LABOR STANDARDS MIDTERM REVIEWER

Atty. Hilario Magsino

1. People v. Julio Pomar

In section 13 it will be seen that no person, firm, or corporation owning or
managing a factory, shop, or place of labor of any description, can make a
contract with a woman, without incurring the obligation, whatever the
contract of employment might be, unless also promise to pay to such woman
employed as a laborer, who may become pregnant, he wages for thirty days
before and thirty days after confinement. In other words, said section creates
a term or condition in every contract made by every person, firm, or
corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment,
become pregnant, and a failure to include in said contract the terms fixed by
the law, makes the employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and
imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of
employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The
law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties.
Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The
constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty
and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and
the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
2. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the establishment of minimum
wages for women was constitutionally legitimate. The Court noted that the
Constitution did not speak of the freedom of contract and that liberty was
subject to the restraints of due process. The Court also noted that employers
and employees were not equally "free" in negotiating contracts, since
employees often were constrained by practical and economic realities. This
was found to be especially true in the case of women.
3. ACCFA v. CUGCO

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this

traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not
to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their
well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.
4. Bengzon v. Drilon
Retired Justices have vested right to the accrued pensions due to them
pursuant to RA 1791. Compliance with the statutory prerequisite for
retirement grants vested right to retire and draw salary, and may not,
thereafter, be revoked or impaired.
"Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value
and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in
his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should
be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was
rewarded for it."
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to
be effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to
the payment of their pensions.
5. Calalang v. Williams
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively

secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the

promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex.

6. Globe-Mackay Cable v. NLRC

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in
our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an
employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in
the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized
dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand,
the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
should find application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor,
the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered
down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection."
7. Brew Master v. NAFLU
While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation
must be fair, just and reasonable. It must be underscored that no less than
our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his
rights not only under a general statement of a state policy, but under the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a
higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between capital
and labor are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest
and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.

8. Fuente v. NLRC
There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent
losses. However, these losses must be serious, actual and real. Otherwise,
this ground for termination of employment would be susceptible to abuse by
scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses in their business
ventures in order to ease out employees.
We agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that the termination of the
services of petitioners was illegal as there was no valid retrenchment. This
Court firmly holds that measures should be strictly implemented to ensure
that such constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not rendered
meaningless by an erroneous interpretation of applicable laws.

9. Jamer v. NLRC
The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of
petitioners in disregard of the right of private respondents. Social justice
ceases to be an effective instrument for the "equalization of the social and
economic forces" by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing. While it
is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the
disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it affects
one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the
benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain
the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to
the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of
justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic
inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale
of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be
cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of
management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an
injustice to the employer, Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be denied
to none).
10. Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC
The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an
apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder. However, the apprenticeship
Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of
approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship

agreement was enforced the day it was signed. The act of filing the proposed
apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towardsits final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship. Nitto Enterprises did not comply
with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship
agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has
no force and effect; and Capili is considered to be a regular employee of the
company.
11. LVN v. Philippine Musicians Guild
Under the control test an employer-employee relationship exists where the
person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not
only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in
reaching the end. The work of the musical director and musicians is a
functional and integral part of the enterprise performed at the same studio
substantially under the direction and control of the company.
The right of control of the film company over the musicians is shown (1) by
calling the musicians through 'call slips' in 'the name of the company; (2) by
arranging schedules in its studio for recording sessions; (3) by furnishing
transportation and meals to musicians; and (4) by supervising and directing
in detail, through the motion picture director, the performance of the
musicians before the camera, in order to suit the music they are playing to
the picture which is being flashed on the screen.
12. Rosario Brothers v. Ople
An independent contractor is the one who exercises independent
employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own
methods without being subjected to control of his employer except as to the
result of his work. In the case at bar, the selection and hiring of respondents
was done by petitioner through the master cutter. Respondents received
their weekly wages from petitioner on piece-work basis within the meaning
of the term wage under the Labor Code. Petitioner also had the power to
dismiss respondents, thus, the latters conduct was controlled by petitioner.
13. Manila Golf v. NLRC
In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of
their conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within

