Aristotle: Ethics and the Virtues

The Goal of Ethics

Aristotle applied the same patient, careful, descriptive approach to his examination
of moral philosophy in the (Nicomachean Ethics). Here he discussed
the conditions under which moral responsibility may be ascribed to individual agents,
the nature of the virtues and vices involved in moral evaluation, and the methods of
achieving happiness in human life. The central issue for Aristotle is the question of
character or personality what does it take for an individual human being to be a
good person?
Every activity has a final cause, the good at which it aims, and Aristotle argued that
since there cannot be an infinite regress of merely extrinsic goods, there must be a
highest good at which all human activity ultimately aims. (Nic. Ethics I 2) This end of
human life could be called happiness (or living well), of course, but what is it really?
Neither the ordinary notions of pleasure, wealth, and honor nor the philosophical
theory of forms provide an adequate account of this ultimate goal, since even
individuals who acquire the material goods or achieve intellectual knowledge may not
be happy.
According to Aristotle, things of any variety have a characteristic function that they
are properly used to perform. The good for human beings, then, must essentially
involve the entire proper function of human life as a whole, and this must be an
activity of the soul that expresses genuine virtue or excellence. (Nic. EthicsI 7) Thus,
human beings should aim at a life in full conformity with their rational natures; for
this, the satisfaction of desires and the acquisition of material goods are less important
than the achievement ofvirtue. A happy person will exhibit a personality appropriately
balanced between reasons and desires, withmoderation characterizing all. In this
sense, at least, "virtue is its own reward." True happiness can therefore be attained
only through the cultivation of the virtues that make a human life complete.
The Nature of Virtue
Ethics is not merely a theoretical study for Aristotle. Unlike any intellectual
capacity, virtues of character are dispositions to act in certain ways in response to
similar situations, the habits of behaving in a certain way. Thus, good conduct arises
from habits that in turn can only be acquired by repeated action and correction,
making ethics an intensely practical discipline.

Each of the virtues is a state of being that naturally seeks its mean {Gk.
[mesos]} relative to us. According to Aristotle, the virtuous habit of action is always
an intermediate state between the opposed vices of excess and deficiency: too much
and too little are always wrong; the right kind of action always lies in the mean. (Nic.
Ethics II 6) Thus, for example:
with respect to acting in the face of danger,
courage {Gk. [andreia]} is a mean between
the excess of rashness and the deficiency of cowardice;
with respect to the enjoyment of pleasures,
temperance {Gk. [sophrosn]} is a mean between
the excess of intemperance and the deficiency of insensibility;
with respect to spending money,
generosity is a mean between
the excess of wastefulness and the deficiency of stinginess;
with respect to relations with strangers,
being friendly is a mean between
the excess of being ingratiating and the deficiency of being surly; and
with respect to self-esteem,
magnanimity {Gk. &alpha [megalopsychia]} is a mean between
the excess of vanity and the deficiency of pusillanimity.
Notice that the application of this theory of virtue requires a great deal of flexibility:
friendliness is closer to its excess than to its deficiency, while few human beings are
naturally inclined to undervalue pleasure, so it is not unusual to overlook or ignore
one of the extremes in each of these instances and simply to regard the virtue as the
opposite of the other vice.
Although the analysis may be complicated or awkward in some instances, the
general plan of Aristotle's ethical doctrine is clear: avoid extremes of all sorts and seek
moderation in all things. Not bad advice, surely. Some version of this general
approach dominated Western culture for many centuries.
Voluntary Action
Because ethics is a practical rather than a theoretical science, Aristotle also gave
careful consideration to the aspects of human nature involved in acting and
accepting moral responsibility. Moral evaluation of an action presupposes the

attribution of responsibility to a human agent. But in certain circumstances, this

