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JO SEPH R. LU JA N ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M IKE JOHANNS, * Secretary, United
States Department of Agriculture,
No. 05-2239
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1163 JP/RH S)
(D . N.M .)
Defendant-Appellee.
On January 21, 2005, M ike Johanns became the Secretary of the United
States Department of Agriculture. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, M r. Johanns is substituted for
Ann Veneman as the defendant in this action.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiffs complaint also alleged a claim for racial discrimination, but that
claim was voluntarily dismissed because it has been subsumed into a class action
suit.
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W e review the district courts grant of summary judgment de novo, and affirm
only if the record, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. Denver Pub. Sch., 427 F.3d
1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 2005); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
II.
To constitute an adverse employment action, the employers conduct must
be materially adverse to an employees job status. Wells v. Colo. Dept of
Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). W e decide
whether an employment action is considered adverse on a case-by-case basis.
Stover v. M artinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2004). A lthough we will
liberally construe the phrase adverse employment action, . . . the action must
amount to a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or . . . causing a significant change in benefits. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); see also Annett v. Univ. of Kan.,
371 F.3d 1233, 1237-39 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Ellerth). M ere
inconveniences or alterations of job responsibilities do not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action. Id.
Applying this standard, the district court ruled that the restrictive leave
policy, the PIP and the letters of warning did not constitute adverse employment
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Plaintiff does not raise any issue on appeal with respect to this ruling and,
indeed, he made clear in his response to the motion for summary judgment that he
is not asserting that these actions, individually, constitute adverse employment
actions or that they individually form the basis of his retaliation claim, but rather
that they constitute evidence of retaliatory hostile work environment. Aplt. App.
at 83, 92, 97-98.
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employment actions). Indeed, he continued to work for the USFS and was
assigned to the ranger district he requested.
In short, the evidence presented by plaintiff portrays . . . simply a w ork
environment that exhibits the monitoring and job stress typical of life in the real
world, . . . not a hostile or abusive work environment. Trujillo, 157 F.3d
at 1214.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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