KCKCC

<File>

C-Dizzle
2009-2010

Hyper Heidegger Af
***1AC***

1AC 3-13

***T/Framework***

T 15-18
2AC: Framework (Short Version) 19
2AC: Framework (Long Version) 24
A2: Instrumental Desirability 30
A2: You Destroy Education 31
A2: Topical Version 32
A2: You Could Run Anything 33
2AR Framework Overview 34
Framework/T- Education 2AR 35
1AR/2AR: FW/T (Zimmerman Extension) 36
1AR/2AR: FW/T (Der Derian Extension) 37

***CP's***

2AC: CP- No Solvency 38

***DA's***

2AC: DAs 40
A2: Econ Scenarios 44
A2: Terrorism Scenarios 45
A2: Nuclear War Scenarios 46
Systemic MPX Out Weigh 47
Aff Comes First 48
1AR: Coviello EXT 49
2AR MPX Overview: Policy MPX 51

***Case Stuf***

2AC: Tech Good 53

A2: Tech Solves 55
2AC: Heidegger= Nazi 56
A2: Heidegger= Violence 59
2AC: Ontology Good/First 60
2AC: Ontology > Ethics 62
2AC: Realism Good 64
2AC: PO-MO 65
A2: Aff = Metaphysics Turn 66

***Kritiks***

2AC: Doubling 68
2AC: Nietzsche 69
A2: Nietzsche You are Will To Power 70
2AC: Anthro K 71
Generic Alt No Solvency/Turn 72

KCKCC
<File>

C-Dizzle
2009-2010

***Perms***

2AC: Generic K Perm Do Both 74

Heidegger Perm 1AR 75
2AC: Perm Do Both- Adaptation 76
2AC: Juxtaposition Perm 77
Juxtaposition Perm: 1AR 78
Juxtaposition Perm: 2AR 79
2AC: Forget Perm 80

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

***1AC***

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Contention 1- Closing the Gap

The logic of distance and time is a representation of technological
thought. Shrinking the distances in all aspects of life to pure
efficiencyHeidegger 50
Martin Heidegger, June 1950, The Thing pg. 1
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Humankind now reaches overnight,
by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel. S/he now
receives instant information, by radio, of events which he formerly learned about
only years later, if at all. The germination and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a minute, on film . Distant sites of the most
ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst
today's street traffic. More- over, the film attests to what it shows by presenting also the camera
and its operators at work. The peak of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by
television, which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of

communication. Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time.
He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before
himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for
nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance,
by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far
from us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great
distance remoteness.

The current pace of technological evolution is accelerating to a point

where we will reach a rupture in the fabric of humanity
representing the next technological paradigm shiftKurzweil
01
Ray Kurzweil, 2001, The Law of Accelerating Returns, http://www.kurzweilai.net/thelaw-of-accelerating-returns
Can the pace of technological progress continue to speed up indefinitely? Is there not a point where humans are unable to think fast enough to keep up with it? With regard to unenhanced humans, clearly so.
But what would a thousand scientists, each a thousand times more intelligent than human scientists today, and each operating a thousand times faster than contemporary humans (because the information

with
technology to become even more intelligent (because their intelligence is no
longer of fixed capacity). They would change their own thought processes to think
even faster. When the scientists evolve to be a million times more intelligent and operate a million
times faster, then an hour would result in a century of progress (in todays terms). This, then, is the
Singularity. The Singularity is technological change so rapid and so profound that it
represents a rupture in the fabric of human history. Some would say that we
cannot comprehend the Singularity, at least with our current level of understanding,
and that it is impossible, therefore, to look past its event horizon and make sense
of what lies beyond. My view is that despite our profound limitations of thought, constrained as we
are today to a mere hundred trillion inter-neuronal connections in our biological brains, we
nonetheless have sufficient powers of abstraction to make meaningful statements
about the nature of life after the Singularity. Most importantly, it is my view that the
intelligence that will emerge will continue to represent the human civilization,
which is already a human-machine civilization. This will be the next step in evolution,
the next high level paradigm shift.
processing in their primarily non-biological brains is faster) accomplish? One year would be like a millennium. What would they come up with? Well, for one thing, they would come up

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

This rupture is the representation of humans moving from the will to

power to what Heidegger calls the Will to Will. The Will to
Will is an expression of power in the purest form and the
height of Metaphysics creating a culture of pure technicity.
This is the essence of technological destining that forces human
and non-humans to be reduced to the functioning of the
standing reserve were humans are set in place as a condition
of technological development; the only way out is through a
constant re-thinking of the technological essenceKroker 02
Arthur Kroker, 2002, Hyper Heidegger http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=348
An idealist in the tradition of German nationalism, Heidegger's fate was to be that of the faithless thinker, ultimately disloyal to German fascism because it was not sufficiently metaphysical, yet unable to
reconcile himself to western liberalism because it was, in his estimation, the political self-consciousness of technicity. For this reason, Heidegger ended the war digging ditches, having been ousted by German
university authorities acting at the behest of state fascism as the University of Freiburg's "most dispensable Professor." It is also for this reason that Heidegger in the post-war period was, except for a brief

always in transition to the next historical stage

of the "will," always in rebellion against the impurities of compromised philosophical vision, Heidegger's mind was fully attuned to the restless stirrings of the will as its broke
from its twin moorings in ethnic fundamentalism and industrial capitalism and began to
project itself into world-history in the pure metaphysical form of the "will to will."
[3] Beyond time and space, breaking through the skin of human culture , respecting no national
borders, an "overcoming" that first and foremost overcomes its own nostalgic yearnings for a final
appearance in the theatre of representation, the will to will , what Heidegger would come to call the
culture of "pure technicity," was the gleam on the post-human horizon, and Heidegger was its most faithful
period before retirement, expelled from university teaching. Always a metaphysician,

reporter. In Heidegger's writings, the main historical trends of the 21st century have their prophet and doomsayer. Heidegger's mind lies between past and future. If Heidegger could write so eloquently and
think so mystically about that which in the present era is so unmentionableBeing, if Heidegger could say that Being "comes into presence"

"enframing," the animating impulse of technology,

in the mode of

if he could speak of Being as containing both a "danger" and a "saving power"

a "turning," a
"lightning-flash" which illuminates human beings to themselves, and which does
so not by surrendering to calculative thinking or by retreating to spurious forms of idealism, but by looking
deeply and meditatively into the danger of technology, by "thinking" technology to
its roots in metaphysics. Hyper-Heidegger, then, a thinker who makes of himself both a "danger" and a "saving-power," who makes of the effort of reading Heidegger
both a form of "unconcealedness" and "openness." If Heidegger could dismiss as illusory thinking the pretension that "man
has mastery of technology," claiming instead the opposite that human beings are
set in place as a condition of possibility for the development of technology , [4] if Heidegger
and speak evocatively of the "turning" so necessary to transform the danger into the saving power, perhaps that is because Heidegger's thought is itself

could only speak of the human essence in terms of its deep entanglement with the question of technology, that is because Heidegger's thought is the "clearing" that he thought he was only prophesying.

Our Technological thinking causes the brutalization of humanity and

establishes a false sense of value to life- this outweighs any
impact. Metaphysical approaches have been exhausted
Weinberger 92
Jerry Weinberger, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, Politics
and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political
Philosophy, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp.
112-127, JSTOR) KR/JRC
Recent thinking about technology and its implications for politics has taken a postmodern turn. In its
modern formulation, the danger of technology is the possibility that in the scientific

age we will succumb to the consequences of our most impressive intellectual

achievements. First, we were poised on the brink of nuclear destruction. Now, as that threat fades, we and the world
face new dangers, this time springing from technology used with the best of intentions. Disaster looms because technology enhances
our powers of control and because modern science, the theoretical ground of
technology, understands human nature to be as manipulable as matter in motion.
Under the spell of these forces we risk self-inflicted deformation and brutalization, all in the name of
human comfort, freedom from pain, and variety of choice. From this modern point of view technology compels us to remember our essential
humanity lest we fail to control the technical means that threaten fundamental
values (e.g., Jonas 1984; Kass 1985). The modern age is not just the age of science; it is the age of the potentially beneficent tension between science and humanism. If we understand how science
and humanism contend within the progress of reason, it will be possible to exercise responsible political choice today. The postmodern view is perhaps best expressed by Heidegger's comment that "the

Technology is not the sum of machines

and techniques that we must learn to master and use as a neutral set of means
lest we forsake our humanity. Technology is not even something we need to "do"
essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger 1977, 4; 1967, vol. 1, 5).

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

anything about. Rather, it is just what we have now become. And although it opens our eyes, it does not compel us to seek out a reinvigorated humanism. On the contrary,
technology discloses to us that humanism is the proximate source of technology.
Technology is indeed a fateful danger; but it shows us that within the tradition of rationalism, the essences of technology and humanism are the same.
As the result of that tradition, our world is now stamped by technology. But the problem of technology has nothing to do with recovering humane
standards for political (and technical) choice. That problem is less a challenge to be met and overcome than a sign that we are on the verge of an age in which all of our
categories of political choice and evaluation have become exhausted. Whatever it
might be that technology compels us to do (especially as regards politics), it will not be to recur to the
contending elements of modern rationalism.

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Technological understanding of being creates the mindset that

people and the environment are a standing reserve for
consumption. What doesnt hold value to us is waste to be
discarded. It was this type of technological thinking that
allowed the extermination of Jewish people in the holocaust
Zimmerman 94
Michael Zimmerman, 1994, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University
Contesting Earth's Future, p.43
Nevertheless, in speaking of the Holocaust in the same breath with the hydrogen bomb, Heidegger was
making an important point. Mass extermination in the Nazi camps was possible only
because of developments within industrial technology. Moreover, the Nazis spoke of

the Jews as if they were little more than industrial waste to be disposed of as
efficiently as possible. Officials in charge of planning strategic use of nuclear
weapons must be trained to conceive of the enemy populace in wholly abstract
terms. Heidegger argued in several places that the hydrogen bomb- an instrument of mass
extermination- was not the real problem facing us. Instead, the problem is the pervasion and
construction of humanitys understanding of being itself in the technological era.
Extermination camps and hydrogen bombs , from Heideggers viewpoint, were both symptoms of
humanitys conception of itself and everything else as a resource to be produced
and consumed, created and destroyed, at will.

Humanitys attempt at making calculations is a facet of our

technological mindset. These calculations represent our
reduction of the world to a subject/object dualism in order to
assign value and deciding what is to be consumed or discarded.
This results in the stripping of nature and a hollowing or our
beingDeLuca 05
Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in
the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, Thinking With Heidegger:
Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice, Ethics & the Environment 10.1
(2005) 67-87, Project Muse)//JRCno change
Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through
calculation, acceleration, technicity, and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to
mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is
calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 8496). Machination is the "pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything
draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (1999,
92). The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: "When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by

. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly

self-surpassing progress are only one sign of this enchantment , by [End Page 75] virtue of which everything presses forth into
calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation" (1999, 8687). Heidegger prophetically predicts that
machination will produce "a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as
well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable
today" (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more
significantly, are banished from Being-in-the-world with us : "What is a plant and an animal to us anymore, when we take away use,
embellishment, and entertainment" (1999, 194). "Nature" suffers a similar fate: "What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The
growingor better, the simple rolling unto its enddestruction of 'nature'.... And finally what was left was only 'scenery' and recreational opportunity and even
this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses" (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of machination,
humans suffer a "hollowing out" (1999, 91, 348) and Being-in-the-world is replaced by "adventures." (I am here translating Erlebnis as
which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it

adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

This loss of Being is worse than nuclear warZimmerman 94

Michael Zimmerman, 1994, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University,
Contesting Earth's Future, p. 119-120)
Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being
and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear
war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth." This
controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is
possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less
likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such
life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for
being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.

If
humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger
believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth,
masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild
The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption.

would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear
omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

Human engagement in technological thought creates the necessity

to order nature to serve our needs creating a standing reserve
culminating in stripping of the need/desire to help others and
creates a strictly technological understanding of beingDreyfus
93
Charles B. Dreyfus, 1993, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at
Berkeley, Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and
politics chapter of The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. By Charles B.
Guignon, p. 306)JRC
In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving God, society, our fellows or even ourselves no longer make sense to us. Human
beings, on this view, become a resource to be used-but more important, to be enhanced-like any other: Man, who no longer
conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process (EP 104; VA 90). In the film 2001, the robot HAL, when asked if he is happy on the mission, says: Im using
all my capacities to the maximum. What more could a rational entity want? This is a brilliant expression of what anyone would say who is in touch

with our current

understanding of being.

We peruse the development of our potential simply of the sake of further

growth. We have no specific goals. The human potential movement perfectly expresses

this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better organize

the future use of our natural resources. We thus become part of a system that no one directs but that moves toward the total mobilization and
enhancement of all beings, even us. This is why Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare
of all is not the solution to our problem but the culmination of the technological
understanding of being.

Dooms Day scenarios are a lie used to ensure the power and control
of the stateCoviello 00
Peter Coviello, 2000 Queer Frontiers: Apocalypse from Now On, Ch. 2, pg. 40-41
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changedit did not go
away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion; if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derridas suitably menacing

, apocalypse is
defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else , always to an other
people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous
contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished general
population. This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontags incisive observation, from 1989,
that, Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not Apocalypse Now but
Apocalypse from Now On. The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the
threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because,
as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the
perpetual threat of destructionthrough the constant reproduction of the figure of
apocalypseagencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the
bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History
phrase) remainderless and a-symbolic destruction, then in postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance

of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, life-administering. Power, he contends, exerts a positive influence on
life [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. In his brief comments on what he calls the atomic situation, however,
Foucault insists as well that the reproductiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

modern power presume to act on behalf of the existence of everyone.

What-so-ever might be constructed as a threat to life and survival in this way
serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed,
race, agencies of

potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, Foucault writes, this is
not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised
at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. For a state that
would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over
the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise,
nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Plan
Resolved: The United States Federal Government should
substantially increase its investment in domestic transportation
infrastructure.

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Advocacy Statement
This is not a problem for which we must find a solution; rather it is
an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our
understanding of the culture of technology and what Being
means in its capacity as a turning that reveals to us that the
path of thinking takes humanity away from the essence of
technology towards a revealing of Being. Thus we should reject
the will to will inherent in the resolution and engage in a
causal evaluation of our relationship to technological destining.

