Sequestration

Republic v. Saludares
327 SCRA 449
FACTS: The PCGG issued a writ of sequestration against the Lianga Bay Logging
Company, which was later lifted by the Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied. Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a complaint
for collection of a sum of money against the company with prayer for preliminary attachment
where PCGG was not impleaded as defendant nor was the sequestration made known to the
RTC. The Court granted the preliminary attachment, and because of failure of company to
answer complaint, it also declared the company in default and ruled in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner argues that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the
sequestered assets are under custodia legis of the PCGG.
HELD: The SC ruled that the order of default of the RTC is affirmed but should be held in
abeyance until the sequestration case is determined. However, the order of attachment was
declared null and void. The Court said that the disputed properties of the company were
already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG
when the judge issued the writ of attachment. Since the writ of sequestration was already
subsisting, it could not be interfered with by the RTC because the PCGG is a coordinate and
equal body.
Public Corporations
I.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000)
FACTS: Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied
issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Hence this petition.
HELD: The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City, is illegal.

II.

Powers
A. Expropriation
Heirs Of Suguitan v. City Of Mandaluyong
G.R. NO. 139087 (March 14, 2000)
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution
authorizing Mayor Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of
Suguitan. The city filed a complaint for expropriation when Suguitan refused to sell the
property. The city later assumed possession of the property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued by the trial court. The court later issued an order of expropriation. Petitioners argue
that the local government units delegated power of eminent domain must be exercised
through the issuance of an ordinance, not by mere resolution.
HELD: The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units that
shall exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit failed to comply
with this requirement when they exercised their power of eminent domain through a
resolution. The Local Government Codes requirement of an ordinance prevails over the
Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.
B. Power To Sue And Be Sued

Mancenido v. CA
G.R. NO. 118605(April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial
officials to compel them to pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for
review on certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in recognizing the authority of the council of
the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.
HELD: The SC held that in resolving whether a local government official may secure the
services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of
the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In view of the damages sought in the
case at bar which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be
deemed to be improperly represented by private counsel.
C. Registration Of Tricycle And Licensing Of Drivers
Land Transportation Office v. City Of Butuan
322 SCRA 805
FACTS: The issue in this case is whether under the present set-up the power of the LTO to
register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise
devolved to local government units.
HELD: The SC ruled that the registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO
while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local
Government Code, LGUs have the power to regulate the operation of tricycle for hire and to
grant franchise for the operation thereof.
III.

Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the
ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro
City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental
for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and
subsequently ran for mayor.
HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as
a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually
resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

IV.

Legislation
Malonzo v. Zamora
323 SCRA 875
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three readings held on
the same day. They were charged with misconduct.
HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three readings of a proposed ordinance
in one session day.

V.

Recall
Afiado v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 141787 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for the annulment of a resolution calling for the
recall of the vice-mayor. The barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed this
resolution. The proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the previous mayor who had
already served for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4 th term but withdrew, and was
substituted by the son. The opponent filed a petition asking for the annulment of the
substitution. When the SC ruled that the substitution was invalid, the vice-mayor became the
mayor. Hence this petition.

HELD: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-mayor.
However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she gave up the
office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.

Regulations
A. Power
Philippine Registered Electrical Practicioners v. Francia
322 SCRA 587
FACTS: Petitioner assails a resolution issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering which
provided for a Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Program for electrical engineers
which required that they must earn credit units of CPE before their licenses could be
renewed. Before these credit units could be earned, they must first apply for accreditation
with the Institute of Integrated Electrical Engineers of the Philippines. Petitioner argues that
the resolution is violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, prohibition against
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and mandate for the protection of the rights of
workers.
HELD: The SC denied the petition for being moot and academic. President Ramos had later
issued E.O. No. 266, which imposed upon registered professionals, the completion of the
CPE as a pre-requisite for the renewal of their licenses.
SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office Of The President
G.R. NO. 126999 (August 30, 2000)
FACTS: On October 23, 1995, petitioner got a copy of the decision of the Board of
Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Petitioner filed an appeal to
the Office of the President on November 20, 1995, but this was denied for having been filed
outside of the required period. Petitioner argues that the period for appeal is actually 30 days
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 30-day period of appeal is subject to the qualification that
there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1344 provide that the decision of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from the date of its
receipt. The period of appeal of 30 days in the Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board is invalid for being in conflict with Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and
1344.
Zabat v. CA
G.R. NO. 122089 (August 23, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed this case questioning the award of a certain lot to the respondent by
the Awards and Arbitration Committee of the National Housing Authority which declared
petitioners as absentee owners. The National Housing Authority signed a contract to sell with
respondent, and sent a notice of demolition to petitioner. Hence this petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that petitioner should have exhausted all applicable administrative
remedies. All decisions of the Awards and Arbitration Committee are subject to review by the
General Manager. Petitioner should have appealed the award of the lot and the execution of
the contract to sell to the Office of the President.
Province Of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA
G.R. NO. 109853 (October 11, 2000)

