Philosophy Internet Resources

Philosophical Methods
Posted on March 30, 2014 by nesche10

For this entry I would like to take a look at several types of philosophical methods which
are typically employed by philosophers. As I go through my list of methods I will share
with you my experiences with, and opinions of each. In the process it will be assumed
that the reader is themselves familiar with philosophical methods, as this is not an
attempt to provide education on methods so much as to provide my thoughts on their
usefulness and application
1.

Logical Analysisthis method is incredibly typical of analytic philosophy, and as

someone who tends toward that style, I employ this method all the time. I think that
the benefit of this approach is multifaceted. First, it allows the reader of an argument
to get practice at identifying solid arguments, and therefore serves the purpose not
only of aiding refutation, but also makes one less prone to making flawed arguments
themselves. Second, this is a very systemized approach to philosophy, which relies
on methods of deduction and ones ability to master said methods. As a result, I feel
gives the arguer a relatively high level of confidence in their work, so long as they
have reason to presume their premises to be true. I frequently employ this method in
almost every single course, but most commonly when I encounter well laid out,
deductive arguments because of the easy accessibility. I do not employ this method
when responding to inductive arguments, since I do not find these particularly
persuasive or complex enough to require in depth analysis.
2.
Conceptual AnalysisI find this method extremely useful in certain
circumstances, such as when a complex concept is either left undefined or a
definition is used inconsistently. This is most useful when responding to the work of
those who are not professional philosophers, such as popular media or politicians.
The reason for this, is that in my experience philosophers are usually very careful to
define their terms and use them consistently, though there are definite exceptions.
That being said, I do not use this approach very often in my formal study of
philosophy.

There is another case in which this approach is often used- when the person responding
to an argument thinks that they can pose a better definition of a concept. While I think

that this can be useful in starting ones own independent argument, I do not think that it
is an effective way of responding to an argument, since it is essentially arguing a
semantic divergence, and the arguers usually end up debating a moot point. For
example If I respond to the Christion argument that god exists as a conscious being
which is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, by saying that god is the
unconscious totality of all physical existence, then I have not addressed the possibility
that the Christian ideal exists; I have only posed a different definition of the word, which
I must then prove to be true independently.
1.

Deconstruction Again, I find this method useful in specific situations. I think

its value is that it allows a thinker to challenge their own cultural preconceptions
and thus gain a somewhat more objective point of view. What it does not do is prove
an argument incorrect, since it simply points out that there is reason to doubt that it
is. While I can say that a given definition is culturally specific, or that it serves to
reinforce power dynamics, that does not mean that the definition is not the best one.
Nor does it prove that the argument which flows from that definition is invalid.

I use this approach most commonly when looking at situations regarding ethics. When I
took our departments Ethical Theory course, I became very aware of the fact that ethical
theories are relative to metaphysical ideas, and that those are contextual. (Note that this
does not, by itself show that any one metaphysics is wrong. It only points out that the
ethics is dependent on the former.) Also, when I traveled to India I was very aware of the
fact that Western notions of the injustice of caste were reliant on the cultural conception
of equality as an ethical ideal.

1.

PhenomenologyI usually manage only to use this approach when encountering

a field of philosophy for the first time. I also usually combine it with a sort of selfdirected deconstruction. So for example, when I first began to think about the
existence of god, I took up the task of proving that god did not exist; a view counter
to my previous belief (which was inherited from my cultural context and hence the
deconstructive aspect). What I usually find is that I start with a phenomenological
approach and wrestle with a question until I believe that I have found some sort of
answer, which I then cling to. The result of this is that I cannot manage to employ
the phenomenological approach for too long. Also interesting, though I do not know

2.

3.

4.

5.

what to make of it, is that this approach usually leads me to nihilist or skeptical
conclusions. I would like to become more practiced at this approach so that I can
continue to challenge my own assumptions. I think that this is invaluable for keeping
inquiry honest and continuous.
Public Intellectual- I have never employed this method. I would also not
categorize it as a method, so much as a roll that some philosophers take (thought
they must employ other methods to fill that role). Still, that being said, this is an
important role for the philosopher. I think that the public intellectual serves to
popularize philosophical discourse and make it accessible to the common man,
which can only serve to improve our world by making it a better informed, and more
educated one.
Philosophy as Dialogue- Again, I do not know that this is a method in and of itself
since one who engages in dialogue must employ the other methods listed here in
order to conduct the conversation. However, this approach to philosophy is very
engaging for me. While any written paper is usually a part of a greater discourse, I
think that spoken dialogue is much more effective in giving life to ideas. The
usefulness of this approach is that it brings a philosopher into contact with many
ideas in a short period of time, especially when there are more than two opinions
being argued. It also creates, in my experience, a community mentality in which
those of different viewpoints are engaged in real conversation for the common goal
of truth seeking. In other words, people discuss to work out a problem together,
rather than in isolation. The down side of dialogue, is that I find it much easier to
commit logical fallacies myself or overlook those of others, since I do not have as
much time to construct the argument, and rhetoric often mixes unintentionally with
reasoning. Since most philosophy courses at SLU are discussion based, I have used
this approach heavily in all my courses bur reasoning.
History of philosophy and explication of meaningI do not find this approach
super useful. I think that there is value in explaining the implications of an argument
on a society. However, negative implication do not imply an absence of truth, nor do
positive ones imply its presence. Furthermore, as deconstruction will show us, those
notions of negative and positive are not absolute.
Comparative-Descriptive- This is a valuable learning tool, since we often come to
understand concepts in relations to what we already know. So if someone
understands the social contract of Rousseau, you be better able to explain the
subtleties of Hobbes argument by comparison. However, I do not much care for this
approach since it does not really generate any new knowledge, and though it is a fast-

track to understanding, it does not seem to do anything that could not be

accomplished by careful reading of original texts.
6.
Comparative-Constructive I think that what is lacking from the ComparativeDescriptive method is present here. This is a very useful method for creating new
ideas, which are extremely important to the process of truth seeking. The only course
that I have ever used this approach in is Modern Philosophy, since few of my courses
have actually asked me to generate new ideas, rather than simply responding to old
ones.
7.
Integrating Philosophy into other experiencesI think that this is not a method
of philosophy, so much as a method for living. I think that this is the point of
philosophy for me. I use philosophy to inform my every day decisions regarding
ethics; interactions with others, lifestyle decisions, etc.

The Fact/Opinion Distinction

Essays

04 March 2015

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John Corvino argues that the claim "That's just your opinion" is pernicious and should be
consigned to the flames.

When debating ethics and other controversial topics, one frequently hears the claim Thats just your opinion. It is
a pernicious claim, devoid of clear meaning, and it should be consigned to the flames or so I shall argue here.

In calling something an opinion, one presumably wants to contrast it with something that is not an opinion, and the
obvious candidate for the contrast class is fact. Philosophers might be tempted to draw this contrast by identifying
facts as states of affairs occurrences that are there in the world regardless of what anyone may think about them
and identifying opinions as beliefs (or some other mental state) about states of affairs. According to this approach,

we can separate facts from opinions by using what Perry Weddle has called the Whose? test: It always makes
sense to ask Whose opinion is it? but never Whose fact is it?

But this way of drawing the contrast merely pushes the problem back further. For among the beliefs that people have
about the world, there are some that people tend to put in the fact column and some that they tend to put in the
opinion column. That is, they contrast factual beliefs from opinions (opinion beliefs), and it is quite appropriate to
ask Whose belief? in either case. The same goes for expressions of belief: We can talk about statements of
fact vs. statements of opinion, or factual claims vs. opinion claims, and so forth, and all of these are in the mouths of
subjects.

Suppose, then, we narrow our inquiry to statements, so that when we ask, What is the difference between facts and
opinions? what were really asking is What is the difference between statements of fact and statements of
opinion?

This seems like it should be an easy question, but it actually tends to stump most people on the street. Mind you,
they have no trouble in offering examples of either, or in categorising others examples. So for instance, given

(1a) There is beer in my refrigerator.

(2a) The earth revolves around the sun.
(3a) Thousands were killed in Darfur.
(4a) The current US president is a Democrat.

(1b) Wine tastes better than beer.

(2b) The earth was created by an omnipotent God.
(3b) Genocide is wrong.
(4b) A Democrat will win the presidency in 2016.

theyll say that the A statements are facts and the B statements are opinions. When asked to explain the principle of
distinctionbetween the two, however the rule that tells us how to assign statements to one category or the other
they often get tongue-tied.

Some have tried to explain the distinction to me by arguing that facts are true. This answer is not at all helpful, since
opinions are typically put forth as true, and some factual claims turn out to be false. For example, most people would
say that its true that genocide is wrong, and there may or may not be beer in my refrigerator. The fact/opinion
distinction varies independently of the true/false distinction.

Others say that factual statements are concrete rather than abstract, but that answer would render all
mathematical statements non-factual, since mathematics involves abstract concepts (e.g. numbers). Neither does it
help, at least at first glance, to say that facts are objective (rather than subjective), since at least some statements
in the opinion column involve matters that would be true (or false) regardless of what any particular subject
believes. For example, whether or not God created the earth is an objective matter, albeit a controversial and
difficult-to-prove one. If it happened, it happened whether anyone believes it or not. Ditto if it didnt happen. (Ill
say more about the subjective/objective distinction later on.)

Perhaps the last example suggests a better answer: the difference between facts and opinions is that factual
statements are uncontroversial. But this answer doesnt seem right either, since it would make it audience-relative
whether something is a fact: for example, the earth revolves around the sun would be a fact for modern Europeans
but not for medieval ones; God created the earth would be a fact for believers but not for sceptics; The earth is
flat would be a fact for Flat-Earthers but not for the rest of us. How useful would the fact/opinion distinction be if
any statement could count as either one, depending on who hears it?

If everyday observers are confused about the distinction, experts fare little better. Curious as to the standard
explanation, I Googled facts vs. opinions. (This is not how to conduct serious philosophical research, but it can be
a useful way of gauging common thoughts on a subject.) Heres the first result I received, from a Critical Thinking
Across the Curriculum Project website:

Fact: statement of actuality or occurrence. A fact is based on direct evidence, actual experience, or observation.

Opinion: statement of belief or feeling. It shows ones feelings about a subject. Solid opinions, while based on
facts, are someones views on a subject and not facts themselves.

This way of drawing the distinction makes The earth revolves around the sun an opinion or at least, not a fact
since no one directly observes it happening (not even astronauts!). It also jumbles together occurrences (what we
earlier called states of affairs), statements about occurrences, and the evidence for those statements.

Perhaps more confusing is its labelling opinions as statement(s) of belief. As weve been using the
terms, all statements express beliefs, and our task is to determine which of them express factual beliefs and which
express opinions.

So I looked further. Here are the second and third results from my quick internet search, from an Education Oasis
and Enchanted Learning website, respectively:

A fact is a statement that can be proven true.

An opinion expresses someones belief, feeling, view, idea, or judgment about something or someone.

and

Facts are statements that can be shown to be true or can be proved, or something that really happened. You can look
up facts in an encyclopedia or other reference, or see them for yourself. For example, it is a fact that broccoli is good
for you (you can look this up in books about healthy diets).

Opinions express how a person feels about something opinions do not have to be based upon logical reasoning.
For example, it is an opinion that broccoli tastes good (or bad).

Both of these connect fact with provability. But in common parlance, provability seems audience-relative as well:
While one person might find Anselms ontological argument to be a sufficient proof for Gods existence (thus
rendering God exists a factfor that person); others may not.

The Education Oasis site announces that An opinion expresses someones belief ... about something. So if I
believe that theres beer in my refrigerator, is that just an opinion? The Enchanted Learning site muddies the waters
even further by claiming that you can look up facts in an encyclopaedia (always? but then were there no facts before
books?), and by including an evaluative notion (good for you) among examples of facts.

If this is Critical Thinking, Id hate to see what Sloppy Thinking looks like.

Let me offer a conjecture: the fact/opinion distinction is ambiguous, and in trying to explain it, people typically
conflate it with other distinctions in the neighbourhood.

Lets consider three of those other distinctions. Take, first, the familiar philosophical distinction between belief and
reality. In common understanding, theres a world (reality), and then there are our representations of that world
(beliefs: sometimes true, sometimes not). I might believe that theres beer in the refrigerator, whether or not theres
any there. I might believe that God created the earth, whether or not God did indeed, whether or not God exists at
all. Generally, we strive to make our beliefs as accurate as possible in representing reality, but that doesnt remove
the gap (some would say gulf) between the two.

The problem, obviously, is that attempts to bridge that gap always proceed via our own fallible cognitive capacities.
Beliefs about reality are still beliefs, and some of them, despite our best efforts, turn out to be false. Thats true
whether were talking about beliefs that usually show up in the fact column (Theres beer in the refrigerator) or
in the opinion column (God created the earth). In other words, both facts and opinions can be either successful
or unsuccessful in representing reality, and thus the fact/opinion distinction is not the same as the belief/reality
distinction.

Second, consider the subjective/objective distinction. Something is subjective insofar as it is mind-dependent,

objective insofar as it is mind-independent. Given this definition, all beliefs (qua beliefs) are subjective, because
beliefs depend on minds. And since weve been treating both facts and opinions as statements of belief, facts and
opinions are similarly subjective: In other words, we can always ask Whose belief? or Whose statement?

Of course, there are different kinds of beliefs and statements. Some are about objective matters, such as whether
there is beer in the refrigerator. Others are about subjective matters, such as whether one would enjoy a Guinness
more than a Corona. Perhaps the fact/opinion distinction tracks the distinction between statements with objective
content (facts?) and those with subjective content (opinions?). But if so, we would need to revise what usually gets
put in each column. In particular, the statement that God created the earth will need to move over to the fact
column, since whether God created the earth is an objective matter it happened (or not) independently of whether
we believe it happened. The same is true for God exists not an opinion, on this schema, but a factual claim
(maybe true, maybe false).

It is also by no means obvious that Genocide is wrong should remain in the opinion column. While some
philosophers hold that moral beliefs are subjective, many do not. Moreover, there is a strong commonsense intuition
that genocide would be wrong whether anyone believes its wrong, suggesting that the claim is objective, not
subjective. So while the subjective/objective distinction might be useful in explaining the fact/opinion distinction,
adopting this approach would require us to revise our common thinking about facts and opinions. Thats not
necessarily a bad thing, since as we have seen our common thinking about facts and opinions appears rather
confused.

Finally, consider the descriptive/normative distinction. Descriptive statements describe or represent the world;
normative statements evaluate it. For example: the statement that thousands were killed in Darfur is descriptive; the
statement that such killing was wrong is normative.

The descriptive/normative distinction is sometimes called the fact/value distinction, which might lead it to be
confused with the fact/opinion distinction. But its controversial whether all normative claims are matters of opinion.
Moreover, many of the standard opinion examples are not normative: consider God exists or A Democrat will
win the presidency in 2016. If the fact/opinion distinction were identical to the fact/value distinction, then once
again we would need to revise our common thinking about facts and opinions.

Having teased apart these various distinctions, and looking back over the several attempts to explain the difference
between fact and opinion, we might propose the following definitions:

o A statement of fact is one that has objective content and is well-supported by the available evidence.

o A statement of opinion is one whose content is either subjective or else not well supported by the available
evidence.

These definitions have several advantages. First, they capture some of the concerns that lead people to insist on the
fact/opinion distinction in the first place in particular, the concern that claims not be accepted without good
evidence. Second, they explain why some objective matters in particular, controversial matters such Gods
existence or predictions about the future get placed in the category of opinion, despite their objective content. And
third, they avoid the sloppiness of some of the earlier proposals. That said, they are still somewhat revisionist: They

do not fully capture everyday usage (since everyday usage is messy and confused), but instead serve to refine that
usage.

Why worry about the fact/opinion distinction? One reason is that precise thinking is valuable for its own sake. But
theres another, more pragmatic reason. Despite its unclear meaning, the claim Thats just your opinion has a
clear use: It is a conversation-stopper. Its a way of diminishing a claim, reducing it to a mere matter of taste which
lies beyond dispute. (De gustibus non est disputandum: theres no disputing taste.)

Indeed, the opinion label is used not only to belittle others stances, but also to deflate ones own. In recognising
that a personal belief differs sharply from that of other individuals and cultures, one may conclude, I guess thats
just my opinion no better than anyone elses. This conclusion may stem from an admirable humility. On the other
hand, it can have pernicious effects: it leads to a kind of wishy-washiness, wherein one refrains from standing up for
ones convictions for fear of imposing mere opinions. Such reticence conflicts with common sense: surely some
opinions are more thoughtful, more informed, more coherent, and more important than others.

This diminishment is especially troubling in moral debates. Moral debates are practical theyre debates about what
to do and they concern our values: things that matter to us. Either we send troops to Syria or we dont. Either we
allow same-sex couples to marry or we dont. Either we lie to our parents about what happened to the car or we
dont. Categorising these issues as matters of opinion doesnt make them any less urgent or vital.

I therefore propose that we abandon the ambiguous fact/opinion distinction, and especially the dismissive retort
Thats just your opinion. We should focus instead on whether people can offer good reasons for the claims they
make reasons that might compel us to share their views. Thats my opinion, anyway. If you think yours is better,
dont merely say so: Say why.

Truth, in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, the property of sentences,

assertions, beliefs, thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the
facts or to state what is the case.
Truth is the aim of belief; falsity is a fault. People need the truth about the world in order to
thrive. Truth is important. Believing what is not true is apt to spoil a persons plans and may even
cost him his life. Telling what is not true may result in legal and social penalties. Conversely, a
dedicated pursuit of truth characterizes the good scientist, the good historian, and the good
detective. So what is truth, that it should have such gravity and such a central place in peoples
lives?

The correspondence theory

The classic suggestion comes

from Aristotle (384322 BCE): To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.
In other words, the world provides what is or what is not, and the true saying or thought
corresponds to the fact so provided. This idea appeals to common sense and is the germ of what
is called the correspondence theory of truth. As it stands, however, it is little more than a
platitude and far less than a theory. Indeed, it may amount to merely a wordy paraphrase,
whereby, instead of saying thats true of some assertion, one says that corresponds with the
facts. Only if the notions of fact and correspondence can be further developed will it be possible
to understand truth in these terms.
Unfortunately, many philosophers doubt whether an acceptable explanation of facts and
correspondence can be given. Facts, as they point out, are strange entities. It is tempting to think
of them as structures or arrangements of things in the world. However, as the Austrian-born
philosopherLudwig Wittgenstein observed, structures have spatial locations, but facts do not.
The Eiffel Tower can be moved from Paris to Rome, but the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris
cannot be moved anywhere. Furthermore, critics urge, the very idea of what the facts are in a
given case is nothing apart from peoples sincere beliefs about the case, which means those
beliefs that people take to be true. Thus, there is no enterprise of first forming a belief or theory
about some matter and then in some new process stepping outside the belief or theory to assess
whether it corresponds with the facts. There are, indeed, processes of checking and verifying
beliefs, but they work by bringing up further beliefs and perceptions and assessing the original in

light of those. In actual investigations, what tells people what to believe is not the world or the
facts but how they interpret the world or select and conceptualize the facts.

Coherence and pragmatist theories

Starting in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to think that they
should concentrate on larger theories, rather than sentences or assertions taken one at a time.
Truth, on this view, must be a feature of the overall body of belief considered as a system of
logically interrelated componentswhat is called the web of belief. It might be, for example,
an entire physical theory that earns its keep by making predictions or enabling people to control
things or by simplifying and unifying otherwise disconnected phenomena. An individual belief in
such a system is true if it sufficiently coheres with, or makes rational sense within, enough other
beliefs; alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent. Such were the
views of the British idealists, including F.H. Bradley and H.H. Joachim, who, like all idealists,
rejected the existence of mind-independent facts against which the truth of beliefs could be
determined (see also realism: realism and truth).
Yet coherentism too seems inadequate, since it suggests that human beings are trapped in the
sealed compartment of their own beliefs, unable to know anything of the world beyond.
Moreover, as the English philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell pointed out, nothing seems
to prevent there being many equally coherent but incompatible belief systems. Yet at best only
one of them can be true.

Some theorists have

suggested that belief systems can be compared in pragmatic or utilitarian terms. According to
this idea, even if many different systems can be internally coherent, it is likely that some will be

much more useful than others. Thus, one can expect that, in a process akin to Darwinian natural
selection, the more useful systems will survive while the others gradually go extinct. The
replacement ofNewtonian mechanics by relativity theory is an example of this process. It was in
this spirit that the 19th-century American pragmatistphilosopher Charles Sanders Peirce said:
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by
the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.
In effect, Peirces view places primary importance on scientific curiosity, experimentation, and
theorizing and identifies truth as the imagined ideal limit of their ongoing progress. Although this
approach may seem appealingly hard-headed, it has prompted worries about how a society, or
humanity as a whole, could know at a given moment whether it is following the path toward such
an ideal. In practice it has opened the door to varying degrees of skepticism about the notion of
truth. In the late 20th century philosophers such as Richard Rorty advocated retiring the notion of
truth in favour of a more open-minded and open-ended process of indefinite adjustment of
beliefs. Such a process, it was felt, would have its own utility, even though it lacked any final or
absolute endpoint.

Tarski and truth conditions

The rise of formal logic (the abstract study of assertions and deductive arguments) and the
growth of interest in formal systems (formal or mathematical languages) among many AngloAmerican philosophers in the early 20th century led to new attempts to define truth in logically
or scientifically acceptable terms. It also led to a renewed respect for the ancient liar
paradox (attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epimenides), in which a sentence says of
itself that it is false, thereby apparently being true if it is false and false if it is true. Logicians set
themselves the task of developing systems of mathematical reasoning that would be free of the
kinds of self-reference that give rise to paradoxes such as that of the liar. However, this proved
difficult to do without at the same time making some legitimate proof procedures impossible.
There is good self-reference (All sentences, including this, are of finite length) and bad selfreference (This sentence is false) but no generally agreed-upon principle for distinguishing
them.
These efforts culminated in the work of the Polish-born logician Alfred Tarski, who in the 1930s
showed how to construct a definition of truth for a formal or mathematical language by means of
a theory that would assign truth conditions (the conditions in which a given sentence is true) to
each sentence in the language without making use of any semantic terms, notably
including truth, in that language. Truth conditions were identified by means of T-sentences.
For example, the English-language T-sentence for the German sentence Schnee ist
weiss is: Schnee ist weiss is true if and only if snow is white. A T-sentence says of some
sentence (S) in the object language (the language for which truth is being defined) that S is true if
and only if, where the ellipsis is replaced by a translation of S into the language used to
construct the theory (the metalanguage). Since no metalanguage translation of any S (in this
case, snow is white) will contain the term true, Tarski could claim that each T-sentence provides
a partial definition of truth for the object language and that their sum total provides the
complete definition.
While the technical aspects of Tarskis work were much admired and have been much discussed,
its philosophical significance remained unclear, in part because T-sentences struck many theorists
as less than illuminating. But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually shifted, and
eventually this platitudinous appearance was regarded as a virtue and indeed as indicative of the

whole truth about truth. The idea was that, instead of staring at the abstract question What is
truth?, philosophers should content themselves with the particular question What does the truth
of S amount to?; and for any well-specified sentence, a humble T-sentence will provide the
answer.

Deflationism
Philosophers before Tarski, including Gottlob Frege and Frank Ramsey, had suspected that the
key to understanding truth lay in the odd fact that putting It is true that in front of an
assertion changes almost nothing. It is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white. At
most there might be an added emphasis, but no change of topic. The theory that built on this
insight is known as deflationism or minimalism (an older term is the redundancy theory).
Yet, if truth is essentially redundant, why should talk of truth be so common? What purpose does
thetruth predicate serve? The answer, according to most deflationists, is that true is a highly
useful device for making generalizations over large numbers of sayings or assertions. For
example, suppose that Winston Churchill said many things (S1, S2, S3,Sn). One could express
total agreement with him by asserting, for each of these sayings in turn, Churchill said S, and
S, and then asserting, And that is all he said. But even if one could do thiswhich would
involve knowing and repeating every single saying Churchill madeit would be much more
economical just to say, Everything Churchill said was true. Similarly, Every indicative
sentence is either true or false is a way of insisting, for each such sentence (S), S or not S.
Despite their contention that the truth predicate is essentially redundant, deflationists can allow
that truth is important and that it should be the aim of rational inquiry. Indeed, the paraphrases
into which the deflationary view renders such claims help to explain why this is so. Thus, It is
important to believe that someone is ill only if it is true that he is becomes It is important to
believe that someone is ill only if he is. Other broad claims that appeal to the notion of truth can
likewise be paraphrased in illuminating ways, according to deflationists. Science is useful
because what it says is is true is a way of simultaneously asserting an indefinitely large number
of sentences such as Science is useful because it says that cholera is caused by a bacterium, and
it is and Science is useful because it says that smoking causes cancer, and it does and so on.
While deflationism has been an influential view since the 1970s, it has not escaped criticism.
One objection is that it takes the meanings of sentences too much for granted. According to many
theorists, including the American philosopher Donald Davidson, the meaning of a sentence is
equivalent to its truth conditions (see semantics: truth-conditional semantics). If deflationism is
correct, however, then this approach to sentence meaning might have to be abandoned (because
no statement of the truth conditions of a sentence could be any more informative than the
sentence itself). But this in turn is contestable, since deflationists can reply that the best model of
what it is to give the truth conditions of a sentence is simply that of Tarski, and Tarski uses
nothing beyond the deflationists own notion of truth. If this is right, then saying what a sentence
means by giving its truth conditions comes to nothing more than saying what a sentence means.
As indicated above, the realm of truth bearers has been populated in different ways in different
theories. In some it consists of sentences, in others sayings, assertions, beliefs, or propositions.
Although assertions and related speech acts are featured in many theories, much work remains to
be done on the nature of assertion in different areas of discourse. The danger, according
to Wittgensteinand many others, is that the smooth notion of an assertion conceals many
different functions of language underneath its bland surface. For example, some theorists hold
that some assertions are not truth bearers but are rather put forward as useful fictions, as
instruments, or as expressions of attitudes of approval or disapproval or of dispositions to act in

certain ways. A familiar example of such a view is expressivism in ethics, which holds that
ethical assertions (e.g., Vanity is bad) functionas expressions of attitude (Tsk tsk) or as
prescriptions (Do not be vain!) (see ethics: Irrealist views: projectivism and expressivism).
Another example is the constructive empiricism of the Dutch-born philosopher Bas van
Fraassen, according to which some scientific assertions are not expressions of belief so much as
expressions of a lesser state of mind, acceptance. Accordingly, assertions such as Quarks
exist are put forward not as true but merely as empirically adequate. If some such views are
correct, however, then an adequate theory of truth will require some means of distinguishing the
kinds of assertion to which it should applysome account, in other words, of what asserting as
true consists of and how it contrasts, if it does, with other kinds of commitment.
Even if there is this much diversity in the human linguistic repertoire, however, it does not
necessarily follow that deflationismaccording to which the truth predicate applies redundantly
to all assertionsis wrong. The diversity might be identifiable without holding the truth
predicate responsible. Vanity is bad or Quarks exist might contrast with Snow is white in
important respects without the difference entailing that the first two sentences are without truth
value (neither true nor false) or at best true in other senses.

Facts
First published Fri Sep 21, 2007; substantive revision Mon Jan 7, 2013
Facts, philosophers like to say, are opposed to theories and to values, they are the objects of
certain mental states and acts, they make truth-bearers true and correspond to truths, they are
part of the furniture of the world. We present and discuss some philosophical and formal
accounts of facts.
1. Philosophies of Facts
o 1.1. Facts, Facts & Facts
o 1.2. Facts, Ontology and Metaphysics
o 1.3. Facts and Knowledge
o 1.4. Facts, Intentionality, Semantics and Truthmaking
o Supplement: On the History of Philosophies of Facts
2. Formal Theories of Facts
o 2.1. Facts and Worlds
o 2.2. Boolean Operations on Facts

o 2.3. Independency
o 2.4. Facts and Propositions
o 2.5. The Inner Structure of Facts
o Supplement: Some Formal Theories in the Literature
o Supplement: The Slingshot Argument
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Philosophies of Facts
1.1. Facts, Facts & Facts
The word fact is used in at least two different ways. In the locution matters of fact, facts
are taken to be what is contingently the case, or that of which we may have empirical or a
posterioriknowledge. Thus Hume famously writes at the beginning of Section IV of An
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: All the objects of human reason or inquiry may
naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. The word
is also used in locutions such as
It is a fact that Sam is sad
That Sam is sad is a fact
That 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact.
In this second use, the functor (operator, connective) It is a fact that takes a sentence to
make a sentence (an alternative view has it that It is a fact takes a nominalised sentence, a
that-clause, to make a sentence), and the predicate is a fact is either elliptic for the functor,
or takes a nominalised sentence to make a sentence. It is locutions of this second sort that
philosophers have often employed in order to claim (or deny) that facts are part of the
inventory of what there is, and play an important role in semantics, ontology, metaphysics,
epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

We may, then, distinguish between Humean facts and functorial facts. With the help of this
distinction, two philosophical options can be formulated. One may think that there are facts
in the functorial sense of the word which are contingent the fact that Sam is sad and
facts in the functorial sense which are not contingent the fact that 2 + 2 = 4. Or one may
think that all facts in the functorial sense are contingent, are Humean matters of fact. The
latter option is expounded in the influential philosophy of facts to be found in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1921). Wittgenstein there announces that the world is the totality of
facts and that every fact is contingent (Wittgenstein TLP 1.1).
The word fact, particularly when it is understood in the functorial sense, belongs to a
family of related terms: circumstance, situation (Sachlage), state of affairs
(Sachverhalt). We refer happily to the state of affairs or circumstance that Sam is sad and to
the situation in which Sam is sad, although It is a circumstance/situation that Sam is sad,
unlike It is a fact/the case that Sam is sad, is ill-formed.
In what follows, we distinguish three types of account of what it is to be a fact in the
functorial sense and consider some possible roles for facts which have been thought to yield
arguments in favour of admitting facts into our inventory of what there is. Since the category
of facts is a formal category, a semantic or ontological category, we then look in some detail
at different formal theories of facts and their ilk.
What might a fact be? Three popular views about the nature of facts can be distinguished:
A fact is just a true truth-bearer,
A fact is just an obtaining state of affairs,
A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in
relations.
In order to understand these claims and the relations between them it is necessary to appeal
to some accounts of truth, truth-bearers, states of affairs, obtaining, objects, properties,
relations and exemplification. Propositions are a popular candidate for the role of what is true
or false. One view of propositions has it that these are composed exclusively of concepts,
individual concepts (for example, the concept associated with the proper name Sam),
general concepts (the concept expressed by the predicates is sad and est triste) and
formal concepts (for example, the concept expressed by or). Concepts so understood are
things we can understand. Properties and relations, we may then say, are not concepts, for
they are not the sort of thing we understand. Properties are exemplified by objects and
objects fall under concepts. Similarly, objects stand in relations but fall under relational
concepts.
It will be convenient to understand the view that a fact is just a sui generis type of entity in
which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations as relying on the way of
understanding properties and relations just sketched. We shall refer to the view as the claim

that facts are exemplifications. Similarly, we may understand the claim that a fact is an
obtaining state of affairs to say that a state of affairs is something which contains one or more
objects and at least one property or relation and that a state of affairs obtains if an object
exemplifies a property or one or more objects stand in a relation. Obtains (German:
besteht) belongs to the same family of predicates as is true. Just as it is often argued that
the truth-predicate is tenseless and timeless, so it is sometimes argued or assumed that
obtains is tenseless and timeless. A distinct question: Is obtain not simply a fancy way of
saying exists? (Sundholm 1994). No, it is sometimes claimed. Obtaining is a mode of
being. If a state of affairs obtains, then an obtaining state of affairs exists, a fact exists. In this
respect, obtains resembles endures. Things endure. If a thing endures, then the enduring
thing exists.
But it should be noted that some philosophers use proposition or structured proposition
(Soames 2010) to refer to what are here called states of affairs and that some philosophers
do not distinguish between properties and concepts. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind
that in ordinary English the expression state of affairs is not normally used to refer to
something which obtains or fails to obtain. It is used to refer to what is the case. Philosophers
who talk of states of affairs as obtaining or failing to obtain are employing the term as a
technical term, often as a translation of the German word Sachverhalt. Finally, states of
affairs, unlike facts, are commonly said to last or endure, whereas Sachverhalte do not last
or endure.
The two views of facts as exemplifications of properties and as obtaining states of affairs
raise many metaphysical and ontological questions and are often appealed to in giving
answers to metaphysical and ontological questions. They are also often appealed to in
answers to questions about semantics and intentionality. Finally, facts are sometimes invoked
in an area where semantics and ontology connect, the theory of truthmaking.

1.2. Facts, Ontology and Metaphysics

The metaphysical and ontological questions which are raised by the two views of facts
mentioned include the following: Are the properties and relations which go to make up facts
abstract (repeatable) universals or bearer-specific (non-repeatable) properties and relations
(tropes)? If they are abstract universals, are these such that they are always exemplified, as
friends of Aristotelian universals claim, or not, as friends of Platonic universals claim?
And are they qualitative only (the property of being round) or also substantial (the property
of being a man)? Are there facts containing abstract objects and properties, for example the
fact that 2 is a number? Is a fact which contains a concrete object, for example the fact that
Sam is sad, itself concrete or abstract? Are there facts which are formally complex, for
example negative or conditional facts? What is the relation between facts, on the one hand,
and concrete events, processes and states, on the other hand? Do objects stand in
relations because the objects and the relations they stand in are parts of facts? What are the

identity conditions for facts? Are there states of affairs which do not obtain? May such states
of affairs contain non-existent objects? Are states of affairs abstract entities which exist
necessarily? Do facts understood as exemplifications of properties come in two kinds the
contingently existing ones and the non-contingently existing ones? (For discussions of all
these questions see the entry on states of affairs.) If concrete events, processes and states are
identical with facts or can be constructed out of facts, then it is plausible to think that
causality is a relation between facts. If they are not identical with facts and cannot be
constructed out of facts, then it is plausible to think that causality is a relation between events
and states and that causality should not be identified with causal explanations (see the entry
on the metaphysics of causation, Vendler 1967, Mellor 1995, Persson 1997).
The assumption that facts contain objects, properties and relations as proper parts may be
criticised (Lowe 1998, Vallicella 2002, Knne 2003). One natural mereological principle is
that the proper parts of the most basic kinds of whole belong to the same general ontological
category to which their wholes belong. Thus parts of things or substances are things or
substances and parts of processes are processes. The view that the fact that Sam is sad
contains a substance and a property offends against this principle: substances and properties
belong to different kinds and neither substances nor properties, it seems, are facts. Perhaps
the natural mereological principle should be rejected in favour of the view that entities of any
kind may come together to form a whole. But friends of facts tend to think of facts as
forming a very natural kind of whole. Another possible view is that Sam is a fact rather than
part of a fact (Armstrong 1997, Johansson 2004 34, Rcanati 2000, Bergmann 1967).
One ontological role for states of affairs and facts is to be the primary bearers of modality.
Suppose that facts are obtaining states of affairs. Then we may distinguish the obtaining state
of affairs that Sam is sad from the obtaining states of affairs that Sam is possibly sad, that
Sam is probably sad, and that Sam ought to be sad. Here the modal properties qualify the
property of being sad and so qualify Sam. They are de re modalities. And, so the view goes,
the place of such modal properties is in states of affairs. (A state of affairs is, as the German
terms Sachverhalt, Sachverhltnis suggest, a relation between things, the way things
stand with respect to one another, wie die Sachen sich zueinander verhalten.) A further
claim is that some de dictomodalities properly qualify states of affairs: the state of affairs that
Sam is sad probably obtains/possibly obtains/ought to obtain. Suppose that a fact is just the
exemplification of properties. Then we may distinguish the fact that Sam is a man and the
fact that Sam is necessarily a man. But a friend of facts like the last one then has to accept
that not all facts are formally simple.
Another possible ontological role for states of affairs and facts is to provide the terms for the
tie of grounding or explanation. The fact that there is an explosion explains the fact that
Sam's head turns (causal explanation). The fact that Mary slapped Sam is explained by the
fact that Sam is a sexist (explanation of action by reference to an objective reason; Dancy
2000). The fact that Sam admires Mary is explained by the fact that she is charming

(explanation of feeling by reference to an objective reason). The fact that there is a one-one
correlation between the Fs and the Gs is explained by the fact that the number of Fs = the
number of Gs (non-causal, conceptual or essential explanation). Sceptics about such claims
ask what the fact that p explains the fact that q adds to q because p. (See Correia and
Schnieder 2012, Mulligan 2007 and Trogdon forthcoming.)
Appeal to facts has also been made in order to give a semantics for counterfactuals (Kratzer
2002). A premise semantics for counterfactual, Kratzer argues, relies on facts: in a premise
semantics, a would-counterfactual is true in a world w iff every way of adding as many
facts ofw to the antecedent as consistency allows reaches a point where the resulting set
logically implies the consequent. On the other hand, a might-counterfactual is true in a
world w iff not every way of adding as many facts of w to the antecedent as consistency
allows reaches a point where adding the consequent would result in an inconsistent set.
Those facts, she argues, have to be propositions, but they must be highly specific, almost as
specific as facts conceived of as particulars (see section 1.3 below).
Finally, certain metaphysical disputes of the realism/anti-realism type are sometimes
characterized in terms of facts: in such a dispute, the realist is said to countenance facts of a
certain kind, whereas the anti-realist is said to reject facts of that kind. The disagreement
between realists about tense (or A-theorists) and anti-realists about tense (or B-theorists), for
instance, is sometimes taken to boil down to a disagreement about the question whether there
are tensed facts: the former answer Yes while the latter say No. (See e.g. Mellor 1998,
Fine 2005 and Correia and Rosenkranz 2011.)
One difficulty faced by such characterizations is that of making clear what the relevant facts
are supposed to be. The difficulty is particularly acute in certain debates, for instance in the
debate over tense realism. For what is it for a fact to be tensed? It cannot simply be said that
a tensed fact is a fact that can be referred to by means of a tensed description of type the fact
that p, where p is a tensed sentence. For it is open to a B-theorist to hold that such
expressions do refer to (tenseless) facts e.g. that the fact that Sam is lying refers, at any
time t, to a fact which can also be referred to (at any time) using the description the fact that
Sam is lying at t. Another suggestion is that a fact is tensed if and only if it is transient, i.e.
sometimes obtains and sometimes fails to obtain. Yet, it may be replied, even if the proposed
characterization does capture some tensed facts, it leaves aside a number of other such facts,
e.g. those which can be referred to by the fact that Sam is currently sitting or not currently
sitting and (barring certain forms of indeterminism) the fact that if Sam is currently sitting,
then it was the case yesterday that Sam would be sitting one day hence, respectively.

1.3. Facts and Knowledge

Know in instances of the locution x knows that p is factive: if x knows that p, then p.
Similarly, know in instances of the locution x knows y is veridical: if x knows y, is
acquainted with y, then there is a y and x knows y.

Is knowledge that p knowledge of facts? Is coming to know (cf. Erkennen) that p a form of
contact with facts, where facts are understood as something other than true truth-bearers?
Husserl, Russell, Vendler and Hossack (Husserl 19001901), Russell, Vendler 1967, 1972,
Hossack 2007) reply affirmatively to one of these questions; thus Russell at one point argues
that a perception has a single object, such as knife-to-left-of-book, an entity he first called
a complex and then a fact (Russell ONTF). From Ramsey to Williamson (Ramsey 1931,
Vickers 2004; Williamson 2000) many philosophers have replied negatively.
What may be said in favour of the view? Coming to know that Fa, in the simplest cases,
involves acquaintance with objects and properties. Coming to know that the wall is red by
seeing that it is red often involves seeing the wall. The wall is not any sort of concept.
According to a popular theory in perceptual psychology, seeing that the wall is red or straight
typically involves perception of a constant property, the redness or straightness of the wall,
and perception of it as constant (property constancy, colour constancy, shape
constancy). These properties are not concepts. There is thus some reason for thinking that
perceptually coming to know that p, in the simplest cases, involves epistemic contact with
objects and with properties. If that is right, then two components of the view that to come to
know that p in such cases is to come to have knowledge of facts are plausible. But even if
perceptual knowledge of facts is allowed, it is not clear why one should think that instances
of knowledge that p or of coming to know that p in which the substitutions for p are
logically complex, constitute knowledge of robust facts. Similarly, if we consider the many
and various types of coming to know that p in which the source of knowledge is not sensory
perception but, for example, testimony or inference, we may think that in such cases there is
no reason to think that what we come to know are facts.
Kratzer's (2002) account of knowledge of facts is applied to Gettier problems (Gettier 1963,
see the entry on the analysis of knowledge). She puts forward a view according to which
facts are particulars which exemplify propositions (cf. Baylis 1948) just as other
particulars such as tables and persons exemplify properties. (She models these facts and
propositions within Situation Semantics, as situations of a certain sort and sets of situations,
respectively, but we need not go into the details here. Note that, as we saw in section 1.2
above, she also countenances facts which are propositions.) She then proposes the following
analysis of knowledge:
S knows p if and only if
i.

There is a fact f that exemplifies p,

ii.

S believes p de re of f, and

iii.

S can rule out relevant possible alternatives of f that do not exemplify p.

It is condition (ii), Kratzer argues, which deals with Gettier cases. Take the second type of
case discussed by Gettier. Smith is justified in believing the false proposition that Jones owns
a Ford. Therefore he is justified in believing the proposition that Jones owns a Ford or Brown
is in Barcelona. Now Brown happens to be in Barcelona, but Smith has no idea about where
Brown is in particular, he is not justified in believing that Brown is in Barcelona.
Intuitively, Smith does not know the disjunctive proposition he is justified in believing. But
that proposition is true, and so the standard analysis of knowledge fails. The analysis in terms
of beliefs de re of facts fares better, Kratzer argues. For, she claims, the fact exemplified by
the disjunctive proposition is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, and Smith's belief is not
a de re belief about that fact.