10

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Contention 2- Making Space

Resolve is not to be found in a willful action, but as a steadfastness
to allow the revelations of being. This allows for a new mode of
political action outside the arbitrary whims of the sovereign ego
Pezze 06
Barbara Pezze, PhD Philosophy at Honk Kong U, Heidegger on Gelassenheit,
Minerva, vol .10,http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol10/Heidegger.html
Let us pause for a moment to consider a possible misunderstanding. It could appear, from what we have been saying, that Gelassenheit floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking all
power of action, is a will-less letting in of everything and, basically, the denial of the will to live! (1966a, p. 80). But this is not the case, for in the Gelassenheitwe find something that recalls the power of

resolve [Entschlossenheit] (ibid., p. 81), but not as an act of will that

makes a decision and finds a solution to a problem or a situation . This resolve, as
action, but which is not a will. It is a

Heidegger himself suggests, must be thought as the one that is spoken of in Being and Time, that is, it
is a letting oneself be called forth (1996, p. 283) to ones own most possibility of
being. Resoluteness as Entschlossenheit is translated in Being and Time is authentic

being a self

(1996, p. 274). It is quite difficult to think a resolve that is not a matter of will that moves to an action; we tend, in fact, to consider resoluteness as a strong determination to

the essence of the resolve, as he intends it, is not an

intention to act; it is not a gathering of energy to be released into action. Resolve
is the beginning, the inceptual beginning of any action moved. Here acting is not
be taken as an action undertaken by Dasein in being resolute. Rather, acting refers
to the existential and fundamental mode of being of Dasein, which is to be care, and
which is the primordial being of Dasein. Resoluteness, in its essence, is the remaining open
of Dasein for being. In the context of the Conversation, this resolve should thus be understood as the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness [als
attain something. As we read in Heideggers Introduction To Metaphysics (2000),

das eigens bernommene Sichffnen des Daseins fr das Offene] (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81). It is a resolve to remain open to be-ing, and therefore to what is own most to mans nature, which is disclosed in
relation to be-ing. This resolve is what Heidegger, in the Conversation, indicates as releasement to that-which-regions, the resolve to release oneself to that-which-regions, to remain open towards the

a steadfastness [Ausdauer]
(Heidegger 1966a, p.81) proper to Gelassenheit. Thinking, becoming more and more aware of its
nature, and experiencing more clarity about it, remains firm and resolute . Thinking stands
within and rests in this composed steadfastness (ibid., p. 81]). The steadfastness
proper to Gelassenheit would be behavior which did not become a swaggering comportment, but which
collected itself into and remained always the composure of releasement.
openness itself. Now, there is another element that pertains to Gelassenheit: there is, in fact, not only a resolve, but also

11

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Our Af represents a radical break from the technological age

through the examination of being- This break will reconnect
humans with their nature and remove themselves and nature
from standing reserve, now is the key time to act; We are
fighting for our livesBest and Nocella 06
Best and Nocella, 2006, associate professor of philosophy at the University of
Texas at El Paso (Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, p. 82-84,
google books)//JRC
Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, there exist possibilities
for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing. In the midst of technological peril indeed,
precisely because the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life there emerges a sense of
solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of human resource
management and personnel resources, the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve
is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness
resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly
enframed within one giant gasoline station. It is precisely the experience of this
solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic
and political action in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the
metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action will only be truly
revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature, where liberation is
always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics.

Anything less will always lapse back into the false and oppressive hierarchy of
human over nature and human over animals with attendant effects of
technological, disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective,
revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of fighting for our lives where the pronoun refers to all life not just
human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of Being as a re-figured
humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within
which all of life emerges and is sustained. A human being, like any entity, is s/he stands forth as present. But his
distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being.Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such
experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a ceremony or in the
awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being
to be brought to language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of
dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being the open realm within which entities are released into presence (Gelassenhait or releasement).

What comes to the fore in suspension of willed manipulation is an embrace of

other beings and the enduring process of evolution within which all beings emerge
and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all
beings pass, human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context
of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an
authentic basis. It is the engagement with the Other that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they
demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a dynamic
and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with animals and

Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing,

What will change is, first, the pre-eminence of
Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer
will technical solutions be sought after in realms of activity where technique is not
applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology. No longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources
to be extracted and exploited. No longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth . No longer
the Earth.

post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society.

will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly
denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But

Being unfolds,

as the turning toward the re-emergence of

both through revolutionary action rooted in solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world,

the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be

discerned so that new forms and uses of technology can emerge. Questions about
technology will center on whether a given technology can be developed and used
so that plant and animal life can appear as it is and not be reduced to standing
reserve. The question, for Heidegger, is not whether technology, in the sense of a set of tools, is done
away with, but whether Enframing is surmounted . It is in this sense of releasement Heidegger writes,
technics will not disappear; instead,

12

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Our evidence is comparative- Loss of essence outweighs extinction

and makes extinction inevitable- Recapturing the essence of
being is a prerequisite to reestablishing a proper form of ethics
and politicsDe Beistegui 97
Miguel de Beistegui, 1997, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, Heidegger
and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG//JRC
Yet, at this point, everything happens as if our postmodern condition were nothing but the experience
of the unlimited acceleration of time, an acceleration that results in the spatialisation of the planet
(and of the universe as a whole), that is, in the absolute domination of space in the form of

total and readily available presence. The need of being is no longer needed. The essential
unfolding of presence has withdrawn , and we are left with beings in the form of standing-reserve. As a
result, man is for the first time confronted with the greatest of all dangers, a danger far
greater than that of the total and destructive unleashing of power over the earth,
and that is the danger of the threat of the annihilation of his essence. The essence
of man consists in being needed by being. So long as we do not envisage the
destination of man according to his essence, so long as we do not think of man
together with being, but solely with the unrelentless releasing of beings, nihilism
will continue to prevail, both in essence and in actuality. In essence, as the most extreme
manifestation of the Seinsvergessenheit; in actuality,

as the politics of world domination, which our democracies seem to carry out with particular

Does this mean that

Heidegger promotes something like a politics of being? No, insofar as politics is always and irreducibly
ontic: it concerns mans relation to man. Yet this relation is itself made subject to the way in which
being claims man. There can be no politics of being, whether in the sense of a politics inspired by being
or with being as its object, because being cannot be the stake of a political program or will. A politics of
being is as meaningless as an ethics of being. Yet neither ethics nor politics can be without
the prior disclosure of the epochal configuration within which they emerge. In this
sense, ethics and politics are always of being. Both ethics as dwelling and politics as
effectiveness. Thus, a politics that concerns itself only with man, and not with the essence of man is bound to nihilism as to its most intimate fate.

place point to mans necessity to find an abode on this earth and to dwell amongst
beings. And if Heidegger is so weary of ethics and politics, it is precisely insofar as these modes
of dwelling no longer satisfy mans essence, no longer provide man with an abode
that is adequate to his essence, in other words, no longer constitute the space of
his freedom understood as freedom for his essence (for his relation to the default of
being), but are entirely summoned by the power of machination. Unless we come to
think of ethics and of politics as the site of a conversion toward the essence of being, a site in which
man would find his proper place.

This movement of questioning does not spread through a linear

process but through a resonance that takes us to a point where
a return to the old order is no longer desirable or even possible
The Invisible Committee 09
The Invisible Committee, 2009, The Coming Insurrection pg. 12
Revolutionary movements do not spread by contamination but by resonance.
Something that is constituted here resonates with the shock wave emitted by
something constituted over there. A body that resonates does so according to its
own mode. An insurrection is not like a plague or a forest firea linear process
which spreads from place to place after initial spark. It rather takes the shape of
music, whose focal points dispersed in time and space, succeed in imposing the
rhythm of their own vibrations, always taking on more density. To the point that
any return to normal is no longer desirable or even imaginable.

13

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Endpoints of the 1ACs questioning doesnt matter; what matters is

that we actually think. The path to the endpoint is what gives
rise to diferent perspectives and viewsShanahan 93
William Shanahan, 1993, Kritik of Thinking
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Shanahan1993HealthCare.htm
Martin Heidegger lived most of his life in close proximity to the Black Forest in Germany. The forest permeated much of his thinking. In many of his later lectures and essays, Heidegger included at least a
brief movement through the German word Weg. Weg, way or path in English, provides Heidegger's readers with a hint for understanding his sometimes difficult philosophical prose. As is often the case,

the basic feature of the way- ('method") - is that be

conveying along the course, underway, it opens up a view and a perspective and
hence provides the disclosure of something." (4) While walking in near-darkness through a dense forest, the trees
above suddenly break and some light hits you. The experience of emerging
suddenly into the light, feeling the warmth of the sun, is the movement of
Heidegger's thinking. Difficult matters are engaged not to resolve them, but
simply to think them. The darkness is as important as the light. Conveying along a particular path is not the
answer. Views become possible, perspectives open only while underway. What
allows for the moment of brightness is the moving along a way, not the reaching
of a destination. On another day, the sun is absent and the moment is missing. So unconcerned with destination was Heidegger that he names a collection of his essays Holzwege,
Heidegger turns to the ancient Greeks for help: "For the Greeks, however,

woodpaths, and offers the following description: "Wood" is an old name for forest. In the wood arepaths which mostly wind along until they end quite suddenlyin an impenetrable thicket.They are called
"woodpaths." Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest.Often it seems as though one were like another. Yet it only seems so. Woodcutters and forest-dwellers are familiar with these paths. They know

what is important
is not the end, but the way. The way of thinking does not invite the thinker to
arrive, only to think. Sometimes you get shown the light in the strangest of places. Sometimes the light shows you.The danger of thinking in this or any other way is the way can
what it means to be on a woodpath. (5) Amazing! Heidegger describes his thinking as ending in an impenetrable thicket, a dead end. So why read him? - because

become old, tired. When one way is followed too often or too closely, it becomes fixed. Where once fresh forest floor led the thinker, pavement now determines the way. Permanency replaces flexibility. The
need to seek new, different ways is stressed by Heidegger

Only questioning ontology accesses deeper questions of the

structural ismsSpanos 00
William V. Spanos, 2000, Americas Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, pgs. 56-57
markoff
The end of the pursuit of knowledge, according to this developed postcolonial form of imperial practice, is to produce
peace, but this peace will be achieved only by the total colonization and
pacification of the Other. Theory (understood as a mode of inquiry that privileges seeing, theoria) and practice are conterminous. The Pax Metaphysica and the Pax
Romana. My intention in invoking Heideggers ontological genealogy of imperialism has not been to offer an alternative to that of Foucault, Said, and most postcolonial critics who would interrogate
imperialism as an economic and/or political practice or as economic-political practice to which cultural texts contribute in a fundamental way. As Heideggers entanglement with the German National Socialist
project testifies, his restricted ontological focus is hardly adequate to the complex actualities of modern imperial practice. My purpose, rather, has been to demonstrate that the

contemporary postcolonial critique of imperialism is disabled by a significant lack or, perhaps more accurately, by a resonant
unthought in its discourse. What I have tried to make explicit by reconstellating
Heideggers destruction of the metaphysical thinking of the ontotheological tradition (and by thematizing the affiliative system
of sedimented tropes inscribed in it) into the context of more practical postcolonial critiques of
imperialism is that these oppositional discourses, whether Foucouldian or New Historicist or Marxist or nationalist, tend
to be blind to (or refuse to take seriously) the enabling degree to which Western imperialism is not simply a practice as such, but a
deeply inscribed ideological state of mind produced by a truth endemic to a
metaphysical ontology. More specifically, they overlook the fact that the modern imperial project is informed by a representational or a visual problematic that has its
constructed origins in the origins of the very idea of the West. These opositional discourses, in short, are blinded by their overdetermination of practice to the reality that the idea of the West and imperialism
are synonymous. To wring a turn on Enrique Dussels resonant insight into Descartess I think; therefore I am, the identity of the collective Western subject is epitomized by the statement: I think; therefore
I conquer.

14

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

The afs examination of technology reveals its true essence to

humans preventing the technological mindset from controlling
usBeckman 00
Tad Beckman, 2000 Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,
http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html JRC
In our present point of view, we see technology as a complex of contrivances and technical skills,
put forth by human activity and developed as means to our ends. Technology, in this view, is an object, or a complex of objects
and techniques, that seems passive itself; indeed, we conceive of it as activated by us only. According to Heidegger, however, we are fundamentally mistaken
in this; "we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral." {[7], p. 4} On the contrary, the essence of technology
reveals it as something far from neutral or merely an instrument of human control;
it is an autonomous organizing activity within which humans themselves are
organized. Viewing technology as a means to an end, "everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner...We will, as we say, 'get' technology 'spiritually in hand.'...But
suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it?" {[7], p. 5} How, indeed, can we cope with it if it
encompasses us in its organizational activity? In summary, the problem with our critique of technology lies at two levels. First,
while we argue and take sides on the issue of technology, none of us is really free
to deal with it constructively because none of us really understands it in its
essence, i.e., in its entirety and in its central sense. Second , our limited
understanding of technology is so misguided that little of value can be salvaged
from it. This is because all discussions are prefaced on the view that technology is
an object which we manipulate as a means to our own ends. In fact, the essence
of technology reveals it as a vast system of organization which encompasses us
rather than standing objectively and passively ready for our direction and control. If
our discussion of technology is so far off its mark, then, how can we anticipate discovering its essence? Heidegger's method is to assume that the instrumental view of technology has a basic correctness even
though it is not true. That basic correctness explains why we have dealt successfully with it at a practical level as long as we have. For Heidegger, this basic correctness offers a pathway for investigative
thinking by pursuing the concept of "instrument" and the roots of the word 'technology.' These are the only correct clues that we have. To view something as an instrument is to place it in a context of ends for

one promising path to the essence of

technology is through an examination of causation. Heidegger was guided in this examination by Aristotle's classic account of the
which it is presumed to be a means and this is the context of "causation." {[7], p. 6} Thus,

four factors in all causation -- causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficiens. While the traditional reading of Aristotle tends to understand each of these factors in isolation and ignores their

Heidegger asserted that the essence of causation must lie in what

unifies the four. "The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being
responsible for something else." {[7], p. 7; emphasis added} A singular thing, or event, is caused and the four factors are cooperatively responsible for that in
some way. The thing caused is something that "comes into presence;" thus, the factors are cooperatively responsible for bringing it forth. In this way, Heidegger discovered
the very essence of causation in the Greek word 'aitia,' or "to occasion ;" and as Plato expressed it in
cooperative relationship,

Symposium, "Every occasion for whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poiesis, is bringing-forth." {[7], p. 10}

15

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

16

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

***T/Framework***

17

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: T
1. The use of language to discount the criticism of the 1AC only
entrenches the mindset of standing reserve as they attempt to
manipulate language as ready-to-hand to meet their own ends.
We must rejection the way language of the resolution reveals
transportation infrastructure to us which is the affirmation of
our belonging to language and allows us to have a more natural
understanding of being and a more holistic understanding of
the resolution; Reason to vote AfZimmerman 86
Michael Zimmerman, 1986, Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's
Concept of Authenticity pg. 72
In trying to explain Ereignis, Heidegger attempts the impossible. Since Ereignis "is not," we cannot talk about it propositionally. Heidegger himself says that "Everything-- statements,
questions, and answers--presupposes the experience of the matter itself." (ZS, 25-26) Yet in discussing Ereignis, he maintains that man is called on to
bring it to language. Mortal legein is supposed to gather and shelter the the cosmic Logos. In his 1936 essay, "Hlderlin and the Essence of Poetry," he described language as a gift. For
Hlderlin, man becomes himself when he affirms that he belongs to the things that are.
We belong to everything because we can understand them. We can be universal because language allows us to
transcend the immediate environment. Hlderlin suggests that language is rooted in "innerness" (Innigkeit) which--much like the Logos of Heraclitus--means
the setting-apart which binds together the beings of the cosmos. We become most human when we affirm that we belong
to this innerness. "This attesting to belonging to the whole of being happens as history. But so that history is possible, language is given to
man. It is the 'good' of man." (EHD, 275) Western history has been conditioned by the various ways in which Western man has "attested" to belonging to the whole of being. In the
modern age, man has concluded that the whole of being belongs to him! We have
forgotten that "Language is not a tool at [man's] disposal , rather it is that Ereignis which disposes of the highest
possibility of humanity." (EHD, 276) Man becomes attuned to cosmic necessity when he responds to the silent appeal of Logos or "Saying" (Sagen). (US, 52-53) We can speak only because Logos endows us

language speaks, not man. Man only speaks insofar as he corresponds to language." (HH) Since the essence of language lies in unconcealing, and since language is distinctive to man, then genuine human existence means disclosing
with that power. "Authentically

things through language. "Man is that being [Wesen], who--by speaking--lets what is present lie forth in its presence, and perceives that lying forth."