FACTS: Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperation increased the fuel compensation charge
without the approval of the Energy Regulatory Board. As a result, petitioner filed a complaint
with the RTC.
HELD: The Energy Regulatory Board has jurisdiction over the fixing of power rates to be
charged by electric cooperatives. Petitioner should have exhausted the available
administrative remedies before resorting to the court.
Pimentel v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does
not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372
is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of
supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of
the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability
in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the
national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment
shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated
by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding
of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Solar Entertainment and People of the Philippines v. Hon. How
G. R. No. 140863 (August 22, 2000)
FACTS: The question raised in this case is whether or not the trial court can indefinitely
suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice has been resolved, without violating RA 8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial
Act of 1998.
HELD: The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even
after the information has already been filed in court is well-settled. Procedurally speaking,
after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend arraignment to
await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such
discretion. Thus, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
suspended arraignment to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice. The SC stressed that the court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after
an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with
the Speedy Trial Act. Section 7 of the Act prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment
of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the law enumerates periods of delay
that shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. The
exceptions provided in the Act reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept
of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Recently, the DOJ issued Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the
period for the disposition of appeals/petition for review shall be 75 days. In view of this
memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a
pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.
Isagani Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et al
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights
asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle ofparens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed.

HELD: After due deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
PUBLIC OFFICERS
I.

Appointment
Marohombsar v. CA
326 SCRA 62
FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed as Technical Assistant. The position was
subsequently reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II. Since the private respondent
did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility required of the position, she was
extended a temporary appointment only. She was later extended a permanent appointment
when she acquired a Career Service Professional Eligibility. When petitioner became the
President of MSU, private respondent was later dismissed. Petitioner argues that the
dismissal was legal since the private respondents appointment lacks the requisite
confirmation by the Board of Regents.
HELD: Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board
disapproves them. There is absolutely no showing that the Board of Regents disapproved
private respondents appointment. Since the private respondent holds an appointment under
permanent status, he enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by law.

II.

Termination
Salvador v. CA
G.R. NO. 127501 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner had been a permanent employee of the DENR when it was reorganized
under E.O. No. 192. This resulted in the conversion of the positions of several employees to
coterminous. The petitioner was one of the employees who were offered a coterminous
position. Petitioner later filed a complaint along with other employees. The court decided in
their favor, and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. DENR failed to comply with this
order. Meanwhile, petitioner applied for a new opening in the company but was ignored.

HELD: Petitioner was covered by the decision of the court and thus entitled to
reinstatement. His act of applying for a new position cannot be construed against him.
III.

Administrative Case
Conseares v. Almeida
324 SCRA 388
HELD: A case against a public officer should not be dismissed even if the complainant has
withdrawn it. (See also Lapea v. Pamarang 325 SCRA 440; and Farrales v. Camorista 327
SCRA 84)
Secretary Of Education, Culture And Sports v. CA
G.R. NO. 128559 (October 4, 2000)
FACTS: The Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports filed charges against several
public school teachers for refusing to obey his return-to-work order, thus incurring
unauthorized absences for participating in a mass action.
HELD: The SC held that petitioners were liable for their participation in the mass actions
which actually amounted to a strike since they were involved in the concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work.

IV.

Rights, Privileges And Benefits

Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports v. CA
G.R. No. 128559 (October 4, 2000)
HELD: A public officer found guilty is not entitled to backwages.

ELECTION LAW
I.

Certificate Of Candidacy
A. Deficiency
Conquilla v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139801 (May 31, 2000)
FACTS: Alarilla filed his Certificate of Candidacy without indicating the position he was
aspiring for. However, he attached a Certification which indicated that he was being
nominated for the position of municipal mayor. He was later proclaimed as the mayor-elect.
Petitioner argues that the Certificate of Candidacy should be declared null and void for failing
to specify the elective position that Alarilla was running for.
HELD: Alarillas failure to specify the public office he was seeking in his Certificate of
Candidacy was not a fatal defect. First, there was an attached certification which stated that
he was being nominated for the position of municipal mayor. Second, Alarilla had rectified
the deficiency by filing an Amended Certificate. Third, there was a Certified List of
Candidates listing Alarilla for the position of mayor. Finally, Alarilla was elected mayor. If
substantial compliance with the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will
of the electorate, as far as Alarilla is concerned, would be frustrated.
B. Disqualification

II.