attribution would not be appropriate. Responsible action must be
undertaken voluntarily, on Aristotle's view, and human actions are involuntary under
two distinct conditions: (Nic. Ethics III 1)
First, actions that are produced by some external force (or, perhaps, under an
extreme duress from outside the agent) are taken involuntarily, and the agent is not
responsible for them. Thus, if someone grabs my arm and uses it to strike a third
person, I cannot reasonably be blamed (or praised) morally for what my arm has done.
Second, actions performed out of ignorance are also involuntary. Thus, if I swing
my arm for exercise and strike the third party who (unbeknownst to me) is standing
nearby, then again I cannot be held responsible for having struck that person. Notice
that the sort of ignorance Aristotle is willing to regard as exculpatory is always of lack
of awareness of relevant particulars. Striking other people while claiming to be
ignorant of the moral rule under which it is wrong to do so would not provide any
excuse on his view.
As we'll soon see, decisions to act voluntarily rely upon deliberation about the
choice among alternative actions that the individual could perform. During the
deliberative process, individual actions are evaluated in light of the good, and the best
among them is then chosen for implementation. Under these conditions, Aristotle
supposed, moral actions are within our power to perform or avoid; hence, we can
reasonably be held responsible for them and their consequences. Just as with health of
the body, virtue of the soul is a habit that can be acquired (at least in part) as the result
of our own choices.
Deliberate Choice
Although the virtues are habits of acting or dispositions to act in certain
ways, Aristotle maintained that these habits are acquired by engaging in proper
conduct on specific occasions and that doing so requires thinking about what one does
in a specific way. Neither demonstrative knowledge of the sort employed in science
nor aesthetic judgment of the sort applied in crafts are relevant to morality.
The understanding{Gk. [dinoia]} can only explore the nature of origins of
things, on Aristotle's view, and wisdom{Gk. [sopha]} can only trace the
demonstratable connections among them.
But there is a distinctive mode of thinking that does provide adequately for
morality, according to Aristotle: practical intelligence or prudence {Gk.
[phrnsis]}. This faculty alone comprehends the true character of individual and
community welfare and applies its results to the guidance of human action. Acting

rightly, then, involves coordinating our desires with correct thoughts about the correct
goals or ends.
This is the function of deliberative reasoning: to consider each of the many actions
that are within one's power to perform, considering the extent to which each of them
would contribute to the achievement of the appropriate goal or end, making a
deliberate choice to act in the way that best fits that end, and then voluntarily
engaging in the action itself. (Nic. Ethics III 3) Although virtue is different from
intelligence, then, the acquisition of virtue relies heavily upon the exercise of that
intelligence.
Weakness of the Will
But doing the right thing is not always so simple, even though few people
deliberately choose to develop vicious habits. Aristotle sharply disagreed with
Socrates's belief that knowing what is right always results in doing it. The great
enemy of moral conduct, on Aristotle's view, is precisely the failure to behave well
even on those occasions when one's deliberation has resulted in clear knowledge of
what is right.
Incontinent agents suffer from a sort of weakness of the will {Gk.
[akrsia]} that prevents them from carrying out actions in conformity with what they
have reasoned. (Nic. Ethics VII 1) This may appear to be a simple failure of
intelligence, Aristotle acknowledged, since the akratic individual seems not to draw
the appropriate connection between the general moral rule and the particular case to
which it applies. Somehow, the overwhelming prospect of some great pleasure seems
to obscure one's perception of what is truly good. But this difficulty, Aristotle held,
need not be fatal to the achievement of virtue.
Although incontinence is not heroically moral, neither is it truly vicious. Consider
the difference between an incontinent person, who knows what is right and aims for it
but is sometimes overcome by pleasure, and an intemperate person, who purposefully
seeks excessive pleasure. Aristotle argued that the vice of intemperance is incurable
because it destroys the principle of the related virtue, while incontinence is curable
because respect for virtue remains. (Nic. Ethics VII 8) A clumsy archer may get better
with practice, while a skilled archer who chooses not to aim for the target will not.
Friendship
In a particularly influential section of the Ethics, Aristotle considered the role of
human relationships in general and friendship {Gk. [philia]} in particular as a
vital element in the good life.