the premises and grounds of whatever club they do their work in without
having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to
stay away for as long they like, without violating any right to work on their
part. A caddy is not required to exercise his occupation in the premises of
petitioner. He may work with any other golf club or he may seek employment
a caddy or otherwise with any entity or individual without restriction by
petitioner. There is no Em-Er relationship.
14. La Suerte v. Director of BLR
Dealership agreement at bar established an independent contractual
relationship not employment. Considering the terms and stipulations of the
dealership contracts which are clear and leave no doubt upon the intentions
of the parties,pursuant to the rule in interpretation of contracts, the literal
meaning of the stipulations shall control. The employees were free to enter
into the new status, to sign or not to sign the new agreement. 14 local union
members voluntarily executed the formal dealership agreements which
indicate the distribution and sale of La Suerte cigarettes and signifying that
they were acting as independent businessmen. In the dealership
agreements, the dealer purchases and sells the cigarettes manufactured by
the company under and for his own account.
15. Tabas vs. CMC
The record show that petitioners had been given an initial six month contract
renewed for another six months. Accordingly, under 281 of the code, they
had become regular employees of California and had acquired a secure
tenure. Hence they cannot be separated without due process of law. Hence
the court orders the reinstatement of the promodizer with full status of a
regular employees. And had Livi and California jointly and severally liable for
backwages etc.

16. Insular Life v. NLRC

Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for
in the Insurance Code. These rules merely serve as guidelines towards the
achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means or
methods to be employed in attaining it. Its aim is only to promote the result,
thereby creating no employer-employee relationship. It is usual and expected
for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its
commission agents in selling its policies which prescribe the qualifications of

persons who may be insured. None of these really invades the agents
contractual prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell insurance
at his own time and convenience, hence cannot justifiable be said to
establish an employer-employee relationship between Basiao and the
company. The respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiaos
contract with the company bound him to observe and conform to such rules.
No showing that such rules were in fact promulgated which effectively
controlled or restricted his choice of methods of selling insurance. Therefore,
Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an
independent contract whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been
litigated in an ordinary civil action.
17. Sonza v. ABS-CBN
There was no employer-employee relationship that existed, but that of an
independent contractor. ABS-CBN engaged Sonzas services specifically to
co-host the "Mel & Jay" programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to
Sonza. To perform his work, Sonza only needed his skills and talent. How
Sonza delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were
outside ABS-CBNs control. Sonza did not have to render eight hours of work
per day. The Agreement required Sonza to attend only rehearsals and tapings
of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN
could not dictate the contents of Sonzas script. However, the Agreement
prohibited Sonza from criticizing in his shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The
clear implication is that Sonza had a free hand on what to say or discuss in
his shows provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests.

18. Broterhood Labor Movement v. Zamora

In the case, the records fail to show that San Miguel entered into mere oral
agreements of employment with the workers. Considering the length of time
that the petitioners have worked with the company, there is justification to
conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary in the usual
business or trade. Despite past shutdowns of the glass plant, the workers
promptly returned to their jobs. The term of the petitioners employment
appears indefinite and the continuity and habituality of the petitioners work
bolsters the claim of an employee status.

As for the payment of the workers wages, the contention that the
independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the
salaries the workers where entitled to have no merit. The amount paid by
San Miguel to the contracting firm is no business expense or capital outlay of
the latter. What the contractor receives is a percentage from the total
earnings of all the workers plus an additional amount from the earnings of
each individual worker.
The power of dismissal by the employer was evident when the petitioners
had already been refused entry to the premises. It is apparent that the
closure of the warehouse was a ploy to get rid of the petitioners, who were
then agitating the company for reforms and benefits.
The inter-office memoranda submitted in evidence prove the companys
control over the workers. That San Miguel has the power to recommend
penalties or dismissal is the strongest indication of the companys right of
control over the workers as direct employer.
19. CMC v. NLRC
Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by
reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective
bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the
dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter
and the NLRC but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.
20. Pepsi v. Galang
The case involving a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution file
with the RTC by the employees does not appear to have a reasonable causal
connection between the complaint and the relations of the parties as
employer and employees. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is
asserted. What the employees are alleging is that petitioners acted with bad
faith when they filed the criminal complaint with the MTC said was intended
to harass the poor employees and dismissal affirmed by prosecutor for lack
of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all respondents
have committed the crime imputed to them. This is a matter which the Labor
arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is the revised
penal code.
21. Medina v. Castro Bartolome

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair
labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts
allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case the governing
statute is the Civil code and not the labor code.
22. Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag
1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from employer-employee relations including termination disputes involving
all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC
from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her
working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and
processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the
commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered
by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. When
she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment
certificate.
2. A migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or
has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is
not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino
worker. Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and
employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is clearly an
OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for
illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where
she resides or the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her
Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice
of proper venue.
23. Urbanes v. Secretary of Labor
The present petition is dismissed and the complaint before the regional
director is also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. While
the resolution of the issue involves the application of the labor laws,
reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary
liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee
relation exist. In the case at bar, even if petitioner filed the complaint on
behalf of the security guards, the relief sought has to do with the
enforcement of the contract between him and SSS which was deemed
amended by Wage Order. The controversy subject of the case at bar is thus
civil dispute, the proper forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts.