2. The questioning that occurs via the 1AC allows us to develop a

path through language; this path of thinking allows us to
develop a free relationship with technology and away from
technological enframingRayner 01
Timothy Rayner, 2001, Biopower and Technology: Foucault and Heideggers Way of
Thinking http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/2may2001/rayner.pdf
In the opening lines of The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger offers an insight into the nature of his critique. This insight concerns the way-like character of his questioning and thinking.

questioning concerning technology. Questioning builds a

way...The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking , more or less perceptibly, lead through
language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in doing so we should like to prepare
a free relationship to it.3 It is important that we grasp the proposition being made here. To properly appreciate this work, Heidegger is saying, we must
first of all attend to the path of the discussion. Before we fix our attention on
isolated sentences and topics, we need to attend to the shifts, transformations,
and displacements of the argument as it proceeds from question to response, premise to
conclusionin short, the way of thinking that is forged by Heideggers discourse as it proceeds through language . This way leads from the interiority of
technological enframing to an experience of the essence of technology.4 We need to experience
this essence, says Heidegger, if we are to experience the technological within its own bounds,5 and thus establish a free relationship
towards it.
Heidegger writes: In what follows we shall be

3. Their type of education is co-opted- The form of education they

are attempting to preserve is based within humanities
technological mindset. These mindsets that they enforce are the
seeds for total human brutalization and establishes a false
sense of value to life. Thats the entire 1AC.

18

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

4. Topicality is an act of biopolitics that discards outside thinking

and authorizes unprecedented force to control populations.
Anything that doesnt fit within their narrow minded order is
eliminatedBleiker 97
Roland Bleiker, 1997, Forget IR Theory Vol. 22 No. 1

5. Topicality implicitly seeks to sort and exclude afs that are

considered problematic. The logic of voting neg on this form of
exclusion replicates the mode of enframing humanity into
standing reserve.
6. Infinitely regressivefairness is arbitrary, one argument is no
more reasonable than another. Negative forces a race to the
bottom where everyone empties their tubs and says they could
never predict the af, even if it was educational.

19

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

7. Turnthe negative conception of fairness as law of the game is

antithetical to participation and short circuits political
education. We all become docile to systematic norms and
exclusion actually becomes inevitableBevel 00
Mary Bevel, 2000, PhD Educational Development, Prof. @ Webster U, A POSTMODERN INQUIRY
INTO JUSTICE, FAIRNESS AND INCLUSION, http://members.aol.com/jophe00/bevel.htm

Traditionally, in modern times at least, the authority to determine "right" from

"wrong" is embedded in cultural norms and established as law by governments.
From the perspectives of both Lyotard and Aristotle, the notion of achieving justice
and fairness through standards of judgement represented as law, is antithetical to
notions of justice and fairness. Law usually stipulates specific rules and structures within which certain activities take place. According to John Rawls, any set of
rules or law is primarily concerned with, "the subtle distortions of prejudice and bias as these effectively
discriminate against certain groups in the judicial process."7 For Lyotard, law is discourse which has become a prescribing norm, limiting choices, and
turning judgements into those fixed standards that discriminate among discreet criteria. If one considers justice in the terms of rights and fairness employing Rawls' notion of "justice as fairness," then it is
necessary that all players have absolute and completely equal voice in determining what is just. [] One educator grounded her notion of fair in the equal distribution of goods and time. The criterion of
distinction was efficiency/inefficiency as expressed in the technical language game. A technical move is considered "good" only if it optimizes performance with minimal input, demanding investments of time
and money in exchange for a product. Lyotard calls the ultimate technical move the performativity principle, requiring verification that the investment of time or knowledge or goods as necessary to produce

The performativity principle changes the role of

authority in education through the domination of policy language . Such an equation is particularly
optimal performance with the goal of minimum input with maximum output.

problematic when applied to humans, especially to those individuals who are unable to speak for themselves. Humanist and idealistic narratives of legitimation are abandoned to support the new ideal of
efficiency. Achieving fairness and justice is no longer relevant. Rather, power is sought through controlling and dispensing knowledge. Under these circumstances "the only credible goal is
power."12According to Lyotard, devices that optimize the performance of the human body for the purpose of producing proof require additional expenditures. No money, no proof-- and that means no
verification of statements and no truth. The games of scientific language, become a game of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency,
and truth is thus established.13 When the notion of fair is expressed in the technical game, fair becomes equal allocations of the teacher's time, effort, and expertise, all to be cut up and dispensed equally,
whether or not there was need or abundance. It is this notion of fairness and justice that dominates the liberation of the discourse of modernity and subsumes liberation into issues of efficiency or truth, which
are not synonymous. Lyotard offers a different notion of justice which is situation specific--justice based on possibilities of the not yet presentable. [] The legitimation of knowledge through the political
model occurs when the government or the system of schooling acting as an agent of the government, appropriates the narrative of access in the name of progress (instead in the name of justice). Then the
narrative of legitimation is transformed from one of justice and fairness expressed through prescription into issues of truth expressed in denotation. When the narrative of access is completely captured by
science in the name of progress, the denotative language game is supplemented by the technical game of efficiency. In this scientific narrative of progress, humanity serves knowledge and knowledge

When the
narrative of access is subsumed in the name of progress and the knowledge is
reduced to science, then the government controls both "what counts as
knowledge" and "who has access to knowledge" through education controlled by
the state and federal programs.16 The legitimation of knowledge proceeds in a much different manner in the philosophical model where knowledge only serves
legitimates itself through a relationship that Kant describes as knowing and willing.15 Knowledge changes into a control agent and wills humanity into its service.

the subject, which is humanity, in the pursuit of access. Narratives of knowledge serving humanity in the prescriptive game of justice are narratives in which the people achieve their power from the state or
government and the state receives its power from the people in an ideal reciprocal relationship--a dialectic. In the ideal sense, the narrative of access operates in the mode of values conveying justice. In this
practical narrative of justice, a prescription becomes an ethical responsibility when the people, through dialectic discourse with the state regarding the legitimacy of knowledge, agree to accept an obligation.
The knowledge of legitimation is "practical" in the form of ethics expressed in the prescriptive language game of a just/unjust criterion of distinction. Such is the case for those desiring fairness to be
considered as giving each student, regardless of ability, whatever he or she needs to learn which is very different from the narrative of access which operates in modernity defining access in terms of progress

despite intentions grounded in notions of liberty,

access and justice and fairness, have become instead exemplars of subjugation by
disciplining individuals through seemingly neutral discourse to socially constructed
norms. Foucault noted several recurring themes as possible elements of the power, control, knowledge matrix: It seems to me that the real political task in a society ... is to criticize the working of
which is measured by efficiency and truth.[] Postmodernists believe that schools,

institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so one
can fight them.18 Humans are objectified thus controlled subtly through popular forms of knowledge (e.g., linguistics, psychology, science, economics, and education). The accumulation of pseudo-scientific
knowledge in the social sciences (in which behaviorism resides) leads to power through language and encourages comparison, normalization, and correction of humans as objects to be manipulated.

8. Potential abuse not a voter:

A) Forces judge interventionno brightline on ideal debate.
Kills in-round education and strategic thinking.
B) Infinitely regressiveeither there is or isnt abuse, that we
might abuse them is irrelevant and makes this debate a waste of time

20

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

9. Even if they win their definitions and education are good, its
irrelevanthow those interpretations are shaped in the realworld and by policymakers is through discourse. Our criticism is
a gateway to their education claims means voting af solves the
best form of debateLapadat 94
Judith C. Lapadat, Prof. @ North British Columbia U, Learning Language and Learning Literacy:
Construction of Meaning Through Discourse, Presented @ Inter-National Regions Conference
Contemporary Writing in English Produced in Canada, October 1994,
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/26/84/d3.pdf

social construction of meaning is not limited to words, but applies to

all components of language, from phonology and syntax through to discourse structures,
This point about

suprasegmentals, and literary genres. A second central idea is that language is for communication. In
conversation, meaning is jointly constructed through the interactions of people who
alternate the roles of speaker and listener. In written language, writers construct a text for
an implied reader. The implied writer stands behind a text as a reader reads it, or as critics talk about
it. Meaning (communication) implies community. First Language is inherently social; it is
socially constructed. Every structural component of language every way of using

language, every meaning that can be taken from language, whether written,
spoken, or thought, has a history of social discourse that defines it, and itself potentially
can re-enter and re-define social discourse . By way of example, take any wordMuffin,
interface, dumb. Or a small childs goedand it is clear that each word comes to trailing
a whole history of meanings, situations, and new vocabulary (e.g. login, software, or
modem), and variations in grammar, morphology, spelling or punctuation in colloquial usage (e.g.
apples for apples, ungendered they for a singular, gender-unspecified he or she) all provide
daily evidence of language change.

21

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Framework (Short Version)

1. C/I- Speech is our action in debate; we dont actually pass policies
and fiat is illusory. Discourse is inevitably bound to action. The
resolution functions as a simple expression of a fact, principle,
or opinion to be considered in this round as a simple resolution
lack of a proceeding whereas statement means enactment
is irrelevant. The ballot is the judges endorsement of our
advocacyJohnson 03
Charles W. Johnson, June 2003, ParliamentarianUnited States House of
Representatives, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/formsofaction.html
Joint resolutions may originate either in the House of Representatives or in the Senate-not, as is sometimes incorrectly assumed, jointly in both Houses. There is little
practical difference between a bill and a joint resolution and the two forms are
sometimes used interchangeably. One difference in form is that a joint resolution may include a
preamble preceding the resolving clause. Statutes that have been initiated as bills may be amended by a joint resolution and vice versa. Both are
subject to the same procedure except for a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. When a joint resolution amending the Constitution is approved by two-thirds of both Houses, it is not
presented to the President for approval. Rather, such a joint resolution is sent directly to the Archivist of the United States for submission to the several states where ratification by the legislatures of three-

The form of a House joint resolution is as follows:

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing, etc. [as the title may be]. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, etc.
The resolving clause is identical in both House and Senate joint resolutions as has been prescribed by statute since 1871. It is frequently preceded by a
preamble consisting of one or more ''whereas'' clauses indicating the necessity for or
the desirability of the joint resolution. A joint resolution originating in the House of Representatives is designated ''H.J. Res.'' followed by its individual number
fourths of the states within the period of time prescribed in the joint resolution is necessary for the amendment to become part of the Constitution.

which it retains throughout all its parliamentary stages. One originating in the Senate is designated ''S.J. Res.'' followed by its number. Joint resolutions, with the exception of proposed amendments to the
Constitution, become law in the same manner as bills. Concurrent Resolutions A matter affecting the operations of both Houses is usually initiated by a concurrent resolution. In modern practice, and as

simple resolutions normally are not legislative in

character since not ''presented'' to the President for approval, but are used merely for
expressing facts, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses. A concurrent resolution is not equivalent to a bill and its use is narrowly limited
determined by the Supreme Court in INS v.Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), concurrent and

within these bounds. The term ''concurrent'', like ''joint'', does not signify simultaneous introduction and consideration in both Houses. A concurrent resolution originating in the House of Representatives is
designated ''H. Con. Res.'' followed by its individual number, while a Senate concurrent resolution is designated ''S. Con. Res.'' together with its number. On approval by both Houses, they are signed by the
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate and transmitted to the Archivist of the United States for publication in a special part of the Statutes at Large volume covering that session of Congress.
Simple Resolutions A matter concerning the rules, the operation, or the opinion of either House alone is initiated by a simple resolution. A resolution affecting the House of Representatives is designated ''H.

Simple resolutions are considered only

by the body in which they were introduced. Upon adoption, simple resolutions are attested
Res.'' followed by its number, while a Senate resolution is designated ''S. Res.'' together with its number.

to by the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate and are published in the
Congressional Record.

A) Thats BestIts the only interpretation which uses the

actual grammatical function of the resolution, which solves the
internal link to real world policy making.
B) Its FairThey can levy this framework as solvency for their
own advocacy.
C) Deficit to their FrameworkTheir interpretation of how the
affirmative should be structured would limit us to direct action
and political solutions corrupted by the technological
understanding of being; this prevents us from breaking down
the standing reserve making their impacts inevitable. Since
policy making is technological thought it means we will always
control the direction of good education in the debate.
2. Group their definitionsthere are no true contingent definitions
only contingent onesTurnali 03
Aydan Turnali, 2003, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest
for Another World, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26.
Despite this,Wittgenstein and Nietzsche differ with respect to the methodology of conceptual analysis. Nietzsche goes to the origins of concepts. He gives the genealogy of concepts. According to him,
concepts can only have meaning when seen from a historical perspective. He appeals to history, and shows in what ways concepts were used under different circumstances. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, by
showing connections between concepts, tries to get us to see that most of our concepts elude clear-cut definition. While criticizing Freges view that a concept should have definite boundaries, he says, Stand

22

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

To define the concept game, we give examples and we

intend them to be taken in a particular way. There is nothing common to all types
of games. There is rather a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail (PI 66). Wittgenstein does not appeal to history; he does not give us the origin of concepts. He suggests that
we look and see how concepts are used in daily life, and what relation they have
to other concepts in order to show us that there is no uniformity in their usage. The
roughly there is also enough to describe a concept (PI 71).

point of similarity, on the other hand, is that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein reject categories and a prioricity.

