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Indexedas:

R.v.Oakes
HerMajestyTheQueen,appellantand
DavidEdwinOakes,respondent.
[1986]1S.C.R.103
[1986]1R.C.S.103
[1986]S.C.J.No.7
[1986]A.C.S.no7
FileNo.:17550.

SupremeCourtofCanada
1985:March12/1986:February28.
Present:DicksonC.J.andEstey,McIntyre,Chouinard,Lamer,
WilsonandLeDainJJ.
ONAPPEALFROMTHECOURTOFAPPEALFORONTARIO
ConstitutionallawCharterofRightsPresumptionofinnocence(s.11(d))ReverseonusclauseAccusedpresumedtobetraffickeronfindingofpossessionof
illicitdrugOnusonaccusedtorebutpresumptionWhetherornotreverseonusinviolationofs.11(d)oftheCharterWhetherornotreverseonusareasonable
limittos.11(d)andjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,ss.1,11(d)NarcoticControlAct,R.S.C.1970,c.N1,ss.
3(1),(2),4(1),(2),(3),8.
CriminallawPresumptionofinnocenceReverseonusAccusedpresumedtobetraffickeronfindingofpossessionofillicitdrugOnusonaccusedtorebut
presumptionWhetherornotconstitutionalguaranteeofpresumptionofinnocence(s.11(d)oftheCharter)violated.
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Respondentwaschargedwithunlawfulpossessionofanarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,contrarytos.4(2)oftheNarcoticControlAct,butwasconvictedonly
ofunlawfulpossession.Afterthetrialjudgemadeafindingthatitwasbeyondareasonabledoubtthatrespondentwasinpossessionofanarcotic,respondentbrought
amotionchallengingtheconstitutionalvalidityofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct.ThatsectionprovidesthatiftheCourtfindstheaccusedinpossessionofa
narcotic,theaccusedispresumedtobeinpossessionforthepurposeoftraffickingandthat,absenttheaccused'sestablishingthecontrary,hemustbeconvictedof
trafficking.TheOntarioCourtofAppeal,onanappealbroughtbytheCrown,foundthatthisprovisionconstituteda"reverseonus"clauseandheldittobe
unconstitutionalbecauseitviolatedthepresumptionofinnocencenowentrenchedins.11(d)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.TheCrownappealed
andaconstitutionalquestionwasstatedastowhether[page104]s.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolateds.11(d)oftheCharterandwasthereforeofnoforceand
effect.Inherentinthisquestion,givenafindingthats.11(d)oftheCharterhadbeenviolated,wastheissueofwhetherornots.8oftheNarcoticControlActwasa
reasonablelimitprescribedbylawanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyforthepurposeofs.1oftheCharter.
Held:Theappealshouldbedismissedandtheconstitutionalquestionansweredintheaffirmative.
PerDicksonC.J.andChouinard,Lamer,WilsonandLeDainJJ:Pursuanttos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,theaccused,uponafindingbeyondareasonabledoubtof
possessionofanarcotic,hasthelegalburdenofprovingonabalanceofprobabilitiesthathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.On
proofofpossession,amandatorypresumptionarisesagainsttheaccusedthatheintendedtotrafficandtheaccusedwillbefoundguiltyunlesshecanrebutthis
presumptiononabalanceofprobabilities.
Thepresumptionofinnocenceliesattheveryheartofthecriminallawandisprotectedexpresslybys.11(d)oftheCharterandinferentiallybythes.7righttolife,
libertyandsecurityoftheperson.Thispresumptionhasenjoyedlongstandingrecognitionatcommonlawandhasgainedwidespreadacceptanceasevidencedfrom
itsinclusioninmajorinternationalhumanrightsdocuments.Inlightofthesesources,therighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltyrequires,ataminimum,
that:(1)anindividualbeprovenguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt(2)theStatemustbeartheburdenofproofand(3)criminalprosecutionsmustbecarriedoutin
accordancewithlawfulproceduresandfairness.
Aprovisionwhichrequiresanaccusedtodisproveonabalanceofprobabilitiestheexistenceofapresumedfact,whichisanimportantelementoftheoffencein
question,violatesthepresumptionofinnocenceins.11(d).Thefactthatthestandardrequiredonrebuttalisonlyabalanceofprobabilitiesdoesnotrenderareverse
onusclauseconstitutional.
Section8oftheNarcoticControlActinfringesthepresumptionofinnocenceins.11(d)oftheCharterby[page105]requiringtheaccusedtoproveheisnotguiltyof
traffickingoncethebasicfactofpossessionisproven.
Therationalconnectiontestthepotentialforarationalconnectionbetweenthebasicfactandthepresumedfacttojustifyareverseonusprovisiondoesnotapply
totheinterpretationofs.11(d).Abasicfactmayrationallytendtoproveapresumedfact,butstillnotproveitsexistencebeyondareasonabledoubt,whichisan
importantaspectofthepresumptionofinnocence.Theappropriatestageforinvokingtherationalconnectiontestisunders.1oftheCharter.
Section1oftheCharterhastwofunctions:First,itguaranteestherightsandfreedomssetoutintheprovisionswhichfollowitandsecond,itstatesexplicitlythe
exclusivejustificatorycriteria(outsideofs.33oftheConstitutionalAct,1982)againstwhichlimitationsonthoserightsandfreedomsmaybemeasured.
TheonusofprovingthatalimitationonanyCharterrightisreasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyrestsuponthepartyseekingto
upholdthelimitation.Limitsonconstitutionallyguaranteedrightsareclearlyexceptionstothegeneralguarantee.ThepresumptionisthatCharterrightsare
guaranteedunlessthepartyinvokings.1canbringitselfwithintheexceptionalcriteriajustifyingtheirbeinglimited.
Thestandardofproofunders.1isapreponderanceofprobabilities.Proofbeyondareasonabledoubtwouldbeundulyonerousonthepartyseekingtolimittheright
becauseconceptssuchas"reasonableness","justifiability",and"freeanddemocraticsociety"arenotamenabletosuchastandard.Nevertheless,thepreponderanceof
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probabilitytestmustbeappliedrigorously.
Twocentralcriteriamustbesatisfiedtoestablishthatalimitisreasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.First,theobjectivetobeserved
bythemeasureslimitingaCharterrightmustbesufficientlyimportanttowarrantoverridingaconstitutionallyprotectedrightorfreedom.Thestandardmustbehigh
toensurethattrivialobjectivesorthosediscordantwiththeprinciplesofafreeanddemocraticsocietydonotgainprotection.Ataminimum,anobjectivemustrelate
tosocietalconcernswhicharepressingandsubstantialinafreeanddemocraticsocietybeforeitcanbe[page106]characterizedassufficientlyimportant.Second,the
partyinvokings.1mustshowthemeanstobereasonableanddemonstrablyjustified.Thisinvolvesaformofproportionalitytestinvolvingthreeimportant
components.Tobegin,themeasuresmustbefairandnotarbitrary,carefullydesignedtoachievetheobjectiveinquestionandrationallyconnectedtothatobjective.
Inaddition,themeansshouldimpairtherightinquestionaslittleaspossible.Lastly,theremustbeaproportionalitybetweentheeffectsofthelimitingmeasureand
theobjectivethemoreseverethedeleteriouseffectsofameasure,themoreimportanttheobjectivemustbe.
Parliament'sconcernthatdrugtraffickingbedecreasedwassubstantialandpressing.Itsobjectiveofprotectingsocietyfromthegraveillsofdrugtraffickingwasself
evident,forthepurposesofs.1,andcouldpotentiallyincertaincaseswarranttheoverridingofaconstitutionallyprotectedright.Therewas,however,norational
connectionbetweenthebasicfactofpossessionandthepresumedfactofpossessionforthepurposeoftrafficking.Thepossessionofasmallornegligiblequantityof
narcoticswouldnotsupporttheinferenceoftrafficking.
PerEsteyandMcIntyreJJ:ConcurredinthereasonsofDicksonC.J.withrespecttotherelationshipbetweens.11(d)ands.1oftheCharterbutthereasonsofMartin
J.A.inthecourtbelowwereadoptedforthedispositionofallotherissues.
CasesCited
R.v.Shelley,[1981]2S.C.R.196R.v.Carroll(1983),147D.L.R.(3d)92R.v.Cook(1983),4C.C.C.(3d)419R.v.Stanger(1983),7C.C.C.(3d)337R.v.
Appleby,[1972]S.C.R.303Woolmingtonv.DirectorofPublicProsecutions,[1935]A.C.462,consideredOngAhChuanv.PublicProsecutor,[1981]A.C.648,
distinguishedR.v.BabcockandAuld,[1967]2C.C.C.235R.v.O'Day(1983),5C.C.C.(3d)227R.v.Landry[1983]C.A.408,7C.C.C.(3d)555R.v.Therrien
(1982),67C.C.C.(2d)31R.v.Fraser(1982),138D.L.R.(3d)488R.v.Kupczyniski,[1982]O.J.No.626(Ont.Co.Ct.,June23,1982R.v.Sharpe(1961),131
C.C.C.75R.v.Silk,[1970]3C.C.C.1R.v.Erdman(1971),24C.R.N.S.216PublicProsecutorv.Yuvaraj,[1970]2W.L.R.226R.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,[1985]1
S.C.R.295ReB.C.MotorVehicleAct,[1985]2S.C.R.486Manchukv.[page107]TheKing,[1938]S.C.R.341R.v.CityofSaultSte.Marie,[1978]2S.C.R.1299
Duboisv.TheQueen,[1985]2S.C.R.350Singhv.MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration,[1985]1S.C.R.177R.v.Therens,[1985]1S.C.R.613R.v.Stock
(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)319ReAnsonandTheQueen(1983),146D.L.R.(3d)661R.v.Holmes(1983),41O.R.(2d)250R.v.Whyte(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)277R.
v.Lee'sPoultryLtd.(1985),17C.C.C.(3d)539R.v.T.(1985),18C.C.C.(3d)125R.v.Kowalczuk(1983),5C.C.C.(3d)25R.v.Schwartz(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)
34ReBoyleandTheQueen(1983),41O.R.(2d)713Totv.UnitedStates,319U.S.463(1943)Learyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6(1969)CountyCourtofUlster
County,NewYorkv.Allen,442U.S.140(1979)InReWinship,397U.S.358(1970)PfundersCase(Austriav.Italy)(1963),6YearbookE.C.H.R.740Xagainstthe
UnitedKingdom,Appl'nNo.5124/71,CollectionofDecisions,E.C.H.R.,135Hunterv.SouthamInc.,[1984]2S.C.R.145LawSocietyofUpperCanadav.
Skapinker,[1984]1S.C.R.357Baterv.Bater,[1950]2AllE.R.458Hanesv.WawanesaMutualInsuranceCo.,[1963]S.C.R.154Smithv.Smith,[1952]2S.C.R.
312,referredto.
StatutesandRegulationsCited
CanadianBillofRights,R.S.C.1970,App.III,s.2(f).
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,ss.1,11(d).
ConstitutionAct,1982,s.33.
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerican,5thand14thAmendments.
CriminalCode,R.S.C.1970,c.C34,s.224A(1)(a)(nows.237(1)(a)).
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FoodandDrugsAct,R.S.C.1970,c.F27,s.35(formerlys.33en.by196061(Can.),c.37,s.1).
InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,1966,art.14(2).
MisuseofDrugsAct1971,1971(U.K.),c.38.
MisuseofDrugsAct1975,1975(N.Z.),No.116.
NarcoticControlAct,R.S.C.1970,c.N1,ss.3(1),(2),4(1),(2),(3),8.
OpiumandNarcoticDrugAct,R.S.C.1952,c.201.
ProtocolforLimitingandRegulatingtheCultivationofthePoppyPlant,theProductionof,InternationalandWholesaleTradein,andUseofOpium.
SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs,1961.
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,art.11(I).
AuthorsCited
Canada.CommissionofInquiryintotheNonMedicalUseofDrugs.FinalReportoftheCommissionof[page108]InquiryintotheNonMedicalUseofDrugs,
Ottawa,InformationCanada,1973.
Canada.ReportoftheSpecialCommitteeonTrafficinNarcoticDrugs,AppendixtoDebatesoftheSenate,1955Session.
Cross,SirRupert.Evidence,5thed.,London,Butterworths,1979.
Cross,SirRupert."TheGoldenThreadoftheEnglishCriminalLaw:TheBurdenofProof,"deliveredintheRedeLectures,UniversityofToronto,Toronto,1976.
Jacobs,Francis.TheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,Oxford,ClarendonPress,1975.
MacKay,A.WayneandT.A.Cromwell."Oakes:ABoldInitiativeImpededbyOldGhosts"(1983),32C.R.(3d)221,221235.
Sopinka,JohnandSidneyN.Lederman.TheLawofEvidenceinCivilCases,Toronto,Butterworths,1974.
APPEALfromajudgmentoftheOntarioCourtofAppeal(1983),145D.L.R.(3d)123,2C.C.C.(3d)339,dismissinganappealoftheCrownfromajudgmentof
WalkerProv.Ct.J.convictingtheaccusedofsimplepossessiononachargeofpossessingnarcoticsforthepurposesoftraffickingcontrarytos.4(2)oftheNarcotic
ControlAct.Appealdismissed.
JuliusIsaac,Q.C.,MichaelR.DambrotandDonnaC.McGillis,fortheappellant.GeoffreyA.Beasley,fortherespondent.
Solicitorfortheappellant:RogerTass,Ottawa.Solicitorsfortherespondent:Cockburn,Foster,CudmoreandKitely,London.