1.4. Facts, Intentionality, Semantics and

Truthmaking
We have mentioned the view that facts may explain actions and mental states and the view
that facts are what we know. Facts are also invoked in the philosophy of mind by
philosophers who claim that judgements or beliefs enjoy the property of intentionality, of
being directed towards something, because they represent states of affairs or are
psychological relations to states of affairs and that judgements and beliefs are correct or
satisfied only if states of affairs obtain, that is, if facts exist. Versions of these claims are
given by many philosophers from Meinong, the early Husserl and Russell to Searle (1983).
Analogous claims in semantics are sometimes made about propositions or other truthbearers: the proposition that Sam is sad represents the state of affairs that Sam is sad and is
true only if this state of affairs obtains. Versions of this view are given by Husserl,
Wittgenstein and Carnap. See the
Supplementary document on the History of Philosophies of Facts.
One objection to the view that the judgement that Sam is sad represents a state of affairs is
that although the judger arguably thinks of Sam and of his sadness, he may not possess any
concept of a state of affairs. (Consider the analogous claim that one may judge that p without
employing the concept of truth). Perhaps then a judgement represents a state of affairs but
does not represent itas a state of affairs. One objection to this claim is that it commits one to
the ontological view that there are states of affairs which do not obtain, the states of affairs
represented by false judgements or beliefs.
If we reject the view that judgements and beliefs represent states of affairs, it is still possible
to claim that judgements and beliefs have correctness conditions which mention states of
affairs: ifx judges correctly that p, then the state of affairs that p obtains. And if this is
plausible, so too is the further claim that if x judges correctly that p, then x judges correctly
that p because the state of affairs that p obtains. Facts make judgements correct.

Does the proposition that Sam is sad represent the state of affairs that Sam is sad? It may be
objected that the proposition does not refer to anything as a state of affairs. And once again
the friend of states of affairs may retreat to the safer claims that the proposition that Sam is
sad is true only if the state of affairs that Sam is sad obtains and that if the proposition that
Sam is sad is true, it is true because the state of affairs obtains. Facts make propositions true.
Facts, then, are perhaps qualified to play the role of what makes judgements correct and
propositions true. But the theory of correctness and of truth does not require us to accept that
there are facts. Indeed it may be thought that the requirements of such a theory are satisfied
by the observations that a judgement that p is correct only if p, and that the proposition
that p is true only if p. If arguments in metaphysics or epistemology persuade us that there
are facts, then we may perhaps appeal to facts in giving accounts of correctness and of truth.
In the case of the theory of correctness conditions for judgement and belief the argument that
knowledge is of facts together with the view that, contrary to a long and influential tradition,
the theory of belief and of judgement presupposes a theory of knowledge (Williamson 2000)
may persuade us that facts make judgements and beliefs correct.
The view that facts make propositions or other truth-bearers true is one theory among many
of truthmaking. The theory of truthmaking deals with questions at the intersection between
ontology, metaphysics and semantics. The view that facts are what make truth-bearers true is
the oldest theory of truthmaking. One central choice within truthmaker theory is between
acceptance and rejection of truthmaker maximalism. Truthmaker maximalism is the view
that every truth has a truthmaker. (It is an analogue of claims about modalities other than the
modality of truth such as that every necessity is made necessary, that every probability has a
probabiliser, that if something has a value there is something which makes it valuable, a
valifier etc.) Factualist truthmaker maximalism says that every truth is made true by a fact.
Factualist truthmaker maximalism comes in many shapes and sizes. It is sometimes
combined with the view that propositions represent states of affairs. It is sometimes defended
by friends of the view that facts are obtaining states of affairs (Pfnder 1921), sometimes by
friends of the view that facts are neither true propositions nor obtaining states of affairs but
exemplifications of properties (Armstrong 2004).
By far the most popular objection to factualist truthmaker maximalism, an objection made by
both friends and enemies of facts, is that it is ontologically baroque, that is to say, incredible.
The idea that there are negative or conditional facts, the objection goes, is incompatible with
the demands of metaphysical economy or with the requirements of naturalism. By far the
most popular factualist alternative to factualist truthmaker maximalism is the view that all
logically atomic truths have truthmakers and that these are formally simple or atomic facts or
the view that the only truthmakers which are facts are formally simple. Versions of these
views are defended by the logical atomists (see the entry on the correspondence theory of
truth and section 2.4.2 below).

Appeals to facts as truthmakers presuppose that there are different facts. But it has been
argued that if there are any facts, there is only one Great Fact. See the
Supplementary document on the Slingshot Argument.
If this argument is sound, then theories of facts as truthmakers and as what correspond to
truths as well as many other theories which rely on facts, are trivialised.
In the debate between friends and enemies of factualist truthmaker maximalism it is often
assumed that truthmakers must be ontologically or metaphysically fundamental. Indeed it is
sometimes argued that the theory of truthmaking is a guide to what there is and it is assumed
that what there is is just what is ontologically fundamental. The assumption may be rejected.
(See the entry on truthmakers.) Perhaps there are facts but facts are not ontologically
fundamental. (Compare the claim that there are social entities but that these are not
ontologically fundamental.) Then even atomic facts would not be ontologically fundamental.
Perhaps Sam and his concrete state of sadness are ontologically fundamental and the fact that
Sam is sad is not ontologically fundamental.
What might it mean to say that there are facts but they are not ontologically fundamental?
Perhaps that facts or the unity of facts are determined by non-facts (Valicella 2000, Mulligan
2006a). Possible candidates for this role are truth-bearers, for example propositions, together
with what is ontologically fundamental. If facts are not ontologically fundamental, then one
objection to factualist truthmaker maximalism misses its mark. According to yet another
view, facts are complexes made up of objects and properties and those complexes which are
facts are less basic than their parts (Fine 1982) .
Any philosophy of facts owes us an account of the form of such expressions as the fact that
Sam is sad (Lowe 1998) and the state of affairs that Sam is sad. (Analogous questions
arise concerning the form of the proposition that Sam is sad, the property of sadness,
the concept of sadness etc.) Friends of facts who have written at great length about facts
and given the distinct impression that they are referring to facts and predicating properties of
facts have nevertheless claimed that facts or situations cannot be named (Russell,
Wittgenstein; cf. Clarke 1975) or that they have no properties (Ingarden). The expression
the fact that Sam is sad looks like a definite description. What is the form of such a
description? One possibility (Knne 2003 p. 10) is that it should be read as: the
unique x such that x is a fact and x = that Sam is sad.
One objection to this suggestion is that clauses such as that Sam is sad cannot flank the
identity sign. The following identity sentence, on the other hand, is perfectly well-formed
and, many friends of facts claim, false:
The fact that Sam is sad = the proposition that Sam is sad
This suggests that clauses such as that Sam is sad can only flank the identity sign if they
are governed by expressions such as the fact, the proposition, the belief. The suggested

analysis of our definite descriptions may be motivated by the assumption that the fact that
Sam is sad is derived by nominalising It is a fact that Sam is sad and the assumption that
in the latter sentence It is a fact takes that Sam is sad to make a sentence.
Another account of expressions such as the fact that Fa builds on suggestions made by
Russell in 1913 (Hochberg 2001). Let T, A and IN express the relations is a term in,
is an attribute in and informs, respectively. These relations are the formal ontological
relations between atomic facts, on the one hand, and their terms (objects), attributes
(properties) and forms, on the other hand. Then the structure of the fact that Fa exists is:
E![f(T(a, f) & A(F, f) & IN(x, f))]
That is, the fact that contains a as a term and F as an attribute and that is of the form
x exists. It has also been argued that what underlies talk about an object exemplifying a
property is just the relations of being a term in a fact and being an attribute in a fact (Sprigge
1970).
How do expressions such as the state of affairs that Sam is sad relate to their referents?
One view is that they are rigid designators. (For discussion of this question in connection
with related cases such as instances of the property of being F and the proposition that p,
see Schnieder 2005, Yagiwasa 1997, Tye 1981).

2. Formal Theories of Facts

Formal studies of facts are scarce. And they are also heterogeneous, both in form and in
content. In form insofar as they are formulated in languages of various kinds, which vary
greatly in expressive power. And in content, not only because of the variety of views on
given issues, but also because the kind of issues dealt with varies greatly. This makes it
difficult to present these theories within a uniform framework. We are going to choose a
specific framework, present, within that framework, (some of) the options a fact-theorist may
wish to adopt, study their relationships, and give references in due course to indicate where
in the resulting space of possible theories various accounts, formal and non-formal, are to be
located. Our framework is significantly distinct from many of those which are used in the
literature. So it should be kept in mind that in attributing this or that view to an author, what
we will say is often not to be understood literally: when it is not, what we really attribute to
the author is something which, translated into our framework, is what we literally attribute to
her.
There are two main uses of the predicate is a fact. On one of them, the predicate is rigid
(necessarily, if something is a fact, then it cannot fail to be a fact). On that use, and given the
assumption that there are contingent facts, it is possible that something be a fact without
existing (obtaining). On the second use, nothing can be a fact unless it exists, and so on the
assumption that there are contingent facts, the predicate is non-rigid. Some call facts in the
first sense states of affairs or situations, reserving the word fact to mean what obtaining

state of affairs or actual situation mean. Throughout this section we shall use fact in the
first sense.
The issues we are going to deal with fall under the following five headings: Facts and
Worlds, Boolean Operations on Facts, Independency, Facts and Propositions, The Inner
Structure of Facts. The presentation will be cumulative in character: in each section we will
come back to topics dealt with in previous ones (if any), sometimes in order to compare the
current options available to a fact-theorist to the old ones.

2.1. Facts and Worlds

Many metaphysicians are interested in the modal sphere. They do not only want to determine
which entities there actually are and their actual properties. They wish to formulate claims
with modal content, they want to determine which entities there can or must be, and which
are their properties across all (metaphysically) possible worlds.
In this section we deal with some basic modal issues related to facts. More precisely, we shall
present and compare certain principles involving facts and (possible) worlds. Although at
some places we shall mention the view that worlds are themselves facts, or sets or pluralities
or sums of facts, we shall remain neutral as to the nature of worlds.
Let W be the set of all possible worlds, F the function which assigns to each world w the
set Fw of facts which exist in it, and F the union of all the Fws, i.e. the set of all facts. We
assume that Whas infinitely many members. This is a reasonable assumption, which will
have some importance in what follows with respect to certain entailment claims we are going
to make (not having the assumption would force us to distinguish cases). Since we are
dealing with theories of facts, we shall also assume that F is non-empty. Although perhaps
there are impossible states of affairs or situations, we take it that there are no impossible
facts. That is why there is no room for them in our framework.
Where x is a fact, es(x) (the existence-set of x) is the set of all worlds at which x exists. And
where G is a set of facts, ces(G) (the conjunctive-existence-set of G) is xG es(x), i.e. the set
of worlds at which all elements of G exist, and des(G) (the disjunctive-existence-set of G) is
xGes(x), i.e. the set of worlds at which some elements of G exist. Notice that ces() = W,
des() = , and that given any G , ces(G) des(G). (Here and elsewhere, we borrow
some vocabulary and symbolism from Fine 1982.)

2.1.1. Some Characterization Principles

We shall say that a set of facts G characterizes a set of worlds V iff ces(G) = V, and that a
fact xcharacterizes a set of worlds V iff es(x) = V (no confusion should arise from the
ambiguity of characterize). At this very early point some work can already be done.
We assume the following definitions:

 F# = the set of all contingent facts (i.e. of all facts whose existence-set is not W);
P(F) = the set of all sets of facts;
P(F)* = the set of all non-empty sets of facts;
(F) = the set of all sets of facts G with G and ces(G) .
Of special interest are the following boolean principles (\ refers to the operation of settheoretic substraction):
B1.

If xF#, then some fact characterizes W \ es(x);

B2.

If G(F), then some fact characterizes ces(G);

B3.

If GP(F)*, some fact characterizes des(G);

B4.

Some fact characterizes W.

If facts can be negated, then the negation of fact x (if any) will have existence-set W \ es(x).
If facts can be conjoined, then the conjunction of the facts in set G (if any) will have
existence-set ces(G). And if facts can be disjoined, then the disjunction of the facts in
set G (if any) will have existence-set des(G). One can then understand why we call these
principles boolean.
B1 and B3 together entail B4. Assuming B1 and B4, B2 is equivalent to B3. Notice that if it
is assumed that every world contains at least one fact (a principle we shall call Plenitude),
then B3 implies B4 (take G = F). Also notice that both B1 and B4 entail Plenitude. See
Figure 1.

Figure 1.
It is tempting to adopt the principle:
No Twins. Worlds with the very same facts (twins, for short) are identical,
i.e. Fw = Fvimplies w = v, i.e. F is injective.
Another formulation of No Twins might be the following: the identity of a world is
completely determined by which facts hold in it. No Twins imposes serious constraints on the
cardinality ofF. In particular, since there are infinitely many worlds, No Twins implies that
there must also be infinitely many facts.

The B-principles assert the existence of facts characterising various sets of worlds. Similar
principles of special interest are of the same vein:
W1. Every world-singleton is characterized by some non-empty set of facts;
W2. Every world-singleton is characterized by some fact;
W3. Every non-empty set of worlds is characterized by some non-empty set of facts;
W4. Every non-empty set of worlds is characterized by some fact.

The W-principles have mates of a certain interest:

W1. Every singleton* is characterized by some non-empty set of facts;
W2. Every singleton* is characterized by some fact;
W3. Every non-empty set* is characterized by some non-empty set of facts;
W4. Every non-empty set* is characterized by some fact.

A set* is a set of worlds which contains all twins of its members ( and W are then sets*),
and asingleton* is a set* whose members are all twins. Notice that all existence-sets,
conjunctive existence-sets and disjunctive existence-sets, as well as their complements in W,
are sets*.
W4 entails both W2 and W3, and in turn each of them entails W1. All the same, W4 entails
both W2 and W3, and in turn each of them entails W1. No Twins is a consequence of W1.
Under the assumption that No Twins is true, each Wi is equivalent to Wi. So each Wi entails
Wi. W4 entails all the Bs. W1 entails Plenitude. W4 is thus an extremely strong principle,
since it entails all the principles we have met so far. See Figure 2.

Figure 2.

W4 is equivalent to B2 + W3, W2 plus B3 yields W4, W1 plus B2 yields W2. B1 yields

W1. See Figure 3.

Figure 3.
All the previous principles are compatible with there being distinct facts existing at exactly
the very same worlds. One may wish to deny that this is possible, and adopt:
Modal Criterion. Two facts are identical if they have the same existence-set,
i.e. x = ywhenever es(x) = es(y).
This provides a modal criterion for the identity of facts. If Modal Criterion is accepted, each
B-principle is equivalent to the result of replacing in the principle some fact by a unique
fact. The same holds of W2, W2, W4 and W4.
Modal Criterion is controversial. One may wish to claim that there are such things as the fact
that Socrates exists, the fact that Socrates exists and every number is a number, and the fact
that singleton {Socrates} exists, and that all or some of these facts are distinct. But given
plausible assumptions about the existence-conditions of these facts, they all have the same
existence-set.
Modal Criterion holds in the views put forward in Wittgenstein TLP, Suszko 1968 and Fine
1982 (in theories F(A)-Cond and C-Cond). It does not hold in Fine's theory F-Cond (Fine
1982) and Zalta's theory (Zalta 1991), under the two interpretations indeed. References
relative to previous principles will be given later on. More detail is available in the
Supplementary document on Some Formal Theories in the Literature.

2.1.2. Facts as Sets of Worlds, Worlds as Facts, Worlds as Sets (or

Pluralities, or Sums) of Facts
There is a view according to which propositions are sets of worlds. One might prefer to
identifyfacts with sets of worlds (this is what is done in Restall 2004). On this view, for every
fact x, es(x) = x, and for every world w, Fw = {x : xF and wx}. Modal Criterion is then
satisfied. Suppose that all non-empty sets of worlds are facts. This is a very natural option for

the view under consideration, and is actually countenanced by Restall. Then the strong W4 is
satisfied.
On a dual view, worlds are taken to be sets of facts, a world being identified with its own
domain: for every world w, Fw = w. On that view, No Twins is trivially true. Variants on that
view take worlds to be pluralities, or mereological sums of facts. Cresswell (Cresswell 1972)
is in the set camp, Wittgenstein (TLP), it seems, in the plurality camp.
Still another view is that worlds are themselves facts (Suszko 1968, Plantinga 1974 and Zalta
1991). A natural claim, on that view, is that each world belongs to its own domain and to it
only, i.e. that for every world w, es(w) = {w}. If this is accepted, No Twins and W2 are true.
Here is a simple theory which goes in that direction (Wolniewicz 1982). Let us take the
notion of a fact containing another fact as a primitive. We shall use x y for x is contained
in y, and we shall take relation to be reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. One option is
to define fact containment in modal terms (i.e. define x y as necessarily, x exists
if y does), but we shall remain neutral on this issue.
Let us define a world as a maximal fact under the relation of fact-containment: x is a world
iff for every fact y, if x y, then x = y. We assume that every fact is contained in some world.
We then define the domain Fw of world w to be the set of all facts w contains. Thus the union
of all the domains is the set of all facts. Clearly, each world belongs to its own domain and to
it only: es(w) = {w}. So (as we previously pointed out) No Twins and W2 hold, and Modal
Criterion is ensured if we accept the principle according to which two facts are identical
provided that they are contained in the very same worlds.

2.2. Boolean Operations on Facts

Propositions can be negated, conjoined and disjoined to other propositions. As we previously
saw, there is an issue as to whether the same holds of facts. In this section we introduce the
boolean operations on facts, and point to the four main views as to which of these operations
actually exist.
An operation of negation on facts is a function n which satisfies the following axioms:
N1.

n is a total function from F# to F#;

N2.

If x = yn, then es(x) = W \ es(y);

N3.

xnn = x.

The existence of a negation operation ensures the truth of B1. In turn, the existence of an
operation of negation is ensured if Modal Criterion and B1 are acceptedin particular under
the view which takes facts to be sets of worlds; in that case, set-complementation is a
negation operation.

An operation of conjunction on facts is a function c which obeys the following principles:

C1.

c is a total function from (F) to F;

C2.

If x = Gc, then es(x) = ces(G) (for G(F));

C3.

{x}c = x;

C4.

(KG K)c = (KG {Kc})c (for KG K(F)).

The existence of a negation operation ensures the truth of B2. In turn, the existence of an
operation of conjunction is ensured if Modal Criterion and B2 are accepted in particular
under the view of facts as sets of worlds; in that case, intersection is a conjunction operation.
Finally, an operation of disjunction on facts is a function d which has the following
properties:
D1.

d is a total function from P(F)* to F;

D2.

If x = Gd, then es(x) = des(G) (for GP(F)*);

D3.

{x}d = x;

D4.

(KG K)d = (KG {Kd})d (for KG KP(F)*).

The existence of a negation operation ensures the truth of B3. In turn, the existence of an
operation of disjunction is ensured if Modal Criterion and B3 are accepted in particular
under the view of facts as sets of worlds; in that case, union is a disjunction operation.
Suppose all three operations are accepted (in which case all the Bs are true). It is then
possible to define an operation in terms of negation and conjunction which behaves almost
exactly like disjunction. Let (F) be the set of all sets of facts G with G and des(G) W.
Where H is any set of facts, we let nH be {xn : xHF#}, the negative image of H. This
disjunction-like operation, , is a (total) function from (F) to F# defined by the following
condition: G = (nG)cn. behaves like disjunction in that it satisfies the principles resulting
from replacing P(F)* by (F) in D1-D4.
Some extra principles must then presumably be introduced, as we presumably want d and to
coincide on (F). We may just adopt the principle which says this:
D5.

If G(F), then Gd = G.

Here is a table indicating, for some theories, which operations they allow (+ means
acceptance and rejection):
negation

conjunction

disjunction

Armstrong 1997

Fine 1982 *

+ for theory F(A)-Cond + for F(A)-Cond

+ for F(A)-Cond

 for theory C-Cond

+ for C-Cond

for C-Cond

Restall 2004

Russell PLA

neither + nor

Suszko 1968 *

+ restricted to finite + restricted to finite

collections of facts collections of facts

Taylor 1985

+ restricted to finite + restricted to finite

collections of facts collections of facts

Van Fraassen 1969

(modalized version) *

+ for a distinguished
class of atomic facts
only

Wittgenstein TLP

Zalta 1991 first

interpretation *

+ restricted to finite + restricted to finite

collections of facts collections of facts

Zalta 1991 second

interpretation *

+ restricted to finite
collections of facts

(On the entries containing a *, see the supplementary document Some Formal Theories in the
Literature.) In the case of Restall, commitment to all three operations directly follows from
the fact that his theory validates W4 and Modal Criterion. Taylor in fact has no modal theory
of facts, but it seems that in a natural modal extension of his theory the previously mentioned
acceptance claims should be correct. The restrictions in Taylor's case are due to the fact that
he works with standard first-order languages. Taylor is concerned with giving a theory of the
facts posited by standard first-order languages, i.e. of the facts which play a role in
determining the truth-values of the sentences of that language. Standard first-order languages
admit of conjunction and disjunction only on finite collections of sentences, hence the
restrictions relative to facts. But clearly, moving to languages in which infinite conjunctions
and disjunctions are freely allowed, the restrictions would vanish.
In the light of the previous table, there are four main views as to which boolean operations
are to be accepted:
1: No boolean operation on facts.
2: Only negation on a distinguished class of atomic facts, and conjunction.
3: Only conjunction.
4: All boolean operations.

(The restrictions for conjunction and disjunction indicated in the table are due to accidental
limitations in expressive power, as we pointed out for the case of Taylor, and point out for the
other cases in the supplementary document Some Formal Theories in the Literature.)

2.3. Independency
Say that a set of facts G is independent iff G is not empty and any of its subsets H is such
that there is a domain Fw such that such that G Fw = H. That G is independent means (i) that
any collection of facts in G may obtain together without any other fact in G obtaining, and
(ii) that no fact in G need obtain.
Let n, c, d be boolean operations, of negation, conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
Where Gis any set of facts, we put:
nG =df {xn : xGF#} (the negative image of G);
cG =df {Hc : H G, H(F)} (the conjunctive closure of G);
dG =df {Hd : GH , HP(F)*}(the disjunctive closure of G);
G is consistent iff for every fact x in F#, not both xG and xnG;
G is maximal iff (xG) implies x in F# and xnG.
G is conjunctively complete iff for every set of facts H in (F), HcG iff H G.
Each world-domain is maximal consistent. Maximal consistency entails conjunctive closure,
so each world-domain is maximal consistent. A maximal set of facts contains all noncontingent facts (if any), and is never empty.
Where G and H are any set of facts, we shall say that:
H generates G via conjunction iff G = cH;
H generates G via booleanization iff G = dc(H nH).
Notice that dc(H nH) is the smallest set of facts containing H closed under the boolean
operations.
Suppose there is an independent set H. Then if H = F or H generates F via conjunction, then
all facts are contingent. Moreover, Modal Criterion holds if H = F or generates F via
conjunction or booleanization.
We shall now consider three particular theories of facts involving the notions of
independence and generation:

T1: 1 + F is independent;
T3: 3 + F is generated by an independent set via conjunction;
T4: 4 + F is generated by an independent set via booleanization.

Let be the function which associates to each singleton* the common domain of its
members. Consider now the following principles:
Co1. is a bijection from the set of all singletons* onto the set of all sets of facts;
Co3. is a bijection from the set of all singletons* onto the set of all conjunctively
complete sets of facts;
Co4. is a bijection from the set of all singletons* onto the set of all maximal consistent
sets of facts.

For i = 1, 3 or 4, Ti entails Coi. If No Twins is added to each theory, each Ti entails the
principle which results from replacing by F and the set of all singletons' by W in Coi:
CO1. F is a bijection from W onto the set of all sets of facts;
CO3. F is a bijection from W onto the set of all conjunctively complete sets of facts;
CO4. F is a bijection from W onto the set of all maximal consistent sets of facts.

Some properties of our theories are depicted in the following tableaux, where + means
holds, means fails to hold and ? means indeterminate.
B B B B W W W W W1 W2 W3 W4 Plenitud No Twins Modal Criterion
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

e
T

T +
3

T + + + + ?
4

In the presence of No Twins, T4 entails all the Ws.

T1 is a component of Wittgenstein's logical atomism in Wittgenstein TLP. It also appears in
Cresswell 1972. Suszko 1968 has something very close to T4 (Cf. the supplementary
documentSome Formal Theories in the Literature).
Armstrong (Armstrong 1997) works with a different notion of independency, which we may
callindependency*. A set of facts is independent* iff given any of it subsets G and any of its
memberx not in G, it is possible that the members of G exist without x, and it is also possible

that they exist with x. Independency is strictly stronger than independency*: The
independency*, but not the independency, of a set is compatible with there being a member
of that set existing in every world (not the same member each time, of course). Armstrong
expresses the hope that the set of atomic facts he countenances is independent*, though he
recognizes that there may be difficulties to defend the view. We do not know whether he
would express the hope that the set of atomic facts he countenances is independent tout
court. Anyway, even if he held the view he would not endorse T3, since he recognizes
totality facts (Cf. section 2.4.2), which are not conjunctions of atomic facts.

2.4. Facts and Propositions

As we pointed out above, one view about facts is that to be a fact is to be a true proposition.
On another, incompatible view, facts are what make true propositions true, or more generally,
account for their truth. The search for what accounts for the truth of propositions is, as we
have seen, actually one main rationale for the introduction of facts. In what follows we shall
deal with the two views.
By proposition, we shall mean truth-bearer, and remain neutral as to whether truth-bearers
are sentences, statements, beliefs or abstract objects expressed by sentences, for instance
except in section 2.4.1.
Each world w has its set Tw of true propositions, and we call ts(p) (the truth-set of p) the set
of all worlds at which p is true. Where p is a proposition, let es(p) (the existence-set of p) be
the set of all worlds at which it exists.

2.4.1. Facts as True Propositions

Let us consider here the view that to be a fact is to be a true proposition. On such a view,
propositions cannot be sentences or statements or beliefs. They are, perhaps, abstract entities
expressed or designated by sentences.
There is an issue as to what the existence-conditions for propositions (taken in that sense, the
qualification will be constant in this section) are, which is relevant for the view under
consideration. On one view, propositions exist necessarily, i.e. the existence-set of any
proposition is W, the set of all possible worlds. On another view, the existence of a
proposition is in general world-relative.
The world-relative view comes in several variants. Two such variants which will be of
central interest to us correspond to the two possible answers to the question Can a
proposition be true without existing?. The view that a proposition can be true without
existing is quite plausible under the assumption that propositions expressed by sentences
which contain proper names are composite objects which literally contain the individuals
denoted by these names. For it is plausible to maintain that no whole can exist without its
parts, and if this and the previously mentioned assumption are true, then the proposition

expressed by Socrates is not a philosopher will turn out true in worlds where it does not
exist (it is assumed here that there can be no non-existent philosopher, and that Socrates is
not a necessary existent). (Against this line of thought, see the discussion of New Actualism
in the entry on actualism.)
There is a conception of propositions according to which they are sets of worlds (see e.g.
Stalnaker 1976). On such a conception, the truth-set of a proposition is the proposition itself,
and issues about propositional existence remain: it may be held that propositions exist
necessarily, or that their existence is in general world-relative. The first option seems
intrinsically the most natural, and a proponent of the world-relative view will most naturally
identify the existence-set of a proposition with its truth-setor so it seems.
Where w is a world, let Pw be the set of propositions which exists in it, and let P be wW Pw,
the set of all propositions. On the view that to be a fact is to be a true proposition, the set of
facts which exist in world w is the set of all propositions which exist and are true at w,
i.e. Fw = Tw Pw, and the existence-set of a fact x is es(x) ts(x). (There is a similar view
according to which all facts are true propositions, while some true propositionssay, the
complex onesmay not be facts, but we leave it aside.) Of course, under the assumption that
no proposition can be true without existing, in particular under the assumption that they exist
necessarily, for every world w,Fw = Tw, and the existence-set of a fact x is ts(x).
Suppose that propositions exist necessarily. It is plausible to say that propositions can be
freely negated, conjoined and disjoined to other propositions. On that view, there are
operations of negation, conjunction and disjunction of facts which obey the principles we
previously introduced. The resulting view is thus extremely strong. If not all propositions
exist necessarily, then questions related to the boolean operations receive answers which may
vary according to the existence-conditions which are imposed on propositions.

2.4.2. Making True

As we have emphasized, one of the main rationale for introducing facts has been to account
for the truth of true propositions. The idea is that whenever a proposition is true, its truth is to
be explained in terms of the existence and / or non-existence of some facts.
A minimal requirement one may wish to impose in that direction is the following:
Supervenience. Fw = Fv implies Tw = Tv.
This says that truth supervenes on facts: no difference in truth without a difference in facts.
Supervenience is a direct consequence of No Twins, but one may wish to leave open the
possibility of distinct worlds containing the same facts. (On the view that to be a fact is to be
a true proposition, Supervenience trivially holds if it is assumed that no proposition can be
true if it does not exist. If that assumption is dropped, then there is room for Supervenience to

fail. That might be taken to be an argument for keeping the assumption on the view under
consideration.)
Let us say that a property is a fact-condition iff it is a binary relation connecting sets of sets
of facts and worlds, such that given any set of sets of facts and any worlds w and v,
if Fw = Fv, then (,w) iff (,v) (i.e. the holding of the condition supervenes on which facts
there are). The following principle better captures the idea that facts account for the truth of
true propositions:
Determination. For every proposition p and every world w at which it is true, there exists a
fact-condition and a set of sets of facts such that
i. (,w), and
ii. for every world v such that (,v), p is true at v.
Determination clearly entails Supervenience.
Let us examine some stronger principles. Let us say that some given facts
(jointly) necessitateproposition p iff p is true in every world where they all exist. The facts in
set G (jointly) necessitate p iff ces(G) ts(p). Let us also say that some given facts
(jointly) make trueproposition p in world w iff they all exist in w and they necessitate the
proposition. Let us finally say that proposition p represents some given facts iff in every
world where p is true, some of them exist. Proposition p represents the facts in G iff ts(p)
des(G).
Our definition of truthmaking fails to capture the explanatory character of the notion people
have usually in mind when they talk about truthmaking. If something makes a given
proposition true, it is usually assumed, then the existence of that thing explains the truth of
the proposition. Now it should be clear that truthmaking as we have defined it is not
explanatory in this sense. For everything whatsoever is a truthmaker (in our sense) for any
necessary proposition, while arguably, the obtaining of the fact that Philipp lives in Geneva
fails to explain the truth of your favourite tautology. Or again, consider Socrates and its
singleton-set, {Socrates}. It may be argued, as we previously stressed, that granted that there
are such things as the fact that Socrates exists and the fact that {Socrates} exists, these two
facts obtain in exactly the same worlds. Assume this is the case. Now some may be happy
with the view that the fact that Socrates exists is a truthmaker (in the usual sense) for the
proposition that Socrates existsand so with the view that the obtaining of the fact explains
the truth of the proposition, but the view that the truth of that proposition is explained by the
obtaining of the fact that the singleton exists is highly implausible. Yet if the fact that
Socrates exists is a truthmaker (in our sense) for the proposition that Socrates exists, then the
fact that the singleton exists is also a truthmaker (in our sense) for that proposition.

Representation, as we have defined it, is also quite remote from what people usually have in
mind when they speak of propositions representing facts: propositions which cannot be true
represent (in our sense) any fact whatsoever, and if the proposition that Socrates exists
represents (in our sense) the fact that Socrates exists, then it also represents (in our sense) the
fact that {Socrates} exists (granted that these two facts exist at the same worlds).
Despite the fact that truthmaking as defined above does not to capture the usual concept of
making true, we shall not deal with the latter concept here. And we shall not deal either with
the usual notion of representation.
Let us now turn to the stronger principles. A very strong principle connecting propositions
and facts says that for every proposition p which can be true, there exists a fact represented
by pwhich necessitates p (i.e., a fact which makes the proposition true in every world where
it is true). The principle just says that for every proposition which can be true, there is a fact
whose existence-set is identical to the proposition's truth-set:
P1. pP xF es(x) = ts(p).
(P is the set of all propositions which can be true.)
This is a very strong principle. Under reasonable assumptions, P1 entails the strong principle
W4. For instance, this is so under the assumption that every set of worlds is the truth-set of
some proposition. This assumption trivially holds if sets of worlds are taken to be
propositions, but such an assumption is not needed. For let V be any set of worlds. Assume
that No Twins is true. To each world w associate the conjunction cw of all propositions true
in w (we suppose it exists), and consider the disjunction dV of all cw, wV (we suppose it
exists). Then ts(dV) = V.
Theory F(A)-Cond described in Fine 1982 licences P1, as well as the theory put forward in
Zalta 1991 (Cf. the supplementary document Some Formal Theories in the Literature). As we
saw, Taylor (Taylor 1985) has no modal theory of facts, but it seems that in a natural modal
extension of his theory, P1 should hold. Notice that P1 is immediate on the view that facts
are sets of worlds, and that all non-empty sets of worlds are facts (the view put forward in
Restall 2004). For then, es(x) = x for any fact x.
P1 might be accepted by a proponent of theory T4. Consider the following assumptions (H0 is
a selected independent set which generates F via booleanization):
1. All propositions are boolean compounds of propositions taken from a special set, the
set ofatomic propositions;
2. To each atomic proposition p corresponds a fact x in H0 such that es(x) = ts(p).
A friend of T4 may be willing to accept them, and doing so he will thereby endorse P1.

There is a simpler argument against P1 enemies of disjunctive facts may advance. Take any
two propositions p and q and assume they have a disjunction r (we may assume that p can be
true andq false, and vice versa). By P1, there are facts x, y and z such that es(x) = ts(p) and
es(y) = ts(q) and es(z) = ts(r). So es(z) = es(x) es(y), and z behaves like a disjunctive fact: it
exists in a world iff x or y does.
Those who take these to be problems may endorse the following weaker principle: for every
proposition p which can be true and every world w at which it is true, there is a fact which
makes it true. That principle is equivalent to: for every proposition p which can be true, there
exists a set of facts G whose members are represented by p such that every member
of G necessitates p. To put it differently, for every proposition which can be true, there is set
of facts whose disjunctive existence-set is identical to the proposition's truth-set:
P2. pP GF des(G) = ts(p).
This principle is endorsed by Armstrong (Armstrong 1997), and seems to be taken by Fine as
fitting his theory C-Cond (Fine 1982; Cf. the supplementary document Some Formal
Theories in the Literature).
But there are still potential problems, this time related to conjunction.
For take the conjunctive proposition that Socrates is a philosopher and Frege is human. P2
tells us that there is a set of facts K such that des(K) is the truth-set of that proposition. What
is that set of facts? One may be tempted to answer: the set whose sole member is the fact that
Socrates is a philosopher and Frege is human. It is hard to see which other answer could be
provided, and so P2 seems to commit one to conjunctive facts.
Those who are bothered by these features of P1 and P2 may wish to adopt the following
principle: there is a special set of propositions Q such that (i) the restriction of P1 to Q holds,
i.e. for every p in Q, there is a fact x such that es(x) = ts(p), and (ii) for every world w where
a proposition p is true, there is a part R of Q whose members are true, and such that in every
world where they are true, p is true.
But there are still potential problems, which actually affect P2 as well, this time related to
negation. Take the negative proposition that Socrates is not a philosopher. By P2, there is a
set of facts K such that des(K) is the truth-set of that proposition. What is that set of facts?
One may wish to answer: the set whose sole member is the fact that Socrates is not a
philosopher. Again, it is hard to think of any alternative, and so P2 seems to commit one to
negative facts. Alternatively, assume the previous principle. Shall we take the proposition
that Socrates is not a philosopher to be in Q or not? If we do, then we are in the same
situation as before: we seem to be committed to negative facts. If we do not, it is hard to see
which set of propositions R Q satisfying condition (ii) above we are going to choose.
In order to deal with negative propositions, Armstrong (Armstrong 1997) invokes a certain
kind of facts which he calls totality facts', facts which can be designated by means of

expressions of type the fact that X are all the Fs that there are, where X is a rigid plural
designator and F a predicate. The proposition that Socrates is not a philosopher is made
true, on his view, by the fact that the atomic facts which actually obtain are all the atomic
facts there area totality fact.
Those who are reluctant to admit disjunctive, conjunctive, negative and totality facts may
wish to adopt the following principle (weaker than P2):
P3. pP GP(F)P(F) <G,H> G (ces(G) (W \ des(H))) = ts(p).
P3 says that the following is true of every proposition p which can be true: for every world
wherep is true, there are two sets of facts G and H such that (i) in w, all members of G exist
and none ofH do, and (ii) in every world where this is the case, p is true. That principle is
rather ugly, but it does what it should do.
P3 might be accepted by a proponent of theory T1. Consider the following assumptions:
1. All propositions are boolean compounds of propositions taken from a special set, the
set ofatomic propositions;
2. To each atomic proposition p corresponds a fact x in F such that es(x) = ts(p).
A friend of T1 may be willing to accept themWittgenstein (TLP) does and if he does, he
will thereby accept P3.
Even the weak principle P3 faces some difficulties. Consider a true universal proposition, say
the proposition that every finger of my right hand is less than 1m long. It seems that unless
some controversial assumptions are made (like Wittgenstein's view that universal
propositions are conjunctions), to countenance P3 involves accepting that there is something
like the fact that every finger of my right hand is less than 1m long and claiming that its
existence-set is identical to the truth-set of the proposition in question. Following
Wittgenstein (TLP), many reject such universal facts. In the other camp are e.g. Russell
(PLA) and Armstrong (Armstrong 1997) (Armstrong invokes certain totality facts, which
have indeed a universal component.).
There is an alternative approach which escapes all the previous difficulties. The idea is that
facts make true certain basic propositions, and the truth-value of the remaining, more
complex propositions is determined by the basic truths and the particular content of these
propositions. This is the view put forward in Wittgenstein TLP: the atomic facts make true
the true atomic propositions, and whether a complex proposition (for him, a boolean
combination of atomic propositions) is completely settled by what happens at the atomic
level. Views of that kind are rather attractive, since they tend to favour parsimonious
ontologies of facts. But they prove especially difficult to develop, especially when special
propositions are taken into account, e.g. propositions involving modal concepts.

2.5. The Inner Structure of Facts

There is, as we have seen, an issue as to whether facts are complex entities or not, and as to
how (if at all) the various facts are composed and as to what composition means here. (This
question is not always independent of the question whether propositions are complex. This is
obvious if facts are taken to be true propositions. But even if the identification is rejected, it
may nevertheless be maintained that facts share important features with propositions. On
propositional complexity, see the entries on singular propositions and structured
propositions.)
The view that there is an operation of negation, or conjunction, or disjunction on facts is
compatible with the claim that some facts are complex. For on a natural view, a conjunctive
fact is literally composed by the facts of which it is a conjunctionand similarly for
negation and disjunction. (Notice that admitting any two of the boolean operations would
then force one to accept that there are several ways in which the very same facts can combine
in order to make up a fact.) Acceptance of some boolean operations on facts is compatible
with taking facts to be complex, but it does not entail it: one may accept, e.g., that a given
fact is the conjunction of other facts, and at the same time believe, say, that its depends for its
identity on them without having them as parts.
The issue of the complexity of facts also arises independently of issues of boolean
composition. It is a widespread view among the friends of facts that certain facts are complex
entities made up of objects and properties or relations, and correspond to certain simple
predications, at least in the sense that in every world, the predication is true if the fact
obtains. Call such factssubstantial facts, and that view Substantialism. We may designate the
substantial fact that objects a1, , an stand in relation R (in that order) by [R; a1, , an].
According to Substantialism, the sentence Socrates is mortal corresponds in the previous
sense to a certain fact composed of Socrates and of the property of being mortal, namely
[being mortal; Socrates], which obtains in a world only if in that world, Socrates exemplify
the property of being mortal. (There may easily be disagreement about this very example, as
indeed with any particular example.) Substantialism is a form of what Fine calls
objectualism (Fine 1982). Substantialist views are put forward in Russell PLA, Suszko
1968, Van Fraassen 1969, Taylor 1985, Armstrong 1997, and perhaps
Wittgenstein TLP (perhaps, because it is not clear which kinds of objects compose facts
according to him).
The existence-conditions of a whole often depend upon facts about its parts. If there are
disjunctive / conjunctive facts which contain the corresponding disjuncts / conjuncts, then
any such fact exists in a world iff some disjuncts / all the conjuncts do. And if there is a
negative fact containing the corresponding negated item, the former fact exists in a world iff
the latter does not. These existence-conditions are written into the nature of the boolean
operations.

When we come to substantial facts, things are not so straightforward. A comparison with sets
may be useful. There is a view according to which the existence of a set requires that of its
members: in a world where, say, Socrates exists but not Plato, the set {Socrates, Plato} does
not exist. And there is the more liberal view which says that every set exists necessarily.
Corresponding to these two positions are the following two views about facts:
a. A substantial fact exists in a world iff in that world (i) the objects have that property
and (ii) the objects and the property exist;
b. A substantial fact exists in a world iff in that world the objects have that property.
The two views are identical if no objects can have a property unless the objects and the
property exist. Otherwise they are distinct. Suppose there is such a thing as the fact [being
human; Socrates]. Both views can countenance such an object. But for the first the fact will
exist only in worlds where Socrates exists, while for the second it is sufficient that Socrates
has the property of being human. And it may be held that Socrates has the property in all
possible worlds, even in those where he fails to exist. (Of course, there is a similar issue
regarding the existence-conditions of facts across times.)
It is clear that this divergence potentially has dramatic consequences for one's conception of
the relationships between facts and propositions. Take for granted that it is necessary that
Socrates is human, and that Socrates only contingently exists. Then a proponent of view (b),
but not a proponent of view (a), can claim that the proposition that Socrates is human is true
in a world iff [being human; Socrates] exists in that world.
A substantialist may either deny or accept that there is an operation of conjunction on facts.
If he accepts it, he will presumably view conjunctions of susbtantial facts as themselves
complex entities (the opposite view would be very odd), doubly complex indeed, having a
conjunctive structure and the conjuncts in turn having their own internal composition.
Similar considerations hold of disjunction and negation.
Proponents of (a) are likely to deny that there is an operation of negation on facts. For take
the fact [being a philosopher; Socrates], and suppose there is a corresponding negation x.
Then as we saw, it would be odd to claim that x is not a complex fact, having Socrates as a
component. Suppose x has such a complexity. Now take two worlds w and v, such that
in w Socrates exists but is not a philosopher, and in v, Socrates does not exist (and so is not a
philosopher either). Then in both worlds, the proposition that Socrates is not a philosopher is
true. And according to a proponent of view (a), x exists in w but not in v. The outcome is
rather odd. Similar considerations hold of disjunction, but not of conjunction.
So far we have considered two types of complexity facts may have: boolean complexity
(which in turn divides into the various types corresponding to the various boolean
operations) and the complexity of substantial facts. But there are many other types of

complexity one may take facts to have. Think of universal facts (the fact that all men have a
brain), modal facts (the fact that it is possible that Socrates is a football player), and so on.
The identity-conditions of a whole often depends upon facts about its parts. When are two
substantial facts [R; a, b] and [S; c, d] identical? A plausible answer is:
when R = S, a = c and b =d. This answer has consequences for a friend of Modal Criterion.
Accepting both the proposed identity-condition and Modal Criterion, one cannot claim that
there are distinct but necessarily coextensive properties (which are part of some facts), or that
the facts [being human; Socrates] and [having a human member; {Socrates}] are distinct,
even on the plausible assumption that they exist in the very same worlds.

