Due Process

Joseph Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560 (Nov. 19, 2001)
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest ranking official was
prosecuted under Plunder Law (R.A. 7080 as amended by R.A. 7659). He assails that
Plunder Law was unconstitutional for being vague.
The petitioner
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague and
overbroad and denies him the fundamental right to due process?

2. Whether or not Plunder Law violates the rights of the accused to due process
because it requires less evidence?
3. Whether or not Plunder Law is Malum Prohibitum and is within the powers of
congress to classify it?
RULING:
1. No. During the deliberations of the Court on the allegations that Plunder Law
is vague and overbroad, it was observed that it does not justify a facial
review of its validity.
The void for vagueness doctrine states that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of common intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute. The overbreadth doctrine on the other hand, given a
controversy, it permits a litigant to challenge a statute on the ground that it
violates free speech rights.
This rationale, does not apply to penal statutes. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The vagueness
and overbreadth doctrine have special application only to free speech
cases.
In Broadrick vs. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which seek to regulate only spoken
words. As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference
to every other part. The petitioner cannot feign or assume ignorance of what
the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its
passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated

upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he

even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
2. No. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, s in all other crimes, the accused
always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by
Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.
3. No. Plunder is a Malum In Se which requires proof of criminal intent. The
application of mitigating circumstances in the RPC to prosecutions under the
Anti Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea (general intent to
break the law) is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Any doubt as to whether the crime plunder is a malum in se must be deemed
to have been resolved in the affirmative decision of the Congresss in 1993 to
include it among heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The legislative declaration in R.A. 7659 (AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH
PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is in malum in se. For when acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law.