ThejudgmentofDicksonC.J.andChouinard,Lamer,WilsonandLeDainJJ.wasdeliveredby
1DICKSONC.J.:Thisappealconcernstheconstitutionalityofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,R.S.C.1970,c.N1.Thesectionprovides,inbrief,thatifthe
Courtfindstheaccusedinpossessionofanarcotic,heispresumedtobeinpossessionforthepurposeoftrafficking.Unlesstheaccusedcanestablishthecontrary,he
mustbeconvictedoftrafficking.TheOntarioCourtofAppealheldthatthisprovisionconstitutesa"reverseonus"clauseandisunconstitutionalbecauseitviolates
oneofthecorevaluesofourcriminaljusticesystem,thepresumptionofinnocence,nowentrenchedins.11(d)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.The
Crownhasappealed.

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[page109]

StatutoryandConstitutionalProvisions
2Beforereviewingthefactualcontext,Iwillsetouttherelevantlegislativeandconstitutionalprovisions:
NarcoticControlAct,R.S.C.1970,c.N1
3.(1)ExceptasauthorizedbythisActortheregulations,nopersonshallhaveanarcoticinhispossession.
(2)Everypersonwhoviolatessubsection(1)isguiltyofanindictableoffenceandisliable
(a)
(b)

uponsummaryconvictionforafirstoffence,toafineofonethousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforsixmonthsortobothfine
andimprisonment,andforasubsequentoffence,toafineoftwothousanddollarsortoimprisonmentforoneyearortobothfine
andimprisonmentor
uponconvictiononindictment,toimprisonmentforsevenyears.
4.(1)Nopersonshalltrafficinanarcoticoranysubstancerepresentedorheldoutbyhimtobeanarcotic.
(2)Nopersonshallhaveinhispossessionanarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.
(3)Everypersonwhoviolatessubsection(1)or(2)isguiltyofanindictableoffenceandisliabletoimprisonmentforlife.

8.Inanyprosecutionforaviolationofsubsection4(2),iftheaccuseddoesnotpleadguilty,thetrialshallproceedasifitwerea
prosecutionforanoffenceundersection3,andafterthecloseofthecasefortheprosecutionandaftertheaccusedhashadanopportunity
tomakefullansweranddefence,thecourtshallmakeafindingastowhetherornottheaccusedwasinpossessionofthenarcotic
contrarytosection3ifthecourtfindsthattheaccusedwasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticcontrarytosection3,heshallbeacquitted
butifthecourtfindsthattheaccusedwasinpossessionofthenarcoticcontrarytosection3,heshallbegivenanopportunityof
establishingthathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,andthereaftertheprosecutorshallbegivenan
opportunityofadducingevidencetoestablishthattheaccusedwasinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftraffickingifthe
accusedestablishesthathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,heshallbeacquittedoftheoffenceas
chargedbutheshallbe[page110]convictedofanoffenceundersection3andsentencedaccordinglyandiftheaccusedfailstoestablish
thathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,heshallbeconvictedoftheoffenceaschargedandsentenced
accordingly.
(Emphasisadded.)

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CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms
11.
(d)

Anyperson...
tobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltyaccordingtolawinafairandpublichearingbyanindependentand
impartialtribunal.

1.TheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsguaranteestherightsandfreedomssetoutinitsubjectonlytosuchreasonable
limitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.
II
Facts
3Therespondent,DavidEdwinOakes,waschargedwithunlawfulpossessionofanarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,contrarytos.4(2)oftheNarcoticControl
Act.Heelectedtrialbymagistratewithoutajury.Attrial,theCrownadducedevidencetoestablishthatMr.Oakeswasfoundinpossessionofeightonegramvialsof
cannabisresinintheformofhashishoil.Uponafurthersearchconductedatthepolicestation,$619.45waslocated.Mr.Oakestoldthepolicethathehadboughtten
vialsofhashishoilfor$150forhisownuse,andthatthe$619.45wasfromaworkers'compensationcheque.Heelectednottocallevidenceastopossessionofthe
narcotic.Pursuanttotheproceduralprovisionsofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,thetrialjudgeproceededtomakeafindingthatitwasbeyondareasonabledoubt
thatMr.Oakeswasinpossessionofthenarcotic.

[page111]

4Followingthisfinding,Mr.Oakesbroughtamotiontochallengetheconstitutionalvalidityofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,whichhemaintainedimposesa
burdenonanaccusedtoprovethatheorshewasnotinpossessionforthepurposeoftrafficking.Hearguedthats.8violatesthepresumptionofinnocencecontained
ins.11(d)oftheCharter.
III
Judgments
(a)

OntarioProvincialCourt(R.v.Oakes(1982),38O.R.(2d)598)

5Attrial,WalkerProv.Ct.J.borrowedthewordsofLaskinC.J.inR.v.Shelley,[1981]2S.C.R.196,atp.202,andfoundtherewasnorationalornecessary
connectionbetweenthefactproved,i.e.,possessionofthedrug,andtheconclusionaskedtobedrawn,namely,possessionforthepurposeoftrafficking.WalkerProv.
Ct.J.heldthat,totheextentthats.8oftheNarcoticControlActrequiresthispresumptionandtheresultantconviction,itisinoperativeasaviolationofthe
presumptionofinnocencecontainedins.11(d)oftheCharter.
6WalkerProv.J.addedthatthereverseonusins.8wouldnotbeinvalidiftheCrownhadadducedevidenceofpossessionaswellasevidencefromwhichitcould
beinferredbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthepossessionwasforthepurposeoftrafficking.Ifthisweredone,therewouldbeasufficientrationalconnectionbetween
thefactofpossessionandthepresumedfactoftrafficking.
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(b)

OntarioCourtofAppeal(R.v.Oakes(1983),145D.L.R.(3d)123)

7MartinJ.A.,writingforaunanimouscourt,dismissedtheappealandheldthereverseonusprovisionins.8oftheNarcoticControlActunconstitutional.
8MartinJ.A.statedthat,asageneralrule,areverseonusclausewhichplacesaburdenonthe[page112]accusedtodisproveonabalanceofprobabilitiesan
essentialelementofanoffencecontravenestherighttobepresumedinnocent.Nevertheless,heheldthatsomereverseonusprovisionsmaybeconstitutionallyvalid
providedtheyconstitutereasonablelimitationsontherighttobepresumedinnocentandaredemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.
9Todeterminewhetheraparticularreverseonusprovisionislegitimate,MartinJ.A.outlinedatwoprongedinquiry.First,itisnecessarytopassathresholdtest
whichheexplainedasfollows,atp.146:
Thethresholdquestionindeterminingthelegitimacyofaparticularreverseonusprovisioniswhetherthereverseonusclauseis
justifiableinthesensethatitisreasonableforParliamenttoplacetheburdenofproofontheaccusedinrelationtoaningredientofthe
offenceinquestion.Indeterminingthethresholdquestionconsiderationshouldbegiventoanumberoffactors,includingsuchfactors
as:(a)themagnitudeoftheevilsoughttobesuppressed,whichmaybemeasuredbythegravityoftheharmresultingfromtheoffenceor
bythefrequencyoftheoccurrenceoftheoffenceorbybothcriteria(b)thedifficultyoftheprosecutionmakingproofofthepresumed
fact,and(c)therelativeeasewithwhichtheaccusedmayproveordisprovethepresumedfact.Manifestly,areverseonusprovision
placingtheburdenofproofontheaccusedwithrespecttoafactwhichitisnotrationallyopentohimtoproveordisprovecannotbe
justified.
10Ifthereverseonusprovisionmeetsthesecriteria,dueregardhavingbeengiventoParliament'sassessmentoftheneedfortheprovision,asecondtestmustthenbe
satisfied.ThissecondtestwasdescribedbyMartinJ.A.asthe"rationalconnectiontest".Accordingtoit,tobereasonable,theprovenfact(e.g.,possession)must
rationallytendtoprovethepresumedfact(e.g.,anintentiontotraffic).Inotherwords,theprovenfactmustraiseaprobabilitythatthepresumedfactexists.