WHAT IS THE SOCRATIC METHOD?

excerpted from Socrates Caf by Christopher Phillips

The Socratic method is a way to seek truths by your own lights.

It is a system, a spirit, a method, a type of philosophical inquiry an
intellectual technique, all rolled into one.
Socrates himself never spelled out a "method." However, the Socratic
method is named after him because Socrates, more than any other before or
since, models for us philosophy practiced - philosophy as deed, as way of
living, as something that any of us can do. It is an open system of
philosophical inquiry that allows one to interrogate from many vantage
points.
Gregory Vlastos, a Socrates scholar and professor of philosophy at
Princeton, described Socrates method of inquiry as "among the greatest
achievements of humanity." Why? Because, he says, it makes philosophical
inquiry "a common human enterprise, open to every man." Instead of
requiring allegiance to a specific philosophical viewpoint or analytic

technique or specialized vocabulary, the Socratic method "calls for common

sense and common speech." And this, he says, "is as it should be, for how
man should live is every mans business."
I think, however, that the Socratic method goes beyond Vlastos
description. It does not merely call for common sense but examines what
common sense is. The Socratic method asks: Does the common sense of our
day offer us the greatest potential for self-understanding and human
excellence? Or is the prevailing common sense in fact a roadblock to
realizing this potential?
Vlastos goes on to say that Socratic inquiry is by no means simple, and
"calls not only for the highest degree of mental alertness of which anyone is
capable" but also for "moral qualities of a high order: sincerity, humility,
courage." Such qualities "protect against the possibility" that Socratic
dialogue, no matter how rigorous, "would merely grind out . . . wild
conclusions with irresponsible premises." I agree, though I would replace the
quality of sincerity with honesty, since one can hold a conviction sincerely
without examining it, while honesty would require that one subject ones
convictions to frequent scrutiny.
A Socratic dialogue reveals how different our outlooks can be on concepts
we use every day. It reveals how different our philosophies are, and often
how tenable - or untenable, as the case may be - a range of philosophies can
be. Moreover, even the most universally recognized and used concept, when
subjected to Socratic scrutiny, might reveal not only that there is not universal
agreement, after all, on the meaning of any given concept, but that every
single person has a somewhat different take on each and every concept under
the sun.
Whats more, there seems to be no such thing as a concept so abstract, or a
question so off base, that it cant be fruitfully explored at Socrates Caf. In the
course of Socratizing, it often turns out to be the case that some of the most
so-called abstract concepts are intimately related to the most profoundly
relevant human experiences. In fact, its been my experience that virtually

any question can be plumbed Socratically. Sometimes you dont know what
question will have the most lasting and significant impact until you take a
risk and delve into it for a while.
What distinguishes the Socratic method from mere nonsystematic inquiry
is the sustained attempt to explore the ramifications of certain opinions and
then offer compelling objections and alternatives. This scrupulous and
exhaustive form of inquiry in many ways resembles the scientific method.
But unlike Socratic inquiry, scientific inquiry would often lead us to believe
that whatever is not measurable cannot be investigated. This "belief" fails to
address such paramount human concerns as sorrow and joy and suffering and
love.
Instead of focusing on the outer cosmos, Socrates focused primarily on
human beings and their cosmos within, utilizing his method to open up new
realms of self-knowledge while at the same time exposing a great deal of
error, superstition, and dogmatic nonsense. The Spanish-born American
philosopher and poet George Santayana said that Socrates knew that "the
foreground of human life is necessarily moral and practical" and that "it is so
even so for artists" - and even for scientists, try as some might to divorce
their work from these dimensions of human existence.

Scholars call Socrates method the elenchus, which is Hellenistic Greek

for inquiry or cross-examination. But it is not just any type of inquiry or
examination. It is a type that reveals people to themselves, that makes them
see what their opinions really amount to. C. D. C. Reeve, professor of
philosophy at Reed College, gives the standard explanation of an elenchus in
saying that its aim is not simply to reach adequate definitions" of such
things as virtues; rather, it also has a "moral reformatory purpose, for
Socrates believes that regular elenctic philosophizing makes people happier
and more virtuous than anything else. . . . Indeed philosophizing is so
important for human welfare, on his view, that he is willing to accept
execution rather than give it up."

Socrates method of examination can indeed be a vital part of existence,

but I would not go so far as to say that itshould be. And I do not think that
Socrates felt that habitual use of this method "makes people happier." The
fulfillment that comes from Socratizing comes only at a price - it could well
make us unhappier, more uncertain, more troubled, as well as more fulfilled.
It can leave us with a sense that we dont know the answers after all, that we
are much further from knowing the answers than wed ever realized before
engaging in Socratic discourse. And this is fulfilling - and exhilarating and
humbling and perplexing. We may leave a Socrates Caf - in all likelihood
we willleave a Socrates Caf - with a heady sense that there are many more
ways and truths and lights by which to examine any given concept than we
had ever before imagined.
In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche said, "I admire the courage and
wisdom of Socrates in all he did, said - and did not say." Nietzsche was a
distinguished nineteenth-century classical philologist before he abandoned
the academic fold and became known for championing a type of heroic
individual who would create a life - affirming "will to power" ethic. In the
spirit of his writings on such individuals, whom he described as "supermen,,
Nietzsche lauded Socrates as a "genius of the heart. . . whose voice knows
how to descend into the depths of every soul . . . who teaches one to listen,
who smoothes rough souls and lets them taste a new yearning . . . who
divines the hidden and forgotten treasure, the drop of goodness . . . from
whose touch everyone goes away richer, not having found grace nor amazed,
not as blessed and oppressed by the good of another, but richer in himself,
opened . . . less sure perhaps... but full of hopes that as yet have no name." I
only differ with Nietzsche when he characterizes Socrates as someone who
descended into the depths of others souls. To the contrary Socrates enabled
those with whom he engaged in dialogues to descend into the depths of their
own souls and create their own life - affirming ethic.
Santayana said that he would never hold views in philosophy which he did
not believe in daily life, and that he would deem it dishonest and even
spineless to advance or entertain views in discourse which were not those
under which he habitually lived. But there is no neat divide between ones

views of philosophy and of life. They are overlapping and kindred views. It is
virtually impossible in many instances to know what we believe in daily life
until we engage others in dialogue. Likewise, to discover our philosophical
views, we must engage with ourselves, with the lives we already lead. Our
views form, change, evolve, as we participate in this dialogue. It is the only
way truly to discover what philosophical colors we sail under. Everyone at
some point preaches to himself and others what he does not yet practice;
everyone acts in or on the world in ways that are in some way contradictory
or inconsistent with the views he or she confesses or professes to hold. For
instance, the Danish philosopher Sren Kierkegaard, the influential founder
of existentialism, put Socratic principles to use in writing his dissertation on
the concept of irony in Socrates, often using pseudonyms so he could argue
his own positions with himself. In addition, the sixteenth-century essayist
Michel de Montaigne, who was called "the French Socrates" and was known
as the father of skepticism in modern Europe, would write and add
conflicting and even contradictory passages in the same work. And like
Socrates, he believed the search for truth was worth dying for.
The Socratic method forces people "to confront their own dogmatism,"
according to Leonard Nelson, a German philosopher who wrote on such
subjects as ethics and theory of knowledge until he was forced by the rise of
Nazism to quit. By doing so, participants in Socratic dialogue are, in
effect,"forcing themselves to be free," Nelson maintains. But theyre not just
confronted with their own dogmatism. In the course of a Socrates Caf, they
may be confronted with an array of hypotheses, convictions, conjectures and
theories offered by the other participants, and themselves - all of which
subscribe to some sort of dogma. The Socratic method requires that honestly and openly, rationally and imaginatively - they confront the dogma
by asking such questions as: What does this mean? What speaks for and
against it? Are there alternative ways of considering it that are even more
plausible and tenable?
At certain junctures of a Socratic dialogue, the "forcing" that this
confrontation entails - the insistence that each participant carefully articulate
her singular philosophical perspective - can be upsetting. But that is all to the

good. If it never touches any nerves, if it doesn't upset, if it doesn't mentally

and spiritually challenge and perplex, in a wonderful and exhilarating way, it
is not Socratic dialogue. This "forcing" opens us up to the varieties of
experiences of others - whether through direct dialogue, or through other
means, like drama or books, or through a work of art or a dance. It compels
us to explore alternative perspectives, asking what might be said for or
against each.
Keep this ethos in mind if you ever, for instance, feel tempted to ask a
question like this one once posed at a Socrates Caf: How can we overcome
alienation? Challenge the premise of the question at the outset. You may need
to ask: Is alienation something we always want to overcome? For instance,
Shakespeare and Goethe may have written their timeless works because they
embraced their sense of alienation rather than attempting to escape it. If this
was so, then you might want to ask: Are there many different types, and
degrees, of alienation? Depending on the context, are there some types that
you want to overcome and other types that you do not at all want to overcome
but rather want to incorporate into yourself? And to answer effectively such
questions, you first need to ask and answer such questions as: What is
alienation? What does it mean to overcome alienation? Why would we ever
want to overcome alienation? What are some of the many different types of
alienation? What are the criteria or traits that link each of these types? Is it
possible to be completely alienated? And many more questions besides.

Those who become smitten with the Socratic method of philosophical

inquiry thrive on the question. They never run out of questions, or out of new
ways to question. Some of Socrates Cafs most avid philosophizers are, for
me, the question personified.

Philosophy - Love of
Wisdom
The Importance of Truth for Humanity

Wisdom from Truth - Truth from Reality

Humanity must know Truth and Reality to be Wise
Truthfulness. He will never willingly tolerate an untruth, but will hate it as much as
he loves truth.
And is there anything more closely connected with wisdom than truth? ...
The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of
day, and there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed, my dear Glaucon,
of humanity itself, till philosophers are kings in this world, or till those we now
call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and
philosophy thus come into the same hands. (Plato)
Sabbadanam dhammadanam jinati - The gift of truth excels all other gifts.
The world is continuous flux and is impermanent.
I will teach you the Truth and the Path leading to the Truth.
One is ones own refuge, who else could be the refuge? ..The wise man makes an
island of himself that no flood can overwhelm.
Never by hatred is hatred appeased, but it is appeased by kindness. This is an
eternal truth.
.. Transient are conditioned things. Try to accomplish your aim with diligence.
(Buddha)
It is clear, then, that wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles and
causes. But now, since it is this knowledge that we are seeking, we must consider
the following point: of what kind of principles and of what kind of causes

is wisdom the knowledge?

(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 340BC)
Introduction - Beauty & Importance of Philosophy / Quotes Famous
Philosophers - Consequences of Truth for Humanity - Truth Links - Top of Page

Introduction to Philosophy (Love of

Wisdom)
Hi Everyone,
This is a long page that I wrote ten years ago when I first stumbled onto the idea of the wave
structure of matter. It could be better written - but it is interesting and has a lot of very good
philosophy / wisdom quotes - and the central message of the importance of truth and reality are very
important to humanity.
Geoff Haselhurst, June, 2007

Philosophy is the realisation that Wisdom comes from Truth, and Truth
comes from Reality. Because of the many errors currently found in Physics it
is hardly surprising that Philosophy is also corrupted with many untrue and
absurd ideas. Sadly, these errors do great damage to what is in fact a most
beautiful and important subject. This is not trivial as the problems of
Philosophy always manifest as problems for Humanity herself, and this
largely explains why the modern world suffers such profound problems (such
as the destruction of Nature, and the resulting change in the Earth's climate
and ability to produce clean air, water, and food).
The main problem for Philosophy has always been to connect our Senses
(which are limited) and our resultant Ideas/Language (which are
Representations of our Senses, and thus deceptive) with the Real World of
What Exists.
Unfortunately, because of many thousands of years of failure to correctly
describe 'what exists', we live in a time of 'enlightened postmodernism'
where the only absolute truth is that there are no absolute truths. But they
are mistaken, they have simply made an error in their assumptions, and this
explains why their foundation is a contradiction. As Aristotle wrote 2,350
years ago:

Finally, if nothing can be truly asserted, even the following claim would be false,
the claim that there is no true assertion. (Aristotle)
Please see links to articles on the side of the page which explain the
Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter. They
show a simple sensible deduction of absolute truth from the necessary
connection of the One Absolute Thing (Space).
As David Bohm wrote, and which the Wave Structure of Matter explains
(there are no particles, reality is a dynamic unity!);

The notion that all these fragments is separately existent is evidently an illusion,
and this illusion cannot do other than lead to endless conflict and confusion.
Indeed, the attempt to live according to the notion that the fragments are really
separate is, in essence, what has led to the growing series of extremely urgent
crises that is confronting us today. Thus, as is now well known, this way of life has
brought about pollution, destruction of the balance of nature, over-population,
world-wide economic and political disorder and the creation of an overall
environment that is neither physically nor mentally healthy for most of the people
who live in it. Individually there has developed a widespread feeling of helplessness
and despair, in the face of what seems to be an overwhelming mass of disparate
social forces, going beyond the control and even the comprehension of the human
beings who are caught up in it.
(David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 1980)
Geoff Haselhurst

Introduction - Beauty & Importance of Philosophy / Quotes Famous

Philosophers - Consequences of Truth for Humanity - Truth Links - Top of Page

Importance & Beauty of Philosophy

& Truth
Famous Philosophers Quotations
Aristotle, Plato, Buddha, Michel de Montaigne, David Hume & Albert Einstein

The life of theoretical philosophy is the best and happiest a man can lead. Few men
are capable of it (and then only intermittently). For the rest there is a secondbest way of life, that of moral virtue and practical wisdom. (Aristotle,
Metaphysics)
It is clear, then, that wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles and
causes. But now, since it is this knowledge that we are seeking, we must consider
the following point: of what kind of principles and of what kind of causes
is wisdom the knowledge?
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 340BC)
The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of
day, and there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed, my dear Glaucon,
of humanity itself, till philosophers are kings in this world, or till those we now
call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and
philosophy thus come into the same hands, while the many natures now content to
follow either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred from doing so.
This is what I have hesitated to say so long, knowing what a paradox it would
sound; for it is not easy to see that there is no other road to happiness, either for
society or the individual. (Plato, 380BC)
And tell him it's quite true that the best of the philosophers are of no use to their
fellows; but that he should blame, not the philosophers, but those who fail to make
use of them. (Plato, 380BC)
The philosopher is in love with truth, that is, not with the changing world of
sensation, which is the object of opinion, but with the unchanging reality which is
the object of knowledge. (Plato)
The object of knowledge is what exists and its function to know about reality.
(Plato)
What is at issue is the conversion of the mind from the twilight of error to the
truth, that climb up into the real world which we shall call true philosophy. (Plato)
And isn't it a bad thing to be deceived about the truth, and a good thing to know
what the truth is? For I assume that by knowing the truth you mean knowing
things as they really are. (Plato)
The object of knowledge is what exists and its function to know about reality.
(Plato)
And those whose hearts are fixed on Reality itself deserve the title of
Philosophers. (Plato)

'But the man who is ready to taste every form of knowledge, is glad to learn and
never satisfied - he's the man who deserves to be called a philosopher, isn't he?'
(Plato, 380BC)
... there are some who are naturally fitted for philosophy and political leadership,
while the rest should follow their lead and let philosophy alone. (Plato, 380BC)
...for the object of education is to teach us to love beauty. (Plato)
When the mind's eye rests on objects illuminated by truth and reality, it
understands and comprehends them, and functions intelligently; but when it turns
to the twilight world of change and decay, it can only form opinions, its vision is
confused and its beliefs shifting, and it seems to lack intelligence. (Plato)
One trait in the philosopher's character we can assume is his love of the
knowledge that reveals eternal reality, the realm unaffected by change and decay.
He is in love with the whole of that reality, and will not willingly be deprived even
of the most insignificant fragment of it - just like the lovers and men of ambition
we described earlier on. (Plato)
The dustless and stainless Eye of Truth (Dhamma-cakkhu) has arisen.
He has seen Truth, has attained Truth, has known Truth, has penetrated into
Truth, has crossed over doubt, is without wavering.
Thus with right wisdom he sees it as it is (yatha bhutam) (Ancient Buddhist texts)
(Buddha) Sabbadanam dhammadanam jinati - The gift of truth excels all other
gifts.
The world is continuous flux and is impermanent.
I will teach you the Truth and the Path leading to the Truth.
One is ones own refuge, who else could be the refuge? ..The wise man makes an
island of himself that no flood can overwhelm.
Never by hatred is hatred appeased, but it is appeased by kindness. This is an
eternal truth.
.. Transient are conditioned things. Try to accomplish your aim with diligence.
(Buddha's last words)
Philosophy proper deals with matters of interest to the general educated public,
and loses much of its value if only a few professionals can understand what is said.
(Bertrand Russell, 1948)

Since philosophy is the art which teaches us how to live, and since children need to
learn it as much as we do at other ages, why do we not instruct them in it? (de
Montaigne)
Oddly, things have now reached such a state that even among men of intelligence
philosophy means something fantastical and vain, without value or usefulness, both
in opinion and practice. The cause lies in chop-logic which has captured all the
approaches. It is a great mistake to portray Philosophy with a haughty, frowning,
terrifying face, or as inaccessible to the young. Whoever clapped that wan and
frightening mask to her face! There is nothing more lovely, more happy and gay- I
almost said more amorously playful. What she preaches is all feast and fun. A sad
and gloomy mien shows you have mistaken her address. (de Montaigne, 1592)
Philosophical discussions habitually make men happy and joyful not frowning and
sad. (de Montaigne)
The soul which houses philosophy must by her own sanity make for a sound body.
Her tranquility and ease must glow from her; she must fashion her outward bearing
to her mould, arming it therefore with gracious pride, a spritely active demeanour
and a happy welcoming face. The most express sign of wisdom is unruffled joy: like
all in the realms above the Moon, her state is ever serene.
Her aim is virtue, which is not (as they teach in schools) perched on the summit of
a steep mountain, rough and inaccessible. Those ho have drawn nigh her hold that
on the contrary she dwells on a beautiful plateau, fertile and strewn with flowers;
from there she clearly sees all things beneath her; but if you know the road you
can happily make your way there by shaded grassy paths, flower-scented, smooth
and gently rising, like tracks in the vaults of heaven. (de Montaigne)
She (philosophy) is equally helpful to the rich and poor: neglect her, and she equally
harms the young and old. (Horace)
Those sciences which govern the morals of mankind, such as Theology and
Philosophy, make everything their concern: no activity is so private or so secret as
to escape their attention or their jurisdiction. (de Montaigne)
Knowledge is a very weighty thing: they sink beneath it. Their mental apparatus has
not enough energy nor skill to display the noble material and to apportion its
strength, to exploit it and make it help them. Knowledge can lodge only in a
powerful nature: and that is very rare. Feeble minds, said Socrates, corrupt the

dignity of philosophy when they handle it; she appears to be useless and defective
when sheathed in a bad covering. (de Montaigne, 1592)
We readily inquire, Does he know Greek or Latin? Can he write poetry and prose?
But what matters most is what we put last: Has he become better and wiser? We
ought to find out not who understands most but who understands best. We work
merely to fill the memory, leaving the understanding and the sense of right and
wrong empty. Just as birds sometimes go in search of grain, carrying it in their
beaks without tasting it to stuff it down the beaks of their young, so too do our
schoolmasters go foraging for learning in their books and merely lodge it on the tip
of their lips, only to spew it out and scatter it on the wind. (de Montaigne)
Teach him a certain refinement in sorting out and selecting his arguments, with an
affection for relevance and so for brevity. Above all let him be taught to throw
down his arms and surrender to truth as soon as he perceives it, whether the truth
is born at his rivals doing or within himself from some change in his ideas. (de
Montaigne)
As for our pupils talk, let his virtue and his sense of right and wrong shine through
it and have no guide but reason. Make him understand that confessing an error
which he discovers in his own argument even when he alone has noticed it is an act
of justice and integrity, which are the main qualities he pursues; stubbornness and
rancour are vulgar qualities, visible in common souls whereas to think again, to
change ones mind and to give up a bad case on the heat of the argument are rare
qualities showing strength and wisdom. (de Montaigne)
The difference between a man who is led by opinion or emotion and one who is led
by reason. The former, whether he will or not, performs things of which he is
entirely ignorant; the latter is subordinate to no one, and only does those things
which he knows to be of primary importance in his life, and which on that account
he desires the most; and therefore I call the former a slave, but the latter free.
(David Hume, 1737)
The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of
science and learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way,
or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind.
And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some
minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health,
require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of

mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the
mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour,
must needs be delightful and rejoicing. (David Hume, 1737)
... Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish,
by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in
which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries
shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your
philosophy, be still a man. (David Hume, 1737)
And though the philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of
philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself
throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and
calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtlety, in the subdividing
and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his
reasoning; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his
plans and operations. (David Hume, 1737)
Of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed philosophical
tranquility, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of adverse fortune.
Conscious of his own virtue, say the philosophers, the sage elevates himself above
every accident of life; and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on
inferior mortals engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every
frivolous enjoyment. These pretensions, no doubt, when stretched to the utmost,
are by far too magnificent for human nature. They carry, however, a grandeur with
them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes him with admiration. And the nearer
we can approach in practice to this sublime tranquility and indifference (for we
must distinguish it from a stupid insensibility), the more secure enjoyment shall we
attain within ourselves, and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the
world. The philosophical tranquility may, indeed, be considered only as a branch of
magnanimity. (David Hume, 1737)
But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than those
here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms,
and makes us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress
falls off, with which many divines, and some philosophers have covered her; and
nothing appears but gentleness, humanity beneficence, affability; nay, even at
proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and
rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make

her votaries and all mankind, during every instant of their existence, if possible,
cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes
of ample compensation in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble which
she demands, is that of just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater
happiness. (David Hume, 1737)
To see with one's own eyes, to feel and judge without succumbing to the
suggestive power of the fashion of the day, to be able to express what one has
seen and felt in a trim sentence or even in a cunningly wrought word - is that not
glorious? Is it not a proper subject for congratulation? (Albert Einstein, 1934)
Somebody who only reads newspapers and at best books of contemporary authors
looks to me like an extremely near-sighted person who scorns eyeglasses. He is
completely dependent on the prejudices and fashions of his times, since he never
gets to see or hear anything else. And what a person thinks on his own without
being stimulated by the thoughts and experiences of other people is even in the
best case rather paltry and monotonous. There are only a few enlightened people
with a lucid mind and style and with good taste within a century. What has been
preserved of their work belongs among the most precious possessions of mankind.
We owe it to a few writers of antiquity (Plato, Aristotle, etc.) that the people in
the Middle Ages could slowly extricate themselves from the superstitions and
ignorance that had darkened life for more than half a millennium. Nothing is more
needed to overcome the modernist's snobbishness. (Albert Einstein, 1954)
Human kind ... cannot bear very much reality (T.S. Elliot)
Beauty is truth, truth is beauty (Keats)
This truth is to be lived, it is not merely pronounced with the mouth... (Hui Neng)
Great truths do not take hold of the hearts of the masses. And now, as all the
world is in error, how shall I, though I know the true path, how shall I guide? If I
know that I cannot succeed and yet try to force success, this would be but
another source of error. Better then to desist and strive no more. But if I do not
strive, who will? (Chuang Tzu)
To begin with our knowledge grows in spots. ..What you first gain, ... is probably a
small amount of new information, a few new definitions, or distinctions, or points
of view. But while these special ideas are being added, the rest of your knowledge

stands still, and only gradually will you line up your previous opinions with the
novelties I am trying to instill, and to modify to some slight degree their mass.
..Your mind in such processes is strained, and sometimes painfully so, between its
older beliefs and the novelties which experience brings along. (William James,
Pragmatism)
Introduction - Beauty & Importance of Philosophy / Quotes Famous
Philosophers - Consequences of Truth for Humanity - Truth Links - Top of Page

Consequences of Truth to
Humanity
On the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave
Structure of Matter
The true value of a human being is determined primarily by the measure and the
sense in which they have obtained liberation from the self. (Albert Einstein, 1934)

On the Importance of Truth

It is true that we can only appreciate things that we understand, and as
most people have not studied the subjects of Physics, Philosophy, and
Metaphysics they do not appreciate their importance to Humanity. It is also
true that it takes time for us to understand new ideas and truths, to form
the necessary knowledge within our mind such that we can then see the
logical consistency and common-sense of the idea, and thus appreciate its
truth and importance. Once this knowledge has been formed though (by
reading, thinking, discussing the idea) then the Truth becomes 'obvious' to
us. Thus the beautiful thing about philosophy is that it shows us how to
determine the truth, that the liberation of the individual comes from having
the necessary skeptical/critical knowledge to determine this truth for
themselves (and that any other form of belief is ultimately a form of
tribalism which is contrary to the ideals of Philosophy).
Currently philosophy is telling us that we cannot with certainty know the
truth, and this is simply because Postmodern philosophy does not know the

truth. Once truth IS known though, then the converse applies and it
becomes possible for philosophy (Metaphysics) to prove that this is the
truth. Thus I now feel quite certain, as a philosopher, that I understand
Reality, and that the Metaphysics of Space and Motion provides Humanity
with the correct language for describing how matter exists in Space (and
hence explains how matter is interconnected with all other matter in our
Universe). Thus I now know how I exist as a 'Human' in this Space of the
Universe. As a consequence, when I read the work of other great physicists
and philosophers I can clearly see their problems and how they try to
overcome them. But if you don't know what exists, and their necessary
connections it is impossible to have certain (necessary) knowledge and thus
science/philosophy fails. They all try, they get parts right, but they ultimately
never connect it all in ONE completely consistent logical sensible whole.
As Hawking says about the discovery of Reality,

.. if the theory was mathematically consistent and always gave predictions that
agreed with observations, we could be reasonably confident it was the right one. It
would bring to an end a long and glorious chapter in the history of humanity's
intellectual struggle to understand the universe. But it would also revolutionize the
ordinary person's understanding of the universe. (Stephen Hawking, 1988)
What I wish to emphasize is that from my reading of physics and philosophy
it now seems to me possible to solve virtually all their disputes, paradoxes,
and problems. Now this would be extraordinary (and I know that you will
naturally skeptical of such a claim) but then I am a unique philosopher, for I
consider myself to be the first philosopher to know the truth as to what
exists. I also wish to emphasize here that I make no claims to any great
genius and accept that all my knowledge initially came from others greater
than myself (Aristotle, Newton, Hume, Einstein, to name but a few!). I
simply have the advantage of their combined knowledge and now an
awareness of where they are right and wrong. The power that this gives to
human thought is quite simply staggering!
Now though these may be grand claims that I make, it seems to me (as a
skeptical philosopher) that if I know the truth then I should be able to
provide others with the same knowledge such that they will (given time and
thought) come to the same conclusion that I have, that others will also find
this truth amazing in how it guides and solves their problems. I sincerely
hope that this Treatise on the Metaphysics of Space and Motion provides the
necessary knowledge such that this will in time happen.
Perhaps the most serious error of the past century, which now manifests
itself throughout our postmodern world, is the belief that there can be no
absolute and eternal True Knowledge of Reality. This belief has become self-

fulfilling, our minds have become skeptical and closed, and this is like a
disease which spreads and blinds us to the truth. And so in one sense I write
this treatise as an antidote to this sickness that currently pervades our
intellectual world, for it is truth that will cure us of our blindness and will
enable us to see the world as it really is.
I now realize how vitally important it is to be aware of how human beliefs
(and myths) determine our collective behavior. In fact it is now the human
mind which largely controls the evolution of the complex ecology of life
which exists on earth. While our individual minds are relatively feeble and
limited, our collective cultural knowledge and resultant technology and
population have grown enormously over thousands of years so that we now
wield enormous power on this planet. Unfortunately, giving such power to
our feeble minds while we did not know the truth about what exists is
dangerous, and this has largely resulted in the destruction of Nature on
Earth. The consequences of this are only just beginning to emerge, but I am
now certain that because of the complexity and interconnectedness of this
ecology of life on earth, including ourselves, that the consequences of this
destruction will not be good for Humanity, and urgent changes in our
thoughts and actions are required if we are to avoid future catastrophe.
I am confident though, that as this knowledge of the Spherical Standing
Wave Structure of Matter in Space grows and spreads, then it will lead to the
global realization that we truly are structures of Space/the Cosmos - that as
we damage the Space around us, then we must also be damaging ourselves.
And once this is known I do not think that humanity will continue these
actions which so clearly damage our world, and thus ourselves.
I suppose by writing this, what I am really trying to say is that this is not
just some esoteric theory which shall please us. True Knowledge of our
connection to the cosmos is fundamental for wisdom and thus for survival. (I
think our modern world is in great need of some truth and wisdom!)

On the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Important

Consequences to Humanity
If this Cosmology of the Wave Structure of Matter WSM) is True, as logic and
observation suggest, then it will be profoundly important in a positive sense
for humanity:
1. It infers that we are each both the center/Focal-Point of our Universe, yet
intimately interconnected and a part of all other matter in the universe. This
supports the Buddhist view of interconnectedness and change and removes

our limited/blinkered view or ourselves as somehow existing here on earth

separated from the world around us. (The Particle view)
2. This more cosmic view of ourselves will undoubtedly lead to a better
understanding of our ecological interconnectedness with life on earth, and
thus a much greater and more urgent respect for Nature. (I began reading
Physics and Philosophy five years ago because I believed that only true
knowledge of reality, of what we are as humans, and thus what Nature is
and how we are interconnected would lead to the end of the destruction of
Nature.)
Now as this is Treatise is written as a submission for the Peter Gruber Prize
for Cosmology I thought it reasonable to give one example of how this
Metaphysics (importantly) changes our world/cosmic view.
It is now clear to me that a major threat to humanity is that by changing life
on the surface of the earth (largely agriculture, technology, Human overpopulation) we are inadvertently changing the molecular structure of the
gases in our earth's atmosphere. This in turn changes how we are
interconnected with the rest of the universe, and if this change exceeds what
we have evolved to deal with, then it will begin to damage us. It will also
damage a lot of other life on earth, causing a positive feedback cycle of
greater change and instability. Indeed from what I have read, it seems likely
that humanity is pushing Nature into another episode of massive species
extinction, with intelligent scientists suggesting that up to 80% species
extinction may occur. The consequences of this kind of change in
environment to modern humanity would be catastrophic.
Let me make one more important point here which naturally follows. While I
have attempted to clearly explain what things are, the reason why this is
important is that it will guide us in how we should sensibly live with Nature
on Earth within the Cosmos. Nature created both us and the gas structure of
our atmosphere, thus it is logical that as we radically change and destroy
Nature then we shall also radically change (and destroy) our Atmosphere. It
is also logical, as it is an interconnected system, that these gases are
critically important for the survival of most life on Earth, obviously ourselves
included.
And so it seems to me that three points should be made well clear to
Humanity;
1. The WSM tells us that we are part of the One Finite Spherical Universe,
and are thus complexly interconnected to all other matter in our universe.
Therefore;

2. As we change the Gas Structure of the Atmosphere we are in fact

changing how we are interconnected to the rest of the Universe. It is likely
that some of these changes will be detrimental to life on earth and that it is
even possible that, in time, sunlight would effectively become 'poisonous' to
us due to the different energy of radiation (resonantly coupling) that would
be allowed to interact between our matter and the matter of the Sun (and
other Cosmic Radiation - which the existing Atmosphere effectively filters).
Now this thought is shocking, that sunshine could become poisonous to
Humanity. I live in the country, and the sunshine through the trees gently
warming me this Autumn day is delightful. Everyone has enjoyed sitting in
the sunshine at some time, feeling the warmth, seeing the beauty of things
illuminated by her soft light. It seems hard to imagine that the sun could
ever be our enemy. But let us not be ignorant about this!, the sun is an
enormous influence in our Space, we depend upon her energy, and one day
(in many billions of years) she will tire, and collapse (as her Hydrogen fuel is
depleted) only to then explode and consume our planet (as Helium begins
nuclear fusion), so we would be foolish to ignore such a powerful force. (Do
not forget, the Sun is a part of our Spherical Standing Wave-Structure,
which explains HOW we can sense the sun's heat and light.)
Now some may immediately think, well I live and work mainly indoors so I
would survive OK, that we have built our own shields and thus no longer
need the shielding effects of the Earth's Atmosphere. Unfortunately, Nature
and Agriculture can't move indoors like Humans, and they are also alive and
depend on the Sun, just like us. And further, we do not exist as motions of
tiny Particles, but as Structures of the Universe, which would make hiding
indoors from the Universe seem rather quaint and primitive.)
3. Thus it seems to me quite possible that Humanity is now changing things
such that it will set up positive feedback cycles between the change in
Nature, the change in the Gas Structure of the Atmosphere, and the change
in Climate which will exponentially amplify the changes and their effects. If
this were the case, then it also seems likely that by the time we become
aware of the complex interconnection of the system we were changing, and
how it is connected to the rest of the Universe, then it would be impossible
for Humanity to solve the problem. (i.e. We must have some humility, to
learn the limits of what we can and can't do, what we should and shouldn't
do!). The consequences of this would be horrific to Humanity and Nature
alike, with massive species extinction on Earth, and the death of Billions of
Humans, men women and children, all over the world (for we share a
common planet within a common Space, so we cannot escape from any
changes that we make to this system!).

As a philosopher, I do not like writing alarmist essays, for they are inclined
to sound emotional/hysterical and thus loose their effect. Nonetheless, I
have given this considerable thought, and have read on the changes in the
gas structure of the atmosphere, which have occurred over the past thirty
years, and the results of these studies are disturbing to say the least.
Further, this is simply one example of the interconnectedness between
ourselves and the Natural environment of the Earth. There are many other
relationships that are also disturbing, and ultimately only truth will enable us
to solve these emerging problems.
On the future positives, the WSM suggests that the universe is perpetually
evolving, and thus it opens up humanity to the challenge of exploring and
colonizing other planets in Space, the long term aim being to see how clever
(and wise) we can be as a species and thus how long we can continue to
survive and reproduce within the at times hostile universe, as Fowles
astutely states;

The purpose of hazard is to force us, and the rest of matter, to evolve. It is only
by evolving that we, in a process that is evolving, can continue to survive. The
purpose of human evolution is therefore to recognize this: that we must evolve to
exist. And that we should extirpate unnecessary inequality - in other words, limit
hazard in the human sphere - is an obvious corollary. There is therefore no more
sense in being unhappy at hazard in general then there is in hating hands because
they can be cut off; or in not taking every precaution to see that they shall not be
cut off.
What we are before is like a strait, a tricky road, a passage where we need
courage and reason. The courage to go on, not to try to turn back; and the reason
to use reason; not fear, not jealousy, not envy, but reason. We must steer by
reason, and jettison - because much must go - by reason. (Fowles, 1964)
I sincerely believe that I have done the hard work to gather the evidence
which supports the Wave Structure of Matter. I also appreciate though, that
the WSM will not seem obvious to most people at first reading simply
because our minds change slowly, thus it takes time for new ideas that
depend on a complex diversity of knowledge to seem true and obvious to us.

For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing

isolated or independent, but every single part is essential to all the rest; and
hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or positive error, could not fail
to betray itself in use. (Kant, 1781)

Nonetheless, like Kant, I feel certain that there is now enough evidence in
support of the WSM (due to the many problems it solves and its clear
common sense and logical consistency) such that it has earned the right to
be seriously considered, analyzed, and experimentally tested by other
Scientists and Philosophers. When we consider the consequences of this
knowledge to Humanity if it were true, then it seems to me that it would
now be negligent and irresponsible for this knowledge to continue to be
ignored.
I am well aware of the extraordinary nature of the claims made in this
Metaphysics of Space and Motion. The discovery of Reality is the holy grail of
human intellectual thought and would profoundly change our perception of
ourselves and our place in the world. It would change how we think and live,
and thus forever change how we treat this complex ecology of life on earth
which created us, and upon which we depend.
And so I write this Treatise as a gift to humanity, certain that the
Metaphysics of Space and Motion finally provides the correct language for
describing Reality, and that this Truth has a beautiful simplicity and profound
power that shall, in time, do great good both for the individual and our
collective Human society. I know that True Knowledge of Reality (simply
because of its inherent Truth) will spread and grow into the first true age of
enlightenment, the 'Age of Realism', where humans live by Truth in a world
of greater harmony. How long this takes now depends upon the thoughts,
actions (and courage) of others.

Concluding Remarks
Sadly, (and I feel this for Humanity) I do not expect to win the Gruber Prize
for Cosmology. Perhaps my pessimism stems from having recently
read Halton Arp's book Seeing Red which greatly disturbed me with its
portrayal of our current academic/scientific community. And likewise
as Kuhnreminds us;

Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after Copernicus' death.
Newton's work was not generally accepted, particularly on the Continent, for more
than half a century after the Principia appeared. The difficulties of conversion
have often been noted by the scientists themselves. Darwin, in a particularly
perceptive passage at the end of his Origin Of Species, wrote: "Although I am
fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume .. I, by no means
expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a
multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view

directly opposite to mine. ..But I look with confidence to the future - to young and
rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with
impartiality." And Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific
Autobiography, sadly remarked that "a new scientific truth does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.
(Kuhn, 1962)
Thus I expect that the award will go to someone with well established (and
thus famous) ideas within the Scientific world, from which, as a nonacademic philosopher, I am quite separate. I am more like Faraday who, as
he "came from no learned academy; his mind was not burdened with traditional
ideas and theories." (Born, 1924)
And so in ending this submission I wish to make (as a non-academic
philosopher) the following points;
This Metaphysic of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter is
either True or False. Either Matter exists as a Spherical Standing Wave in this
Space (that we all exist in and sense about us) or it does not.
Now it seems to me inconceivable that the WSM is false, for then I am
completely at a loss to explain why it so exactly describes what we sense
from observation and experiment, and why it so exactly fits the
requirements of Aristotle's Metaphysics, along with the ideas of many other
great Philosophers and Physicists. Thus I cannot help but feel certain that it
is true.
(I suggest to you that having now read this Metaphysic, that you spend
some time looking at the world around you, and ask yourself this important
question? 'Do I see anything in the way matter moves in the Space around
me that is contrary to the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave
Structure of Matter?')
Further, it has now become obvious to me that the concepts of Time,
Particles, Fields, and a Finite Spherical Universe are observed effects of the
Motion of Matter relative to other Matter in Space. Thus they are Inductive
and describe effects, they are not a priori causes, which can only be
understood by knowing Reality. The solution though, is simple and obvious
once known. The Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the WSM explains
the further existence of Particles, Time, Fields, and a Finite Universe in an
Infinite Space. (And it is the assumption that these things physically existed
that has deceived us.)

i) The Particle Effect of Matter is Caused by the Wave-Center of Spherical

Standing Waves in Space. The Particle Effect of Light (photons) is Caused
by resonant coupling between two oscillating Wave-Centers.
ii) Time - It takes Time for a Wave to flow from place to place. (i.e. The finite
velocity of Wave Motion causes Time)
iii) Force Fields - Force is caused by a change in velocity of the Spherical InWaves which determines the future location of the Wave-Center (which we
see as the accelerated Motion of the Particle.)
iv) Finite Spherical Universe - Exists perpetually in an Infinite Space where
distant Matter's Out-Waves become our Matter's In-Waves (Huygens' Wave
Combination and Mach's Principle)
Once we have these foundations correctly understood though, and the Two
Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter formalized then this Metaphysics,
though exceedingly simple, becomes awesomely powerful as a method of
critical logical analysis of Physics and Philosophy.
Therefore, if the Peter Gruber prize was awarded to the Metaphysics of
Space and Motion, I feel quite sure that it will then lead to the following
profound events;
i) This publicity and emerging respect for this Metaphysic would lead to it
being published in a number of Journals and Newspapers.
ii) Other Scientists and Philosophers would then become aware of this work,
would see its clear common sense and simple logic, and some of them would
then apply these ideas to their own work and they will be pleasantly
surprised that it begins to explain and solve their current problems.
iii) This will also lead to getting some important experiments done (including
Wolff's EPR experiment) that will further confirm and give confidence to this
Wave Structure of Matter.
iv) This would then most likely (and most justly) result in Milo Wolff (now
78), receiving the Nobel Prize for Physics for his work of the Wave Structure
of Matter, and in particular his discovery of two things: the wave interactions
and Doppler shift with relative Motion that are the cause of both the de
Broglie Wavelength and Einstein's Relativistic Mass increase; and his
'Equation of the Cosmos' that results from his simple and ingenious
unification of Huygens' Wave Combinations, and Mach's Principle, and thus

explains how our Finite Spherical Universe can Perpetually Exist in an Infinite
Eternal Space.
v) Most importantly though, this knowledge of how we are intimately
interconnected to the world around us would slowly spread, and would
without doubt profoundly change how we Humans think and view the world
around us. This will, fortunately, lead to a much greater respect and
understanding of how we are intimately interconnected with Nature, that we
are not separate 'Humans' consisting of tiny Particles, rather, we are
awesomely complex structures of the Universe. We shall finally realize our
connection and 'place' in the world, and this will be a turning point for the
evolution of Humanity, and thus of Nature on Earth.
And so you see that I have high hopes and passions for changing the world
to Truth, which is nothing but the passion of the philosopher. And it is
obvious that winning the Peter Gruber Prize at this stage in the development
of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion would greatly nurture and enhance a
Metaphysic still struggling in its infancy. And it seems to me, having read up
on Peter Gruber, that this is exactly what he had in mind when he proposed
this award, and thus the reason for my entry of this work.
I would hazard a guess that all other entries that you receive will continue to
assume the separate existence of either Time, Particles, or Electromagnetic
and Gravitational Fields. Therefore none of these other works can be
fundamental as the WSM explains. Thus as a philosopher I must conclude
that if another work (founded on Time, Particles, or Fields) wins the Gruber
award, no matter how deserving it may be (and I mean these comments
kindly and sincerely, but also truthfully) it must also mean that at the end of
the day this Metaphysic of Space and Motion was judged not to be true. (For
if the work that I have submitted is true, then it explains why their work
must ultimately not be fundamental.)
And so I ask, kindly and sincerely, for you to consider this point - that if this
Metaphysic is deemed unworthy of the Gruber Prize it means that you
believe that it is not true. And thus as a philosopher, I must then ask you,
what is your evidence, based both upon your senses, and upon the collective
knowledge of 2,500 years of Physics and Philosophy, that tells you that this
is not true. For I feel that I would be owed such an explanation, as we all
agree that ultimately it is truth that matters, not money, not awards, not
fame and ego, but the Truth.
I am sorry if this sounds arrogant or abrupt, I mean neither. I am simply a
philosopher who has devoted ten years of his life (with a mix of pleasure,
passion, and responsibility!) to understanding the truth of our existence,
because I now believe that Humanity is in great peril without this
knowledge, and that only the truth can solve our problems ....

