetic alloy 2714 A) and metglas having
values of, respectively, 80,000 and 1,000,000! Interestingly, pure metals such as nickel,
cobalt and magnesium exhibit only very slight magnetic properties, but when alloyed
with iron very strong magnetic properties will result.
For example, compare the magnetic ux (in weber) produced by a given magnetising
force of 1,000 H in free space and the magnetic ux produced in a quantity of nanoperm
with relative permeability of 80,000 across an area of 2 m2.
In free space, B = 0H = 4 107 1,000 = 4 104 T and, for the nanoperm,
B = H = 0RH = 4 107 8 1,000 1 103 = 32 101 T.
So the ux (in weber) in the free space and nanoperm is given, respectively,
as = 4 104 2 = 8 103 Wb and = 32 101 2 = 64 101 Wb.
The consequence of this concentration of magnetic eld lines is seen in the relationship
between moving conductors and the generation of an electric eld. A metal ship
of iron can be considered to be composed of a series of conductors which cut the
earths magnetic eld to induce an electric eld in the assembly of conductors. These
current-carrying conductors not only can become magnetised themselves but also can
inuence the region of space around them because of the magnetic eld produced by
the same current-carrying wires.

86 Stealth Warship
One solution to this problem is the practical engineering technique of degaussing or,
its more modern version, deperming. Degaussing provides a degree of protection from
magnetic mines, but the physical explanation is often the least understood of magnetic
reduction measures, although degaussing is often considered as simply a process of
decreasing or eliminating unwanted magnetic elds.

Degaussing Ships Hulls

With the introduction of iron ships, the eect of the ships metal hull on steering
compasses was noted very quickly. It was also observed that lightning strikes frequently
had an eect on compass deviation, which in some extreme cases could completely
reverse the ships magnetic signature. This phenomenon was rst recorded in 1866
by a Mr Evan Hopkins of London, who registered a patent for a process to depolarise
iron vessels and leave them thenceforth free from any compass-disturbing inuence
whatever. However, it was a relatively long period after this before degaussing was to
be applied practically to the problem of ships magnetisation.
Degaussing of a naval vessels hull was rst demonstrated by Cmdr Charles Goodeve during
the Second World War whilst he was trying to counter German magnetic mines which were
proving a deadly threat to the British eet. German scientists had succeeded in designing
very eective mines which could detect a small increase in local magnetic eld when a
ships large steel hull, concentrating the earths ever-present magnetic eld, was over it.
The earth can be considered as a relatively simple dipole magnetic with magnetic lines of
force running from north to south. Magnetic lines of forces at the earths surface have two
key components, a vertical component (Z) and a horizontal component (H), which is itself
divided into two components: a longitudinal component along the ship and an athwartship
component across the beam of the ship. The medium the eld lines pass through, with its
specic permeability, will aect the eld strength (the lines of force per unit area). Metal, for
example, is more permeable than water. So the eld intensity increases in the ship, creating
anomalies or localised concentrations in the magnetic eld around it, as illustrated with
visualised lines of force in Figure 5.3. In reality, the ship will have a composite permeability
of diering metal components and structures with a three-dimensional spatial distribution.
A further complication is that all ships are built within the earths magnetic eld, and
so they will become permanently magnetised, at least partially. However, the level of
permanent magnetisation depends on the earths eld where the ship was built, its
orientation when it was built and the construction materials used.

Magnetic Signature 87

Figure 5.3 Magnetic eld lines concentrated in the steel of the ship CR Lavers

The induced magnetic eld from the ships magnetic materials when moving in the
earths magnetic eld will depend upon the earths magnetic eld strength and the
ships orientation. The components are longitudinal (aected by latitude, heading and
pitch), athwartship (aected by latitude, heading and roll) and vertical (aected by
latitude, pitch and roll).
A somewhat complex method can be used to compensate for a ships magnetic elds
by winding high-current-carrying coils around the ships and then passing a direct
current (DC) through them. This DC can be used to create a eld equal yet opposite
to the ships magnetic eld, making the ship magnetically invisible. It should be noted
that this is not a trivial operation, and is not necessarily a complete success. Dierent
classes of ship, because of their dierent geometry and dierent construction materials,
will require very dierent degaussing arrangements. Nonetheless, the key dierences
between these arrangements can be characterised in terms of what power supplies are
required and the control circuitry used.
Returning to our discussion of German mines, since the Germans at this time used the
Gauss as the unit of strength of the magnetic eld in their mine triggering mechanisms
(there was not at this time a standardised measure of magnetic eld), Goodeve decided
to refer to the various processes trialled to counter the mines as degaussing.
Let us take a little closer look at a simplistic layout of coil arrangements that could be
more eectively achieved by embedding them within the superstructure of a ships
platform itself (Figure 5.4).
Main coil (M) can be used to eectively compensate for the induced and permanent
vertical components of a ships magnetic eld (the so-called Z zone). The main coil is

88 Stealth Warship
M coil

F coil
Q coil

L coil

A coil

Figure 5.4 Coil arrangements

usually installed in the horizontal plane at or close to the ships waterline running
completely around the hull internally. As the ship changes hemispheres, the coil current
polarity must be reversed, for the same reason that a split ring is found in a DC motor,
where otherwise the two half rotations of a loop of wire will produce induced electric
elds of opposite polarity.
Forecastle permanentquarterdeck permanent (FP-QP) coils will compensate for the
longitudinal permanent component of a ships magnetic eld. The FP coil will encircle
approximately the forward third of a ship in the horizontal plane at the main deck. Similarly
the QP coil encircles the aft third of the ship in the horizontal plane at the quarterdeck.
Forecastle inducedquarterdeck induced (FI-QI) coils are located in the same general
vicinity as the FP-QP coils, but must compensate for the longitudinal induced component
of a ships magnetic eld due to the ships motion. The FI-QI current is proportional to
the horizontal component of earths magnetic eld along the ships longitudinal axis.
To be used usefully, a modern degaussing system should automatically compensate for
heading changes as they occur.

Magnetic Signature 89
An athwartship (A) coil should be installed in the vertical plane and extend from the keel
to the main deck. It is designed to compensate for both the athwartship component
of magnetic eld induced and the athwartships permanent component of the ships
magnetic eld. The athwartship coil current consists of permanent and induced
components.
The rst method of degaussing involves installing electromagnetic coils into the ships,
and was termed coiling. British ships, notably our cruisers and battleships, were well
protected in this way by 1943.
However, installing such specialist equipment was still too expensive and dicult to
service all the ships that really needed it, so the navy developed an alternative called
wiping, which entailed the dragging of a large electrical cable along the ships side
with a current of about 2,000 A owing through it to induce the right eld in it! a
potentially dangerous proposition for engineers tasked with achieving this reduction
in eld. It was initially thought that the pounding of the sea, especially during the
erce winter storms of the North Atlantic, on the ships hull and the elds produced
by the ships engines might rapidly randomise this impressed correcting induced eld.
Fortunately ship tests found this not to be a problem.
After the Second World War, magnetic fuses were improved, which now did not require
the mine to detect the absolute value of the magnetic eld itself, but changes to it,
which improved the overall sensitivity of the mine considerably. This also meant that
a generally well-degaussed ship which still retained a small magnetic hot spot could
trigger a mine. In addition, the precise orientation of the eld could now be measured,
something a simple bias eld could not remove, at least not for all points on a warship.
A series of increasingly complex coil arrangements was introduced to oset these
eects, with modern systems including no fewer than three separate sets of coils to
reduce elds in all axes.
Deperming is now viewed as a procedure for erasing the permanent magnetism from
ships and submarines, in order to camouage them from a magnetic point of view
against magnetic detection vessels and enemy marine mines. Sea-going, metal-hulled
ships will nonetheless develop a magnetic signature as they travel due to interaction
with earths magnetic eld, and this signature can still be exploited by magnetic mines
or facilitate detection of a submarine by ships or aircraft with magnetic anomaly
detection (MAD) equipment. Navies use deperming procedures as a countermeasure
against this, and today specialised deperming facilities can perform the procedure.
Heavy gauge copper cables are rst wrapped round the hull and superstructure of the
vessel, and after safety checks are made, very high electrical currents up to 4,000 A
(4 kA) are pulsed through the cables. This has the eect of resetting the ships magnetic

90 Stealth Warship
signature. The process is now suciently sophisticated that it is even possible to assign
a specic signature that is best suited to the particular area of the world the ship will
operate in, but this is not something that can easily be done operationally at sea. Over
time, the deperm will start to degrade and the deperming procedure must be repeated
periodically to maintain the desired eect.
When a ship is close to a magnetic mine or magnetic torpedo, the magnetic eld of
a ship actuates the ring mechanism and will cause the mine or torpedo to explode.
Degaussing is thus quite reasonably viewed as a tted electrical installation designed
to protect a ship against magnetic mines and torpedoes. So, in summary, the purpose
of degaussing is to counteract the ships magnetic eld and establish a condition such
that the magnetic eld near the ship is, as nearly as possible, the same as if the ship
were not there. Degaussing coils are simply large diameter electrical wires which when
carrying a large enough current are able to produce an electromagnetic eld.
A ship made of ferromagnetic materials such as steel, which as explained earlier
concentrate lines of magnetic ux, will constrain them to follow a preferred path to
the water surface. Consequently the local magnetic eld of the earth, as stated, can
become quite distorted. Magnetic ux through a surface is proportional to the number
of magnetic eld lines passing through the surface. This is the net number, that is, the
number passing through in one direction, minus the number passing through in the
other direction. Quantitatively, magnetic ux through a surface S is dened as the integral
of the magnetic eld over the area of the surface, but this is best omitted in this volume.
As the ship moves, it will have a potential dierence (p.d.) or voltage induced across
its hull plates and superstructure, with diering voltages over the entire ship due to
the non-uniformities in its original construction and/or subsequent modications.
Variations in current owing inside the ship will induce magnetic elds around it.
A metal ship conductor of width L with a velocity v that is in relative motion within a
perpendicular magnetic eld of ux density B will have a voltage of magnitude V = BLv
induced across it, where B is measured in tesla (T), L in metres and v in metres per
second. A more precise form of the equation will also take into account the angle of the
eld line to the velocity vector, and it is left to the reader to investigate and consider
the consequences of this.
This voltage or potential dierence across the ends of the conductor will cause
a current to ow, which in turn produces an induced magnetic eld (Figure 5.5). A
conductor which carries a current I has a decreasing radial magnetic eld of ux
density B with increasing distance from the wire. Hence a current is applied which
creates a magnetic eld in the opposite direction to that which has been induced by
this motion (Figure 5.6).

Magnetic Signature 91

Figure 5.5 Origin of induced voltage V CR Lavers

Current
Magnetic
field
Field pattern of straight wire

Figure 5.6 Magnetic eld around current-carrying wire CR Lavers

As a nal note to the discussion of magnetic signature, the US Navy was reported to
have recently tested a new prototype of its high-temperature superconductor (HTS)
degaussing coil system in 2009 which works by encircling the vessel with superconducting
ceramic cables whose purpose is to neutralise the ships magnetic signature, as was the
case with the copper-cabled systems. The main advantage of the HTS degaussing coil
system is reputedly to be its greatly reduced weight and increased eciency.
There is, of course, a simpler solution than having to remove the permanent and
induced elds, and that is to avoid the use of ferromagnetic materials in modern ship
construction entirely. Insulating dielectric materials would provide the best solution,

92 Stealth Warship
but generally these are not especially durable or aordable. Traditional wood and
laminated wood materials are very good at avoiding the magnetic eld problem,
but they do not provide the required strength of a steel warship. Ship or platform
survivability is also an issue, and this rules out materials like simple plastics and glass.
However, composite GRP and laminate GRP can provide a surprisingly strong yet
lightweight option, particularly for mine-hunting and mine-laying vessels such as the
RN Sandown- and Hunt-class vessels, ships such as the US Avenger class (using various
hardwoods) and advanced sandwich composites on the Visby corvette.
GRP is a bre polymer made of a plastic matrix reinforced with ne glass bres which
importantly for magnetic marine mine operations does not become magnetised. GRP is
both lightweight and extremely strong. Although its strength properties are lower than
that of carbon bre, GRP is less brittle, and the raw materials are much less expensive for
large-scale construction. Its bulk strength and weight properties are favourable when
compared to commonly used metals, and another key suitability factor is its ability to
be moulded into highly complex shapes. Fibres, almost entirely free of defects, can
reach gigapascal tensile strength levels.
If multiple glass bres are arranged in a preferred direction, the GRP material will be
preferentially strong in that direction. By laying multiple layers of bre on top of each
another, with each layer oriented dierently, both the materials stiness and strength
properties can be controlled.
Fibre glass is typically of thin shell construction, lled on the inside with structural
foam. Fibre glass is a versatile material, combining lightweight with inherent strength
to provide a weather-resistant material, ideal for maritime operations. Fibre was
rst researched extensively in the 1930s for commercial aviation applications. Mass
production of glass strands was achieved in 1932 accidentally when a researcher at
Owens-Illinois directed compressed air at a stream of molten glass to produce bres.
After combining with the Corning company in 1935, a reproducible method was found
to produce a patented Fiberglas. A resin for combining Fiberglas with a plastic, needed
for achieving modern GRP fabrication, was developed in 1936 by the US company du
Pont.
During the Second World War, GRP was developed as a replacement for moulded
plywood, which had been used in aircraft radomes up to this time. Fibreglass was
found to be transparent at microwave radar wavelengths and was readily adapted
for these applications. Its rst main civil application was in the building of boats and
sports car bodies, where it gained widespread acceptance in the 1950s. GRP is often
also used in telecommunications to cover or shroud the visual appearance of ships
aerials and antennas (from both inclement weather and prying eyes) because of its

Magnetic Signature 93
suitability at radio frequencies and its low signal attenuation properties. The relatively
recent introduction of frequency selective GRP has made possible the construction of
integrated ships masts, which are designed to be opaque to enemy radar transmissions
whilst being transparent at our own radar frequencies.
The low permeability properties of GRP combined with its low RCS make it a very
attractive construction material for vessels needing to operate in potentially mineinfested waters. The Royal Navy used GRP extensively in its Sandown-class minehunters.
The rst, HMS Sandown (Figure 5.7), was built by Vosper Thornycroft and launched in
1988 by the Duchess of Gloucester, as the rst of 12 Sandown-class minehunters. HMS
Sandown was decommissioned relatively recently in January 2005, and handed over to
the Estonian Navy in April 2007, and renamed EML Admiral Cowan.
Another platform used by the Royal Navy is the RN Hunt class, composed of 13 mine
countermeasure vessels combining the role of traditional minesweeper and that of
an active minehunter into the same hull. Upon introduction in the early 1980s, these
were the largest warships ever built out of GRP, superseded now by the Visby stealth

Figure 5.7 HMS Sandown-class minehunter

94 Stealth Warship
corvette. All 13 were built by Vosper Thornycroft except HMS Cottesmore and Middleton,
which were built instead by Yarrow Shipbuilders Limited. HMS Quorn was the last ship
of the class to be launched. The capabilities of the current eight remaining Hunt-class
vessels have been upgraded by the installation of Sonar Type 2193 and the NAUTIS 3
command system. The performance of Sonar 2193 is believed to exceed that of any
other mine-hunting naval sonar in service worldwide and can both detect and classify
correctly a target or object the size of a football up to 1 km away.

Chapter Reections
1. Try and rank the importance of the cross sections and signatures discussed in
this and earlier chapters, and consider the likely interactions between them.
2. What reasonable reduction measures can you suggest that are already used and
could be used in the future to make a warship stealthier than at present?
3. Consider a ship travelling in the Arctic Ocean with a magnetic eld strength
of 63,000 nT (nanotesla) with an athwartships conducting width of 4 m and a
speed of 3 m s1. What will be the value of the induced voltage that consequently
induces a magnetic eld in the ships superstructure (three signicant gures)?
(Note: V = BLv.)
4. For a magnetising force of 2 107 T and a relative permeability of 500, nd
(a) the ux density B, (b) the ux across 2 m2 and (c) the induced voltage on
an athwartship coil of length 2 m and a speed of 4 m s1 (in exact terms).
5. Find the rate of change of voltage with speed as a function of H and L. If the rate
of change is 2 mV (m s)1, for a relative permeability of 22.3 and a length of 3 m
what is the value of the magnetising force H (in terms of )?

Reference
1.

Kaye, GWC and Laby, TH (1973), Table of Physical and Chemical Constants and Some
Mathematical Functions. 14th ed. London: Longman.

THE ACOUSTIC
THREAT AND
OTHER SIGNATURES
The worst wheel of the cart makes the most noise.
Albert Einstein

Acoustic Noise
Blending a ship visually into its background and making modifications to both its radar
reflectivity and infra-red emissions are a clear benefit to ship stealth. Ships, however,
are also full of moving equipment generating significant acoustic noise, which can be
detected underwater if the sound is transmitted through the hull. Sound can travel
very long distances underwater so that ships can be located by submarines, torpedoes
or even a sonar dipped from a helicopter. But perhaps the greatest threat to a ship is
the silent running submarine menace coupled with the use of anti-sound technology
or sonar.
Sonar is an acronym for sound navigation and ranging, which is a well-developed
technique similar to above-water radar, but instead of transmitting electromagnetic
waves uses sound propagation underwater for roles such as navigation and mine
detection. There are two main types of sonar technology in common naval use today:
the so-called passive sonar, essentially listening to sounds generated from surface
vessels and submarines, and active sonar, which emits pulses of sound energy from

96 Stealth Warship
a transducer and then listens for returning echoes. The time between transmission
and reception of an underwater echo enables a sonar operator to establish the range
of the underwater contact. Sonar is frequently used as a means of acoustic location,
and because of the typical broad frequency spread of a typical ship platforms echo
characteristics, can even identify targets which are not possible from receipt of a
corresponding radar echo alone. It is interesting historically that acoustic location in
air was used long before radar, and was still in use relatively late in the Second World
War by the Japanese, whose huge tuba-like apparatuses, each the size of a house,
were used to listen as early warning detectors for incoming US bomber aircraft. The
acoustic frequencies detected by modern sonar systems, however, are extremely
varied, ranging from very low frequencies below the range of human hearing (the
so-called infrasonic frequencies) up to extremely high frequencies above the range
of human hearing (or ultrasonic frequencies). It should be noted that the spectrum
of frequencies heard by the human ear in air is not the same as that detected under
water, for several reasons: differences in water absorption being the principal
reason and, second, for waves incident from above the waterline, due to change in
wave speed. The study of underwater sound is generally referred to as underwater
acoustics or hydroacoustics, and is a key part of modern anti-submarine and antiship-based warfare.
Although cetaceans such as whales and dolphins use sound for communication and
precise fish location in the worlds oceans, mankinds entrance into this arena is only
relatively recent. The first verified measurement of sound underwater was in 1490 by
Leonardo da Vinci who used a tube inserted into water, and it was reputed he could
detect vessels in his vicinity by simply placing his ear to the tube [1].
Interest in radio, radar and the use of sound to echo locate objects underwater seems
to have been given impetus after the Titanic disaster of 1912. The worlds first patent for
an underwater echo ranging device was registered by the English meteorologist Lewis
Richardson just a month after the Titanic sank [2], and a German physicist Alexander
Behm quickly followed suit with a patent for design of a prototype echo sounder in
1913. Early work in 1912 by Mr Reginald Fessenden, a Canadian engineer working for
the Submarine Signal Company in Boston, was noted by the British, who recognised the
potential naval benefits of this technology. In 1914, Fessenden demonstrated depth
sounding, underwater Morse communications and iceberg detection at a surprisingly
good 3km range. Consequently by 1915 the newest Canadian-built Royal Naval H-class
submarines were equipped with Fessenden oscillators [3]. Despite their cramped size
and lack of deck guns, these H-class submarines were popular amongst submariners,
and saw action in British waters and the Adriatic, losing only four of their own in the
First World War combat.