[page113]

11Inconsiderings.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,MartinJ.A.focusedprimarilyonthesecondtestatp.147:
Ihavereachedtheconclusionthats.8oftheNarcoticControlActisconstitutionallyinvalidbecauseofthelackofarational
connectionbetweentheprovedfact(possession)andthepresumedfact(anintentiontotraffic)....Merepossessionofasmallquantityof
anarcoticdrugdoesnotsupportaninferenceofpossessionforthepurposeoftraffickingoreventendtoproveanintenttotraffic.
Moreover,uponproofofpossession,s.8castsupontheaccusedtheburdenofdisprovingnotsomeformalelementoftheoffencebutthe
burdenofdisprovingtheveryessenceoftheoffence.
12MartinJ.A.addedthatitisnotforcourtstoattempttorewrites.8byapplyingitonacasebycasebasis.Furthermore,wherearationalconnectiondoesexist
betweenpossessionandthepresumedintentiontotraffic,suchas"wherethepossessionofanarcoticdrugisofsuchanatureastobeindicativeoftrafficking,the
commonsenseofajurycanordinarilybereliedupontoarriveataproperconclusion".Therewouldnot,therefore,beanyneedforastatutorypresumption.
13OnefinalnoteshouldbemaderegardingMartinJ.A.'sjudgment.Inassessingwhetherornots.8wasareasonablelimitationontheconstitutionalprotectionof
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thepresumptionofinnocence,MartinJ.A.combinedtheanalysisofs.11(d)withs.1.Heheldthattherequirementsofs.1,thatalimitationbereasonableand
demonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety,providedthestandardforinterpretingthephrase"accordingtolaw"ins.11(d).
IV
TheIssues
14Theconstitutionalquestioninthisappealisstatedasfollows:
Iss.8oftheNarcoticControlActinconsistentwiths.11(d)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsandthusofnoforceand
effect?

[page114]

Twospecificquestionsareraisedbythisgeneralquestion:(1)doess.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolates.11(d)oftheCharterand,(2)ifitdoes,iss.8areasonable
limitprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyforthepurposeofs.1oftheCharter?Iftheanswerto(1)isaffirmativeandthe
answerto(2)negative,thentheconstitutionalquestionmustbeansweredintheaffirmative.
V
Doess.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolates.11(d)oftheCharter?
(a)

TheMeaningofs.8

15Beforeexaminingthepresumptionofinnocencecontainedins.11(d)oftheCharter,itisnecessarytoclarifythemeaningofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct.The
proceduralstepscontemplatedbys.8wereclearlyoutlinedbyBrancaJ.A.inR.v.BabcockandAuld,[1967]2C.C.C.235(B.C.C.A.),atp.247:
(A)Theaccusedischargedwithpossessionofaforbiddendrugforthepurposeoftrafficking.
(B)Thetrialoftheaccusedonthischargethenproceedsasifitwasaprosecutionagainsttheaccusedonasimplechargeofpossession
oftheforbiddendrug....
(C)WhentheCrownhasadduceditsevidenceonthebasisthatthechargewasaprosecutionforsimplepossession,theaccusedis
thengiventhestatutoryrightoropportunityofmakingafullansweranddefencetothechargeofsimplepossession....
(D)WhenthishasbeendonetheCourtmustmakeafindingastowhethertheaccusedwasinpossessionofnarcoticscontrarytos.3
ofthenewAct.(Unlawfulpossessionofaforbiddennarcoticdrug).
(E)AssumingthattheCourtsofinds,itisthenthatanonusisplacedupontheaccusedinthesensethatanopportunitymustbegiven
totheaccusedofestablishingthathewasnotinpossessionofanarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.
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(F)Whentheaccusedhasbeengiventhisopportunitytheprosecutormaythenestablishthatthepossessionoftheaccusedwasforthe
purposeoftrafficking...

[page115]

(G)ItisthenthattheCourtmustfindwhetherornottheaccusedhasdischargedtheonusplaceduponhimunderandbythesaid
section.
(H)IftheCourtsofinds,theaccusedmustbeacquittedoftheoffenceascharged,namely,possessionforthepurposeoftrafficking,but
inthateventtheaccusedmustbeconvictedofthesimplechargeofunlawfulpossessionofaforbiddennarcotic....
(I)Iftheaccuseddoesnotsoestablishhemustthenbeconvictedofthefulloffenceascharged.

Mr.JusticeBrancathenaddedatpp.24748:
Itisquitecleartomethatunders.8ofthenewActthetrialmustbedividedintotwophases.Inthefirstphasethesoleissuetobe
determinediswhetherornottheaccusedisguiltyofsimplepossessionofanarcotic.Thisissueistobedetermineduponevidence
relevantonlytotheissueofpossession.Inthesecondphasethequestiontoberesolvediswhetherornotthepossessionchargedisfor
thepurposeoftrafficking.
16Againstthebackdropoftheseproceduralsteps,wemustconsiderthenatureofthestatutorypresumptioncontainedins.8andthetypeofburdenitplacesonan
accused.Therelevantportionsofs.8read:
8....ifthecourtfindsthattheaccusedwasinpossessionofthenarcotic...heshallbegivenanopportunityofestablishingthathe
wasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking...iftheaccusedfailstoestablishthathewasnotinpossessionofthe
narcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,heshallbeconvictedoftheoffenceascharged....
17Indeterminingthemeaningofthesewords,itishelpfultoconsiderinageneralsensethenatureofpresumptions.Presumptionscanbeclassifiedintotwogeneral
categories:presumptionswithoutbasicfactsandpresumptionswithbasicfacts.Apresumptionwithoutabasicfactissimplyaconclusionwhichistobedrawnuntil
thecontraryisproved.Apresumptionwithabasicfactentailsaconclusiontobedrawnuponproofofthebasicfact(seeCrossOnEvidence,5thed.,atpp.12223).
18Basicfactpresumptionscanbefurthercategorizedintopermissiveandmandatorypresumptions.[page116]Apermissivepresumptionleavesitoptionalasto
whethertheinferenceofthepresumedfactisdrawnfollowingproofofthebasicfact.Amandatorypresumptionrequiresthattheinferencebemade.
19Presumptionsmayalsobeeitherrebuttableorirrebuttable.Ifapresumptionisrebuttable,therearethreepotentialwaysthepresumedfactcanberebutted.First,
theaccusedmayberequiredmerelytoraiseareasonabledoubtastoitsexistence.Secondly,theaccusedmayhaveanevidentiaryburdentoadducesufficientevidence
tobringintoquestionthetruthofthepresumedfact.Thirdly,theaccusedmayhavealegalorpersuasiveburdentoproveonabalanceofprobabilitiesthenon
existenceofthepresumedfact.
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20Finally,presumptionsareoftenreferredtoaseitherpresumptionsoflaworpresumptionsoffact.Thelatterentail"frequentlyrecurringexamplesofcircumstantial
evidence"(CrossonEvidence,supra,atp.124)whiletheformerinvolveactuallegalrules.
21Toreturntos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,itismyviewthat,uponafindingbeyondareasonabledoubtofpossessionofanarcotic,theaccusedhasthelegal
burdenofprovingonabalanceofprobabilitiesthatheorshewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.Oncethebasicfactofpossessionis
proven,amandatorypresumptionoflawarisesagainsttheaccusedthatheorshehadtheintentiontotraffic.Moreover,theaccusedwillbefoundguiltyoftheoffence
oftraffickingunlessheorshecanrebutthispresumptiononabalanceofprobabilities.Thisinterpretationofs.8issupportedbythecourtsinanumberof
jurisdictions:R.v.Carroll(1983),147D.L.R.(3d)92(P.E.I.S.C.inbanco)R.v.Cook(1983),4C.C.C.(3d)419(N.S.C.A.)R.v.O'Day(1983),5C.C.C.(3d)227
(N.B.C.A.)R.v.Landry[1983]C.A.408,7C.C.C.(3d)555(Que.C.A.)R.v.Stanger(1983),7C.C.C.(3d)337(Alta.C.A.)
22Insomedecisionsithasbeenheldthats.8oftheNarcoticControlActisconstitutionalbecause[page117]itplacesonlyanevidentiaryburdenratherthana
legalburdenontheaccused.TheultimatelegalburdentoproveguiltbeyondareasonabledoubtremainswiththeCrownandthepresumptionofinnocenceisnot
offended.(R.v.Therrien(1982),67C.C.C.(2d)31(Ont.Co.Ct.)R.v.Fraser(1982),138D.L.R.(3d)488(Sask.Q.B.)R.v.Kupczyniski,[1982]O.J.No.626(June
23,1982,Ont.Co.Ct.))
23ThissameapproachwasreliedoninR.v.Sharpe(1961),131C.C.C.75(Ont.C.A.),aCanadianBillofRightsdecisiononthepresumptionofinnocence.Inthat
case,aprovisionintheOpiumandNarcoticDrugAct,R.S.C.1952,c.201,similartos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,wasinterpretedasshiftingmerelythesecondary
burdenofadducingevidenceontotheaccused.TheprimaryonusremainedwiththeCrown.InR.v.Silk,[1970]3C.C.C.1(B.C.C.A.),theBritishColumbiaCourtof
Appealheldthats.2(f)oftheCanadianBillofRightshadnotbeeninfringedbecauses.33oftheFoodandDrugsAct,(nowR.S.C.1970,c.F27,s.35)requiredonly
thatanaccusedraiseareasonabledoubtthatthepurposeofhisorherpossessionwastrafficking.Thisdecision,however,wasnotfollowedinR.v.Appleby,[1972]
S.C.R.303,norinR.v.Erdman(1971),24C.R.N.S.216(B.C.C.A.)
24ThosedecisionswhichhaveheldthatonlythesecondaryorevidentiaryburdenshiftsarenotpersuasivewithrespecttotheNarcoticControlAct.AsRitchieJ.
foundinR.v.Appleby,supra,(thoughaddressingadifferentstatutoryprovision)thephrase"toestablish"istheequivalentof"toprove".Thelegislature,byusingthe
word"establish"ins.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,intendedtoimposealegalburdenontheaccused.Thisismostapparentinthewords"iftheaccusedfailsto
establishthathewasnotinpossessionofthe[page118]narcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking,heshallbeconvictedoftheoffenceascharged".
25IntheApplebycase,RitchieJ.alsoheldthattheaccusedisrequiredtodisprovethepresumedfactaccordingtothecivilstandardofproof,onabalanceof
probabilities.Herejectedthecriminalstandardofbeyondareasonabledoubt,relying,interalia,uponthefollowingpassagefromtheHouseofLords'decisionin
PublicProsecutorv.Yuvaraj,[1970]2W.L.R.226,atp.232:
Generallyspeaking,noonusliesuponadefendantincriminalproceedingstoproveordisproveanyfact:itissufficientforhis
acquittalifanyofthefactswhich,iftheyexisted,wouldconstitutetheoffencewithwhichheischargedare"notproved".But
exceptionally,asinthepresentcase,anenactmentcreatinganoffenceexpresslyprovidesthatifotherfactsareproved,aparticularfact,
theexistenceofwhichisanecessaryfactualingredientoftheoffence,shallbepresumedordeemedtoexist"unlessthecontraryis
proved".Insuchacasetheconsequenceoffindingthatthatparticularfactis"disproved"willbeanacquittal,whereastheabsenceof
suchafindingwillhavetheconsequenceofaconviction.Wherethisistheconsequenceofafact'sbeing"disproved"therecanbeno
groundsinpublicpolicyforrequiringthatexceptionaldegreeofcertaintyasexcludesallreasonabledoubtthatthatfactdoesnotexist.
IntheirLordships'opinionthegeneralruleappliesinsuchacaseanditissufficientifthecourtconsidersthatupontheevidencebeforeit
itismorelikelythannotthatthefactdoesnotexist.Thetestisthesameasthatappliedincivilproceedings:thebalanceof
probabilities.
26Iconcludethats.8oftheNarcoticControlActcontainsareverseonusprovisionimposingalegalburdenonanaccusedtoproveonabalanceofprobabilities
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thatheorshewasnotinpossessionofanarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.Itisthereforenecessarytodeterminewhethers.8oftheNarcoticControlActoffends
therighttobe"presumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty"asguaranteedbys.11(d)oftheCharter.