I end with perhaps the two most important (and beautiful) quotes from
Albert Einstein, a man whom I never met, but who has taught me a great
deal and who I admire more than any other. (The great power of words and
ideas, and these wonderful things we call books.)

Albert Einstein talking to a group of children (1934)

My dear children:
I rejoice to see you before me today, happy youth of a sunny and fortunate land.
Bear in mind that the wonderful things that you learn in your schools are the work
of many generations, produced by enthusiastic effort and infinite labor in every
country of the world.
All this is put into your hands as your inheritance in order that you may receive it,
honor it, and add to it, and one day faithfully hand it on to your children. Thus do
we mortals achieve immortality in the permanent things which we create in
common.
If you always keep that in mind you will find meaning in life and work and acquire
the right attitude towards other nations and ages.
A human being is part of the whole called by us universe, a part limited in time and
space. We experience ourselves, our thoughts and feelings as something separate
from the rest. A kind of optical delusion of consciousness. This delusion is a kind of
prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few
persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from the prison by
widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of
nature in its beauty ..
We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if humanity is to survive.
(Albert Einstein)
~~~~~~~~~~
Geoff Haselhurst
May 2001
Introduction - Beauty & Importance of Philosophy / Quotes Famous
Philosophers - Consequences of Truth for Humanity - Truth Links - Top of Page

Links / Importance of Truth, Beauty &

Philosophy
Philosophy: Art / Truth - The Philosophy of Art and the Art of Philosophy. The
greatest Art is founded on profound Truths. Art Pictures and Quotations
from Botticelli, Da Vinci, Michelangelo, Titian, Caravaggio, Reubens,
Velazquez, Rembrandt, Goya, Renoir, Van Gogh, Mattise, Picasso,
Warhol. On the rise and fall of great Art - On the new Metaphysical
foundations of Art as representation of Absolute Truth.
Philosophy: Education - Plato, Michel de Montaigne, Albert
Einstein and Jean Jacques Rousseauon Philosophy of Education, both for
the Individual and their Responsibility to Society. On True Knowledge of
Reality as Necessary for Education of Critical Thinking.
Philosophy: Absolute Truth - Absolute Space - Absolute Truth comes from
Necessary Connection which requires One Thing, Absolute Space, to
Connect the Many Things (Matter as Spherical Wave Motions of Space). On
the Absolute Truth and Reality of the Existence of Absolute Space as a Wave
Medium. And ending such nonsense as 'The ONLY ABSOLUTE TRUTH is that
there are NO ABSOLUTE TRUTHS' (Feyerabend) as Aristotle wrote, 'Finally, if
nothing can be truly asserted, even the following claim would be false, the
claim that there is no true assertion.'
Aristotle - On Philosopher Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics (Motion).
(Aristotle was one of the greatest of the famous philosophers and should be
read by all people interested in philosophy and wisdom.)
Gandhi, Mohandas 'Mahatma' - On Civil Disobedience and the Path of Truth
(Satyagraha - Truth Force, God is Truth). Information, Biography of
Mohandas Gandhi.
Plato - On Plato's Republic - Plato appreciated that all Truth comes from
Reality and this Truth was profoundly important to the future of Humanity.
'Till Philosophers are Kings, or Kings are Philosophers there is no Hope for
Humanity'

WISDOM AS VIRTUE OR HUMAN EXCELLENCE

PLATO'S VIEW OF THE SEARCH FOR WISDOM (i.e. PHILOSOPHY)
In the Apology, Socrates identifies his activity with "wisdom""This man
among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his
wisdom is worthless [my emphasis]."

According to Plato, this is best thing for human life, the best way humans can
live their lives, the only way human life will be satisfying.
"Men of Athens, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as
I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to
point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the
greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your
eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor
give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?" 29d
"the greatest good for a man [is] to discuss virtue [excellence] every day and those other things about
which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living
for men" 38a

Three Platonic images of wisdom

1. LEAVING THE CAVE: WISDOM AS ENLIGHTENMENT.
In the Allegory of the Cave, wisdom is depicted as getting out of the cave and
coming to see things as "they really are." It's important to note that life outside
the cave is not a complete break with being in the cave. We know about the
same things: dogs, cats, boats, justice, and so on. But we no longer look at
shadows cast by copies of these things. We see then in a new way, but also
atruer waywe see the "prototypes" for the copies that exist in the cave.
"Enlightenment" is different from our previous life, but not unrelated to it.
This image of wisdom stresses that part of being wise is having
"understanding."
2. THE EXAMINED LIFE: WISDOM AS CARE FOR THE SOUL.
Near the end of the Apology, Socrates famously says: "the greatest good for
a man [is] to discuss virtue [excellence] every day and those other things
about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the
unexamined life is not worth living for men" 38a. This suggests a second
image of wisdom: the examined life. This is how the philosopher cares for
his/her soul (cf. 29d).
Socrates' point is that the unexamined life is a barely human life, it is
incomplete life, even dysfunctional. Thinking without examining that thought
ignores our deepest human need.
A life focused on the question of its greatest good is a life lived to its fullest
an excellent or virtuous life.

This image of wisdom stresses the practical part of being wise, being able to
put your understanding into practice, to have it make a difference in your life
and the lives of others.
3. WISDOM AS NOT KNOWING

At 21d Socrates says: "when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I

am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know
what I do not know." [In our text it is translated thus: ...I am better off than he
is,for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think
that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage
of him." pg 23]
What does Socrates mean when he professes his ignorance in this way?
1. Certainly he means this: he realizes that he has more to learn. This is a
common interpretation of this idea, and probably the one most people have.
2. He is also refering to the limited nature of human knowingas he says, all
human wisdom is worthless, nothing, in other words, fallible. Even in their best
operation, even regarding those beliefs for which we have the best reasons,
and spent the most time considering, human knowing is still fallible, and error
is still possible. Human wisdom therefore ill always be a tentative thing and
open thing. (However the natural human attitude treats it in the opposite way!)
Therefore, in our search for wisdom (philosophy), we must be more committed to the
process itself than to its results: the best results may fail us, but the process will not. It is
living the examined life that guarantees human happiness, not certain knowledge. Being
proved wrong, even about things we thoroughly and rigorously considered, is always a
good thing; committment to inquiry itself should ensure that such an event would not
unduly disturb us.
So the process of inquiry satisfies human desirethe examined lifemore so than
success. The goal is to engage in the process, and not to find some truth that we can
categorically say is "the truth." [Does this mean there is no truth? No. It says nothing
about that either way. It just means that the process of inquiry must always continue. A
good case can be made that Socrates thinks that the God has truth in this final sort of
way.]
Socratic dialectic is a remedy for our fallibility:

It is open-ended and can involve anyone.

It requires others (a community). We need others for two purposes:

1. to try to prove our ideas wrong
2. to help us overcome our own defensiveness, prejudice, haste, lack
of confidence

CODA: DOES SOCRATES KNOW NOTHING?

Some of things Socrates does know

A general knowledge of helpful directions of inquiry, and its dead ends

The unexamined life is not worth living

The importance to human excellence of caring for our souls

The dangerous effects of human vice

Genuine knowledge leads to actual good choices

Whats the Difference Between

Fact and Opinion?
271
8

25

4768

by Dr. Edward Feser

Filed under Belief

97 Comments

NOTE: Dr. Feser's contributions at Strange Notions were originally posted on his own blog, and
therefore lose some of their context when reprinted here. Dr. Feser explains why that matters.

A reader wrote me to ask:

"Please could you elucidate the distinction between a fact and an opinion? I am a secondary school
English teacher and there is a lot of rubbish written on this part of the curriculum that would lead to
such absurdities as, for example, the atomic weight of sodium is a fact, but the proposition 'raping
babies is wrong' is merely an opinion."

The manner in which fact is commonly pitted against opinion seems to rest on multiple
confusions. In particular, it seems to rest, in part and in several ways, on a failure to take note of
the distinction between metaphysical questions and epistemological questions. It also seems to rest
in part on a rather crude and dogmatic application of the so-called fact/value distinctiona
distinction that is, where ethics is concerned, dubious in any event. Finally, it often seems to rest as
well on a failure to distinguish science from scientism.
Lets walk through this. When people say that such-and-such a claim about sodium (for example) is
a fact, it seems pretty clear that part of what they mean is that it is objectively true that sodium is
that way. That is to say, that sodium has such-and-such chemical properties is a state of affairs that
holds completely independently from human convention or subjective tastes. It seems that another
part of what they mean, though, is that this objective truth about sodium has been discovered by
means of unimpeachable evidence, airtight scientific arguments, and so forth. These two claims are
of logically distinct types. The first is a claim about the way the world isall it a metaphysical claim
while the second is a claim about how we know about the way the world iscall it an

epistemological claim. And this difference entails a corresponding difference between two different
senses of the word fact:
Fact (1): an objective state of affairs
Fact (2): a state of affairs known via conclusive arguments, airtight evidence, etc.
In the same way, when people say that such-and-such is a matter of opinion, it seems clear
that what they mean, in part, is that it concerns something that is not known via conclusive
arguments based on airtight evidence, etc. but is at best believed in on the basis of controversial
arguments. But it seems that they also at least sometimes mean that it not a claim that could be
objectively true in any eventthat its truth could only ever be a matter of convention or subjective
taste. Here too we have claims of two logically different types, where the first is an epistemological
claim and the second a metaphysical one. And as with fact, we need therefore to distinguish
between two senses of the expression matter of opinion:
Matter of opinion (1): a state of affairs determined entirely by human convention or taste, about
which no objective claims can be made
Matter of opinion (2): a state of affairs not known via conclusive arguments, unimpeachable
evidence, etc., but at best believed in on the basis of controversial arguments
Now part of the problem with most fact versus opinion talk is that the people who engage
in it do not make these distinctions. One result of this is that they fallaciously assume that if
something is a matter of controversy, then there must be no objective fact of the matter about it
that is to say, that if it is a Matter of opinion (2) then it must therefore be a Matter of opinion (1) and
therefore must not be a Fact (1). That this is muddleheaded should be obvious from the following
example:
"The existence of Pluto is a fact in both of the senses we have distinguished. But though it was
always a Fact (1), it was not always a Fact (2), for Plutos existence was of course not known for
most of human history. More to the present point, during the period in which there was debate over
what the relevant observations really showed, the existence of Pluto, though still (as it turns out)
a Fact (1), was not a Fact (2) but only aMatter of opinion (2)."

In general, it is perfectly possible for something to be a fact in the first sense but not in the second
sense, and therefore perfectly possible for it to be a fact in the first sense and at the same time a
matter of opinion, in the second sense of that expression. It is also, for that matter, possible for
something to be a Matter of opinion (1) but a Fact (2). For example, that the speed limit on most
highways in California is 65 MPH is a matter of human convention, and that my favorite Scotch is
Laphroaig is a matter of taste. But someone could easily acquire airtight evidence that these things
are so.
So, that is one problem with most talk about fact versus opinionit fails to make these
crucial distinctions between metaphysical vs. epistemological senses of the relevant
terms. But there are other problems too. Precisely because people fallaciously infer from
somethings being a matter of controversy to the conclusion that there must be no objective truth
about it, they tend to fall for a rather crude version of the fact/value distinction. They conclude that,
since people disagree about morality, morality must be entirely subjective, so that even judgments

like Raping babies is wrong must be true only as a matter of taste or convention. We all agree
about facts but dont all agree about morality, therefore (so the "reasoning goes) morality must be
a matter of mere opinion rather than fact. Once we make the distinctions noted above, the
fallaciousness of this reasoning becomes obvious. And as I show in my essay on classical natural
law theory and property rights, there is ample reason to reject the fact/value distinction in any case.
Finally, as the example my reader gives suggests, there also seems to be a tendency to think that
what is factual is what can be established by means of empirical science, so that what cannot be
established in that way must be merely a matter of opinion. The scientism implicit in this tendency
is difficult to justify even when endorsed by professional philosophers. In the thinking of the average
non-professional who casually pits scientific fact against non-scientific opinion, it is nothing more
than a prejudice picked up from the surrounding culture. Certainly it embodies no actual rational
basis for rejecting the possibility that solid philosophical arguments can rationally justify moral,
aesthetic, and theological claimsthus showing such claims to be entirely factual in both senses of
the term even if one agrees that they are not the sorts of claims which could be established on
empirical scientific grounds.
In summary, then, there seem to be four errors underlying the common tendency to pit fact
against opinion, to identify the former with science, and to relegate moral judgments and the
like to the latter category. First, it fails to distinguish the relevant two senses of fact. Second, it
fails to distinguish the two relevant senses of opinion. Third, it unjustifiably assimilates moral and
other value judgments to matters of opinion in the first sense we distinguished. And fourth, it
unjustifiably assimilates facts in both senses of the term to scientific facts. When we clear up all
these errors, we can see that a great deal of what is said in the name of fact versus opinion is, as my
reader puts it, rubbish.

Teaching Philosophy as Education and Evaluation of

Thinking
Giuseppe Boncori
Pontificia Universita Urbaniana
giboncori@axrma.uniroma1.it

ABSTRACT: Teaching philosophy and critical thinking is one of the main ways to clearly
reaffirm the value of human persons and of goodness and freedom. It is not sufficient to
propose a philosophical message, but we must teach it systematically (curriculum) with a
real synergy between teachers and parents. We must also build a curriculum, which includes
an evaluation model based on clear goals and objectives: the intermediate and final
evaluation and assessment will enable us to be sure that we have reached our aim. It is also
necessary to verify every step, evaluate it and compare it to the criteria (general project,
goals, objectives) we put in our mind and use in our teaching. This critical evaluation needs

methods and some teaching instruments described herein. The final philosophical education
will be much stabler and assure us about our scientific and formative project.

I. Teaching Philosophy
Philosophical thinking includes an educational dimension, according to the dialogical
structure of human thinking. First of all a preliminary question: is philosophy teaching and
learning possible? This is the main problem, from Socrates to today: if a science exists and
can be transmitted: without any objective and universal philosophical knowing about justice,
goodness, truth, man becomes the measure of all things (according to Protagoras; science
becomes sensation and human knowing is under subjectivism. But it's possible to get truth
by dialogue: then it is also possible teaching and philosophically thinking using
argumentation and research of universal ideas, transcending simple and unfounded opinions
(CIFUENTES, 1997 #4922). This thesis, from Plato to Kant and German idealism (Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel) seems the main scientific trend up to today (BARON & STERNBERG,
1987a; BARON & STERNBERG, 1987b; ENNIS, 1987; QUELLMALZ, 1987; SMITH,
1987), in spite of contrasting voices, like Rousseau, against any guidance in philosophical
education: the tradition of philosophical schools seems to deny these assumptions, at least
"in actu exercito". A problem arises about the teacher, whose duty would be to propose and
not to impose his ideas: truth, freedom and human person could be at risk, particularly in
developing situations. It is possible to overcome these problems by a philosophical
education that could be able to teach critical thinking as a method to evaluate, assess and
verify ideas, events and everything that is transmitted. This is a way philosophy can
maintain its main traits. The present communication will say how we can teach philosophy,
and how we can evaluate philosophical learning (High, 1991; O'Loughlin, 1991), and how
we can evaluate critical philosophical learning.
The teaching of philosophy want to obtain the integral education of human person, to know
the meaning of human existence and activiy (PIERETTI, 1991).
The teaching of philosophy is a contribute to complete formation of the human subject,
specially in doing philosophy, asking to know, to look for the truth, to compare opinions, to
dialogue with others subjects, with nature, with God. This kind of teaching significantly
contributes to know the human nature and to discover values and meanings of life and
community (RIGOBELLO, 1979).
II. Education and its role in teaching philosophy
The teaching process tries to study the best methods, mental processes and contents to learn
and grow as a human person, according to developing situations and cultural and social
differences. Teaching activity is a kind of "translation" (as Bruner says), trying to adapt

something to someone. From the old philosophical tradition to now a day, many kinds of
myths and concrete representations have been used to help intelligence, motivation, memory
and learning. This kind of speaking by "parables" and "concrete operations", as J Piaget
would say, is a quite useful method in philosophical education , that we have to program by
systematic steps, goals and objectives. For example, to make children understand the idea of
virtue, of goodness and so on, we had not only to explain theorically defined concepts, but
also show concrete good behaviours in which the goodness is actualised. Active methods are
proposed too, like simulations of philosophical activity, able to help motivation of the
students (GIRLE, 1991; MILLAN, 1997).
At the end of a systematic teaching there is the evaluation, that verifies if the programmed
goals have been realised. We must compare the programmed curriculum, our intentions, to
reality, on the basis of the goals and objectives. The validity and reliability are the main
traits of a good evaluation (BONCORI, 1992).
III. Education and philosophy learning: critical thinking evaluation.
1) Evaluation and critical thinking
Educational research about critical thinking is increasing in the last decades , at least in the
U.S.A. The main interest is about intelligence education and evaluation ability; that ability is
to make a guided judgement based on logical and epistemological criteria guided . There are
discussions and debates about theory and educational methods and instruments. Researchers
emphasise the value of human person, the social, educational and curricular dimension,
including teaching and evaluating (BLAIR, 1988; CHAFFEE, 1988; PAUL, 1984; PAUL,
1987; SIEGEL, 1988). Why so much interest for this topic? Critical thinking research have
originally a social and philosophical-educational dimension: one of the first book on this
subject was edited by National Council for the social Studies, in Washington D.C. in 1942:
the editor was H.R. Anderson (ANDERSON, 1942) associated professor at the Cornell
University, which presented a series of studies by G. Marcham , professor of English
History at the Cornell University, H. Taba, assistant professor of Education and Research
Associates at the University of Chicago ("The evaluation of critical thinking"), H.E. Wilson,
associate professor at Harvard University. Theorical debate emphasises many aspects of the
critical thinking idea: for many authors it is quite the same as logical thinking (CURTIS,
1980; ENNIS, 1958; ENNIS, 1962; HUGHES, 1977; Hyram, 1957; ULMER, 1949;
WERKMEISTER, 1948; WHITE, 1936; WOODS & WALTON, 1974) or problem solving
thinking (ALDRICH, 1948; BOSTWICK, 1959; DRESSEL & MAYHEW, 1954; MILLER
& WESTON, 1949) The researchers stress the social motivation, the value of human person:
the education of critical thinking could be a good defence against propaganda, advertisement
and all the enemies of freedom and democracy (ANDERSON, MARCHAM, & DUNN,
1944; ELLIS, 1942; MARCHAM, ANDERSON, DUNN, & LUDLUM, 1941; SMITH,
1953) Others emphasise the critical evaluation in scientific method, specially about the
hypothese's nature and analysis (HENDERSON, 1958; WALLEN, HAUBRICH, & REID,
1963). Other authors underline critical thinking as a cognitive act: the main components are
logical analysis, data and experience evaluation, problem solving steps evaluation

(BLOOM, KRATHWOHL, & MASIA, 1984-85; DRESSEL & MAYHEW, 1954a;

HUNKINS, 1970; RIVERSO, 1993; RUSSELL, 1956; TABA, et al., 1964). Analysing
different researches through the years, we can see a common trend that unifies many
authors: critical thinking is theorised as an intelligence ability, but as a particular one, like a
thinking directed to evaluate and verify a process or a product of mind. This trend is clearly
exposed by an italian pedagogist (CALONGHI, 1976a; CALONGHI, 1976b): critical ability
is a control on mind product and it is different from any other mental activity, for example
verbal understanding and logical thinking or problem solving activity.
Methods to evaluate critical thinking. Different methods are used to evaluate critical
thinking. Among written tests, one of the first tools is the "Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Appraisal": published in the U.S.A. in many editions (WATSON & GLASER, 1964) , is
broken up into five parts, each of which has its own set of directions and examples. The
parts are called "Inference" (Items 1-20), "Recognition of Assumptions" (Item 21-36),
"Deduction" (Item 37-61), "Interpretation" (Items 62-85), and "Evaluation of Arguments"
(Itams 86-99). (...) The materials were developed in the late 30's and have since been revised
several times. The items consistently require students to examine evidence and to think
(...).The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is a popular critical thinking, and as
such, deserves careful examination (ENNIS, 1958) Example from the Watson-GlaserCritical-Thinking-Apraisal - section on assumption identification: "If you think the
assumptio is not necessarily taken for granted inthe statement, blacken the space under
"ASSUMPTION NOT MADE" - "I'm travelling to South America. I want to be sure that I
do not get typhoid fever, so I shall go my physician and get vaccinated against typhoid fever
before I begin my trip". Proposed Assumption: Typhoid fever is more common in South
America than it is where I live. MADE or NOT MADE?" (ENNIS, 1987) . This test aims to
assess evaluative and reasoning abilities, including the critical ones. However, many
studies stress the necessity of a better validation (WILSON & WAGNER, 1981) : the main
objection is that this test seems more similar to a reading test than to a critical thinking test
(MODJESKI & MICHAEL, 1983) . The "Cornell Critical Thinking Test" instead, by R.H.
Ennis e J. Millman (ENNIS, 1958; RUST, 1960; RUST, JONES, & KAISER, 1962;
WALLEN, HAUBRICH, & REID, 1963) aims to evaluate critical abilities, but in fact is a
test of logical thinking. The Ennis model of critical evaluation and thinking: Critical
thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking that il focused on deciding what to believe or
do. Based upon this definition, I suggested a conception of critical trhinking utilizing the
simple idea that a decision about belief or action involves four basic elements: (A) basic
support (especially information) on which the decision is grounded, (B) the inference to the
decision, (C) clarity, and (D) a set of critical thinking dispositions. These four majior
categories generate a set of aspects that could be a sest of specifications for the critical
thinking component of a teacher-competence test, both in and out of teachers' subject-area
specialities. A) Basic support: 1. Judging the credibility of sources; 2. Observing and
judging observation statements. B) Inference: 3. Deducing, and judging deductions; 4.
Inducing, and judging inductions; 5. Value judging. C) Clarity: 6. Focusing on a question; 7.
Analyzing arguments; 8. Asking and answering clarifying questions; 9. Defining terms, and
judging definitions; 10. Identifying assupntions; D) Dispositions, including these: 11. Being
openminded; 12. Looking for other alternatives; 13. Being well informed; 14. Using one's

critical thinking abilities

The American Council on Education built a test to evaluate critical thinking: in this case too
there is an overlapping between critical evaluation and other intellectual abilities, like verbal
competence and problem solving capacity (CALONGHI, 1976) . The test of critical thinking
by S.W. Lundsteen is directed to evaluate this ability in a sample of preadolescents, and
aims to assess it more exactly, without overlapping with any other intellectual (verbal,
logical, ...) abilities. What is meant by critical thinking and by critical listening? The
opinion presented in this report is taken from the definition by Russell (RUSSELL, 1956) ,
also found in the descriptions by Guilford (cit) and Bloom (cit) for evaluation. Russell
distinguished this basic mental process from the five others (perceptual, associative,
conceptual, creative and problem solving) by insisting (1) that a standard or highly
conscious criteria be present in the mind of the thinkier at the same time the process takes
place; (2) that as the thinkier sifts the evidence regarding an object or statement and
suspends evaluation, he does then make a critical judgment; (3) finally, that the thinker, who
is able to support his judgment with reasons derived from either internal logic or external
values, in the form of consensual data, acts or concludes on the judgment made
(LUNDSTEEN, 1969) . Critical listening was defined as a fourfold process that included
esamining spoken materials in the light of related objective evidence, comparing the ideas
under evaluation with some criteria, making a judgment on the ideas, and acting on the
judgment made (LUNDSTEEN, 1966) . B.S. Bloom says the evaluation is defined as the
making of judgments about the value, for some purpose, of ideas, works, solutions,
methods, material, etc. It involves the use of criteria as well as standards for appraising the
extent to which particulars are accurate, effective, economical, or satisfying. The judgments
may be either quantitative or qualitative, and the criteria may be either those determined by
the student or those which are given to him. (...) After an individual has comprehended and
perhaps analyzed a work, he may be called upon to evaluate it in terms of various internal
criteria. Such criteria are for the most part tests of the accuracy of the work as judged by the
logical relationship evident in the work itself. Has the writer (or speaker) been consistent in
his use of terms, does one idea really follow from another, and do conclusions follow
logically from the material presented. (...) Judgments in terms of external criteria.
Evaluation of material with reference to selected or remembered criteria. The criteria may
be ends to be satisfied; the techniques, rules, or standards by wich such works are generally
judged; or the comparison of the work with other works in the filed. This type of evaluation
involves the classification of the phenomena that the appropriate criteria for judgment may
be employed. Thus, a work of history is to be judged by criteria relevant to historical works
rather than to works of fiction. A rethorical work is to be judged by criteria relevant to such
works rather than criteria appropriate to different kinds of verbal presentations (...) All of
this involves the assumption that each phenomenon is a member of a class and is to be
judged by criteria which are apprppriate to that class. This also includes the possibility of
comparing a work with other members of the same class work. (BLOOM, 1979)
J.P. Guilford & ass. studied also a way to analyse intelligence and critical thinking, and a
method to evaluate it: an interesting distinction Guilford does about the contents critical
thinking can be applied: verbal or non verbal, auditory, perceptual, behavioural, etc.

Evaluation involves reaching decisions as to the accuracy, goodness, suitability, or

workability of information (GUILFORD, 1959) . The best established evaluation factor is
that of logical evaluation. This is defined as the ability to judge the soundness of
conclusions where logical consistency is the criterion. The facto has sometimes been called
"deduction", with the belief that it is the ability to draw conclusions logically consistent with
premises. If this were the case, the factor would belong with the production-factors group.
Most tests in which the factor has been found to be a component are the true-false or
multiple-choice form, in which the examinee is given conclusions. (GUILFORD, 1956) ;
(GUILFORD & HOPFNER, 1967)
On the light of these and others studies we built a new test, the "Caccia all'errore 12A". This
test has been originally built for a Ph.D. in Education, in the University "La Sapienza" of
Roma. It's a non verbal test, including 60 multiple alternative items, experimentally
validated on a sample of preapdolescents. The model is strictly based on the idea we
described (and criticied) in the previous sections: the test consists in comparing different
geometrical figures in logical order; one of the elemnts can be a mistake: the task is to find
the mistake, if there is one. The logical operations are selected among seriation and
classification, the only ones children 11 years old usually master. So we can be sure that the
evaluation is only about critical ability, without any verbal overlapping (BONCORI, 1986;
BONCORI, 1989) .
Conclusion
Teaching of philosophy and critical thinking is one of the main problems to clearly reaffirm
the value of human person and of goodness and freedom. It is not sufficient to propose a
philosophical message but we had to teach it systematically (curriculum) with a real synergy
of teachers and parents. We must also build a curriculum, with includes an evaluation model
based on clear goals and objectives: the intermediate and final evaluation and assessment
shall make us sure that we reached our aim. It is also necessary to verify every step, evaluate
it and compare it to the criteria (general project, goals, objectives) we put in our mind and
used in our teaching. This critical evaluation needs methods and some teaching instruments,
we described before. The final philosophical education will be so more stable and will make
us sure about our scientific and formative project.

We humans are embodied spirits

Homily for Corpus Christi

Readings: Gen. 14.18-20; Ps. 110; 1 Cor. 11.23-26; Lk. 9.11-17

We humans are embodied spirits. We consist of and communicate with our body and soul.
It's not good enough for a husband to sit in his lazy boy lounge chair, and just think about
how much he loves his wife; he better say it and show it. It is not good enough for a child to
think how much he/she loves mom and dad, and do nothing to communicate that love. They
better say it and show it. Similarly, if someone says and does all the right things in giving
hugs and kisses, flowers, and chocolate candy; or obeying in all things, but lacks genuine
love and affection; all those things don't matter if the soul is absent from actions.
Notice how God relates and communicates with us. God has made us body and soul. God
has created us with five senses which enable us to hear, see, smell, taste and touch. Look at
the beauty of creation about which God has said, "It is good." God has made us male and
female, and has said "it is good." We are a physical and spiritual people. Throughout
salvation history God has called and sent leaders to instruct and/or to inspire his people:
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; Moses, Aaron and Miriam; Elijah, Eliza and other prophets;
Kings David and Solomon; the women Ruth and Esther, and finally his Son Jesus: God
became Man, body and soul, to be God's Word, i.e., God's communication in our midst.
People's five senses were active in their interacting with Jesus. John the Baptist used water
to baptize Jesus by immersing him in the Jordan River. Jesus physically touched people in
ways that healed them, and showed forgiveness of their sins. When our Lord spoke, people
listened to him. Jesus participated in the wedding feast of Cana which demonstrates his
support for this God-given institution of marriage; I suspect that Jesus drank the wine and
danced too. At the Last Supper, Jesus fed the apostles and disciples physically and
spiritually, and he empowered his apostles to continue his sacred meal by instructing them,
"Do this in memory of me." God has created us body and soul, therefore, he communicates
with his people in physical and spiritual ways.
Communication is a two-way street. God wants us to communicate with him in words and
deeds also. Jesus warns us not to use long prayers as do the Pharisees, but to pray in this
manner: "Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name " Jesus requires that we
show our love for God by demonstrating our love for each other: "If you say that you love
God but hate your neighbor, you are a liar." The criterion for entering into heaven is simply,
"When I was hungry, did you give me to eat; when I was thirsty, did you give me to drink;
when I was sick or in prison, did you visit me?" Because we are body and soul, we relate
and communicate with God and all people in words and deeds, in spirit and in actions. We
praise God and serve others in physical and spiritual ways.
On this feast of Corpus Christi, we celebrate that at the Last Supper, Jesus took ordinary
gifts of bread and wine, prayed to his Father in heaven, broke the bread, gave it to his
disciples and said, "Take this all of you and eat it: this is my body which will be given up for
you." When supper was ended, Jesus took the cup. Again he gave you thanks and praise,
gave the cup to his disciples and said, "Take this all of you, and drink from it. This is the cup
of my blood, the blood of the new and everlasting covenant."
For two thousand years since that Last Supper night, we Christians have re-enacted, repeated, re-presented what Jesus had done for us. By the power of God, we take Jesus at his
word and believe that this bread and wine is transformed into his body and blood. It

interests me that the early Church debated at great length about the nature of God, Jesus
and Mary, but not until 1500 years after Christ's death, did some people, mostly dissident
priests, reject Real Presence. In the 9th, 11th, 14th and 16th centuries theologians argued
over language to describe Real Presence. Martin Luther, who used the term
consubstantiation rather than transubstantiation, adamantly defended Real Presence.
Huldrich Zwingli and other contemporaries began using words like symbol and memorial to
try to supplant the word sacrament. Now, 500 years later, the Catholic and Protestant
Churches are enjoying very fruitful discussions on the Eucharist. Whole still arguing over
language, most denominations agree in taking Jesus at his own words: "This is my body.
This is my blood."
Today, when you individually receive this sacred bread and wine, thank God for the gift of
this mutual communication. In the Eucharist, Jesus' Holy Spirit penetrates and permeates
our human spirit. Consequently, we humans experience God's divine life; divine life enters
into our human life. One of the early Church Fathers advised priests: "Imitamini quod
tractamini," which means, "Imitate what you are holding in your hands." Today, when you
receive Communion, pause for a moment, and repeat the classical exhortation: "Imitate
what you are holding in your hands." When you leave church, live this divine life, graced
life, body and soul in the real world. Let your words and deeds demonstrate that God lives
within you. Become what you eat; you have received the most holy Body and Blood of
Christ. Regard yourself and others as living temples of the Holy Spirit.

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Unang Pahatid
Sapagkat ang Pilosopiya ay Ginagawa
Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.
Ateneo de Manila University
Pagtanong at Paggawa
Sapagkat nagsisimula tayo ng kurso ng pilosopiya, marahil gusto mong
tanungin: ano kaya ang pilosopiya? Lalong mabuting gawin muna bago pagusapan kung ano. Sapagkat ang pilosopiya ay ginagawa. Natututo tayong
lumakad sa paglakad, magbisikleta sa pamimisikleta, lumangoy sa
paglalangoy, magmaneho ng kotse sa pagmamaneho ng kotse. Ganyan din
sa pamimilosopiya. Sa lahat nito ay maari tayong tulungan ng isang
kaibigan na mamilosopiya, magmaneho, lumangoy, magbisikleta, at pati
lumakad. At marahil sasabihin natin na tinuruan niya tayong magbisikleta,
atbp.
At ano kay ang iniisip ko kapag aking sinasabi na tinuruan akong

magbisikleta ng isang kaibigan? Sa palagay koy aking naaalala kung

papaanong pinangatawanan niyang paligiran ako ng isang kalagayan upang
akoy matauhan na ako riy maaring magbisikleta. At pinamumulat niya sa
akin na, upang maisagawa ko itong pagka-maaring ito ay kailangan kong
magsipag at magtiyaga at kaya kong magsipag at magtiyaga. Tinuruan
akong magbisikleta ng isang kaibigan. Ang ibig sabihin: Sa kanyang
pagpapakita, pagtawag ng pansin, pagsusubaybay, pagbibigay-loob,
pagmamakulit nagisnan ko na nasa aking sariling pagpasya kung
isasagawa ko itong pagka-maaring ito o hindi. Pinasya kong isagawa. At
niloob kong tupdin ng buong sipag at tiyaga. At sa wakas nagbibisikleta na
ako.
At hawig diyan ang masasabi ukol sa maneho, langoy, lakad, at pati
sa pilosopiya.
Instrumento sa Paggawa ang Kataga
Habang tinuturuan ako ng aking kaibigan, paminsan-minsan siyang
nagsasalita. Nagbibitiw siya ng mga kataga. Hindi siya nagkakabit-kabit ng
mga kataga upang bumuo, halimbawa, ng isang matunog na diskurso uko

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ANG TOTOO, MABUTI AT DAPAT

Hango sa mga Nota ni Padre Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.

Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Manila

Ang Totoo at Mabuti
At sapagkat ang hinahanap natin na totoo at mabuti ay buong buo,
umaapaw, walang maliw, walang pagkukulang, walang katapusan, tahasan
at lubusan, hindi maiiwasang kilalanin na ang mabuti at totoo na samasama nating hinahanap ay ang Puong Maykapal. Ang landas na nararapat
nating tahakin ay hindi lamang isang personal na pakikipagkapuwa sa isa't
isa kundi isa ring personal na pakikipagkapuwa sa Maykapal. Ganyan ang
landas ng nagsisikap na humantong sa isang matindi at walang maliw at
buhay na buhay na pakikiisa sa ubod ng tunay at mabuti, sa Puon.
Kaya't natutuklasan natin na ang kalagayang angkop sa sangkatauhan. .
.ang kalagayan na talagang nagpapaka-ako ako, nagpapaka-ikaw ka,
nagpapaka-tayo tayo. . .ay ang kalagayan ng pagsusumikap humantong sa
dinamiko at buhay na pakikisama sa Puong Maykapal. At hindi yata mahirap
makita at matauhan na sa pagtupad sa mga gawain at sa paglikha ng uri
ng pamumuhay na nababagay at naaayon sa ganitong kalagayan ay

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TELOS
Hango sa Mga Nota ni P. Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.

Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Manila

Ang bawat umiiral ay may panloob na istruktura ng paghahantong. Ang
maliit na tanim nang magpaka-punong-kahoy, ang tuta nang magpaka-aso,
ang mga atomo nang mag-tumba-tumba at, ayon sa kurba ng probabilidad,
magpaka-molekula. Ang pagtungo sa telos ay mapagmamasdan, hindi
lamang bilang isang basta't galaw ng meron, kundi bilang nasa mismong
panloob na istruktura ng mismong meron, bilang isang panloob na pagudyok ng kalikasan. Bahagi ng "utos" ng kalikasan sa bawat meron:
"Magpakameron ka."
At hindi mahirap na mapagmasdan na ang udyok patungo sa telos ng tao
ay limulitaw at umiiral sa kanyang pagmamalay bilang isang palaging
nandodoon at palaging tumutulak sa kanya na pagnanais lumigaya.
Sapagkat kilalang kilala ito, kung minsan ay hilig nating huwag pag-isipan,
paalisin na lamang sa isang, "Ayan na naman."
Ngunit, kung maaring paalisin ang tahasang pag-iisip ukol sa kaligayahan,
hindi mapapaalis ang lihim at walang pahingang kilus ng kalooban na
naghahanap. Sa lahat ng pagpili at pagpasiya, sa lahat ng pag-ayaw pumili
at pumasya, nandodoon, kahit na papaano, ang pagtungo sa inaakala
nating kaligayahan. Maaring ayaw natin ang katagang "kaligayahan". Baka
sabihin natin na ang hinahanap natin ay "pananahimik ng loob na hindi

Home | Articles | Links | Mailing List | Contact

PILOSOPIKAL AT KULTURAL NA BATAYANG ESPIRITWALIDAD

NG PAMILYANG PILIPINO
ni Manuel B. Dy, Jr.
Pambungad
Hindi karaniwan ang ipinapagawa sa akin sa talumpating ito. Kadalasan,
ang espiritwalidad ang nauuna, ang siyang pinagbabatayan ng ating
pilosopiko at kultural na pananaw sa mga bagay-bagay, sa katalagahan.
Subalit, ayon sa tema ng kombensiyong ito, "pagsasabuhay ng tunay na
espiritwalidad sa pamilyang Pilipino," ipinapalagay na meron ngang hindi
tunay na espiritwalidad sa pamilyang Pilipino. Marahil, dala ito ng ebolusyon
ng pamilyang Pilipino, pagbabago mula sa sinaunang pamilya tungo sa
modernong pamilyang Pilipino. At kaya, kasangkot ang kultural na aspeto,
"kultural" sa kahulugang ang kultura ay nagbabago at umuunlad. At
pumasok sa lahat ng ito ang pilosopiya ng pamilya, ang pagmumuni-muni
sa kabuoan at kahulugan ng pamilya.
Samakatwid, layunin ng talumpating ito ang mga sumusunod: 1) ang
paghahanap ng tunay na espiritwalidad sa pamilyang Pilipino; 2) ang
pagtuklas ng mga nananatiling halaga sa pamilyang Pilipino sa gitna ng
mga pagbabago; at 3) ang pagbuo ng pilosopikong batayan mula sa tunay
na espiritwalidad at mga halagang nasa pamilyang Pilipino.
Espiritwalidad
Ang espiritwalidad ng tao ay galing sa kanyang pagkatao. Naiiba ang tao
sa hayop ayon kay Max Scheler dahil meron siyang espiritu na ang
kinaroroonan ay ang persona. Tatlo ang katangian ng pagka-espiritu o
pagkapersona o pagkatao ng tao: ang kamalayan ng sarili (alam ng tao na
alam niya o hindi niya alam samantalang ang hayop ay kaya lamang
umalam o mag-isip); ang kakayahang kumuha ng mga "ganito" (thusness)
mula sa mga "ito" (thisness) o ang kakayahang mag-abstraksyon; at ang
pagiging ens amans o umiiral na nagmamahal. Para kay Scheler, ang
pagmamahal (at pagkapoot) ang pangunahing kilos ng tao bilang tao.
Naiiba ang pagmamahal sa pagkapoot, ayon kay Scheler, sa
tinutunguhang mga halaga. Nagsisimula ang pagmamahal sa
pagpapahalaga sa isang halaga ngunit sa pagkilos nito natutuklasan at
pinapahalagahan ang higit na mataas na halaga, patuloy ang pagtubo
hanggang sa makarating sa pinakamataas na halaga, ang halagang banal.
Kabaliktaran naman ang pagkapoot: nagsisimula sa isang halaga, ngunit
patugo sa mas mababang halaga.

Ang pamilya, ayon naman kay Karl Marx sa interpretasyon ni Jurgen

Habermas, ay batay rin sa pagkatao ng tao. Isinilang ang tao mula sa mga
primates nang sa ebolusyon ng paggawa naimbento ang kasangkapan
(tools) at nagkaroon ng pamilya ang tao. Sa katunayan, walang pamilya ang
hayop; nagsimula ang homo sapiens nang nagkaroon ng ugnayan ng magasawa, mag-ama, mag-ina, at ang mga katumbas na tungkulin.
Ano ngayon ang kahulugan ng espiritwalidad ng tao, ng pamilya?
Masasagot natin ito sa pagsasalarawan muna sa pinakamataas na
halaga, ang halagang banal. Ano ang larawan natin ng Poon? Ang larawan
natin ng Poon ay nagpapahiwatig ng ating ugnayan sa Kanya. Kung ang
larawan natin ng Poon ay isang kaibigan, ganoon din ang ugnayan natin sa
Kanya, isang ugnayan ng pagsasamahan, pagbabahagian ng kasayahan at