Casting of Votes
A. Postponement of Election
Basher v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139028 (April 12, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for Punong Barangay. The
election was declared a failure and a special one was scheduled. Again, the election failed
and was reset. However, the voting only started at 9PM because of the prevailing tension in
the locality. Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to declare the election as a failure alleging that no election was conducted in the
place and at the time prescribed by law. COMELEC dismissed the petition.
HELD: The SC ordered the conduct of a special election. The Court held that the peculiar
set of facts in the present case show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a
valid electoral exercise. The place where the voting was conducted was illegal. As to the
time of voting, the law provides that the casting of votes shall start at 7 in the morning and
end at 3 in the afternoon. The election officer did not follow the procedure laid down by law
for election postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of election. The
electorate was also not given ample notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election.
B. Failure of Election
Banaga v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134696 (July 31, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner had filed a petition for declaration of failure of election on grounds of vote
buying and glaring discrepancies in the election returns. The COMELEC dismissed the case
declaring that the above grounds do not fall within the scope of failure of election.
HELD: To warrant a declaration of failure of election, the commission of fraud must be such
that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or fatally affected the preparation
and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought
to have been alleged clearly by petitioner, but he did not.
Benito v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134913 (Jan 19, 2001)

FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the
position of municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5
precincts clustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were met with violence when
some 30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed
panic among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. It
happened before noon at the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.
Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting never
resumed even after the lawless elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that
voting resumed when the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking,
however, a declaration of failure of elections on the first three precincts, not with the entire five
precincts. During the counting, the ballots from the three precincts were excluded. Nevertheless,
the winner was the private respondent. And even if the votes from the three excluded precincts
were added, private respondent still emerged as the winner.
Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election.
COMELEC however denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
1. Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting has been
held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not cast therein
are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise before or
after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
2. Whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper
subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
3. Voting in all five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in the Disimban
Elementary School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two precincts
during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the three
precincts herein?
4. Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis--vis the number of
registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failure of election in a
political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election
laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires
is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast.
5. The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only
under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the
great body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising
their franchise.

C. Jurisdiction to declare a failure of elections

Carlos v. Angeles
G.R. No. 142907 (Nov. 29, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998
elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent
filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also
showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial
court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges of fraud,"
which it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the
winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning
the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC.

HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in

election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed
with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule
because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to
disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic
remedial measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure
of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent
of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The
result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a
winner.

III.

Counting Of Ballots
A. Counting of Votes
Villarosa vs. HRET
G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000
FACTS:
Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether JTV votes should be
counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosas husband, who is the incumbent
representative of Occidental Mindoro.

HELD:
Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its
determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of
VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.
Columbres vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 142038, September 18, 2000
Two issues: (1) Whether the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially in matters of
appreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc;
(2) Whether in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent
any evidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by a third
person, and therefore, should not invalidate the ballot.

HELD:
(1) No. What is being challenged is not the sufficiency of evidence but the appreciation thereof
by the COMELEC Division. If the appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is the
implication that such finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
(2) No. There is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is that the sanctity of
the ballot has been protected and preserved.
The case was remanded back to the COMELEC en banc.
B. Defects In Ballot
Pacris v. Pagalilawan
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-98-1403 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves the election protest filed by the private respondent against the
petitioner who was declared as mayor. The case was decided in favor of the private
respondent. Petitioner argues that the respondent invalidated several ballots cast in his favor
due to undetached upper stubs.