[page119]

(b)

ThePresumptionofInnocenceands.11(d)oftheCharter

27Section11(d)oftheCharterconstitutionallyentrenchesthepresumptionofinnocenceaspartofthesupremelawofCanada.Foreaseofreference,Isetoutthis
provisionagain:
11.

Anypersonchargedwithanoffencehastheright
...

(d)

tobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltyaccordingtolawinafairandpublichearingbyanindependentandimpartial
tribunal.

28Tointerpretthemeaningofs.11(d),itisimportanttoadoptapurposiveapproach.AsthisCourtstatedinR.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,[1985]1S.C.R.295,atp.
344:
ThemeaningofarightorfreedomguaranteedbytheCharterwastobeascertainedbyananalysisofthepurposeofsuchaguaranteeit
wastobeunderstood,inotherwords,inthelightoftheinterestsitwasmeanttoprotect.
Inmyviewthisanalysisistobeundertaken,andthepurposeoftherightorfreedominquestionistobesoughtbyreferencetothe
characterandthelargerobjectsoftheCharteritself,tothelanguagechosentoarticulatethespecificrightorfreedom,tothehistorical
originsoftheconceptsenshrined,andwhereapplicable,tothemeaningandpurposeoftheotherspecificrightsandfreedoms....
ToidentifytheunderlyingpurposeoftheCharterrightinquestion,therefore,itisimportanttobeginbyunderstandingthecardinalvaluesitembodies.
29Thepresumptionofinnocenceisahallowedprinciplelyingattheveryheartofcriminallaw.Althoughprotectedexpresslyins.11(d)oftheCharter,the
presumptionofinnocenceisreferableandintegraltothegeneralprotectionoflife,libertyandsecurityofthepersoncontainedins.7oftheCharter(seeReB.C.Motor
VehicleAct,[1985]2S.C.R.486,perLamerJ.)Thepresumptionofinnocenceprotectsthefundamentallibertyandhumandignityofanyandeverypersonaccusedby
theStateofcriminalconduct.Anindividualchargedwithacriminaloffencefacesgravesocialandpersonalconsequences,includingpotentiallossofphysicalliberty,
subjectionto[page120]socialstigmaandostracismfromthecommunity,aswellasothersocial,psychologicalandeconomicharms.Inlightofthegravityofthese
consequences,thepresumptionofinnocenceiscrucial.ItensuresthatuntiltheStateprovesanaccused'sguiltbeyondallreasonabledoubt,heorsheisinnocent.This
isessentialinasocietycommittedtofairnessandsocialjustice.Thepresumptionofinnocenceconfirmsourfaithinhumankinditreflectsourbeliefthatindividuals
aredecentandlawabidingmembersofthecommunityuntilprovenotherwise.
30Thepresumptionofinnocencehasenjoyedlongstandingrecognitionatcommonlaw.Intheleadingcase,Woolmingtonv.DirectorofPublicProsecutions,
[1935]A.C.462(H.L.),ViscountSankeywroteatpp.48182:
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ThroughouttheweboftheEnglishCriminalLawonegoldenthreadisalwaystobeseen,thatitisthedutyoftheprosecutiontoprove
theprisoner'sguiltsubjecttowhatIhavealreadysaidastothedefenceofinsanityandsubjectalsotoanystatutoryexception.If,atthe
endofandonthewholeofthecase,thereisareasonabledoubt,createdbytheevidencegivenbyeithertheprosecutionortheprisoner,
astowhethertheprisonerkilledthedeceasedwithamaliciousintention,theprosecutionhasnotmadeoutthecaseandtheprisoneris
entitledtoanacquittal.Nomatterwhatthechargeorwherethetrial,theprinciplethattheprosecutionmustprovetheguiltofthe
prisonerispartofthecommonlawofEnglandandnoattempttowhittleitdowncanbeentertained.
SubsequentCanadiancaseshavecitedtheWoolmingtonprinciplewithapproval(see,forexample,Manchukv.TheKing,[1938]S.C.R.341,atp.349R.v.Cityof
SaultSte.Marie,[1978]2S.C.R.1299,atp.1316).
31Furtherevidenceofthewidespreadacceptanceoftheprincipleofthepresumptionofinnocenceisitsinclusioninthemajorinternationalhumanrights
documents.Article11(1)oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,adoptedDecember10,1948bytheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNations,provides:

[page121]

Article11.
I.

Everyonechargedwithapenaloffencehastherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingtolawinapublictrialat
whichhehashadalltheguaranteesnecessaryforhisdefence.

IntheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,1966,art.14(2)states:
Article14.
2.

Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallhavetherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingtolaw.

CanadaaccededtothisCovenant,andtheOptionalProtocolwhichsetsupmachineryforimplementingtheCovenant,onMay19,1976.Bothcameintoeffecton
August19,1976.
32Inlightoftheabove,therighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltyrequiresthats.11(d)have,ataminimum,thefollowingcontent.First,anindividual
mustbeprovenguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.Second,itistheStatewhichmustbeartheburdenofproof.AsLamerJ.statedinDuboisv.TheQueen,[1985]2
S.C.R.350,atp.357:
Section11(d)imposesupontheCrowntheburdenofprovingtheaccused'sguiltbeyondareasonabledoubtaswellasthatof
makingoutthecaseagainsttheaccusedbeforeheorsheneedrespond,eitherbytestifyingorcallingotherevidence.
Third,criminalprosecutionsmustbecarriedoutinaccordancewithlawfulproceduresandfairness.Thelatterpartofs.11(d),whichrequirestheproofofguilt
"accordingtolawinafairandpublichearingbyanindependentandimpartialtribunal",underlinestheimportanceofthisproceduralrequirement.
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(c)

AuthoritiesonReverseOnusProvisionsandthePresumptionofInnocence

33Havingconsideredthegeneralmeaningofthepresumptionofinnocence,itisnow,Ithink,desirabletoreviewbrieflytheauthoritiesonreverseonusclausesin
Canadaandotherjurisdictions.

[page122]

(i)

TheCanadianBillofRightsJurisprudence

34Section2(f)oftheCanadianBillofRights,whichsafeguardsthepresumptionofinnocence,provides:
2.EverylawofCanadashall,unlessitisexpresslydeclaredbyanActoftheParliamentofCanadathatitshalloperate
notwithstandingtheCanadianBillofRights,besoconstruedandappliedasnottoabrogate,abridgeorinfringeortoauthorizethe
abrogation,abridgmentorinfringementofanyoftherightsorfreedomshereinrecognizedanddeclared,andinparticular,nolawof
Canadashallbeconstruedorappliedsoasto
...
(f)

depriveapersonchargedwithacriminaloffenceoftherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingtolawina
fairandpublichearingbyanindependentandimpartialtribunal.