kalungkutan. Kung ang larawan natin ay isang tagahatol, ang ugnayan sa
Kanya ay may takot at pangamba, na may magagawa akong masama at
mapaparusahan Niya.
At ang ugnayan natin sa Poon ay may pagkakatulad sa ugnayan natin sa
kapwa. Kung ang Poon ay kaibigan, ang turing ko sa kapwa ay kaibigan din.
Kung ang Poon ay tagahatol, mapaghatol naman ako sa kapwa o maingat
ako sa pakikitungo ko sa kapwa dahil maaari akong mapaghatulan.
Ang espiritwalidad kung gayon ay walang iba kundi ang pagsasabuhay
natin sa larawan ng Poon, ang pagganap natin sa ating buhay ng larawan
ng Poon. Hindi nangangahulugan ang espiritwalidad ng pagsimba,
pagrorosaryo, o pagnonobena lamang bagaman bahagi ito ng buhayespiritwal. Ang tunay na espiritwalidad ay ang pagtugon natin sa tawag ng
Poon sa ating buhay, at ito'y hindi hiwalay sa ugnayan natin sa ating kapwa.
Ano ngayon ang larawan ng Poon ng pamilyang Pilipino?
Dalawa ang larawan ng Poon sa pamilyang Pilipino: ang Nazareno at ang
Santo Nino. Ano ang isinasagisag ng mga larawang ito?
Ang Nazareno ay si Jesus na nagdurusa sa krus dahil sa kasalanan ng tao
upang mailigtas tayo, dahil mahal Niya tayo. Ang Poon ay tagapagligtas,
nagdurusa dahil sa pagmamahal Niya sa atin. Pansinin ang pagbigay-diin ng
ating kultura sa Jesus na nagmamalasakit kaysa sa Jesus na nabubuhay
muli. Ang espiritwalidad ng ating pamilyang Pilipino ay ang pagasasabuhay
ng nagmamalasakit na Poon sa pamamagitan ng pagdadalamhati ng
kahirapan ng bawat miyembro ng pamilya. Sa pamilya tayo tumatakbo sa
panahon ng kahirapan at kagipitan. Sa pamilya tayo nakakatagpo ng paguunawan at pagtanggap sa isa't isa.
Kasabay naman sa Nazareno ay ang Santo Nino. Kaiba-iba sa Nazareno
ang Santo Nino, ang batang Jesus na kadalasan dala ang bilog na mundo, at
iba't iba ang kasuotan. Ang Sto. Nino ay regalo ng mga Kastila kay Haring
Humabon, at mula noon naging bahagi ng ating kultura. Pansinin na kahit
sa pamilyang Pilipino na nag-iibang bayan ay dala-dala ang imahen ng Sto.
Nino. Ano ang Poon sa imahen ng Sto. Nino? Hindi kaya sagisag ito ng
katangian ng Diyos--na katangian din ng bata--na bukas sa lahat, bukas sa
tao, kahit sino ka man? Hindi ba ganoon din ang espiritwalidad ng

pamilyang Pilipino: ang pagiging bukas-palad, ang pagiging magiliw sa

panauhin?
(Kung babalikan natin ang tradisyon na pinanggalingan ng Kristiyanismo
sa Lumang Tipan, hindi ba itinuturing ng mga Hudyo na malaking kasalanan
sa Diyos ang pagtanggi sa isang estranghero sa tahanan?)
Subalit, saan nanggagaling ang ganitong espiritwalidad ng pamilyang
Pilipino? Totoo nga ba na iba na ngayon ang pamilyang Pilipino, na ito'y
humihina na ang espiritwalidad?
Ang mga Halaga sa Pamilyang Pilipino
Maraming pangyayari ang nagpabago sa pamilyang Pilipino mula sa
tradisyonal tungo sa moderno: politiko, ekonomiko at media. Sa larangan ng
politika, nandiyan ang mahabang kasaysayan ng kolonyalismo at ang
dalawang dekada ng diktadura. Sa ekonomiya, naririyan ang pag-usbong ng
industriyalisasyon, ang unti-unting pagreporma ng sistemang pagsasaka, at
higit sa lahat ang malaking agwat sa pagitan ng mayayaman at mahihirap.
At sa media, ang pagkalat ng radyo, telebisyon , pelikula, pahayagan. Lahat
ito at iba pa ay may epekto sa pamilyang Pilipino.
Mangangailangan tayo ng mahaba at malalim na pananaliksik sa
pampolitiko, pang-ekonomiko, at pangkomunikasyong impluwensiya sa
pamilyang Pilipino. Sapat na siguro sa talumpati na ito na isalarawan ko ang
kaibahan ng tradisyonal at modernong pamilyang Pilipino. Makikita pa rin
natin ito sa kaibahan ng kanayunan at kalunsuran, dahil sa bayan natin tila
naiiwanan sa pag-unlad ang nayon sa lunsod.
Ang tradisyunal na pamilyang Pilipino ay nakaugat sa trabaho ng tatay,
kadalasan sa pagsasaka kundi man sa negosyo. Ang ginagawang
hanapbuhay ng ama ay ipanapasa sa mga anak, kung kaya't nagkahalohalo ang ugnayang personal at pungsyonal. Itinuturing na "amo" ang ama,
kaya't mahalaga rito ang pagiging masunurin sa lahat ng kagustuhan ng
ama, pati na rin ang mapangasawa ng anak, na madalas isinaalang-alang
ang kayamanan ng mapangasawa. Inaayon na rin ang uri at nibel ng
edukasyon sa pangkabuhayan ng pamilya.
Ano ang papel na ginagampanan ng ina sa tradisyunal na pamilyang
Pilipino? Siya ang maybahay: siya ang nagluluto, naglilinis, nag-aalaga ng
sanggol--gawaing pambahay, mahalaga ngunit suporta lamang sa
hanapbuhay ng lalaki.
Nakaugat sa isang lugar ang tradisyunal na pamilyang Pilipino, sa lugar
na mismong pinagtatrabahuan o malapit dito, kaya't may
pagkapermanente ang tinitirahan. Sa gabi, nagkakasama-sama ang lahat sa
hapunan at pagrorosaryo o pagdarasal ng angelus.
Sa modernong pamilyang Pilipino nahihiwalay ang trabaho sa pamilya.
Namamasukan ngayon ang ama sa isang pabrika o kompanua na maaring
may kalayuan sa tahanan. Ang mga anak ay hindi kailangang sumunod sa
trabaho o propesyon ng magulang. Ang trabaho ay nagiging pungsyonal,
hindi hinahaluan ng personal, at naiwan ang personal sa ugnayan ng

pamilya. Subalit, madalas wala sa tahanan ang mga miyembro ng pamilya

dahil sa kani-kanilang mga pinapasukan na trabaho na malayo sa tinitirhan.
Ang edukasyon ng mga anak ay hindi kailangang iayon sa hanapbuhay
ng mga magulang. Maaring pumili ng sariling karera ang mga anak ayon sa
hilig at talino nila upang makapagsarili sila at makabuo na rin ng pamilya.
Ang maybahay naman ay hindi rin kailangan maiwan sa bahay dahil may
katulong o yaya na makakagawa ng trabaho rito. Ang ina ngayon ay maari
na ring maghanap ng kanyang trabaho, pandagdag ng kita o di kaya'y dahil
sa interesado siya sa kanyang propesyon.
Makikita natin ang modernong pamilya ng Pilipino sa lungsod ng Maynila
o Cebu, dahil nasa lungsod ang mga oportunidad ng trabaho, ang pag-unlad
sa propesyon, at ang iba't-ibang libangan. At dito pumapasok sa pamilyang
Pilipino ang diwang kompetisyon, pagnanasa sa mga materyal na bagay at
aliw ng katawan.
Nawawasak na nga ba ang pagkakakaisa ng pamilyang Pilipino sa
modernong panahon? Nawawala na nga ba ang paggalang at pagiging
masunurin na anak sa magulang? Nasisira na nga ba ang pagkarelihiyoso
ng pamilyang Pilipino?
Sa ganang akin, hindi. May nananatiling mga halaga sa pamilyang
Pilipino sa gitna ng mga pagbabago, bagaman naiiba ngayon ang kanilang
pagsasakatawan. Apat ang nakikita kong mga halaga sa pamilyang Pilipino:
ang pagkakaisa at harmoniya, paggalang sa nakakatanda, utang-na-loob, at
relihiyon.
Ang pagkakaisa at harmoniya sa pamilyang Pilipino ay nakikita sa
pagtutulungan ng mga miyembro ng pamilya, sa pagbibigayan ng suporta
sa isa't-isa, materyal o higit pa sa materyal na bagay. Sa pagtutulungan at
pagbibigayang ito natatagpuan ng Pilipino ang kanyang seguridad. Sa
pamilya siya't tinatanggap sa kanyang pagkatao. Kung may away o dipagkakaunawaan man, ito'y inaayos sa mahinahong paraan, sa
pakikiramdaman. Sa kasalukuyang panahon, maaring madalang ang
samahan ng pamilya dahil sa abala sa kanya-kanyang gawain. Subalit, ang
kakulangan ng panahon ay natutumbasan sa kalidad ng mga ritwal sa
Linggo, sa mga pagdiriwang ng kaarawan, binyag, kasal, atbp.
Hindi pa rin nawawala ang halagang paggalang sa nakatatanda sa
pamilyang Pilipino. Kahit na may titulo na ang mga anak, sinasangguni at
hinihingi pa rin ang kamay ng mga magulang sa pagpapakasal. Bagaman
hindi nakapag-aral ang mga magulang, ang kanilang katandaan ang
sumasakatawan ng marami at mayamang karanasan at karunungan.
At ang utang-na-loob ay nababatid ng anak dahil utang niya sa kanyang
mga magulang ang kanyang buhay. Kung kaya't kahit naririyan ang
institusyon para sa mga nakakatanda, ikinahihiya ng anak ang iwanan ang
matandang magulang sa pag-alaga nito. At ang magulang naman, dahil a
siya'y naging anak rin, binabayaran niya ang utang-na-loob niya sa kanyang
mga magulang sa pagbibigay ng magandang kinabukasan sa kanyang mga
anak kung kaya't siya'y nagtatrabaho.

At ang relihiyon hindi pa rin nawawala sa modernong pamilyang Pilipino.

Nakikita natin ang pagkamakadiyos ng pamilyang Pilipino sa paglapit nito
sa Diyos tuwing may problema o may mag-ibang bayan, at ang pag-alay ng
Misa o anuman bilang pasasalamat sa Kanya sa ipinagkaloob na biyaya.
Bagaman madalang na lang ang mga pamilyang sabay na nagrorosaryo o
nag-o-orasyon, dumadami naman ang mga samahang pamilya tulad ng
Marriage Encounter, Couples for Christ, atbp.
Maaaring may iba pang mga halagang nananatili sa pamilyang Pilipino sa
daloy ng panahon, ngunit sa tingin ko ang apat na ito ang mahalaga at
nararapat alagaan sa harap ng maraming pagsubok sa kasalukuyang
panahon, sapagkat ang apat na halagang ito ang kultural na batayan ng
ating espiritwalidad.
Subalit hindi natin maipagkakailang napapanganib ang mga halagang ito
sa kasalukuyang panahon.
Sa isang pananaliksik na ginawa ng McCann-Erickson Philippines,
"Portrait of the Filipino as Youth," nalalamang 32% ng 500 kabataan mula sa
lahat ng kategorya (ABCD) ng mga pamilya sa Metro Manila na
nakapanayam ay wala ang isa (nanay o tatay) o dalawang magulang
(nanay at tatay) sa tahanan. At sa 58% ng mga kabataan may nanay at
tatay, 69% sa kanila ay may mga nanay na may trabaho sa labas ng baay.
Marahil marami sa mga magulang ay overseas workers. Ngunit maari ding
marami sa ating mga kabataan ay may hiwalay na mga magulang. Kung
kaya't ang ating kabataan ay bumabaling sa kanilang barkada upang
hanapin hindi lamang ang samahan at pakikipagkaibigan kundi ang aruga,
katapatang-loob, seguridad, gabay-sa madaling salita ang pagmamahal-na
hindi nila nararamdaman sa kanilang magulang.
"Friendsbarkadakasi sila ang nakakaintindi sa iyo."
"Mahirap nang mabuo 'yung family namin kasi may lakad-lakad din."
At kung hindi na buo ang pamilya, hindi na rin nalalayo ang pagkawasak
ng halagang paggalang sa nakatatanda, utang-na-loob at relihiyon.
Bagaman sinasabi ng pananaliksik na humahanga pa rin ang atin kabataan
ngayon sa kanilang mga magulang (na hindi maliwanag kung bakit),
sinasabi ring kulang sila ng mga bayani at modelo. Sila rin ay mga anak ng
media: ang media ang kanilang surrogate parent. Dahil sa impluwensiya ng
media, ang moral/imoral para sa ating kabataan ngayon ay nakabatay sa
social acceptance kaysa prinsipyo o relihiyon. Napapanganib ang mga
halagang paggalang sa nakatatanda, utang-na-loob at relihiyon dahl hindi
iginagalang ang media, hindi tayo nagkakautang-na-loob sa media, at higit
sa lahat, hindi sinasasamba ang media.
Kung kaya't sa harap ng krisis na ito ng modernong pamilyang Pilipino,
kailangan natin ang pilosopikong batayan ng espiritwalidad ng pamilyang
Pilipino.
Ang Pilosopikong Batayan
Ayon kay Gabriel Marcel, hindi isang problema ang pamilya kundi isang

hiwaga. Ang problema ay isang bagay na labas sa ating pagkatao, hiwalay

sa ating kalooban. Ang hiwaga naman ay higit sa problema dahil tumatalab
ito sa aking kalooban, sa aking pagkatao.
Matagal na nating itinuturing bilang isang problema ang pamilya.
Tinuturing natin iton isang cell o basic unit ng lipunan-isang biolohikong
pananaw-na may pungsyon para sa lipunan o estado. Sinasabi natin, sa
panananaw na ito, na may dalawang layunin ang pamilya. Ang pangunahin
ay ang pagpaparami ng uri, ang pagkakaroon ng anak, at ang ikalawa ay
ang pagmamahalan ng asawa. Batay sa kalikasan ang mga layuning ito,
naiiba lamang ang tao sa hayop dahil sa rasyonal ang tao, at lumilikha siya
ng mga batas para maging pormal ang pamilya, maging isang institusyon.
May kalabuan ang ganitong pananaw sa pamilya. Nagiging sobrang
pungsyonal ang pamilya. Pangunahin ang layuning paramihan ang uri at
pangalawa lamang ang pag-iibigan. Ginagawang kasangkapan ang anak
para sa pagpapatuloy ng angkan at sa pangangailangang sekswal ng magasawa. Bagaman hindi mahihiwalay ang pangunahin at ikalawang layunin,
sa katunayan maari silang magkakatunggali dahil sa dami ng mga anak at
kahirapang pinansiyal sa buhay. Alin sa kanila ngayon ang pairalin? Kung
ang pangunahing layuning ang bibigyang-diin, mangyayari ang pagsuko sa
tuksong umibig sa iba. Kung ang ikalawa naman ang bibigyang-diin,
mangyayari ang free love, ang pag-iibigang walang pananagutan, kasama
ang pagpapalaglag.
Hiwaga ang pamilya. Hindi mga layuning panlabas ang pagkakaroon ng
pamilya kundi isang panloob na kahulugan-ang makatao at makadiyos na
pag-iibigan. Hindi tulad ng isang problema, ang halaga ng pamilya ay nasa
loob nito mismo, sa pag-iibigan ng mag-asawa. Ang pag-iibigang ito ay
isang uring pagmamahalang may tatlong katangian: ito ay walang-hanggan
at walang kondisyon, natatangi (exclusive), at sumasakatawan. Walang
hanggan at walang kondisyon ang pag-iibigan ng magasawa: minamahal
nila ang isa't-isa sa kanilang pagkabukod-tangi, hindi dahil sa anupamang
dahil: kayamanan, kagandahan o pagkakaroon ng anak. Natatangi ang
kanilang pagsasama dahil sila'y sumasakatawang-diwa. Hindi maaaring
magmahal ng dalawang asawa sabay maging tapat sa dalawing ito. At
sumasakatawan ang kanilang pag-iibigan dahil sa sumasakatawang-diwa
sila, binubuo ang mga halagang materyal at espiritwal.
Lumilikha ang pag-iibigan nila ng anak. Ang kanilang pagkakaisa ay hindi
maaring manatiling mag-isa: sumasakatawan at lumalawak ito sa ikatlo, at
kaya nagbubunga ng anak. Nakararananas ng katapatang-loob ang
pinagkaisang "tayo" ng mag-asawa kapag nagiging isang sanggol ito. At
dahil iniibig nila ang isa't-isa bilang mga persona at hindi bilang mga hayop,
hindi lamang nila ginugusto ang isang anak kundi itong anak. Bawat
pagsilang ng sanggol ay bukod-tanging pangyayari sa buhay ng magasawa.
Ang pagiging magulang sa hiwaga ng pamilya ay mapaglikhang
pananagutan. Malaya nga ang pag-ibig nila sa isa't isa, ngunit ang
kalayaang ito ay may pananagutan, may pagtataya. Sinasagot nila ang
bawat pagsilang ng anak: isinasaalang-alang ang mga materyal at
sikolohikong pangangailangan ng pagpapalaki at pagbibigay ng edukasyon
ng anak. Mapaglikha rin sila sa kanilang pagtataya dahil iniiwasan nila ang

sobrang pagbibigay-tuon sa mga materyal na bagay: kahit papaano,

makararaos din, makahahanap ng paraan.
Tunay na mahiwaga ang pamilya dahil hindi mabibigyang katwiran ang
walang-hanggan at walang kundisyong pag-iibigan ng mag-asawa at ang
pagmamahalan ng magulang at anak. Sa gitna ng kahirapan sa buhay at
kawalang-katiyakan sa hinaharap, walang katututuran ang umibig at
magmahal. Naririyan lagi ang posibilidad ng kataksilan, ang pagbabago ng
damdamin, ang kahirapan ng buhay, at sa pagpapalaki ng anak, na hindi
mahubog ng magulang ayon sa kanilang kagustuhan, at kung gayon ay
maari silang mawalan ng landas. Ang pananampalataya lamang sa Diyos
ang maaring makapagpatibay sa pagmamahalan ng pamilya. Sa paniniwala
sa Diyos nabubuo ang komunidad ng pamilya. Sa pananalig sa Diyos ang
bawat anak ay biyayang ipinagkaloob sa mga magulang, at ang mga
magulan ay regalo ng Diyos sa anak.
Balikan natin ngayon ang mga larawan ng Poon sa pamilyang Pilipino na
binanggit natin sa simula: ang Nazareno at ang Sto. Nino. Ang mga ito ang
sagisag ng espiritwalidad ng pamilyang Pilipino. Mula sa mga ito,
mahihinuna natin ang pilosopikong pananaw ng Pilipino sa pamilya.
Ipinapakita ng Nazareno ang pagmamahalang nagbubuklod at
namamalasakit sa pamilya. Napakadakila ng pagmamahal ng Panginoon sa
sangkatauhan at sa bawat isa sa atin na inalay Niya ang sariling buhay sa
krus upang maibalik ang pagkakaisa ng Diyos sa tao. Ang tunay na
pagmamahal ay ang walang kondisyong pag-aalay ng sarili sa minamahal
bilang siya. Ang pamilya ay isang komunidad ng binubuhay ang tunay na
pagmamahalan. Binubuklod ng pagmamahal na ito ang bawat isa sa
kaniyang pagka-siya. Tinatanggap ang bawat isa sa kanyang pagkasiya,
kahit ano o sino pa man siya, at kung nagkakasala, nagpapatawaran. Sa
pamilya tayo malayang maging ako, walang pakundangan, walang
pagkukunwari, ika nga sa Ingles, "at home." Nagmamalasakit ang
pagmamahal na ito. Nagtutulungan ang mga miyembro ng pamilya,
nagbibigayan, pinapasan ang hapis at hirap ng bawat isa. Sa pagbibigayang
ito nagkakaroon ng pagkakaisa at harmoniya sa pamilya.
Pinapakita ng Sto. Nino ang pagmamahalang mapagkumbaba at
nagpapasalamat. Itinuturo rin nito ang pagiging bukas ng kalooban sa
kanino mang ibig pumasok nito. Ang batang Hesus ay masunurin kay Maria
at Jose. Kahit Diyos siya, hindi niya ipinagmalaki ang kanyang pagkadiyos,
bagkus nagpakumbaba siya, naging magalang at masunuring anak. Maari
rin nating sabihing marunong siyang tumanaw ng utang-na-loob na sa
paglaki niya at sa simula ng kanyang misyon, pinagbigyan niya ang
kahilingan ng Inang Maria na gawing alak ang tubig sa kasal sa Cana. Bukas
din siya sa ibang tao, tulad ng pakikisalimuha niya sa mga marurunong sa
templo. Ang tunay na pagmamahalan ay may paggalang, pagtanaw na
utang-na-loob at pagbubukas-palad. Sa pamilya, mahalaga ang paggalang,
lalo na sa nakatatanda, ngunit mahalaga rin ang paggalang ng magulang sa
anak sa pagkabukod-tangi niya. At kahit inutil ang magulang, ginagalang pa
rin siya at personal na inaalagaan. Sa pamilya, mahalaga ang pagtanaw ng
utang-na-loob, dahil ang pagmamahalan ay nagbibigay-buhay, at ang
buhay ay isang pakikipagsapalaran dahil ang pagmamahalan sa buod nito
ay isang pagtataya sa hinaharap, sa sinumang makakasalamuha. Ika nga
ng isang pelikula, "relaks lang, sagot kita."

Ang Nazareno at ang Sto. Nino. Kapwa sila naglalarawan ng halagang

relihiyoso sa pamilyang Pilipino: ang pag-ibig sa Diyos na sinasaktawan sa
pagmamahal sa kapwa. Ang tunay na espiritwalidad ng pamilyang Pilipino
ay ang pagsasabuhay ng pag-ibig ng Diyos sa pag-iibigan ng mag-asawa at

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PAMBUNGAD SA KURSONG PILOSOPIYA

Roque J. Ferriols, S.J./ Bong S. Eliab
Sa simula gusto kong ipalawanag ang patakarang sinusundan sa pagpili sa
katagang ginagamit sa kursong ito. Iba-iba ang may akda sa mga tatalakaying
teksto. Ngunit mangangahas akong magsabi na -- o nakakahawig dito -- ang
aming paningin ukol sa paggamit at paglikha sa wikang Pilipino.
Paggamit at paglikha. Sa paggamit sa anumang wika hindi natin maiiwasang
lumikha. Sapagkat kinukuha natin ang mga katagang nagamit na ng
pagkaramiraming tao, at kailangan nating hubugin at baguhin ang mga katagang
ito nang makayanan nilang bigkasin ang ating pinakapersonal na kaisipan at
pagmumunimuni. May kahulugang kilala ng lahat ang bawat kataga. Meron
namang bukod-tanging kahulugan ang bawat tao. Kung alam na ng lahat ang
iyong sinasabi, parang wala ka ring sinabi. Kung ang sariling isip lamang ang
iyong iniintindi na walang pakundangan sa mga nakikinig sa iyo, walang
nakakaunawa sa iyo at parang wala ka ring sinabi. Kung nagtatalaban at
nagsasagutan ang dalawang ito, kung sumasang-ayon sa isa't isa at tumututol sa
isa't isa ang dating kahulugan at ang bagong kahulugan, may naisisilang na
bagong likha -- talagang meron kang sinabi. Kaya ang paggamit sa anumang wika
ay sabay na pagtanggap sa nasabi na at pagbibigay anyo sa hindi pa nasasabi.
Ngunit kung may isang wikang hindi pa nakatatalakay sa mga problemang
kinagigipitan ng modernong tao o sa mga disiplinang umiiral sa mga pamantasan,
at kung pinasiya nating gamitin ang wikang ito sa pagtalakay sa mga problema't
disiplinang ito, tiyak na sasapitan ng tayo ng isang pambihirang krisis sa paglikha.
Kakailanganin nating halus likhain muli ang buong wika.
Papaano natin magagawa ito?

Tingnan muna natin ang paninindigan ng purismo at taglish. Ayon daw sa mga
purista, bawal kumuha ng salita mula sa banyagang wika. Kung titingnan naman
natin ang mga katha ng mga purista, medyo tayo magtataka. Sapagkat hindi sila
tumututol sa budhi, mukha, dukha, pitaka -- mga katagang hango sa Sanskrit.
Hindi rin nila inuurungan ang petsay, hikaw, pansit -- mga ngalang mula sa Intsik.
At madalas nila sabihing asikaso, hitsura, kamiseta, kutsara -- Kastila ang mga
katagang ito. Hindi yata anumang katagang banyaga ang kanilang iniilagan kundi
mga katagang Ingles lamang at mga katagang Kastila din kapag napaka-Kastila
ang tunog. Sa taglish naman, maaring gamitin ang anumang Ingles at Pilipino ng
halo-halo. Madalas natin ito marinig sa radyo't telebisyon at sa tanggapan ng
mararangya. Halimbawa: "Sa tag-ulan, nag-iispread ang, you know, all kinds of
diseases kasi kung anu-ano ang mga things ang tinatangay ng floods. Kaya alam
na ninyo, iba na if you wash your hands bago kumain."
Ganito yata ang nangyayari. Ipinapalagay ng mga purista na bago sumapit ang
higit kumulang 1920, bahagi ng wastong wikang Pilipino ang pagkuha at pagangkin sa mga banyagang kataga. Ang usapan dito ay hindi ukol sa anumang
ligaw na banyagang kataga kundi mga katagang kinilatis at pinili. At ganyan
naman ang pamamaraang sinusundan ng mga ibang wika. Tigib sa mga hiram na
kataga ang Ingles. Mula sa Latin, education, disciple, pedestrian. Mula sa
Griyego: thrombosis, melancholy. Pranses: prestige, courage. At meron pang
Kastila sa Ingles na Amerikano: hoosegow, desperado. Pinagmamalaki naman ng
mga Kastila na meron silang musikang maka-arabe at meron pang mga katagang
Arabe gaya ng alhambra, alferez, alcohol. Ninakaw din ang ating mga salita at
inangking pag-aari ng mga banyagang wika. Ang salitang Ingles na boondocks at
ang salitang Kastila na Quizame. Ganyan rin naman ang pamamaraan ng wikang
Pilipino bago magka-1920 kaya't inaangkin nila ang mga naturang kataga: mukha,
hikaw, kutsara at iba pa. At ngayon isang Pilipinong nag-aalinlangan ang isang
purista. Kung minsan ipinagmamalaki niya ang kanyang wika. Noong araw ay buo
na araw ang wikang Pilipino. Hindi na kailangang buuin pa ang buo na, hindi na
kailangang likhain pa ang nilikhang buo na. Hindi na madaragdagan. Hindi naman
mababawasan. Walang magawa ang ganap na kundi manatili sa kanyang
kaganapan. Kung minsan nasisiraan yata ng loob ang mga purista. Napakaraming
bagay nga ang nasabi sa wikang Pilipino, ngunit napakarami yatang mga
pangyayari na hindi pa nasasabi sa Pilipino at hindi yata masasabi sa Pilipino.
Hindi na bale, sabi ng purista. Kung hindi masasabi sa Pilipino, hindi karapatdapat
sabihin ng Pilipino. Mga kilalang bagay na lamang ang kanyang pag-uusapan, At
kung may mauungkat na modernong bagay, mabuti pang gumamit ng pasikutsikut na parirala kaysa umampon sa isang banyagang wika. Gaya noong isang
manunulat na nagsasabing ginawa niya ang kailangang gawin upang lumitaw ang
larawan sapagkat ayaw niyang sabihing pinadebelop niya ang letrato.
Mga nag-aalinlangan rin ang mananaglish. Sa isang panig ibig nilang magkaroon
ng isang wikang Pilipino, sapagkat malinaw na hindi wikang Ingles ang taglish.
Kung ginagamit nila ang wikang Pilipino, ito ay sapagkat laganap ang wika sa
buong kapuluuan dahil sa sine at iba pang mga media at dahil sa marami ang
mga hindi Tagalog na dumalaw o naninirahan sa Maynila at iniuwi sa kanila ang
Tagalog Maynila. Sa madali't sabi, ginagamit nila ang Tagalog hindi sapagkat ito ay
Tagalog kundi sapagkat dito nagsalubungan na at nagsasalubungan pa ang iba't
ibang wikang Pilipino. Kahit papaano dito nadarama ng kanilang hubad na
talampakan ang lupang kanilang kinauugatan. Kahit na alanganin, dito yata
nakatatalab sa kanilang ugat ang tumitibok na dugo ng kanilang mga ninuno.
Ngunit sa kabilang panig, naniniwala sila na hindi mapag-uusapan sa Pilipino ang
mga problema't pangyayari ng kasalukuyang panahon. Kaya taos puso nilang

niyayakap ang Ingles. Imposible ang kanilang kalagayan. Pilipino ang awit ng
kanilang loob at damdamin. Hindi naman nila kayang buuin ang kanilang isip
kundi sa Ingles. Kapag sila magsalita, hati ang kanilang dila. Hati na rin ang
kanilang diwa. Nalilimutan nila ang dumarating sa atin ang Ingles mula sa isang
malaong pagtubo at pag-unlad, na nagkaroon rin ang Ingles ng mga panahon ng
paghahagilap, pag-angkin sa ganito at ganyang katagang banyaga, pagtaboy sa
ganito o ganoong katagang banyaga, na may krisis rin sa paglikha ang Ingles.
Akala yata nila na biglang tumayo na lamang diyan ang wikang Ingles , bagong
gawa, napakamoderno, kumikintab na parang raket na handa nang magpaimbulog sa buwan.
Kung may krisis tayo, atin ang pananagutang harapin ito. Pananagutan at
kakayahan at inspirasyon na mulang isilang at sariwain ang wikang Pilipino.
Pirapiraso ba ang iyong sarili, ang iyong diwa? Iyo ang kakayahang buuin ito.
Maingat mong ipunin ang mga piraso. Mga bahagi ito ng iyong pagkatao.
Pagsamasamahin ang mga bahagi. Pag-ugnay-ugnayin. Hingahan ng iyong diwang
tunay. Buhayin . . . .
Ano ang kinalaman ng lahat nito sa pilosopiya, lalo sa pag-eetika? Kailangan buuin

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REFLEKSIBONG PAGTINGIN
Rainier R. A. Ibana, Ph.D.

Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Manila

Isang panayam na binigkas sa Ikalawang Pambansang Kumperensiya si
Pilosopiyang Filipino: "Ang Pilosopiya sa Ibat ibang Larangn ng Kaalaman"
na ginanap sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas noong ika 28-29 ng Oktubre, l999 sa
Diliman, Lunsod ng Quezon.
Pahintulutan po ninyong magsimula ako mula sa isang sipi sa buhay ni
Gautama Buddha dahil may sinasabi ang kanyang pangunahing aral sa
ating paksa. Ayon kay Buddha, natutulog ang buong daigdig sa
kamangmangan dahil naghahabol sila sa mga bagay-bagay na lumilipas.
Tanging yaong nakatuklas sa katotohanan ang gising na. Tinataguriang
Buddha ang gising na; mangmang naman ang natutulog pa (SB 91).
Nananatiling mangmang ang tao habang wala siyang matinding
pagmamalay sa mga bagay-bagay. Naghahabol naman ang mga
mangmang sa mga bagay dahil sa kalabuan ng liwanag sa kanilang
kamalayan.
Nakatutulong ang ibat ibang mga disiplina upang sindihan ang kamalayan
ng tao. Subalit higit na pinatitindi ng pamimilosopiya ang liwanag na ito sa
pamamagitan ng pagmumunimuni. May tatlong uri ng pagpapatindi sa
kaliwanagan ng pagmamalay-tao: tawagin nating pagkagulat ang una,
pagkamulat ang ikalawa, at pagkagising ang ikatatlo.
Pagkagulat sa Nagmemeron

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LEY NATURAL: BALANGKAS NG PAGMUMUNI-MUNI

Fr. Roque J. Ferriols, SJ
Tatalakayin ngayon ang ley natural. Eto ang nakaplanong balangkas ng
pagtalakay.
1. Telos - hantungan ng likas na paghihilig
sa malay tao: ninanais, hinahanap
layunin, kabuoan, katuparan
2. Telos ng tao: kaligayahan
hindi aliw ng laman
ni kwarta ni ariarian
ni puri ng tao
3. Ang kahiligan na ugat ng kilos tao
a. paghahanap sa walang hanggang kabutihan at katotohanan

sa walang hanggang pag-ibig at pag-uunawa

sa kalagayan ng pagka-bukod-tangi, pagka-nag-

iisa at pagka-bahagi-ng-kabuoan,

pakikipagkapuwa tao.

b. KALIGAYAHAN - pagtupad sa a.

paghantong sa Puong Maykapal sa kasamahan ng

kapuwa tao

nagsisimulang maganap sa kasalukuyan ngunit hindi

mabubuo dito

sa ibang buhay ang tuluyan-di-tuluyan na walang

hanggang pagtupad

k. ETIKA - kaya't ang gawain ng tao sa lupa ay dapat

nababagay sa kalagayan ng tao bilang nakatalaga at humahantong

sa b.

d. DAPAT - na sa pangangailangan ng udyok ng kalikasan:

udyok na kaibuturan natin: kung wala ito hindi ako ako, hindi tayo
tayo.

4. Nararanasan ang 3, sa konsyensya

bilang kaalaman

bilang utos

bilang katahimikan

SINAUNA
Ang kalikasan ay nararanasan bilang gumagalaw, umiiral, nagiging. . .

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HALAGANG MORAL
Hango sa mga Nota ni Padre Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.
Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Manila
Mga kategorya ng importansya
Sa kalawakan na ating malaytao hindi natin napapansin ang bawat bagay o
pangyayari. Iilan lamang ang tumatawag sa ating pansin. Itong katangiang
"nakatatawag ng pansin" ay pangangalanan nating importansya.
Madalas ang importansya ng ating kapaligiran ay ayon sa kalagayan na
ating malaytao. Sa "kalagayan ng malaytao" sinasakop ko ang mga kombikombinasyon ng hilig, damdamin, paninindigan at ang mga naisisilang na
oryentasyon. May mga sari-saring oryentasyon ng ating malaytao na
ginagawang kapansin-pansin o hindi kapansin pansin ang iba't ibang bagay.
Halimbawa, kung nakatuon ang aking pagmamalay sa paghahanap sa isang
kahon sa kwartong ito, malamang hindi ko mapupuna ang mga papel at
libro, o kung ano ang matatanaw sa bintana. . .pero punang puna ko ang
mga kahon at uusisain ko pa ang bawat isa. Sa oryentasyon na iyon, mga
kahon ang may importansya.
Kung ako naman ay nasa oryentasyon na itinuturing kong ako lamang ang
tunay na batayan ng lahat; kung tinatanaw ko ang aking sarili bilang pinagiikutan ng buong daigdig, marahil mapapansin ko lamang ang bawat tao
bilang kasangkapan ko, taga-bigay aliw, halimbawa, o isang
makapagpapalaganap sa aking poder sa politika, o utusan na taga-tupad sa
aking bilin nang huwag na akong mapagod. Baka ang mapapansin ko
lamang sa pagkain ay kung masarap o hindi. At baka ang inuusisa ko
lamang sa sinasabi ng mga tao ay kung pinupuri nila ako o hindi. Sa
ganitong oryentasyon, nakakulong ako sa aking sariling isip at damdamin.
Lahat ng hindi-ako ay nakikita ko sa kulay ng ako at napapansin ko lamang
ayon sa kanilang relasyon sa aking mga ninanais o tinatanggihan.
Tatawagin nating purong suhetibo ang importansyang ito.
Meron naman ibang importansya na tumatawag sa ating pansin kapag
tayo'y nasa oryentasyon na pinapanuod natin ang buhay at kinikilatis natin
ang mga linalang ayon sa kanilang kaugnayan sa pagka-tunay-na-tao ng
isang tao: kung ang pagkaugnay ay nakabubuti o nakasasama sa kanyang
katauhan, kung nakabubuo o nakasisira. Sa ganitong oryentasyon, makikita
ko marahil na kumain ng malabis ay nakasisira, kumain ng sapat ay
nakabubuti. Ituturing kong mabuti sa matang tumanaw sa malalayong
bulubundukin upang makapahinga. Matatauhan ako na mabuting gumawa
ng makatarungan sapagkat sa ganyang gawain ay lalong mabubuo ang
aking katauhan. Ituturing kong mabuting magmabait sa kapuwa, sapagkat
ang magmalupit ay nakawawasak lamang sa aking sarili. Tatawagin nating

obhetibong mabuti sa tao ang importansyang ito.

Kung nilalampasan naman ng tao ang kanyang mapusok na kahiligang
gawing ikutan ng lahat ang kanyang sarili, at kung lalampasan din niya
iyong atitud ng tagapanuod na tumatayo sa labas ng mga bagay at
inaanalisis palagi ang mga kaugnayan, halimbawa, ng x sa y, ng p sa q . . .
kung lalampasan niya ang mga oryentasyong ito, maaring mangyari na
pumasok siya sa isang pagkabukas ng kalooban na ang iniintindi ay hindi
basta ako, ni hindi pagwalang-bahala sa ako. . .ang tinutukoy ay isang
pagbukas ng loob na lumalampas sa mismong paglampas sa sarili at
nalilimutan ang mismong pagkalimut sa sarili. Ito ang ikatlong oryentasyon,
ang oryentasyon ng pagbubukas-loob. Dito, maaring mangyari na ibang uri
ng pagtawag ng pansin, ibang uri ng importansya, ang tatalab sa kanya.
Sa oryentasyon ng pagbubukas-loob, makatatawag pa rin ng pansin,
halimbawa, ang pagkain, ngunit, hindi lamang bilang masarap at
nagbibigay kalusugan, kundi bilang isang linalang, isang meron na
maraming nibel sa pagmemeron, na karapatdapat galangin bilang itong
espesyal na meron na ito. At ganyan din ang magiging pagtawag ng pansin
ng anomang meron: itong ito, bukod tangi. . .kahit na itong maliit na batong
ito na ganito ang tigas at kulubot. . .o itong ahas na ito na ganito ang kulay
at ganyan ang pag-usad. At kahit na sinong tao. Sa oryentasyon na ito,

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EX ORDINE AT MISMONG MERON

Hango mula sa mga nota sa klase ni Fr. Roque J. Ferriols, SJ
Bong S. Eliab
Dibisyon ng Pilosopiya
Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Davao
Ang Maayos
May mga panahon na nakikita natin ang pagkamaayos sa ating paligid.
Mababakasan itong pagmumulat natin sa maayos sa mga salitang: "Maayos
ang ginawa mong papel" o "maayos ang buhok ni Laarni." Nagpapakita ang
maayos bilang kahanga-hanga at maganda. May mga sandali ring nakikita
natin ang pagkamaayos bilang paghanga sa kakayahan ng tao sa
pakikipag-ugnayan at pakikibagay: "ayos ka talaga, pare." Ngunit hindi nito
ibig sabihin na "ayos ka talaga" kapag marunong kang makibagay sa akin,
kundi isang malalim na pagkaunawa sa tao na nakikita nilang may
kaayusan sa pagitan ng tao sa tao na dapat galangin.
Kaya ang pagbigkas ng maayos, pagkilala at pag-amin sa maayos. Arawaraw mababakasan natin sa ating malay-tao ang ating pagkamulat sa
kaayusan. Kaya mapanatag ang ating loob na umakyat sa hagdanan ng
ating tahanan sapagkat mulat tayo na may pagkamaayos ang ating
tahanan. Hindi kailangan mabagabag. Mulat tayong mapanatag at
mapayapa tayo sapagkat walang sakit ang ating katawan. Maayos ang
ating katawan. Ngunit minsan, nababakasan din natin ang kaayusan na
lampas sa katawan. May maayos na katawan ang taong may maayos na
sarili. Kapag maraming problema ang sarili, unti-unti ring hindi naging
maayos ang katawan. Kapag nasisiraan ng loob ang tao, maari ring masira
ang kanyang katawan.
Pagtataka Ukol sa Kaayusan
Noong natuto akong magbasa ng orasan, binigyan ako ng isang relos ng
tatay ko. Sabi niya, "bigay ito ng matalik kong kaibigang Malay habang nagaaral kami ng lingwistika sa isang bayan ng Singapore." Iyon ay naging
alaala ng tatay ko sa akin, alaala ng kaibigan niya sa kanya -- may
nangyayari ring kaayusan sa pagitan ng tao-sa-tao, at madalas may mga
bagay na nagpapaala-ala sa ibang klaseng kaayusang nalikha at nililikha sa
daloy ng taon.
Noong kuwan, pinagtakhan ko ang relos. Alam kong merong kaayusan na
nangyayari sa relos, ngunit hindi ko alam kung ano at paano. Alam kung
meron. Hindi ko alam kung ano. Nararanasan ko sa musmos kong isip ang
sinaunang pagmumulat sa kaayusan. Naaninagan ang pagkamaayos ng
relos ngunit nagtataka pa rin kung anong klaseng kaayusan, paano
umiikot ng maayos: na ang isang ikot ng maliit na kamay, isang pitik sa
mahabang kamay; isang ikot naman ng mahabang kamay ay isang oras.
Dala ng matinding pagnanais malaman ang kaayusan naroroon na, ang
kaayusang hindi ko pa rin masakyan-sakyan, binuksan ko isang araw ang
relos. Mula noon, hindi na umandar ang relos. Pinagalitan ako ng tatay. May
nasirang kaayusan.

Kaayusang Nararanasan
Isa pang landas na maaring pagmunihan mula sa pamimilosopiya ni Sto.
Tomas de Aquino, ang landas ng ex ordine.1 Ito ang isang malalim na
pagmumuni-muni at pagmumulat sa meron bilang maayos. Mula dito,
maaring mamulat tayo sa liwanag ng matinong pag-uunawang laging
kumakagat sa meron, na ang pag-uunawa at pagkilala ng pagkamaayos na
ating nararanasan araw-araw. Na ang mismong pagdanas sa kaayusan,
isang pagdanas sa presensiya ng Maykapal2 na taga-ayos ng lahat.
Meron tayong kakayahang matauhan sa kaayusan na nangyayari sa lahat
na nagmemeron. Paksa3 ang kaayusan na nagpapakita sa iba't ibang
paraan, ngunit isa lamang ang pinapahiwatig: merong isang kaayusan na
tumatalab sa lahat, at ang kaayusan na naroroon sa lahat. Mas maganda
yatang tawagin natin sa katagang sangkaayusan: isang kaayusan na
naroroon sa lahat. May nababakasang kaayusan na hindi lubusang
nauunawaan. Kahit hindi natin alam o lubusang malaman, alam pa rin
nating meron. Halimbawa sa nagpapakitang kaayusang katutubo ay
kaayusang nasa daigdig: taglagas, tag-init, taglamig, tag-ulan. Ang
kaayusang sinusunod ng mga planeta habang umiikot sa araw, atbp.
Maayos na tumutubo ang tanim, maayos na umaalon ang dagat, maayos na

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EX CONTINGENTIA AT POTENSYAL
Hango sa Nota sa Klase ni Fr. Roque J. Ferriols, S.J.
Jeremy S. Eliab
Dibisyon ng Pilosopiya
Pamantasan ng Ateneo de Davao
Namumulatan natin na ang ating pagiging tao ay tigib sa kaligayahan, tigib rin
sa pagkadapa. Maraming beses tayong nagtagumpay at magtatagumpay,
maraming beses rin tayong nabigo at mabibigo. Ngunit laging nanatili ang
ating potensyal. Laging kasama ng tao ang kanyang kakayahan na sumaibayo
at lampasan ang kanyang sarili, ngunit isang paglampas na hindi iniiwan ang
sarili, kundi laging kasama ang sarili. Potensyal: isang lumang kataga na
nagpapahiwatig ng binhi ng nakatagong kakayahan na minsan pinapatulog ng
tao. Maaaring gisingin, pangatawanan. Kapag pinapatubo, dinidiligan at
patuloy na inaalagaan sa daloy na panahon, maaring maging isang kahangahangang paghakbang tao, ng buong sangkatauhan, sa paglalakbay sa buhay.
Sana wala . . . pero meron1
Habang naglalakad ako minsan sa likod ng seminaryo, may maliit na gubat
doon na puno ng samu't saring klase ng tanim at insekto. Biglang may
napagmasdan akong isang kakaibang kulisap na hindi ko pa nakita sa lahat ng
aking paglalakad sa bahaging iyon, ibang iba sa mga ipis, langaw, kuto, at
mga langgam. Parang patpat na mahaba sa malayo. Ang bagal kung lumakad,
berde ang kulay ng buong katawan. Ginising ng mahiwagang kulisap na ito
ang aking pagtataka sapagkat hindi nasanay ang aking mga mata at paguunawa sa ganoong uri ng insekto. Ngayon lang ako nakakita ng insektong ito.
Ginigising ang aking kakayahang magtaka at magtanong. Ano kaya ito?
Posibleng ang dahilan kung bakit nawawala ang pagkamahiwaga at
pagkailangang pagtakhan ng mga nagmemeron sa mundong ito ay dahil
nasasanay na ang pag-uunawa ng tao na kinakasagupa niya araw-araw ang
mga bagay, at nagiging pangkaraniwan na lamang. Nawawala sa iba't ibang
antas ang pagtataka at mapagkilatis na pag-uunawa ng tao at nakaligtaan na
niyang damhin ang pagkamahiwaga at pagkabukod-tangi kahit ng mga
pangkaraniwang nagmemeron tulad ng bato, bulaklak, tanim, kapuwa,
kaibigan, pag-ibig. Madalas kung meron nang pangalan at nakasulat na sa
diksiyunaryo ay para bagang alam na ng tao ang lahat.
Itong "patpat" na insekto ang nagpabighani sa aking sarili, ginising ang
katutubong pagtataka sa akin. Nagtatanong ako. Anong hayop ito?
Nangangain kayo ito ng ipil-ipil? O ito ba ang kumain sa aming mga halaman
sa likod ng bahay? Nangangagat ba ito kapag hinawakan? Alam na kaya ito ng
mga siyentista? Meron na ba itong siyentipikong pangalan? Baka. Ngunit
merong isang tanong na siyang ugat ng mga tanong: Bakit meron, sana wala.
Hindi ito sumulpot dito sa kanyang sariling poder lamang. Kung siya lamang,
walang wala sana itong insektong ito. Kung siya lamang maiwan sa kanyang
sarili, hindi niya kayang magmeron siya. Hindi niya kayang likhain ang mga
komplikadong galaw ng mga sidhay2 na nasa kanyang katawan, ni hindi siya
mulat sa nangyayari sa kanyang katawan, sa kanyang sarili, sa nakakapaligid
sa kanya. Ngunit buhay na buhay, totoong totoo na merong hayop sa aking

harapan na gumagalaw at nagpapabighani sa akin.

Humantong ang pagmumuni sa isang pag-amin at pagtanggap na merong
nagpameron sa insektong ito, at patuloy na nagpapameron sa kanya sa bawat
sandali. At sabay sa pagmumulat na merong patuloy na nagpapameron,
namumulatan rin ang pag-uunawa na may nakikitang kahulugan, kahit hindi
sapat ngunit nakakagat pa rin sa katotohanan.
Bakit kaya meron, sana wala? Para ano pa? Ano ang dahilan kung bakit
meron? Ano ngayon ang kahulugan nito, ang kahulugan ng presensya nito?
Maaring may hula ka. At sabay totoo ring hula, ayon sa matinong pag-uunawa.
Abot-kaya ng tao. Ngunit kahit hula lamang, tunay pa ring may dahilan at may
tunay na kahulugan kung bakit meron ito. Ngayon, nasa antas ako ng
pagtatanong na naghahagilap sa kahulugan ng kuwan na ito. Ngunit isang
paghahagilap sa mailap, at hindi basta-basta mahuli-huling kahulugan. May
naaninagan akong kahulugan, tumatalab rin sa aking pag-uunawa ang
mismong kuwan na ito, meron akong nababakasan at natatanggap na
kahulugan, pero, sabay hindi ko rin lubusang maunawaan.
Totoo na tumatalab ang aking pag-uunawa sa aking inuunawa, ngunit isang
pagtalab na sabay alanganin. Ngunit tunay at totoo pa rin ang kahulugan na
binababaran ng aking pag-uunawa, tinatablan, kinikilatis, niyayaman at
inaangkin. . Natatauhan ako na pati ang aking pag-uunawa ay may hangganan
rin sa paghahanap ng kahulugan. Mula sa malayo nararanasan ko na may
isang pagkatiyak na merong tunay na kahulugan ito, ang mga iyon, at lahat
lahat sa aking paligid. Kaya patuloy akong nagsisikap na unawain, hanapin

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ETIKA AT MORALIDAD
(Ang teksto ay galing sa turo ni Roque J. Ferriols, SJ)
Ang Mga Katagang ethike at ethos
Ang paksa ng kursong ito ay tinatawag na "etika". Ang kataga ay Griyego,
ethike, na nakaugat sa ethos: "ugali" o "nakaugaliang pamamalakad sa
buhay". Natagpuan na ng mga sinaunang tao ang ugali na nakasanayan sa
buhay bilang tao. Kaya masasabi nating may ethos ang bawat isa, ang
bawat komunidad, sapagkat ang ethos ay kaugaliang tinatanggap ng isang
komunidad bilang mabuti, dapat at mahalaga (Habermas 1996), sa
kalinangan, sa tradisyon na ipinapasa sa bawat salinlahi (Gadamer 1984).
Bilang pambungad o malinaw-na-malabong pagtalakay sa kahulugan ng
katagang ethos, maaring sabihin na ang ethos ng isang tao ay marangal o
di marangal, patakaran ng isang tao na may magandang kalooban o kaya'y
pamamalakad ng isang masamang loob, makahulugan o kabaliwan.
Ang nakatatawag pansin ay na tinitimbang ng tao ang uri ng pamumuhay
ng kanyang kapuwa at ng kanyang sarili, hindi lamang sa nibel ng
kalusugan (maaring sabihin na ang katawan ni kuwan ay masasaktin o
mahina o malakas o matibay atbp.), sa nibel ng paghawak sa ari-arian (si
kuwan ay mayaman, mahirap, dukha, mariwasa, atbp.), sa nibel ng
kakayahan sa isang linya (magaling o patsamba-tsambang inhinyero, guro,
doktor, kaminero, abogado, atbp.), kundi lalo na sa nibel ng mismong
pagpapakatao.
Kaya't masasabi natin na mabuti o masama ang kondisyon ng katawan ni
Juana (nasa kondisyon, ika nga, o wala sa kondisyon), na mabuti o masama
ang kalagayan ng mga ari-arian ni Juan, na mabuting doktor si Petra o
masamang doktor si kuwan, o mabuting kaminero si Pedro o masamang
kaminero si kuwan . . . ngunit ang importante sa lahat ay kung mabuting
tao o masamang tao ang isang tao. At iyan ang larangan ng etika.
Makikita rin natin dito na nagtatalaban ang mga nibel (Reyes 1989, 2).
Aalagaan ng mabuting tao ang kanyang kalusugan upang makapaglingkod
siya sa kapywa. Kung patsamba-tsamba lamang ang kaalaman ng isang
mabuting tao ukol sa medisina'y hindi siya mangangahas na magtrabaho
bilang doktor.
Tayong lahat ay merong mga kuro-kuro o atitud ukol sa kung ano ang

mabuting tao o masamang tao. Madaling mapagmasdan iyan. Ngunit, kung

susuriin natin ng mas masusi itong mga kuro-kuro o mga atitud na ito,
marahil mahihirapan tayo. Maari pang mangyari na sa pagtatanong ng
isang tuso ay magulo tayo at isipin pa natin na kalokohan pala ang buong
usapan ukol sa mabuti o masama. Maari namang akayin tayo ng isang
matinong pagtatanong sa mas maliwanag na pag-uunawa.
Hindi natin matatalakay ang lahat ng mga posibleng paninindigan ukol sa
etika, ngunit, baka makatulong tingnan ang ilang mga atitud na kung
minsa'y natatagpuan sa karaniwang pamumuhay.
Madalas ding gamitin ang katagang "moral" o "moralidad", dalawang
kataga na katumbas ng "maka-etika" at "etika". Galing sa Latin, mos, moris,
(=ethos) at morale, moralitas, (=ethike). Makikita natin na samu't sari ang
paggamit ng salitang etika at moralidad. Mababakasan natin ito sa ating
pang-araw-araw na salita: "ito ang karapatdapat", "ito ang mabuting
gawin", "ito ang tamang plano", "ito ang wastong pasya" (Reyes 1989).
Kaya minsan ang etika at moralidad ay gagamitin bilang magkasingkahulugan, ngunit alisto tayo na iba ang pinanggalingan ng bawat isa.

Ukol sa normatibo at heuristiko

Ngunit, isang nota muna ukol sa paggamit sa mga kataga. Tingnan muna
natin ang dalawang pamamalakad sa paggamit sa kataga.

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Ekonomiya sa Larangan ng Espiritu

Isang Pagmumunimuni mula sa
Balangkas ng Penomenolohiya at Metapisika ng Pag-asa
ni Gabriel Marcel Symposium ng mga Guro ng Pilosopiya sa Mindanao
2nd Ateneo Philosophy Convention
St. Paul Seminar House, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City
October 25-27, 1995

Maaring napakadayuhan ang aking pamagat na pinili upang pag-usapan

ang pamimilosopiya ni Gabriel Marcel. Isang pagtaliwas yata sa agos ng
kanyang pag-iisip ang pagsingit ng katagang "ekonomiya" -- sapagkat halos
lahat ng kanyang pinag-uusapan ay ukol sa karanasang relihiyoso, pag-asa,
pasensiya, pag-ibig at Diyos na may matinding pagkiling sa oryentasyon ng
tunay at nararapat sa meron (etr). Lantaran naman niyang tinutuligsa ang
aba, ako! (avoir) na may kulay ng pagkamakasarili at pag-aari.
Ngunit hayaan ninyong buksan ko ang posibilidad na pumasok ang
pamimilosopiya ni Marcel sa "ekonomiya" hindi sa larangan ng materyal,
kundi sa larangan ng espiritu. Una kong nakatagpo itong mga kataga sa
librong isinalin ni Padre Roque J. Ferriols, S.J. mula sa Homo Viator, habang
malalimang sinasalin sa wikang Filipino ang Pranses na teksto ni Marcel.
Bago ko pasukin ang mismong paksa, nais ko munang magbigay ng
kaunting pambungad upang mailagay natin sa tamang konteksto ang ating
pagmumunimuni. Tinatalakay ni Marcel ang espiritu ng tao sa kanyang
pinakabuod na kahulugan -- at ngayon pa lamang kailangan na nating
pagbawalan ang ating sarili na maglagda ng isang tumpak at malinaw na
kahulugan (idea clara et distincta) sa "espiritung" ito. Mas sasabihin kong
isang pagtatangkang kahangalan ang pagsikapang linawin at isuksok sa
isang makitid na konsepto ang mahiwagang nangyayari sa tao. Itong
espiritu ay mahihiwatigan na may kilos na laging sumasaibayo, laging may
kakayahang lumampas sa mga partikular na bagay na akala noong una ay
mga balakid sa pagsasaibayo. Tinatawag niya itong kilos ng espiritu bilang
nisus: " . . . isang hindi masusupil na galaw ng loob na ang gawi at hilig ay
lampasan ang lahat ng mga partikular na bagay na, noong una, parang
siyang kinakapitan."2 Lalo niyang pinatindi ang pagkadalisay nitong dimasupil na galaw ng kalooban bilang likas na kilos pag-asa, ng pagtubo, ng
hindi matapos-tapos na pagsasaibayo ng tao. Kaya masasabing isang
pagbaling sa liwanag ang nisus, isang pagharap at pagtanggap sa tunay na
kakayahan at posibilidad ng tao bilang tao.
Itong ubos lakas na pagbaling (nisus) ay nangyayari kapag ang espiritu ng
tao ay nasa kalagayan ng kadiliman, isang kalagayang parang nabibilanggo
ang kalooban. Nararanasan ang sitwasyong ito na parang binunot sa

katutubong ikinabubuhay o tumpak na sabihing ". . . isang pagka-hindimaaring-dumating sa isang kasaganahan ng mismong buhay . . . ."3 Sa
katunayan, ang sitwasyon ng kadiliman ay siyang mismong katangi-tanging
pagkakataon upang magpasakop ang tao sa pag-asa, pagkakataon upang
bumaling sa mahiwagang kakayahang sumaibayo ng mismong buhay ng
tao, (mag-ekonomiya, `ika nga) sa gitna ng kadiliman. Sa pagpapasakop
niya sa pag-asa, sa pagbaling niya sa misteryong bumabalot sa
pagmemeron ng tao -- may naaninagan siyang katutubong kakayahang ng
tao na pinanatilling makahulugan at mahalaga ang kanyang buhay, ang
kanyang kalooban sa gitna ng kadiliman: ang ekonomiya sa larangan ng
espiritu.
Gumagalaw ang ekonomiyang tinutukoy ko dito sa malay-tao ng tao. Ang
oryentasyon mismo ng pagmamalay ang may kinalaman rin, o sasabihin
kong matindi ang talab at dating sa "pag-eekonomiyang" gagawin ng
espiritu. Hilig ni Marcel na umayon lagi sa dapat at katutubo sa tao, sa
tawag ng nararapat at makatao -- etr. At itong oryentasyon ang kanyang