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 97

Meanwhile under the leadership of another Canadian physicist Robert William Boyle, a
prototype system for active sound detection was produced for trials in 1917. This work
took place under maximum security, and used quartz piezoelectric crystals to produce
the worlds first underwater active sound detection system. To maintain this secrecy,
no mention of sound experimentation or quartz was made the word instead used to
describe this early work was ASDics, hence the initial British use of the acronym ASDIC.
At the start of the Second World War, British ASDIC technology was made freely available
to the United States, as part of a pooling of collaborative research, a partnership which
also saw the development of the atomic bomb (with the help again of Canada) under
the Manhattan Project. Research on ASDIC and underwater sound was significantly
expanded by this cooperative act between the United Kingdom and the United States.
It is about this time, in the late 1930s, that the Americans began to use the now more
widely used term sonar for the first time. Many new types of military sound detection
systems were consequently developed, which included sonobuoys, developed by the
British in 1944 under the codename High Tea, dipping sonar and, most importantly,
mine detection sonar. This work also formed the basis for most post-war developments
related to countering the Soviet nuclear submarine threat. In recent years, the main
military development has been the increasing interest in low-frequency active systems.

Various Environmental Factors

The underwater environment is generally a much messier and unpredictably changing
environment than the above-water environment, being at best a foggy day under
most circumstances. Sonar detection, classification and location performance depend
unsurprisingly on this environment, as well as the receiver and transmitter subsystems
used, and for passive sonar, the critical target (ship or submarines) radiated noise.
Sonar operation is also affected by variations in sound speed, which travels more
slowly in fresh water (less dense) than in sea water (more dense). Speed is also
determined by the waters Temperature, dissolved impurities (principally Salinity) and
Pressure (or STP).
Sonar prediction is difficult to achieve but as sound is still bent or refracted in accordance
with Snells law likely threat ranges for a given set of STP conditions can be made. If
conditions are right, propagation may occur in deep sound channels which provide
extremely low propagation loss to a sonar receiver within the channel, in a similar way
to radar ducts in the above-water environment. Sound propagation is also affected by

98 Stealth Warship
water absorption loss, which depends critically upon frequency. Long-range sonar also
use low frequencies (large wavelengths) to minimise undesirable absorption effects.
The sea also contains many sources of noise that will interfere with the target echo or
signature, such as that generated by waves or snapping krill. It should be added here
that sonar, like radar, is a double-edged sword, a weapon used by both mariner and
submariner alike in a battle of wits for survival.

Active Sonar
Active sonar uses both a sound transmitter and a receiver and creates a series of
regular sound pulses, and in between them listens for reflected echoes (Figure 6.1).
Sound pulses are generated first at lower power levels electronically from a signal
generator, a power amplifier and an electro-acoustic transducer/array. A beam former
can concentrate the acoustic power into a tightly focused beam, which can be swept to
cover a chosen search angle and is similar, although a little simpler, to that found within
modern phased array radar.
To measure bearing, a hydrophone array can be used, and the system measures the
relative time of arrival delay at each hydrophone. An array reduces spatial response, or
angular response, so to provide wide cover multi-beam systems are used. Target signal,
together with noise and unwanted background clutter, will undergo signal processing
before operator display. Further processes may be used to classify the target and locate
it as well as to measure its velocity (Doppler effect). In a similar manner to radar, sonar
pulses may transmit at constant frequency or in a chirped pulse mode where a pulse

Target

Transmitted wave

Figure 6.1 Principle of active sonar CR Lavers

Reflected wave

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 99

increases in frequency throughout its duration (a technique used in ultrasound by bats).
Simple sonar generally use the former with a filter sufficiently wide to cover possible
target movement Doppler changes, while more complex ones include the latter. As
digital processing has become more widely available, pulse compression is now more
common. Military sonar often use multiple beams to provide all-round coverage while
simple ones only cover a narrow arc, although a beam may be rotated, relatively slowly,
by mechanical scanning or quickly electronically via phased steering. Particularly when
single frequency transmission is used, the Doppler effect can measure a targets radial
speed. The difference in frequency between the transmitted and received signal is
measured and is converted into a radial velocity vector.
For a modern warship, the importance of minimising emitted sound cannot be
underestimated. Any piece of machinery incorrectly mounted can provide telltale
signs of its presence to the watchful scrutiny of the practised sonar operator. In
combat situations, an active pulse can be detected by an opponent and might
crucially reveal a submarines position, and hence passive sonar will be generally
used instead.

Passive Sonar
Passive sonar listens without transmitting and is frequently employed by navies
worldwide. Passive sonar benefits are that as no pulses are transmitted there is no
direct risk of compromise to its stealth, be it a ship or submarine platform. However, a
lack of timed echoes means that no range, or range resolution information, is directly
available from the surrounding environment and other non-transmitting platforms and
objects will not necessary show up on the passive sonar display to the operator. This
is, of course, a similar problem for the radar operator who wants to establish a faithful
tactical picture of what is around him/her in the real environment. Key detection
aspects are built around the characteristic sound emitted by AC and DC transformers
and generators on board different platforms. Even intermittent sound sources (such
as a dropped tool) may be detectable with passive sonar. Passive sonar systems rely
heavily upon having large up-to-date sound databases, but the trained sonar operator
can usually classify the signals by ear.
For these reasons, many navies operate submarines fuelled by nuclear reactors that are
cooled without pumps, using convection instead to run silently. Vehicles propellers are
also designed and precisely machined to emit minimal noise. High-speed propellers

100 Stealth Warship

often create tiny bubbles in the water, and this cavitation has a distinct sound, which
we will look at in a little more detail shortly. Sonar hydrophones may be towed behind
the ship or submarine in order to reduce the effect of noise generated by the vessel
itself.
Modern naval warfare makes extensive use of both passive and active sonar from
surface vessels and aircraft. The relative benefits of using active rather than passive
sonar technology depend on the radiated characteristics of the target. In the Second
World War, active sonar was used by surface vessels, whilst submarines avoided
transmission at almost any cost for fear of revealing their presence and location. The
genesis of modern signal-processing passive sonar is now greatly improved for initial
stealthy detection. Consequently submarines are now designed to be the quietest
vessels ever, with a revolution in propeller blade design, needed since the advent of
ever improved sonar systems, both passive and active.

Sonar Comparison
Active sonar gives the exact bearing, and the approximate range, to a target and is used
when a platform commander, surface or submarine, determines it is more important
to determine the position of a possible threat submarine than it is to conceal his own
position. However, the emitting sonar will likely be detected. Having registered the
signal, it is possible to identify the sonar equipment used (by its frequency and other
characteristics, for example, pulse duration) and its position. Active sonar is similar
to radar in that, while it allows detection of targets at a certain range, it enables the
emitter to be detected at a greater range, which is not desirable.
As active sonar reveals the presence and position of the operator, and does not
allow exact classification of targets, it is rarely used by submarines. When active
sonar is used by surface ships or submarines, it is typically activated intermittently to
minimise the detection risk. Active sonar, however, is routinely used with disposable
sonobuoys dropped in an aircrafts patrol area or in the vicinity of possible enemy
sonar contacts.
In conclusion, passive sonar has many advantages; most importantly, it is silent. Since
any vessel makes some noise, the vessel may in principle be detected, depending on
the level of platform sound emitted and the ambient background noise level in the
area, as well as the technology used. A ship or submarine sonar also has a limited

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 101

field of vision, which can influence detection. On a submarine, nose-mounted passive
sonar detects in arc range of about 270, centred on the ships long axis, and for a hullmounted array of about 160 on each side of this (whilst a towed array drawn behind a
submarine platform can provide a full 360).
Once a signal is detected in a certain direction with the so-called broadband detection,
it is then possible to analyse any confirmed target with narrowband analysis. As every
engine makes a specific set of sounds, it is straightforward to identify the target if
it is already in the database. Passive sonar is stealthy and very useful, but it is costly
and it is generally deployed on high-priority platforms (high-value assets) in the form
of sonar arrays to enhance detection. Although the focus of this volume is on ships
stealth, nonetheless it is difficult not to make mention of the complementary area of
anti-submarine warfare!
Until relatively recently, ship sonar was usually hull-mounted arrays, either amidships
or at the bows. To reduce water flow noise further, sonar began to be enclosed in metal
frames and then placed within reinforced plastic and rubber. Because of problems of
ship noise (self-noise), towed sonar are also used, which have the advantage of being
able to be placed deeper in the water, a good distance away from the platform itself.
However, there are limits on their use in shallow littoral (coastal) waters. Common
sonar arrangements include linear towed arrays or variable depth sonar (VDS) with
two- or three-dimensional arrays. One example of a modern active/passive ship towed
sonar is the Thales Sonar 2087. Sonar 2087 is a towed array sonar designed to replace
the older Sonar 2031 towed array. Sonar 2087 is described by its manufacturer as a
towed-array system that enables Type 23 frigates to hunt the latest submarines at
considerable distances and locate them beyond the range at which they can launch
an attack [4]. Sonar 2087 is a low-frequency active sonar (LFAS) and consists of both
active and passive sonar arrays, manufactured by Thales in the United Kingdom and
France. Usually mine countermeasure (MCM) sonar are hull mounted, for example, one
example of a hull-mounted MCM sonar is the Type 2193.
The two main threats to ships from sonar-activated devices are torpedoes and
mines. Modern torpedoes are often fitted with active/passive sonar, which can home
directly on a target. To deal with these threats torpedo countermeasures are used,
which can be towed or moved independently. A modern system used is the UK Royal
Navy S2170 Surface Ship Torpedo Defence system. However, mines can also be fitted
with sonar able to detect, locate and recognise targets, making them a very potent
threat indeed. Even helicopters can be used in anti-submarine warfare by deploying
fields of active/passive sonobuoys or by operating dipping sonar, such as the AQS-13
(Figure 6.2).

102 Stealth Warship

Figure 6.2 AN/AQS-13 dipping sonar deployed from an H-3 Sea King
Note: A US Navy Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King helicopter from Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron 15
(HS-15) Red Lions lowers its AN/AQS-13 sonar. HS-15 was assigned to Carrier Air Wing 6 (CVW-6)
aboard the aircraft carrier USS Independence (CV-62) for a deployment to the Mediterranean Sea
from 28 June to 14 December 1979.

To summarise so far, sonar systems can either be passive and consist simply of an
acoustic detector, such as a hydrophone to pick up the noise generated by the ships
themselves, or they can be active systems that work in a manner analogous to radar.
Passive sonar was first used to detect submarines as early as 1916, and by 1918 both
the United States and Britain had built working active systems.

Cavitation
Propellers are by far the noisiest part of a ship because as the propeller blades spin
they create a region of partial vacuum at the trailing edges. Cavitation bubbles, which
first grow rapidly in size and then collapse equally quickly due to the surrounding
high-pressure water, form in lower pressure regions behind the blades. When bubbles
collapse, a great deal of energy is released in the form of acoustic shock waves, which
can even generate light through sonoluminescence. One way to reduce collapsing
cavitation bubble noise, reputedly used by the US Navy, is to inject low-pressure air into

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 103

the partial vacuum behind the rotating blades, which reduces the pressure difference
between the bubbles and surrounding water so that the bubbles collapse more
slowly and more quietly. Swedens Visby stealth corvette avoids cavitation with water
jets instead of propellers. Electric propulsion acoustic insulation also helps to reduce
the overall amount of platform acoustic noise, which includes blade rate noise and
singing. It is no accident then that there is great emphasis placed upon propeller blade
design especially for hunter-killer nuclear-powered submarines to reduce the affects
of singing, blade rate noise and cavitation. Propulsor systems are now becoming more
widespread, having reduced cavitation at high speeds with all moving parts housed in
ducts, so very little sound is radiated directly into the marine environment with a more
laminar flow.
A great emphasis in the Visby is rightly placed on reducing its hydroacoustic
signature. Vibrations generated by engines, gearboxes and so on are transmitted
to the ships superstructure and critically for sonar detection to the hull and from
there to the surrounding water and together with the propulsion unit generates the
dominant features of the platforms hydroacoustic signature. Consequently, the
technical design specification for a given platform will set certain noise limits
against frequency which must be achieved. Similar high technical specifications
will be set for other key ships parameters. Key areas of potential noise include the
low-speed diesel engine, high-speed gas turbine and the main reduction gearbox
of the Visby.

Future Acoustic Technology

However, one successful method to silence a noisy piece of machinery in the future
could be to simply drill holes in the casing that surrounds it. Workers in Spain noticed
a new effect extraordinary acoustic screening (EAS) while firing ultrasonic waves
at mm-thick metal plates underwater. When researchers drilled holes in the plates,
they found a significant drop in transmission at specific frequencies. For ultrasound
with a wavelength of 7mm, a perforated plate reduced transmission by 10dB more
than a solid plate of the same thickness. The plate thickness, its diameter, spacing and
hole arrangement all affect ultrasound transmission. Holes with the same spacing as
the wavelength of sound gave the greatest attenuation [5]. Workers in France have
also designed a metamaterial cloak for water waves 10 cm across, with a shallow
cylindrical metamaterial of 700 short posts that splay from the centre in seven
concentric rings.

104 Stealth Warship

When waves approach the device, liquid enters the gaps and travels faster around
the rings than in the channels leading to the centre. This flow pattern forces liquid
approaching from one side to swirl around, leaving the central region dry [6]. In fact,
it has even been suggested that large-scale versions could deflect tsunamis around
coastlines and prove more effective than dykes.
In summary of acoustic and sonar topics covered here, the key sources of noise that
contribute to a warships acoustic signature include its own active sonar transmissions
and machinery noise. Sonar transmissions are minimised by reducing the time and
sonar power levels that are used with power equating to range. However, most of the
machinery-radiated noise is provided by contributions from a ships diesel engine
and gas turbines, which cannot readily be turned off. Anti-vibration ship engine
mountings will absorb a significant part of this mechanical coupling of sound energy
from the gearbox. In the case of a submarine, rubber or polyurethane tiles, which
look analogous to the heat-absorbing tiles coated on the outer skin of the space
shuttle (but actually have more in common with the radar anti-reflection coatings
discussed in Chapter 1), having broad and narrowband characteristics with multiple
layer coatings are tailored against hostile sonar on the deadly submarine menace of
the deep.

Bioluminescence
The night-time wakes of ocean-going ships are frequently observed from their
bioluminescent flow fields. Ship-wake bioluminescence is well known, and in
fact the last German U-boat detected in the First World War was sunk because it
created a flow field sufficient to generate a significant bioluminescent footprint,
and bioluminescence can give away submarine positions to a vigilant enemy. Pilots
have even followed luminescent trails over many miles to find their aircraft carriers
(including a lost and radarless Apollo astronaut Jim Lovell) [7, 8]. The bioluminescent
wake of a US aircraft carrier has been estimated to be greater than 6km [9]. US Navy
SEALs are taught that there are certain beaches where bioluminescence is likely to
give them away, and Navy crew have even detected the luminous wakes of torpedoes.
Consequently bioluminescent flow-stimulated light emission is now considered a real
threat to current US Navy maritime stealth night-time operations. At the same time,
bioluminescence provides the ideal opportunity in biologically rich coastal waters to
detect an enemy in turn. Bioluminescent occurs dramatically in milky seas where huge
populations of bacteria give the ocean a peculiar glow [10]. Even waving a hand in a

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 105

Figure 6.3 Bioluminescent dinoflagellates producing light in breaking waves

river such as the River Dart in Devon on a dark mid-summers night whilst kayaking, in
my own experience, can produce bright sparkles of light.
Marine bioluminescence is produced by a vast number of creatures, including bacteria,
dinoflagellates (single-celled algae), radiolarians (single-celled marine organisms), jellyfish,
hydrozoa, sea pens, sea pansies and comb jellies. Bioluminescence is especially abundant
in warm coastal regions where nutrients are abundant and life thrives (Figure 6.3).
On 19 January 1991, the MV Benavon was heading for Singapore in the South China Sea,
an area noted for its bioluminescent displays, when significant flashes of light were seen in
the bow wave and the ships wake, appearing to be both on the surface and slightly below,
which links very nicely to one of the last effects we will look at, which is the wake effect.