Thewordingofthissectioncloselyparallelsthatofs.11(d).Forthisreason,oneoftheCrown'sprimarycontentionsisthattheCanadianBillofRightsjurisprudence
shouldbedeterminativeoftheoutcomeofthepresentappeal.
35Theleadingcasedecidedunders.2(f)oftheCanadianBillofRightsandreliedonbytheCrown,isR.v.Appleby,supra.Inthatcase,theaccusedhadchallenged
s.224A(1)(a)(nows.237(1)(a))oftheCriminalCode,R.S.C.1970,c.C34,whichimposesaburdenuponanaccusedtoprovethatheorshe,thoughoccupyingthe
driver'sseat,didnotenterthevehicleforthepurposeofsettingitinmotionanddidnot,therefore,havecareandcontrol.ThisCourtrejectedtheargumentsofthe
accusedthats.2(f)hadbeenviolateditreliedontheWoolmingtoncasewhichheldthatthepresumptionofinnocencewassubjectto"statutoryexceptions".As
RitchieJ.statedinhisjudgmentforthemajorityatpp.31516:
Itseemstome,therefore,thatifWoolmington'scaseistobeaccepted,thewords"presumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingto
law..."astheyappearin[page123]s.2(f)oftheBillofRights,mustbetakentoenvisagealawwhichrecognizestheexistenceof
statutoryexceptionsreversingtheonusofproofwithrespecttooneormoreingredientsofanoffenceincaseswherecertainspecificfacts
havebeenprovedbytheCrowninrelationtosuchingredients.
36Inaconcurringopinion,LaskinJ.(ashethenwas)putforwardanalternativetest.HechosenottofollowRitchieJ.'sapproachofreadingastatutoryexception
limitationintothephrase"accordingtolaw"ins.2(f)oftheCanadianBillofRights,andsaidatp.317:
Idonotconstrues.2(f)asselfdefeatingbecauseofthephrase"accordingtolaw"whichappearstherein.Hence,itwouldbeoffensive
tos.2(f)forafederalcriminalenactmenttoplaceupontheaccusedtheultimateburdenofestablishinghisinnocencewithrespecttoany
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elementoftheoffencecharged.The"righttobepresumedinnocent",ofwhichs.2(f)speaks,is,inpopularterms,awayofexpressingthe
factthattheCrownhastheultimateburdenofestablishingguiltifthereisanyreasonabledoubtattheconclusionofthecaseonany
elementoftheoffencecharged,anaccusedpersonmustbeacquitted.Inamorerefinedsense,thepresumptionofinnocencegivesan
accusedtheinitialbenefitofarightofsilenceandtheultimatebenefit(aftertheCrown'sevidenceisinandaswellanyevidence
tenderedonbehalfoftheaccused)ofanyreasonabledoubt:seeCoffinv.U.S.(1895),156U.S.432atp.452.
Nevertheless,LaskinJ.wentontoholdthatthepresumptionofinnocenceisnotviolatedby"anystatutoryornonstatutoryburdenuponanaccusedtoadduce
evidencetoneutralize,orcounteronabalanceofprobabilities,theeffectofevidencepresentedbytheCrown"(p.318).Thetest,accordingtoLaskinJ.,iswhetherthe
legislativeprovisioncallsforafindingofguilteventhoughthereisareasonabledoubtastotheculpabilityoftheaccused.Thiswouldseemtoprohibitthe
impositionofanylegalburdenontheaccusedhowever,LaskinJ.upheldastatutoryprovisionwhichwouldappeartohavedonepreciselythat.
37Inasubsequentcase,R.v.Shelley,supra,involvingareverseonusprovisionregarding[page124]unlawfulimportation,LaskinC.J.discussedfurthertheviews
hehadarticulatedinApplebyatp.200:
ThisCourtheldinR.v.Applebythatareverseonusprovision,whichgoesnofartherthantorequireanaccusedtoofferproofona
balanceofprobabilities,doesnotnecessarilyviolatethepresumptionofinnocenceunders.2(f).Itwouldofcourse,beclearly
incompatiblewiths.2(f)forastatutetoputuponanaccusedareverseonusofprovingafactinissuebeyondareasonabledoubt.Insofar
astheonusgoesnofartherthantorequireanaccusedtoproveaessentialfactuponabalanceofprobabilities,theessentialfactmustbe
onewhichisrationallyopentotheaccusedtoproveordisprove,asthecasemaybe.Ifitisonewhichanaccusedcannotreasonablybe
expectedtoprove,beingbeyondhisknowledgeorbeyondwhathemayreasonablybeexpectedtoknow,itamountstoarequirement
thatisimpossibletomeet.
Inaddition,LaskinC.J.sowedtheseedsforthedevelopmentofa"rationalconnectiontest"fordeterminingthevalidityofareverseonusprovisionwhenhestatedat
p.202:
Itisevidenttomeinthiscasethatthereisontherecordnorationalornecessaryconnectionbetweenthefactproved,i.e.
possessionofgoodsofforeignorigin,andtheconclusionofunlawfulimportationwhichtheaccusedunders.248(1)must,toavoid
conviction,disprove.
38AlthoughthereareimportantlessonstobelearnedfromtheCanadianBillofRightsjurisprudence,itdoesnotconstitutebindingauthorityinrelationtothe
constitutionalinterpretationoftheCharter.AsthisCourtheldinR.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,supra,theCharter,asaconstitutionaldocument,isfundamentally
differentfromthestatutoryCanadianBillofRights,whichwasinterpretedassimplyrecognizinganddeclaringexistingrights.(SeealsoSinghv.Ministerof
EmploymentandImmigration,[1985]1S.C.R.177perWilsonJ.R.v.Therens,[1985]1S.C.R.613,perLeDainJ.)InrejectingtheCanadianBillofRightsreligion
casesasdeterminativeofthemeaningoffreedomofreligionunderthe[page125]CharterinR.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,theCourthadoccasiontosayatpp.34344:
IagreewiththesubmissionoftherespondentthattheCharterisintendedtosetastandarduponwhichpresentaswellasfuture
legislationistobetested.Thereforethemeaningoftheconceptoffreedomofconscienceandreligionisnottobedeterminedsolelyby
thedegreetowhichthatrightwasenjoyedbyCanadianspriortotheproclamationoftheCharter.Forthisreason,Robertsonand
Rosetanni,supra,cannotbedeterminativeofthemeaningof"freedomofconscienceandreligion"undertheCharter.Wemustlookrather,
tothedistinctiveprinciplesofconstitutionalinterpretationappropriatetoexpoundingthesupremelawofCanada.
39Withthisinmind,onecannotbutquestiontheappropriatenessofreadingintothephrase"accordingtolaw"ins.11(d)oftheCharterthestatutoryexceptions
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acknowledgedinWoolmingtonandinAppleby.TheWoolmingtoncasewasdecidedinthecontextofalegalsystemwithnoconstitutionallyentrenchedhuman
rightsdocument.InCanada,wehavetemperedparliamentarysupremacybyentrenchingimportantrightsandfreedomsintheConstitution.ViscountSankey's
statutoryexceptionprovisoisclearlynotapplicableinthiscontextandwouldsubverttheverypurposeoftheentrenchmentofthepresumptionofinnocenceinthe
Charter.Idonot,therefore,feelconstrainedinthiscasebytheinterpretationofs.2(f)oftheCanadianBillofRightspresentedinthemajorityjudgmentinAppleby.
Section8oftheNarcoticControlActisnotrenderedconstitutionallyvalidsimplybyvirtueofthefactthatitisastatutoryprovision.
(ii)

CanadianCharterJurisprudence

40Inadditiontothepresentcase,therehavebeenanumberofotherprovincialappellateleveljudgmentsaddressingthemeaningofthepresumptionofinnocence
containedins.11(d).Thisjurisprudenceprovidesacomprehensiveandpersuasivesourceofinsightintothequestionsraisedinthisappeal.Inparticular,sixappellate
levelcourts,inadditiontotheOntarioCourtofAppeal,haveheld[page126]thats.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolatestheCharter:R.v.Carroll,supraR.v.Cook,
supraR.v.O'Day,supraR.v.Stanger,supraR.v.Landry,supraR.v.Stock(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)319(B.C.C.A.)
41FollowingthedecisionoftheOntarioCourtofAppealinthepresentcase,thePrinceEdwardIslandSupremeCourt(inbanco)rendereditsdecisioninR.v.
Carroll,supra.Writingforthemajority,MacDonaldJ.heldatp.105:
Unlessaprovisionfallswithins.1oftheCharter,therecannotbearequirementthatanaccusedmustproveanessentialpositiveelement
oftheCrown'scaseotherthanbyraisingareasonabledoubt.Thepresumptionofinnocencecannotbesaidtoexistifbyshiftingthe
persuasiveburdenthecourtisrequiredtoconvictevenifareasonabledoubtmaybesaidtoexist.
Inaconcurringjudgment,MitchellJ.commentedatpp.10708:
Section11(d)givesanaccusedpersontherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty.Itfollowsthatifanaccusedistobe
presumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty,hemustnotbeconvictedunlessanduntiltheCrownhasproveneachandalloftheelements
necessarytoconstitutethecrime.
Applyingtheselegalconclusionstos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,theCourtheldthats.11(d)hadbeenviolated.AsMitchellJ.statedatp.108:
Unders.8anaccusedisnotpresumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty.Heisonlypresumedinnocentuntilfoundinpossession.Once
theCrownprovestheaccusedhadpossessionofthenarcotic,heispresumedtobeguiltyofanintentiontotrafficuntilheproves
otherwise.
42TheNovaScotiaSupremeCourt,AppellateDivision,alsoconcludedthats.8isanunconstitutionalviolationofthes.11(d)presumptionofinnocenceinits
decisioninR.v.Cook,supra.AfterreviewingR.v.Oakes,supra,andR.v.Carroll,supra,HartJ.A.concludedatpp.43536:

[page127]

Section8oftheNarcoticControlActisapieceoflegislationthatattemptstorelievetheCrownofitsnormalburdenofproofby
useofwhatisknownasareverseonus.Differenttypesofreverseonushavebeenknowntothelawandproofofacasewiththeaidofa
reverseonuscaninmyopinion,fallintothewordingofs.11(d)oftheCharterasbeingproof"accordingtolaw"....Iknowofno