kikilingan sa "pag-eekonomiya". Kaya, habang ang kalagayan ng espiritu ay
nasa sitwasyon ng pagkabihag, ng kadiliman, ng pagkabilanggo, nanatiling
buhay ang espiritu sa katutubong galaw nito. Ngunit kailangan rin ng
pagmumulat na ganito ang katutubong kilos ng espiritu -- kailangang
maging bahagi mismo ng pagmamalay ng tao, ng kanyang oryentasyon ang
nisus. At habang may mga pagkakataong tinutukso ang loob na bumitiw,
umurong at sumuko sa kalagayan ng pagkabihag, kadiliman,
pagkabilanggo, dito ang mas tumpak na lugar upang patubuin ang binhi ng
pag-asa: isang mulat, pinasya at sadyang pagpapatubo ng sarili sa gitna ng
kadiliman sa halip na maging "baog", huminto, nakabara -- o hihiramin ko
ang katagang pang-ekonomiya sa pinakaluwang na kahulugan nito, "nilugi
at dinaya ko ang aking sarili".
Maaring unti-unting nakikita na natin ang pag-eekonomiya natin sa ating
sarili sa pinakamababaw na antas. Sa pag-eekonomiya, gumagamit tayo ng
kapital, ng puhunan. Itinataya natin ang ating puhunan sa pagnenegosyo -ngunit mulat tayong ang negosyo ay laging kumpetisyon. Lalago at tutubo
ang aking puhunan kung marunong akong magtimbang ng mga
pagkakataon, o baka purong tsamba lamang ang negosyo, o baka
nakasalalay ang kikitain ng aking pinuhunan sa "isang di-nakikitang kamay
ng ekonomiya". Tatlo ang kahihinatnan, malulugi ako, kikita ako, o kaya
tabla lamang - walang kinita, walang nalugi. Ganito yata ang ginagawa ng
mga ekonomista: tinitimbang ang mga antas ng pangangailangan (demand)
ng tao, ang antas na kayang tugunan itong pangangailangan (supply).
Pagkatapos ilagay sa isang kurba ng x,y upang makita ang ugnayan nito sa
presyo, sa buwis. Hahantong sa mga probabilidad kung tiyak bang lalago
ang puhunan o malulugi lamang ang negosyo.
Kauungkat ko lamang ang nangyayari sa ekonomiya, ngunit ang
nakasangkot sa sinasabi ko sa itaas ay pera, halagang kuwarta, halagang
materyal. Sa pagpapalitan ng mga halagang materyal, nasa malay tao ang
intensyon na kumita at gamitin ang lahat upang manalo sa paligsahang ito.
At makikita nating iba ang nangyayari kapag halagang hindi kuwarta ang
nakasangkot; kaya ibang klaseng "negosyo" rin ang nangyayari na hindi
katulad ng pagnenegosyo sa tindahan. Ngunit minsan, itong oryentasyon
na ang halagang materyal lamang ang tunay at kaisaisang kumikilos at

gumagalaw sa malay-tao ang namamayani. Naging isang batayan ng

pagtingin at pagsalo sa lahat ng pakikitungo ng tao sa daigdig -- at maaring
maging isang kulturang popular, isang "kabihasnang" lumalaganap at untiunting kinakain ang tao. Tulad lamang ng paglalaganap ng condom at ng
AIDS, ng mga nagpapabili ng katawan at ang mga sabik bumili.
Nagmistulang laruang materyal ang tao, isang "bagay" na ipinabibili at
binibili.
Ganyan ang hilig ng mundo ngayon -- lahat isasalin sa halagang materyal,
lahat pipiliting iuwi sa halaga ng pera. Ganyan raw ang mga taong sawa na
sa mga mas mahahalagang bagay na kadalasan hindi masusukat,
humahantong sa mga bagay na tinitingnan lamang ang halagang materyal,
ang masusukat.
Kung sasabihin mo sa kanila na nakakita ka ng bagong kaibigan, hindi ka
nila tatanungin kung malamig ba ang boses niya, anong gusto niyang laro,
nangungulekta ba siya ng paru-paro. Sa halip, kailangan nilang malaman:
ilang taon na siya, ilan kapatid meron siya, ano ang bigat niya, magkano
ang kinikita ng kanyang tatay? At kapag nalaman nilang ang mga
numerong sinukat na iyan, sigurado na silang nakuha na nila ang
pinakamahalaga na dapat malaman sa iyong bagong kaibigan.4
Tumatakas ang malay-tao, maaring sinadya o hindi sinadya, tungo sa
daigdig na ang larangang materyal ang mahalaga, at nawawala o mas
tumpak na sabihing pinapahina ang kakayahang makita ang lampas pa sa
materyal, sa katawan: pagka-persona ng tao. Maaring ganito ang

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Ukol sa Persona: Mga Pagninilay

Setyembre 1, 2000
Agnes David
Ateneo de Manila University
[Ang sanaysay na ito ay isang maikling pagmumuni-muni ukol sa Persona,
ngunit isa na ring parangal kay Fr. Ferriols]
Pambungad
Noong nakaraang linggo, inanyayahan ako ni Dr. Ibana na maging isa sa
mga tagapagsalita sa panayam ni Fr. Ferriols. "Naging guro mo siya, hindi
ba?" tanong niya sa akin. "Oo," ang sagot ko. Sa katunayan, naging guro ko
siya sa Philo 101 at 102. Ipinagpilitan kong makapasok sa kanyang klase
bagamat kilala non si Fr. Ferriols sa pagiging mabagsik. Bali-balita na
mahirap daw makapasa sa kanya. Gayunpaman, itinuloy ko pa rin. Sa isip
ko, di baleng mahirapan, basta maraming matutunan. Isa pa, mayroon
kaming "tradisyung Ferriols" sa aming pamilya- apat kaming magkakapatid
na dumaan sa kanya dahil dito, pati tatay ko, may ilusyon na ring maging
"Ferriols baby."
Mga Natutunan
Kung mayroong iisang matingkad na bagay akong natutunan kay Fr.
Ferriols, iyon ang pagiging tapat sa aking pagkatao. Iminulat niya ako sa
kagandahan, kabutihan, kabanalan at misteryong nananahan at likas sa
akin. Sa loob ng dalawang semestre, sinabayan ako ni Fr. Ferriols sa aking
"personal na paglalakbay" at doon ko nasimulang paliyabin ang mga
mahahalagang tanong ukol sa aking pagkatao: Sino ako? Bakit ako narito?
Saan ako patutungo? Naaalala ko pa na dahil sa labis kong pagkagiliw sa
Pilosopiya, madalas kong mapabayaan ang aking ibang mga klase tulad ng
biolohiya at kimika.
Higit sa sampung taon na ang nakalilipas patuloy pa rin akong
naglalakbay at hindi pa rin namamatay ang liyab ng pagtatanong.
Bagamat marami na ang mga pagbabago sa akin at sa mundong
ginagalawan, may mga bagay na sadyang hindi kumukupasmga bagay na
natutunan na patuloy na gumagabay sa akin.
Pagtuturo ng agham
Hindi ko inakalang mapapadpad ako sa pagtuturo balak ko sana noon na
kumuha ng medisina at maging isang ganap na duktor - ngunit nag-iba ang

tinahak kong landas

Halos pitong taon na akong nagtuturo ng agham. Sa loob ng panahong
iyon, nakita ko na maging ano pa man ang aking bokasyon, ang
pinakamahalagang pamantayan ko sa aking paggawa sa araw araw ay ang
maging tapat sa aking sarili, at sikaping pagyamanin ang aking pagkatao.
Mas mahalaga ang pagsasabuhay kaysa sa detalye
Isa sa mga paniniwala ko bilang guro ay ang kapangyarihan ng persona o
pagkatao sa pagtuturo. Mas may kapangyarihang magbigay liwanag at
inspirasyon ang persona ng isang guro kaysa sa ano pa mang diskusyon sa
klase. Nakasisiguro akong madaling malimutan ng isang estudyante ang
mga detalye na pinag-uusapan sa silid aralan tulad ng anatomiya ng tao,
ang proseso ng photosynthesis o ang mekanismo ng pagkasira ng ozone sa
papawirin ngunit hindi niya malilimutan ang pagbati mo sa kanya tuwing
nakakasalubong mo siya, ang kaugaliang pagtitipid (mula sa maliliit na
bagay tulad ng papel, tubig o kuryente hanggang sa malalaking mga
bagay), o marahil ang likas na pagkagiliw sa paglubog ng araw.
Paghahanap sa katotohanan
Gayunpaman, paano ko isinasagawa ang pagtuturo ng agham? Ang agham
ay isang disiplina na masasabing nakatuon sa paghahanap sa katotohanan
upang higit na maunawaan ang misteryo hindi lang ng ating sarili kundi ng
ating kapaligiran. Halimbawa, may malalim na pagnanasa ang tao na
malaman kung saan siya nanggalinglikas sa tao ang magtanong kung
paanong nagkaroon ng lupa, ng tubig, ng solar system, ng sansinukuban?
Saan, kailan at higit sa lahat, bakit nagsimula ang lahat?
Dahil sa agham at teknolohiya nagkaroon ng mga kasagutan, bagamat
hindi ganap, ang mga pagtatanong na ito. Mas nauunawaan na natin ang
simulain ng sansinukuban dahil sa pinagpaguran ng agham at teknolohiya:
ang mga pinagsama-samang kaalaman tungkol sa mga iba't ibang
puwersang umiiral (tulad ng strong force, weak force, electromagnetic at
gravitational force), butil ng materia (tulad ng proton, electron, neutron,
bosons, mesons) at teoriya (tulad ng Big Bang) ay nakapagdulot sa atin ng
kagalakan at pagkamangha.
Dahil sa mga bagong kaalamang ito na ang sansinukuban ay patuloy na
lumalaki, na "latak ng mga bituin" ang mga planeta, na bawat butil ng
buhay ay umagos sa loob ng higit na tatlong bilyong taon upang mabuo
ang tao umaasa ako na higit nating pahahalagahan ang mga kaloob na
ito, at higit nating magagamit ang ating talino at galing para sa ikabubuti
hindi lang ng tao, kundi ng iba pang nilikha.
Sa kasawiang palad, ang disiplina ng agham at ang pamamaraan ng
teknolohiya ay maaaring makapagdulot ng di-kanais-nais na mga bagay.
Ang dalisay na adhikain ng agham na hanapin ang katotohanan at
pagyamanin ang buhay ng tao ay maaaring malunod ng iba pang mga
puwersa. Ang paggamit, halimbawa ng mga genetically modified organisms
ay nakapagpabuti sa agrikultura ngunit maituturing na karahasan sa
integridad ng halaman, hayop at microorganismo. Ang paggamit ng langis
at mga makinarya ay nakapagpabilis sa industriyalisasyon ngunit

nakapagpadumi ng ating hangin, tubig at lupa. Ang paggamit ng cellphone

ay isang epektibong pamamaraan ng pagtutulay sa mga tao, ngunit tila
naglalaho ang diwa ng paghihintay at tunay na pakikinig.
Makapangyarihan ang agham at teknolohiya sapagkat isinisiwalat niya ang
nakapinid na pinto ng sansinukuban. Nagmistulang diyos ang tao dahil sa
kakayahan niyang baguhin ang landas ng ebolusyon. Dahil dito malaki rin
ang ating pananagutang siguruhin na magamit ito sa wastong paraan. Ang
hamon, marahil, sa aming mga guro, ay ang matulungan ang mga magaaral na sikaping patuloy na magtanong at manimbang na sa kabila ng
lahat ng pagbabago at sa gitna ng mga puwersang ginagalawan ng siglong
ito, maaari pa rin silang tumigil, manahimik at magtanong: Sino ako? Bakit
ako narito? Saan ako patutungo?
Magtatapos ako sa isang tula na isinulat ko noong taong katatapos ko lang
ng kolehiyo ginamit ko ang simbolismo ng kandila sapagkat itinuturing ko
itong isa sa pinaka-angkop na talinghaga sa buhay ng tao
Setyembre, 1989
Kawalahan:
Mula rito'y nasindihan ang apoy ng buhay.
Ang pinagmulan:
Walang kamatayang liyab ng Purong Pag-ibig.
Nilalang:
Kandilang nasindihan,

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ANG LANDAS NG MISTISISMO

SA PAGTUKLAS SA KAHULUGAN NG PAG-IISIP
AYON KAY HEIDEGGER
Albert Lagliva
Ateneo de Manila University
Introduksyon
Hindi maipagkakaila na isa sa pinakamaimpluwensya at marahil isa rin sa
pinakamakontrobersya sa larangan ng kanlurang pilosopiya ang mga pagiisip ni Martin Heidegger. Mahirap na hindi mapansin ang yaman ng
kanyang pag-iisip sa kasalukuyang panahon sapagkat patuloy niya tayong
hinahamon na maging hindi palagay sa mga nakasanayang mga batayan at
idolo ng ating pag-iisip upang malaya nating ilagay ang ating sarili sa
kahiwagaan at kamanghaan ng lahat-lahat.
Layunin ng papel na ito na unawain ang kabuuang diwa ng mga
pagmumuni ni Heidegger simula sa mga taon noong 1930 kung
kailannaging malinaw na hindi na niya pinagtutuunan ng pansin ang
problematiko ng Dasein (na siyang katangian ng unang Heidegger), kundi
ang usapin na mismo ng Sein. Bibigyang diin sa papel na ito ang pagnanais
ni Heidegger na makamit ang pag-iisip o Denken na may ganap na
pagkakaiba sa tinataguriang "pamimilosopiya." Bibigyan ng linaw ang
intensyon ng papel na ito sa pamamagitan ng pagpapahayag ng mga ideya
at pagmumuni-muni ni John D. Caputo sa kanyang librong pinamagatang
The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought kung saan ipinakikita niya na
may natatanging impluwensiya kay Heidegger ang pag-iisip ng isang
Dominikanong mystiko na si Meister Eckhart. Ang mga elementong mystikal
sa pag-iisip ni Heidegger ang nagpapanatiling bukas ng pilosopiya sa hindi
mabilang na posibilidad sa pag-uunawa ng pagkanagmemeron ng lahat.
Isang Sulyap Sa Proyektong Metapisikal Ni Heidegger
Marahil ang pinakaakmang paglalarawan na maaaring ibigay sa proyektong
metapisikal ni Heidegger ay isang uri ng pag-iisip na maituturing na radikal
ang pagkakaiba sa nakagawiang uri ng pamimilosopiya . Ang pag-iisip
(Denken) na ito ay isang pagbalik sa isang higit na sinaunang gawain kung
saan ang napapaloob din ang Dasein. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-iisip na ito,
nagigising tayo sa isang uri ng "pagkalimot" na siyang nagiging batayan at

bumubuo sa mismong kasaysayan ng kanluraning metapisika, mula sa

pananaw ni Heidegger . Kailangang lampasan ang matinding pagbibigay
diin sa isang antroposentrikong uri ng pamimilosopiya (na ang pinagaaksayahang problematiko ay ang pagiging awtentiko ng Dasein) upang
makarating tayo sa pagpukaw sa mismong nagbibigay posibilidad sa Sein,
sa panahon, at maging sa kasaysayan.
Malinaw kay Heidegger na ang pinagkakaabalahan ng kanlurang pilosopiya
ay ang pag-uugat ng lahat ng umiiral sa isang partikular na ideya o eidos na
kailangang naririyan upang maging batayan ng kahit anong posibilidad ng
katotohanan at diskurso. Kailangang matatag at hindi naglalaho ang mga
batayan upang magkaroon ng saysay ang kahit na anong uri ng rason o
pag-abot ng pag-uunawa sa mga bagay. Para kay Heidegger, ang nahuhuli
lamang ng kanlurang pilosopiya ay ang katatagan ng presensiya ng isang
Sein bilang responsable sa lahat ng kahulugan at saysay ng Seindes.
Ninanais lampasan ni Heidegger ang ganitong simplistikong pananatili ng
pilosopiya sa mistulang ontolohikal na pagkakaiba sa gitna ng Sein at
Seindes. Layon ni Heidegger na para bagang iwaksi ang pagtingin sa punto
de bista ng Dasein at maging lublob sa mismong pagpapakita ng
Sein na siyang pinanggagalingang bukal ng lahat ng paglalantad at
pagkukubli sa kasaysayan at panahon .
Ngunit upang maging matagumpay si Heidegger, nakikita niya nga
pangangailangan na iwanan ang usapin ng Sein at mas maging abala sa

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Salaysay, Buhay at Sarili

ni Glenda Callanta Oris
Ateneo de Manila University
Nakagawian na nating banggitin na ang buhay ay isang kuwento. Bilang
isang kuwento, ang buhay ng tao ay nagsisimula sa kapanganakan at
nagtatapos naman sa kamatayan, ngunit, para sa pilosopong si Paul
Ricoeur, hindi dapat maging awtomatiko ang pag-uugnay ng kuwento at
buhay. Ayon sa kanya, kailangang ibitin muna ang paghuhusga na ang
buhay nga ay isang salaysay o kuwento at masusing siyasatin muna ang
mga salik ng dalawang gawaing ito. Sa kanyang sanaysay na pinamagatang
"Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator," binanggit niya na dahil sa mga
kaalamang nakalap nitong mga nakaraang dekada, tila naging dayuhan ang
salaysay at pananalaysay sa daloy at agos ng buhay mismo. Sa madaling
salita, ang mga kaalamang ito ang nagpapaniwala sa atin na ang kuwento
ay isinasalaysay at hindi isinasabuhay samantalang ang buhay naman ay
isinasabuhay, hindi isinasalaysay. Sa nabanggit na sanaysay, naniniwala si
Ricoeur na higit na nagiging makatao ang buhay sa tulong ng mga
bungang-isip na katha (fiction), kaya't sinikap niyang suriin muli ang
kaugnayan ng buhay at salaysay.
Ilalahad ng papel na ito ang mga salik ng salaysay at buhay at kung paano
nauugnay ang gawain ng pamumuhay at pagsasalaysay mula sa pananaw
ni Ricoeur. Nakatuon ang papel na ito sa sanaysay na nabanggit at sa
dalawa pang akda ng tanyag na pilosopo. Magtatapos ang papel na ito sa
pamamagitan ng paglalagom ng mga ugnayang natalakay at ilang mga
pagmumuni-muni sa mga elemento ng salaysay at buhay tungo sa higit na
pag-uunawa sa at pagbubuo ng sarili.
I. Mga Salik ng Salaysay
Upang muling maitatag ang kaugnayan ng salaysay at buhay, hinihiram
ni Ricoeur ang konsepto ng komposisyon ni Aristoteles sa kanyang Poetics
at itinutuon ang pansin sa konsepto nito ng banghay (plot). Ayon kay
Ricoeur,
For my part, from Aristotle's Poetics I retain his central concept of
'composition' [mise en intrigue], mythos in Greek, which means both 'fable'
(in the sense of imaginary story) and 'plot' (in the sense of well-constructed
history). This second aspect of Aristotle's mythos I will take as guide; and
from this concept of 'plot' I will draw all the elements that are able to help

us towards reformulation of the relation between life and narrative.

Binibigyang-kahulugan ni Ricoeur ang banghay bilang isang sintesis ng
magkakaibang mga elemento. Una, ang banghay ay sintesis ng iba't ibang
mga pangyayari o tagpo na bumubuo ng isa at kumpletong kasaysayan.
Mula sa ganitong pananaw, may kakayahan ang banghay na tipunin ang
mga pangyayari upang makabuo ng isang maayos na kuwento.
Samakatwid, ang bawat pangyayari ay hindi lamang basta nangyayari,
bagkus, ang bawat pangyayari ay may iniaambag at idinurugtong sa
patuloy na pag-usad ng kuwento. Ang bawat pangyayari ay sabay
nagdaragdag sa simula at sa wakas ng kuwento. Sa lenteng ito, makikita na
ang isang salaysay ay hindi lamang simple at/o sunud-sunod na pag-iisa-isa
ng mga pangyayari kundi isang maayos na paghahabi ng mga pangyayari
na humahantong sa isang mauunawaang kabuuan.
Ikalawa, ang banghay ay sintesis ng mga sangkap ng kuwento na
magkakatunggali: mga inaasahan at di-inaasahang pangyayari, mga aktibo
at pasibong tauhan sa kuwento, mga alitan at pagtutulungan ng mga
tauhan, mga aksidente at pinaghandaang mga tagpo, at mga
pamamaraang akma at di-akma sa inaasam na katapusan. Sa
pamamagitan ng pagbabanghay, natutuhog ang mga magkakatunggaling
sangkap na nabanggit sa isang kabuuang mailalarawan bilang salu-salungat
na pagkakatugma (discordant concord) at/o pagkakatugmang salu-salungat

Environmental Ethics
First published Mon Jun 3, 2002; substantive revision Tue Jul 21, 2015
Environmental ethics is the discipline in philosophy that studies the moral relationship of
human beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its non-human
contents. This entry covers: (1) the challenge of environmental ethics to the
anthropocentrism (i.e., human-centeredness) embedded in traditional western ethical
thinking; (2) the early development of the discipline in the 1960s and 1970s; (3) the
connection of deep ecology, feminist environmental ethics, animism and social ecology to
politics; (4) the attempt to apply traditional ethical theories, including consequentialism,
deontology, and virtue ethics, to support contemporary environmental concerns; (5) the
preservation of biodiversity as an ethical goal; (6) the broader concerns of some thinkers
with wilderness, the built environment and the politics of poverty; (7) the ethics of
sustainability and climate change, and (8) some directions for possible future developments
of the discipline.
1. Introduction: The Challenge of Environmental Ethics
2. The Early Development of Environmental Ethics
3. Environmental Ethics and Politics
o 3.1 Deep Ecology
o 3.2 Feminism and the Environment
o 3.3 Disenchantment and the New Animism
o 3.4 Social Ecology and Bioregionalism
4. Traditional Ethical Theories and Contemporary Environment Ethics
o Supplementary Document: Biodiversity Preservation
5. Wilderness, the Built Environment, Poverty and Politics
6. Sustainability and Climate Change
o Supplementary Document: Pathologies of Environmental Crisis Theories
and Empirical Research

 Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Introduction: The Challenge of

Environmental Ethics
Suppose putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or destroying some individual
members of overpopulated indigenous species is necessary for the protection of the integrity
of a certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required? Is it
morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn
techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed
open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral
obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And what is the value of a humanly
restored environment compared with the originally natural environment? It is often said to be
morally wrong for human beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and
to consume a huge proportion of the planets natural resources. If that is wrong, is it simply
because a sustainable environment is essential to (present and future) human well-being? Or
is such behaviour also wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents
have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be respected and protected
in any case? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of
them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are
more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract
questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components.
In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between instrumental
value and intrinsic value (in the sense of non-instrumental value) has been of considerable
importance. The former is the value of things as means to further some other ends, whereas
the latter is the value of things as ends in themselves regardless of whether they are also
useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats
who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it
is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a
person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire
knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person,

has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for
serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental
value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for
human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects
for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic
experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically valuable is that
which is good as an end in itself, it is commonly agreed that somethings possession of
intrinsic value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to protect
it or at least refrain from damaging it (see ONeil 1992 and Jamieson 2002 for detailed
accounts of intrinsic value).
Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or humancentered in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might
call anthropocentric in a strong sense) or they assign a significantly greater amount of
intrinsic value to human beings than to any non-human things such that the protection or
promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of non-human things turns out to
be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For
example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that nature has made all things
specifically for the sake of man and that the value of non-human things in nature is merely
instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is
wrong with the cruel treatment of non-human animals, except to the extent that such
treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings. Immanuel Kant (Duties to
Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics), for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog
might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty
towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards non-human animals would be
instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes
some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental
devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the
future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment (see
Passmore 1974; Bookchin 1990; Norton et al. (eds.) 1995).
When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early
1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it
questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other species on
earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning
intrinsic value to the natural environment and its non-human contents. It should be noted,
however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, nonanthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be
called enlightened anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately
called, prudential anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we
have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants.
The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds for

social policies aimed at protecting the earths environment and remedying environmental
degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical
purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of
policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to
provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the non-human environment has
intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996). Furthermore, some
prudential anthropocentrists may hold what might be called cynical anthropocentrism, which
says that we have a higher-level anthropocentric reason to be non-anthropocentric in our dayto-day thinking. Suppose that a day-to-day non-anthropocentrist tends to act more benignly
towards the non-human environment on which human well-being depends. This would
provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking, even to those who find the
idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value hard to swallow. In order for such a strategy to be
effective one may need to hide ones cynical anthropocentrism from others and even from
oneself. The position can be structurally compared to some indirect form
of consequentialism and may attract parallel critiques (see Henry Sidgwickon utilitarianism
and esoteric morality, and Bernard Williams on indirect utilitarianism).

2. The Early Development of

Environmental Ethics
Although nature was the focus of much nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy,
contemporary environmental ethics only emerged as an academic discipline in the 1970s.
The questioning and rethinking of the relationship of human beings with the natural
environment over the last thirty years reflected an already widespread perception in the
1960s that the late twentieth century faced a human population explosion as well as a serious
environmental crisis. Among the accessible work that drew attention to a sense of crisis was
Rachel Carsons Silent Spring (1963), which consisted of a number of essays earlier
published in the New Yorkermagazine detailing how pesticides such as DDT, aldrin and
deildrin concentrated through the food web. Commercial farming practices aimed at
maximizing crop yields and profits, Carson speculates, are capable of impacting
simultaneously on environmental and public health.
In a much cited essay (White 1967) on the historical roots of the environmental crisis,
historian Lynn White argued that the main strands of Judeo-Christian thinking had
encouraged the overexploitation of nature by maintaining the superiority of humans over all
other forms of life on earth, and by depicting all of nature as created for the use of humans.
Whites thesis was widely discussed in theology, history, and has been subject to some
sociological testing as well as being regularly discussed by philosophers (see Whitney 1993,
Attfield 2001). Central to the rationale for his thesis were the works of the Church Fathers
and The Bible itself, supporting the anthropocentric perspective that humans are the only
things that matter on Earth. Consequently, they may utilize and consume everything else to

their advantage without any injustice. For example, Genesis 1: 278 states: God created
man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.
And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the
earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over fish of the sea, and over fowl of the air, and
over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Likewise, Thomas Aquinas (Summa
Contra Gentiles, Bk. 3, Pt 2, Ch 112) argued that non-human animals are ordered to mans
use. According to White, the Judeo-Christian idea that humans are created in the image of
the transcendent supernatural God, who is radically separate from nature, also by extension
radically separates humans themselves from nature. This ideology further opened the way for
untrammeled exploitation of nature. Modern Western science itself, White argued, was cast
in the matrix of Christian theology so that it too inherited the orthodox Christian arrogance
toward nature (White 1967: 1207). Clearly, without technology and science, the
environmental extremes to which we are now exposed would probably not be realized. The
point of Whites thesis, however, is that given the modern form of science and technology,
Judeo-Christianity itself provides the original deep-seated drive to unlimited exploitation of
nature. Nevertheless, White argued that some minority traditions within Christianity (e.g., the
views of St. Francis) might provide an antidote to the arrogance of a mainstream tradition
steeped in anthropocentrism.
Around the same time, the Stanford ecologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich warned in The
Population Bomb (Ehrlich 1968) that the growth of human population threatened the
viability of planetary life-support systems. The sense of environmental crisis stimulated by
those and other popular works was intensified by NASAs production and wide
dissemination of a particularly potent image of earth from space taken at Christmas 1968 and
featured in the Scientific American in September 1970. Here, plain to see, was a living,
shining planet voyaging through space and shared by all of humanity, a precious vessel
vulnerable to pollution and to the overuse of its limited capacities. In 1972 a team of
researchers at MIT led by Dennis Meadows published theLimits to Growth study, a work that
summed up in many ways the emerging concerns of the previous decade and the sense of
vulnerability triggered by the view of the earth from space. In the commentary to the study,
the researchers wrote:
We affirm finally that any deliberate attempt to reach a rational and enduring state of
equilibrium by planned measures, rather than by chance or catastrophe, must ultimately be
founded on a basic change of values and goals at individual, national and world levels.
(Meadows et al. 1972: 195)
The call for a basic change of values in connection to the environment (a call that could be
interpreted in terms of either instrumental or intrinsic values) reflected a need for the
development of environmental ethics as a new sub-discipline of philosophy.
The new field emerged almost simultaneously in three countriesthe United States,
Australia, and Norway. In the first two of these countries, direction and inspiration largely

came from the earlier twentieth century American literature of the environment. For instance,
the Scottish emigrant John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club and father of American
conservation) and subsequently the forester Aldo Leopold had advocated an appreciation
and conservation of things natural, wild and free. Their concerns were motivated by a
combination of ethical and aesthetic responses to nature as well as a rejection of crudely
economic approaches to the value of natural objects (a historical survey of the confrontation
between Muirs reverentialism and the human-centred conservationism of Gifford Pinchot
(one of the major influences on the development of the US Forest Service) is provided in
Norton 1991; also see Cohen 1984 and Nash (ed) 1990). Leopolds A Sand County
Almanac (1949), in particular, advocated the adoption of a land ethic:
That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and
respected is an extension of ethics. (Leopold 1949: viiix)
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1949: 2245)
However, Leopold himself provided no systematic ethical theory or framework to support
these ethical ideas concerning the environment. His views therefore presented a challenge
and opportunity for moral theorists: could some ethical theory be devised to justify the
injunction to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biosphere?
The land ethic sketched by Leopold, attempting to extend our moral concern to cover the
natural environment and its non-human contents, was drawn on explicitly by the Australian
philosopher Richard Routley (later Sylvan). According to Routley (1973 (cf. Routley and
Routley 1980)), the anthropocentrism imbedded in what he called the dominant western
view, or the western superethic, is in effect human chauvinism. This view, he argued, is
just another form of class chauvinism, which is simply based on blind class loyalty or
prejudice, and unjustifiably discriminates against those outside the privileged class. Echoing
the plot of a popular movie some three years earlier (see Lo and Brennan 2013), Routley
speculates in his last man (and last people) arguments about a hypothetical situation in
which the last person, surviving a world catastrophe, acts to ensure the elimination of all
other living things and the last people set about destroying forests and ecosystems after their
demise. From the human-chauvinistic (or absolutely anthropocentric) perspective, the last
person would do nothing morally wrong, since his or her destructive act in question would
not cause any damage to the interest and well-being of humans, who would by then have
disappeared. Nevertheless, Routley points out that there is a moral intuition that the imagined
last acts would be morally wrong. An explanation for this judgment, he argued, is that those
non-human objects in the environment, whose destruction is ensured by the last person or
last people, have intrinsic value, a kind of value independent of their usefulness for humans.
From his critique, Routley concluded that the main approaches in traditional western moral
thinking were unable to allow the recognition that natural things have intrinsic value, and
that the tradition required overhaul of a significant kind.

Leopolds idea that the land as a whole is an object of our moral concern also stimulated
writers to argue for certain moral obligations toward ecological wholes, such as species,
communities, and ecosystems, not just their individual constituents. The U.S.-based
theologian and environmental philosopher Holmes Rolston III, for instance, argued that
species protection was a moral duty (Rolston 1975). It would be wrong, he maintained, to
eliminate a rare butterfly species simply to increase the monetary value of specimens already
held by collectors. Like Routleys last man arguments, Rolstons example is meant to draw
attention to a kind of action that seems morally dubious and yet is not clearly ruled out or
condemned by traditional anthropocentric ethical views. Species, Rolston went on to argue,
are intrinsically valuable and are usually more valuable than individual specimens, since the
loss of a species is a loss of genetic possibilities and the deliberate destruction of a species
would show disrespect for the very biological processes which make possible the emergence
of individual living things (also see Rolston 1989, Ch 10). Natural processes deserve respect,
according to Rolstons quasi-religious perspective, because they constitute a nature (or God)
which is itself intrinsically valuable (or sacred).
Meanwhile, the work of Christopher Stone (a professor of law at the University of Southern
California) had become widely discussed. Stone (1972) proposed that trees and other natural
objects should have at least the same standing in law as corporations. This suggestion was
inspired by a particular case in which the Sierra Club had mounted a challenge against the
permit granted by the U.S. Forest Service to Walt Disney Enterprises for surveys preparatory
to the development of the Mineral King Valley, which was at the time a relatively remote
game refuge, but not designated as a national park or protected wilderness area. The Disney
proposal was to develop a major resort complex serving 14000 visitors daily to be accessed
by a purpose-built highway through Sequoia National Park. The Sierra Club, as a body with
a general concern for wilderness conservation, challenged the development on the grounds
that the valley should be kept in its original state for its own sake.
Stone reasoned that if trees, forests and mountains could be given standing in law then they
could be represented in their own right in the courts by groups such as the Sierra Club.
Moreover, like any other legal person, these natural things could become beneficiaries of
compensation if it could be shown that they had suffered compensatable injury through
human activity. When the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, it was determined by a
narrow majority that the Sierra Club did not meet the condition for bringing a case to court,
for the Club was unable and unwilling to prove the likelihood of injury to the interest of the
Club or its members. In a dissenting minority judgment, however, justices Douglas,
Blackmun and Brennan mentioned Stones argument: his proposal to give legal standing to
natural things, they said, would allow conservation interests, community needs and business
interests to be represented, debated and settled in court.
Reacting to Stones proposal, Joel Feinberg (1974) raised a serious problem. Only items that
have interests, Feinberg argued, can be regarded as having legal standing and, likewise,

moral standing. For it is interests which are capable of being represented in legal proceedings
and moral debates. This same point would also seem to apply to political debates. For
instance, the movement for animal liberation, which also emerged strongly in the 1970s,
can be thought of as a political movement aimed at representing the previously neglected
interests of some animals (see Regan and Singer (eds.) 1976, Clark 1977, and also the entry
on the moral status of animals). Granted that some animals have interests that can be
represented in this way, would it also make sense to speak of trees, forests, rivers, barnacles,
or termites as having interests of a morally relevant kind? This issue was hotly contested in
the years that followed. Meanwhile, John Passmore (1974) argued, like White, that the
Judeo-Christian tradition of thought about nature, despite being predominantly despotic,
contained resources for regarding humans as stewards or perfectors of Gods creation.
Skeptical of the prospects for any radically new ethic, Passmore cautioned that traditions of
thought could not be abruptly overhauled. Any change in attitudes to our natural
surroundings which stood the chance of widespread acceptance, he argued, would have to
resonate and have some continuities with the very tradition which had legitimized our
destructive practices. In sum, then, Leopolds land ethic, the historical analyses of White and
Passmore, the pioneering work of Routley, Stone and Rolston, and the warnings of scientists,
had by the late 1970s focused the attention of philosophers and political theorists firmly on
the environment.
The confluence of ethical, political and legal debates about the environment, the emergence
of philosophies to underpin animal rights activism and the puzzles over whether an
environmental ethic would be something new rather than a modification or extension of
existing ethical theories were reflected in wider social and political movements. The rise of
environmental or green parties in Europe in the 1980s was accompanied by almost
immediate schisms between groups known as realists versus fundamentalists (see
Dobson 1990). The realists stood for reform environmentalism, working with business and
government to soften the impact of pollution and resource depletion especially on fragile
ecosystems or endangered species. The fundies argued for radical change, the setting of
stringent new priorities, and even the overthrow of capitalism and liberal individualism,
which were taken as the major ideological causes of anthropogenic environmental
devastation. It is not clear, however, that collectivist or communist countries do any better in
terms of their environmental record (see Dominick 1998).
Underlying these political disagreements was the distinction between shallow and deep
environmental movements, a distinction introduced in the early 1970s by another major
influence on contemporary environmental ethics, the Norwegian philosopher and climber
Arne Nss. Since the work of Nss has been significant in environmental politics, the
discussion of his position is given in a separate section below.

3. Environmental Ethics and Politics

3.1 Deep Ecology

Deep ecology was born in Scandinavia, the result of discussions between Nss and his
colleagues Sigmund Kvaly and Nils Faarlund (see Nss 1973 and 1989; also see Witoszek
and Brennan (eds.) 1999 for a historical survey and commentary on the development of deep
ecology). All three shared a passion for the great mountains. On a visit to the Himalayas,
they became impressed with aspects of Sherpa culture particularly when they found that
their Sherpa guides regarded certain mountains as sacred and accordingly would not venture
onto them. Subsequently, Nss formulated a position which extended the reverence the three
Norwegians and the Sherpas felt for mountains to other natural things in general.
The shallow ecology movement, as Nss (1973) calls it, is the fight against pollution and
resource depletion, the central objective of which is the health and affluence of people in
the developed countries. The deep ecology movement, in contrast, endorses biospheric
egalitarianism, the view that all living things are alike in having value in their own right,
independent of their usefulness to others. The deep ecologist respects this intrinsic value,
taking care, for example, when walking on the mountainside not to cause unnecessary
damage to the plants.
Inspired by Spinozas metaphysics, another key feature of Nsss deep ecology is the
rejection of atomistic individualism. The idea that a human being is such an individual
possessing a separate essence, Nss argues, radically separates the human self from the rest
of the world. To make such a separation not only leads to selfishness towards other people,
but also induces human selfishness towards nature. As a counter to egoism at both the
individual and species level, Nss proposes the adoption of an alternative relational totalfield image of the world. According to this relationalism, organisms (human or otherwise)
are best understood as knots in the biospherical net. The identity of a living thing is
essentially constituted by its relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological
relations to other living things. If people conceptualise themselves and the world in relational
terms, the deep ecologists argue, then people will take better care of nature and the world in
general.
As developed by Nss and others, the position also came to focus on the possibility of
theidentification of the human ego with nature. The idea is, briefly, that by identifying with
nature I can enlarge the boundaries of the self beyond my skin. My largerecologicalSelf
(the capital S emphasizes that I am something larger than my body and consciousness),
deserves respect as well. To respect and to care for my Self is also to respect and to care for
the natural environment, which is actually part of me and with which I should identify. Selfrealization, in other words, is the reconnection of the shriveled human individual with the
wider natural environment. Nss maintains that the deep satisfaction that we receive from
identification with nature and close partnership with other forms of life in nature contributes
significantly to our life quality. (One clear historical antecedent to this kind of nature

spiritualism is the romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as expressed in his last work,

the Reveries of the Solitary Walker)
When Nsss view crossed the Atlantic, it was sometimes merged with ideas emerging from
Leopolds land ethic (see Devall and Sessions 1985; also see Sessions (ed) 1995). But Nss
wary of the apparent totalitarian political implications of Leopolds position that individual
interests and well-being should be subordinated to the holistic good of the earths biotic
community (see section 4 below)has always taken care to distance himself from
advocating any sort of land ethic. (See Anker 1999 for cautions on interpreting Nsss
relationalism as an endorsement of the kind of holism displayed in the land ethic; cf. Grey
1993, Taylor and Zimmerman 2005). Some critics have argued that Nsss deep ecology is
no more than an extended social-democratic version of utilitarianism, which counts human
interests in the same calculation alongside the interests of all natural things (e.g., trees,
wolves, bears, rivers, forests and mountains) in the natural environment (see Witoszek 1997).
However, Nss failed to explain in any detail how to make sense of the idea that oysters or
barnacles, termites or bacteria could have interests of any morally relevant sort at all.
Without an account of this, Nsss early biospheric egalitarianismthat all living things
whatsoever had a similar right to live and flourishwas an indeterminate principle in
practical terms. It also remains unclear in what sense rivers, mountains and forests can be
regarded as possessors of any kind of interests. This is an issue on which Nss always
remained elusive.
Biospheric egalitarianism was modified in the 1980s to the weaker claim that the flourishing
of both human and non-human life have value in themselves. At the same time, Nss
declared that his own favoured ecological philosophyEcosophy T, as he called it after
his Tvergastein mountain cabinwas only one of several possible foundations for an
environmental ethic. Deep ecology ceased to be a specific doctrine, but instead became a
platform, of eight simple points, on which Nss hoped all deep green thinkers could agree.
The platform was conceived as establishing a middle ground, between underlying
philosophical orientations, whether Christian, Buddhist, Daoist, process philosophy, or
whatever, and the practical principles for action in specific situations, principles generated
from the underlying philosophies. Thus the deep ecological movement became explicitly
pluralist (see Brennan 1999; c.f. Light 1996).
While Nsss Ecosophy T sees human Self-realization as a solution to the environmental
crises resulting from human selfishness and exploitation of nature, some of the followers of
the deep ecology platform in the United States and Australia further argue that the expansion
of the human self to include non-human nature is supported by the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory, which is said to have dissolved the boundaries between the
observer and the observed (see Fox 1984, 1990, and Devall and Sessions 1985; cf. Callicott
1985). These "relationalist" developments of deep ecology are, however, criticized by some
feminist theorists. The idea of nature as part of oneself, one might argue, could justify the

continued exploitation of nature instead. For one is presumably more entitled to treat oneself
in whatever ways one likes than to treat another independent agent in whatever ways one
likes. According to some feminist critics, the deep ecological theory of the expanded self is
