Angara v.

Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
Laurel, J.
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935,
the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board
of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most number
of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified.
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative?
Held:
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond
the
reach
of
the
constitutional
mechanism adopted by the people and that it is
not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and

appropriate cases. The Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.
Issue:
Has the said Electoral Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed
the
election
of
the
herein
petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
Held:
Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provides:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three
of whom shall be nominated by the party having
the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly. Under the organic law
prevailing before the present Constitution went
into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
The 1935 Constitution has transferred all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission. Such transfer of power
from the legislature to the Electoral Commission
was full, clear and complete, and carried with
it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time
and manner of filing protests.

The avowed purpose in creating the

Electoral
Commission
was
to
have
an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if
the National Assembly were to retain the power
to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
Section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members,
but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering
each house to prescribe by resolution the time
and manner of filing contests against the election
of its members, the time and manner of notifying
the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses
of contest.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of
the National Assembly. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to
said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power
to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
Based on the foregoing, the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara,
and that the resolution of the National Assembly
of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll
the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Doctrine:
The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government

has exclusive cognizance of matters within its

jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive
under our Constitution is so far made a check on
the legislative power that this assent is required
in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential
to
the
conclusion
of
treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution. (Garcia v. Macaraig)
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted
a
Resolution,
sponsored
by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed

by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.

Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political
question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment

proceedings against the same

officer within a one-year period.

impeachable

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of

the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions." From this clarification it
is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)First
Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in
the dailies of Manila that he would orderthe
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the
33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner,Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head
of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfillmentof what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
PhilippineBar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest
of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts
publicly announced having sent to the United
Statesthe designs of the postage for printing. The
said stamps were actually issued and sold though
thegreater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be
preventedby the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was
in violation of the Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence forreligion
and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith toan
active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. And, in so far as itinstills
into the minds the purest principles of morality,

its influence is deeply felt and highlyappreciated.

When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserveand
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselvesand
their posterity the blessings of independence
under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy, they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of
men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere.Act 4052 contemplates no religious
purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is thediscretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be advantageous to the Government. Of
course, the phrase advantageous to the
Government does not authorize the violation of
the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply
of publicmoney or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or church. In the case
at bar,the issuance of the postage stamps was
not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particularchurch or religious denominations. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit
of theRoman Catholic Church, nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to
thatchurch. The purpose of the issuing of the
stamps was to take advantage of an event
considered of international importance to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people and
attract moretourists to the country. Thus, instead
of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
contained a map of the Philippines, the location
of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads
Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 37, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ
of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167,
August 16, 2011
The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon
the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The
laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to
be an archipelago. RA 3046 stoodunchallenged
until 2009, when Congress amended it and
passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened
onebaseline and determined new base points of
the archipelago. Moreso, it has identified the
Kalayaan IslandGroup and the Scarborough Shoal,
as "regimes of islands", generating their own
maritime zones.The petitioners filed a case
assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their
opinion, the law has effectivelyreduced the
maritime territory of the country. With this, Article

I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated.

Thepetitioners also worried that that because of
the suggested changes in the maritime baselines
will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to
traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it
steps on the states sovereignty and national
security.Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in
no way will the amendments affect any pertinent
power of the state. Italso deferred to agree that
the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines
claims over Sabah. Lastly, they havequestioned
the normative force of the notion that all the
waters within the rectangular boundaries in the
Treatyof Paris. Now, because this treaty still has
undetermined controversies, the Congress
believes that in theperspective of international
law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor
it. Thus, this case of prayer forwrits of certiorari
and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing
the constitutionality of RA 9522.
THE COURTS RULING:
The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the
constitutionality of the law and made it clear that
it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime
zones and continental shelves in accordance to
UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the
framework of the regime of islands suggested by
the law is not incongruent with the Philippines
enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the
areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and
theScarborough. Third, the court reiterated that
the claims over Sabah remained even with the
adoption of theamendments.Further, the Court
importantly stressed that the baseline laws are
mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III toprecisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to
the international family of states and it is in no
wayaffecting or producing any effect like
enlargement or diminution of territories.With
regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522
has converted the internal waters into
archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to
be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that
the political branches of Government can pass
domestic laws that will aid in the competent
security measures and policies that willregulate
innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized
innocent passage as a right based on customary
law, italso believes that no state can validly
invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged
by modern states.In the case of archipelagic
states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the
imposition of innocent passage as aconcession in
lieu of their right to claim the entire waters
landward baseline. It also made it possible
forarchipelagic states to be recognized as a
cohesive entity under the UNCLOS II
Magallona v. Ermita (Case Digest)
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167,
August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating
the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over
their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to
be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough
Shoal as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the
law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory
under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and
sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of
islands would weaken our claim over those
territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition
or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand,
RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints
along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the
legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the
absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters
are subject to both passages does not place them
in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal
states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its
sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils. total maritime space.
Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the
UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not
exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw

to include them, well breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and
indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is
still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered
by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the
child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took
charge of Florentinos benefits for the child.
Meanwhile, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and
allow herself to be the childs trustee. Francisco
asserted the terms of the insurance policy and
contended that as a private contract its terms
and obligations must be binding only to the
parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may
interfere by virtue of parens patriae to
the terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of
the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the
case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it
should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is
assumed that the mother shows more care
towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept
that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever
a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a
minor to accord priority to his best interest. It
may happen, family relations may press their
respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent
to be preferred. it could have been different if the
conflict were between father and mother. Such is
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting
priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity
of her plea.
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon.
Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First

Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff

of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk
of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co.,
Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, respondents.

authority that makes the law on which the

right depends.
KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction
Corporation was declared final and
executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo
P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ,
the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially
on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the
banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions
of retireees, pay and allowances of
military and civillian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor
for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices and
garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution
issued by respondent Judge Villasor is
valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not
in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate
of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state and its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign
is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but
on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the

Posted on March 6, 2009 by raquel

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO,
respondents

FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a
Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo,
Japan and Manila came to the country to study in
1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian
National Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an
Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal
charge followed a buy-bust operation
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic
agents in his house where a quantity of heroin
was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by private respondent
Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be
sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity
conformably with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations

RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the
functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the

representation of the interests of the sending

state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are
vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from
civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function
is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host
country and submit reports to their own
ministries or departments in the home
government. He is not generally regarded as a
member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis
of an erroneous assumption that simply because
of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic
immunity is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity
from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be
sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longstanding rule of customary international law. If
the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could
be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is
not accorded for the benefit of an individual but
for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that
all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication is
that if the judgment against an official would
require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state. The

consent of the host state is an indispensable

requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such acts are
indication that the Philippine government has
given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during
the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Lasco vs UNRFNRE
Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations
Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration
(UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995
Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their
employment with privaterespondent, the United
Nations Revolving Fund for
NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is
a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited
Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of thePhilippineGovernment and the
United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat
Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal
dismissal and damages.Private respondent
alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed
diplomatic immunity.
Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic
immunity
Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that
petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof
the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations
states that each specialized agency shall makea
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of
(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which
thespecialized agencyisa party. Private
respondent is not engaged in a commercial
venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue
of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine
Government and theUnited Nations for mineral
exploration in DinagatIsland