24. Yusen Air and Sea Service Philippines v. Villamor

Petitioner does not ask any relief under the labor code of the Philippines. It
seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private
respondents breach of his contractual obligation to its prejudice and damage.
Such cause of action is within the realm of civil law. And jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so when we consider that the
stipulation refers to the post-employment relations of the parties. When, as
here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article
217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.
25. Baguio v. NLRC
Art. 106 of the Labor code speaks specifically of labor only contracting,
which is not the set-up between GMC and LUPO. The construction of an
annex building inside the company plant has no relation whatsoever with the
employers business of flour and feeds manufacturing. GMC though qualifies
as an indirect employer. It entered into a contract with an independent
contractor LUPO for the construction of an annex building, a work, a task, job
or project not directly related to GMCs business of flour and feeds
manufacturing. Being an indirect employer GMC is solidarily liable with LUPO
for an violation of the Labor code pursuant to Art. 109 . In Art. 106 1 by
operation of law, the contractor is merely considered as an agent to the
employer who is deemed responsible to the workers to the same extent as if
the latter were directly employed by him. The NLRCs submission that Art.
107 is not applicable for the coverage thereof is limited to one not an
employer, however this court, GMC is of a job contracting and while the
contractor himself is the employer, he is deemed by operation of law as
indirect employer.
In labor-only contracting there is employer-employee relationship while job
contracting has none.
26. San Miguel corporation v. MAERC
Evidence discloses that petitioner played a large and indispensable part in
the hiring of MAERCs workers, that majority had been working in SMC prior
to the contract with MAERC, that SMC assumed the responsibility of paying
overtime pay, holiday pay etc. In deciding of control, the language of the
contract is not determnative of the parties relationship; rather it is the

totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of each case. SMC

maintained a constant presence of checker in its workplace tasked to report
on the identity of the workers whose performance or quality of work was not
according to the rules and standards of SMC. Also substantial capitalizati0n
or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises
is not enough to be considered indepent contractor, several factors are
considered,such as the skill, term, supervision etc. also it cannot be ignored
that it was SMC that required MAERC to undertake the investment for a long
term business relations.
The distinction however will not discharge SMC from paying the separation
benefits , they are in solidar liable being that MAERC is a labor-only and as
such SMCs liability is that of an indirect employer.
27. DBP v. NLRC
On the contention that there was no insolvency or unwillingness on their part
to pay the guards but only requires them to submit clearance prior to
payment does not make them fall within the sphere of art. 106 does not hold
water. Nothing in the said article indicates that the insolvency or
unwillingness is a prerequisite for the solidary liability of the indirect
employer. In fact the rule is, in job contracting, the principal is jointly and
severally liable with the contractor.
28. Neri v. NLRC and FEBTC
Based on Art. 106 of LC BCC cannot be considered a labor only contractor
because it has substantial capital. While there maybe no evidence that it has
investment in the form of tools and equipments etc it is enough that it had
substantial capital. In other words the law does not require both substantial
capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment machineries etc. this
is clear from the use of the concjuntion or. Moreso, there was also no
control. The guidelines for wearing uniform among others only were laid
down to ensure that the end result was achieve and did not dictate how the
radio be operated
29. Vinoya v. NLRC
PMCI is engaged in labor-only contracting. PMCI does not have substantial
capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises among others, to qualify as an independent contractor. While
it has an authorized capital stock of 1M only 75,000 is actually paid-in, which
cannot be considered as substantial capitalization. The work of the petitioner