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justification,however,forholdingthatitwouldbe"accordingtolaw"toallowuseofareverseonusclausewhichpermittedtheCrown
theassistanceofaprovisionwhichrelieveditfromcallinganyprobativeevidencetoestablishoneoftheessentialelementsofan
offence.
Althoughconcurringinresult,JonesJ.A.maintainedthatthereasonablenesstestshouldbeappliedwithrespecttos.1andnotwithrespecttothewords"accordingto
law"ins.11(d).
Thetestofreasonablenessshouldbeavailableinconsideringthesecondaryquestionunders.1oftheCharter.Itisimportantthatthe
burdenofproofshouldbeontheCrowntoshowthatastatutewhichviolatess.11(d)oftheCharterisdemonstrablyjustifiedinafree
anddemocraticsociety.(p.439)
43InR.v.O'Day,supra,theNewBrunswickCourtofAppealstruckdowns.8oftheNarcoticControlActandregistereditsagreementwiththethreeearlier
provincialappellatelevelcourts.
44TheAlbertaCourtofAppealinR.v.Stanger,supra,alsofounds.8unconstitutionalhowever,thecourtwasnotunanimousinthisconclusion.Onthemeaning
ofs.11(d),StevensonJ.A.,writingforthemajority,paraphrasedMartinJ.A.'scommentinOakesandstatedatp.351thatthepresumptionofinnocencemeant"first,
thatanaccusedisinnocentuntilprovenguiltyinaccordancewithestablishedprocedure,andsecondly,thatguiltmustbeprovenbeyondareasonabledoubt".Mr.
JusticeStevensonalsocitedMacDonaldJ.'scommentinCarrollthatthepresumptionofinnocenceismaintained"aslongastheprosecutionhasthefinalburdenof
establishing[page128]guilt,onanyelementoftheoffencecharged,beyondareasonabledoubt"(supra,p.98).
45Ishouldaddthatthemajority,inStanger,correctlyrejectedtheapplicabilityofthePrivyCouncildecisioninOngAhChuanv.PublicProsecutor,[1981]A.C.
648.ThatcaseconcernedconstitutionalprovisionsofSingaporewhicharesignificantlydifferentfromthoseoftheCharterinparticular,theydonotcontainan
explicitendorsementofthepresumptionofinnocence.Moreover,thePrivyCouncildidnotreadthisprincipleintothegeneraldueprocessprotectionsofthe
ConstitutionofSingapore.
46InR.v.Landry,supra,theQuebecCourtofAppealinvalidateds.8oftheNarcoticControlActandextendeditsconclusionstos.2(f)oftheCanadianBillof
Rights.AsMaloufJ.A.statedatp.561:
BoththeBillofRightsandtheCharterrecognizetherightofanaccusedtobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltyaccordingto
law.Icannotacceptthatsuchabasicandfundamentalprinciplecanbesetasidebysuchareverseonusprovision.
47Finally,inaverybriefjudgment,R.v.Stock,supra,theBritishColumbiaCourtofAppealconcurredwiththeCourtofAppealdecisionsreviewedabove,
endorsinginparticulartheOntarioCourtofAppealdecisioninOakes.AnearlierBritishColumbiaCourtofAppealopinion,ReAnsonandTheQueen(1983),146
D.L.R.(3d)661(B.C.C.A.),haddismissedanappealfromarulingwhichhadupheldtheconstitutionalityofs.8oftheNarcoticControlActhowever,thebasisforthe
denialoftheappealwasprocedural.Thecourtdidnotassesstheconstitutionalityofs.8inrelationtothepresumptionofinnocence.
48Therehavealsobeenanumberofcasesinwhichthemeaningofs.11(d)hasbeenconsideredin[page129]relationtootherlegislativeprovisionssee,for
example,R.v.Holmes(1983),41O.R.(2d)250(Ont.C.A.)R.v.Whyte(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)277(B.C.C.A.),leavetoappealtoS.C.C.grantedR.v.Lee'sPoultry
Ltd.(1985),17C.C.C.(3d)539(Ont.C.A.)R.v.T.(1985),18C.C.C.(3d)125(N.S.C.A.)R.v.Kowalczuk(1983),5C.C.C.(3d)25(Man.C.A.)R.v.Schwartz
(1983),10C.C.C.(3d)34(Man.C.A.)ReBoyleandTheQueen(1983),41O.R.(2d)713(Ont.C.A.)
49Tosummarize,theCanadianCharterjurisprudenceonthepresumptionofinnocenceins.11(d)andreverseonusprovisionsappearstohavesolidlyaccordeda
highdegreeofprotectiontothepresumptionofinnocence.Anyinfringementsofthisrightarepermissibleonlywhen,inthewordsofs.1oftheCharter,theyare
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reasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.
(iii)

UnitedStatesJurisprudence

50IntheUnitedStates,protectionofthepresumptionofinnocenceisnotexplicit.Rather,ithasbeenreadintothe"dueprocess"provisionsoftheAmericanBillof
RightscontainedintheFifthandFourteenthAmendmentsoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica.AnextensivereviewoftheUnitedStatescaselawis
providedinMartinJ.A.'sjudgmentfortheOntarioCourtofAppeal.Iwill,therefore,merelyhighlightthemajorjurisprudentialdevelopments.
51InTotv.UnitedStates,319U.S.463(1943),RobertsJ.outlinedthefollowingtestatpp.46768:
...astatutorypresumptioncannotbesustainediftherebenorationalconnectionbetweenthefactprovedandtheultimatefactpresumed,
iftheinferenceoftheonefromproofoftheotherisarbitrarybecauseoflackofconnectionbetweenthetwoincommonexperience.
Thecomparativeconvenienceofproducingevidencewasalsoacknowledgedasacorollarytest.Thecaseinvolvedapresumptiontobedrawn,[page130]fromthe
possessionoffirearmsbyapersonconvictedofapreviouscrimeofviolence,thatthefirearmswereillegallyobtainedthroughinterstateorforeigncommerce.Ofnote
wasRobertsJ.'scommentthatevenifarationalconnectionhadbeenproved,thestatutorypresumptioncouldnotbesustainedbecauseoftheprejudicialrelianceona
pastconvictionaspartofthebasicfact.Theaccusedwouldbediscreditedintheeyesofthejuryevenbeforeheattemptedtodisprovethepresumedfact.
52InLearyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6(1969),HarlanJ.articulatedamorestringenttestforinvalidityatp.36:
...acriminalstatutorypresumptionmustberegardedas"irrational"or"arbitrary",andhenceunconstitutional,unlessitcanatleastbesaid
withsubstantialassurancethatthepresumedfactismorelikelythannottoflowfromtheprovedfactonwhichitismadetodepend.
HarlanJ.alsonotedthatsincethestatutorypresumptionwasinvalidundertheabovetest,"weneednotreachthequestionwhetheracriminalpresumptionwhich
passesmusterwhensojudgedmustalsosatisfythecriminal"reasonabledoubt'standardifproofofthecrimechargedoranessentialelementthereofdependsuponits
use"(footnote64)
53TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdidanswerthisquestioninCountyCourtofUlsterCounty,NewYorkv.Allen,442U.S.140(1979).Itheldthatwherea
mandatorycriminalpresumptionwasimposedbystatute,theStatemaynot"restitscaseentirelyonapresumptionunlessthefactprovedissufficienttosupportthe
inferenceofguiltbeyondareasonabledoubt"(p.167).Amererationalconnectionisinsufficient.Thiscaseillustratesthehighdegreeofconstitutionalprotection
accordedtheprinciplethatanaccusedmustbefoundguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.The[page131]rationaleforthisiswellstatedbyBrennanJ.inInReWinship,
397U.S.358(1970),atpp.36364:
Therequirementofproofbeyondareasonabledoubthasthisvitalroleinourcriminalprocedureforcogentreasons.Theaccused
duringacriminalprosecutionhasatstakeinterestsofimmenseimportance,bothbecauseofthepossibilitythathemaylosehisliberty
uponconvictionandbecauseofthecertaintythathewouldbestigmatizedbytheconviction.Accordingly,asocietythatvaluesthe
goodnameandfreedomofeveryindividualshouldnotcondemnamanforcommissionofacrimewhenthereisreasonabledoubtabout
hisguilt.
(iv)EuropeanConventiononHumanRightsJurisprudence
54Asmentionedabove,internationaldevelopmentsinhumanrightslawhaveaffordedprotectiontotheprincipleofthepresumptionofinnocence.The
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jurisprudenceonTheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsincludesaconsiderationofthelegitimacyofreverseonusprovisions.Section6(2)ofTheEuropean
ConventiononHumanRightsreads:
Article6
2.

Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallbepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingtolaw.

Themeaningofs.6(2)wasclarifiedinthePfundersCase(Austriav.Italy)(1963),6YearbookE.C.H.R.740,atp.782andp.784:
Thistext,accordingtowhicheveryonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallbepresumedinnocentuntilprovedguiltyaccordingto
law,requiresfirstlythatcourtjudgesinfulfillingtheirdutiesshouldnotstartwiththeconvictionorassumptionthattheaccused
committedtheactwithwhichheischarged.Inotherwords,theonustoproveguiltfallsupontheProsecution,andanydoubtistothe
benefitoftheaccused.Moreover,thejudgesmustpermitthelattertoproduceevidenceinrebuttal.Intheirjudgmenttheycanfindhim
guiltyonlyonthebasisofdirectorindirectevidencesufficientlystrongintheeyesofthelawtoestablishhisguilt.

[page132]

55AlthoughtheCommissionhasendorsedthegeneralimportanceoftherequirementthattheprosecutionprovetheaccused'sguiltbeyondareasonabledoubt,it
hasacknowledgedthepermissibilityofcertainexceptionstothisprinciple.Forexample,theCommissionupheldastatutoryreverseonusprovisioninwhichaman
livingwithorhabituallyinthecompanyofaprostituteispresumedtobeknowinglylivingontheearningsofprostitutionunlessheprovesotherwise(Xagainstthe
UnitedKingdom,Appl'n.No.5124/71,CollectionofDecisions,E.C.H.R.,135).TheCommissionnotedtheimportanceofexaminingthesubstanceandeffectofa
statutoryreverseonus.Itconcluded,however,atp.135:
Thestatutorypresumptioninthepresentcaseisrestrictivelyworded....Thepresumptionisneitherirrebuttablenorunreasonable.To
obligetheprosecutiontoobtaindirectevidenceof"livingonimmoralearnings"wouldinmostcasesmakeitstaskimpossible.
(SeediscussioninFrancisJacobs,TheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(Oxford:1975),pp.11314).
(d)