HELD: The SC upheld the validity of the ballots. The Court declared that the voters must not
be disenfranchised because of the failure of the election officials to perform their duties, one
of which involves the detachment of the upper stubs. Also, a ballot should not be invalidated
because it was not signed at the back
C. Effect of Failure to Authenticate Ballots
Malabaguio v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 142507 ( December 1, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay in Barangay 172, Kalookan City. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly
elected Punong Barangay. The petitioner filed an election protest case with the MTC. The
rendered a judgment declaring the petitioner as the winner. Private respondent filed a case with
the COMELEC. The 2nd Division set aside the MTCs decision, and declared the private
respondent as the winner. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but was denied by the
COMELEC en banc. The petitioner now questions the disregarding of the 57 ballots cast in favor
of petitioner which do not bear the signatures of the chairmen of the board of election inspectors,
considering that private respondent won by only 54 votes over petitioner.
HELD: In invalidating the 57 ballots, the COMELEC relied on several laws which basically said
that the signatures of the particular authorities are needed to validate the ballots. However, the
SC ruled that It is correct to postulate that administrative findings of facts are accorded great
respect, and even finality when supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, when it can be
shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion, this Court has not hesitated to reverse their factual findings. Factual findings
of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.
The COMELEC has already promulgated a new set of rules which states that the failure to
authenticate the ballots shall not invalidate them. Rather, the Board of Election Inspectors shall
merely note such failure in the minutes and declare the failure to authenticate the ballots as an
election offense. Consequently, the absence of the Chairmen's signature at the back of the
ballot should not be a reason to invalidate the 57 ballots which are genuine. Hence, all votes
indicated in these ballots must be counted in favor of the petitioner because the intent of the
voters to vote for him is crystal.

IV.

Canvassing
Immam v. COMELEC
322 SCRA 866
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent both ran for mayor. Of the 55 precincts, only the
votes cast in 41 precincts were certified as counted. Private respondent filed a petition with
the COMELEC to count the ballots cast at the elections and for holding of special elections
with prayer for issuance of a TRO &/or writ of preliminary injunction. While the petition was
pending, the petitioner was proclaimed as the mayor. Private respondent filed a case asking
that the proclamation of the petitioner be declared void. COMELEC suspended the effects
and consequences of petitioners proclamation. Hence this petition.
HELD: The effects of proclamation of only one candidate may be suspended where the
validity of his election is still subject to determination. COMELEC has jurisdiction to suspend
oath-taking of proclaimed candidate on account of incomplete canvass of votes. A canvass
cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and
none is omitted. This is true when the election returns missing or not counted will affect the
results of the election.

V.

Pre-Proclamation Cases
A. Correction Of Manifest Errors
Angelia v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139468 (MAY 31, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner was proclaimed as a member, ranking 8 th with 4 votes
more that the private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition to annul the
proclamation presenting copies of Election Returns which showed a tally of 92 votes for
private respondent but indicated a corresponding total in words and figures of only 82 votes.
There was also a copy which showed a tally of only 13 votes for private respondent but
indicated a corresponding total in words and figures of 18 votes. These copies were
supported by affidavits from a poll clerk and the chairperson of the Board of Election
Inspectors. COMELEC annulled the proclamation of petitioner. Hence this petition.
HELD: In accordance with the Courts ruling in Castromayor v. COMELEC, the expedient
action to take is to direct the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice
and hearing in accordance with Rule 27, 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect
the necessary corrections, if any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim
the winning candidate/s.
B. Defective Returns
1. Formal Defects
Ocampo v. COMELEC
326 SCRA 636
HELD: Formal defects are not grounds for excluding an election return.
2.

Statistically Improbable Returns

Velayo v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 135613 (March 9, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Private respondent
filed several cases with the COMELEC. Petitioner was proclaimed as mayor. COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution annulling the proclamation and declaring private respondent as the
winner. Hence this petition.
HELD: Standing alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public office
received zero votes in one or two precincts cannot adequately support a finding that the
subject election returns are statistically improbable. The doctrine on statistical improbability
must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing the fraudulent and
corrupt practices, innocent voters become disenfranchised. Moreover, the doctrine involves a
question of fact and a more prudential approach prohibits its determination ex parte.
Ocampo v. COMELEC
325 SCRA 636
HELD: If only one candidate obtained all the votes in some precincts, this is not sufficient to
make the election returns statistically improbable.
3. Duress
Sebastian v. COMELEC
327 SCRA 406
HELD: Duress cannot be raised as an issue in a pre-proclamation case.

VI.

Election Contests
A. Payment of Docket Fee
Enojas v. Gacott
322 SCRA 272
HELD: An election protest should not be dismissed despite a deficiency in the docket fee,
because it involves public interest.
Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
HELD: An election protest should be dismissed if the correct docket fee is not paid.