as sales rep is directly related to the business of RFC. Petitioner due to his
length of service, already attained the status of a regular employee, he is
entitled to security of tenure. Actual reinstatement.
30. SMC Employee Union v. Bersamira
A labor dispute as defined in Art. 212 (l) of the Labor Code includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless
of whether the disputable stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
A labor dispute can nevertheless exist regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relationship relationship of employer and employee.
As defined by law the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the
fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relations
of employer and employee.
A labor dispute does exist herein is evident. As the case is indisputably
linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals.
31. PT&T v. NLRC
Labor Code provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Art. 130-138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of
night work while Art. 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with
facilities and standards which the Sec. of labor may establish to ensure their
health and safety. Art 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason
of the marriage of a female employee. While it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms and conditions that they may
deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it
may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds
would encourage illicit or common law relations and subvert the sacrament
of marriage.
32. Biboso v. Victorias Milling
The employer may terminate the employment of teachers on probationary
status after their contracts have expired. In the case at bar, petitioners were
well aware all the that their tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its
termination, both parties were free to renew it or to let it lapse. It was the

declaration of private responded that it should cease. However, this is by no

means to assert that the security of tenure protection in the constitution
does not apply to probationary employees.Petitioners did not enjoy
permanent status. However, the duration of their employment is being
respected as any circumvention of their rights during said period shall, in
accordance with statutory scheme, subject to inquiry and thereafter
correction by Department of Labor. To that extent their tenure was secured.
33. International Catholic Migration v. NLRC
The word probationary implies the purpose of the term or period but not its
length. Being in the nature of a trial period the essence of a probationary
period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought
to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period.
Art. 281 of Labor Code gives ample authority to the employer to terminate a
probationary for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. Records show that private
respondent is deficient in classroom management, teacherstudent
relationship and teaching technics and has failed to qualify as a regular
employee as per evaluation conducted by her supervisors.. Her dismissal
was not arbitrary because she was duly notified orally and in writing.
34. Ver Buiser v. GTE Directories
Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six months.
The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment
contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by
company policy or the same is required by the nature of work to be
performed by the employee. There is recognition of managerial prerogatives
in requiring a longer period of employment such as in the case at bar when
the employee must lean a particular kind of work. The six months period is
actually the period needed to determine the fitness of the job.The period, for
lack of a better measurement is deemed to be the period needed to lean the
job.
The stipulation or company policy is not contrayr to law, morals and public
policy. The 18 months probationary status of the employee is valid and legal.
And their failure to meed the assigned qouta assigned to them constitute a
just cause of their dismissal,regardless of the permanent or probationary
status of their employment.

35. Mariwasa v. Leodegario

Dequilas extention of probation was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part
of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having
initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. By voluntary agreeing to
the extension of the probation, Dequlla in effect waived any benefit attaching
to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the
period of extension.
36. Holiday Inn Manila v. NLRC
Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the
employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at
bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasans OJT. When her
services were continued in effect petitioner has recognized that she had
passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee. She was
certainly under observation during her week on the job training. If her
services proved unsatisfactory then she could have been dropped as early as
during that period, but she was not. The rules for the removal of a regular
employee was not observed in the case at bar as she was only told that her
services were terminated because they were found to be unsatisfactory. No
administrative investigation of any kind was undertaken to justify the ground
let alone a chance to be heard. The double probation system is a transparent
scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law.
37. De La Cruz v. NLRC
A probationary employee is one who for a given period of time, is under
observation and evaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for
permanent employment. There is no dispute that petitioner enjoyed only
temporary employment status. He was terminable anytime, permanent
employment not having attained in the meantime. As long as the termination
was made before the expiration of the 6 month probationary period, the
employer was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee
relationship.
38. Central Negros Electric Coop v. NLRC
Petitioners are regular employees even before 1988. Firstly, they perform
activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
petitioner as an electric cooperative. They are meter inspectors, PABX
operators,utility men, etc. Secondly they had worked for petitioner for more

than 6 months before they were given regular appointments. They had been
hired on various dates starting from 1984.
Articles 280-281 put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent
casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them
probationary appointments, ad infinitum. Thus a ceiling of 6 months is
provided. On the other hand, 280 supra, defined when an employment shall
be regular notwithstanding any written agreement to the contrary.
In the collective bargaining agreement, it only excludes three classed to
those performing managerial functions, temporary or probationary
employees, casuals and extras. Private respondents do not belong to any of
those as they had been regularized. There is no reason to deny them of the
benefits granted in the collective bargaining agreement.
39. De Leon v. NLRC
The primary standard therefore of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation t the usual business or trade of the employer. The test
is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering
the nature of the work performed and its relation t the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety.
In the case at bar, it was shown that during petitioners period of
employment the tasks assigned to him included not only painting of
company buildings but also the cleaning and oiling of machines even
operating a drilling machines and other odd jobs which lasted for more than
one year. By this fact he is a regular employee and considering that he was
rehired by the company through a labor agency to perform the same
activities that he used to do, his activities as a regular painter and
maintenance personnel still exist.
40. Kimberly Independent Union v. Drilon
While the actual regularization of these employees entails the mechanical
act of issuing regular appointment papers and compliance with such other
operating procedures as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular
employment attaches to the casual worker on the day immediately after the
end of his first year of service.