For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other
goods.
Differentiating between the aims or goals of each, he distinguished three kinds of
friendships that we commonly form. (Nic. Ethics VIII 3)
A friendship for pleasure comes into being when two people discover that they
have common interest in an activity which they can pursue together. Their reciprocal
participation in that activity results in greater pleasure for each than either could
achieve by acting alone. Thus, for example, two people who enjoy playing tennis
might derive pleasure from playing each other. Such a relationship lasts only so long
as the pleasure continues.
A friendship grounded on utility, on the other hand, comes into being when two
people can benefit in some way by engaging in coordinated activity. In this case, the
focus is on what use the two can derive from each other, rather than on any enjoyment
they might have. Thus, for example, one person might teach another to play tennis for
a fee: the one benefits by learning and the other benefits financially; their relationship
is based solely on the mutual utility. A relationship of this sort lasts only so long as its
utility.
A friendship for the good, however, comes into being when two people engage in
common activities solely for the sake of developing the overall goodness of the other.
Here, neither pleasure nor utility are relevant, but the good is. (Nic. Ethics VIII 4)
Thus, for example, two people with heart disease might play tennis with each other for
the sake of the exercise that contributes to the overall health of both. Since the good is
never wholly realized, a friendship of this sort should, in principle, last forever.
Rather conservatively representing his own culture, Aristotle expressed some rather
peculiar notions about the likelihood of forming friendships of these distinct varieties
among people of different ages and genders. But the general description has some
value nevertheless, especially in its focus on reciprocity. Mixed friendshipsthose in
which one party is seeking one payoff while the other seeks a different oneare
inherently unstable and prone to dissatisfaction.
Achieving Happiness
Aristotle rounded off his discussion of ethical living with a more detailed
description of the achievement of true happiness. Pleasure is not a good in itself, he
argued, since it is by its nature incomplete. But worthwhile activities are often
associated with their own distinctive pleasures. Hence, we are rightly guided in life by
our natural preference for engaging in pleasant activities rather than in unpleasant
ones.

Genuine happiness lies in action that leads to virtue, since this alone provides true
value and not just amusement. Thus, Aristotle held that contemplation is the highest
form of moral activity because it is continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and complete.
(Nic. Ethics X 8) In intellectual activity, human beings most nearly approach divine
blessedness, while realizing all of the genuine human virtues as well.

Aristotle accepts from the view of "the many" that the ultimate end
of human life is happiness ( = well-being of the soul chapt. 7). The
corresponding adjective of originally meant "watched over by a
good genius or spirit," but its general usage is a good fortune with a
special reference to material prosperity. Therefore, the English
translation "happiness" which means a state of feeling, "differing
from pleasure only by its suggestion of permanence, depth, and
serenity," according to David Ross.

Just as today, the notion of happiness as the ultimate end of our life
varies depending upon people's opinions. Aristotle examines and
proceeds from the notion of happiness with more generality and
more popularity to the highest and most uniquely human intrinsic
happiness. Some say that it is pleasure. Others will identify it
with wealth. Others, honor. We even may change our opinion at a
different time of our life. Some ill people may say that it is health.
Pleasure is rather the end for slaves than freemen, while honor
cannot be the end f life, for it depends on the giver and is not really
our own decision. Honor seems to e aimed at assuring us of our
virtue; so maybe moral virtue is the end of life. But Aristotle denies
it by saying that moral virtue may be in inactivity and misery.
Aristotle insists that is a kind of activity, which in itself is not a
pleasure, although it naturally accompanies "pleasures," and further
excludes misery.
If happiness is an activity peculiar to the human, it is neither the
activity of growth or reproduction, nor of sensation, since these are
shared by other beings below the human.

Every human action aims at some good, and the good which is chosen for its own sake
rather than as means to an end is the highest good. Ethics is a part of politics, which is the
most authoritative and architectonic science. An inquiry into ethics should not be expected
to have the same sort of precision as a mathematical inquiry, because the nature of the
subject-matter is different. A proper student of ethics must already have substantial life
experience and training in virtue; otherwise he will not profit from the subject because he is
more inclined to listen to his passions than to reason.
Section 2:
The highest good is happiness, which means living well. There is a dispute as to what
constitutes happinesswhether it is pleasure, honor, health, wealth, knowledge or
something else. If a student's ethical habits are not good, he will be hindered from
accepting ethical knowledge.
Section 3:
Some think that happiness is to be found in pleasure, others that it is to be found in honor,
and others that it is to be found in contemplation. Happiness is not found in living for
pleasure because such a life is slavish. Nor is it found in seeking honor because honor
depends not on the person but on what others think of him. The contemplative life will be
examined later.
Section 4:
The Good cannot is not a universal Idea, as the Platonists claim, because this universal Idea
does not encompass the range of things are considered good and had no practical
ramifications.
Section 5:
Each actions aims at some end specific to it. Some ends are for the sake of other things, but
the highest good must be complete, an end in itself. The highest good should also be selfsufficient. Happiness fits these criteria.
Section 6:
To decide what happiness is, it is necessary to determine what the function of man is,
because excellence consists in performing one's function well. Man's function is that which
sets him apart from all other beings, an action which only human beings can perform. Thus
the function of man is activity of the soul according to reason. Acting according to reason
means acting virtuously. Therefore to good for man is activity of the soul "according to the
best and most complete virtue."
Section 7:
Happiness is the first from principle from which our inquiry will advance. Precision in its
definition should be sought in accordance with the nature of the concept.