3. Under the negatives framework the state of intellectual

oppression is perpetuated which is an internal link take out to
their education and fairness claims. When faced with something
that cannot be processed by their technological understanding
of debate and there for deemed a threat to that world; they
seek to push it out of the realm of discussion.
A) Means they are a re-creation of the standing reserve; This
technological understanding of debate allows them to mark
our affirmative and others like it as a threat to their world of
political policy making. They have deemed our affirmative as
waste and that we should be discarded immediately. This is the
type of thinking that justified the holocaust. Thats our
Zimmerman in 94 evidence.
4. Common ground kills educationsubsuming everything under an
umbrella of predictability means you already know it; truly
educational debate occurs without external restrictions on what
questions can and cannot be asked about the resolution
Bleiker 98
Roland Bleiker, December 1998, Retracting and Redrawing the Boundaries of Events:
Postmodern Interferences with International Theory
In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for

there is no common discursive ground, no language

that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first. But the celebration of
the elusive Truth. But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often

difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference,

excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize,
expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing.

conceals everything that is invisible from this

vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a
disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering ." And where this ordering holds
By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one

sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an
approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to
contents of mental resting places. Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and
judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not
to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

5. Turn: Their Framework arguments are an example of the

technological will to will manufacturing knowledge by
determining that the only thing that is right is what perpetuates
itself and therefore the only discourse permitted in debate; This
self-serving nature of their argument only serves the will to
wills guarantee of itselfCaughey 99
John Caughey, November 2, 1999, Overcoming Metaphysics
http://kengarman.tripod.com/themetaphysicalresource/id7.html
Heidegger terms the above mentioned basic form of appearance technology . Technology for
Heidegger incorporates more than just the production of machines, it includes "all
the areas of beings which equip the whole of beings: objectified nature, the business

of culture, manufactured politics, and the gloss of ideals overlying everything."

In short,
technology, thus understood, coincides with completed metaphysics. Saying metaphysics has come to completion, we must recall, does not mean that metaphysics is in some sense abandoned. People will still

23

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

live and think metaphysically but metaphysical philosophy is unnecessary. "Completed metaphysics...gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no
longer needs philosophy [i.e. metaphysics] because philosophy is already its foundation." So, metaphysics has come to an end in the sense that it has exhausted its essential possibilities but it will continually

all that is left to do is the

purely 'economical' role of ordering raw materials, humans being the most primary
of these raw materials. This function constantly provides new raw materials but they
are too be consumed in the same fashion. That is, they are used by the will to will to further
guarantee the will to will--consumption for the sake of consumption. As the will to
power increasingly comes to dominate it further guarantees itself. In its most developed form it
determines what is correct. What is in accordance with it is correct whatever
perpetuates it is correct, it is increasingly self-guaranteeing. Translated, we could say
return again and again in different forms, and these forms will be grounded by completed metaphysics. After the end of metaphysics,

the will to power is pragmatic, and what is correct in pragmatism is what works. In a sense pragmatism
guarantees itself. The only judgement left to man is "whether something is important

of unimportant for life." In the end the only thing we are certain of is our desires in
the sense of our wants or will. The will to will provides its own certainty.

24

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

6. They advocate a topic that cannot be questioned, this seeks to

limit what can be truth and what is a legitimate question. To
question the discipline we must reject these rulesBleiker 97
Roland Bleiker, 1997, Forget IR Theory, pg. 22
The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, make sure that the disciplines discursive
boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms
that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be
thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the
production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain
procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of
discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile. Although the
boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity
across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts or social practices. They explain, to come back to Nietzsche, why all things that live long are gradually so
saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable. Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to
direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and
define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins each discipline
recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it
established to assess them. It is not my intention here to provide a coherent account or historical survey of the exclusionary academic conventions that have been established by the discipline
of IR. Instead, I want to illustrate the process of disciplining thought by focusing on a recent publication by three well placed academics, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. By
outlining the methodological rules about how to conduct good scholarly research,
they fulfill important and powerful doorkeeping functions . These functions emerge as soon as the authors present their
main argument, that qualitative and quantitative research approaches do not differ in substance for both can (and must be) systematic and scientific. One does not need to be endowed with the investigating
genius of a Sherlock Holmes to detect positivist traits in these pages. One easily recognizes an (anti)philosophical stance that attempts to separate subject and object, that believes the social scientist, as
detached observer, can produce value-free knowledge. Such a positivist position assumes only that which is manifested in experience, which emerges from observing reality deserves the name knowledge.
All other utterances have no cognitive and empirical merit, they are mere value statements, normative claims, unprovable speculations. Indeed, if the doorkeepers did not inform us that their methodological
suggestions emerged from years of teaching a coregraduate course at one of North Americas foremost research institution, one could easily mistake their claims as parodies of positivism. We are told that the
goal of research is to learn facts about the real world and that all hypotheses need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge. Which facts? Whose real world? What

statement has to be within the

true before one can even start to judge whether it is true or false, legitimate or
illegitimate. Hence, the doorkeepers inform us that what distinguishes serious
research about the facts of the real world from casual observation is the
search for valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures
of inquiry. Such procedures not only suggest on what grounds things can be studied
legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first
place. In other words, a topic has to fulfill a number of preliminary criteria before it can even be evaluated as a legitimate IR concern. The criterion of admittance, the doorkeepers notify us, are
form of knowledge? The discursive power of academic disciplines, George Canguilhem argues, works such that a

twofold. A research topic must pose a question that is important in the real world and it must contribute to the scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific
explanation of some aspect of the world. The doorkeepers of IR remind the women and men from the country who pray for admittance to the temple of IR that only those who abide by the established rules
will gain access. Admittance cannot be granted at the moment to those who are eager to investigate the process of knowing, to those who intend to redraw the boundaries of good and evil research, or to

The warning is loud and clear: A proposed topic

that cannot be refined into a specific research project permitting valid descriptive
or causal inference should be modified along the way or abandoned . And if you are drawn to the
those who even have the audacity of questioning what this real world really is.

temple of IR after all, the doorkeepers laugh, then just try to go in despite our veto. But take note, we are powerful and we are only the least of the doorkeepers, for ultimately all research topics that have no
real-world importance will run the risk of descending to politically insignificant questions. Or could it be that these allegedly unimportant research topics need to be silenced precisely because they run
the risk of turning into politically significant questions? The systems of exclusion that doorkeeping functions uphold is sustained by a whole range of discipline related procedures, linked to such aspects as
university admittance standards, teaching curricula, examination topics, policies of hiring and promoting teaching staff, or publishing criteria determined by the major journals in the field. At least the
doorkeepers of IR have not lost a sense of (unintended) irony. They readily admit that we seek not dogma, but disciplined thought. Academic disciplines discipline the production of discourses.

They force the creation and exchange of knowledge into preconceived spaces ,
called debates. Even if one is to engage the orthodox position in a critical manner, the outcome of the discussion is already circumscribed by the
parameters that had been established through the initial framing of debates. Thus, as
soon as one addresses academic disciplines on their own terms, one has to play according to rules of a discursive police which is reactivated each time one speaks.

25

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

7. Turn their Fairness claims; they cite procedure to appear as the

victim, they have no freedom, and build themselves up as
martyrs so they can use their position to attack and exclude.
You must reject this exclusionPhillips 98
Anita Phillips, 1998, A Defense of Masochism pgs. 157-160
In Venus in Furs, Severin relates how the stories of the Christian martyrs filled him with a mixture of horror and fascination. Yet the extreme torments of these saints bear little relation to the playful scenarios

the term martyr

he comes to contrive with his willing accomplice, Wanda. Saintly suffering has been inherited by todays world as the martyr complex or attitude. Nowadays,
is used
sardonically. Obviously it no longer applies to anyone who suffers and dies for their Christian beliefs. The term has to come to indicate the kind of person who radiates a sense of moral superiority, and a

is a personality type and a

current behavior, one which can in particular historical moments become powerful and
dangerous especially in politics. For example, the massacres of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia seem to have been driven by a genuine idealism. The moral martyr
suppressed resentment that emerges glorified as an idealism which reproves and condemns the inadequacies of lesser beings. This

. At the logical extreme they are

totalitarian. The denunciation is the key strategy of resentful idealists, who see appalling shortcomings everywhere around them, except in themselves. Such people are recognizable by their
will proclaim how few hours they sleep each night, so that everyone knows how hard they are working

accusatory tone of voice, by their tendency to find fault in others, by an aggression denied and projected on to others, and by a glint in their eye. They may be seen as charismatic in that they appeal to, and
mobilize, a generalized resentment that will not speak its name. As a character type, the modern martyr is quite distinct from the masochist. Nor is he or she a sadist; this self-righteous idealist is quite another
species than Sades libertines, who at the very least take a direct pleasure in their atrocities. The discourse of the modern martyr is not one of rampant egoistic lust, of an appetite that swallows up everything

an uptight cruelty that denies its own involvement in pleasure. Thus when
the Nazis were tried for their crimes, they refused to speak in a human way,
merely citing bureaucratic documents and instructions as if they were without any
kind of reflexiveness; any capacity to comprehend their own motivations. There may be sadism here, but it
in its path, but of

is so suppressed as to be almost unrecognizable as any kind of pleasure. Persecutory idealists represent themselves as singular, absolute and zealous, projecting a ready-made myth of the strong, strict father

, such people divide the world into the

unattainably good, strong, and powerful (which is to be fanatically subscribed to)
and the irredeemably bad, poisonous and alien (which is to be cleansed away , crushed by
who will protect the good and persecute the sinners. Using a set of drastically over-simplified symbolizations

the wrath of God, etc.) Part of the attraction of the moral martyr is this simplicity, which finds echoes in all of us at different times, and especially at difficult times. Idealism of this kind means losing touch
with what you have worked out as your own modus operandi, your own sense of what is right, and instead allowing yourself to become a ventriloquists dummy. Not only are they different, but the martyr and
the masochist are natural enemies. Masochism uses suffering to explore and create, moving through it to the other side. But moral martyrdom clutches on to suffering neither fully experiencing its bite nor ever
letting it go into pleasure. It becomes a chronic ache that is carried around and set into currency, a resentful, generalized misery. I have talked about masochism both as a sexual phenomenon and as an artistic
or mythical aspiration. In both cases there is an enquiry into the nature of life and death, the two forces that accompany everyone for their span on earth. Masochism tends to be the sublime, however wretched
and sordid its initial moves and gestures may be. The wretched and the sordid are in fact essential to the attainment of the sublime, because, in a phrase I have used several times in this book, masochism is all

martyrdom, on the
aims at a standard of purity that excludes human fault. Where masochism includes the most rancid detritus in its
scope, making all this unwelcome matter into the tissue of pleasure, moral martyrdom excludes, purifies, hacks away at the roots of what it
is to be human. To be human is to want contact, including sexual contact. But a desexualized idealism distances the individual from the human community. By projecting oneself upon
a dead ideal of authority, one becomes cut off from life and ready to reduce the lives of others. Thus Margaret Thatchers
about getting down to the dirt. Masochism is a movement which integrates the lowest impulses with the highest; it is a story about falling in order to ascend. Moral

other hand,

act as education minister of stopping the daily free bottle of milk that used to go to schoolchildren, cutting off the cheering flow of life, of maternal warmth, of basic human nourishment. I have given one
answer as to why this position is such a popular one; because people who are under particular and perhaps chronic pressure may become disoriented to the point of fixing on to simple, authoritarian structures

The result is disaster

through paranoid exclusion

that bear no relation to their own human needs.

because

such ideals actively attack

the human impulses towards

love, sharing, and community

(for example, race hate), moral censoriousness and the adulation of models of perfection. With the moral
martyr, something is going wrong. It is the same thing that goes wrong with everyone, and maybe most of us fall into this category at least some of the time. After all, the widespread notions of moderation and

. These prevailing repressions perhaps

strengthen society, but de-energize the individuals in it.
prudence do nothing to help us recognize the need for self-renewal through enlivening, invigorating self-rupture

26

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

8. Competition and exclusivity enforces a singular truth and

stagnates human imaginationMakedon 92
Alexander Makedon, 1992, HUMANS IN THE WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO RADICAL
PERSPECTIVISM http://alexandermakedon.com/RadicalPerspectivism/Truth.html
The nature of truth dictates our method for "finding" it. Since any single "truth" can't be true in
isolation from all the other truths that give it context, and therefore also substance, to find it one
must be inclusive in his approach, rather than exclusive. By this we mean that we can't
find truth through a process of elimination, which would eliminate precisely that
which we are looking for, but through a process of inclusion of all truths. It follows
that in order to find truth we should include not only human-bound truths within our own culture or
time, but also all those that are based on what we can imagine are "universal first assumptions,"
including those held by non-human universal parts. It is only as we make our set of truths "universal,"
in the sense of including even non-human-bound truths, that we come to realize the "truth" about any
one of our theories. Although we don't consider any one of these truths "true," or one more "true" than
another, we view all of them collectively as representative of the world's many

truths, and therefore, ultimately, what is true about the world.

9. No Impact to their Framework:

A) People wont quit debate because we ran a K af; this is
empirically proven because they are ran today in debate and
the activity is still here. However when peoples voices are
suppressed and alternative modes of dissent are not allowed
people are at a higher risk to quit.
B) They have no ofense specific to policy debateAll of their
policymaking good arguments can be solved with a copy of The
New Republic or the Economist. Even if we destroy debate,
their type of education can be achieved numerous ways.
10. Not a reason to rejectFramework is an in round negotiation on
how we should evaluate impacts in the debate. If they win it
just means they get to weigh their impacts against the Af.

27

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Framework (Long Version)

1. C/I- The Affirmative should defend the resolution through a
specific advocacy and the negative should negate it; solves all
of your policymaking/fiat good ofense.
A) GrammarResolved comes before the colon meaning the
direction of the resolution is towards the affirmative as a
question of agency.
2. C/I- Speech is our action in debate; we dont actually pass policies
and fiat is illusory. Discourse is inevitably bound to action. The
resolution functions as a simple expression of a fact, principle,
or opinion to be considered in this round as a simple resolution
lack of a proceeding whereas statement means enactment
is irrelevant. The ballot is the judges endorsement of our
advocacyJohnson 03
Charles W. Johnson, June 2003, ParliamentarianUnited States House of
Representatives, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/formsofaction.html
Joint resolutions may originate either in the House of Representatives or in the Senate-not, as is sometimes incorrectly assumed, jointly in both Houses. There is little
practical difference between a bill and a joint resolution and the two forms are
sometimes used interchangeably. One difference in form is that a joint resolution may include a
preamble preceding the resolving clause. Statutes that have been initiated as bills may be amended by a joint resolution and vice versa. Both are
subject to the same procedure except for a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. When a joint resolution amending the Constitution is approved by two-thirds of both Houses, it is not
presented to the President for approval. Rather, such a joint resolution is sent directly to the Archivist of the United States for submission to the several states where ratification by the legislatures of three-

The form of a House joint resolution is as follows:

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing, etc. [as the title may be]. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, etc.
The resolving clause is identical in both House and Senate joint resolutions as has been prescribed by statute since 1871. It is frequently preceded by a
preamble consisting of one or more ''whereas'' clauses indicating the necessity for or
the desirability of the joint resolution. A joint resolution originating in the House of Representatives is designated ''H.J. Res.'' followed by its individual number
fourths of the states within the period of time prescribed in the joint resolution is necessary for the amendment to become part of the Constitution.

which it retains throughout all its parliamentary stages. One originating in the Senate is designated ''S.J. Res.'' followed by its number. Joint resolutions, with the exception of proposed amendments to the
Constitution, become law in the same manner as bills. Concurrent Resolutions A matter affecting the operations of both Houses is usually initiated by a concurrent resolution. In modern practice, and as

simple resolutions normally are not legislative in

character since not ''presented'' to the President for approval, but are used merely for
expressing facts, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses. A concurrent resolution is not equivalent to a bill and its use is narrowly limited
determined by the Supreme Court in INS v.Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), concurrent and

within these bounds. The term ''concurrent'', like ''joint'', does not signify simultaneous introduction and consideration in both Houses. A concurrent resolution originating in the House of Representatives is
designated ''H. Con. Res.'' followed by its individual number, while a Senate concurrent resolution is designated ''S. Con. Res.'' together with its number. On approval by both Houses, they are signed by the
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate and transmitted to the Archivist of the United States for publication in a special part of the Statutes at Large volume covering that session of Congress.
Simple Resolutions A matter concerning the rules, the operation, or the opinion of either House alone is initiated by a simple resolution. A resolution affecting the House of Representatives is designated ''H.