ConclusionRegardings.11(d)oftheCharterands.8oftheNarcoticControlAct

56Thisreviewoftheauthoritieslaysthegroundworkforformulatingsomegeneralconclusionsregardingreverseonusprovisionsandthepresumptionofinnocence
ins.11(d).Wecanthenproceedtoapplytheseprinciplestotheparticularsofs.8oftheNarcoticControlAct.
57Ingeneralonemust,Ithink,concludethataprovisionwhichrequiresanaccusedtodisproveonabalanceofprobabilitiestheexistenceofapresumedfact,which
isanimportantelementoftheoffenceinquestion,violatesthepresumptionofinnocenceins.11(d).Ifanaccusedbearstheburdenofdisprovingonabalanceof
probabilitiesanessentialelementofanoffence,itwouldbepossibleforaconvictiontooccurdespitetheexistenceofareasonabledoubt.Thiswouldariseifthe
accusedadducedsufficientevidencetoraisea[page133]reasonabledoubtastohisorherinnocencebutdidnotconvincethejuryonabalanceofprobabilitiesthat
thepresumedfactwasuntrue.
58Thefactthatthestandardisonlythecivilonedoesnotrenderareverseonusclauseconstitutional.AsSirRupertCrosscommentedintheRedeLectures,"The
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GoldenThreadoftheEnglishCriminalLaw:TheBurdenofProof",deliveredin1976attheUniversityofToronto,atpp.1113:
ItissometimessaidthatexceptionstotheWoolmingtonruleareacceptablebecause,whenevertheburdenofproofonanyissueina
criminalcaseisbornebytheaccused,heonlyhastosatisfythejuryonthebalanceofprobabilities,whereasonissuesonwhichthe
Crownbearstheburdenofproofthejurymustbesatisfiedbeyondareasonabledoubt....Thefactthatthestandardislowerwhenthe
accusedbearstheburdenofproofthanitiswhentheburdenofproofisbornebytheprosecutionisnoanswertomyobjectiontothe
existenceofexceptionstotheWoolmingtonruleasitdoesnotalterthefactthatajuryorbenchofmagistratesmayhavetoconvictthe
accusedalthoughtheyarefarfromsureofhisguilt.
59Aswehaveseen,thepotentialforarationalconnectionbetweenthebasicfactandthepresumedfacttojustifyareverseonusprovisionhasbeenelaboratedin
someofthecasesdiscussedaboveandisnowknownasthe"rationalconnectiontest".Inthecontextofs.11(d),however,thefollowingquestionarises:ifweapply
therationalconnectiontesttotheconsiderationofwhethers.11(d)hasbeenviolated,areweadequatelyprotectingtheconstitutionalprincipleofthepresumptionof
innocence?AsProfessorsMacKayandCromwellpointoutintheirarticle"Oakes:ABoldInitiativeImpededbyOldGhosts"(1983),32C.R.(3d)221,atp.233:
Therationalconnectiontestapprovesaprovisionthatforcesthetriertoinferafactthatmaybesimplyrationallyconnectedtotheproved
fact.Whydoesitfollowthatsuchaprovisiondoesnotoffendtheconstitutional[page134]righttobeprovedguiltybeyondareasonable
doubt?
Abasicfactmayrationallytendtoproveapresumedfact,butnotproveitsexistencebeyondareasonabledoubt.Anaccusedpersoncouldtherebybeconvicted
despitethepresenceofareasonabledoubt.Thiswouldviolatethepresumptionofinnocence.
60Ishouldaddthatthisquestioningoftheconstitutionalityofthe"rationalconnectiontest"asaguidetointerpretings.11(d)doesnotminimizeitsimportance.
Theappropriatestageforinvokingtherationalconnectiontest,however,isunders.1oftheCharter.ThisconsiderationdidnotariseundertheCanadianBillofRights
becauseoftheabsenceofanequivalenttos.1.AttheCourtofAppeallevelinthepresentcase,MartinJ.A.soughttocombinetheanalysisofs.11(d)ands.1to
overcomethelimitationsoftheCanadianBillofRightsjurisprudence.Tomymind,itishighlydesirabletokeeps.1ands.11(d)analyticallydistinct.Separatingthe
analysisintotwocomponentsisconsistentwiththeapproachthisCourthastakentotheChartertodate(seeR.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,supraHunterv.Southam
Inc.,[1984]2S.C.R.145LawSocietyofUpperCanadav.Skapinker,[1984]1S.C.R.357).
61Toreturntos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct,Iaminnodoubtwhatsoeverthatitviolatess.11(d)oftheCharterbyrequiringtheaccusedtoproveonabalanceof
probabilitiesthathewasnotinpossessionofthenarcoticforthepurposeoftrafficking.Mr.Oakesiscompelledbys.8toproveheisnotguiltyoftheoffenceof
trafficking.Heisthusdeniedhisrighttobepresumedinnocentandsubjectedtothepotentialpenaltyoflifeimprisonmentunlesshecanrebutthepresumption.Thisis
radicallyandfundamentallyinconsistentwiththesocietalvaluesofhumandignityandlibertywhich[page135]weespouse,andisdirectlycontrarytothe
presumptionofinnocenceenshrinedins.11(d).Letusturnnowtos.1oftheCharter.
V
Iss.8oftheNarcoticControlActaReasonableandDemonstrablyJustifiedLimitPursuanttos.1oftheCharter?
62TheCrownsubmitsthatevenifs.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolatess.11(d)oftheCharter,itcanstillbeupheldasareasonablelimitunders.1which,ashas
beenmentioned,provides:
1.TheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsguaranteestherightsandfreedomssetoutinitsubjectonlytosuchreasonable
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limitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.
Thequestionwhetherthelimitis"prescribedbylaw"isnotcontentiousinthepresentcasesinces.8oftheNarcoticControlActisadulyenactedlegislative
provision.Itis,however,necessarytodetermineifthelimitonMr.Oakes'right,asguaranteedbys.11(d)oftheCharter,is"reasonable"and"demonstrablyjustifiedin
afreeanddemocraticsociety"forthepurposeofs.1oftheCharter,andtherebysavedfrominconsistencywiththeConstitution.
63Itisimportanttoobserveattheoutsetthats.1hastwofunctions:first,itconstitutionallyguaranteestherightsandfreedomssetoutintheprovisionswhich
followand,second,itstatesexplicitlytheexclusivejustificatorycriteria(outsideofs.33oftheConstitutionAct,1982)againstwhichlimitationsonthoserightsand
freedomsmustbemeasured.Accordingly,anys.1inquirymustbepremisedonanunderstandingthattheimpugnedlimitviolatesconstitutionalrightsandfreedoms
rightsandfreedomswhicharepartofthesupremelawofCanada.AsWilsonJ.statedinSinghetal.v.MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration,supra,atp.218:"...it
isimportanttorememberthatthecourtsareconductingthisinquiryinlightofa[page136]commitmenttoupholdtherightsandfreedomssetoutintheothersections
oftheCharter."
64Asecondcontextualelementofinterpretationofs.1isprovidedbythewords"freeanddemocraticsociety".Inclusionofthesewordsasthefinalstandardof
justificationforlimitsonrightsandfreedomsreferstheCourttotheverypurposeforwhichtheCharterwasoriginallyentrenchedintheConstitution:Canadian
societyistobefreeanddemocratic.TheCourtmustbeguidedbythevaluesandprinciplesessentialtoafreeanddemocraticsocietywhichIbelieveembody,toname
butafew,respectfortheinherentdignityofthehumanperson,commitmenttosocialjusticeandequality,accommodationofawidevarietyofbeliefs,respectfor
culturalandgroupidentity,andfaithinsocialandpoliticalinstitutionswhichenhancetheparticipationofindividualsandgroupsinsociety.Theunderlyingvalues
andprinciplesofafreeanddemocraticsocietyarethegenesisoftherightsandfreedomsguaranteedbytheCharterandtheultimatestandardagainstwhichalimitona
rightorfreedommustbeshown,despiteitseffect,tobereasonableanddemonstrablyjustified.
65TherightsandfreedomsguaranteedbytheCharterarenot,however,absolute.Itmaybecomenecessarytolimitrightsandfreedomsincircumstanceswheretheir
exercisewouldbeinimicaltotherealizationofcollectivegoalsoffundamentalimportance.Forthisreason,s.1providescriteriaofjustificationforlimitsontherights
andfreedomsguaranteedbytheCharter.Thesecriteriaimposeastringentstandardofjustification,especiallywhenunderstoodintermsofthetwocontextual
considerationsdiscussedabove,namely,theviolationofaconstitutionallyguaranteedrightorfreedomandthefundamentalprinciplesofafreeanddemocratic
society.
66TheonusofprovingthatalimitonarightorfreedomguaranteedbytheCharterisreasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocratic[page137]
societyrestsuponthepartyseekingtoupholdthelimitation.Itisclearfromthetextofs.1thatlimitsontherightsandfreedomsenumeratedintheCharterare
exceptionstotheirgeneralguarantee.Thepresumptionisthattherightsandfreedomsareguaranteedunlessthepartyinvokings.1canbringitselfwithinthe
exceptionalcriteriawhichjustifytheirbeinglimited.Thisisfurthersubstantiatedbytheuseoftheword"demonstrably"whichclearlyindicatesthattheonusof
justificationisonthepartyseekingtolimit:Hunterv.SouthamInc.,supra.
67Thestandardofproofunders.1isthecivilstandard,namely,proofbyapreponderanceofprobability.Thealternativecriminalstandard,proofbeyonda
reasonabledoubt,would,inmyview,beundulyonerousonthepartyseekingtolimit.Conceptssuchas"reasonableness","justifiability"and"freeanddemocratic
society"aresimplynotamenabletosuchastandard.Nevertheless,thepreponderanceofprobabilitytestmustbeappliedrigorously.Indeed,thephrase"demonstrably
justified"ins.1oftheChartersupportsthisconclusion.Withinthebroadcategoryofthecivilstandard,thereexistdifferentdegreesofprobabilitydependingonthe
natureofthecase:seeSopinkaandLederman,TheLawofEvidenceinCivilCases(Toronto:1974),atp.385.AsLordDenningexplainedinBaterv.Bater,[1950]2
AllE.R.458(C.A.),atp.459:
Thecasemaybeprovedbyapreponderanceofprobability,buttheremaybedegreesofprobabilitywithinthatstandard.Thedegree
dependsonthesubjectmatter.Acivilcourt,whenconsideringachargeoffraud,willnaturallyrequireahigherdegreeofprobability
thanthatwhichitwouldrequireifconsideringwhethernegligencewereestablished.Itdoesnotadoptsohighadegreeasacriminal
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court,evenwhenitisconsideringachargeofacriminalnature,butstillitdoesrequireadegreeofprobabilitywhichiscommensurate
withtheoccasion.