in effect a disguised form of human colonialism, unable to give nature its due as a genuine
other independent of human interest and purposes (see Plumwood 1993, Ch. 7, 1999, and
Warren 1999).
Meanwhile, some third-world critics accused deep ecology of being elitist in its attempts to
preserve wilderness experiences for only a select group of economically and socio-politically
well-off people. The Indian writer Ramachandra Guha (1989, 1999) for instance, depicts the
activities of many western-based conservation groups as a new form of cultural imperialism,
aimed at securing converts to conservationism (cf. Bookchin 1987 and Brennan 1998a).
Green missionaries, as Guha calls them, represent a movement aimed at further
dispossessing the worlds poor and indigenous people. Putting deep ecology in its place, he
writes, is to recognize that the trends it derides as shallow ecology might in fact be
varieties of environmentalism that are more apposite, more representative and more popular
in the countries of the South. Although Nss himself repudiates suggestions that deep
ecology is committed to any imperialism (see Witoszek and Brennan (eds.) 1999, Ch. 367
and 41), Guhas criticism raises important questions about the application of deep ecological
principles in different social, economic and cultural contexts. Finally, in other critiques, deep
ecology is portrayed as having an inconsistent utopian vision (see Anker and Witoszek 1998).

3.2 Feminism and the Environment

Broadly speaking, a feminist issue is any that contributes in some way to understanding the
oppression of women. Feminist theories attempt to analyze womens oppression, its causes
and consequences, and suggest strategies and directions for womens liberation. By the mid
1970s, feminist writers had raised the issue of whether patriarchal modes of thinking
encouraged not only widespread inferiorizing and colonizing of women, but also of people of
colour, animals and nature. Sheila Collins (1974), for instance, argued that male-dominated
culture or patriarchy is supported by four interlocking pillars: sexism, racism, class
exploitation, and ecological destruction.
Emphasizing the importance of feminism to the environmental movement and various other
liberation movements, some writers, such as Ynestra King (1989a and 1989b), argue that the
domination of women by men is historically the original form of domination in human
society, from which all other hierarchiesof rank, class, and political powerflow. For
instance, human exploitation of nature may be seen as a manifestation and extension of the
oppression of women, in that it is the result of associating nature with the female, which had
been already inferiorized and oppressed by the male-dominating culture. But within the
plurality of feminist positions, other writers, such as Val Plumwood (1993), understand the
oppression of women as only one of the many parallel forms of oppression sharing and

supported by a common ideological structure, in which one party (the colonizer, whether
male, white or human) uses a number of conceptual and rhetorical devices to privilege its
interests over that of the other party (the colonized: whether female, people of colour, or
animals). Facilitated by a common structure, seemingly diverse forms of oppression can
mutually reinforce each other (Warren 1987, 1990, 1994, Cheney 1989, and Plumwood
1993).
Not all feminist theorists would call that common underlying oppressive structure
androcentric or patriarchal. But it is generally agreed that core features of the structure
include dualism, hierarchical thinking, and the logic of domination, which are typical of,
if not essential to, male-chauvinism. These patterns of thinking and conceptualizing the
world, many feminist theorists argue, also nourish and sustain other forms of chauvinism,
including, human-chauvinism (i.e., anthropocentrism), which is responsible for much human
exploitation of, and destructiveness towards, nature. The dualistic way of thinking, for
instance, sees the world in polar opposite terms, such as male/female, masculinity/femininity,
reason/emotion, freedom/necessity, active/passive, mind/body, pure/soiled, white/coloured,
civilized/primitive, transcendent/immanent, human/animal, culture/nature. Furthermore,
under dualism all the first items in these contrasting pairs are assimilated with each other,
and all the second items are likewise linked with each other. For example, the male is seen to
be associated with the rational, active, creative, Cartesian human mind, and civilized, orderly,
transcendent culture; whereas the female is regarded as tied to the emotional, passive,
determined animal body, and primitive, disorderly, immanent nature. These interlocking
dualisms are not just descriptive dichotomies, according to the feminists, but involve a
prescriptive privileging of one side of the opposed items over the other. Dualism confers
superiority to everything on the male side, but inferiority to everything on the female side.
The logic of domination then dictates that those on the superior side (e.g., men, rational
beings, humans) are morally entitled to dominate and utilize those on the inferior side (e.g.,
women, beings lacking in rationality, non-humans) as mere means.
The problem with dualistic and hierarchical modes of thinking, however, is not just that that
they are epistemically unreliable. It is not just that the dominating party often falsely sees the
dominated party as lacking (or possessing) the allegedly superior (or inferior) qualities, or
that the dominated party often internalizes false stereotypes of itself given by its oppressors,
or that stereotypical thinking often overlooks salient and important differences among
individuals. More important, according to feminist analyses, the very premise of prescriptive
dualismthe valuing of attributes of one polarized side and the devaluing of those of the
other, the idea that domination and oppression can be justified by appealing to attributes like
masculinity, rationality, being civilized or developed, etc.is itself problematic.
Feminism represents a radical challenge for environmental thinking, politics, and traditional
social ethical perspectives. It promises to link environmental questions with wider social
problems concerning various kinds of discrimination and exploitation, and fundamental

investigations of human psychology. However, whether there are conceptual, causal or

merely contingent connections among the different forms of oppression and liberation
remains a contested issue (see Green 1994). The term ecofeminism (first coined by
Franoise dEaubonne in 1974) or ecological feminism was for a time generally applied to
any view that combines environmental advocacy with feminist analysis. However, because of
the varieties of, and disagreements among, feminist theories, the label may be too wide to be
informative and has generally fallen from use.

3.3 Disenchantment and the New Animism

An often overlooked source of ecological ideas is the work of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt
School of critical theory founded by Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (Horkheimer
and Adorno 1969). While classical Marxists regard nature as a resource to be transformed by
human labour and utilized for human purposes, Horkheimer and Adorno saw Marx himself
as representative of the problem of human alienation. At the root of this alienation, they
argue, is a narrow positivist conception of rationalitywhich sees rationality as an
instrument for pursuing progress, power and technological control, and takes observation,
measurement and the application of purely quantitative methods to be capable of solving all
problems. Such a positivistic view of science combines determinism with optimism. Natural
processes as well as human activities are seen to be predictable and manipulable. Nature
(and, likewise, human nature) is no longer mysterious, uncontrollable, or fearsome. Instead,
it is reduced to an object strictly governed by natural laws, which therefore can be studied,
known, and employed to our benefit. By promising limitless knowledge and power, the
positivism of science and technology not only removes our fear of nature, the critical
theorists argue, but also destroys our sense of awe and wonder towards it. That is to say,
positivism disenchants naturealong with everything that can be studied by the sciences,
whether natural, social or human.
The progress in knowledge and material well-being may not be a bad thing in itself, where
the consumption and control of nature is a necessary part of human life. However, the critical
theorists argue that the positivistic disenchantment of natural things (and, likewise, of human
beingsbecause they too can be studied and manipulated by science) disrupts our
relationship with them, encouraging the undesirable attitude that they are nothing more than
things to be probed, consumed and dominated. According to the critical theorists, the
oppression of outer nature (i.e., the natural environment) through science and technology is
bought at a very high price: the project of domination requires the suppression of our own
inner nature (i.e., human nature)e.g., human creativity, autonomy, and the manifold
needs, vulnerabilities and longings at the centre of human life. To remedy such an alienation,
the project of Horkheimer and Adorno is to replace the narrow positivistic and
instrumentalist model of rationality with a more humanistic one, in which the values of the
aesthetic, moral, sensuous and expressive aspects of human life play a central part. Thus,
their aim is not to give up our rational faculties or powers of analysis and logic. Rather, the

ambition is to arrive at a dialectical synthesis between Romanticism and Enlightenment, to

return to anti-deterministic values of freedom, spontaneity and creativity.
In his later work, Adorno advocates a re-enchanting aesthetic attitude of sensuous
immediacy towards nature. Not only do we stop seeing nature as primarily, or simply, an
object of consumption, we are also able to be directly and spontaneously acquainted with
nature without interventions from our rational faculties. According to Adorno, works of art,
like natural things, always involve an excess, something more than their mere materiality
and exchange value (see Vogel 1996, ch. 4.4 for a detailed discussion of Adornos views on
art, labour and domination). The re-enchantment of the world through aesthetic experience,
he argues, is also at the same time a re-enchantment of human lives and purposes. Adornos
work remains largely unexplored in mainstream environmental philosophy, although the idea
of applying critical theory (embracing techniques of deconstruction, psychoanalysis and
radical social criticism) to both environmental issues and the writings of various ethical and
political theorists has spawned an emerging field of ecocritique or eco-criticism (Vogel
1996, Luke 1997, van Wyk 1997, Dryzek 1997).
Some students of Adornos work have argued that his account of the role of sensuous
immediacy can be understood as an attempt to defend a legitimate anthropomorphism that
comes close to a weak form of animism (Bernstein 2001, 196). Others, more radical, have
claimed to take inspiration from his notion of non-identity, which, they argue, can be used
as the basis for a deconstruction of the notion of nature and perhaps even its elimination from
eco-critical writing. For example, Timothy Morton argues that putting something called
Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the environment what patriarchy does
for the figure of Woman. It is a paradoxical act of sadistic admiration (Morton 2007, 5), and
that in the name of all that we value in the idea of nature, [ecocritique] thoroughly
examines how nature is set up as a transcendental, unified, independent category. Ecocritique
does not think that it is paradoxical to say, in the name of ecology itself: down with
nature! (ibid., 13).
It remains to be seen, however, whether the radical attempt to purge the concept of nature
from eco-critical work meets with success. Likewise, it is unclear whether the dialectic
project on which Horkheimer and Adorno embarked is coherent, and whether Adorno, in
particular, has a consistent understanding of nature and rationality (see Eckersley 1992
and Vogel 1996, for a review of the Frankfurt Schools thinking about nature).
On the other hand, the new animists have been much inspired by the serious way in which
some indigenous peoples placate and interact with animals, plants and inanimate things
through ritual, ceremony and other practices. According to the new animists, the replacement
of traditional animism (the view that personalized souls are found in animals, plants, and
other material objects) by a form of disenchanting positivism directly leads to an
anthropocentric perspective, which is accountable for much human destructiveness towards
nature. In a disenchanted world, there is no meaningful order of things or events outside the

human domain, and there is no source of sacredness or dread of the sort felt by those who
regard the natural world as peopled by divinities or demons (Stone 2006). When a forest is
no longer sacred, there are no spirits to be placated and no mysterious risks associated with
clear-felling it. A disenchanted nature is no longer alive. It commands no respect, reverence
or love. It is nothing but a giant machine, to be mastered to serve human purposes. The new
animists argue for reconceptualizing the boundary between persons and non-persons. For
them, living nature comprises not only humans, animals and plants, but also mountains,
forests, rivers, deserts, and even planets.
Whether the notion that a mountain or a tree is to be regarded as a person is taken literally or
not, the attempt to engage with the surrounding world as if it consists of other persons might
possibly provide the basis for a respectful attitude to nature (see Harvey 2005 for a popular
account of the new animism). If disenchantment is a source of environmental problems and
destruction, then the new animism can be regarded as attempting to re-enchant, and help to
save, nature. More poetically, David Abram has argued that a phenomenological approach of
the kind taken by Merleau-Ponty can reveal to us that we are part of the common flesh of
the world, that we are in a sense the world thinking itself (Abram 1995).
In her work, Freya Mathews has tried to articulate a version of animism or panpsychism that
captures ways in which the world (not just nature) contains many kinds of consciousness and
sentience. For her, there is an underlying unity of mind and matter in that the world is a selfrealizing system containing a multiplicity of other such systems (cf. Nss). According to
Mathews, we are meshed in communication, and potential communication, with the One
(the greater cosmic self) and its many lesser selves (Mathews 2003, 4560). Materialism (the
monistic theory that the world consists purely of matter), she argues, is self-defeating by
encouraging a form of collective solipsism that treats the world either as unknowable or as
a social-construction (Mathews 2005, 12). Mathews also takes inspiration from her
interpretation of the core Daoist idea of wuwei as letting be and bringing about change
through effortless action. The focus in environmental management, development and
commerce should be on synergy with what is already in place rather than on demolition,
replacement and disruption. Instead of bulldozing away old suburbs and derelict factories,
the synergistic panpsychist sees these artefacts as themselves part of the living cosmos, hence
part of what is to be respected. Likewise, instead of trying to eliminate feral or exotic plants
and animals, and restore environments to some imagined pristine state, ways should be found
wherever possibleto promote synergies between the newcomers and the older native
populations in ways that maintain ecological flows and promote the further unfolding and
developing of ecological processes (Mathews 2004). Panpsychism, Mathews argues, frees us
from the ideological grid of capitalism, can reduce our desire for consumer novelties, and
can allow us and the world to grow old together with grace and dignity.
In summary, if disenchantment is a source of environmentally destructive or uncaring
attitudes, then both the aesthetic and the animist/panpsychist re-enchantment of the world are

intended to offer an antidote to such attitudes, and perhaps also inspirations for new forms of
managing and designing for sustainability.

3.4 Social Ecology and Bioregionalism

Apart from feminist-environmentalist theories and Nsss deep ecology, Murray Bookchins
social ecology has also claimed to be radical, subversive, or countercultural (see Bookchin
1980, 1987, 1990). Bookchins version of critical theory takes the outer physical world as
constituting what he calls first nature, from which culture or second nature has evolved.
Environmentalism, on his view, is a social movement, and the problems it confronts are
social problems. While Bookchin is prepared, like Horkheimer and Adorno, to regard (first)
nature as an aesthetic and sensuous marvel, he regards our intervention in it as necessary. He
suggests that we can choose to put ourselves at the service of natural evolution, to help
maintain complexity and diversity, diminish suffering and reduce pollution. Bookchins
social ecology recommends that we use our gifts of sociability, communication and
intelligence as if we were nature rendered conscious, instead of turning them against the
very source and origin from which such gifts derive. Exploitation of nature should be
replaced by a richer form of life devoted to natures preservation.
John Clark has argued that social ecology is heir to a historical, communitarian tradition of
thought that includes not only the anarchist Peter Kropotkin, but also the nineteenth century
socialist geographer Elise Reclus, the eccentric Scottish thinker Patrick Geddes and the
latters disciple, Lewis Mumford (Clark 1998). Ramachandra Guha has described Mumford
as the pioneer American social ecologist (Guha 1996, 210). Mumford adopted a regionalist
perspective, arguing that strong regional centres of culture are the basis of active and
securely grounded local life (Mumford 1944, 403). Like the pessimists in critical theory,
Mumford was worried about the emergence under industrialised capitalism of a
megamachine, one that would oppress and dominate human creativity and freedom, and
one thatdespite being a human productoperates in a way that is out of our control. While
Bookchin is more of a technological optimist than Mumford, both writers have inspired a
regional turn in environmental thinking. Bioregionalism gives regionalism an environmental
twist. This is the view that natural features should provide the defining conditions for places
of community, and that secure and satisfying local lives are led by those who know a place,
have learned its lore and who adapt their lifestyle to its affordances by developing its
potential within ecological limits. Such a life, the bioregionalists argue, will enable people to
enjoy the fruits of self-liberation and self-development (see the essays in List 1993, and the
book-length treatment in Thayer 2003, for an introduction to bioregional thought).
However, critics have asked why natural features should significant in defining the places in
which communities are to be built, and have puzzled over exactly which natural features
these should begeological, ecological, climatic, hydrological, and so on (see Brennan
1998b). If relatively small, bioregional communities are to be home to flourishing human

societies, then a question also arises over the nature of the laws and punishments that will
prevail in them, and also of their integration into larger regional and global political and
economic groupings. For anarchists and other critics of the predominant social order, a return
to self-governing and self-sufficient regional communities is often depicted as liberating and
refreshing. But for the skeptics, the worry remains that the bioregional vision is politically
over-optimistic and is open to the establishment of illiberal, stifling and undemocratic
communities. Further, given its emphasis on local self-sufficiency and the virtue of life in
small communities, a question arises over whether bioregionalism is workable in an
overcrowded planet.
Deep ecology, feminism, and social ecology have had a considerable impact on the
development of political positions in regard to the environment. Feminist analyses have often
been welcomed for the psychological insight they bring to several social, moral and political
problems. There is, however, considerable unease about the implications of critical theory,
social ecology and some varieties of deep ecology and animism. Some writers have argued,
for example, that critical theory is bound to be ethically anthropocentric, with nature as no
more than a social construction whose value ultimately depends on human determinations
(see Vogel 1996). Others have argued that the demands of deep green theorists and
activists cannot be accommodated within contemporary theories of liberal politics and social
justice (see Ferry 1998). A further suggestion is that there is a need to reassess traditional
theories such as virtue ethics, which has its origins in ancient Greek philosophy (see the
following section) within the context of a form of stewardship similar to that earlier endorsed
by Passmore (see Barry 1999). If this last claim is correct, then the radical activist need not,
after all, look for philosophical support in radical, or countercultural, theories of the sort deep
ecology, feminism, bioregionalism and social ecology claim to be (but see Zimmerman
1994).

4. Traditional Ethical Theories and

Contemporary Environment Ethics
Although environmental ethicists often try to distance themselves from the anthropocentrism
embedded in traditional ethical views (Passmore 1974, Norton 1991 are exceptions), they
also quite often draw their theoretical resources from traditional ethical systems and theories.
Consider the following two basic moral questions: (1) What kinds of thing are intrinsically
valuable, good or bad? (2) What makes an action right or wrong?
Consequentialist ethical theories consider intrinsic value / disvalue or goodness /
badness to be more fundamental moral notions than rightness / wrongness, and
maintain that whether an action is right/wrong is determined by whether its consequences are
good/bad. From this perspective, answers to question (2) are informed by answers to
question (1). For instance, utilitarianism, a paradigm case of consequentialism, regards

pleasure (or, more broadly construed, the satisfaction of interest, desire, and/or preference) as
the only intrinsic value in the world, whereas pain (or the frustration of desire, interest,
and/or preference) is the only intrinsic disvalue, and maintains that right actions are those
that would produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain.
As the utilitarian focus is the balance of pleasure and pain as such, the question of to whom a
pleasure or pain belongs is irrelevant to the calculation and assessment of the rightness or
wrongness of actions. Hence, the eighteenth century utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (1789), and
now Peter Singer (1993), have argued that the interests of all the sentient beings (i.e., beings
who are capable of experiencing pleasure or pain)including non-human onesaffected by
an action should be taken equally into consideration in assessing the action. Furthermore,
rather like Routley (see section 2 above), Singer argues that the anthropocentric privileging
of members of the species Homo sapiens is arbitrary, and that it is a kind of speciesism as
unjustifiable as sexism and racism. Singer regards the animal liberation movement as
comparable to the liberation movements of women and people of colour. Unlike the
environmental philosophers who attribute intrinsic value to the natural environment and its
inhabitants, Singer and utilitarians in general attribute intrinsic value to the experience of
pleasure or interest satisfaction as such, not to the beings who have the experience. Similarly,
for the utilitarian, non-sentient objects in the environment such as plant species, rivers,
mountains, and landscapes, all of which are the objects of moral concern for
environmentalists, are of no intrinsic but at most instrumental value to the satisfaction of
sentient beings (see Singer 1993, Ch. 10). Furthermore, because right actions, for the
utilitarian, are those that maximize the overall balance of interest satisfaction over
frustration, practices such as whale-hunting and the killing of an elephant for ivory, which
cause suffering to non-human animals, might turn out to be right after all: such practices
might produce considerable amounts of interest-satisfaction for human beings, which, on the
utilitarian calculation, outweigh the non-human interest-frustration involved. As the result of
all the above considerations, it is unclear to what extent a utilitarian ethic can also be an
environmental ethic. This point may not so readily apply to a wider consequentialist
approach, which attributes intrinsic value not only to pleasure or satisfaction, but also to
various objects and processes in the natural environment.
Deontological ethical theories, in contrast, maintain that whether an action is right or wrong
is for the most part independent of whether its consequences are good or bad. From the
deontologist perspective, there are several distinct moral rules or duties (e.g., not to kill or
otherwise harm the innocent, not to lie, to respect the rights of others, to keep
promises), the observance/violation of which is intrinsically right/wrong; i.e., right/wrong in
itself regardless of consequences. When asked to justify an alleged moral rule, duty or its
corresponding right, deontologists may appeal to the intrinsic value of those beings to whom
it applies. For instance, animal rights advocate Tom Regan (1983) argues that those
animals with intrinsic value (or what he calls inherent value) have the moral right to
respectful treatment, which then generates a general moral duty on our part not to treat them

as mere means to other ends. We have, in particular, a prima facie moral duty not to harm
them. Regan maintains that certain practices (such as sport or commercial hunting, and
experimentation on animals) violate the moral right of intrinsically valuable animals to
respectful treatment. Such practices, he argues, are intrinsically wrong regardless of whether
or not some better consequences ever flow from them. Exactly which animals have intrinsic
value and therefore the moral right to respectful treatment? Regans answer is: those that
meet the criterion of being the subject-of-a-life. To be such a subject is a sufficient (though
not necessary) condition for having intrinsic value, and to be a subject-of-a-life involves,
among other things, having sense-perceptions, beliefs, desires, motives, memory, a sense of
the future, and a psychological identity over time.
Some authors have extended concern for individual well-being further, arguing for the
intrinsic value of organisms achieving their own good, whether those organisms are capable
of consciousness or not. Paul Taylors version of this view (1981 and 1986), which we might
callbiocentrism, is a deontological example. He argues that each individual living thing in
naturewhether it is an animal, a plant, or a micro-organismis a teleological-center-oflife having a good or well-being of its own which can be enhanced or damaged, and that all
individuals who are teleological-centers-of life have equal intrinsic value (or what he calls
inherent worth) which entitles them to moral respect. Furthermore, Taylor maintains that
the intrinsic value of wild living things generates a prima facie moral duty on our part to
preserve or promote their goods as ends in themselves, and that any practices which treat
those beings as mere means and thus display a lack of respect for them are intrinsically
wrong. A more recent and biologically detailed defence of the idea that living things have
representations and goals and hence have moral worth is found in Agar 2001. Unlike Taylors
egalitarian and deontological biocentrism, Robin Attfield (1987) argues for a hierarchical
view that while all beings having a good of their own have intrinsic value, some of them
(e.g., persons) have intrinsic value to a greater extent. Attfield also endorses a form of
consequentialism which takes into consideration, and attempts to balance, the many and
possibly conflicting goods of different living things (also see Varner 1998 for a defense of
biocentric individualism with affinities to both consequentialist and deontological
approaches). However, some critics have pointed out that the notion of biological good or
well-being is only descriptive not prescriptive (see Williams 1992 and ONeill 1993, Ch. 2).
For instance, even if HIV has a good of its own this does not mean that we ought to assign
any positive moral weight to the realization of that good.
More recently, the distinction between these two traditional approaches has taken its own
specific form of development in environmental philosophy. Instead of pitting conceptions of
value against conceptions of rights, it has been suggested that there may be two different
conceptions of intrinsic value in play in discussion about environmental good and evil. One
the one side, there is the intrinsic value of states of affairs that are to be promoted - and this
is the focus of the consequentialist thinkers. On the other (deontological) hand there is the
intrinsic values of entities to be respected (see Bradley 2006, McShane 2014). These two

different foci for the notion of intrinsic value still provide room for fundamental argument
between deontologists and consequentialist to continue, albeit in a somewhat modified form.
Note that the ethics of animal liberation or animal rights and biocentrism are
both individualisticin that their various moral concerns are directed towards individuals only
not ecological wholes such as species, populations, biotic communities, and ecosystems.
None of these is sentient, a subject-of-a-life, or a teleological-center-of-life, but the
preservation of these collective entities is a major concern for many environmentalists.
Moreover, the goals of animal liberationists, such as the reduction of animal suffering and
death, may conflict with the goals of environmentalists. For example, the preservation of the
integrity of an ecosystem may require the culling of feral animals or of some indigenous
animal populations that threaten to destroy fragile habitats. So there are disputes about
whether the ethics of animal liberation is a proper branch of environmental ethics (see
Callicott 1980, 1988, Sagoff 1984, Jamieson 1998, Crisp 1998 and Varner 2000).
Criticizing the individualistic approach in general for failing to accommodate conservation
concerns for ecological wholes, J. Baird Callicott (1980) once advocated a version of landethical holism which takes Leopolds statement A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise
to be the supreme deontological principle. In this theory, the earths biotic community per se
is the sole locus of intrinsic value, whereas the value of its individual members is merely
instrumental and dependent on their contribution to the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the larger community. A straightforward implication of this version of the land ethic is that an
individual member of the biotic community ought to be sacrificed whenever that is needed
for the protection of the holistic good of the community. For instance, Callicott maintains
that if culling a white-tailed deer is necessary for the protection of the holistic biotic good,
then it is a land-ethical requirement to do so. But, to be consistent, the same point also
applies to human individuals because they are also members of the biotic community. Not
surprisingly, the misanthropy implied by Callicotts land-ethical holism was widely criticized
and regarded as areductio of the position (see Aiken (1984), Kheel (1985), Ferr (1996), and
Shrader-Frechette (1996)). Tom Regan (1983, p.362), in particular, condemned the holistic
land ethics disregard of the rights of the individual as environmental fascism.
Under pressure from the charge of ecofascism and misanthropy, Callicott (1989 Ch. 5, and
1999, Ch. 4) later revised his position and now maintains that the biotic community (indeed,
any community to which we belong) as well as its individual members (indeed, any
individual who shares with us membership in some common community) all have intrinsic
value. To further distance himself from the charge of ecofascism, Callicott introduced
explicit principles which prioritize obligations to human communities over those to natural
ones. He called these second-order principles for specifying the conditions under which the
land ethics holistic and individualistic obligations were to be ranked. As he put it:

... obligations generated by membership in more venerable and intimate communities take
precedence over these generated in more recently-emerged and impersonal communities...
The second second-order principle is that stronger interests (for lack of a better word)
generate duties that take precedence over duties generated by weaker interests. (Callicott
1999, 76)
Lo (in Lo 2001) provides an overview and critique of Callicotts changing position over two
decades, while Ouderkirk and Hill (eds.) 2002 gives an overview of debates between
Callicott and others concerning the metaethical and metaphysical foundations for the land
ethic and also its historical antecedents. As Lo pointed out, the final modified version of the
land ethic needs more than two second-order principles, since a third-order principle is
needed to specify Callicotts implicit view that the second second-order principle generally
countermands the first one when they come into conflict (Lo 2001, 345). In his most recent
work, Callicott follows Los suggestion, while cautioning against aiming for too much
precision in specifying the demands of the land ethic (Callicott 2013, 66 - 7).
The controversy surrounding Callicotts original position, however, has inspired efforts in
environmental ethics to investigate possibilities of attributing intrinsic value to ecological
wholes, not just their individual constituent parts. Following in Callicotts footsteps, and
inspired by Nsss relational account of value, Warwick Fox has championed a theory of
responsive cohesion which apparently gives supreme moral priority to the maintenance of
ecosystems and the biophysical world (Fox 2007). It remains to be seen if this position
escapes the charges of misanthropy and totalitarianism laid against earlier holistic and
relational theories of value.
Individual natural entities (whether sentient or not, living or not), Andrew Brennan (1984,
2014) argues, are not designed by anyone to fulfill any purpose and therefore lack intrinsic
function (i.e., the function of a thing that constitutes part of its essence or identity
conditions). This, he proposes, is a reason for thinking that individual natural entities should
not be treated as mere instruments, and thus a reason for assigning them intrinsic value.
Furthermore, he argues that the same moral point applies to the case of natural ecosystems,
to the extent that they lack intrinsic function. In the light of Brennans proposal, Eric Katz
(1991 and 1997) argues that all natural entities, whether individuals or wholes, have intrinsic
value in virtue of their ontological independence from human purpose, activity, and interest,
and maintains the deontological principle that nature as a whole is an autonomous subject
which deserves moral respect and must not be treated as a mere means to human ends.
Carrying the project of attributing intrinsic value to nature to its ultimate form, Robert Elliot
(1997) argues that naturalness itself is a property in virtue of possessing which all natural
things, events, and states of affairs, attain intrinsic value. Furthermore, Elliot argues that even
a consequentialist, who in principle allows the possibility of trading off intrinsic value from
naturalness for intrinsic value from other sources, could no longer justify such kind of tradeoff in reality. This is because the reduction of intrinsic value due to the depletion of

naturalness on earth, according to him, has reached such a level that any further reduction of
it could not be compensated by any amount of intrinsic value generated in other ways, no
matter how great it is.
As the notion of natural is understood in terms of the lack of human contrivance and is
often opposed to the notion of artifactual, one much contested issue is about the value of
those parts of nature that have been interfered with by human artificefor instance,
previously degraded natural environments which have been humanly restored. Based on the
premise that the properties of being naturally evolved and having a natural continuity with
the remote past are value adding (i.e., adding intrinsic value to those things which possess
those two properties), Elliot argues that even a perfectly restored environment would
necessarily lack those two value-adding properties and therefore be less valuable than the
originally undegraded natural environment. Katz, on the other hand, argues that a restored
nature is really just an artifact designed and created for the satisfaction of human ends, and
that the value of restored environments is merely instrumental. However, some critics have
pointed out that advocates of moral dualism between the natural and the artifactual run the
risk of diminishing the value of human life and culture, and fail to recognize that the natural
environments interfered with by humans may still have morally relevant qualities other than
pure naturalness (see Lo 1999). Two other issues central to this debate are that the key
concept natural seems ambiguous in many different ways (see Hume 1751, App. 3; Mill
1874; Brennan [1988] 2014; Ch. 6; Elliot 1997, Ch. 4), and that those who argue that human
interference reduces the intrinsic value of nature seem to have simply assumed the crucial
premise that naturalness is a source of intrinsic value. Some thinkers maintain that the
natural, or the wild construed as that which is not humanized (Hettinger and Throop
1999, p. 12) or to some degree not under human control (ibid., p. 13) is intrinsically
valuable. Yet, as Bernard Williams points out (Williams 1992), we may, paradoxically, need
to use our technological powers to retain a sense of something not being in our power. The
retention of wild areas may thus involve planetary and ecological management to maintain,
or even imprison such areas (Birch 1990), raising a question over the extent to which
national parks and wilderness areas are free from our control. An important message
underlying the debate, perhaps, is that even if ecological restoration is achievable, it might
have been better to have left nature intact in the first place.
Given the significance of the concept of naturalness in these debates, it is perhaps surprising
that there has been relatively little analysis of that concept itself in environmental thought. In
his pioneering work on the ethics of the environment, Holmes Rolston has worked with a
number of different conceptions of the natural (see Brennan and Lo 2010, pp.11623, for an
analysis three senses of the term "natural" that may be found in Rolstons work). An explicit
attempt to provide a conceptual analysis of a different sort is found in Siipi 2008, while an
account of naturalness linking this to historical narratives of place is given in ONeill,
Holland and Light 2008, ch. 8 (compare the response to this in Siipi 2011).

As an alternative to consequentialism and deontology both of which consider thin concepts

such as goodness and rightness as essential to morality, virtue ethics proposes to
understand moralityand assess the ethical quality of actionsin terms of thick concepts
such as kindness, honesty, sincerity and justice. As virtue ethics speaks quite a
different language from the other two kinds of ethical theory, its theoretical focus is not so
much on what kinds of things are good/bad, or what makes an action right/wrong. Indeed,
the richness of the language of virtues, and the emphasis on moral character, is sometimes
cited as a reason for exploring a virtues-based approach to the complex and always-changing
questions of sustainability and environmental care (Hill 1983, Wensveen 2000, Sandler
2007). One question central to virtue ethics is what the moral reasons are for acting one way
or another. For instance, from the perspective of virtue ethics, kindness and loyalty would be
moral reasons for helping a friend in hardship. These are quite different from the
deontologists reason (that the action is demanded by a moral rule) or the consequentialist
reason (that the action will lead to a better over-all balance of good over evil in the world).
From the perspective of virtue ethics, the motivation and justification of actions are both
inseparable from the character traits of the acting agent. Furthermore, unlike deontology or
consequentialism the moral focus of which is other people or states of the world, one central
issue for virtue ethics is how to live a flourishing human life, this being a central concern of
the moral agent himself or herself. Living virtuously is Aristotles recipe for flourishing.
Versions of virtue ethics advocating virtues such as benevolence, piety, filiality, and
courage, have also been held by thinkers in the Chinese Confucian tradition. The
connection between morality and psychology is another core subject of investigation for
virtue ethics. It is sometimes suggested that human virtues, which constitute an important
aspect of a flourishing human life, must be compatible with human needs and desires, and
perhaps also sensitive to individual affection and temperaments. As its central focus is human
flourishing as such, virtue ethics may seem unavoidably anthropocentric and unable to
support a genuine moral concern for the non-human environment. But just as Aristotle has
argued that a flourishing human life requires friendships and one can have genuine
friendships only if one genuinely values, loves, respects, and cares for ones friends for their
own sake, not merely for the benefits that they may bring to oneself, some have argued that a
flourishing human life requires the moral capacities to value, love, respect, and care for the
non-human natural world as an end in itself (see ONeill 1992, ONeill 1993, Barry 1999).
Supplementary Document:
Biodiversity Preservation

5. Wilderness, the Built Environment,

Poverty and Politics
Despite the variety of positions in environmental ethics developed over the last thirty years,
they have focused mainly on issues concerned with wilderness and the reasons for its

preservation (see Callicott and Nelson 1998 for a collection of essays on the ideas and moral
significance of wilderness). The importance of wilderness experience to the human psyche
has been emphasized by many environmental philosophers. Nss, for instance, urges us to
ensure we spend time dwelling in situations of intrinsic value, whereas Rolston seeks recreation of the human soul by meditating in the wilderness. Likewise, the critical theorists
believe that aesthetic appreciation of nature has the power to re-enchant human life. As
wilderness becomes increasingly rare, peoples exposure to wild things in their natural state
has become reduced, and according to some authors this may reduce the chance of our lives
and other values being transformed as a result of interactions with nature. An argument by
Bryan Norton draws attention to an analogy with music. Someone exposed for the first time
to a new musical genre may undergo a transformation in musical preferences, tastes and
values as a result of the experience (Norton 1987. Such a transformation can affect their
other preferences and desires too, in both direct and indirect ways (see Sarkar 2005, ch. 4,
esp. pp. 827). In the attempt to preserve opportunities for experiences that can change or
enhance peoples valuations of nature, there has been a move since the early 2000s to find
ways of rewilding degraded environments, and even parts of cities (Fraser 2009, Monbiot
2013).(
By contrast to the focus on wild places, relatively little attention has been paid to the built
environment, although this is the one in which most people spend most of their time. In postwar Britain, for example, cheaply constructed new housing developments were often poor
replacements for traditional communities. They have been associated with lower amounts of
social interaction and increased crime compared with the earlier situation. The destruction of
highly functional high-density traditional housing, indeed, might be compared with the
destruction of highly diverse ecosystems and biotic communities. Likewise, the loss of the
worlds huge diversity of natural languages has been mourned by many, not just
professionals with an interest in linguistics. Urban and linguistic environments are just two
of the many places inhabited by humans. Some philosophical theories about natural
environments and objects have potential to be extended to cover built environments and nonnatural objects of several sorts (see King 2000, Light 2001, Palmer 2003, while Fox 2007
aims to include both built and natural environments in the scope of a single ethical theory).
Certainly there are many parallels between natural and artificial domains: for example, many
of the conceptual problems involved in discussing the restoration of natural objects also
appear in the parallel context of restoring human-made objects.
The focus on the value of wilderness and the importance of its preservation has overlooked
another important problemnamely that lifestyles in which enthusiasms for nature rambles,
woodland meditations or mountaineering can be indulged demand a standard of living that is
far beyond the dreams of most of the worlds population. Moreover, mass access to wild
places would likely destroy the very values held in high esteem by the natural aristocrats, a
term used by Hugh Stretton (1976) to characterize the environmentalists driven chiefly by