Simple resolutions are considered only

by the body in which they were introduced. Upon adoption, simple resolutions are attested
Res.'' followed by its number, while a Senate resolution is designated ''S. Res.'' together with its number.

to by the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate and are published in the
Congressional Record.

A) Thats BestIts the only interpretation which uses the

actual grammatical function of the resolution, which solves
the internal link to real world policy making.
B) Its Fair: They can levy this framework as solvency for their
own advocacy.

28

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

3. Turn: Their interpretation is based on a concept of truth that

debate should look a certain way before it happens. Debate is
good because it is organic; we may hear the same kind of
arguments but we dont have the exact same debates every
round. Their interpretation would make debate stagnant and
prevent growth that would otherwise expose us to new radical
thought.
4. Deficit to their FrameworkTheir interpretation of how the
affirmative should be structured would limit us to direct action
and political solutions corrupted by the technological
understanding of being; this prevents us from breaking down
the standing reserve making their impacts inevitable. Since
policy making is technological thought it means we will always
control the direction of good education in the debate.
5. Were in the LiteraturePeople have been running Heidegger for
years now. If you get your claim that people run this as an af
and on the neg then that means the argument is predictable
anyway and that you just didnt do due diligence in prepping
answers to our argument so that you get the links you claim to
lose.
6. Group their definitionsthere are no true contingent definitions
only contingent onesTurnali 03
Aydan Turnali, 2003, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest
for Another World, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26.
Despite this,Wittgenstein and Nietzsche differ with respect to the methodology of conceptual analysis. Nietzsche goes to the origins of concepts. He gives the genealogy of concepts. According to him,
concepts can only have meaning when seen from a historical perspective. He appeals to history, and shows in what ways concepts were used under different circumstances. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, by
showing connections between concepts, tries to get us to see that most of our concepts elude clear-cut definition. While criticizing Freges view that a concept should have definite boundaries, he says, Stand

To define the concept game, we give examples and we

intend them to be taken in a particular way. There is nothing common to all types
of games. There is rather a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail (PI 66). Wittgenstein does not appeal to history; he does not give us the origin of concepts. He suggests that
we look and see how concepts are used in daily life, and what relation they have
to other concepts in order to show us that there is no uniformity in their usage. The
roughly there is also enough to describe a concept (PI 71).

point of similarity, on the other hand, is that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein reject categories and a prioricity.

7. Their education is co-optedTheir form of education they wish to

continue to breed in debate is one that is blinded by the
technological understanding of being. This mindset is the seed
for total human brutalization and establishes a false sense of
value to life. Thats our Weinberger evidence.

29

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

8. Under the negatives framework the state of intellectual

oppression is perpetuated which is an internal link take out to
their education and fairness claims. When faced with something
that cannot be processed by their technological understanding
of debate and there for deemed a threat to that world; they
seek to push it out of the realm of discussion.
A) Means they are a re-creation of the standing reserve; This
technological understanding of debate allows them to mark
our affirmative and others like it as a threat to their world of
political policy making. They have deemed our affirmative as
waste and that we should be discarded immediately. This is the
type of thinking that justified the holocaust. Thats our
Zimmerman in 94 evidence.
9. Common ground kills educationsubsuming everything under an
umbrella of predictability means you already know it; truly
educational debate occurs without external restrictions on what
questions can and cannot be asked about the resolution
Bleiker 98
Roland Bleiker, December 1998, Retracting and Redrawing the Boundaries of Events:
Postmodern Interferences with International Theory
In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for

there is no common discursive ground, no language

that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first. But the celebration of
the elusive Truth. But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often

difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference,

excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize,
expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing.

conceals everything that is invisible from this

vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a
disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering ." And where this ordering holds
By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one

sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an
approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to
contents of mental resting places. Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and
judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not
to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

30

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

10. They advocate a topic that cannot be questioned, this seeks to

limit what can be truth and what is a legitimate question. To
question the discipline we must reject these rulesBleiker 97
Roland Bleiker, 1997, Forget IR Theory, pg. 22
The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, make sure that the disciplines discursive
boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms
that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be
thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the
production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain
procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of
discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile. Although the
boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity
across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts or social practices. They explain, to come back to Nietzsche, why all things that live long are gradually so
saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable. Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to
direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and
define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins each discipline
recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it
established to assess them. It is not my intention here to provide a coherent account or historical survey of the exclusionary academic conventions that have been established by the discipline
of IR. Instead, I want to illustrate the process of disciplining thought by focusing on a recent publication by three well placed academics, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. By
outlining the methodological rules about how to conduct good scholarly research,
they fulfill important and powerful doorkeeping functions . These functions emerge as soon as the authors present their
main argument, that qualitative and quantitative research approaches do not differ in substance for both can (and must be) systematic and scientific. One does not need to be endowed with the investigating
genius of a Sherlock Holmes to detect positivist traits in these pages. One easily recognizes an (anti)philosophical stance that attempts to separate subject and object, that believes the social scientist, as
detached observer, can produce value-free knowledge. Such a positivist position assumes only that which is manifested in experience, which emerges from observing reality deserves the name knowledge.
All other utterances have no cognitive and empirical merit, they are mere value statements, normative claims, unprovable speculations. Indeed, if the doorkeepers did not inform us that their methodological
suggestions emerged from years of teaching a coregraduate course at one of North Americas foremost research institution, one could easily mistake their claims as parodies of positivism. We are told that the
goal of research is to learn facts about the real world and that all hypotheses need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge. Which facts? Whose real world? What

statement has to be within the

true before one can even start to judge whether it is true or false, legitimate or
illegitimate. Hence, the doorkeepers inform us that what distinguishes serious
research about the facts of the real world from casual observation is the
search for valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures
of inquiry. Such procedures not only suggest on what grounds things can be studied
legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first
place. In other words, a topic has to fulfill a number of preliminary criteria before it can even be evaluated as a legitimate IR concern. The criterion of admittance, the doorkeepers notify us, are
form of knowledge? The discursive power of academic disciplines, George Canguilhem argues, works such that a

twofold. A research topic must pose a question that is important in the real world and it must contribute to the scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific
explanation of some aspect of the world. The doorkeepers of IR remind the women and men from the country who pray for admittance to the temple of IR that only those who abide by the established rules
will gain access. Admittance cannot be granted at the moment to those who are eager to investigate the process of knowing, to those who intend to redraw the boundaries of good and evil research, or to

The warning is loud and clear: A proposed topic

that cannot be refined into a specific research project permitting valid descriptive
or causal inference should be modified along the way or abandoned . And if you are drawn to the
those who even have the audacity of questioning what this real world really is.

temple of IR after all, the doorkeepers laugh, then just try to go in despite our veto. But take note, we are powerful and we are only the least of the doorkeepers, for ultimately all research topics that have no
real-world importance will run the risk of descending to politically insignificant questions. Or could it be that these allegedly unimportant research topics need to be silenced precisely because they run
the risk of turning into politically significant questions? The systems of exclusion that doorkeeping functions uphold is sustained by a whole range of discipline related procedures, linked to such aspects as
university admittance standards, teaching curricula, examination topics, policies of hiring and promoting teaching staff, or publishing criteria determined by the major journals in the field. At least the
doorkeepers of IR have not lost a sense of (unintended) irony. They readily admit that we seek not dogma, but disciplined thought. Academic disciplines discipline the production of discourses.

They force the creation and exchange of knowledge into preconceived spaces ,
called debates. Even if one is to engage the orthodox position in a critical manner, the outcome of the discussion is already circumscribed by the
parameters that had been established through the initial framing of debates. Thus, as
soon as one addresses academic disciplines on their own terms, one has to play according to rules of a discursive police which is reactivated each time one speaks.

31

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

11. Turn: Their Framework arguments are an example of the

technological will to will manufacturing knowledge by
determining that the only thing that is right is what perpetuates
itself and therefore the only discourse permitted in debate; This
self-serving nature of their argument only serves the will to
wills guarantee of itselfCaughey 99
John Caughey, November 2, 1999, Overcoming Metaphysics
http://kengarman.tripod.com/themetaphysicalresource/id7.html
Heidegger terms the above mentioned basic form of appearance technology. Technology for Heidegger incorporates more than just
the production of machines, it includes "all the areas of beings which equip the
whole of beings: objectified nature, the business of culture, manufactured politics, and
the gloss of ideals overlying everything." In short, technology, thus understood, coincides with completed metaphysics. Saying metaphysics has
come to completion, we must recall, does not mean that metaphysics is in some sense abandoned. People will still live and think metaphysically but metaphysical philosophy is unnecessary. "Completed
metaphysics...gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no longer needs philosophy [i.e. metaphysics] because philosophy is already its
foundation." So, metaphysics has come to an end in the sense that it has exhausted its essential possibilities but it will continually return again and again in different forms, and these forms will be grounded by

all that is left to do is the purely 'economical' role of ordering

raw materials, humans being the most primary of these raw materials. This
function constantly provides new raw materials but they are too be consumed in the same fashion. That is, they are used by
the will to will to further guarantee the will to will--consumption for the sake of
consumption. As the will to power increasingly comes to dominate it further
guarantees itself. In its most developed form it determines what is correct. What is in accordance
with it is correct whatever perpetuates it is correct, it is increasingly selfguaranteeing. Translated, we could say the will to power is pragmatic, and what is correct in pragmatism is what works. In a sense pragmatism guarantees itself . The only
judgement left to man is "whether something is important or unimportant for life."
In the end the only thing we are certain of is our desires in the sense of our wants
or will. The will to will provides its own certainty.
completed metaphysics. After the end of metaphysics,

12. Turn their Fairness claims; they cite procedure to appear as the
victim, they have no freedom, and build themselves up as
martyrs so they can use their position to attack and exclude.
You must reject this exclusionPhillips 98
Anita Phillips, 1998, A Defense of Masochism pgs. 157-160
In Venus in Furs, Severin relates how the stories of the Christian martyrs filled him with a mixture of horror and fascination. Yet the extreme torments of these saints bear little relation to the playful scenarios

the term martyr

he comes to contrive with his willing accomplice, Wanda. Saintly suffering has been inherited by todays world as the martyr complex or attitude. Nowadays,
is used
sardonically. Obviously it no longer applies to anyone who suffers and dies for their Christian beliefs. The term has to come to indicate the kind of person who radiates a sense of moral superiority, and a

is a personality type and a

current behavior, one which can in particular historical moments become powerful and
dangerous especially in politics. For example, the massacres of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia seem to have been driven by a genuine idealism. The moral martyr
suppressed resentment that emerges glorified as an idealism which reproves and condemns the inadequacies of lesser beings. This

. At the logical extreme they are

totalitarian. The denunciation is the key strategy of resentful idealists, who see appalling shortcomings everywhere around them, except in themselves. Such people are recognizable by their
will proclaim how few hours they sleep each night, so that everyone knows how hard they are working

accusatory tone of voice, by their tendency to find fault in others, by an aggression denied and projected on to others, and by a glint in their eye. They may be seen as charismatic in that they appeal to, and
mobilize, a generalized resentment that will not speak its name. As a character type, the modern martyr is quite distinct from the masochist. Nor is he or she a sadist; this self-righteous idealist is quite another
species than Sades libertines, who at the very least take a direct pleasure in their atrocities. The discourse of the modern martyr is not one of rampant egoistic lust, of an appetite that swallows up everything

an uptight cruelty that denies its own involvement in pleasure. Thus when
the Nazis were tried for their crimes, they refused to speak in a human way,
merely citing bureaucratic documents and instructions as if they were without any
kind of reflexiveness; any capacity to comprehend their own motivations. There may be sadism here, but it
in its path, but of

is so suppressed as to be almost unrecognizable as any kind of pleasure. Persecutory idealists represent themselves as singular, absolute and zealous, projecting a ready-made myth of the strong, strict father

, such people divide the world into the

unattainably good, strong, and powerful (which is to be fanatically subscribed to)
and the irredeemably bad, poisonous and alien (which is to be cleansed away , crushed by
who will protect the good and persecute the sinners. Using a set of drastically over-simplified symbolizations

the wrath of God, etc.) Part of the attraction of the moral martyr is this simplicity, which finds echoes in all of us at different times, and especially at difficult times. Idealism of this kind means losing touch
with what you have worked out as your own modus operandi, your own sense of what is right, and instead allowing yourself to become a ventriloquists dummy. Not only are they different, but the martyr and
the masochist are natural enemies. Masochism uses suffering to explore and create, moving through it to the other side. But moral martyrdom clutches on to suffering neither fully experiencing its bite nor ever
letting it go into pleasure. It becomes a chronic ache that is carried around and set into currency, a resentful, generalized misery. I have talked about masochism both as a sexual phenomenon and as an artistic
or mythical aspiration. In both cases there is an enquiry into the nature of life and death, the two forces that accompany everyone for their span on earth. Masochism tends to be the sublime, however wretched
and sordid its initial moves and gestures may be. The wretched and the sordid are in fact essential to the attainment of the sublime, because, in a phrase I have used several times in this book, masochism is all

martyrdom, on the
aims at a standard of purity that excludes human fault. Where masochism includes the most rancid detritus in its
scope, making all this unwelcome matter into the tissue of pleasure, moral martyrdom excludes, purifies, hacks away at the roots of what it
is to be human. To be human is to want contact, including sexual contact. But a desexualized idealism distances the individual from the human community. By projecting oneself upon
about getting down to the dirt. Masochism is a movement which integrates the lowest impulses with the highest; it is a story about falling in order to ascend. Moral

other hand,

32

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

cut off from life and ready to reduce the lives of others.

a dead ideal of authority, one becomes

Thus Margaret Thatchers
act as education minister of stopping the daily free bottle of milk that used to go to schoolchildren, cutting off the cheering flow of life, of maternal warmth, of basic human nourishment. I have given one
answer as to why this position is such a popular one; because people who are under particular and perhaps chronic pressure may become disoriented to the point of fixing on to simple, authoritarian structures

The result is disaster

through paranoid exclusion

that bear no relation to their own human needs.

because

such ideals actively attack

the human impulses towards

love, sharing, and community

(for example, race hate), moral censoriousness and the adulation of models of perfection. With the moral
martyr, something is going wrong. It is the same thing that goes wrong with everyone, and maybe most of us fall into this category at least some of the time. After all, the widespread notions of moderation and

. These prevailing repressions perhaps

strengthen society, but de-energize the individuals in it.
prudence do nothing to help us recognize the need for self-renewal through enlivening, invigorating self-rupture

33

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

13. Competition and exclusivity enforces a singular truth and

stagnates human imaginationMakedon 92
Alexander Makedon, 1992, HUMANS IN THE WORLD: INTRODUCTION TO RADICAL
PERSPECTIVISM http://alexandermakedon.com/RadicalPerspectivism/Truth.html
The nature of truth dictates our method for "finding" it. Since any single "truth" can't be true in
isolation from all the other truths that give it context, and therefore also substance, to find it one
must be inclusive in his approach, rather than exclusive. By this we mean that we can't
find truth through a process of elimination, which would eliminate precisely that
which we are looking for, but through a process of inclusion of all truths. It follows
that in order to find truth we should include not only human-bound truths within our own culture or
time, but also all those that are based on what we can imagine are "universal first assumptions,"
including those held by non-human universal parts. It is only as we make our set of truths "universal,"
in the sense of including even non-human-bound truths, that we come to realize the "truth" about any
one of our theories. Although we don't consider any one of these truths "true," or one more "true" than
another, we view all of them collectively as representative of the world's many

truths, and therefore, ultimately, what is true about the world.