B. Verification
Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves an election protest filed by respondent against petitioner who
was proclaimed as mayor. The protest included a verification stating that it was respondent
who prepared the protest and, that he read and understood all its allegations.
HELD: The SC declared the verification as insufficient because of the failure of respondent
to state that the contents of the election protest are true, correct and of his personal
knowledge. The SC held that the protest should be considered as an unsigned pleading
because of the lack of the proper verification.
C. Certificate Of Absence Of Forum Shopping
Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
HELD: Election protest should contain certificate of non-forum shopping.
Barroso v. Ampig
G.R. NO. 138218 (March 17, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Private respondent
filed several cases against the petitioner with the COMELEC. He also filed criminal
complaints with the Law Department of the COMELEC. Petitioner was proclaimed the
winner. Private respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. Of the 5 cases which he
had previously filed, he only mentioned the 3 as pending.
HELD: Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to election cases, except by analogy
or in a suppletory character. Election contests are subject to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Rule 35 which is applicable in this case, does not require that the petition
contesting the election of a municipal official be accompanied by a certification or any
statement against forum shopping. Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure suppletorily, the
failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements does not automatically warrant
the dismissal of the case with prejudice.
D. Motion To Dismiss
Maruhom v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139397 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Because of several
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the
winner. Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later
withdrew it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for
dismissal of the protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision Committee to
convene and start the revision of the ballots. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the petition.
HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was not a
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact,
appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as
evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading
in an election contest filed before the regular courts.
E. Certiorari
Beso v. Aballe
326 SCRA 100

HELD: The COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari in election contests
pending in the inferior courts.
F. Motion For Reconsideration
Columbres v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 142038 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner filed an election protest against respondent who was proclaimed as
mayor. The RTC decided in favor of petitioner, but the decision was reversed by the
2ndDivision of the COMELEC in an appeal filed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the decision of the division to validate the marked ballots cast in
favor of the respondent. The MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc which declared that
findings of fact cannot be a subject of an MR. Hence this petition.
HELD: Any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed ruling of a
Division is also a proper subject for a motion for reconsideration.
G. Execution Pending Appeal
Fermo v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 140179 (March 13, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for Punong Barangay. The latter
was proclaimed as the winner. Petitioner filed an election protest. The court ruled in favor of
petitioner. Private respondent appealed this decision to COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion
for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court. The private respondent
appealed this decision to the COMELEC, which the latter reversed. Hence this petition.
HELD: COMELEC did not err in reversing the decision. Only one ground was used by
petitioner to support his petition i.e. shortness of term, which the SC considered as
insufficient. The order of COMELEC for the petitioner to relinquish his post to the private
respondent pending final resolution of the appeal is a logical and necessary consequence of
the denial of execution pending appeal.
VII.

Election Offenses
A. Jurisdiction
Juan v. People
322 SCRA 125
HELD: It is the RTC which has jurisdiction over election offenses.
B. Procedure
Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC Of Manila
G.R. NO. 131778 (January 28, 2000)
C. Offenses
1. Transfer Of Government Employee
Regalado v. CA
325 SCRA 516
FACTS: Mayor Navarro appointed Barba as a nursing attendant. When he ran for mayor,
the petitioner was appointed as OIC-mayor. Petitioner issued a memorandum informing
Barba that she would be reassigned. This transfer was made without prior approval of
COMELEC. Barba filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner was later charged and convicted of the offense.
HELD: Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel, as the exigencies of
public service require. However, during election period, as such personnel movement could
be used for electioneering or even to harass subordinates who are of different political

persuasion, 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless
approved by the COMELEC.
2. Carrying Firearm
Caa v. Gebusion
A.M. NO. P-98-1284 (March 30, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner (judge) filed a complaint against private respondent (Sheriff IV in the
same court as petitioner) for violation of the Civil Service Law, the Firearms Law, and the
Omnibus Election Code. In addition, respondent was also accused of carrying a revolver
without a license and of threatening to kill complainant for having filed the above charges. An
investigation was conducted, and the respondent was found guilty of several of the charges.
HELD: The SC ruled that respondent should be dismissed from service. One of the reasons
is that by possessing a firearm without the necessary license, he committed a serious
misconduct.
VIII. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 1136781 (October 6, 2000)
FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously
with the national elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list
representatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC,
pleading for their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38
parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the
proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim
additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps.
HELD:
1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?SC: The
20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory.
2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system.
3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method
of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the
votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two
percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional seats
of other qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned party divided by no.of votes of first party
multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at
face value. ( 5% = 2 seats )

IX. Right of Suffrage - Special Registration before the General Elections

Akbayan vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066 (March 26,2001)

