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877 F.2d 947
Calvin Lewis OWENS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.FULTON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
 No. 88-8512.
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
 July 20, 1989.
Robert W. Caplan, Avondale, Ga., Ralph Goldberg, Atlanta, Ga., for  plaintiff-appellant.Susan B. Forsling, Fulton County Office of Staff Counsel, Atlanta, Ga.,for defendant-appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON,Senior Circuit Judge.PER CURIAM:1Carlos Lowery Young, Jr. was robbed and killed on February 18, 1984. The plaintiff-appellant, Calvin Lewis Owens, Jr. was mistakenly identified as one of Young's black assailants and indicted by the Fulton County Grand Jury oncharges of murder and armed robbery. In October, 1984, Owens was convictedin Fulton County Superior Court of felony murder and sentenced to lifeimprisonment. Soon after he and his alleged accomplice were sentenced,however, the Atlanta police received a tip that a black woman had beenoverheard in a bar bragging about having murdered a white man in midtownAtlanta. The police reopened their investigation and subsequently arrestedTonya Wilkes and two other females in connection with the crime for whichOwens had been convicted. Wilkes later gave a full confession and in January,1985, pleaded guilty to felony murder. Owens, meanwhile, was released fromincarceration on a signature bond. In February, 1985, the Fulton County
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the UnitedStates or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....Superior Court granted Owens' unopposed motion for a new trial. A monthlater, the appellant moved for an acquittal and dismissal of the indictment or alternatively for an order requiring the State to enter a nolle prosequi in thecase. The district attorney for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Lewis Slaton,opposed the motion and sought by separate motion to place the case on thecourt's "dead docket."
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 In June, 1985 the court denied both parties' motions andreturned the case to the active docket.2Owens moved again for an acquittal in August, 1985, arguing that his right to aspeedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and the Georgia Speedy Trial Act had been violated, and the district attorney once more attempted to transfer the caseto the dead docket. On August 23, 1985 the Superior Court judge entered anorder granting the appellant's motion for acquittal under the Speedy Trial Act.3Owens now seeks to hold the defendant-appellee, Fulton County, liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The gravamen of his complaint is that the county, throughthe actions of the district attorney, violated his Sixth Amendment right to aspeedy trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of libertywithout due process. The United States District Court for the Northern Districtof Georgia granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment anddismissed the complaint in June 1988 on the grounds that the district attorneywas a state rather than a county official and therefore the county could not besubject to a Sec. 1983 action. Owens v. Fulton County, 690 F.Supp. 1024(N.D.Ga.1988). We affirm.442 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides in pertinent part:56In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 635 (1978), the United StatesSupreme Court established that municipalities and other local bodies could betreated as "persons" for purposes of a Sec. 1983 action who could be sueddirectly for constitutional violations caused by "a policy statement, ordinance,regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body'sofficials." Monell, however, rejected liability based on a respondeat superior theory, instead limiting recovery to instances in which "execution of a
 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by thosewhose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts theinjury." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638. Owens does notcontend that Slaton acted directly according to county prosecutorial policydealing with the dead-docketing of cases, refusal to enter a nolle prosequi in acase, or allowing expiration of a speedy trial demand. Instead, he alleges thatthe district attorney's actions constitute edicts or acts which may fairly be saidto represent official Fulton County policy. Thus, the determinative issue iswhether Slaton, in making prosecutorial decisions concerning the chargesagainst Owens, was acting as a final policymaker for the county, in which caseSec. 1983 liability would attach, or for the state, which would preclude thisaction.
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7Municipal liability under Sec. 1983 is incurred only where "a deliberate choiceto follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by theofficial or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to thesubject matter in question." Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 465 (1986). Consequently, only thoseofficials having "final policymaking authority" may be sued under the statute.City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, ----, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99L.Ed.2d 107, 118 (1988). The district court assumed arguendo that the districtattorney was a final decisionmaker for purposes of Sec. 1983, but correctlynoted that the threshold determination in this case was whether Slatonenunciated policy on behalf of the county or the state. 690 F.Supp. at 1026,1028.8Pembaur and Praprotnik both make clear that whether a particular official hasfinal policymaking authority for Sec. 1983 purposes is a matter of state law.Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 924; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300.Implicit in these decisions is the corollary proposition that whether an officialacts on behalf of the county or the state is similarly a question of state law.
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently followed such anapproach. See, e.g., Lucas v. O'Loughlin, 831 F.2d 232 (11th Cir.1987)(deciding whether, under Florida law, sheriff acted for the county), cert. deniedsub nom., St. Johns County, Florida v. Lucas, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1595, 99L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.1980)(evaluation of Texas law to determine whether judge's issuance of statutorydisclosure demands represented official county policy).
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 Furthermore, we rejectthe appellant's argument that this issue requires a jury determination. ThePraprotnik Court noted that "the identification of policymaking officials ... isnot a question of fact in the usual sense" and thus not a suitable matter for the jury to decide. 485 U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 924-25, 99 L.Ed.2d at 118-19.

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