Wake Effects
A ship at the surface will generate a wake, which not only persists for a long time but is
also easy to see at high altitude and even on satellite imagery. In incompressible liquids
such as water, a bow wake will be created when a warship moves through the medium;

106 Stealth Warship

Figure 6.4 Boat sailing the Lyse fjord in Norway

Note: Picture taken from the Preikestolen.

as water cannot be compressed, it is displaced instead, resulting in a wave. The wake

spreads outward from the source until its energy is sufficiently dispersed (Figure 6.4).
Wake patterns observed around moving ships can be extremely complex. With
displacement-type hull surface vessels in deep water, far from shallow water and narrow
channels, a ship relies on the buoyancy principle for flotation only. All displacement
ships moving through surface water experience four types of motion resistance:
friction, wave making, eddying and air resistance. The first two of which are always
visible when a ship is moving.
If sea water were a perfect fluid with zero viscosity and hulls perfectly smooth, there
would be no frictional resistance. Water would flow smoothly over the hull. However,
water has a finite viscosity, and no hull is exactly smooth. Consequently a hull will drag
a water layer next to it, a so-called boundary layer. Second, if there are sudden changes
in design (e.g. a transom stern) eddying can occur. Boundary layers grow in width from
zero at the bows to a finite width at the stern. As a first approximation, the boundary
layer grows in width in proportion to its length along the hull from the bows, that is, the
wake amidships is half that typically at the stern. The width of the boundary layer at the
stern is reliably estimated to vary anywhere from 5ft for a small vessel up to 30ft or so
for a large vessel like an aircraft carrier. The width and intensity of the boundary layer
also depend on the vessel speed and size.

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 107

Any object moving through surface water will create a disturbance which is observed as a
visible wave pattern. The pattern is fixed or dragged along by the ship like a garment and
at high speed is the dominant part of resistance. The pattern consists of two types of waves:
divergent waves, which start at the bows and stern, and angle aft (wave crests curve and
are not straight), and transverse waves, which originally start out perpendicular to a ships
line of motion, but the further away from the ship they are, the more they curve aft.
Based upon careful observation from countless marine observers, it is noted that at the
bows water is forced higher up the ships side than when further from the hull. This causes
the divergent bows wave to be the first to break. The bows wave rises above the at-rest
waterline, reaching a peak of about 3545ft aft of the stern. Amidships the transverse wave
is perhaps a couple of feet below the at-rest waterline, building up to a height of several
feet above the at-rest waterline some 3445ft forward of the stern. When a divergent wave
grows enough in height it breaks, like breaking beach waves. Once waves break, white
foam appears in bands parallel to the ships side. Foam may extend over 7080ft from the
sides and persist for several ships lengths behind the ship. The presence of the bows wave
has been exploited since the First World War by painting false bows waves onto ships to
confuse U-boat submarine commanders as to the speed and direction of a vessel.
Researchers at the University of Michigan have studied ship wakes for the US Navy, as
wake bubbles are a significant problem which can persist for up to a kilometre behind
military vessels. Radar systems now mounted on satellites are sufficiently sensitive
to detect ship wakes. According to Internet sources, the US Navy recently patented a
technique that may make ships harder to find by eradicating the bubbles as soon as they
appear. As a ship pushes its way through the sea, pockets of air get trapped in the water
flowing round it. These bubbles are caught in strong counter-rotating currents created
by the propellers. Big bubbles stay in the wake for only a short time because they are
more buoyant, but smaller ones can be caught in the wake for a long time, and it is these
small bubbles that make ship wakes easy to spot from the air as they scatter visible light
well. In a test to remove bubbles, several transducers injected 1MHz acoustic waves into
water. Waves were produced which interfered with one another, producing a 3D grid of
high- and low-pressure pockets. It was found that small bubbles, 0.2mm across, drifted
into low-pressure regions where they then formed bigger bubbles, 1.5mm across, now
with sufficient buoyancy to float to the surface [11]. However, active production of
1MHz acoustic waves into water is probably not a practical stealthy solution.
There have also been a number of concerns raised in recent years about the possibilities
that high-power naval sonar transducers may either directly or indirectly be responsible
for the mass deaths of dolphins and other cetaceans in shallow waters. Loud noises
created by sonar may frighten dolphins into shallow waters from which they are later

108 Stealth Warship

unable to escape. It is also possible that sonar may cause them to surface too quickly
while diving, leading to decompression sickness. Certainly it is well known that the
loudest military sonar can reach a level of 235 dB, and anything in the above-water
environment over 100 dB is documented as being harmful to human hearing. One
particular incident in June 2008 was the death of 26 common dolphins stranded in the
narrow creaks of the Fal and Helford estuaries, whilst ships of the Dutch, British and
German fleets were conducting exercise 50 miles further south, with helicopter carrying
powerful mid-frequency sonar of a type previously linked in the media with the deaths
of marine mammals, although no clear evidence was provided. Precautionary enforced
measures for acoustic emission control in established dolphin and diving areas are
therefore sensible, until this controversy is finally resolved.

Extremely Low-Frequency (ELF)

Signature
Galvanic currents flowing in the hull and in the water around the hull can generate
underwater electrical potentials. Under certain conditions, these can cause ELF
electrical fields to be radiated into the water. Detection of the ELF signature can be
prevented by certain basic electrical design measures. Recent research combining
ELF electrical signals recorded along with those of hydroacoustic detection is even
now producing a greater level of sophistication in target detection and identification
than ever before [12]. In this work, classification using data-fusion on real underwater
signatures from surface ships enabled discrimination between small and big ships
based on features extracted from ELF electric (ELFE) and hydroacoustic signatures.
A data set was recorded and analysed in the Baltic Sea off the coast of Sweden for
23 passages of surface ships of various size, divided into small (up to 21,484) and big
(above 21,484) tons displacement.

Likely Future Cross Sections

In the future, further exploitation of the ultraviolet (UV) spectrum is anticipated for
advanced forms of airborne missile detection and possibly surface combatant detection
as well. Although terahertz (1012 Hz) active imaging is becoming well established in

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 109

airport baggage screening (alongside X-ray methods), as well as for medical and
dentistry applications, it is wrong to think of it as a panacea for all imaging issues and
is an unlikely candidate for maritime operations, except perhaps for extremely shortrange, above-water terminal guidance imaging. It would be unable to penetrate the
metal hulls of most platforms to provide any internal structural details. Terrestrial and
sub-surface very low frequency (VLF) imaging, however, has been conducted from
exotic ionospheric stimulated microwave transmissions in the Arctic and has been
able to successfully image underground mine workings in Alaska, but this is on a larger
scale than examination of internal ships compartments combined with the difficulty
of producing intense ELF waves without exciting the earths ionospheric ring current!
However, this may provide avenues of research for maritime sensing as well.
Platforms may incorporate more natural or synthetic materials, such as multiple
wavelength coatings that are becoming increasingly necessary, notably of visible, infrared and microwave wavelengths, stretching the ingenuity of the coating engineers to
the limit to provide a near optimum response across all threat wavelengths. Active
RAM would be an attractive possibility for the future or a surface skin which could
act as a large area living ear to listen for long-range search radar pulse characteristics
and then reradiate low amplitude but out-of-phase pulses to cancel the enemy radar
echoes. Such an outer skin would be able to respond, chameleon-like, to changes in
local environment. Future technologists may also utilise the abundance of water in the
maritime environment for numerous activities, such as directed walls of water for closerange missile defence (as discussed earlier), mist-sprays to defeat the electro-optics of
future sophisticated guided missiles, or to provide ice packs on Arctic patrol vessels to
insulate heat from external thermal imagery detection. Of all these sensing methods
under development, it is likely that satellite tracking of ships in visible, near infra-red,
radar and thermal bands will become more commonplace over the next decade, driven
in part in the first instance by market forces associated with anti-piracy policing in the
troublesome Gulf waters off Somalia and Yemen, and the South China Seas.

Biologically Inspired Design

Biologically inspired design involves using biological principles to solve engineering
design problems, such as replicating the lotus petals extreme water-repellence (or
superhydrophobicity), and is ideal for washing pathogens/chemicals off warship
surfaces. Super hydrophobic surfaces have contact angles greater than 150, showing

110 Stealth Warship

almost no contact between the liquid drop and the surface and is often referred to as
the lotus effect (Figure 6.5).
Modelling dolphin skin may allow scientists to copy their drag-reducing ability
to enhance warship performance whilst minimising acoustic signature, achieving
potentially greater endurance and range. In the future, intelligent optical fibre
surfaces, borrowed from advances in aviation, may warn of cracks and use liquid
crystal to self-heal, mimicking blood clotting from vascular networks. For example,
in nature, liquid crystalline drag-line silk will convert from liquid to solid as it is
squeezed down a spiders spinning ducts, so a similar super strength glue could
potentially repair damage in ship coatings, turbines and rotary composite blades
even as problems begin to arise. From a materials viewpoint, future ship stealth is
very exciting, with metamaterials and composites, and the challenge of embedding
sensory nerve-like networks and healing networks via optical fibres into a platforms
skin. Future use is likely to be made of carbon nanotubes in fabrication for their
considerable strength, and have even been proposed to design a space elevator
cable [13], first suggested, as were satellite communications, by science fiction
writer Arthur C Clarke.
High-power underwater lasers are likely to increase in prominence in combating future
torpedo terminal homing phase design, and could provide a long-range standoff
destruction capability in the underwater environment comparable to Raytheons

Figure 6.5 Water droplet on Lotus leaf

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 111

prototype solid-state laser area defence system (LADS), which successfully detonated
60-mm mortars at ranges greater than 550 yards in 2007 above water.
Advanced chemical sensing systems, mounted on high-altitude aircraft, satellite and
unmanned aerial vehicles, may also allow the telltale chemical emissions of platforms,
nuclear isotopes and Cherenkov radiation (especially from surfaced or near surface
leaky submarines) to be detected at considerable altitude. Recent research has shown
that ship tracks may be detected by the use of ATSR-2 satellite imagery as ships modify
cloud microphysics by adding cloud condensation nuclei (CCN) to a developing
or any existing cloud. These create lines of larger reflectance in cloud fields that are
observed in satellite imagery. In this way, ships are frequently seen off the West Coast
of California, the Atlantic coast of West Africa and South West Europe [14], through
cloud area amplification, making it easier in one sense to see a ship from its trails than
with the use of high-resolution satellite imagery to achieve ship detection, which still
requires detailed image analysis to find vessels hidden in a vast ocean.

Emissions Control Policy

Clearly with so many possible different types of sensor emission from a platform, be
they active signatures or passive cross sections, we would be wise to consider the
impact of communications equipment used onboard and the overall coordination of
all of the ships sensors and communications to have an Emissions Control Policy in
place at all times with various enforced states to ensure that all emissions are kept to
as low a level as strictly necessary for the conditions and operations. A ships stealth
should not be compromised by operator error.
Overall electronic stealth design has become increasingly sophisticated, encompassing
many cross sections and signatures. The ongoing conflict between offensive and
defensive capability will continue this trend, requiring the design of further stealthier
platforms. The ideal of a warship which cannot be detected is unlikely to be achieved
across all energy bands simultaneously, but it is less likely to be detected if signatures are
minimised and increases the probability that decoys and electronic countermeasures
will be more effective against enemy threats. In most cases, this husbandry of
emissions is simple, comprising easily applied safety issues which can readily counter
any unwitting ignorance, such as the use of a mobile phone on the quarterdeck at a
time of rising tension. However, sophisticated electronic systems are quite capable of
generating fake or pre-recorded radio emissions to saturate the airwaves and saturate
an enemys ability to handle the communications traffic.

112 Stealth Warship

Chapter Reflections
1

Consider the benefits of an electromagnetic final terminal phase for a

hypothetical underwater threat.

What laser wavelengths might be the best suited to such a threat as that suggested
in Point 1 and also for design of appropriate laser-based countermeasures?

References
1.

Fahy, F (1998), Fundamentals of Noise and Vibration. Frank Fahy and John Gerard Walker
(eds). Taylor & Francis, Oxford, UK. pp. 375. ISBN 0419241809.

2.

Hill, MN (1962), Physical Oceanography. Allan R. Robinson (ed.). Harvard University Press ,
Harvard, USA. pp. 498.

3.

Seitz, F (1999), The Cosmic Inventor: Reginald Aubrey Fessenden (18661932), vol. 89.
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, USA. pp. 4146. ISBN 087169896X.

4.

http://www2.thalesgroup.com/blogs/farnborough2010/files/2010/07/HMS-SutherlandsSonar-Impresses-on-First-Major-Test.pdf (accessed 22 May 2012).

5.

Estrada, H, Candelas, P, Uris, A, Belmar, F, Garca de Abajo, FJ and Meseguer, F (2008),

Extraordinary sound screening in perforated plates, Physical Review Letters, 101(8): 084302.

6.

Farhat, M, Enoch, S, Guenneau, S and Movchan, AB (2008), Broadband cylindrical acoustic

cloak for linear surface waves in a fluid, Physical Review Letters, 101(13): 134501.

7.

Bityukov, EP (1971), Bioluminescence in the wake of a ship in the Atlantic Ocean and
Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea, Okeanologiya, 11(11): 127133.

8.

Hastings, JW (1993), Dinoflagellates: Cell biochemistry and its regulation of the

millisecond and 24-hour time scale, Naval Research Reviews Bioluminescence in the Sea,
XLV(2): 2130.

9.

Rohr, J, Hyman, M, Fallon, S and Latz, MI (2002), Bioluminescence flow visualization in

the ocean: An initial strategy based on laboratory experiments, Deep-Sea Research, Part I:
Oceanographic Research Papers, 49(11): 20092033.

10.

Miller, SD, Haddock, HD, Elvidge, CD and Lee, TF (2006), Twenty thousand leagues over
the seas: The first satellite perspective on bioluminescent milky seas, International
Journal of Remote Sensing, 27(2324): 51315143.

11.

http://www.marinetalk.com/articles-marine-companies/art/Removing-a-Ships-Wakexxx00095309TU.html.

The Acoustic Threat and Other Signatures 113

12.

Lennartsson, RK, Dalberg, E, Levonen, MJ, Lindgren, D and Persson, L (2007), Fused
Classification of Surface Ships Based on Hydroacoustic and Electromagnetic Signatures.
OCEANS 2006 Asia Pacific, ISBN:978-1-4244-0138-3.

13.

Pugno, NM (2006), On the strength of the carbon nanotube-based space elevator cable:
From nanomechanics to megamechanics, Journal of Physics: Condensed Matter, 18(33):
S1971S1990.

14.

Campmany, E, Grainger, RG and Dean, SM (2008), Detection of ship tracks in ATSR2

satellite imagery, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussion, 8(4): 1481914839.

MODERN
STEALTH SHIPS
To see and yet be unseen, this is the very heart of stealth.
Chris Lavers

This chapter will look at the current generation of warships and marine vessels as well
as the latest prototypes. I will leave future ideas and developments for the reader in
the next chapter. Amongst the vessels to be covered here are the Swedish Visby stealth
corvette, the UK Type 45 Destroyer and its French and Italian variants, the French La
Fayette-class frigate, and the US M80 Stiletto. Of course, by the very nature of stealth,
there may be platforms under development that are not mentioned here, simply
because we do not know about them yet!

Sweden
Visby
The Visby stealth corvette is named after Visby in Gotland County, Sweden (Figure 7.1).
It is probably the best preserved medieval city in Scandinavia and a World Heritage
Site. The name Visby comes from the Old Norse Vis, meaning sacrificial place, and by,
meaning city.
The Swedish Navys Visby-class corvettes are claimed to be the first operational naval
vessels in the world to use fully developed stealth technology to minimise all the

Modern Stealth Ships 115

Figure 7.1 Visby stealth corvette Kockums

obvious signatures discussed in earlier chapters: optical and infra-red, above-water

acoustic and underwater acoustic signature, electrical potential, magnetic signature,
pressure signatures, RCS and other emitted signals. In order to achieve optimum stealth
properties, virtually every part of the vessel was examined, evaluated and adapted to
minimise each signature.
RCS analysis now uses very advanced prediction tools. As an example of work done
to achieve an extremely low RCS, the design process includes the following: shaping,
that is, the otherwise flat hull sides are inclined upward and flat superstructure and
mast surfaces arranged into truncated pyramids. A sandwich surface layered structure
is constructed of carbon-fibre-reinforced plastic (CFRP) for both good surface
conductivity and necessary flatness, but without the starved horse-rib pattern often
associated with steel and aluminium plating fixed onto a supporting framework. The
ability to conceal the installation of weapons, sensors, sonars, cranes, boats and so on
and to ensure that all external doors and hatches are of smart design is of paramount
importance. Stealth adaptation and platform integration are given close attention for
all above-deck equipment, especially with flush-mounted or miniature retractable
antennas so no antennas stick out proud of the superstructure. Frequency selective
surfaces (FSS) also cover some antennas which only allow a radars own frequencies
to pass through, thus protecting the ship against probing radar systems which might
otherwise even be identified from reflections from its own radar! There is also extensive

116 Stealth Warship

use of radar absorbent materials and absorbing epoxy where needed, with special
attention given to the design of all the external features, for example, air intakes and
outlets, windows and so on.
Gas turbine exhausts are concealed in hidden outlets near to the stern water surface
to minimise the thermal visibility of emitted heat rather than from upright traditional
funnels (Figure 7.2). The heat is mixed up into the spray generated by the stern water
jets and is dissipated much more quickly. The CFRP hull is fully non-magnetic and so
has a small magnetic signature, as is the RCS.
The Visbys builders admit that the Visby costs about 50% more than a conventionally
built corvette of the same dimensions, but it has the military advantage of stealth,
and the price difference is anticipated to be recouped over a 30-year projected active
service through lower projected maintenance costs of the composite hull. However,
predicting maintenance costs, especially with a newly designed platform, is not
necessarily an accurate task. Whilst the Visby could be regarded as an extreme case of
building entirely for stealth features, nonetheless stealth features are now considered
amongst the key requirements around which a naval vessel should be designed and
built (Figure 7.3).
The Visby class was built for the Swedish Navy by Kockums [1], and its littoral sea
trials lasted nearly 4 years. Sweden has a considerable border security requirement to

Figure 7.2 Visby Kockums

Modern Stealth Ships 117

Figure 7.3 Stealth corvette under construction Kockums

monitor and defend a coast that stretches for over 2,700km. Against the background
of post-Soviet threats, and in a new millennium of unexpected global terror threats,
the Visby is the first vessel to be fully developed around stealth technology from
conception. Such stealth design will increase its probability of conflict survival under
all these engagement scenarios. The Visby culminates a decades research starting with
HMS Smyge in 1991. The Visby, like the Royal Navys Type 45 Destroyer, is designed to
minimise all the signatures mentioned but obtains the greatest benefit of signature
reduction from its being a much smaller platform (650t vs 7,000t compared with the
Type 45 Destroyer).
The Visbys hull is designed with large flat-angle surfaces constructed for in-shore
operating conditions (Figure 7.4), whereas the Type 45 Destroyer incorporates a
more facetted appearance and uses glass-reinforced epoxy (GRE), more suited to
ocean maritime naval operations although the Visby is not unacquainted with such
requirements (Figure 7.5). Steel is abandoned in favour of composite hull construction,
using a PVC core sandwich with carbon-fibre-laminated composites with good strength
and durability, low weight, low magnetic signature and at relatively low cost.
As of 2012, there are five Visby-class ships, from the first HMS Visby to the most recent
HMS Karlstaad, although a sixth ship was originally intended. Overall ship magnetic
signature is low; its hull is non-magnetic and uses composites lighter than conventional

118 Stealth Warship

Figure 7.4 Picture of HMS Helsingbord in the Mediterranean Kockums

Figure 7.5 Visby at full speed Kockums

steel, increasing both speed and endurance over ordinary vessels, and making it almost
invisible to detection. Racing yachts and patrol boats have been manufactured from
carbon composite materials for many years, but the Visby is the largest ship to date

Modern Stealth Ships 119

made from carbon fibre. According to Rear Admiral Andes Grenstad, Inspector General
of the Royal Swedish Navy,
In the Swedish Navys operational environment, namely the littoral zone, the
stealth technology Visby-class corvettes are the right concept for the future.
After final delivery and commissioning, these vessels will form the core of the
Swedish Navy for years to come. And our stealth concept has already attracted
considerable international attention.
Such is the degree of stealth reduction achieved by the Visby class that there are reports
of notices to mariners being issued to avoid possible collision with stealth ships in the
Channel.