Section 8:
There are three types of goods: external, those of the soul and those of the body. Those of
the soul are most important, and a person's actions fall into this category.
Section 9:
Our definition of happiness includes all the other things that people commonly think of as
the goodvirtue, prudence, wisdom, pleasure, etc. Noble actions are inherently pleasant to
a virtuous man. The good, the noble and the pleasant are all interconnected, because they
all go along with the best activities, the best of which is happiness. Happiness also requires
a minimal amount of external goods.
Section 10:
The end of politics is the highest good, and consequently politics must try to cultivate
dispositions to noble actions in citizens. Strictly speaking, only human beings with full use of
reason (not animals or even small children) can be considered happy because happiness is
action in accordance with reason.
Section 11:
Happiness consists in a complete life lived according to virtue. It is difficult to say whether
the happiness of a person after death should depend on the fortunes of his descendants.
Another difficulty is that a noble person may suffer external misfortunes which lessen his
happiness. However, a virtuous person will endure misfortunes much better than an ignoble
one. Therefore regardless of external circumstances no happy person will ever wretched,
because to be wretched one must do something hateful or bad.
Section 12:
Happiness is the principle of actions and the cause of all good things. It is thus worthy of
honor.
Section 13:
Because happiness is an activity of the soul according to virtue, it is necessary to examine
human virtue. Something is considered to have reason in two senses: that which has reason
in itself and that which listens to reason. These two senses are the origin of the distinction
between intellectual and ethical virtues, respectively.

Second, mans happiness does not consist of wealth, honor, fame, glory, power, the goods of the
body, or pleasure. In fact, mans happiness cannot consist in any created good at all, since the
ultimate object of mans will, the universal good, cannot be found in any creature but rather only in
God, who is the source of all good.

Every human activity aims at some end that we consider good. The highest ends are ends in
themselves, while subordinate ends may only be means to higher ends. Those highest ends, which
we pursue for their own sake, must be the supreme Good.
The study of the Good is part of political science, because politics concerns itself with securing the
highest ends for human life. Politics is not a precise science, since what is best for one person may
not be best for another. Consequently, we can aim at only a rough outline of the Good.
Everyone agrees that the supreme Good is happiness, but people disagree over what constitutes
happiness. Common people equate happiness with sensual pleasure: this may be sufficient for
animals, but human life has higher ends. Others say that receiving honors is the greatest good, but
honors are conferred as recognition of goodness, so there must be a greater good that these honors
reward. Platos Theory of Forms suggests that there is a single Form of Good and that all good
things are good in the same way. This theory seems flawed when we consider the diversity of things
we call good and the diversity of ways in which we consider goodness. Even if there were a single
unifying Form of Good, our interest is in the practical question of how to be good, so we should
concern ourselves not with this abstract concept but with the practical ends we can actually pursue
in everyday life.
Happiness is the highest good because we choose happiness as an end sufficient in itself. Even
intelligence and virtue are not good only in themselves, but good also because they make us happy.
We call people good if they perform their function well. For instance, a person who plays the flute
well is a good flutist. Playing the flute is the flutists function because that is his or her distinctive
activity. The distinctive activity of humans generallywhat distinguishes us from plants and animals
is our rationality. Therefore, the supreme Good should be an activity of the rational soul in
accordance with virtue. This definition aligns with popular views of happiness, which see the happy
person as virtuous, rational, and active.
When talking about happiness, we consider a persons life as a whole, not just brief moments of it.
This raises the paradoxical suggestion that a person can be considered happy only after death, that
is, once we can examine the persons life as a whole. However, a good person will always behave in
a virtuous manner. Even faced with great misfortune, a good person will bear himself or herself well
and will not descend into mean-spiritedness. Once a person has died, according to Aristotle,
posthumous honors or dishonors and the behavior of his descendants might affect his happiness
somewhat, but to no great extent.