[page138]

ThispassagewascitedwithapprovalinHanesv.WawanesaMutualInsuranceCo.,[1963]S.C.R.154,atp.161.AsimilarapproachwasputforwardbyCartwrightJ.
inSmithv.Smith[1952]2S.C.R.312,atpp.33132:
Iwish,however,toemphasizethatineverycivilactionbeforethetribunalcansafelyfindtheaffirmativeofanissueoffactrequiredtobe
proveditmustbereasonablysatisfied,andthatwhetherornotitwillbesosatisfiedmustdependonthetotalityofthecircumstanceson
whichitsjudgmentisformedincludingthegravityoftheconsequences....
68Havingregardtothefactthats.1isbeinginvokedforthepurposeofjustifyingaviolationoftheconstitutionalrightsandfreedomstheCharterwasdesignedto
protect,averyhighdegreeofprobabilitywillbe,inthewordsofLordDenning,"commensuratewiththeoccasion".Whereevidenceisrequiredinordertoprovethe
consituentelementsofas.1inquiry,andthiswillgenerallybethecase,itshouldbecogentandpersuasiveandmakecleartotheCourttheconsequencesofimposing
ornotimposingthelimit.See:LawSocietyofUpperCanadav.Skapinker,supra,atp.384Singhetal.v.MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration,supra,atp.217.A
courtwillalsoneedtoknowwhatalternativemeasuresforimplementingtheobjectivewereavailabletothelegislatorswhentheymadetheirdecisions.Ishouldadd,
however,thattheremaybecaseswherecertainelementsofthes.1analysisareobviousorselfevident.
69Toestablishthatalimitisreasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety,twocentralcriteriamustbesatisfied.First,theobjective,which
themeasuresresponsibleforalimitonaCharterrightorfreedomaredesignedtoserve,mustbe"ofsufficientimportancetowarrantoverridingaconstitutionally
protectedrightorfreedom":R.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,supra,atp.352.Thestandardmustbehighinordertoensurethatobjectiveswhicharetrivialordiscordant
withtheprinciplesintegraltoafreeanddemocraticsocietydonotgains.1protection.Itisnecessary,ataminimum,thatanobjectiverelatetoconcernswhichare
pressingandsubstantial[page139]inafreeanddemocraticsocietybeforeitcanbecharacterizedassufficientlyimportant.
70Second,onceasufficientlysignificantobjectiveisrecognized,thenthepartyinvokings.1mustshowthatthemeanschosenarereasonableanddemonstrably
justified.Thisinvolves"aformofproportionalitytest":R.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,supra,atp.352.Althoughthenatureoftheproportionalitytestwillvary
dependingonthecircumstances,ineachcasecourtswillberequiredtobalancetheinterestsofsocietywiththoseofindividualsandgroups.Thereare,inmyview,
threeimportantcomponentsofaproportionalitytest.First,themeasuresadoptedmustbecarefullydesignedtoachievetheobjectiveinquestion.Theymustnotbe
arbitrary,unfairorbasedonirrationalconsiderations.Inshort,theymustberationallyconnectedtotheobjective.Second,themeans,evenifrationallyconnectedto
theobjectiveinthisfirstsense,shouldimpair"aslittleaspossible"therightorfreedominquestion:R.v.BigMDrugMartLtd.,supra,atp.352.Third,theremustbea
proportionalitybetweentheeffectsofthemeasureswhichareresponsibleforlimitingtheCharterrightorfreedom,andtheobjectivewhichhasbeenidentifiedasof
"sufficientimportance".
71Withrespecttothethirdcomponent,itisclearthatthegeneraleffectofanymeasureimpugnedunders.1willbetheinfringementofarightorfreedom
guaranteedbytheCharterthisisthereasonwhyresorttos.1isnecessary.Theinquiryintoeffectsmust,however,gofurther.Awiderangeofrightsandfreedomsare
guaranteedbytheCharter,andanalmostinfinitenumberoffactualsituationsmayariseinrespectofthese.SomelimitsonrightsandfreedomsprotectedbytheCharter
willbemoreseriousthanothersintermsofthenatureoftherightorfreedomviolated,theextentoftheviolation,andthedegreetowhichthemeasureswhichimpose
thelimittrenchupontheintegralprinciplesofafreeanddemocratic[page140]society.Evenifanobjectiveisofsufficientimportance,andthefirsttwoelementsof
theproportionalitytestaresatisfied,itisstillpossiblethat,becauseoftheseverityofthedeleteriouseffectsofameasureonindividualsorgroups,themeasurewillnot
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bejustifiedbythepurposesitisintendedtoserve.Themoreseverethedeleteriouseffectsofameasure,themoreimportanttheobjectivemustbeifthemeasureistobe
reasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.
72Havingoutlinedthegeneralprinciplesofas.1inquiry,wemustapplythemtos.8oftheNarcoticControlAct.Isthereverseonusprovisionins.8areasonable
limitontherighttobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguiltybeyondareasonabledoubtascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety?
73Thestartingpointforformulatingaresponsetothisquestionis,asstatedabove,thenatureofParliament'sinterestorobjectivewhichaccountsforthepassageof
s.8oftheNarcoticControlAct.AccordingtotheCrown,s.8oftheNarcoticControlActisaimedatcurbingdrugtraffickingbyfacilitatingtheconvictionofdrug
traffickers.Inmyopinion,Parliament'sconcernthatdrugtraffickingbedecreasedcanbecharacterizedassubstantialandpressing.Theproblemofdrugtraffickinghas
beenincreasingsincethe1950'satwhichtimetherewasalreadyconsiderableconcern.(SeeReportoftheSpecialCommitteeonTrafficinNarcoticDrugs,Appendix
toDebatesoftheSenate,Canada,Session1955,pp.690700seealsoFinalReportoftheCommissionofInquiryintotheNonMedicalUseofDrugs(Ottawa,1973).)
Throughoutthisperiod,numerousmeasureswereadoptedbyfreeanddemocraticsocieties,atboththeinternationalandnationallevels.
74Attheinternationallevel,onJune23,1953,theProtocolforLimitingandRegulatingtheCultivation[page141]ofthePoppyPlant,theProductionof,
InternationalandWholesaleTradein,andUseofOpium,towhichCanadaisasignatory,wasadoptedbytheUnitedNationsOpiumConferenceheldinNewYork.
TheSingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs,1961,wasaccededtoinNewYorkonMarch30,1961.ThistreatywassignedbyCanadaonMarch30,1961.Itentered
intoforceonDecember13,1964.AsstatedinthePreamble,"addictiontonarcoticdrugsconstitutesaseriousevilfortheindividualandisfraughtwithsocialand
economicdangertomankind,..."
75Atthenationallevel,statutoryprovisionshavebeenenactedbynumerouscountrieswhich,interalia,attempttodeterdrugtraffickingbyimposingcriminal
sanctions(see,forexample,MisuseofDrugsAct1975,1975(N.Z.),No.116MisuseofDrugsAct1971,1971(U.K.),c.38).
76Theobjectiveofprotectingoursocietyfromthegraveillsassociatedwithdrugtrafficking,is,inmyview,oneofsufficientimportancetowarrantoverridinga
constitutionallyprotectedrightorfreedomincertaincases.Moreover,thedegreeofseriousnessofdrugtraffickingmakesitsacknowledgementasasufficiently
importantobjectiveforthepurposesofs.1,toalargeextent,selfevident.Thefirstcriterionofas.1inquiry,therefore,hasbeensatisfiedbytheCrown.
77ThenextstageofinquiryisaconsiderationofthemeanschosenbyParliamenttoachieveitsobjective.Themeansmustbereasonableanddemonstrablyjustified
inafreeanddemocraticsociety.Asoutlinedabove,thisproportionalitytestshouldbeginwithaconsiderationoftherationalityoftheprovision:isthereverseonus
clauseins.8rationallyrelatedtotheobjectiveofcurbingdrugtrafficking?Ataminimum,thisrequiresthats.8beinternallyrationaltheremustbearational
connectionbetweenthebasicfactofpossessionandthepresumedfactofpossessionforthepurposeoftrafficking.Otherwise,thereverseonusclausecouldgiveriseto
unjustifiedanderroneous[page142]convictionsfordrugtraffickingofpersonsguiltyonlyofpossessionofnarcotics.
78Inmyview,s.8doesnotsurvivethisrationalconnectiontest.AsMartinJ.A.oftheOntarioCourtofAppealconcluded,possessionofasmallornegligible
quantityofnarcoticsdoesnotsupporttheinferenceoftrafficking.Inotherwords,itwouldbeirrationaltoinferthatapersonhadanintenttotrafficonthebasisofhis
orherpossessionofaverysmallquantityofnarcotics.Thepresumptionrequiredunders.8oftheNarcoticControlActisoverinclusiveandcouldleadtoresultsin
certaincaseswhichwoulddefybothrationalityandfairness.Inlightoftheseriousnessoftheoffenceinquestion,whichcarrieswithitthepossibilityofimprisonment
forlife,IamfurtherconvincedthatthefirstcomponentoftheproportionalitytesthasnotbeensatisfiedbytheCrown.
79Havingconcludedthats.8doesnotsatisfythisfirstcomponentofproportionality,itisunnecessarytoconsidertheothertwocomponents.
VI
Conclusion
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80TheOntarioCourtofAppealwascorrectinholdingthats.8oftheNarcoticControlActviolatestheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsandisthereforeof
noforceoreffect.Section8imposesalimitontherightguaranteedbys.11(d)oftheCharterwhichisnotreasonableandisnotdemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeand
democraticsocietyforthepurposeofs.1.Accordingly,theconstitutionalquestionisansweredasfollows:
Question:
Iss.8oftheNarcoticControlActinconsistentwiths.11(d)oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsandthusofnoforceand
effect?
Answer:Yes.
Iwould,therefore,dismisstheappeal.

[page143]

ThereasonsofEsteyandMcIntyreJJ.weredeliveredby

81ESTEYJ.:Iwoulddismissthisappeal.IagreewiththeconclusionsofDicksonC.J.withreferencetotherelationshipbetweens.11(d)ands.1oftheCanadian
CharterofRightsandFreedoms.Forthedispositionofallotherissuesarisinginthisappeal,IwouldadoptthereasonsgivenbyMartinJ.A.inthecourtbelow.
Appealdismissed.

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