The law is explicit. As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of
service, he becomes a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed. The law does not provide the qualification that the employee
must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally declared
as such before he can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law
does not distinguish, no distinction should be drawn.
41. Ferrochrome Phils. v. NLRC
Under the law, an employment shall be deemed regular if the employee
performs activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business and
trade of the employer or if the employee has rendered at least one year of
service whether the service be continuous or broken. Applying these two
tests, we find that contrary to the suppositions of petitioner, Bartsch was a
regular employee of the latter.
The term consultant is merely more of a matter of nomenclature as he is
required under the contract to observe regular office hours . It therefore
precludes the hiring of a mere consultant who is supposed to render part
time service to the principal employer. His service was extended for an
indefinite period which lasted until his termination because they were in dire
need of his expertise. The services substantially covered a period of 1 year,
being a regular employee he is entitled to security of tenure.
42. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Drilon
The agreement confirms the status of the collecting agent in this case as an
independent contractor not only because the provisions permit him to
perform collection services for the company without being subject to the
control of the latter except only as to the result of his work. The monthly
collection quota is a normal requirement found in similar contractual
agreements and is stipulated to encourage a collecting agent to report at
least the minimum amount of proceeds. It is clear that the company and
each collecting agent intended that the former take control only over the
amount of collection which is a result of the job performed. The manner and
method of effecting collections are left solely to the discretion of the
collection agents without an interference on the part of singer. The plain
language of the agreement reveals that the designation as collection agent
does not create an employment relationship and that the applicant is an
independent contractor. The literal meaning of the stipulations in the
contract controls. No such words as to hire and employ are present.

43. Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men

The pernicious practice of having employees engaged for a fixed period of
few months short of the normal 6 month probationary period of employment
and there after to be hired on a day to day basis mocks the law. The
repeated hiring of the workers and the continuing need for their services
clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular
conduct of the business or trade of petitioner.
The applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity perform by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of
the employer. The standard, is whether the work undertaken is necessary or
desirable to the business or trade of the employer, a fact that can be
assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation
to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in the
usual course.
44. Brent School v. Zamora
The decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities
that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon
by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment
relationship, a day certain being understood to be "that which must
necessarily come, although it may not be known when." Seasonal
employment, and employment for a particular project are merely instances
of employment in which a period, where not expressly set down, is
necessarily implied.
Since the entire purpose behind of Article 280 of the Labor Code is to prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause
in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined
therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code
itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent
security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed
period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the
parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear
upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.

45. Pakistan Air Lines v. Ople

Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment
agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that
those provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of
three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively
neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6
in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period
ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a
facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to
be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause
satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying
the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6
of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of
petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to
prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents
even during the limited period of three (3) years, and thus to escape
completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.
46. Cielo v. NLRC
There is no question that the petitioner was not engaged as an apprentice,
being already an experienced truck driver when he began working for the
private respondent. Neither has it been shown that he was informed at the
time of his employment of the reasonable standards under which he could
qualify as a regular employee. It is plain that the petitioner was hired at the
outset as a regular employee. At any rate, even assuming that the original
employment was probationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner
had completed more than six month's service with the trucking company and
so had acquired the status of a regular employee at the time of his dismissal.
The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the
private respondent with the petitioner (and who knows with how many other
drivers). The agreement was a clear attempt to exploit the unwitting
employee and deprive him of the protection of the Labor Code by making it
appear that the stipulations of the parties were governed by the Civil Code
as in ordinary private transactions. They were not, to be sure. The agreement
was in reality a contract of employment into which were read the provisions
of the Labor Code and the social justice policy mandated by the Constitution.
It was a deceitful agreement cloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal

the selfish desire of the employer to reap undeserved profits at the expense
of its employees. The fact that the drivers are on the whole practically
unlettered only makes the imposition more censurable and the avarice more
execrable.