United Kingdom
Type 23 Frigate
On account of the lessons learned in the Falklands Conflict, the Type 23 frigate
(Figure 7.6) design grew in complexity to encompass a medium-calibre gun for
naval gunfire support and the vertical launch seawolf (VLS) system as a defence

Figure 7.6 Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset, July 2006 CR Lavers

120 Stealth Warship

against low-flying aircraft and sea-skimming, anti-ship missiles such as Exocet,
which were used to devastating effect in the Falklands. With the addition of
Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, the Type 23 became a complex warship which
introduced new technologies and concepts to the Royal Navy. These included its
first serious RCS reduction measures, increased automation to reduce crew size,
a combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG) propulsion system providing quiet
running for anti-submarine operations with increased endurance, a fully distributed
Combat Management System (CMS) providing essential built-in redundancy, and
a VLS missile technology. The VLS missile is boosted vertically until it first clears
the ships superstructure and then turns to fly directly to engage the target. This
launch procedure ensures that there are no no-fire zones that would delay or inhibit
missile firing caused by the layout of the ships structure. HMS Norfolk was the first
of the class to enter service, commissioned into the British Fleet in June 1990 at a
then cost of 136 million. In 2005, it was announced that three vessels, including
HMS Norfolk, would be sold to the Chilean Navy. Norfolk was commissioned into
the Chilean Navy on the 22 November 2006 and named Almirante Cochrane (FF-05)
after Lord Cochrane, a naval hero to both British and Chileans, and of Irish descent.
The 4.5in. gun clearly shows the addition of faceting in order to reduce the RCS of
the gun (Figure 7.7), which itself otherwise would return a significant amount of
radar energy.

Figure 7.7 Facetted 4.5in. gun CR Lavers

Modern Stealth Ships 121

Type 45 Destroyer
The Type 45 Destroyer (also known as the Daring class) is the latest state-of-the-art air
defence destroyer programme of the Royal Navy. The Type 45 Destroyer was the first
major project undertaken by the United Kingdoms new Smart Procurement strategy,
a strategy initiated by the then Defence Secretary in 1997. The process evaluated what
combination of capabilities for a new ship were affordable and within budget and
most importantly, for big military projects, to be delivered on time [2]. I will comment
a little further about this aspect later on. In July 2000, expenditure of 5 billion (5,000
million) was approved to procure six Type 45 Destroyers, to replace the ageing Type 42
Destroyers in service at that time. The Type 42 has been in operation since 1978 and
needed a significant step-up in capability. The original proposal required 12 Type 45
platforms, but in July 2004 the UK Ministry of Defence announced that this would
be reduced to 8, and then reduced to 6 in June 2008. An engineering development
and production contract was placed with British Aerospace (BAE) Systems Marine
and VT Shipbuilding in Portsmouth to build the bow sections, masts and funnel, with
production of the first of class HMS Daring (D32) begun on March 2003. First sea trials
began in JulyAugust 2007 with five further weeks of second-stage sea trials taking
place in 2008 focusing on weapons systems, radar and endurance. The vessel finally
completed contractors trials in September 2008, and Daring was formerly handed over
to the UK Ministry of Defence in December 2008, arriving in Portsmouth in January 2009
with commissioning in July 2009. The Type 45s primary function is to provide an anti-air
warfare (AAW) role but also to engage more hostile aircraft or missiles simultaneously
than ever before. At the same time, the principal anti-air missile system (PAAMS) allows
the crew to operate in more hostile warfare environments than previously [3].
The first three ships were all assembled by BAE Systems Surface Fleet from partially
prefabricated blocks whose main sections were built at Scotstoun, Scotland. The Type 45
Destroyer utilises the Sampson (Type 1045) active phased array radar (APAR) in its
PAAMS. Daring also incorporates the S1850M (Type 1046) long-range surveillance
radar behind the integrated main mast. After Darings launch on 1st February 2006,
former First Sea Lord, and veteran of the Falkland Islands conflict, Admiral Sir Alan West,
stated it would be the Royal Navys most capable destroyer ever as well as the worlds
best air defence ship. Daring also represents the largest escort type ever built for the
Royal Navy.
The Type 45 is also the first of all electric frontline warships in the world. Power
generation and propulsion systems are integrated along the lines of a power station,
with electrical power being provided to both the ship and its 20MW propulsion motors
through an integrated high-voltage system. The WR21 complex cycle gas turbine

122 Stealth Warship

Type 45 integrated electric propulsion
High-voltage power generation and propulsion (4.16kv)
WR21
GT

WR21
GT
DG

Ships services
440V
115V

DG

Frequency
converter

Frequency
converter

20MW
motor

20MW
motor

Ships services
440V
115V

Figure 7.8 The power distribution system of a Type 45 Destroyer

is hoped to deliver greater operational flexibility and lower maintenance costs than
previous naval platforms. The Type 45 is also the first ship to utilise advanced induction
motors (Figure 7.8).
HMS Daring (Figure 7.9) was launched by BAE Systems at Yarrows Scotstoun shipyard.
The BAE is the largest defence contractor in Europe, formed by recent merger of two
British companies, Marconi Electronic Systems (MES) and British Aerospace (BAE). The
BAE Systems is involved in several other major defence projects, including the F-35
Lightning II, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers,
which will be the largest platforms of the twenty-first-century Royal Navy dwarfing
even the Type 45 (at a staggering 65,000t).
The Type 45 Destroyer (Figure 7.10) represents the latest generation of the Royal Navys
development of stealth, building upon previous success with the Type 23 frigate, itself
a revolutionary design after lessons learned from the Type 42 Destroyers performance
in the complex littoral environment of the Falkland Islands conflict in the early 1980s
(Figure 7.11).
Daring is the most powerful UK-built destroyer to date, with the vital PAAMS system
designed to allow equipped vessels to protect themselves and any escorted vessels

Modern Stealth Ships 123

Figure 7.9 Destroyer HMS Daring at Scotstoun dockyard on 1st February 2006

Figure 7.10 HMS Daring passing Cloch Pt John Crae

against all missile and anticipated aircraft threats. PAAMS is also capable of operating
close inshore to provide air defence for ground forces, for example, those involved with
amphibious landings (Figure 7.12).

124 Stealth Warship

Figure 7.11 HMS Daring passing Cloch Pt with Dunoon providing the backdrop, July 2008
John Crae

Figure 7.12 HMS Daring arriving at the TOB anchorage for transfer operations for sea trials,
April 2008 John Crae

Modern Stealth Ships 125

PAAMS provides a paradigm shift in capability over other current systems; for example,
the Type 42s Sea Dart system is relatively vulnerable to saturation at low level, whilst
PAAMS Aster missiles were designed from conception to be able to intercept multiple
sea-skimming missiles from its Sylver launcher, and has the capability to launch eight
missiles within 10s. PAAMS was originally intended to be deployed in the Common New
Generation Frigate (CNGF) for the partner nations: Britain, France and Italy. However,
differences in design requirements led to the United Kingdom leaving the then Horizon
frigate project in 1999 to pursue its own national interests and warship design to create
the Type 45 Destroyer.

PAAMS Components
PAAMS (S) is composed of several critical parts: its Sampson multifunctional radar (MFR),
automatic command and control system (C2), its Windows 2000 operating system
and a Sylver vertical missile launcher containing assorted Aster missiles (Aster 15 for
short-range intercept and Aster 30 for medium to long range). The Aster 15 missile
is a short- to medium-range, surface-to-air missile providing ship point defence and
local defence, whilst the Aster 30 provides a longer range anti-aircraft and anti-missile
capability with a range of over 70nm designed to provide area defence. The missile
system is now termed the Sea Viper, and the programme is expected to produce six
warships at a total cost of 6.5 billion.
There has been some discussion about Sea Vipers lack of anti-ballistic missile
capability, whilst the United States (Aegis), Japan, South Korea and other
navies have surface combatants with sufficient anti-ballistic missile capabilities.
Unfortunately, except for the Sampson MFR, PAAMS components do not presently
meet such a ballistic missile defence tasking compared with the American Aegis
and its standard missile combination. However, it is anticipated that future
capacity exists to give PAAMS a theatre anti-ballistic missile (TABM) capacity to
deal with relatively unsophisticated threats such as Scud missiles with a range up
to 600km and which follow a predictable ballistic trajectory. There are also some
critics who rightly point to the more complex Aegis architecture (preferred by
other modern navies such as the future Australia Hobart class) which can perform
a much more varied response, but the minimalistic approach of PAAMS may work
in its favour, and its active phased array technology is extremely advanced and
highly adaptable.
PAAMS operates in conjunction with the Thales S1850M (Type 1046) long-range radar,
the single large radar face structure on the aft section of the Type 45 (Figure 7.13),
rotating at 15rpm, a little faster than the earlier Smart-L radar (12rpm). The long-range

126 Stealth Warship

radar is noticeably inclined upwards to give substantially improved long-range air cover
and is also a phased array-based system, although with less elements than Sampson,
rotating at 30rpm (Figure 7.14).

Figure 7.13 HMS Daring arriving at the Tail o the Banks to transfer personnel onto MV
Cruiser before heading upriver to Glasgow, August 2008 John Crae

Figure 7.14 Type 45 Destroyer John Crae

Modern Stealth Ships 127

Agility
The ship is extremely manoeuvrable, able to turn easily a figure of 8 with a diameter of
some three ships lengths and can routinely incline at significant angles to the normal
when in a turn. It is able to push 30 knots, and under such conditions it typically has a
bow wave just forward of the gun about half way above the waterline. The Type 45, like
the French La Fayette class, makes use of sliding covered panels to conduct activities
such as recovery of rigid inflatable boats (RIB) from the sea with a large four-pronged,
red-tipped claw. Daring has an operations room with modern state-of-the-art displays
and cutting-edge technology so that each operator can sit at a number of LCD screens,
typically with a blue background, onto which radar data and imagery, for example,
thermal view of an attacking aircraft, can be displayed.
The Sampson design was very important in terms of its functions and the capability it
brings to the platform, which in turn has a direct impact on the rest of the ships design.
To work effectively, Sampson must be placed some 30m above the waterline in order
to provide the necessary radar coverage. Its size and weight determine the ships beam
in terms of necessary stability and also its length.
The Daring class uses a new system called integrated electric propulsion (IEP). Dieselelectric engines and gas turbines generate electricity for electric motors to drive shafts.
The high voltage produced is transformed down to provide power supply to the various
weapon systems and the ships hotel services. This power distribution architecture
means electric motors can be placed much closer to the propellers and use a shorter
shaft so that a mechanical gearbox is not needed [4].
Chitale [4] comments on the benefits of integrated full electric propulsion (IFEP):
increased survivability, reduced detectability, reduced manpower, aspects the Indian
Navy are keen to replicate and exploit for its own future warship designs.
From an electrical engineers perspective, IEP means electric motors can be operated
in both directions simply by switching voltage polarity, saving cost and requiring
less maintenance, as does the absence of a gearbox! IFEP can provide a rapid rate of
acceleration. In sea trials, Daring was said to have reached her top speed of 29 knots in
just 70s, reaching 31.5 knots in just over 2min.
A recent report from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee entitled
Ministry of Defence: Type 45 Destroyer (HC 372) raised a number of concerns with the
procurement process [5]. The Type 45 was procured to form the backbone of the Royal
Navys air defence capability for the next 30 years (and potentially beyond), and it will
provide a very impressive capability upgrade compared to the Type 42 Destroyers which

128 Stealth Warship

it was designed to replace. However, the problems encountered on the project have
meant that it will enter service over 2 years later than expected and 1.5 billion over
budget. The UK MOD as a consequence had to extend the life of the Type 42 Destroyers
for much longer as a result and at a further cost of 195 million. The problems on the
Type 45 project resulted from the Departments failure to take sufficient account of the
technical risks involved in such a complex project in its estimates of the likely costs and
timescales to deliver not, as it turns out, especially smart. The Type 45 entered service
in 2009 without a single PAAMS missile having been fired from the ship and without
other equipments and capabilities to enhance the ships ability to conduct AAW
operations, which will not be fitted until after the ship is in service. Although the Type 45
was based on 80% new technology, the Department failed to take sufficient account
of this in its assessment of technical risk. However, the percentage man-hours required
to complete all the subsequent Type 45 platforms was approximately 60% that needed
for Daring, the first of its class. It is hoped that further lessons have been learned from
this that will help in not compromise the Carrier and Future Surface Combatant (FSC
or Type 26) introduction. The reduction in the number of destroyers to six (a highly
controversial decision) means it will be much more challenging for the MOD to meet its
policy requirement of five destroyers at sea for tasking at any time.

Italian and French Destroyer Variants

Italian
The first Italian Horizon-class frigate Caio Duilio (D554) was ordered in October 2000,
built by Horizon Sas and Fincontieri from September 2003 to launch in October 2007
and commissioned in April 2009. The ship was named after the third-century BC Roman
leader and Admiral Gauis Duilius. She has a similar displacement of 6,700t and similar
dimensions to the Type 45 Destroyer. Power is provided by four diesel generators
(1.680kW each). Propulsion is Combined Diesel or Gas (CODOG), with two gas turbine
engines (20.5MW) and two diesel engines (4.32MW each). She can achieve 29 knots
with gas turbines and 18 knots with diesel, achieving a range of 7,000nm at 18 knots
and 3,500nm at 24 knots, and an endurance of 45 days. Caio Duilio has an E/F band
Selex search radar, a 3D European multifunctional phased array radar, providing some
of the functionality of Sampson (Type 1045), and essential to the C2 of PAAMS.
The platforms integrated CMS is based on a Linux system and provides 10 redundant
servers and 24 multifunction consoles (MFC): 19 located in the Primary Combat
Information Centre (CIC), 3 in a remote secondary CIC, 1 in the Admiral CIC and 1 in

Modern Stealth Ships 129

Figure 7.15 The CIC of ITS Duilio

the bridge (Figure 7.15). Authorised users can access tactical data relevant to their role
and common features such as the cameras, the Infra Red (IR) system view, the weapons
engagement plan, status of hardware and software subsystems, flight orders, weather
situation and so on.
The system automatically performs the control and the evaluation of each air target
and suggests possible engagement with missiles, gun fire or jammers. The system can
control 24 Aster missiles simultaneously in flight.
Particular note is made of the ships response to chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) warfare, with a dedicated decontamination station, a series of new
generation sensors for such hazards detection distributed across the ship and an
external prewashing.
The long-range 3D radar used in the ship is the D-band Thales S1850M, common to
the UK destroyer programme. Secondary surveillance radar and navigation radar, the
I-band SPN 753(V)4, is also used. She possesses two multi-sensor target indicators
and a dual-colour (two wavelength), infra-red detection and tracking system (Sagem
Vampir), along with an electronic support measure (ESM) system. The platform also has
a medium-frequency hull sonar, various jammers, decoys and anti-torpedo systems,
besides rapid guns. She and her sister ship Andrea Doria form the Italian Doria class,
whilst the French-equivalent vessels are the Forbin and the Chevalier-Paul.

130 Stealth Warship

France
The French meanwhile have the Forbin (D620), named after Claude Forbin-Gardanne,
a seventeenth-century French Admiral laid down in January 2004 and launched in
March 2005. She was subsequently commissioned in 2008 and in service as of October
2010, and was built by DCNS and Thales group. Forbin, of the Horizon class, has a
displacement of 7,050t and draft of 5.4m, other dimensions being the same as for the
Caio Duilio. However, in addition to the PAAMS Aster missiles, she carries eight Exocet
Block 3 anti-ship missiles. The hull was built in 14 sections, each section 7m high and
between 16 and 20m long. Trials found that the CMS had some problems, delaying
completion of commissioning by several months. By November 2007 these problems
were overcome.

United States of America

M80 Stiletto
The M80 Stiletto is a recently built naval prototype manufactured by the M Ship
Company as an operational experimental platform for the US Navy. It has an unusual
catamaran (pentamaran) hull design which makes extensive use of carbon-fibre
construction for both strength and stealth. The M80 Stiletto is an American vessel
designed primarily for littoral combat and shallow water roles taking its name from the
Italian Stiletto a short dagger. This 27m-long vessel has an M-shaped hull providing a
stable and fast platform for surveillance, weapons and special operations (Figure 7.16).
Its shallow draft means the M80 Stiletto can operate in littoral and river environments
that other naval vessels cannot operate in (due to their draught) and can even allow for
amphibious assault if needed (Figure 7.17). The Stiletto is equipped with four 1,232kW
engines, modest by comparison with the power levels of the Type 45 Destroyer, but
has a top speed over 50 knots and has a range of some 500 NM when fully loaded!
It uses jet drives for shallow water operations and beaching and a small flight deck
for the launch and retrieval of several UAVs. The Stiletto can set up a communications
network between special inserted forces teams by launching a UAV to relay information
between the team and the boat, and can send real-time images to the team on shore.
The ship is 88.6ft long, with a width of 40ft (12m) and a height of 18.5ft (5.6m), and
with a surprisingly small draft of just 2.5ft (0.8m).
The Stiletto is the largest US naval vessel yet built using carbon-fibre composite and
advanced maritime epoxy building techniques, to yield a light but strong hull with a

Modern Stealth Ships 131

Figure 7.16 The crew of the experimental boat ship Stiletto readies the ship as it prepares to
launch a UAV during Exercise Howler. Stiletto is being tested for its usefulness in littoral combat
warfare and interoperable environments.