We can divide the soul into an irrational and a rational part. The irrational soul has two aspects: the
vegetative aspect, which deals with nutrition and growth and has little connection to virtue; and the
appetitive aspect, which governs our impulses. The rational part of the soul controls these impulses,
so a virtuous person with greater rationality is better able to control his or her impulses.

Book I
Chapter 1: Aristotle begins with a hypothesis, one which he will proceed to test.
That hypothesis
is: The Good is that at which all things (including people) aim (or what they all
seek). The
first step in testing the hypothesis, of course, is to get straight about what it is for
people to
aim at or seek something. What is it for something to be an `end' of action?
Chapter 2: If there is some end that we seek for its own sake and not as a means to
some other
end, then clearly that end must be (what we take to be) the highest good. There
surely must
be such a good -- otherwise we would be seeking each thing for the sake of some
other never
seeking anything for itself and thus never being able to get what we ultimately
seek.
Chapter 3: The study of politics and so the study of the highest good for man, is not
an exact
science. "It is the mark of the educated man and a proof of his culture that in every
subject
he looks for only so much precision as its nature permits." (But this is really a
digression.)
Chapter 4: What, then, is the highest good? For want of a better name, let us call it
"Happiness"
-- keeping in mind that people are agreed in their accepting the word but not in the
meaning
they give to it.

Chapter 4: Methodology. To find the highest good, we must begin with the evidence
we have
and move from that to first principles, not the other way around.
Chapter 5: By looking at the lives people actually lead we can discover a clue as to
what they
take to be good. Some seek pleasure -- their vulgarity comes out in their preference
for the
life of a satisfied pig; some seek honor -- yet honor depends more on others than on
he that
has it, and anyway, intelligent people seek honor only as confirmation of their
goodness, i.e.,
as confirmation of their virtue; hence some seek virtue -- yet even virtue cannot be
the
highest good since it may be had by those who are clearly not happy (despite what
Socrates
says); as for money, people clearly seek it--but only as a means to getting other
things they
want (unless they are as confused as Midas).
Chapter 6: Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of Forms.
Chapter 7: Aristotle returns to the question: what is the Highest Good? Whatever it
is, (1) it
must be chosen (always) for its own sake and (never) as a means to something else,
and (2) it
must be such that when completely had by a person, that person is lacking in
nothing that is
worth having. Happiness meets both of these constraints.

Book 1
Aristotles method is to begin with a generalization which he holds to be true, although
at this stage he is only presenting it as a proposition. Then, once we have accepted it,
he will go on to develop a more detailed and exact account. The proposition he presents
is, The good is that at which all things aim; a proposition that is fundamental to his

philosophy. But to understand its full implications we must be clear whats meant by
aim or in ethics the more technical term end.
Every rational activity aims at something it regards as good, therefore, good is all
those things that our activities aim at. But as moral agents, if there is not to be an infinite
regress, there must be an ultimate end which we seek for its own sake that justifies us
seeking all the other things. Ethics is a branch of politics in that both aim at that which is
good for man. And even if the good of the community is equivalent to what is good for
the individual, the good of the community is clearly a greater and more perfect good.
What is good for the nation or community is higher than the individual.
The end of political science is happiness. We all choose different ends and some of
these are ends to other things. But because of this these cannot be ends in the full
sense of the word, whereas good, the supreme good, is surely such an end. In other
words, it is the end beyond which there are no further ends: it is completely satisfying;
pursued for its own sake. So, what is it that is the good for man? Happiness! More than
anything else it is chosen for its own sake, never for the sake of something else.
Happiness is everything it needs to be and has everything it needs to have.
When we consider the function of man we find happiness is the virtuous activity of the
soul (the psyche for the Greeks this was the part of us with which we think and feel.
More particularly it is that rational part of man not shared by other animals or plants).
Mans function lies in possessing and exercising the power of reason: exercising the
souls faculties in accordance with a rational principle. The function of a good person is
to perform these activities well and rightly. Like everything else in the world, man has a
function and when that function is performed to its proper excellence he is happy. This
excellence is virtue: the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
Virtuous activities constitute happiness for man.
But happiness is more than momentary pleasure. It is the end of life. There is a
distinction between things that are praised and things beyond praise, that are above it.
The end of life must be something that is beyond praise and such is happiness. It is the
first principle for the sake of which we do what we do. But if happiness is the activity of
soul in conformity with perfect virtue or goodness, we must know what we mean by
virtue.