47. Philippine Village Hotel v. NLRC

It should be borne in mind that when complainants were first terminated as a
result of the company's cessation from operation in May, 1986 the employeremployee relationship between the parties herein was totally and completely
severed. Such being the case, respondent acted well within its discretion
when in rehiring the complainants (herein private respondents) it made them
casual and for a specific period. The complainants are no better than the new
employees of respondent (petitioner) for the matter of what status or
designation to be given them exclusively rests in the discretion of
management.
The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose is, in
its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any
person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have an equality
of right guaranteed by the Constitution. If the employer can compel the
employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee
can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is
oppression.
48. Violeta v. NLRC
Besides, as expounded earlier, contrary to private respondent's insistence,
the following badges of project employment are lacking in this particular
case, viz.: (1) the duration of the specific/identified undertaking for which the
worker is engaged is reasonably determinable, and (2) such duration, as well
as the specific work/ service to be performed, is defined in an employment
agreement and made clear to the employee at the time of hiring. Hence,
even assuming for the moment that DOLE Order No. 19 is effectual in the
case at bar, private respondent cannot successfully invoke the Order in its
favor because the absence of the above indicia persuades us all the more
that petitioners are really regular employees of private respondent.
49. Chua v. CA

While it may be true that private respondents were initially hired for specific
projects or undertakings, the repeated re-hiring and continuing need for their
services over a long span of time-the shortest being two years and the
longest being eight-have undeniably made them regular employees. This
Court has held that an employment ceases to be co-terminus with specific
projects when the employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of
the employer's business and re-engaged for many more projects without
interruption.
Moreover, in the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner was unable to show that private respondents were appraised of
the project nature of their employment, the specific projects themselves or
any phase thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired. He failed to show any document such as private
respondents' employment contracts and employment records that would
indicate the dates of hiring and termination in relation to the particular
construction project or phases in which they were employed.[49] Moreover, it
is peculiar that petitioner did not show proof that he submitted reports of
termination after the completion of his construction projects, considering
that he alleges that private respondents were hired and rehired for various
projects or phases of work therein.
50. Cartagenas v. Romago Electric
The fact that the complainants worked for the respondent under different
project employment contracts for so many years could not be made a basis
to consider them as regular employees for they remain project employees
regardless of the number of projects in which they have worked.
As an electrical contractor, the private respondent depends for its business
on the contracts it is able to obtain from real estate developers and builders
of buildings. Since its work depends on the availability of such contracts or
"projects," necessarily the duration of the employment of its work force is not
permanent but coterminus with the projects to which they are assigned and
from whose payrolls they are paid. It would be extremely burdensome for
their employer who, like them, depends on the availability of projects, if it
would have to carry them as permanent employees and pay them wages
even if there are no projects for them to work on. We hold, therefore, that the
NLRC did not abuse its discretion in finding, based on substantial evidence in
the records, that the petitioners are only project workers of the private
respondent.

51. Fernandez v. NLRC

Policy Instruction No. 20 reads: Members of a work pool from which a
construction company draws its project employees, if considered employees
of the construction company while in the work pool, are non-project
employees or employees for an indefinite period. If they are employed in a
particular project, the completion of the project or of any phase thereof will
not mean severance of employer-employee relationship.
Respondent Commission correctly observed in its decision that complainants,
one of whom petitioner, failed to consider the requirement in Policy
Instruction No. 20 that to qualify as member of a work pool, the worker must
still be considered an employee of the construction company while in the
work pool. In other words, there must be proof to the effect that petitioner
was under an obligation to be always available on call of private respondent
and that he was not free to offer his services to other employers.
Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to introduce any evidence of such
nature during the times when there were no project.
52. ALU-TUCP v. NLRC
The particular component projects embraced in the Five Year Expansion
Program, to which petitioners were assigned, were distinguishable from the
regular or ordinary business of NSC which, of course, is the production or
making and marketing of steel products. During the time petitioners
rendered services to NSC, their work was limited to one or another of the
specific component projects which made up the FAYEP I and II. There is
nothing in the record to show that petitioners were hired for, or in fact
assigned to, other purposes, e.g., for operating or maintaining the old, or
previously installed and commissioned, steel-making machinery and
equipment, or for selling the finished steel products.
The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had
gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their
status as project employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the
Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at
least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
53. Mercado v. NLRC
It is our well-discerned opinion that the petitioners are not regular and
permanent workers of the respondents. The very nature of the terms and