14. No Impact to their Framework:

A) People wont quit debate because we ran a K af; this is
empirically proven because they are ran today in debate and
the activity is still here. However when peoples voices are
suppressed and alternative modes of dissent are not allowed
people are at a higher risk to quit.
B) They have no ofense specific to policy debateAll of their
policymaking good arguments can be solved with a copy of The
New Republic or the Economist. Even if we destroy debate,
their type of education can be achieved numerous ways.
15. Not a reason to rejectFramework is an in round negotiation on
how we should evaluate impacts in the debate. If they win it
just means they get to weigh their impacts against the Af.

34

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Instrumental Desirability

Questions of instrumental desirability ignore the causation of
technological thought denying the question of beingHeidegger
77
Martin Heidegger, 1977, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER
ESSAYS pgs. 7-8

35

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: You Destroy Education

The af is a deconstruction of education not a destruction of
education which is a good thingThomson 01
Iain Thomson, 2001, Heidegger on Ontological Education, or: How We Become What
We Are http://eaz10.kicks-ass.net/Heidegger_Ontological_Education.pdf
Heidegger sought to deconstruct education. Rather than deny this, we should simply reject the polemical reduction of
deconstruction (Destruktion) to destruction (Zersto rung) and instead be clear that the goal of Heideggers
deconstruction of education is not to destroy our traditional Western educational
institutions but to loosen up this hardened tradition and dissolve the
concealments it has engendered in order to recover from the beginning of the educational tradition those primordial experiences which have
fundamentally shaped its subsequent historical development.1 In fact, Heideggers deconstructions are so far from being simple
destructions that not only do they always include a positive as well as a negative moment , but this
negative moment, in which the sedimented layers of distorting interpretations are cleared away, is invariably in the service of the
positive moment, in which something long concealed is recovered. To understand how this double
deconstructive strategy operates in the case of education, then, we need simply clarify and develop these two moments: What distortions does Heideggers deconstruction of education seek to cut through?
And, more importantly, what does it seek to recover? Let us answer this second, more important, question first.

36

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Topical Version

1. No link: They could run that transportation infrastructure is good,
their newest Politics DA, CPs, etc. All of these arguments they
should be prepared to run and the literature bias would be
highly in their favor. The only ground they lose is generic
ground which is not educational or good ground.
A) Af framework solves the terminal impact to fairness,
predictability, and groundwhich is education.
2. In order to make debate better we must question the rules
Nietzsche 82
Friedrich Nietzsche, 1882, The Gay Science pg. 32

3. No Topical Version of the Aff:

37

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: You Could Run Anything

1. This will be important. We are criticizing this topic and a specific
aspect of this topic. We are not claiming that racism is bad in
general or that we should act to end genocide in Darfur. Their
general arguments about why this type of affirmative is bad are
not as specific as to why on this topic the way this resolution is
written is bad or why our af has benefits specific to this
resolution. They should be ready to answer the claims made in
the IAC concerning transportation infrastructure. Means its
predictable and topically educational.
2. Dont vote on potential abuseThat we might abuse them or
justify this abuse is irrelevant since it is unquantifiable in this
round. Abuse is a yes/no question there is no grey area that
would allows you to justify a negative ballot.

38

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AR Framework Overview

We are both impacting turning and critiquing the accepted belief
within debate that there must be blind acceptance to USFG
action embedded within the resolution. The very act of
questioning is an act that looks beyond the traditional lines
drawn in the sand that separate legitimate from illegitimate
dissent within politics itself.
We should instead vote affirmative because the negative impact of
forcing us to affirm a resolution that necessitates complicity
with technological thought and discourse outweighs the
positive benefits of whatever could come from a topical policy
option.

39

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Framework/T- Education 2AR

1. You are going to look to the 2 Bleiker pieces of evidence here.
A) Our first piece of Bleiker in 98 evidence; indicates that their
standards of predictability kills any education claims. When
you already know whats the discussion is going to be in the
debate then you dont learn anything. Our form of
unpredictability will always have a better internal link to good
education which means we will always control the direction of
good education in the debate round.
B) The second piece of Bleiker evidence indicates their interp
of how the affirmative should act is an attempt to make the
resolution a sacred idea that cannot be questioned merely
obeyed. Put a star next to this one on your flow; this evidence
literally says that when this type of forced knowledge
production occurs we must reject the object of questioning or
in this case the res.
2. Extend the Turnali 03 evidence: It indicates that there are no
concrete or pre-determined meanings of words. How we find
these meanings is through context in the debate and the way
we conceptualize them in the round and is proven by the fact
that many people evaluate T debates through a competing
interp. Framework which would mean we win the pepsi
challenge in that framework.
3. Extend our Analysis that their form of education is always going
to be bad because it is based within technological thought.
Saying no its not isnt good enough analysis on why its not.
The form of thinking that they allow and produce is a type of
thinking that leaves us in the status quos technological ordering
and understanding of our being. Prefer our analysis on this
question every time.
4. Extend that Speech is action counter interp; The Johnson in 03
evidence indicates that if there Is no where as statement in
the resolution then it is considered a simple resolution posing a
question rather than committing us to actual political
enactment Which means we are the only one germane to the
type of education meant for us to learn under the resolution.
[Go to the Line By Line Now]

40

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

1AR/2AR: FW/T (Zimmerman Extension)

Were winning specific turns to their interpretation on this flow. The
Zimmerman in 94 evidence is an independent turn to their
interp as a specific recreation of the standing reserve in this
round justifying the exact logic that Nazis used to legitimize the
extermination of the Jews by deeming the af as waste under
their interp and that we should be discarded for our form of
debate. Dont confuse the argument; Were not saying they are
literally causing a form of genocide but a systematic removal
and extermination of ontological thought.
This has a few implications:
1. Means their education is stale and a form of intellectual
incest. They limit the argument gene pool to a specific
policy/resolutional lens. This destroys discussion of the root
cause of the impacts of the status quo. Af interp would
diversify the discussion.
2. Their advocacy of having to operate within a specifc area of
predictable ground is also a recreation of the technological
mindset of the standing reserve. Which means my interp would
solve for better ground in the debate.
These are not only independent dis-ads to their interp they also
function as external reasons to prefer our interp and reasons to
vote af.
[If there is any, go to the line by line]

41

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

1AR/2AR: FW/T (Der Derian Extension)

Der Derian evidence is devastating to them on this flow. Their
interpretation is and attempt to insulate themselves from
radical thought. This securitization logic is a facet of
technological thinking by muting dissent against a system that
brought about the problem of nuclear weapons and the way it
defines the essence of our being.
1. Means their education claims are bunk:
A) We only learn about political action when these approaches
are only band-aid solutions that dont really solve the problem.
Their exclusion of outside thought prevents their impacts from
ever being solved.
B) Proof their education they wish to advocate and produce is
co-opted by technological thought.

42

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: CP- No Solvency

1. Doesnt Solve the Af- The Heidegger in 50 evidence indicates that
the modernization of transportation is what prevents us from
moving away from a technological understanding of being. The
reading of the Plan is a way to open up a path for questioning
our relationship to technicity through the notion of
transportation infrastructure.
2. Technological thinking is always in the service of maintaining the
status quoSwazo 02
Norman K. Swazo, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska Crisis Theory and World Order:
Heideggerian Reflections, p. 43
Whether the subject was understood as world order studies, global policy analysis, or futurology, a sense of the problem and the need for drastic global reform came of age. The report of the first phase of the
Club of Rome's Project in the Predicament of Mankind perhaps served most to generate awareness of the imminent crisis. Concerned with "five basic factors that determine and therefore, ultimately limit,
growth on this planet-population, agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production, and pollution," this research group constructed a world model "built specifically to investigate five major
trends ```of global concern accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and a deteriorating environment."' The main conclusion of the
report is that "If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached

Scenarios of the future, as I have noted, depend on

methodological orientations, on whether the analysis is concerned with empirical norms
primarily or some balance of empirical norms with moral norms. Futures research
concerned more with empirical norms tends to concentrate on quantitative methods and computer analysis, producing "hard" models or scenarios of alternative
futures. Robert Clute describes such efforts thus: International futures research attempts to examine current interrelated global
issues in order to project or forecast the future consequences of past and present trends and to suggest alternative
sometime within the next one hundred years."'

scenarios in an attempt to avoid undesired consequences. This work has become known as futurology, which, according to Victor Ferkiss, "combines the knowledge of the scientist, the will of the utopian and

The problem with futures

however, notes Clute, is that the most visible works which "purport to be global in
approach are, in the main, biased toward scenarios that are concerned with
maintaining the systems and values if the market economy, developed states. Indeed, many of the major futures studies are extremely ethnocentric and are therefore
the imagination of the writer of science fiction." The policy aspect of international futures is in essence an attempt at long-term planning.'

research,

resisted by much of the world."'

A) C/A Kurzweil and Kroker: Kurzweil indicates that the curve

of technological understanding is accelerating at such a
high rate that it will lead to what he calls the Singularity; an
event horizon much like a black hole that consumes
everything in an attempt to satisfy its insatiable hunger for
its own existence. This is what Kroker represents as a
morphing of will into a constant cycle consuming humans
and nonhumans in order to perpetuate its own power into
an ever expanding completed state of metaphysics. This is a
transgression of a metaphysical brink that pushes us into
the will to will that further technological development will
cause.

43

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

44

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

***Dis-Ads***

45

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: DAs
1. Extend the Coviello in 2000 evidence; their war and extinction
scenarios are a lie made as an attempt to ensure the states
control by externalizing conflict to an unknown other and is the
justification of systematic violence.
2. Utilitarian evaluations of body counts through the DA are a
fundamental representation of the will to will; the body now
serves as the grounding for certainty which creates a cyclical
reproduction of this certainty for the will to will to maintain
itself. This cycle makes everything and everyone as consumable
to protect this systemCaughey 99
John Caughey, November 2, 1999, Overcoming Metaphysics
http://kengarman.tripod.com/themetaphysicalresource/id7.html
To see Nietzsche as a metaphysician is to see him as having adopted Descartes' fundamental position.
This fundamental position Heidegger terms the "metaphysics of subjectivity." Yet, for Nietzsche
takes this subjectivity to its 'absolute' validity as a subjectivity of the body. Rather

than the cogito serving as the ground of certainty, the body provides this ground.
The body is what is real; it is comprised of drives and effects. That is, the body is the
will to power. Thus, the drives and effects of the body become the ground for
certainty. The only thing we can be certain of any longer are our own desires our
own drives. We are only certain of our will. This reversal of Platonism, this making the
body absolutely valid, exhausts the last possibility of metaphysics --i.e. its reversal.
From this exhaustion arises the will to will. The will to will has no goal other than
the unconditional guarantee of itself. This is, in a sense, the fulfillment of Descartes project
(and of Plato's also) but in a form far different from what they would ever have imagined. Certainty
is attained through the manipulation of everything for and by the will to will : "The
will to will forces the calculation and arrangement of everything [including humans]
for itself as the basic forms of appearance, only, however, for the unconditionally
protractible guarantee of itself." The only certainty that is attained then, is the will
to will's certainty of itself and the will to will continually produces this certainty.