Figure 7.17 M80 Stiletto during a NAVY SEALs training

very low RCS to avoid radar detection. The M80s hull is unusually wide to capture the
vessels bow wave and redirect the wave energy under the hull. The Stilettos double-M
hull enables the craft to achieve as smooth a ride as possible in rough seas at high
speed, critical for Navy SEALS and Special Operations Forces.
Text by the US Navy: Sailors assigned to Naval Special Clearance Team One (NSCT-1)
prepare to enter the well deck aboard experimental boat ship Stiletto.

132 Stealth Warship

In some ways, this is a practical small-scale supercessor to the US Sea Shadow, which
after its Lockheed Martin test days of the 1980s was for a few years used by Northrop
Grumman for initial research towards the recently abandoned Zumwalt programme.
As a final note perhaps to the history of the Sea Shadow (developed at a cost of a little
over 110 million), this stealthy platform was recently offered to be given away along
with its barge for free to any museum that would take it. The barge itself was built over
35 years ago to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, but since 2005 both have been housed
in San Diego, California.

India
Shivalik and INS Kolkata
The Indian Navys three Shivalik-class frigates have been built at the Mazagaon
dock in Mumbai in the Bay of Bengal with a further seven Shivalik-class frigates
on order. This frigate incorporates stealth features and land attack capability.
Shivalik is a mountain range in the northern Himalayas. The ship is designed for
structural, thermal and acoustic stealth. The first ship of the class INS Shivalik has
now undergone sea trials and originally expected to be commissioned into service
by December 2008. However, it was finally commissioned in April 2010. Indias
multi-role destroyer INS Kolkatas keel was laid in September 2003 and launched in
2006. She was modified extensively to add stealth with rounded and covered sides
to make detection difficult, but unlike the Type 45 was not built primarily around
stealth. Missile launchers and superstructure are also covered in stealth materials
for the same reason. The Kolkata has an efficient gas turbine propulsion system,
allowing speeds above 30 knots and also carries cruise missiles. Kolkata represents
a potent combination of stealth and strength. INS Kolkata is the largest and most
complex Indian multi-role destroyer to date and is armed with supersonic BrahMos
cruise missiles to meet the requirements of this growing regional and international
economy. The Kolkata meanwhile has a 24-cell vertical launch system for surface-toair missiles (SAMs) in its forward and aft areas, and four AK-630 rapid-fire guns. The
ship will have a gun for surface targets. There are also twin-tube torpedo launchers
and anti-submarine rocket launchers. Besides an MFR system, the destroyer has a
Humsa-NG hull-mounted sonar and an active towed array sonar. Kolkata can also
operate two multi-role helicopters. All sensors and weapons are integrated in a
state-of-the-art system, the networking of the weapons and sensors enabling the
ship to combat multiple threats simultaneously.

Modern Stealth Ships 133

Russia
Astrakhan
Russia has also recently unveiled a St Petersburg-built stealth gunboat, the Astrakhan,
with stealth capabilities previously only found on larger vessels such as the Kirov.
The Kirov was named after Sergey Kirov, a Bolshevik revolutionary and famous Soviet
communist (18861934).
The Astrakhan (Figure 7.18) is the first gunboat in the Russian Navys Buyan class to have
stealth capabilities and is armed with various artillery systems previously used only on
Soviet navy destroyers.
According to Navy Commander Vladimir Masorin, Our country (Russia) is still capable of
building combat ships without outside assistance and there is no doubt it will be in the
future. The Buyan-class corvette was designed by Zelenodolsk Design and designated
Project 21630 by the Russian government. This build represents the newest corvette
for the Russian Navy, with the first ship of her class, the Astrakhan, commissioned in
January 2006 and subsequently assigned to the Caspian Flotilla, where it is intended
to spend its entire working life. Astrakhan was built in the Almaz shipyard (established
in 1901), which has built more than 1,000 missile and patrol boats for the Russian
Navy and Coast Guard as well as for foreign clients, including an export version of the
Stevegushchiy corvette the Tiger, incorporating stealth technologies. Certainly there
has been a lot of positioning during 2011 to create interest in overseas sales of similar
Russian-built stealth platforms.

Figure 7.18 Astrakhan corvette from Caspian Flotilla

134 Stealth Warship

France
The La Fayette class (Figure 7.19) is Frances multimillion stealth frigate, which is termed
a 3,000t light frigate or Frgate Lgre Furtive.
These ships are light, multi-mission frigates built by and operated by Frances Marine
Nationale with exported derivative models overseas. Their significantly reduced RCS
is achieved by the design of a very clean upper deck superstructure compared to
conventional designs, reducing the so-called radar microgeometry, with angled sides
and radar absorbent materials, a composite material of wood and glass fibre as hard as
steel, light and fire resistant. It should be noted that a lot of the early stealth materials
were not especially fire resistant and were also highly toxic. Greater stringency on
environmental pollution and health has reduced these hazards significantly.
Most modern fighting ships built around the world since the introduction of the La
Fayette have followed a similar principle of making stealth one of its key design features.
The La Fayette has space available for future installation of the smaller Aster 15 missile,
the latest state-of-the-art, anti-air, pan-European weapon, which is also incorporated

Figure 7.19 La Fayette-class Courbet

Modern Stealth Ships 135

within the arsenal of British Type 45 Destroyer. It currently carries the Crotale shortrange defence system as well as Exocet missiles, which proved deadly to the British
during the Falklands Conflict against Argentina. Ships are designed to accommodate
a 10t helicopter, such as the Panther or NH90 helicopter. These embarked helicopters
can carry anti-ship AM39 or AS15 missiles. France ordered five ships of the La Fayette
class in 1988, the last of which entered service in 2002.
It took several years to develop the concept, and the first ship was launched in 1992. This
class is well-suited to hostile environments and was designed to operate in complex
conflict zones. The weapon system testing took place in 1994, and extensive trials
proved the structure of the ship under a wide range of conditions. The La Fayette itself
was commissioned in March 1996. At that time, the La Fayette class really was the stateof-the-art in stealth for warships with an approximate 10 surface tilt across the entire
superstructure. The shape of the hull and its superstructure was designed to minimise
radar signature, by up to 60%, so a 3,000t La Fayette would have the radar signature of
a 1,200t ship making its various radar decoys more effective. Stealth is achieved with
inclined surfaces and superstructure: mooring equipment is internal, and prominent
structures are covered over by plates. The superstructure is also built using synthetic
radar absorbent materials. The La Fayettes RCS is equivalent to that of a large fishing
boat, which makes radar camouflage amidst civilian ships easy perhaps by indicating a
less capable corvette, which might lead an enemy to critically underestimate the ships
capabilities. In case of direct attack, a smaller radar signature will help it to evade enemy
missiles or fire control systems. The La Fayette is equipped with radar deception jammers
that can generate realistic false radar images as well as decoy launchers. The La Fayette
also has a low thermal signature, given that it uses low-power diesel motors and a special
heat dissipation system. A conventional funnel is replaced by small sets of pipes, aft of
the mast, which are able to cool exit gases before their release into the atmosphere.
Unlike the United Kingdom, French ships usually operate in warm waters of the
Mediterranean or its overseas territories, which further decreases the thermal contrast
with the environment. Magnetic signature is reduced and acoustic signature minimised
by mounting engines on elastic supports, which transmit fewer vibrations to the hull,
and it has rubber coatings on its propellers. La Fayette is also equipped with the Prairie
Masker active acoustic bubble camouflage system, which generates small bubbles
from underneath the hull to confuse sonars.
The La Fayettes superstructure blends into the hull with only a slight change in
inclination, and it is made of light alloy and GRP, which allow a reduction in overall
top weight. This provides reasonable resistance to fire. Vital zones are additionally
armoured with Kevlar and important systems have redundancy built in similar to
the Type 23 frigate. The La Fayette class were built with a modular approach from
11 prefabricated modules, delivered to the shipyard and assembled there. This same

136 Stealth Warship

approach was followed by the recent Type 45 and Horizon Class and resulted in a very
short construction time of under 2 years. The cable deck is covered to reduce the radar
signature, with seamanship evolutions completed through temporary openings in the
hull. The hull has a pronounced angle at the stern with a short forecastle integrated
into the superstructure, whilst the ship's sides have a negative inclination of 10. The La
Fayettes single anchor is located exactly on the stern, into which it is recessed. Similarly
the deck where seamanship equipment and capstans are installed is also internalised
to hide it from radar. The superstructure is built in one piece and directly integrated into
the fully assembled hull. This superstructure runs continuously down to the helicopter
hangar, on top of which short-range, anti-air Crotale missiles are installed. There are two
masts, a main mast with a pyramidal structure which integrates funnels and supports
the antenna of the French Syracuse satellite system, and a second mast which supports
the main ships radar. Incidentally the lead ship, La Fayette (F710), was featured in the
17th James Bond film Golden Eye in 1995 as the site for the unveiling of the Eurocopter
Tiger which is subsequently stolen in the film.
Frances La Fayette-class multi-mission stealth frigate is now widely available in Saudi
Arabia, Singapore and Taiwan, and is powered by diesel-electric engines. They have a
maximum speed of 25 knots and 7,000nm range endurance.

Saudi Arabia
Al Riyadh
The three Al Riyadh-class ships are an expanded version of the La Fayette class, displacing
some 4,700t. The ships combat system is produced by Armaris and also armed with
the Aster 15 missile. The Aster missiles also use the Sylver launcher, common to the
Type 45 Destroyer. As with the La Fayette class, the primary offensive weapon is its
anti-surface Exocet missile.

Singapore
Formidable-Class Frigate
The Republic of Singapores French-built Formidable-class frigate is also comparable
in size to the La Fayette class but differs from that class and the Al Riyadh class in
the armament it carries. In place of the Exocet missile is the US Boeing Harpoon.

Modern Stealth Ships 137

The main gun is a stealth cupola equipped with a 76 mm gun replacing the usual 100 mm
automatic gun. The Formidable class uses the SYLVER launcher/Aster missile
combination also found on the Type 45. The first ship, RSS Formidable, was built by
DCN, while the remaining ships were constructed by Singapore Technologies Marine.
Maximum speed is 27 knots (50 km h1) with a maximum range of 4,200 nm, making it
the fastest and most mobile variant. The Republic of China (Taiwan) Navy is also seeking
to upgrade its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Six ships are configured for
ASW and surface attack. Exocet is replaced by a Taiwanese surface attack missile, and
the AAW weapon is the Chaparral, an elderly SAM system now considered less adequate
for defence against aircraft and anti-ship missiles than when first conceived. The class
maximum speed is 25 knots and has a maximum range of 4,000 nm.

Germany
Braunschweig
The stealthiest of its platforms is the Braunschweig-class corvette. This ship includes
stealth and is similar in some respects to the US Arleigh Burke class, which also employs

Figure 7.20 The Thales Nederland APAR, mounted on the German Sachsen-class frigate
Hamburg (F 220)

138 Stealth Warship

stealth technology but was not built around it. This German stealthy ships shape is
achieved by fabricating a hull and superstructure with a series of slightly protruding
and retruding surfaces (a little bit like the dimples on a golf ball but on a larger scale)
and has been extensively applied on other German vessels. Sloped surfaces are also
used extensively on Sachsen-class frigates, and angling is visible on the APAR mast
(Figure 7.20).

China
Yantai
China unveiled her first stealth radar-evading warship Yantai in July 1999, and this
is expected to make a significant contribution to the modernisation of the Chinese
Navy. On its maiden 120-day voyage of 9,000 miles, over 300 faults were discovered
and rectified, not surprising for a platform with 30% of its equipment newly designed.
Similar teething problems are encountered on every new ships platform and
during its sea trials; the first of a Royal Navy fleet of six T45 destroyers with 80% new
technology was no exception. Work on new Chinese warships has progressed rapidly.
Project 523B guided-missile frigate, Yantai, entered service in 2003. At least three of

Figure 7.21 Chinese ship with disruptive naval camouflage

Modern Stealth Ships 139

Figure 7.22 Chinese ship without disruptive naval camouflage

her sister ships were under construction in 2004. Although details about the Chinese
warship programme are somewhat vague, it is know that China is also developing a
number of smaller stealth vessels with highly distinctive visual camouflage markings
(Figures 7.217.22). Similar camouflage is currently marketed by a Canadian company
under the registered trademark of Hyperstealth [6].
Several other surface vessels employ stealth technology, such as the Evertsen, the
Dutch Zeven Provincien-class frigate; Turkish MILGEM corvette; Norwegian Skjoldclass patrol boat; Chinese Houbei-class missile boat; Finish Hamina-class missile boat;
and Chilean patrol vessels. These vessels have much vested in stealth: the element of
surprise and survivability elements of warfare, elements that are unlikely to diminish in
importance in the near future.

Chapter reflection
1. Compare the different ships discussed in this chapter in terms of capabilities
(see appendix for further details) and contrast the different methods used to
achieve stealth for the relevant cross sections and signatures.

140 Stealth Warship

References
1.

http://www.kockums.se/.

2.

Phillips, LD (2011), The Royal Navys Type 45 story: A case study, Chapter 3, in A Salo,
J Keisler and A Morton (eds), Portfolio Decision Analysis: Improved Methods for Resource
Allocation, International Series in Operations Research and Management Science 162,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-9943-6, New York: Springer Science and Business Media, LLC.

3.

Comptroller and Auditor General (2009), Ministry of Defence: Providing Anti-Air Warfare
Capability: The Type 45 Destroyer: Report. HC (200809), vol. 295. London: The Stationery
Office.

4.

Chitale, Captain SS (2010), Integrated full electric propulsion, Journal of the Institution of
Engineers (India), 90: 1822.

5.

House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. (2009). Ministry of Defence: Type 45

Destroyer, Thirtieth Report of Session: Report. HC (200809), vol. 372. London: The Stationery
Office Limited.

6.

www.hyperstealth.com.

FUTURE NAVAL
STEALTH
PLATFORMS
It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive
naval force we can do nothing denitive
President George Washington, 1781

The book so far has examined the history of stealth and the key aspects of stealth
technology, and reviewed the current generation of stealth vessels and prototype
vessels. This last chapter is more difficult to finalise as it considers ships in the
initial planning stage and those in early build, as well as one recently abandoned
stealth vessel (which will feed into future US surface platforms), and various ideas
that may be incorporated into other future surface combatant (FSC) platforms,
particularly those concepts drawn from developments in the aviation industry.
Consequently this chapter is in some respects the most interesting and yet may
be the furthest from the mark when considered in reflection in 10 years time!
From an authors viewpoint, the twists and turns of changes in government and
a changing background of costs is apparent in discussions of the chosen aircraft
for the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, requiring several rewrites the last
being May 2012.

142 Stealth Warship

Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier

In the United Kingdom, we have designed platforms envisaged to incorporate stealth
for the future. The Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, formerly Carrier Vessel Future
(CVF) project, are a two-ship class of aircraft carrier being developed for the Royal Navy
with some aspects of stealth which will enable decoy systems to be more eective
(Figure 8.1). HMS Queen Elizabeth was originally expected to enter service in 2014, HMS
Prince of Wales a little later in 2016. However, on 19 October 2010, the government
announced the results of its Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Only one
carrier is now certain to be commissioned; the fate of the other is undecided. The
second ship of the class may be placed in extended readiness to maintain a singlecarrier strike capability when the other is in ret or to provide the option to generate
a two-carrier strike ability. But I will give a little more detail about this decision later.
Both vessels are intended to displace about 65,000 t (full load), with a length of 280 m
to provide a ight deck sucient to provide the capability to launch up to 50 aircraft.
This is comparable in displacement to about 10 Type 45 Destroyers or 20 Type 23s
(Figure 8.2)! So to try and make the platform invisible is clearly an unrealistic objective.

Figure 8.1 Diagrams depicting Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, a future UK carrier
incorporating stealth

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 143

Figure 8.2 The US Navy aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) (left) steams alongside
the British Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (R06) in the Persian Gulf on 9 April 1998.
Note: The two ships were operating in the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Southern Watch,
which was the US and coalition enforcement of the no-y zone over Southern Iraq. The CVF
carriers will be closer in size to a Nimitz-class carrier than the Invincible-class ships they replace.

However, the need to replace the ageing Invincible-class aircraft carriers was beyond
doubt and conrmed by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR).
In September 2002, the MOD announced that the Royal Navy and RAF would jointly
operate a stealthy short take-o and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Lightning II
variant and that the future carriers would be conventional carriers, adapted for STOVL
operations. In January 2003, MOD further announced that Thales had won the design
competition, with BAE Systems Surface Ships operating as prime contractor providing
40% of the project. These companies are now part of a carrier alliance with the MOD
and other companies. The contract for the vessels was announced in July 2007.
First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathan Band was quoted as saying of the ships that [t]hese
ships are our insurance policy for our national security, maintaining stability and peace
and, if necessary, ghting, and [t]hese ships will be able to deliver air power anywhere
in the world that we need it. The dimensions of the Queen Elizabeth are 280 m long,
70 m wide, 56 m keel to masthead, up to 40 aircraft including a hanger 150 m long
with 20 aircraft slots and enough space for six Chinooks, and a ships company of 1,450.
The ship will have a 11 m draft and house 10 decks, and both carriers were together
estimated to cost 3.6 billion; again I will return to this issue of cost a little further.