conditions of their hiring reveal that the petitioners were required to perform
phases of agricultural work for a definite period, after which their services
are available to any farm owner. We cannot share the arguments of the
petitioners that they worked continuously the whole year round for twelve
hours a day. This, we feel, is an exaggeration which does not deserve any
serious consideration inasmuch as the planting of rice and sugar cane does
not entail a whole year operation, the area in question being comparatively
small.
54. Hacienda Fatima v. NFSW-Food and General Trade
Although the employers have shown that respondents performed work that
was seasonal in nature, they failed to prove that the latter worked only for
the duration of one particular season. In fact, petitioners do not deny that
these workers have served them for several years already. Hence, they are
regular -- not seasonal -- employees.
The CA did not err when it ruled that Mercado v. NLRC was not applicable to
the case at bar. In the earlier case, the workers were required to perform
phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which their
services would be available to any other farm owner. They were not hired
regularly and repeatedly for the same phase/s of agricultural work, but on
and off for any single phase thereof. On the other hand, herein respondents,
having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several
years, are considered the latter's regular employees for their respective
tasks. Petitioners' eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were
ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were
available -- and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally
assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter.
55. PEFTOK Integrated Services v. NLRC
Pacta privata juri publico derogare non possunt. Private agreements
(between parties) cannot derogate from public right. It is decisively clear that
they (guards) affixed their signatures to subject waivers and/or quitclaims for
fear that they would not be paid their salaries on pay day or worse, still, their
services would be terminated if they did not sign those papers. In short,
there was no voluntariness in the execution of the quitclaim or waivers in
question. It should be borne in mind that in this jurisdiction, quitclaims,
waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor. "Necessitous men are not
free men." "They are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy
and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights."

56. Commando Security Agency v. NLRC

Petitioner's contention that Decierdo is estopped from complaining about the
25% deduction from his salary representing petitioner's share in procuring
job placement for him, is not well taken. That provision of the employment
contract was illegal and iniquitous, hence, null and void.
The constitutional provisions on social justice (Sections 9 and 10, Article II)
and protection to labor (Sec. 18, Article II) in the declaration of Principles and
State Policies, impose upon the courts the duty to be ever vigilant in
protecting the rights of workers who are placed in a contractually
disadvantaged position and who sign waivers or provisions contrary to law
and public policy.
It goes without saying that respondent may not deduct its so-called 'share'
from the salaries of its guards without the latter's express consent and if
such deductions are not allowed by law. This is notwithstanding any previous
agreement or understanding between them. Any such agreement or contract
is void ab initio being contrary to law and public policy.
57. San Miguel Brewery Sales v. Ople
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it
may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal. So long as a
company's management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating
or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under
valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
58. Gaa v. Court of Appeals
It is the legislatures intent to operate the exemption in Article 1708 of the
New Civil Code to those who are 2 laboring men or women in the sense that
their work is manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the
reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such persons
are more in need of the exemption than any others.
In the instant case, Gaa is definitely not within that class of laborers to
exempt her salary from execution. Gaa is not an ordinary or rank and file
laborer but "a responsibly placed employee" of El Grande Hotel.
59. ISAE v. NLRC

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the

presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption
is borne by logic and human experience. if the employer pays one employee
less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less
or why the other receives more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to
explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
60. Philex v. Philex Bulawan Suervisors Union
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. But the rule is not
absolute.
The company's prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor. A priori, they are not absolute prerogatives but
are subject to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements and the general
principles of fair play and justice.
61. Mayon Hotel v. Adana
Facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal
requirements. The employer simply cannot deduct the value from the
employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such
facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of
deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and
(c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value.
The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions
from employees' wages.
As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to
say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The
employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages
because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of
minimum wages is not dependent on the employer's ability to pay
62. Millares v. NLRC
When an employer customarily furnishes his employee board, lodging or
other facilities, the fair and reasonable value thereof, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, is included in the wage." But in

determining whether a privilege is a facility , the criterion is not so much its

kind but its purpose.
63. Songco v. NLRC
Commission is the recompense, compensation or reward of an agent,
salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the
same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on
the profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the
reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate
clearly that commissions are part of their wage or salary.
Commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to
the employee.
64. PNB v. PEMA
There is nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 that could justify that cost-ofliving allowance should be added to 4 the regular wage in computing
overtime pay. Commonwealth Act 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be
paid 'at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twentyfive per centum additional' (Secs. 4 & 5). The law did not define what is a
'regular wage or salary'. What the law emphasized by way of repeated
expression is that in addition to 'regular wage', there must be paid an
additional 25% of that 'regular wage' to constitute overtime rate of pay. The
parties were thus allowed to agree on what shall be mutually considered
regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to
make up overtime compensation.
In the instant case, the cost-of-living allowance began to be granted in 1958
and the longevity pay in 1981. They were granted by PNB upon realizing the
difficult plight of its labor force in the face of the unusual inflationary
situation in the economy of the country. They were not intended to be
regular, much less permanent additional part of the compensation of the
employees and workers.
65. Phil. Agricultural v. NLRC
It is clear from P.D. 851 and its implementing rules and regulations that every
employee receiving a 5 commission in addition to a fixed or guaranteed
wage or salary, is entitled to a 13th month pay. For purposes of entitling rank
and file employees a 13th month pay, it is immaterial whether the
employees concerned are paid a guaranteed wage plus commission or a