Betito vs. Benipayo

G.R. No. 147179 (March 26,2001)
FACTS:
Consolidated cases regarding the Right to Suffrage. Petitioners are asking the COMELEC to
hold a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Election. After hearings, meetings
and consultations, the COMELEC denied the request for special registration on the grounds (1) it
is against the law, and (2) impossibility. The case was elevated to SC.
HELD:
1. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. It is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon the process of registration. The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. The State, undoubtedly then, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration.
2. The period barring any registration before the general elections has its purpose. It is meant to
complement the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion of voters from the list. Stated
otherwise, if a special registration is conducted on a later date, the period for filing petitions for
exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If not, then there can be no challenge to the
voters list. It will then open the registration process to abuse.
3. Petitioners cannot also rely on the standby or residual powers of the COMELEC, under Sec 28,
R.A. 8436 [which provides that if the COMELEC cannot observe the periods and dates
prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, it can fix another period]. Sec 28 relies on the
sound premise that these certain pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably
performed vis--vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other
related pre-election activities required under the law. COMELEC has stressed that there is
an operational impossibility in conducting the special registration such as the additional printing
of the official ballots, election returns and other forms and paraphernalia. Undergoing the long
process of preparing for the elections would result in the postponement of the elections to June
10.
4. It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as
to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight
considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the
best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
5. The law does not require that the impossible be done. There is no obligation to do an impossible
thing.
6. COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the
bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. It merely exercised a prerogative that
chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally
mandated powers.

X. Powers of the COMELEC

Ambil v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern
Samar during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected Governor. Private respondent filed an election protest with the
COMELEC, which was assigned to the First Division.
Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case. Commissioner Y
dissented, while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first before giving her
decision. On 2/15/00, Commissioner X retired and was replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and
respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on
2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X, Y, and Z. The First Division later declared that the

parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a
date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party could then
challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the
promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case.
HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in
certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First, one
who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is
promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the
1st Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the
1st Division even later said that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet
promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution,
since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see both
positions before making her decision.

Soller v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139853 (September 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the
municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was
proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition
with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an election protest
against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by
private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that
respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing private respondent's election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's
suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc.
HELD: The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have
the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any
decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance
is null and void. In the SCs view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental
issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
Salva v. Makalintal
G.R. NO. 132603 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan
of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay
Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to
conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05,
thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was
vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the
essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government
agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28,

1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay
Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act,
resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The
petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this
Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to
scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite,
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in
nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the
aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
HELD: The SC ruled that What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions
of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
XI. Recall Election
Afiado vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 141787 (September 18, 2000)
FACTS: The Preparatory Recall Assembly passed Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice-Mayor
Amelita Navarro. The issue is whether an elective official who became City Mayor by legal
succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly
Resolution that was passed when said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor.
HELD: The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City
is a supervening event that rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A
perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall process is a specific
elective official in relation to her specific office.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. EXTRADITION
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000
overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)
By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested
for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation
of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the
US' extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request. ISSUE: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing?
HELD:
Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The

process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited.
Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be
provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible
consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic
due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable.
Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right
to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between
international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PHILIPPINE LAW
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez
322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)
The observance of our country's duties under a treaty is compelled by, first, the principle
of pacta sunt servanda (the obligation to keep their agreement in good faith), and seond by the
Constitution's doctrine of incorporation, as the Constitution provides that the generally accepted
principles of international law form "part of the law of the land." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action id needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. Thus, a treaty obligation
has the force and effect of a statute, and is given equal treatment with the latter. The
Constitution, as the Supreme law of the Land, may invalidate a treaty inconsistent with it, as it
does in case of an unconstitutional statute. In the case of a conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori appliesa treaty may repeal a prior statute,
and a later statute may repeal an existing treaty.
C.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing and International School
G.R. No. 128845 (June 1, 2000)

International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a
higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but
some are American). It justifies this under the 'dislocation factor' that foreigners must be given
a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the "significant
economic disadvantages" involved in coming here. The Teacher's Union cries discrimination.
HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this
jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give
the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and ennhance the right od all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalitites." The Constitution
also provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work.". These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat
their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all," "regardless of sex, race, or creed." It would be an affront to both the
spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

D.

TREATIES VS. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Bayan v. Zamora

G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever
its particular designation." There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat,
convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All
writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international
agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Article
2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use
of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the
meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State."
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements
in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between
treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even
without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern
Sea Trading, we said:". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects
as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.