144 Stealth Warship

A Brief History of the Build So Far

On 25 January 1999, six companies were invited to tender for the projects
assessment phase British Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Marconi Electronic
Systems, Thomson-CSF and Raytheon. In November 1999, the UK MOD awarded
detailed assessment studies to two consortia, one led by BAE Systems and the other
by the Thales Group. The brief required multiple designs from each consortium with
anticipated air groups of up to 40 Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA). Contracts were
split into two phases, the rst a 5.9 million phase for design assessment, forming part
of the aircraft selection, whist the second 23.5 million phase involving risk reduction
on the preferred carrier design option.
In January 2001, the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
US Department of Defense for full participation in the JSF programme, conrming the
JSF as the FJCA. In September 2002, the STOVL F-35B Lightning II variant was selected
for STOVL operations. The carriers are expected to remain in service for up to 50 years,
and planned to be future proof, allowing them to operate a second generation of
aircraft beyond the F-35.
The contract for the vessels was announced in July 2007 by the Secretary of State
for Defence, ending delays over costs and naval shipyard restructuring. The cost
was estimated initially as 3.53.6 billion. Contracts were signed in July 2008 after
the creation of BVT Surface Fleet through the merger of BAE Systems Surface Fleet
Solutions and VT Groups VT Shipbuilding a requirement set by the UK government.
In October 2010, the UK government announced the results of the SDSR which stated
that only one carrier would be commissioned. This has several implications for UK
carrier strike capability and was the subject of a House of Commons Committee of
Public Accounts report [1]. Oral evidence provided by Ursula Brenna, Permanent UnderSecretary of MOD to Mr Richard Bacon, in July 2011 conrmed the view that originally
the MOD should have had two aircraft carriers for just over 3.6 billion. However, the
United Kingdom will now only get one useable aircraft carrier for nearly twice that
gure (6.24 billion). There are also further total cost uncertainties as there is some
other equipment included in the carrier design which needs to be fully quantied. This
stands against the 1998 SDR, which was then committed to replace the three existing
Invincible-class aircraft carriers with two larger more versatile carriers. The current
projection is the United Kingdom will have no xed-wing carrier aircraft capability for
20122020, and is reduced to a single operational carrier with signicantly reduced

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 145

availability at sea when carrier strike capability is reintroduced in 2020. Certainly the
carrier variant will be more capable with greater operational range (10,000 NM) and the
ability to carry a heavier payload than previously. However, it will require installation
of catapults and arrestor gear to assist aircraft in both take-o and land. The proposed
technology has yet to be tested, and the version the United Kingdom intends to buy
will be unique to Britain a key risk element.
The costs of converting the carrier for use with the carrier variant aircraft (the STOVL
variant of the JSF) would not be known until late 2012 at the earliest. The decision
of the nancial benet from converting to the carrier variant aircraft, against what
it would cost to convert the aircraft carriers (providing a large potential saving by
moving to this variant aircraft), appears to have been made in advance of any denitive
costing as the accurate gure will not be available until after the 18-month conversion
development phase costs and risks report is submitted! However, initial assessment
seemed to support this move and it should be added that available manpower is also a
factor in the decision to provide only one operational aircraft carrier.
To start with, there should be six operational xed-wing aircraft on the carrier at its
inception in 2020, as the rst half of the rst squadron of 12. At this stage, and after it,
the gure of aircraft is uncertain. Certainly the MOD had stated a requirement for the
carrier strike capability to be able to generate daily sortie rates of 72 with 36 fast jets
embarked. As a result of the SDSR decision, the sortie rate will be reduced to 20, which
leads to the question of whether with fewer planes the carriers will be able to full their
role as outlined for them in the National Security Strategy. Proportionally, a daily sortie
rate of 20 could be delivered by only 10 FJCA, not even a full squadron. The STOVL
aircraft is also more complicated than the more conventional aircraft. It has an extra
engine and is trying to do complex things, such as a STOVL. It also has a smaller bomb
bay, which may create diculties for existing sized weapons.
On entering service, the Queen Elizabeth is anticipated to achieve a top speed of 25
knots, with power supplied by two Rolls-Royce Marine Trent MT30 36 MW gas turbine
generators and four tried and tested Wrtsil diesel generator sets (two 9 MW and two
11 MW sets). These generators are the largest ever supplied to the Royal Navy, which
feed the low-voltage system that supplies the tandem electric propulsion motors
driving the twin xed-pitch propeller shafts. Interestingly a non-propulsor technology
has been chosen in spite of this producing less acoustic noise.
The ight deck is equivalent to three football pitches, with two small islands instead of a
traditional large, single island. The forward island will control the ships functions, while
the aft island is for air trac control (ATC). Beneath the ight deck are a further nine
decks, with a hangar deck measuring 509 by 109.9 ft and height between 22 and 33 ft,

146 Stealth Warship

large enough to accommodate 20 xed- and rotary-wing aircraft. To transfer aircraft
from the hangar to the ight deck, the ships will have two large lifts, each capable of
lifting two F-35-sized aircraft from the hangar to the ight deck in 1 min.

Radar and Weapons Systems

The ships radars will be the BAE Systems Type 1046 long-range radar, as tted to the
Type 45, for wide area search, and the BAE Systems Artisan 3D maritime mediumrange radar and a navigation radar. The BAE claims the Type 1046 has a fully
automatic detection and track initiation that can track up to 1,000 air targets at a
range of 400 km, whilst Artisan is reputed to be able to track targets the size of a shell
over 12.5 miles away.
Munitions and ammunition handling is achieved with a highly mechanised weapons
handling system (HMWHS). This is the Royal Navys rst naval application of this common
land-based warehouse system. The HMWHS moves palleted munitions from magazines
and weapon preparation areas, along set tracks and via lifts (forward and aft, port and
starboard). Tracks can carry a pallet to magazines, the hangar, weapons preparation
areas and the ight deck. Magazines will be fully automated for the rst time, pallet
movement is controlled instead from a central location; men are only needed when
munitions are initially stored or prepared, which speeds the delivery and reduces the
needed crew size. However, the ships only self-defence is the Phalanx CIWS to counter
airborne threats, with mini-guns and 30 mm cannons to counter seaborne threats.

Embarked Fleet Air Arm?

The carrier is expected to carry 40 aircraft, for example, 35 F-35s and 5 helicopters,
although the nal number is uncertain. In my view, the ill-timed forced retirement of the
Harrier GR7/9 in 2010 (which was done rather than retiring the Tornado, an aircraft still
required for its ground attack role which the Typhoon has yet to develop fully) leaves the
Royal Navy and RAF with a lamentable lack in current carrier-capable, xed-wing aircraft
availability. This decision has created an avoidable temporary capability shortfall.
Both ships were originally intended to carry the STOVL version, the F-35B. In October
2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the United Kingdom would

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 147

change their order to the F-35C carrier variant, and both platforms would be modied
to use a suitable CATOBAR system for launch and landing aircraft, so the cheaper F-35C
variant with its greater range can carry a larger and more diverse payloads than the
F-35B. However, on May 2012, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond announced the
F-35C now had developmental problems and it would now be cheaper to order F-35B
jump jets as originally planned! Unfortunately, this reversal will cost about 100 million.
F-35C delays would have meant aircraft would enter service from 2023 onwards
3 years later than planned. Financially, scrapping the CATOBAR system does put two
possible carriers into operational service. The estimated cost of the CATOBAR system
had increased from 950 million to 2 billion and rising. Putting the F-35B STOVL
back raises individual aircraft cost from 59.9 to 65.5 million, but without any carrier
adaptation costs. The government was criticised for this decision, but it makes nancial
sense in spite of being a real U-turn and should be valued for restoring two carrier
platforms. As I previously stated, the electromagnetic launch system is an untested UK
technology, and it is wiser to go for a tried and tested technology at this stage rather
than after an expensive 2 billion conversion failure!
The remaining factor to consider is the availability of aircrew. With the Harrier scrapped
(and sold to the Americans who quickly bought them all up), and the view that STOVL
skills were no longer needed, most of the highly skilled Harrier pilots were made
redundant, with a few retained training to y the F-18. It is lamentably easier to build a
platform than to prevent skills fade or to hone those skills in the rst place.

Carrier Construction
The carrier build is being undertaken by four companies across seven shipyards,
with block integration and assembly at Rosyth by BAE Systems Surface Ships: Govan
(lower blocks 3 and 4), Scotstoun (aft island) and Portsmouth (lower block 2 and
forward island); Babcock Mari: Rosyth (sponsons, mast and centre blocks 5 and 6)
and Appledore (lower block 1); A&P Group: Hebburn (centre block 3); and Cammell
Laird: Birkenhead (centre blocks 2 and 4). In December 2007, eight diesel engines and
electricity generators, four for each ship, were ordered from Wrtsil. In March 2008,
contracts for 80,000 t of steel were placed with Corus Group (value 65 million). Other
contracts included 4 million for aviation fuel systems, 3 million for bre-optic cable
and 1 million for reverse osmosis equipment, providing 500 t of fresh water daily. In
April 2008, a contract for manufacture of the specialist F-35C aircraft lifts (13 million)
was awarded to MacTaggart Scott of Loanhead, Scotland.

148 Stealth Warship

In May 2008, the UK Treasury announced it would provide further funds beyond the set
defence budget to commence carrier construction.
In September 2008, MOD announced several other key equipment contracts: 34 million
for the HMWHS, 8 million for supply of uptake and down-take systems, 5 million for
ATC software, 3 million for supply of pumps and associated systems, and 1 million for
emergency diesel generators. In October 2008, it was announced that contracts had
been placed for the Rolls-Royce gas turbines, generators, motors, power distribution
equipment, platform management systems, propellers, shafts, steering gear, rudders and
stabilisers. Carrier construction at peak will involve over 10,000 people in 90 UK companies,
with 7,000 employed directly in the seven shipyards building the ships sections.

HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08)

The rst steel was cut for the project in July 2009, signalling the start of construction
of lower block 3 at BAE Systems Clyde, followed by lower block 4 in January 2010
(gure 8.3). Meanwhile, construction of the bow lower block 1 completed in
March 2010 at Appledore, North Devon. In January 2010, it was announced that

Figure 8.3 Section of lower block 1 (Bulbous bow) of HMS Queen Elizabeth at Rosyth

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 149

Cammell Laird has also secured a 44 million contract to build the carriers ight decks.
In August 2011, the 8,000 t lower block 3 of HMS Queen Elizabeth left BAEs Govan
shipyard on a large barge to travel 600 miles around the north coast of Scotland,
arriving in Rosyth on the 20th August.
In November 2011, it was announced that the Queen Elizabeth would not be nished
in a CATOBAR conguration, in spite of earlier assurances, which has considerable
consequences for F-35C operations. The First Sea Lord Admiral Stanhope said, Current
navy assumptions will see the second-in-class aircraft carrier tted with catapults and
arrestor wire ready to operate the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter carrier variant in 2020,
but the fate of HMS Queen Elizabeth, which will launch rst and be used to train crews
in handling HMS Prince of Wales, is less certain [2]. Training of embarked ight crew
will be aected by this decision. The May 2012 Defence Secretary announcement
will see these shortfalls and several important operational issues back on the road
to recovery.
Under present plans, HMS Queen Elizabeth will enter service in 2016. Construction
on the second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, began in May 2011 when then Defence
Secretary Liam Fox cut the rst steel. In November 2011, the First Sea Lord
Admiral Stanhope conrmed that the Prince of Wales will be tted to a CATOBAR
conguration, a conversion which is expected to increase the total cost, potentially
to over 6.2 billion. HMS Prince of Wales, entering service in 2018, would only be the
second ship in the world tted with the American electromagnetic aircraft launch
system (EMALS). I am not holding my breath that there will be no future changes,
but it is very unlikely to be another last minute U-turn on this particular issue of the
aircraft variant!

UK FSC or Type 26 Frigate

The Future Surface Combatant is a generic expression describing developments
in several navies worldwide. The Royal Swedish Navy, for example, with its current
Visby-class corvette (one might say a littoral surface combatant (LSC) of the future
already here today), is even now thinking ahead to the mid-twenty-rst century
with the intent to build modular multifunction corvettes which can operate in the
littoral zone and potentially outside of it on a global scale [3]. The US Navy is also
looking to the future with its own littoral combat ship (LCS) seeking scaled, modular
war-ghting capability with a 40-knot spring speed and shallow draft [4]. Lockheed

150 Stealth Warship

Martin has also undertaken preliminary design work on an LCS proposed to the Israeli
Navy (known as the LCS-I), with additional interest drawn from Saudi Arabia. However,
Israel is now believed to favour its own LCS development in Israel, whilst French interest
lies with its FutuRe European Multi-Mission (FREMM) frigates [5]. Meanwhile the British
are looking to the Type 26, or Global Combat Ship (GCS), as its FSC [6, 7].
The Type 26 frigate or GCS is a ship programme underway by the Ministry of Defence.
The rst Type 26 frigate is expected to enter service after 2020 to replace the 13 Type
23 frigates still in service. In March 2010, the BAE Systems Surface Ships was awarded
a 4-year contract to develop the Type 26 variant of the GCS. The 2010 SDSR rearmed
the UK governments commitment to the FSC, stating that [a]s soon as possible after
2020 the Type 23 will be replaced by Type 26 frigates, designed to be easily adapted
to change roles and capabilities depending on the strategic circumstances [8]. The
platform will incorporate existing available stealth technology but is unlikely to include
many new stealth concepts or new technologies as the priority is to produce as many
versatile FSCs as cheaply as possible.
Plans for an FSC escort vessel to replace the Royal Navys ageing Type 22 and Type 23
frigates started in 1998 with the RV Triton, to see if a trimaran design was practical for
such a large and complex vessel. However, by early 2000, the Royal Navy favoured a
more conventional design. In March 2005, plans were released for a two-class solution,
a cheaper medium-sized vessel derivative and a more capable versatile surface
combatant [9].
In 2006, the MOD started a Sustained Surface Combatant Capability (S2C2) programme
to explore eciencies and synergies between the FSC and the need for updated
minesweepers, patrol ships and survey ships. By early 2007, this generated three
requirements: C1, C2 and C3. C1 was to be an ASW platform, C2 a general purpose
platform and C3 a Global Corvette replacing a larger number of smaller vessels.
In early 2010, the C3 variant was dropped in favour of the Mine Countermeasures
Hydrographic and Patrol Capability (MHPC) programme to update the mine
countermeasures vessels (MCV) capabilities currently provided by RN Sandownclass minesweepers (and also by the US Navys Avenger class). The FSC concept was
brought forward in the 2008 budget, at the expense of two Type 45 destroyers. In
2009, the BAE Systems received a contract to design the C1 and C2 frigates with a
planned 25-year lifespan.
In March 2010, the BAE Systems was given a 4-year, 127 million contract to design
the Type 26 GCS (formerly the FSC C1). It was conrmed that the rst of these Type 26
frigates is expected to be delivered to the Royal Navy by 2020. The SDSR then decided
to merge the remaining two FSC classes into the Type 26 GCS. The Type 26 will combine

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 151

advantages of both variants into a versatile ship, designed to readily change roles and
capabilities depending on the strategic circumstances at least this is the intent.
As a result of the SDSR, the Royal Navys escort eet is left with a modest 19 destroyers
and frigates (6 Type 45 destroyers and 13 Type 23 frigates) and may struggle to meet
anticipated (apart from unanticipated) requirements. Unlike the original FSC, the GCS
will have only one hull design. The current design has a length of 148 m, beam of 19 m,
top speed of at least 26 knots (48 km hr1) and a crew of 130 with room for 36 embarked
troops. It will have 60 days endurance and a range of 7,000 miles at 15 knots (28 km hr1).

Weapons and Systems

These ships will use the Artisan 3D search radar, Sonar 2087 (towed array sonar) and
Sea Ceptor, common anti-air modular missile (CAMM) air defence missiles launched
via a vertical launch seawolf (VLS). In addition, like the Type 23 frigates they replace,
the Type 26 frigate will be equipped with a torpedo launching system with existing
or next-generation acoustic homing torpedoes. It is expected that the Type 26 frigate
will be equipped from inception with two quad, anti-ship missile launchers (e.g. eight
harpoon missiles), unlike the Type 45.
The Type 26 will be tted-out with guns of various calibres. Primarily it is expected
that the main gun will consist of either the 127 mm, medium-calibre gun or the BAE
Systems 4.5 in. Mark 8 naval gun. In addition, smaller guns will be included.

Modular and Flexible

The GCS is designed to be modular and exible to enhance versatility across its
full operational range: maritime security, counter piracy and terrorism as well as
humanitarian and disaster relief operations. In the stern, a mission bay with a ramp
allows RIB deployment and unmanned surface vehicles or towed array sonar storage.
The well deck at the back permits unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) launch and
recovery. Aircraft similar in size to the Boeing Chinook can also y from the large ight
deck, and the hangar can accommodate either Merlin or Wildcat helicopters. The
ight deck and hanger can additionally accommodate UAVs.

152 Stealth Warship

United States of America

US Navy DD(X) Zumwalt
The DD(X), the US Navys future multi-mission surface combatant, will signicantly
shape the future of the US Navy and its operational eectiveness well into the second
half of the twenty-rst century, although the programme has now been discontinued
due to budgetary constraints (Figure 8.4).
Zumwalt, named after former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr, is
the lead ship of the DD(X) destroyer programme, planned to be a next-generation,
multi-mission surface combatant tailored for land attack and littoral dominance with
capabilities that defeat current and projected threats. The remarkable revolution in
design, development and construction is comparable in naval terms to the revolutionary
development of the swept wing or the turbo jet engine. At 14,000 t, DD(X) should prove
a formidable ship, and will patrol from the temperate waters of the Persian Gulf to the
freezing waters of the North Atlantic.

Figure 8.4 An artist rendering of the Zumwalt-class destroyer DDG 1000, a new class of multimission US Navy surface combatant ship designed to operate as part of a joint maritime eet,
assisting Marine strike forces ashore as well as performing littoral, air and sub-surface warfare.