love of the wilderness. Thus, a new range of moral and political problems open up,

including the environmental cost of tourist access to wilderness areas, and ways in which
limited access could be arranged to areas of natural beauty and diversity, while maintaining
the individual freedoms central to liberal democracies.
Lovers of wilderness sometimes consider the high human populations in some developing
countries as a key problem underlying the environmental crisis. Rolston (1996), for instance,
claims that (some) humans are a kind of planetary cancer. He maintains that while
feeding people always seems humane, ... when we face up to what is really going on, by just
feeding people, without attention to the larger social results, we could be feeding a kind of
cancer. This remark is meant to justify the view that saving nature should, in some
circumstances, have a higher priority than feeding people. But such a view has been
criticized for seeming to reveal a degree of misanthropy, directed at those human beings least
able to protect and defend themselves (see Attfield 1998, Brennan 1998a). The empirical
basis of Rolstons claims has been queried by work showing that poor people are often
extremely good environmental managers (Martinez-Alier 2002). Guhas worries about the
elitist and missionary tendencies of some kinds of deep green environmentalism in certain
rich western countries can be quite readily extended to theorists such as Rolston (Guha
1999). Can such an apparently elitist sort of wilderness ethics ever be democratised? How
can the psychically-reviving power of the wild become available to those living in the slums
of Calcutta or So Paolo? These questions so far lack convincing answers.
Furthermore, the economic conditions which support the kind of enjoyment of wilderness by
Strettons natural aristocrats, and more generally the lifestyles of many people in the
affluent countries, seem implicated in the destruction and pollution which has provoked the
environmental turn in the first place. For those in the richer countries, for instance, engaging
in outdoor recreations usually involves the motor car. Car dependency, however, is at the
heart of many environmental problems, a key factor in urban pollution, while at the same
time central to the economic and military activities of many nations and corporations, for
example securing and exploiting oil reserves. In an increasingly crowded industrialised
world, the answers to such problems are pressing. Any adequate study of this intertwined set
of problems must involve interdisciplinary collaboration among philosophers and theorists in
the social as well as the natural sciences.
Connections between environmental destruction, unequal resource consumption, poverty and
the global economic order have been discussed by political scientists, development theorists,
geographers and economists as well as by philosophers. Links between economics and
environmental ethics are particularly well established. Work by Mark Sagoff (1988), for
instance, has played a major part in bringing the two fields together. He argues that as
citizens rather than consumers people are concerned about values, which cannot plausibly
be reduced to mere ordered preferences or quantified in monetary terms. Sagoffs distinction
between people as consumers and people as citizens was intended to blunt the use of costbenefit analysis as the final arbiter in discussions about natures value. Of course, spouses

take out insurance on each others lives. We pay extra for travel insurance to cover the cost of
cancellation, illness, or lost baggage. Such actions are economically rational. They provide
us with some compensation in case of loss. No-one, however, would regard insurance
payments as replacing lost limbs, a loved one or even the joys of a cancelled vacation. So it
is for nature, according to Sagoff. We can put dollar values on a stand of timber, a reef, a
beach, a national park. We can measure the travel costs, the money spent by visitors, the real
estate values, the park fees and all the rest. But these dollar measures do not tell us the value
of nature any more than my insurance premiums tell you the value of a human life (also see
Shrader-Frechette 1987, ONeill 1993, and Brennan 1995). If Sagoff is right, cost-benefit
analysis of the kind mentioned in section 5 above cannot be a basis for an ethic of
sustainability any more than for an ethic of biodiversity. The potentially misleading appeal to
economic reason used to justify the expansion of the corporate sector has also come under
critical scrutiny by globalisation theorists (see Korten 1999). These critiques do not aim to
eliminate economics from environmental thinking; rather, they resist any reductive, and
strongly anthropocentric, tendency to believe that all social and environmental problems are
fundamentally or essentially economic.
Other interdisciplinary approaches link environmental ethics with biology, policy studies,
public administration, political theory, cultural history, post-colonial theory, literature,
geography, and human ecology (for some examples, see Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, Maple
1995, Shrader-Frechette 1984, Gruen and Jamieson (eds.) 1994, Karliner 1997, Diesendorf
and Hamilton 1997, Schmidtz and Willott 2002). Many assessments of issues concerned with
biodiversity, ecosystem health, poverty, environmental justice and sustainability look at both
human and environmental issues, eschewing in the process commitment either to a purely
anthropocentric or purely ecocentric perspective (see Hayward and ONeill 1997, and
Dobson 1999 for collections of essays looking at the links between sustainability, justice,
welfare and the distribution of environmental goods). The future development of
environmental ethics depend on these, and other interdisciplinary synergies, as much as on
its anchorage within philosophy.

6. Sustainability and Climate Change

The Convention on Biological Diversity discussed in section 5 was influenced by Our
Common Future, an earlier United Nations document on sustainability produced by the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987). The commission was
chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway at the time, and the report is
sometimes known as the Brundtland Report. This report noted the increasing tide of evidence
that planetary systems vital to supporting life on earth were under strain. The key question it
raised is whether it is equitable to sacrifice options for future well-being in favour of
supporting current lifestyles, especially the comfortable, and sometimes lavish, forms of life
enjoyed in the rich countries. As Bryan Norton puts it, the world faces a global challenge to
see whether different human groups, with widely varying perspectives, can perhaps accept

responsibility to maintain a non-declining set of opportunities based on possible uses of the

environment. The preservation of options for the future can be readily linked to notions of
equity if it is agreed that the future ought not to face, as a result of our actions today, a
seriously reduced range of options and choices, as they try to adapt to the environment that
they face (Norton 2001: 419). Note that references to the future need not be limited to the
future of human beings only. In keeping with the non-anthropocentric focus of much
environmental philosophy, a care for sustainability and biodiversity can embrace a care for
opportunities available to non-human living things.
However, when the concept sustainable development was first articulated in the
Brundtland Report, the emphasis was clearly anthropocentric. In face of increasing evidence
that planetary systems vital to life-support were under strain, the concept of sustainable
development is constructed in the report to encourage certain globally coordinated directions
and types of economic and social development. The report defines sustainable
development in the following way:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it
two key concepts:
the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the worlds poor, to which
overriding priority should be given; and
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on
the environments ability to meet present and future needs.
Thus the goals of economic and social development must be defined in terms of
sustainability in all countriesdeveloped or developing, market-oriented or centrally
planned. Interpretations will vary, but must share certain general features and must flow from
a consensus on the basic concept of sustainable development and on a broad strategic
framework for achieving it. (WCED 1987, Ch. 2, paragraphs 12)
The report goes on to argue that the industrial world has already used much of the planets
ecological capital. This inequality is the planets main environmental problem; it is also its
main development problem (WCED 1987, Overview, paragraph 17). In the concept of
sustainable development the report combines the resource economists notion of sustainable
yield with the recognition that developing countries of the world are entitled to economic
growth and prosperity. The notion of sustainable yield involves thinking of forests, rivers,
oceans and other ecosystems, including the natural species living in them, as a stock of
ecological capital from which all kinds of goods and services flow. Provided the flow of
such goods and services does not reduce the capacity of the capital itself to maintain its
productivity, the use of the systems in question is regarded as sustainable. Thus, the report

argues that maximum sustainable yield must be defined after taking into account systemwide effects of exploitation of ecological capital (WCED 1987, Ch. 2, paragraph 11).
There are clear philosophical, political and economic precursors to the Brundtland concept of
sustainability. For example, John Stuart Mill (1848, IV. 6. 1) distinguished between the
stationary state and the progressive state and argued that at the end of the progressive
state lies the stationary state, since the increase of wealth is not boundless. Mill also
recognized a debt to the gloomy prognostications of Thomas Malthus (see the discussion of
Malthus in the Political Economny section of the entry on Mill), who had conjectured that
population tends to increase geometrically while food resources at best increase only
arithmetically, so that demand for food will inevitably outstrip the supply (see Milgate and
Stimson 2009, Ch. 7). Reflection on Malthus led Mill to argue for restraining human
population growth:
Even in a progressive state of capital, in old countries, a conscientious or prudential restraint
on population is indispensable, to prevent the increase of numbers from outstripping the
increase of capital, and the condition of the classes who are at the bottom of society from
being deteriorated (Mill 1848, IV. 6. 1).
Such warnings resonate with more recent pessimism about increasing human population and
its impact on the poorest people, as well as on loss of biodiversity, fresh water scarcity,
overconsumption and climate change. In their controversial work The Population Bomb, Paul
and Anne Ehrlich, argue that without restrictions on population growth, including the
imposition of mandatory birth control, the world faced mass starvation in the short term
(Ehrlich 1968). In a subsequent defence of their early work, the Ehrlichs declared that the
most serious flaw in their original analysis was that it was much too optimistic about the
future, and comment that Since The Bomb was written, increases in greenhouse gas flows
into the atmosphere, a consequence of the near doubling of the human population and the
near tripling of global consumption, indicate that the results will likely be catastrophic
climate disruption caused by greenhouse heating (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2009, 66). It was also
in 1968 that Garrett Hardin published his much cited article on the tragedy of the commons
showing that common resources are always subject to degradation and extinction in the face
of the rational pursuit of self interest. For Hardin, the increasing pressure on shared
resources, and increasing pollution, are inevitable results of the fact that there is no
technical solution to the population problem (Hardin 1968). The problem may be analysed
from the perspective of the so-called prisoners dilemma (also see the free rider problem).
Despite the pessimism of writers at the time, and the advocacy of setting limits to population
growth, there was also an optimism that echoes Mills own view that a stationary state
would not be one of misery and decline, but rather one in which humans could aspire to more
equitable distribution of available and limited resources. This is clear not only among those
who recognize limits to economic growth (Meadows et al. 1972) but also among those who

champion the move to a steady state economy (Daly 1991) or at least want to see more
account taken of ecology in economics (Norgaard 1994).
The Brundtland report puts less emphasis on limits than do Mill, Malthus and these more
recent writers. It depicts sustainability as a challenge and opportunity for the world to
become more socially, politically and environmentally fair. In pursuit of intergenerational
justice, it suggests that there should be new human rights added to the standard list, for
example, that All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for
their health and well being (WCED 1987, Annexe 1, paragraph 1). The report also argues
that The enjoyment of any right requires respect for the similar rights of others, and
recognition of reciprocal and even joint responsibilities. States have a responsibility towards
their own citizens and other states (ibid., chapter 12, paragraph 83). Since the reports
publication, many writers have supported and defended the view that global and economic
justice require that nations which had become wealthy through earlier industrialization and
environmental exploitation should allow less developed nations similar or equivalent
opportunities for development especially in term of access to environmental resources
(Redclift 2005). As intended by the report the idea of sustainable development has become
strongly integrated into the notion of environmental conservation. The report has also set the
scene for a range of subsequent international conferences, declarations, and protocols many
of them maintaining the emphasis on the prospects for the future of humanity, rather than
considering sustainability in any wider sense.
Some early commentators on the notion of sustainable development have been critical of the
way the notion mixes together moral ideas of justice and fairness with technical ideas in
economics. The objection is that sustainability as, in part, an economic and scientific notion,
should not be fused with evaluative ideals (Beckerman 1994). This objection has not
generally been widely taken up. Mark Sagoff has observed that environmental policy is
most characterized by the opposition between instrumental values and aesthetic and moral
judgments and convictions (Sagoff 2004: 20). Some non-anthropocentric environmental
thinkers have found the language of economics unsatisfactory in its implications since it
already appears to assume a largely instrumental view of nature. The use of notions such as
asset, capital and even the word resources in connection with natural objects and
systems has been identified by some writers as instrumentalizing natural things which are in
essence wild and free. The objection is that such language promotes the tendency to think of
natural things as mere resources for humans or as raw materials with which human labour
could be mixed, not only to produce consumable goods, but also to generate human
ownership (Plumwood 1993, Sagoff 2004). If natural objects and systems have intrinsic
value independent of their possible use for humans, as many environmental philosophers
have argued, then a policy approach to sustainability needs to consider the environment and
natural things not only in instrumental and but also in intrinsic terms to do justice to the
moral standing that many people believe such items possess. Despite its acknowledgment of
there being moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, and purely scientific reasons for conserving

wild beings (WCED 1987, Overview, paragraph 53), the strongly anthropocentric and
instrumental language used throughout the Brundtland report in articulating the notion of
sustainable development can be criticised for defining the notion too narrowly, leaving little
room for addressing sustainability questions directly concerning the Earths environment and
its non-human inhabitants: should, and if so, how should, human beings reorganise their
ways of life and the social-political structures of their communities to allow sustainability
and equity not only for all humans but also for the other species on the planet?
The preservation concern for nature and non-human species is addressed to some extent by
making a distinction between weaker and stronger conceptions of sustainability (Beckerman
1995). The distinction emerged from considering the question: what exactly does sustainable
development seek to sustain? Is the flow of goods and services from world markets that is to
be maintained, or is it the currentor some futurelevel of consumption? In answering
such questions, proponents of weak sustainability argue that it is acceptable to replace natural
capital with human-made capital provided that the latter has equivalent functions. If, for
example, plastic trees could produce oxygen, absorb carbon and support animal and insect
communities, then they could replace the real thing, and a world with functionally equivalent
artificial trees would seem just as good as one with real or natural trees in it. For weak
sustainability theorists, the aim of future development should be to maintain a consistently
productive stock of capital on which to draw, while not insisting that some portion of that
capital be natural. Strong sustainability theorists, by contrast, generally resist the substitution
of human for natural capital, insisting that a critical stock of natural things and processes be
preserved. By so doing, they argue, we maintain stocks of rivers, forests and biodiverse
systems, hence providing maximum optionsoptions in terms of experience, appreciation,
values, and ways of lifefor the future human inhabitants of the planet (Norton 2005). The
Brundtland report can also be seen as advocating a form of strong sustainability in so far as it
recommends that a first priority is to establish the problem of disappearing species and
threatened ecosystems on political agendas as a major resource issue (ibid., chapter 6,
paragraph 57). Furthermore, despite its instrumental and economic language, the report in
fact endorses a wider moral perspective on the status of and our relation to nature and nonhuman species, evidenced by its statement that the case for the conservation of nature
should not rest only with development goals. It is part of our moral obligation to other living
beings and future generations (WCED 1987, chapter 2, paragraph 55). Implicit in the
statement is not only a strong conception of sustainability but also a non-anthropocentric
conception of the notion. Over time, strong sustainability has come to be focused not only on
the needs of human and other living things but also on their rights (Redclift 2004, 218). In a
further development, the discourses on forms of sustainability have generally given way in
the last decade to a more ambiguous usage, in which the term sustainability functions to
bring people into a debate rather than setting out a clear definition of the terms of the debate
itself. As globalization leads to greater integration of world economies, the world after the
Brundtland report has seen greater fragmentation among viewpoints, where critics of

globalization have generally used the concept of sustainability in a plurality of different ways
(Sneddon, Howarth and Norgaard 2006). Some have argued that sustainability, just like the
word nature itself, has come to mean very different things, carrying different symbolic
meaning for different groups, and reflecting very different interests (Redclift 2004, 220). For
better or for worse, such ambiguity can on occasion allow different parties in negotiations to
claim a measure of agreement.
The preservation of opportunities to live well, or at least to have a minimally acceptable level
of well being, is at the heart of population ethics and many contemporary conceptions of
sustainability. Many people believe such opportunities for the existing younger generations,
and also for the yet to arrive future generations, to be under threat from continuing
environmental destruction, including loss of fresh water resources, continued clearing of wild
areas and a changing climate. Of these, climate change has come to prominence as an area of
intense policy and political debate, to which applied philosophers and ethicists have much to
contribute. An early exploration of the topic by John Broome shows how the economics of
climate change could not be divorced from considerations of intergenerational justice and
ethics (Broome 1992), and this has set the scene for subsequent discussions and analyses.
More than a decade later, when Stephen Gardiner analyses the state of affairs surrounding
climate change in an article entitled A Perfect Moral Storm (Gardiner 2006), his starting
point is also that ethics plays a fundamental role in all discussions of climate policy. But he
argues that even if difficult ethical and conceptual questions facing climate change (such as
the so-called non-identity problem along with the notion of historic injustices) could be
answered, it would still be close to politically and socially impossible to formulate, let alone
to enforce, policies and action plans to deal effectively with climate change. This is due to
the multi-faceted nature of a problem that involves vast numbers of agents and players. At a
global level, there is first of all the practical problem of motivating shared responsibilities
(see the entry on moral motivation) in part due to the dispersed nature of greenhouse gas
emissions which makes the effects of increasing levels of atmospheric carbon and methane
not always felt most strongly in the regions where they originate. Add to this the fact that
there is an un-coordinated and also dispersed network of agentsboth individual and
corporateresponsible for greenhouse gas emissions, and that there are no effective
institutions that can control and limit them. But this tangle of issues constitutes, Gardiner
argues, only one strand in the skein of quandaries that confronts us. There is also the fact that
by and large only future generations will carry the brunt of the impacts of climate change,
explaining why current generations have no strong incentive to act. Finally, it is evident that
our current mainstream political, economic, and ethical models are not up to the task of
reaching global consensus, and in many cases not even national consensus, on how best to
design and implement fair climate policies.
These considerations lead Gardiner to take a pessimistic view of the prospects for progress
on climate issues. His view includes pessimism about technical solutions, such as
geoengineering as the antidote to climate problems, echoing the concerns of others that

further domination of and large scale interventions in nature may turn out to be a greater evil
than enduring a climate catastrophe (Gardiner 2011, ch 11, Jamieson 1996). A key point in
Gardiners analysis is that the problem of climate change involves a tangle of issues, the
complexity of which conspires to encourage buck-passing, weakness of will, distraction and
procrastination , mak[ing] us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption (ibid., 397; cf.
Gardiner 2011; also see the concept of wicked problem in Brennan 2004). Because of the
grave risk of serious harms to future generations, our failure to take timely mitigating actions
on climate isseus can be seen as a serious moral failing, especially in the light of our current
knowledge and understanding of the problem. Summarizing widespread frustration over the
issue, Rolston writes: All this inability to act effectively in the political arena casts a long
shadow of doubt on whether, politically or technologically, much less ethically, we humans
are anywhere near being smart enough to manage the planet (Rolston 2012, 216). In the
face of such pessimism about the prospects for securing any action to combat climate change
other writers have cautioned against giving in to defeatism and making self-fulfilling
prophecies. These latter behaviours are always a temptation when we confront worrying
truths and insufficient answers. Whatever the future holds, many thinkers now believe that
solving the problems of climate change is an essential ingredient in any credible form of
sustainable development and that the alternative to decisive action may result in the
diminution not only of nature and natural systems, but also of human dignity itself (see
Nanda 2011, especially chapters by Heyd, Balafrej, Gutrich and Brennan and Lo).
Supplementary Document:
Pathologies of Environmental Crisis: Theories and Empirical Research
Easter Circular Letter - 2012

Freedom and the Dignity of the Human Person

Writing to the United Nations in 1978, Pope John Paul II asserted, "Religious freedomis the
basis of all other freedoms and is inseparably tied to them all by reason of that very dignity
which is the human person" (Letter to Kurt Waldheim, Dec 2, 1978). That is to say, without
religious freedom, we have no freedom at all. Though prized more than almost any other
human right and gift, in what consists true freedom is often unknown or misunderstood.
Society without God: "Free to do what I want!"

Modern man considers freedom to be the

right to do whatever he wants, for he seeks
nothing other than himself as the purpose and
goal of his life. He wants to be totally
independent, to be free from any laws or
dogmas, from any "thou shalt" or "thou shalt
not!" He inevitably denies the existence of
God, who is for him a tyrant infringing upon his
"rights" and "freedoms". Ultimately, he denies
truth and any norm of life, for these would
make demands upon his life which he would
rather avoid. This is the beginning of the
"dictatorship of relativism", of which we were warned by Pope Benedict XVI shortly before his
election as Pope. This dictatorship "does not recognize anything as definitive and whose
ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires" (Homily, Mass for the election of a
Pope). Of course, to live in society one must admit the necessity of some laws to maintain
order, but a secularist society seeks to guarantee this sense of "freedom", the right to do
whatever you want, as far as possible.

Freedom and Truth

But is this freedom? Is this total independence from God and ethics and law the fount of
human happiness? Does this contribute to the dignity of man and his ultimate fulfillment?
Pope John Paul II stated, "Freedom consists not in doing what we like, but in having the right
to do what we ought." Man's right to freedom, and first of all, to freedom of religion and
conscience, is based on truth, the truth about God and the truth about man. Man was created
by God and was made for God. He is by very nature free because he is a spiritual being,
endowed by his Creator with intellect and free will. He has a spiritual, transcendent vocation
to enter into an eternal friendship with God. Created in the image and likeness of God, he
was set above the animals in that he has the capacity to freely choose to serve his Lord and
God, and enter into communion of love with Him. Hence, his freedom does not come from the
Statenor can it be taken away by the State. It comes to him as a human person created in
the image of God. As St. Augustine discovered after having abused his human freedom for
many years, man's very happiness consists in obeying God and the natural law in his heart, his
conscience. "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest
in Thee" (Confessions, I, 1). We are only truly free when we are free to make decisions that
orientate our lives towards fulfilling God's will, directing all our actions towards our true
destiny in life, eternal happiness with God.
But from the beginning man has turned away and sought independence from the law of God.
The tempter seduced him with a longing for "freedom": "No, you will not die [if you disobey
God], but you will be like God", determining for yourself what is good and evil! Relativism.
Our will has been enslaved so that it no longer can pursue the good and the true, but wants

only to seek and gratify the "self" with all the deceptive and ethereal goods of this world.
Since the first fall, all sin and disobedience and infidelity have been rooted in this lure of
"freedom", to be a god to oneself. He stole from us the freedom of the sons of God and made
us slaves, first to sin and ultimately to himself. God, on the other hand, does not seek slaves,
but sons who cling to Him freely out of love

Interior freedom and joyful obedience out of love

Some might object, if we have to obey rules or laws, even if it is God's law, we are not free.
We are slaves. But is a woman a slave of her husband for serving him and doing all sorts of
things for him, conforming herself to his will out of love, or vice versa? No, where there is
love, there is freedom, there is mutual self-giving and service. In the same way, it is our
privilege to serve God as beloved children. This great and infinite God has taken us as sons!
We want to do His will out of love and find our joy and happiness in doing His will, in giving
ourselves
to
Him
out
of
love.
We have been created by God and are ordered to God. Our happiness can therefore only be
found in walking towards God and being united with Him. The Son of God also became
"obedient, and obedient unto death, death on a Cross" out of love for the Father. Through this
same Cross, Jesus freed us from slavery to sin and self and the devil. He freed our will from
this servitude in which we find neither peace nor lasting happiness, that we might run with
joy to meet our Father. After every good, deep and sincere Confession, we feel the joy of this
renewed freedom from sin, and in our gratitude, we want nothing other than to do the will of
God, to remain one with Him. This is not subservience or slavery, but the fulfillment of our
inmost longing and of the deepest desire rooted in our very being: the desire for union with
God.

Freedom in society: Giving to God what is God's

Society is made by man and for man. It must therefore respect this truth about man, his
inalienable dignity and right to freedom of conscience, his right and duty to pursue the good,
the true and the beautiful, to serve God as he is led and enlightened by reason and grace,
both internally and externally. "The practice of religion by its very nature consists primarily of
those voluntary and free internal acts by which a human being directly sets his course towards
God. No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind. But man's
social nature itself requires that he give external expression to his internal acts of religion,
that he communicate with others in religious matters and that he profess his religion in
community" (John Paul II, Dignitatis humanae, 3)
The Church is not the enemy of the state nor opposed to secular rule. On the contrary, Jesus
said, "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's" (Mark 12:17). "We look
to the State not to impose religion but to guarantee religious freedom, and to promote
harmony among followers of different religions" (Bishop William E. Lori, National Catholic
Prayer Breakfast, April 27, 2011). The problem arises when the State tries to limit the

presence and works of the Church to the pew, to utilize "nondiscrimination" laws and codes in
such a way as to discriminate against religious organizations! They are told, in opposition to
the demands of conscience, whom they are to employ, what services they must cover in
health care, and what they must assent to unless they want to be severely penalized or
forced to close their doors.

Profane secularism: The analogy with Communism

Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, the fearless Primate of Poland under communist rule, clearly
rebuked the Soviet regime which had gone so far as to mandate even the appointment of
pastors, vicars and Bishops. In a homily at St. John's Cathedral in Krakow, he stated, "We
teach that it is proper to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the
things that are God's. But when Caesar sits himself on the altar, we respond curtly: he may
not!" (quoted by Bishop Paprocki, see below).
In the "Red Mass Dinner" on September 29, 2011 in Houston, Bishop Thomas Paprocki of
Springfield, Illinois, offered insights from his visit to Moscow as a graduate student in the
early 1980's. "For the Soviets, 'freedom of religion' more accurately meant 'freedom of
worship,' that is, people were free to pray in church, but outside of church they were not
allowed to teach the faith or engage in faith-based charitable activities." He contrasts this
model to what, up until recently, the "free exercise of religion" meant in America, as
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. "I thought of our vast network of
Catholic institutions in the United States: our schools, our colleges, universities, hospitals,
nursing homes, and social service agencies." Citing William McGurn he continues, "The radical
part of [the First Amendment protection of freedom of religion in America] was the guarantee
it gave to corporate freedoms: to hold public property together, to own newspapers, to run
schools, to open hospitals and clinics."
Though communism as an ideology has fallen, "profane secularism" has assumed these same
tenets, even here in America. People can worship God in a church, but woe to you if you bring
His Name or principles into the public square! Cardinal George wrote in a column of his
diocesan newspaper, "The purpose of communism and contemporary secularism is the same:
to create a society where God cannot appear in public, to erase any evidence of religious
belief from the public life and to prevent the Church from acting in history, confining the
Church's mission to private worship, carrier of a belief system that can have no influence on
society except on secularist terms. In this sense, secularists in this country and elsewhere are
successors of the communists of the last century." (The Catholic New World, August 28, 2011,
p. 3). (In 19th Century Portugal, a secularist government went so far as to suppress all
religious orders, including our own, the Order of Canons Regular of the Holy Cross.)

Placing our trust in the Cross of Christ

Though we feel helpless in the face of the great problems of our country and society at
large, we are not without means of effecting a change in the world about us. We can and
should, of course, take all the human means at our disposal for establishing religious
freedom, and that means first of all to vote. We are obliged as Catholics to vote pro-life, and
to vote for those who will safeguard all human rights, beginning with freedom of religion. But
even more importantly, we must look to our own lives and our own hearts. For change can
only come through conversion of heart, and each of us knows that we ourselves also need to
be continually converted.
We, too, need to let go of our own self, our own disordered desires, and turn again to God.
Conversion is within reach of all of us, and this is God's promise: "If you remove from your
midst oppression, false accusation, and malicious speech; if you bestow your bread on the
hungry and satisfy the afflicted; then light shall rise for you in the darkness Then the Lord
will guide you always and give you plenty The ancient ruins will be rebuilt for your sake, and
the foundations from ages past you shall raise up" (Isaiah 58:9-13).
In other words, the more we abandon our own interests and seek to do good to others in
concrete ways, to be kind and helpful to our immediate neighbor for the love of God, the
more God Himself will be a light for us and in us. God's Kingdom is not built through political
power, but through purifying our hearts, one by one, from all the contagion of this world, so
that He may take up His dwelling within us. Then from within, He will be a light and strength
for us, and His Spirit will guide our words and actions in the public forum that they may bear
good and lasting fruit.
In this time of grace, therefore, let us make every effort to renew our status as sons, to free
ourselves from all our attachments and sins, of everything that binds and enslaves us to self.
Though we all feel a war within ourselves, a battling of the flesh against the spirit (cf. Gal
5:17), we have nevertheless been set free by the Cross of Christ, through which we can put to
death our old self. The mysteries we commemorate each year in Holy Week by uniting
ourselves lovingly with the sufferings of our divine Savior through prayer and penance help us
to forget ourselves and enter more fully into the sacred Passion of Christ. And the more we
unite ourselves with His suffering, the more will we also be united with His Resurrection.
The entire Season of Easter is the celebration of Christ's victory, the victory of the Cross
over sin and death. Our first battle is always a battle within, a spiritual battle to let Christ
reign within me. Only in His strength and in the strength of His Cross will we be able to meet
the challenges of Christian life in today's society and bear more perfect witness to the
freedom of the sons of God, the freedom to do what is right whatever the cost. The angels
are ready to help us, if we call on them and cooperate with their inspirations, to know and
overcome our own weaknesses, and to place our trust in the grace of God with confidence in
His help. And Mary, our Mother and Mother of the Church, is ever at our side with her
consoling love to lead and guide us through the trials of this life to the full victorious joy of
Easter.

a. The value and limits of freedom

135. Man can turn to good only in freedom, which God has given to him as one of the highest signs
of his image[251]: For God has willed that man remain under the control of his own decisions' (Sir
15:14), so that he can seek his Creator spontaneously, and come freely to utter and blissful
perfection through loyalty to Him. Hence man's dignity demands that he act according to a knowing
and free choice that is personally motivated and prompted from within, neither under blind internal
impulse nor by mere external pressure[252].
Man rightly appreciates freedom and strives for it passionately: rightly does he desire and must form
and guide, by his own free initiative, his personal and social life, accepting personal responsibility for
it[253]. In fact, freedom not only allows man suitably to modify the state of things outside of himself,
but it also determines the growth of his being as a person through choices consistent with the true
good[254]. In this way man generates himself, he is father of his own being[255], he constructs the
social order[256].
136. Freedom is not contrary to man's dependence as a creature on God[257]. Revelation teaches
that the power to decide good and evil does not belong to man but to God alone (cf. Gen 2:16-17).
Man is certainly free, inasmuch as he can understand and accept God's commands. And he
possesses an extremely far-reaching freedom, since he can eat of every tree of the garden'. But his
freedom is not unlimited: it must halt before the tree of the knowledge of good and evil', for it is
called to accept the moral law given by God. In fact, human freedom finds its authentic and complete
fulfilment precisely in the acceptance of that law[258].
137. The proper exercise of personal freedom requires specific conditions of an economic, social,
juridic, political and cultural order that are too often disregarded or violated. Such situations of
blindness and injustice injure the moral life and involve the strong as well as the weak in the
temptation to sin against charity. By deviating from the moral law man violates his own freedom,
becomes imprisoned within himself, disrupts neighbourly fellowship and rebels against divine
truth[259]. Removing injustices promotes human freedom and dignity: nonetheless, the first thing to
be done is to appeal to the spiritual and moral capacities of the individual and to the permanent need
for inner conversion, if one is to achieve the economic and social changes that will truly be at the
service of man[260].

b. The bond uniting freedom with truth and the natural law
138. In the exercise of their freedom, men and women perform morally good acts that are
constructive for the person and for society when they are obedient to truth, that is, when they do not
presume to be the creators and absolute masters of truth or of ethical norms[261]. Freedom in fact
does not have its absolute and unconditional origin in itself, but in the life within which it is
situated and which represents for it, at one and the same time, both a limitation and a possibility.

Human freedom belongs to us as creatures; it is a freedom which is given as a gift, one to be

received like a seed and to be cultivated responsibly[262]. When the contrary is the case, freedom
dies, destroying man and society[263].
139. The truth concerning good and evil is recognized in a practical and concrete manner by the
judgment of conscience, which leads to the acceptance of responsibility for the good accomplished
and the evil committed. Consequently in the practical judgment of conscience, which imposes on
the person the obligation to perform a given act, the link between freedom and truth is made
manifest. Precisely for this reason conscience expresses itself in acts of judgment' which reflect the
truth about the good, and not in arbitrary decisions'. The maturity and responsibility of these
judgments and, when all is said and done, of the individual who is their subject are not measured
by the liberation of the conscience from objective truth, in favour of an alleged autonomy in personal
decisions, but, on the contrary, by an insistent search for truth and by allowing oneself to be guided
by that truth in one's actions[264].
140. The exercise of freedom implies a reference to a natural moral law, of a universal character, that
precedes and unites all rights and duties[265]. The natural law is nothing other than the light of
intellect infused within us by God. Thanks to this, we know what must be done and what must be
avoided. This light or this law has been given by God to creation[266]. It consists in the participation
in his eternal law, which is identified with God himself[267]. This law is called natural because the
reason that promulgates it is proper to human nature. It is universal, it extends to all people insofar
as it is established by reason. In its principal precepts, the divine and natural law is presented in the
Decalogue and indicates the primary and essential norms regulating moral life[268]. Its central focus
is the act of aspiring and submitting to God, the source and judge of everything that is good, and
also the act of seeing others as equal to oneself. The natural law expresses the dignity of the person
and lays the foundations of the person's fundamental duties[269].
141. In the diversity of cultures, the natural law unites peoples, enjoining common principles.
Although its application may require adaptations to the many different conditions of life according to
place, time and circumstances,[270] it remains immutable under the flux of ideas and customs and
supports their progress Even when it is rejected in its very principles, it cannot be destroyed or
removed from the heart of man. It always rises again in the life of individuals and societies[271].
Its precepts, however, are not clearly and immediately perceived by everyone. Religious and moral
truths can be known by everyone with facility, with firm certainty and without the admixture of
error[272] only with the help of Grace and Revelation. The natural law offers a foundation prepared
by God for the revealed law and Grace, in full harmony with the work of the Spirit[273].
142. The natural law, which is the law of God, cannot be annulled by human sinfulness[274]. It lays
the indispensable moral foundation for building the human community and for establishing the civil
law that draws its consequences of a concrete and contingent nature from the principles of the
natural law[275]. If the perception of the universality of the moral law is dimmed, people cannot build
a true and lasting communion with others, because when a correspondence between truth and good
is lacking, whether culpably or not, our acts damage the communion of persons, to the detriment of
each[276]. Only freedom rooted in a common nature, in fact, can make all men responsible and
enable them to justify public morality. Those who proclaim themselves to be the sole measure of
realities and of truth cannot live peacefully in society with their fellow men and cooperate with
them[277].

143. Freedom mysteriously tends to betray the openness to truth and human goodness, and too
often it prefers evil and being selfishly closed off, raising itself to the status of a divinity that creates
good and evil: Although he was made by God in a state of holiness, from the very onset of his
history man abused his liberty, at the urging of the Evil One. Man set himself against God and
sought to attain his goal apart from God Often refusing to acknowledge God as his beginning,
man has disrupted also his proper relationship to his own ultimate goal as well as his whole
relationship toward himself and others and all created things[278]. Human freedom needs therefore
to be liberated. Christ, by the power of his Paschal Mystery, frees man from his disordered love of
self[279], which is the source of his contempt for his neighbour and of those relationships marked by
domination of others. Christ shows us that freedom attains its fulfilment in the gift of self[280]. By his
sacrifice on the cross, Jesus places man once more in communion with God and his neighbour.