Heidegger terms the above mentioned basic form of appearance technology. Technology for Heidegger incorporates more than just the production of machines, it includes "all the areas of beings which equip
the whole of beings: objectified nature, the business of culture, manufactured politics, and the gloss of ideals overlying everything." In short, technology, thus understood, coincides with completed
metaphysics. Saying metaphysics has come to completion, we must recall, does not mean that metaphysics is in some sense abandoned. People will still live and think metaphysically but metaphysical
philosophy is unnecessary. "Completed metaphysics...gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no longer needs philosophy [i.e. metaphysics] because
philosophy is already its foundation." So, metaphysics has come to an end in the sense that it has exhausted its essential possibilities but it will continually return again and again in different forms, and these

, all that is left to do is the purely 'economical' role

of ordering raw materials, humans being the most primary of these raw materials.
This function constantly provides new raw materials but they are too be consumed in the
same fashion. That is, they are used by the will to will to further guarantee the will to
will--consumption for the sake of consumption.
forms will be grounded by completed metaphysics. After the end of metaphysics

46

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

3. The use of Death as a reason for action in order to prevent it

creates a mindset that externalizes death to an Other and
prevents an authentic existence. Embracing death as immanent
reveals that it is intertwined with life and affirms our own
existence; allowing us to experience an authentic existence as
beings among beingsSinger 04
Irving Singer, 2004 Living with Death, pgs. 7-9
http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Linguistics-and-Philosophy/24209Spring2004/18BFF15E-343B-4088-AD56-80AFAEDD5B91/0/death_1.pdf
Through the characters of Antonius Block and his squire Jons, Bergman develops the perspectives on death that result from confrontations with death. Bergman introduces the actor Jof and his family to

not constantly plagued by the threat of death, and as a result, they

maintain a distant attitude toward death through the majority of the film. In fact, death never seems to
cross their minds unless their lives are actually threatened: only when Jof sees Block play a chess match against
Death and during the ensuing storm does the family express any sort of concern about death. This attitude accurately portrays Heideggers belief that people do not
acknowledge that the possibility of death exists at every given moment (Dollimore 161). The final
provide a contrasting view. Unlike Block and Jons, the actors are

sequence reinforces Heideggers idea. After the storm has finally subsided, Jof and his family emerge from their wagon. Like the storm, their fear of death has also abated, leaving them free to resume life as
usual. Even as Jof describes his cryptic vision of Death leading the other characters away, Mia quickly dismisses the image and de- emphasizes the gravity of death with her light tone. As with Block and the

characters such as Jof and his wife

who avoid facing death would never experience authentic existence.

concept of authentic existence, Bergman presents the concepts underlying Heideggers philosophy but refuses the conclusions. Under Heideggers beliefs,

Mia
Heidegger views this in
a negative light as Jof and his family would not enjoy the freedoms from social conventions that come from acknowledging death. However, Bergmans presentation of these sequences seems to indicate that
he does not share the same view. By closing The Seventh Seal with Mias casual denial of Jofs haunting vision, Bergman adds an uplifting mood to the movie. The sequence directly combats the grim fate that
several of the characters met moments earlier. As Jof and his family head towards the horizon having survived their brush with death, Bergman seems to say that there is some solace in the fact that people are
able to carry out in spite of such bleak eventualities. Throughout his masterpiece The Seventh Seal, Bergman presents different human responses to death and contrasts the responses with each other. Bergman
draws upon numerous existential philosophies and manifests them through his characters. The work of Martin Heidegger takes shape within Antonius Block. The knights

Death allows

the authentic experience

contact with

him to achieve
Heidegger describes. In Blocks loyal squire, aspects of Georg Simmels philosophies come
to life. Through his understanding of death, Jons is able to confront death in a jocular manner. The actor Jof and his family provide another vantage point from which to view death. Through them, Bergman

the typical manner in which people acknowledge death (as described by Heidegger): they cower
in fear when death approaches yet readily forget the possibility of death as soon
as the threat passes. Bergman does not stop at simply presenting these philosophies. For instance, despite his use of Heideggers underlying beliefs in both Antonius Block and
presents

Jofs family, the conclusions he suggests do not parallel those of Heidegger himself. In fact, Bergman often seems to argue against Heideggers conclusions. Block cannot accept the loss of meaning in life that

they will never attain Heideggers

acknowledge death. Thus, Bergman takes these existing

results from his confrontation with Death; instead of a feeling of failure or falseness, Jof and his family provide a sense of hope though

authentic existence due to their refusal to

constantly

philosophies and uses them to create a new set of values for the human response to death.

4. This authentic existence is key to disclose nature as something

other than raw materials to be consumedZimmerman 01
Michael E. Zimmerman, Martin Heidegger 2001, pg. 2
In the 1920s, Heidegger distinguished between inauthentic and authentic human existence. Despite his denials to the contrary, this now-famous distinction owed something to the Christian distinction between
the conditions of sinfulness and grace. Heideggers spiritual concerns, which at one time had led him to study for the Roman Catholic priesthood, are at work in many of his writings, which became very

As inauthentic, Heidegger claimed, one denies or flees from ones mortal

openness; as authentic, in contrast, one affirms and owns up to that openness. Authentic
existence involves a radical transformation of temporality, such that entities can
manifest them differently than they show up in everyday life. Authenticity can
characterize not only individuals, Heidegger maintained, but entire peoples as well. In the 1930s, he indicated that an
authentic people, resolved to exist courageously within the limits imposed by historical finitude, could disclose nature in a way
other than as raw material for industry or objects for scientific investigation.
important for 20th century theology.

47

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

5. Insecurity is an inevitable condition of existencethe drive for

perfect security turns life into a standing reserve that
necessitates endless warfareMitchell 05
Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University,
"Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1,
2005 , pp. 181-218
There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of
being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found
in the absence of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total
annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the danger and threat of being.
But how? Heideggerlikewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism. Security and
assurance, both equally apt translations of the German Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (Gew it) for IHeidegger. In the course of
the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of
salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept:
assurance (Sicherung), "In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in thesensible, in the quest for the certainty of salvation

is the assurance of man in the

world

, what is sought

suprasensible
" (VS, 30/14).22 Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological
aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are

Ontological uncertainty would be found in

conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable
and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the
other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical
thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for
representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to
Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (GA 67: 167). Such a
policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the
standing-reserve like everything else This postmodern security is accomplished
through bestowal and appraisal of value, "Securement, as the obtaining of
security, is grounding in valuation" (GA 5: 262/195; tin). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of
our conception of security today. Securement , as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making
the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise,
themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty.

are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place

. Security is only possible when everything works

according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now
becomes evident. For the plan, "the necessity of 'leadership', that is, the planned
calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required " (GA 7: 89-90/EP, 105; tm). The
demand for security is always a call for such Fiihrers. Planning is a matter of ensuring
the smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines
of order and delivery. The plan's success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a
an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement

total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself.
The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of
identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical

Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without

remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the
distances that made possible representation . Without that spacing, there is only
the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan.The
plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own
expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow
right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve
will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for
"They press toward a securing of resources [Bestandsicherung] for a constant form of
consumption" (GA 7: 88; EP, 103-4; tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to
protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The plan seeks "the 'all-inclusive' [restlose] securing
of the ordering of order" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would
model is recognized.

stand outside of the prevailing

48

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

6. A technological mindset makes mass exterminations and the uses

of nuclear weapons both possible and inevitable. Thats our
Zimmerman in 94 evidence

49

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

7. Death is integral to being; prevention of death denies the

question of beingDallmayr 92
Fred Dallmayr, 1992, NOTHINGNESS AND SUNYATA: A COMPARISON OF HEIDEGGER
AND NlSHlTANl pg. 43-44
These comments can hardly be reconciled with Heideggers texts. From his early period, I believe, his writings sought to extricate themselves -by and large successfully- from the
equation of nothingness with negativity or a realm "outside" being and existence.
As articulated in Being and Time, the notion of "being-unto-death" did not designate a terminal point or a sphere
beyond life, but an intrinsic possibility and defining character of human existence
itself. As Heidegger wrote at the time: "As the end of Dasein or existence, death is Dasein's innermost
possibility -where possibility does not mean a theoretical or practical option which Dasein might or might not choose, but rather an inner latency or
potential steadily permeating life from the beginning. "Poised toward this possibility," he added, "Dasein
discovers its innermost potentiality of being in which the very being of Dasein is at
stake." As one may also recall, Being and Time contained a strong critique of the modern reliance on subjectivity and the cogito; a critique which in many ways resembled Nishitani's. Taking a broad
historical view, Heidegger's remarks spanned the tradition of modern thought from Descartes over Kant to Husserl (and the beginning of existentialism). While acknowledging the power of Cartesian doubt,
Heidegger challenged as dubious the basic Cartesian starting point, namely, the ego as a thinking substance. "With the principle 'cogito ergo sum'," he wrote, "Descartes claimed that he was putting philosophy
on a new and secure footing; but what he left undetermined in this 'radical' departure was the mode of being of the res cogitans or-more precisely-the ontological meaning of the 'sum'." A similar halfheartedness, in his view, was operative in Kantian philosophy, despite its comparative refinement of critical reflection. While exposing previous misconceptions and confusions, Kant likewise neglected to
undertake a

"prior ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject "; although demonstrating the "untenability of
"ontological interpretation of selfhood.

the ontic thesis regarding a psychic substance," he refrained from offering an

" In attenuated form, the same
defect was still evident in Husserl's treatment of subjectivity and in Scheler's (quasi-existentialist) notion of personality. Irrespective of the differences between Husserl and Scheler, Heidegger observed, they
concur at least negatively in this respect: "

They no longer raise the question of

the

'being

of a person'.""

50

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Econ Scenarios

(

) Market places have become the new techno war zone were
casualties are discarded and rendered expendablede
Beistegui 97

Miguel de Beistegui, 1997 Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S.
Critchely, p.71, ASG JRC
From the perspective of the essential configuration of the modern age, the Second World War must be seen as the continuation and the confirmation of the total mobilization already operative in the First World
War. Yet the planetary conflict from the heart of which Heidegger addressed his students eventually marked the last stage in the development of mans power over the earth. For if that conflict was eventually
brought to an end, it was only by way of an escalade in the means of mass destruction as well as by the threat of the complete annihilation of an entire nation, if not of the planet as a whole. Is it not a symptom
of our epoch that only the actual possibility of a catastrophe of world magnitude could bring the most deadly of wars to its end? Yet the peace that followed from the death of hundreds of thousands in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not bring the fury of might to an end. That peace was and still is the confirmation of the total mobilization that characterizes our epoch. Brought to its knees by power, Japan has
become the very emblem of power, of this kind of power consisting of a meticulous organization and a military discipline, of an optimization of its resources and of an exemplary treatment of planetary

The distinction between war and peace has become increasingly difficult to
draw. War seems to be carried out as much if not more on the economic terrain as
it is on battle-fields. The fiercest battles are now being fought on the markets:
the labor market, the securities market, the real-estate market, the culture market. The whole of reality has
become a market, saturated to the point of having to invent and simulate for itself
an alternate space, the space of virtuality. The voices of technologyin this case of Capitalare impenetrable. Europe itself has become a
Common Market, the market of the smallest common denominator of exchange. The shares of such markets are being fought
for, much in the same way in which nations used to fight (and still do) for territories. One has
information.

become entitled to wonder whether the Fhrer are indeed those whom we continue to label as such, or whether they are now only left with the menial task of managing and orchestrating the ordering, the

And let us not be fooled into thinking that such wars do

not bring their share of victimsvictims who do not necessarily die, but who find
themselves condemned to survive on the periphery of these planetary
phenomena, cast out into the sombre zones of para-techno-capitalism.
bringing to heel and the empowering of all the sectors of being.

) Claims of economic survival only serve to hide the inherent

technological process of global domination and calculation of
resourcesJoronen 10

Mikko Joronen, Doctoral candidate in Human Geography @ The University of Turku,

The Age of Planetary Space Planetary System of Ordering, 2010
http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf?
sequence=1 JM
Under such colonization of calculable price mechanism, the whole globe eventually becomes an area of domination:
the metaphysical essence of markets is to bring all beings into a quasi-Darwinian struggle
for survival between the powers of business calculation. It is precisely because this
survival is based on successful accumulation and efficient commodification of
beings, that under the contemporary global capitalism the whole globe becomes
conquered for its market. Under such economic malleability everything is established as producible
products and hence delivered to the markets in terms of growing efficiency and competitiveness. Out of the colossal competition between the figures of calculation and machination,
globalization turns into a struggle between different technological worldviews (Heidegger 1977d:134135; See also Joronen 2008; Moisio 2008:8990). Globalization growing giganticism fuelled by the
competition between powers of efficient manipulation and survival a struggle to maximize the utility and control of beings under the pre-delineating framework of gigantic calculation are both

economic survival struggle and the glorification of

competitiveness hide the fact that they aim at massive ordering , thus admiring
the megalomania of endless growth and expansion . By penetrating and spreading, and hence, by turning all beings under the
logic of technological manipulation, the techno-capitalist logic of
optimization of productivity and
competitiveness that constantly seeks to open new markets by turning things
into products of profit making eventually present one of the ontic realities that have accelerated the globalization of Gestell.
manifestations of the operational logic of technological Gestell. Consequently,

) Viewing the world through an economic lens reinforces the

exploitation and inequalities of technological thoughtBall 05

Karyn Ball, 2005, Paranoia in the Age of the World Picture: The Global Limits of
Enlightenment, Cultural Critique No. 61, p. 122-123

Heidegger failed to address the implications of the Nazi movement's genocidal narcissism and,
apart from scattered dark hints, he largely avoided a specific reflection on the effects of capitalist
modes of rationalization. Such realities point to the function of an unconscious ego abiding in
the logic of capital in an international arena. To the extent that half-awake citizens of
industrialized nations insist on acting as if they know not what it does (by definition), this

51

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

allows them perpetually to

disavow or veil the trespasses committed by their governments and
corporations on their behalf while advancing destructive and exploitative
geopolitical economic interests. If recoded from this standpoint, Heidegger's analysis
might prompt a consideration of how the confluence of financial and
research capital in conjunction with neoliberal ideology contributes to grievous
bioeconomic asymmetries.
ego sometimes induces paranoia among them because it

A2: Terrorism Scenarios

(
) Terrorism is a symptom of the technological age; our
ontological questioning of our relationship to technology solvesMitchell 05
Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University,
"Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1,
2005 , pp. 181-218 jrc
Insofar as Heideggerian thinking is a thinking of being, then it must be able to
think terrorism, for the simple reason that terrorism names the current countenance of being for our times, and without such a correspondence to being, Heideggerian thinking is nothing.
The issue is not one of applying a pre-established Heideggerian doctrine to an object or situation that would remain outside of thought. Rather, the issue is one of
recognizing that the objects and situations of our world themselves call for
thought, and that in thinking the world, we enter into a correspondence with being. But what sort of correspondence can be achieved between the thinking of being and terrorism? Heidegger's
articulation of the age of technology already contains in germ four routes of access for the thinking of terrorism. First, Heidegger himself witnessed a transformation in the
making of war, such that he was led to think beyond the Clausewitzian model of
modem warfare and to open the possibility for a "warfare" of a different sort. This thought
beyond war is itself an opening to terrorism. Second, Heidegger prioritizes terror (Erschrecken) as a fundamental mood appropriate to
our age of technological enframing. Terror is a positive mood, not a privative one, and it corresponds to the way that being gives itself today. Third,
Heidegger thinks threat and danger in an "ontological" manner that calls into question
traditional notions of presence and absence. Terrorism attends this transformation in presence. Finally, and following from all of this,
Heidegger rethinks the notion of security in a manner that alerts us to the
oxymoronic character of "homeland security" and the impossibility of ever
achieving a condition of complete safety from terrorism. In each of these ways, Heideggerian thinking responds to this
most uncommon of challenges.