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 153

Size oers greater survivability and allows a warship to absorb the eects of small
attacks. It is widely recognised that any ship below 100 m length, in spite of design
materials, is likely to be destroyed if struck with a modern surface-to-surface, anti-ship
missile. DD(X) is an advanced, expeditionary combatant for a new age of naval warfare,
combining revolutionary land attack capability with the ability to protect itself in all
environments, especially the littoral. It will deliver Tomahawk missile strikes to pinpoint
accuracy. According to John Nilsson, one of the designers, the RCS will be reduced by
99%, a very big improvement. The cost of the platform will be $2.8 billion, also a very
signicant gure! The DD(X) will oer full-spectrum signature management to cloak it
from a variety of detection and targeting methods (Figure 8.5).
Its signature-dampening characteristics will change how the US Navy ghts, forcing
its enemy to alter the way he ghts in turn, hopefully to American advantage. With the
DD(X)s low signatures hidden among signicant clutter of the littoral environment,
ship commanders may develop new maritime dominance tactics. By complicating
the enemys detection and engagement, the DD(X) will stretch tactical advantages by
limiting the eective distance of hostile sensors and weapons and increasing the space
in which ships can safely operate.
The design will necessitate changes to the appearance of future military ships in the
same way that stealth technology changed the appearance of new military aircraft
such as the F-117 ghter and B2 bomber. Whilst stealth technology has several
aspects, one in particular is the careful control of exterior surfaces which requires
precision fabrication technology, from its stainless steel substructure to its glassreinforced composite panels. According to Northrop Grumman, The DD(X) will

Figure 8.5 Zumwalt infrastructure CR Lavers

154 Stealth Warship

be as revolutionary as the Dreadnought was when the British introduced it at the
turn of the last century. However, as of late July 2008, the US Navys agship DDG
1000 Zumwalt land attack destroyer programme was unexpectedly cancelled. Navy
ocials cited massive cost overruns which would threaten other critical procurement
programmes. Similar problems may impact other naval programmes as the price
of stealth rockets to unacceptably high levels. On the positive side, two Zumwaltclass destroyers currently being built will be nished. The US Navys requirement
for additional destroyers will now have to be met by building more conventional
tried and tested Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers instead of the DDG-1000.
These new Arleigh Burke destroyers will be tted with some systems intended for
the Zumwalt, including the SPY-3 AEGIS radar and re-control system. The DD(X)
would have replaced the Arleigh Burke destroyer, which itself incorporated several
radar and infra-red reduction measures (Figure 8.6), and so this could be regarded
as a retrograde step. The DD(X) includes breakthroughs in electric technology
for enhanced ship performance, such as fuel cell technology and its DC power
distribution architecture, which will eventually benet other aspects of the US Navy
and US armed forces programmes of the future.
The US Navy has instead begun a programme to modernise its current 84 Aegis cruisers
and destroyers over the next 20 years, with an estimated cost of US$16.6 billion.
These modernisations will ensure that the ships can be operated throughout their
intended 35-year life cycle [10]. The Navys FY 2011 budget proposals cancelled the
DDX programme as unaordable, whilst improved Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class Aegis
destroyers (called the Flight III version) will take their intended place.
Future advanced avionics stealth platforms under development include the Lockheed
F-22 Raptor and the F-35 (a platform of signicance to the future British aircraft carrier
when built) (Figures 8.7 and 8.8, respectively), where stealth and precision are as always

Figure 8.6 Arleigh Burke

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 155

Figure 8.7 F-22 Raptor

Figure 8.8 F-35

the two vital ingredients. Second-generation stealth ships are likely to incorporate the
continuous curvature designs of later generation stealth aircraft if they are aordable
and to budget.

156 Stealth Warship

Future stealth ships may include smaller unmanned ship platforms, alongside
unmanned underwater and aerial hybrids, beneting from the incorporation of stealth
to y in niche maritime roles without conicting with the roles of the latest generation
of stealth aircraft. Remote operation of both aircraft-and missile-based systems is now
fairly routine for the United States and its key allies, but remote operation of warships is
an unlikely scenario. What is more likely is the operation of small stealth reconnaissancegathering vessels controlled by a mother platform, which itself could be stealthy or
incorporate stealth features, but sitting outside of the weapons range of hostile enemy
forces. Remotely operated stealth platforms having both above- and below-water
capability may provide an extremely exciting possibility for the near future.
However, what hopefully has become clear by the end of this chapter is that the cost
of stealth is rapidly becoming unacceptably high and potentially compromises other
aspects of a nations overall defence budget. As a consequence it may work out cheaper
and just as eective to invest in massive guaranteed re power and eective anti-missile
capability using latest state-of-the-art technologies, such as laser-based systems, to act
as hard-kill options as well as eective countermeasures. It has certainly left some to
question the absence of anti-ship missile capability on the Type 45, which although
intended as an anti-air destroyer is likely to nd itself pitted against an anti-ship missile
at some point. Reliance upon stealth alone is not an attractive option, especially when
stealth has been compromised. However, what stealth will deliver in the future is, of
course, as yet unknown and by denition intended to be unseen!

Chapter Reection
1. What improvements in performance are these stealth ships likely to bring in
terms of detectability, propulsion, signature management, power consumption,
combat capabilities and so on?

Future Naval Stealth Platforms 157

References
1.

House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2011), Providing the UKs Carrier Strike
Capability. 56th Report of Session 201012, HC 1427. London: The Stationery Oce.

2.

Defense Management Journal, http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.

asp?id=18127 (accessed 2 March 2012).

3.

Grenstad, A Rear Admiral (2007), Future surface combatants in the Royal Swedish Navy,
RUSI Defence Systems (October): 104106.

4.

Mahon, M Rear Admiral (2009), US Navy surface warfare: Future requirements and
capabilities, RUSI Defence Systems (February): 4044.

5.

Forissier, P-F Admiral (2009), The French white papers goes navy blue, RUSI Defence
Systems (February): 4547.

6.

Willett, L Dr (2010), Type 26: A global role for the global combat ship?, RUSI Defence
Systems, 13(2): 8587.

7.

Friedman, N Dr (2007), The future surface combatant, RUSI Defence Systems (October): 98100.

8.

HM Government (2010), Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and
Security Review. London: The Stationery Oce.

9.

House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 16 March 2005: Column 265W.
Hansard. House of Commons. 16 March 2005. London: The Stationery Oce.

10.

ORourke, R (2010), Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues
for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Accession No. ADA 535498, 28 September. Darby,
PA: Diane Publishing.

SUMMARY
I have only one eye, I have a right to be blind sometimes I really do not see
the signal!
Admiral Horatio Nelson

At the Battle of Copenhagen, Nelsons commander, Sir Hyde Parker, believed the Danish
repower was too great, and signalled for him to break o his action. Nelson ordered
the signal be acknowledged but not repeated. Legend has it Nelson turned to his ag
captain and said the above words whilst putting a telescope to his glass eye. Nelsons
action was approved in retrospect!
We have examined a large number of dierent stealth platforms, designed over
successive decades and building upon the work of others (upon the shoulders of
giants), and we have considered the basic concepts of stealth or signature reduction
from several spectral perspectives, namely, radar, infra-red and visible wavelengths.
We have introduced the revolutionary concept of metamaterials, upon which future
spectral invisibility will crucially hinge, as well as including several other key cross
sections in lesser detail, and I have related this to the design and building of the
stealth ships themselves. We have also considered the known and anticipated stealth
ships platforms for the current decade, but of course other designs will emerge over
coming decades and from increasingly condent up-and-coming nations such as
China and India, who are rapidly building their own independent high-tech defence
infrastructure. There is an incredible uncertainty and uidity in warship design at the
moment, not least of which is driven by budgetary constrains.
It is hoped that the reader, once having read this introductory volume (and hopefully
read more widely also) and solved some of the simple introductory mathematical
problems set out at the end of each chapter, will now have a much clearer understanding
of the signicance of stealth in modern warship platform design and the relationship
to its performance.
The full cost of embarking upon stealth and/or large warship procurement generally at
the start of the twenty-rst century needs to be more tightly constrained from the start
if overspends and project cancellations are to be avoided. Some degree of restraint
needs to be in place to avoid trying to introduce too much new untested technology

Summary 159
all in one good, and a realisation that it is the integration of this new technology which
also creates challenges of its own. The digital nervous system of future platforms and
indeed a seamlessly integrated eet will likely provide the wining edge over even the
best stand-alone systems or best platforms individually. Lessons to be learnt quickly
from the Type 45 Destroyer should highlight the lack of critical capabilities, be they
anti-ship missile capability or the lack of a carriers strike aircraft capability for an
extended period, which should have been anticipated and appropriate provision or
cover established to remove or minimise these weaknesses and capability shortfalls.
Nonetheless, in the harsh world of maritime operations, it is incumbent upon a ships
crew to have this understanding of the value of stealth rmly embedded in their
thinking so that no seemingly insignicant activity undertaken on board a ship, such
as the use of a phone call home on the quarterdeck, could compromise its mission, the
overall security of the platform or the safety of its entire crew.

APPENDIX
KEY SHIP FACTS
Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier, United Kingdom
Builders: BVT Surface Fleet, BAE Systems Submarine Solutions, Thales Group, Babcock Marine
Preceded by: Invincible class. Succeeded by: N/A
Planned: Queen Elizabeth, Prince of Wales
Completed: 0

General Characteristics
Displacement: 65,000 t (full). Length: 280 m (920 ft)
Beam: 39 m (waterline), 70 m overall. Draught: 9 m
Decks: 13,000 m2. Speed: 25+ knots
Range: 10,000 NM (18,520 km)
Capacity: 1,450. Complement: 600
Aircraft carried: 40 (50 full load) aircraft, including 36 F-35 Lightning II, 4 airborne early-warning
aircraft

Type 45 Destroyer, United Kingdom

Builders: BVT Surface Fleet
Preceded by: Type 42. Succeeded by: N/A
Planned: six. Building: one. Completed: ve. Cancelled: six. Active: 3

General Characteristics
Displacement: 7,205 t light sea going, 8,092 t deep load. Length: 500 ft
Beam: 69.5 ft. Draught: 16.4 ft
Decks: 13,000 m2. Speed: 29+ knots
Range: 7,000 NM (13,000 km)
Complement: 190 (accommodation up to 235)
Propulsion: integrated electric propulsion: two Rolls-Royce/Northrop Grumman/DCN WR-21 gas
turbines (21.5 MW), two Converteam electric motors (20 MW)
Radar:
Sampson multifunctional air tracking radar (Type 1045)
S1850M 3D air surveillance radar (Type 1046)
Two Raytheon X-band radar (Type 1047)

Appendix 161
Weapons:
Sylver missile launcher, 48 MBDA Aster missiles (Aster 15 and Aster 30)
Two Phalanx 20 mm close-in weapons systems, one 114 mm (4.5 in.) Mk 8 gun, two Oerlikon
30 mm KCB guns on DS-30B mounts, NATO Seagnat countermeasures launchers, SSTDS
underway decoy
1 Lynx HMA 8 helicopter or 1 Merlin HM1 helicopter

Caio Duilio Horizon-Class Destroyer, Italy

Builder: Horizon Sass and Financier, Riva Trios and Mugging shipyards
In service: 22 September 2011
There are two ships of this class

General Characteristics
Class and type: Horizon-class frigate. Type: Destroyer
Displacement: 6,700 t (standard)
Length: 501.6 ft. Beam: 66.6 ft. Draft: 24.9 ft
Power: four diesel generators VL1716T2ME, 1,680 kW each
Propulsion: CODOG:
Two GE/Avio LM2500 gas turbine engines, 20.5 MW each
Two SEMT Pielstick 12 PA6 STC diesel engines, 4.32 MW each
Two variable pitch propellers, one bow thruster
Speed: 29 knots (gas turbine engines)
18 knots (diesel engines)
Range: 7,000 nm at 18 knots, 3,500 nm at 24 knots
Endurance: 45 days
Capacity: accommodation for 255
Complement: 24 ocers, 87 petty ocers, 82 sailors and 37 sta, including boarding/security
and ight
Surface search radar in E/F band: Selex RAN 30X/I (RASS)
Multifunctional 3D phased array radar in G-band: Selex SPY-790 (EMPAR) (principal sensor of
PAAMS)
Long-Range 3D radar (D band): Thales/Selex S1850M
Secondary surveillance radar: Selex SIR R/S
Navigation and Helo deck radar (I band): Selex SPN 753(V)4 (NAVR)
Two multi-sensor target indication system NA 25X (radar and electro-optical sensor RTN-30X)
Bispectral IR detection and tracking system Sagem (Vampir) MB (IRAS)

162 Appendix
ESM System SLQ-750 made-up of a WB (wideband) receiver and two HSFA (Superheterodyne)
receivers
Medium frequency hull sonar Thales UMS 4110CL
Electronic warfare (Nettuno 4100):
Two radar jammers
Two Oto Melara SCLAR-H decoys launcher system for cha and ares
Anti-torpedo system SLAT:
Low frequency towed array sonar
Two acoustic decoy launchers
Armament: artillery:
Three Oto Melara 76/62 mm super rapid guns (ILDS)
Two Oto Melara Oerlikon KBA 25/80 mm guns
Torpedoes:
Two EuroTorp torpedo tubes B515/1 with semi-automatic handling system for MU90
lightweight torpedoes
PAAMS (principal anti-air missile system): six DCNS Vertical Launch System Sylver A50 modules
with 48 cells for short-range Aster 15 or medium-range Aster 30 missiles and with a further
capacity for eight S/S Teseo Mk2/A missile launchers
Aircraft carried: one Agusta Westland EH101 or one NH Industries NH90 armed with MU90
torpedoes or Marte Mk2/S A/S missiles

Forbin Horizon-Class Destroyer, France

Builder: DCNS and Thales Group, Lorient shipyard
Homeport: Toulon. Fate: on trials

General Characteristics
Class and type: Horizon-class frigates with two ships in this class
Displacement: 7050 t
Length: 152.87 m. Beam: 20.3 m. Draught: 5.4 m
Propulsion:
2 31,280 HP GE/Avio LM2500 gas turbines
2 5,875 HP SEMT Pielstick 12 PA6 STC diesels
1 beam propeller
2 4 blade propellers
Speed: 29 knots (18 knots diesel)
Range: 7,000 nm at 18 knots, 3,500 nm at 25 knots
Boats and landing craft carried: EDO, 20-seat EFRC, Hurricane 733

Appendix 163
Capacity: 32 passengers or admiral sta
Complement: 26 ocers, 110 petty ocers, 38 sailors
Sensors and processing:
S-1850 LRR tri-dimensional sentry radar with IFF
ABF TUS 4110 CL hull sonar
Tugged linear antenna with Alto torpedo detector
Electronic warfare and decoys:
Radar jammer
Communication jammer
NGDS system (two decoy launchers, REM, RIR, LAD)
Two acoustic decoy launchers
PAAMS EMPAR multifunction radar on G band
Anti-air: 1 PAAMS (48 Aster 15 or 30 anti-air missiles in SYLVER A50 VLS)
Anti-ship: 8 Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles
Anti-submarine: 2 MU90 torpedo tubes
2 Otobreda 76 mm super rapid guns
2 20 mm modle F2 gun
Aircraft carried: 1 NH90 helicopter

Visby, Sweden
Builders: Kockums
Preceded by: N/A. Succeeded by: N/A
In service: 2000. Planned: six
Completed: ve. HMS Visby, HMS Helsingborg, HMS Hrnsan, HMS Nykping and HMS
Karlstad

General Characteristics
Displacement: 650 t. Length: 72.6 m
Beam: 10.4 m. Draught: 2.5 m
Propulsion:
CODAG
Two KaMeWa Waterjets
Four Honeywell TF 50A gas turbines, 16 MW
Two MTU Friedrichshafen 16V 2000 N90 diesel engines, total rating 2.6 MW
Speed: 40+ knots

164 Appendix
Complement: 27 ocers, 16 seamen
Sensors and processing:
Ericsson Sea Girae ABM 3D surveillance radar
Ceros 200 re control radar system
Condor CS-3701 Tactical Radar Surveillance System
Hull-mounted sonar towed array sonar system
Variable depth sonar
Rheinmetall Wae Munition MASS (Multi-Ammunition Softkill System) decoy system, which
provides radar and infra-red response simultaneously

La Fayette Frigate, France

Preceded by: Floreal-class frigate. Succeeded by: Horizon-class frigate
In service: 1996
Completed: 20

General Characteristics
Displacement: 3,200 t. Length: 125 m
Beam: 15.4 m. Draught: 4.1 m
Propulsion: four diesel SEMT Pielstick 12PA6v280 STC2, 21,000 HP (15,400 kW)
Speed: 25 knots
Range: 4,000 NM
Complement: 12 ocers, 68 petty ocers, 61 seamen
Sensors and processing systems:
One Air/Surface DRBV 15C sentry radar
One ring control radar for the 100 mm gun
One DRBN34 navigation radar
One DRBN34 landing radar
One Saigon ARBG, one radio interceptor
Two Dagaie Mk2 cha launcher
One AN/SLQ-25 Nixie tugged noise maker
One Prairie-Masker noise reduction system (as used by the US Arleigh Burke class)
Weapons: one 100 mm TR automatic gun, two 20 mm modle F2 guns
20 mm Crotale CN2 launcher (8 missiles on the launcher, 18 missiles in magazine). Provision for
16 Aster 15 missiles in vertical launchers
Eight Exocet MM40 block II missiles
One 10 t helicopter (Panther or NH90)

Appendix 165
USS Zumwalt Destroyer, United States
Builders: Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics
Preceded by: Arleigh Burke. Succeeded by: N/A
In service: April 2013
Planned: one to three. Two now to be completed

General Characteristics
Displacement: 14,564 t. Length: 600 ft
Beam: 80.7 ft. Draught: 27.6 ft
Propulsion: two Rolls-Royce Marine rent-30 gas turbines and emergency diesel generators,
78 MW
Speed: 30.3 knots
Complement: 140
Sensors: AN/SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) (X-band scanned array), Volume Search Radar
(VSR) (S-band scanned array)
Weapons:
Twenty Mk 57 VLS modules, comprising 80 missiles
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
Tactical Tomahawk Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine ROCket (ASROC)
Two 155 mm advanced gun system
Two Mk 110 57 mm guns (CIWS)
Two SH-60 LAMPS helicopters or one MH-60R helicopter
Three MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV

Arleigh Burke, United States

Preceded by: Kidd-class guided missile destroyer. Succeeded by: Zumwalt-class guided missile
destroyer

General Characteristics
Displacement 8,30010,000 t. Length: 505509 ft
Beam: 59 ft. Draught: 30.5 ft
Propulsion: four General Electric LM2500-30 gas turbines, 75 MW
Speed: 30+ knots
Range: 4,400 nm
Complement: 23 ocers, 250 seamen
Weapons: 90 cells Mk41 vertical launch systems

166 Appendix
BGM-109 Tomahawk
RGM-44 Harpoon SSM
SM-2 Standard SAM ASuW mode
SM-3 standard ballistic missile defence missile for Aegis BMD
RIM-162 ESSM SAM
RUM-139 vertical launch ASROC
127 mm/54 Mk-45 lightweight gun, 127 mm/62 Mk-45 mod 4 lightweight gun
Two 20 mm Phalanx CIWS DDG51-83
Two Mark 32 triple torpedo tubes (six Mk-46 or Mk-50 torpedoes)
Aircraft installed: generally none but two SH-60 Seahawk LAMPS III helos Flight IIA
DDG-51/helo ASW operations Flights I and II

GLOSSARY
AAW

Anti-air warfare

APAR

Active phased array radar

ASM

Anti-ship missile

ASRAAM

Advanced short-range air-to-air missile

ASW

Anti-submarine warfare

ATC

Air trac control

AWCT

Adaptive water curtain technology

BAE

British Aerospace

CCN

Cloud condensation nuclei

CIC

Combat Information Centre

CFRP

Carbon-bre-reinforced plastic

CH

Chain Home

CIWS

Close-in weapon system

CMS

Combat Management System

CVF

Carrier Vessel Future

DARPA

Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency

DF

Direction nding

DIRCM

Directed Infra-Red Countermeasure

ECM

Electronic countermeasure

EHF

Extremely high frequency

ELF

Extremely low frequency

EM

Electromagnetic

EMALS

Electro-magnetic aircraft launch system

ESM

Electronic support measures

EW

Electronic warfare

FBW

Fly by wire

FIR

Far infra-red

FJCA

Future Joint Carrier Aircraft

FSS

Frequency selective surface

GCS

Global Combat Ship

GRP

Glass-reinforced plastic

HF

High frequency

HMWHS

Heavily mechanised weapons handling system

HTS

High-temperature superconductor

IFEP

Integrated full electric propulsion

IRAM

Infra-red absorbent material

168 Glossary
IRCS

Infra-red cross section

IRS

Infra-red signature

JSF

Joint Strike Fighter

LC

Liquid crystal

LCS

Littoral combat ship

LF

Low frequency

LOT

Low observable technology

MCM

Mine countermeasure

MDR

Maximum detection range

MF

Medium frequency

MIR

Middle infra-red

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MOD

Ministry of Defence

NIR

Near infra-red

PBG

Photonic band gap

PRF

Pulse repetition frequency

RADAR

Radio aid for detection and ranging

RAF

Royal Air Force

RAM

Radar absorbent material

RAP

Radar absorbent paint

RASH

Radar absorbent sheeting

RCS

Radar cross section

RF

Radio frequency

RN

Royal Navy

SAM

Surface-to-air missile

SDR

Strategic Defence Review

SDSR

Strategic Defence and Security Review

SHF

Super high frequency

SONAR

Sound navigation and ranging

STOVL

Short take-o and vertical landing

UAV

Unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF

Ultra high frequency

ULF

Ultra low frequency

USAF

United States Air Force

UUV

Unmanned underwater vehicle

VHF

Very high frequency

VLF

Very low frequency

VLS

Vertical launch seawolf

XST

Experimental Survivable Testbed

ANSWERS TO NUMERICAL QUESTIONS

Chapter 1
Q3. 6.5 GHz.
Q4. 8.8 mm.
Q5. 1 km.
Q6. 92.1 km.
Q7. 19 km.