commission with guaranteed wage inasmuch as the bottom line is that they
receive a guaranteed wage.
In the instant case, while the bus drivers and conductors of respondent
company are considered by the latter as being compensated on a
commission basis, they are not paid purely by what they receive as
commission. The bus drivers and conductors are automatically entitled to the
basic minimum pay mandated by law in case the commissions they earned
be less than their basic minimum for eight (8) hours work. Evidently
therefore, the commissions form part of the wage or salary of the bus drivers
and conductors.
What is controlling is not the label attached to the remuneration that the
employee receives but the nature of the remuneration and the purpose for
which the 13th month pay was given to alleviate the plight of the working
masses who are receiving low wages.
66. LMG Chemicals Corporation v. Secretary
It was only the Inorganic division of the petitioner that was sustaining losses.
Such incident does not justify the withholding of any salary increase as
petitioners income from all sources are collated for the determination of its
true financial position.
Petitioners actuation is actually a discrimination against respondent Union
members/ If it could grant a wage increase to its supervisors, there is no
valid reason why it should deny the same to respondent Union members.
67. Special Steel Products, Inc. v. Villarreal
The employer cannot withhold respondents 13th month pay and other
monetary benefits.6
Indeed, petitioner has no legal authority to withhold respondents 13th
month pay and other benefits. What an employee has worked for, his
employer must pay. Thus, an employer cannot simply refuse to pay the
wages or benefits of its employee because he has either defaulted in paying
a loan guaranteed by his employer; or violated their memorandum of
agreement; or failed to render an accounting of his employers property.
68. Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana
Respondents have set out with particularity in their complaint, position
paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard benefits they are

entitled to, and which they alleged that petitioners have failed to pay them.
It was therefore petitioners' burden to prove that they have paid these
money claims. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, and
even where the employees must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that
the burden rests on the defendant to prove nonpayment, rather than on the
plaintiff to prove non payment. This petitioners failed to do.
The documents petitioners submitted, i.e., affidavits executed by some of
respondents during an ocular inspection conducted by an inspector of the
DOLE; notices of inspection result and Facility Evaluation Orders issued by
DOLE, are not sufficient to prove payment. Despite repeated orders from the
Labor Arbiter, petitioners failed to submit the pertinent employee files,
payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which would
show that respondents rendered work entitling them to payment for
overtime work, night shift differential, premium pay for work on holidays and
rest day, and payment of these as well as the COLA and the SILP
documents which are not in respondents' possession but in the custody and
absolute control of petitioners. By choosing not to fully and completely
disclose information and present the necessary documents to prove payment
of labor standard benefits due to respondents, petitioners failed to discharge
the burden of proof. Indeed, petitioners' failure to submit the necessary
documents which as employers are in their possession, in spite of orders to
do so, gives rise to the presumption that their presentation is prejudicial to
its cause.
69. DBP v. NLRC (1994)
Article 110 of the Labor Code , as amended, must be viewed and read in
conjunction with the provisions of the 7 Civil Code on concurrence and
preference of credits.
The aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code (concurrence and preference of
credits), Insolvency Law, and Art. 110 of the Labor Code, require judicial
proceedings in rem in adjudication of creditors claims against the debtors
assets to become operative.
70. DBP v. NLRC (1995)
In the present case, there is as yet no declaration of bankruptcy nor judicial
liquidation of TPWII. Hence, it would be premature to enforce the workers
preference.

The DBP anchors its claims on a mortgage credit. A mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted (Article 2176, Civil Code). It creates a real right which is
enforceable against the whole world. It is a lien on an identified immovable
property, which a preference is not. A recorded mortgage credit is a special
preferred credit under Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of
credits. The preference given by Article 110, when not falling within Article
2241 (6) and Article 2242 (3) of the Civil Code and not attached to any
specific property, is an ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to
move it from second priority in the order of preference established by Article
2244 of the Civil Code.