Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 12, 1952
G.R. No. L-4164
In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Meliton G.
Soliman for appellant.
Amado B. Parreo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This was a petition of habeas corpus filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental by Antonio Infante, and the petition having been granted, the Provincial
Fiscal has appealed to this Court.
It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to 17 years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal, which he recommended to serve on
June 21, 1927, and that on March 6, 1939, after serving 15 years, 7 months and 11
days he was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment, the
condition being that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines".
On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty by the Municipal Court of Bacolod City
of driving a jeep without license and sentence to pay a fine of P10 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority

conferred upon His Excellency, the President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code", the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of
the condition of the aforesaid pardon.
It was the main contention of the petitioner that section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code upon which he was ordered re-incarcerated, had been
abrogated, and he was sustained by the court below.
Since this appeal was taken, this Court has handed down a decision (Sales vs.
Director of Prisons[[*]] 48 Off. Gaz., 560) in which these ruling were laid down:
The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains a
repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other acts sections
102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not repeal section
64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, in its section 9 expressly
preserves the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the President to
authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who violates the condition or
conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the enactment of article 159 of theRevised
Penal Code. In this connection, we observed that section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration
of 3?3 Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under which a violator of a conditional pardon was
liable to suffer and to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence.
We are of the opinion that article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the
President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the
recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the proceeding under
one provision does not necessarily preclude action under the other. . .
The second ground of the petition was that the remitted penalty for which the
petitioner had been recommitted to jail