Chapter 2
Q1. c = 0.2.
Q4. E = 1.2 MV m1.
Q5. 225 nm.

Chapter 3
Q1. 316.4 nm.
Q2. 400 nm.
Q3. /10.
Q4. (a) 4 and (b) 6.54.

Chapter 4
Q3. 16:30.
Q4. (a) 9.8 m, (b) 404.8 W, (c) 283.97 K and (d) 10.21 m.
Q5. Ib = It.
Q6. 0.57 Wm2.
Q8. A = T/3.

Chapter 5
Q3. E = 7.56 x 104 V.
Q4. (a) 4 x 1011 H m1, (b) 8 x 1011 H and (c) E = 64 x 1011 V.
Q5. dE/dV = 0rHL, so H = 1/(74.74) H.

IMAGE SOURCES
Introduction
Figure I.1 Department of Defence.

Chapter 1
Figure 1.6 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.8 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.9 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.10 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.16 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.17 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.18 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 1.19 Combat Index, LLC.

Chapter 3
Figure 3.4 Purdue University School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
http://news.uns.purdue.edu/html4ever/2005/051130.Shalaev.negative.html.
Figure 3.5 www.williamson-labs.com/ltoc/ship-stealth.htm.

Chapter 7
Figure 7.17 http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=34656 File: 060506-N-4021H-122.
jpg. US Navy photo by Photographers Mate Airman Damien Horvath. This le is a work
of a sailor or employee of the US Navy, taken or made during the course of the persons
ocial duties. As a work of the US federal government, the image is in the public
domain.

Chapter 8
Figure 8.4 US Navy photo illustration/released. http://www.navy.mil/view_single.
asp?id=61727.
Figure 8.7 Combat Index, LLC.
Figure 8.8 Combat Index, LLC.
All other, non-credited images have been sourced from the public domain.

INDEX
A
A-12 Oxcart, 8
Abrams tank, 44, 45
Absorption filters, 75
Accurate Automation Corporation, 53
Acoustic noise, 95
environmental factors, 9798
Acoustic threat and other signatures, 95
Active sonar, 9899
principle of, 98
Active cloaking plasma shields, 52
Advanced short-range air-to-air missiles
(ASRAAM), 6768
Aegis cruisers, 154
Agility, of United Kingdom, 127128
AIM-9 Sidewinder, 66
Almirante Cochrane (FF-05), 120
Al Riyadh-class ships, of Saudi Arabia, 136
American electromagnetic aircraft launch
system (EMALS), 149
Andrea Doria, 129
Anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), 63
Argus, HMS, 33, 34, 35
Arleigh Burke, 154155, 165166
ASDIC technology, 97
Aster missiles, 125
Astrakhan, of Russia, 133
Athwartship coil, 89
Atmospheric sparkling, 74
Atwater, Harry, 62

B
Bacon, Richard, 144
Band, Jonathan, 143
Behm, Alexander, 96
Biologically inspired design, 109111
Bioluminescence, 104105
Black and white contrast in warship, 32
Black-and-white palette, 70
Black-and-white stripes in warship, 34
Boundary layer, 106
Boyle, Robert William, 97
Braunschweig-class corvette, of Germany,
137138

Brenna, Ursula, 144

Burke, Arleigh, 154
Burnett, Anne, 59
Burnett, Robert, 59
Butterlflies, 49
Bykov, 58

C
Caio Duilio Horizon-Class Destroyer, 161162
Cameron, David, 146
Camouflage, 140
active, 42
face paints, 38
infra-red electronic, 44
origins of, 3650
real-time adaptive, 44
Carrier Vessel Future (CVF) project, see Queen
Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier
CATOBAR system, 147, 149
Cavitation, 102103
Chain Home, 1, 2
Charles S. Sperry (DD-697), USS, 34, 35
Chinas Yantai, 138139
Chinese Nantsin radar, 27
Cholesteric liquid crystals, 46
Clarke, Arthur C, 110
Cloud condensation nuclei (CCN), 111
Combat Management System (CMS), 120
Combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG)
propulsion system, 120
Committee of Imperial Defence, 1
Common anti-air modular missile (CAMM), 151
Contrast formula, 40
Copper-cabled systems, 91
Corner reflector, 24
Cottesmore, HMS, 94
Cubist patterns, 40, 41
Cuttlefish, 47, 48

D
Dallenbach layer, 23
Daring (D32), HMS, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126
Daring class, see Type 45 Destroyer
Dazzle camouflage, 33, 35, 41, 42
and first world war, 3036

172 Index
Dazzle painting, 33
D-band Thales S1850M, 129
DD(X) Zumwalt, US Navy, 152
Degaussing coils, 90
Degaussing Ships Hulls, 86
Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM),76
Direction finding (DF), 1

Eldridge, 63
Electric field, strength of, 46
Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, 69, 4, 5
Electromagnetic (EM) waves, 52
ELF signature, see Extremely low-frequency
(ELF) signature
Emissions control policy, 111
EML Admiral Cowan, 93
Endara, Guillermo, 18
European Aeronautic Defence and Space
(EADS), 44
Experimental Survivable Testbed (XST)
programme, 10
Extraordinary acoustic screening (EAS), 103
Extremely low-frequency (ELF) signature, 108

F
F-15 Eagle, 53
F-22 Raptor, 155
F-35B Lightning, 143, 144, 146147
F-35 Lightning, 19, 122, 144, 154
F-117A Nighthawk, 9, 32
Face paints of camouflage, 38
Faceting, 11
False colour palette, 71
Far infra-red (FIR), 72
Fessenden, Reginald, 96
Field-emission scanning electron microscope
image, 61
Fixed dazzle camouflage patterns, 36
Flux density, 83
Fog of war, 32, 37
Forbin (D620), 130
Forbin Horizon-Class Destroyer, 162163
Forecastle inducedquarterdeck induced (FI-QI)
coils, 88
Forecastle permanentquarterdeck permanent
(FP-QP) coils, 88
Formidable-class frigate, of Singapore, 136137
France
Forbin Horizon-Class Destroyer, 162163
French destroyer variant, 130

La Fayette Frigate, 164

modern stealth ships of, 134136
Frequency selective surfaces (FSS), 115
Future acoustic technology, 103104
Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA), 144
Future naval stealth platforms, 141
Future surface combatant (FSC) platforms,
141

G
German air force, 31
German Heinkel He 111s, 3, 4
Germanys Braunschweig-class corvette,
137138
Glass-reinforced plastic (GRP), 82, 92
Glint, 4, 33, 41
Goodeve, Charles, 86
Gring, Reich Marshal Hermann, 6
Grumman, Northrop, 153154

H
Hammond, Philip, 147
Have Blue aircraft, 1517
Have Blue design, 9, 15
Heat-seeking missiles, 68
Highly mechanised weapons handling system
(HMWHS), 146
High-temperature superconducting
(HTS), 91
Hopkins, Evan, 86
Horizon-class frigate Caio Duilio (D554), 128
Horten, Reimar, 6
Horten, Walter, 6
Horton H. IX designs, 7
Hughes AIM-4 Falcon, 66
Hydroacoustics, 96

I
I-band SPN 753(V)4, 129
Ideopsis similis butterflies, 48
Incident radar wave, 22
India, modern stealth ships of, 132
INS Kolkata, 132
Shivalik-class frigates, 132
Indium tin oxide (ITO), 19
Infra-red, 66
emission, 73
laws of emission, 7879
Infra-red absorbing materials (IRAM), 75
Infra-red cross section (IRCS), 69
contributors, 71

Index 173
Infra-red electronic camouflage, 44
Infra-red Heat Reduction, 66
Infra-red signature (IRS), 69
Infrasonic frequencies, 96
INS Kolkata, of India, 132
Integrated electric propulsion (IEP), 127
Integrated full electric propulsion (IFEP), 127
Interference theory, 23
Iron ball paint, 19
Italian destroyer variant, 128129
Italys Caio Duilio Horizon-Class Destroyer,
161162

J
Johnson, Clarence, 8

K
Keldysh Research Centre, 5253
Kent, HMS (far infra-red), 72
Khaki, soldiers uniform in, 32, 37
Kirov, 133
Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), 53
Koroteyev, Anatoliy, 5253
Krauss, Thomas, 58

La Fayette class, of France, 134136, 164

Laird, Cammell, 148
Laser area defence system (LADS), 110111
Likely future cross sections, 108109
Lines of flux, 83
Lines of force, 83
Liquid crystal displays (LCD) electronic
products, 46
Lockheed Skunk Works, 8, 1011, 18
Long-range 3D radar, 129
Los Alamos National Laboratories, 53
Lossy layer, 23
Lotus effect, 109110
Lovell, Jim, 104
Low-frequency active sonar (LFAS), 101

M
M80 Stiletto, of United States of America,
130132
Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), 89
Magnetic field of bar magnet, 83
Magnetic permeability, 56
Magnetic signature, 8295
Magnetic stealth, 8287
Main coil (M), 87

Marine bioluminescence, 105

Martin, Kelly, 6
Materials, of radar, 19
Maximum Detection Range (MDR), 1319
Maxwell, James Clerk, 11
Metamaterials, 54
N-(4-Methoxybenzylidene)-4-butylaniline
(MBBA), 46
Micro air vehicles (MAVs), 44
Middle infra-red (MIR), 68
Middleton, HMS, 94
Military sonar, 99
Mine countermeasure (MCM) sonar, 101
Modern stealth ships, 114
Agility, of United Kingdom, 127128
Al Riyadh-class ships, of Saudi Arabia, 136
Astrakhan, of Russia, 133
Braunschweig-class corvette, of Germany,
137138
Formidable-class frigate, of Singapore,
136137
French destroyer variant, 130
INS Kolkata, of India, 132
Italian destroyer variant, 128129
La Fayette class, of France, 134136
M80 Stiletto, of United States of America,
130132
PAAMS, of United Kingdom, 125126
Shivalik-class frigates, of India, 132
Type 23 Frigate, of United Kingdom,
119120
Type 45 Destroyer, of United Kingdom,
121125
Visby stealth corvette, of Sweden,
114119
Yantai, of China, 138139
Morpho, 47, 48
Multiple RAM layers, 19

N
Nanoperm, 85
Nanorods, 59, 60
Nano-structured zinc oxide replica wing
structures, 48
Nantsin radar, 27
Near infra-red (NIR), 70
vegetation in, 3839
wavelengths, 59
Negative refractive index, 57
Nilsson, John, 153

174 Index
NIRATAM, 77
Norfolk, HMS, 120

O
One-dimensional (1D) photonic crystals, 57
Opal, 57
Optical filters, 75
Optical glint, 41
Optical illusions, creation of, 31
Optical metamaterials, 5964
Optoelectronic Research Centre (ORC), 58
Overholser, Denys, 12

P
PAAMS components, of United Kingdom,
125126
Passive sonar, 99100
Peacock feather, 20, 21
Pendry, John, 60
Philadelphia Experiment, 63
Photonic band gap (PBG), 56
nanostructures, 47
Photonic crystals, 54, 56
Plasmons, 59
Prince of Wales, HMS, 142
Project Harvey, 10
Project Yehudi, 43
Pulse delay ranging, of radar, 4, 5

Queen Elizabeth, HMS, 142, 148149

Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier, 142, 160
Quorn, HMS, 94

R
Radar, 1
metamaterials, 5459
and weapons systems, 146
Radar absorbent material (RAM), 6
Radar absorbent paint (RAP), 17
Radar cross section (RCS), 10
Radio-frequency (RF) electric pulse, 52
RAMs, 19
Raven, Alan, 31
Rayleigh, Baron, 57
Rayleigh, Lord, 57
Razzle Dazzle, 33
Real-time adaptive camouflage, 44
Reflected radar wave, 22
Reinitzer, Friedrich, 46
Richardson, Lewis, 96

River Dart taken in visible, near infra-red and

thermal bands in autumn, 38
RMS Mauretania, 36
RMS Olympic, 36
Roach motel, 11
Royal Academy of Arts, 31
Russell, Philip St John, 58
Russias Astrakhan, 133

S
Sajeey, John, 58
Salisbury screen, 21
Sandia National Laboratories, 53
Sandown, HMS, 93
Saudi Arabias Al Riyadh-class ships, 136
Scale invariance, 58
Scherrer, Dick, 10
Schroeder, Bill, 12
Schurig, David, 62
Scintillation, 74
Sea Shadow, 24, 25
Shalaev, Vladimir, 59
Shivalik-class frigates, of India, 132
Short take-off and vertical landing
(STOVL), 143
Shuttle heat tiles, in U.S., 7, 8
Singapores Formidable-class frigate,
136137
Smith, David, 62
Smoke, 32
Soldiers uniform, 37
Sonar, 95
Sonar comparison, 101102
Sophisticated submarine camouflage
schemes, development of, 49
Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), 8
SPIRITS, 77
Splinter camouflage, 37
SR-71, 811, 33
SS Industry, 31
Stealth aircraft, 33
StefanBoltzmann constant, 79
Stennis, John C., 143
Stewart, James, 10
STOVL F-35B Lightning II variant, 144
Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR), 142
Strategic Defence Review (SDR), 144
Strutt, John William, 57

Index 175
Sub-surface very low frequency (VLF)
imaging, 109
Sukhoi Su-27 IB fighter-bomber, 53
Surface plasmon resonance (SPR)
sensors, 58
Swallowtail butterfly, thermal image of, 49
Swedish Navys Visby stealth corvette,
114119, 163164

T
Tesla, Nikola, 84
Thales Sonar 2087, 101
Thermal imaging cameras (TICs), 70
Thornycroft, Vosper, 93
Titanic disaster of 1912, 96
Tizard, Henry, 1
Transmission stop band, 57
Transparent monoplane, 31
Type 23 Frigate, of United Kingdom, 119120
Type 26 frigate, 151
Type 45 Destroyer, 117, 160161
power distribution system of, 122
of United Kingdom, 121125

U
U2 aircraft, 33
Ufimtsev, Pyotr, 12
UK FSC /Type 26 Frigate, 149151
Ultrasonic frequencies, 96
Ultraviolet (UV) spectrum, 108
Underwater acoustics, 96
Underwater vehicle (UUV), 151
Unidentifed flying objects (UFOs), 18
Uniform of soldiers, 37
United Kingdom
Agility, 127128
modern stealth ships of, 119
PAAMS components, 125126
Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carrier, 160
Type 23 Frigate, 119120
Type 45 Destroyer, 121125
Type 45 Destroyer, 160161
United States Air Force (USAF), 8
United States of America
Arleigh Burke, 165166

DD(X) Zumwalt, US Navy, 152

M80 Stiletto, 130132
modern stealth ships of, 130
Zumwalt Destroyer, USS, 165
US adaptive water curtain technology
(AWCT), 6263
US Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), 8
US Navy aircraft carrier, 143
US Navy Sikorsky SH-3H Sea King
helicopter, 102

V
Vegetation in the near infra-red, 3839
Vertical launch seawolf (VLS), 151
Victory, HMS, 20
Vietnam War, 66
Visby, 44, 163164
Visby stealth corvette, 41, 42, 44, 45
of Swedish Navy, 114119
Visibility
camouflage, origins of, 3650
dazzle camouflage and First World
War, 3036

W
Waggonfabrik, Gothaer, 6
Wake effects, 105108
Warships, 82
Watson-Watt, Robert, 1, 3
Weapons and systems, 151
Wilkinson, Lt Norman, 3031, 35
WR21 complex cycle gas turbine, 121122
Yablonovitch, 58

Y
Yablonovitch, Eli, 58
Yantai, of China, 138139
Yarrow Shipbuilders Limited, 94

Z
Zumwalt, Elmo, 152
Zumwalt Destroyer, USS, 165
Zumwalt infrastructure, 153
Z zone, 87