) Political responses to terrorism are destined to fail a thinking

of terrorism is a prior question; means you vote afMitchell
05

Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University,

"Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1,
2005 , pp. 181-218
This does not mean that being exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they

Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and to think
withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where
beings exist as terrorized. Terrorism, in other words, is not simply the sum total of activities carried
out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole.Terrorism is
consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This
"ontological" point demands that there be the "ontic" threat of real terrorists . Further, this
metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail. Political reactions to terrorism, which
depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism
itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics . That is to
say, political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism . In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of
thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politico-technological landscape against which terrorism takes place .
exist.

terrorism. My contention in the following is that the

52

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Nuclear War Scenarios

(

) The very act of war depends on technological thought- it

translates the use of force into the preservation of existence
Burke 07

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW,

Sydney, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2007, Project Muse
Thus war and existence are intertwined. However within such existential imperatives to
war lies a more technical, performative (and thus rationalistic) discourse: that once it is deemed
necessary to use force in defence of one's right to exist it is possible to do so, to
translate military means into political ends in a controlled and rational way. This is the
second, rationalist form of state reason that most commonly takes the name of 'strategy'. Its fundamental
tenet was most famously expressed in Carl Von Clausewitz's argument that war 'is a mere continuation of policy by other
means...a pulsation of violent force...subject to the will of a guiding intelligence' .10
That this is a textbook model of instrumental reason , one that imports Newtonian physics into human relations, is clear in
Clausewitz's influential definition: 'War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will' .11

) Nuclear Weapons are the pinnacle of modern technology; This

nuclear age is a representation of the technological morphing of
our Being. The greatest danger is not that these weapons will
be used but that our perception of our being and approach to
our world is viewed through this technological lensScoggin 02
Dan Scoggin, 2002, Heidegger, Technology and Television Reflections on
Reception, http://www.datawranglers.com/negations/issues/02s/
Martin Heidegger suggests, in a lecture titled "The Thing" (1949), that the atom bomb is "the grossest of all gross
confirmations" of modern technologys destruction of the essence of "thingness." Speaking at the advent of the
nuclear age, Heidegger claims that the universal implications of the bomb represent the
historical culmination of technologys erasure of an older form of Being maintained by the nearness of earth and its objects.
Despite the philosophers use of apocalyptic language in reference to such a singular threat language that leads some to misread Heidegger as engaging in a reactionary rebellion against technologyhe is
not suggesting that technology is some sort of objective evil. The bomb itself is
not the threat. Rather, an older order of Being is challenged by the universal implications
underwriting the bombs very existence, a form of human perception that is wholly modern. Now fifty
years later, we should reexamine Heideggers subtle reading of technology by keeping in mind his emphasis that the "greatest danger" may not figure
as an atomic flash, but concerns our day-to-day approach to the things around us.
On the one hand, the current phenomenon of television, with its privileged status as a cultural event, serves as an excellent example by which to explore Heideggers complex notion concerning how
technology becomes intertwined with our Being. On the other hand, we can start to unravel the complex existence of the event of television today by returning to his notion of Enframing (Gestell)which

the essence of technology is not technological, but a way of life.

proposes that
In either case, the first step of
bringing Heidegger and television together involves an overcoming of the instrumental logic that suggests that television is best thought of as a home appliance, a window to the world, a marketplace, a piece

if we label technology as either neutral, evil, or outside human thinking altogether,

we are handed over to its powers in the "worst possible way"

of furniture, a companion, or something fully human. After all,

Heidegger warns,
(TQCT, 4). The value of
Heideggers theory of technology consists in its ability to offer us an alternative way to conceptualize a rupture between a technological past and present. The user friendly ease of todays most advanced

away from a
reflection on the mechanical sources that underwrite their existence. Yet Heidegger stresses in his
mediumsfrom the internet and CD ROM of home computing, to CAT scans, MRI imaging, sonograms, and computer-enhanced photographylead many users

landmark essay of 1955, "The Question Concerning Technology" ("Die Frage nach der Technik"), that it is nonetheless important for us, when thinking about the seeming dislocation of the technological
present, to recognize that the destiny of technology was set in place long ago: "That which is primally early shows itself only ultimately to men. Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think
through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is passed, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of what is early" (TQCT, 22). In terms of

technology is not
equivalent to the essence of technology " (TQCT, 4). The viewers unparalleled desire to
see through the medium of television, which reinforces our inability to interpret its essence, is
itself a part of the enduring (and often troubling) connection between techne and knowledge in Western
metaphysics.
our discussion, then, television exists within the "destiny" of technology, and is thus the latest object to embody the paradox of his insightful claim that "

53

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Systemic MPX Out Weigh

(

) Subjective violence should not be the main preoccupation in

the round. Systemic violence should take precedence as it
constructs the subjective force, distractions with subjective
violence only allows the systemic to slide by unnoticedZizek
08

Slavoj Zizek, 2008, is a senior researcher at the University of Slovenia Ljubljana. He

also has a beard. Violence.
If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on
violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the
forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to disentangle
ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible "subjective" violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent.
We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance. This
is the starting point

, perhaps even the axiom, of

the

present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that
what Heidegger would call "our

also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms,

house of being." As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious-and extensively studied-cases of incitement and of the relations
of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more
fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its
imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call "systemic"
violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our
economic and political systems. The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is
experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the "normal," peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to

Systemic
violence is thus something like the notorious "dark matter" of physics, the
counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has
to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be
"irrational" explosions of subjective violence. When the media bombard us with
those "humanitarian crises" which seem constantly to pop up all over the world,
one should always bear in mind that a particular crisis only explodes into media
visibility as the result of a complex struggle . Properly humanitarian considerations as a
rule play a less important role here than cultural, ideologico-political, and
economic considerations. The cover story of Time magazine on 5 June 2006, for example, was "The Deadliest War in the World." This offered detailed
this "normal" state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent.

documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political violence over the last decade. None of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple
of readers' letters-as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space. To put it cynically, Time picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony
in suffering. It should have stuck to the list of usual suspects: Muslim women and their plight, or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with their losses. The Congo today has effectively reemerged as a Conradean "heart of darkness." No one dares to confront it head on. The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times
more than the death of a nameless Congolese.

54

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Af Comes First
(

) In order to overcome the philosophical preconceptions about

how we relate to a natural attitude we must examine the way
we perceive things around us in our everyday livesRouse 05

Joseph Rouse, 2005, Heidegger on Science and Naturalism,

http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1035&context=div1facpubs
A natural conception of the world needed working out, because philosophical preconceptions about knowledge and the
mind had supposedly blocked understanding even of our most familiar, unreflective activities. Husserl, for example, assimilated everyday life and
scientific knowledge as exemplifying a natural attitude that was antithetical to
philosophy. Nor was Husserl alone in thus taking all ordinary human activities to involve cognition or
knowledge. In his attempt to avoid reifying relations between knower and known by avoiding epistemological presuppositions, Heidegger was thus led to reconceive human understanding.
Most philosophers take mental states or propositional attitudes (perceiving, judging, desiring) as our basic
way of relating to and understanding things. Heidegger proposed instead to start
philosophical reflection with our most ordinary, familiar dealings with our
surroundings. He talked more encompassingly of our various dealings with or comportments toward entities, and challenged the presumption that such comportments always at least
implicitly involve mental or linguistic representation or cognition. Adapting the term Dasein for the entity we ourselves are (in part to set aside
some of our philosophical prejudices about the being of this entity ), Heidegger claimed that,[Dasein] never
finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in
some way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. (1982, 159) In everyday comportment, we understand the entities we encounter, but Heidegger construed

understanding as practical competence

rather than cognition or mental representation (1953, 143). Cognition and knowledge were supposedly

derivative from (founded upon) such everyday practical understanding.

) Other ontological ways of defining our essence of being fail;

these criticisms are based in a modern humanist anthropology
background that separates man from being in the world and
places humanity above itGlendinning 98

Simon Glendinning, 1998, ON BEING WITH OTHERS pgs. 45-46

In both Being and Time and The Letter on Humanism, Heidegger characterises humanist anthropology as that tradition in which what is called man
is defined by setting it off as one kind of entity present among others. Of course, human
beings are not then simply equated with mere things or even with other living creatures.
On the contrary, man is accorded a specific and special difference: man is the animal
endowed with the power of reason or language ; or is the ens finitum which is made in Gods image.
According to Heidegger, modern philosophy has inherited the essential features of this classical
anthropology. That is, modern philosophy, too, conceives the human being primarily as a
kind of entity present in the world alongside others and only then supplies it with a
distinctive trait. It rejects the baldly naturalistic assumption that the essence of
man consists in being an animal organism, but proposes that this insufficient definition of mans essence [can] be overcome or offset by
outfitting man with an immortal soul or by adjoining a soul to the human body, a mind to the soul . . . and then louder than before singing the praises
of the mind. (LH, pp. 2289). Thus, with respect to the issue of the background conception, Heideggers thesis is that in modern philosophy, where consciousness is
the point of departure, humanism remains the background conception : In principle we are still
thinking of homo animalis even when anima is posited as animus sive mens, and this is later posited as subject, person or spirit (ibid., p. 227).5 According to Heidegger, then, construing
what is distinctive about human existence in this quasi- naturalistic way has opened us up to a determination of ourselves which invites and
sustains scepticism: the possibility of the human organism having access to the world can be conceived only in terms of a (more or less mysterious) extra property of this entity,
and one whose mechanism and success is intrinsically problematic and uncertain. Heideggers alternative
begins with the complete rejection of the idea that something like access to the world is
merely a fortunate, secondary supplement, a supplementary benefit, to our existence: for the entity that we are, being in a
world is something that belongs essentially (BT, p. 13). To emphasise that this is a basic state of Being, Heidegger coins the compound
expression Being-in-the-world to describe it, stressing thereby that the in the world aspect of our existence is not an
added extra but an essential and irreducible feature of it. Existence, for human beings at least, is this unitary
phenomenon (ibid., p. 53). With this in view it is clear that, for Heidegger, the fundamental and recurrent feature of modern

55

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

philosophy informed by the humanist background conception

phenomenon which, in our Being, we are.

is that it

splits the

56

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

1AR: Coviello EXT

1. Coviello is so hard! It literally says that the language of the
negatives impact scenarios is the exact same type of language
used by policy makers to perpetually create an external threats;
the other for us to defend ourselves against. This is the way
we justify any form of violence against any perceived threat as
long as it is in the name of security.
2. In the post 9/11 era we have seen this type of logic come to
fruition contained within the War on Terror creating a state of
fear and panic that the next attack was around the corner,
justifying preemptive violence resulting in authoritarian
ideologiesKroker 06
Arthur Kroker, 2006, BORN AGAIN IDEOLOGY: Religion, Technology, and Terrorism
http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=547
Precipitated by the (symbolically) cataclysmic events of 9/11, by waves of panic fear
and calls for redemptive violence unleashed by this sudden dissolution, this breaching, of the boundaries of the sovereign body politic, a
warp hole has opened up in the spacetime fabric of American empire linking two singularities -- religious fundamentalism and cybernetized global militarism -- into what quantum physicists call a "common

, the psychic shock of 9/11 -- aided and abetted by a neoconservative regime with a preemptive plan of
strategic military action already in place -- ripped wide open the unitary spacetime fabric of the American mind, providing for a momentous fusion of two seemingly
opposite ideas -- technological futurism and religious prophecy -- which, until that moment, had maintained their solitude according to the rituals of modernity. Instantly, the
vengeance-seeking energies of the (religious) past poured through the psychic fissure
of 9/11 to take flesh in the materiality of cybernetic warfare and crusading empireconsciousness. We all know the enlightenment fable of the supposed death of god. But that story, the Nietzschean myth of the death of the sacred in our (enlightenment) minds and with
world-line." Literally

it the supposed triumph of the rights of reason over religious sectarianism, is, it must be admitted, increasingly specific to the particularities of European late modernist experience. Like Hegel's vision of the
owl of Minerva which takes flight at dusk, the God of the New Testament may have died in European consciousness in the age of progress precisely because a new incarnation of God, the God of the Old

fusing a crusading politics of redemptive violence and a domestic tutelary of

panic insecurity, was being born by way of the American political covenant. The second
coming of god then as the real politics of American empire: a fateful meeting of the ancient prophecies of the Old Testament with full-spectrum futurism of
cyber-warfare. That's Born Again Ideology, and this time, the rulers of the American covenant intend to get it right, far right, with a style of political action -- an
unyielding politics based on preemptive action, a politics of hand to mouth
existence, constant military interventions, ceaselessly stirring up turbulence, media
provocations intended to provoke panic fear among the domestic population for
which redemptive violence is the only recourse -- a style of political action which, with its scapegoating and appeals to intolerant,
charismatic leadership is hauntingly reminiscent of what Leo Lowenthal, the Frankfurt School theorist writing in exile during the 1940s, described as the imminent strategy
of authoritarian ideologies.
Testament,

3. Crisis situations are tools for the restructuring of domination;

through fear they are permitted to hold together a world
through infinite management of its own collapseThe Invisible
Committee 09
The Invisible Committee, 2009, The Coming Insurrection pgs. 13-14
It is now publicly understood that crisis situations are so many opportunities for the
restructuring of domination. This is why Sarkozy can announce, without seeming to lie
too much, that the financial crisis is the end of a world, and that 2009 will see France enter a new
era. This charade of economic crisis is supposed to be a novelty: we are supposed
to be in the dawn of a new epoch where we will all join together in fighting
inequality and global warming. But for our generationwhich was born in the crisis and has
known nothing but economic, financial, social and ecological crisisthis is rather difficult to accept.

They wont fool us again, with another round of Now we start all over again and
Its just a question of tightening our belts for a little while. To tell the truth, the
disastrous unemployment figures no longer arouse any feeling in us. Crisis is a
means of governing. In a world that seems to hold together only through the
infinite management of its own collapse.

57

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

58

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

4. Constant claims of collapse are the tools of domination over the

self, making it the more efficient and productive self, willing to
rally to any cause but returning to its original stateThe
Invisible Committee 09
The Invisible Committee, 2009, The Coming Insurrection pg. 31
The
maintenance of the self in a permanent state of deterioration, in a chronic state of
near collapse, is the best-kept secret of the present order of things. The weak,
depressed, self-critical, virtual self is essentially that endlessly adaptable subject
required by the ceaseless innovation of production, the accelerated obsolescence
of technologies, the constant overturning of social norms, and generalized
flexibility. It is at the same time the most voracious consumer and, paradoxically, the most
productive self, the one that will most eagerly and energetically throw itself into
the slightest project, only to return later to its original larval state.
I am what I am. Never has domination found such an innocent sounding slogan.

59

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AR MPX Overview: Policy MPX

On Their MPX1. Af solve Root Cause Conflicts and Wars appear from the mindset
that our government and culture is rooted in. Only through a
causal evaluation of our relationship to it through the af can we
get rid of knee-jerk solutions and get to the root of impact
claims of the technological world. The very essence of the
destruction is rooted in the abandonment of being through our
domination and interpretation of the earth and people as
exploitable objects.
2. Their extinction claims get them nowhere- they are lies that only
entrench the power of the state and construct endless wars
against an external other. Thats Coviello in 2000. This is
especially true given the security culture post 9/11 where we
are always warned of another attack as a way to justify
preemptive warfare to constantly expand and test the limits of
our imperial reach that transcends not only the physical aspect
of warfare but ends in the way that we are allowed to criticize
and debate about government and social policy. That is the the
ultimate manifestation of the standing reserve. Thats our
Kroker in 06 and Der Derian 95 evidence
-This means that the systemic impacts of technological
mindsets will always come first. Its a turn to all of their realist
impacts.
3. Their impacts link back to the criticism of the af- Their attempts
at achieving perfect security only forces life into standing
reserve and preventing us from experiencing an authentic
existence. Thats the Singer and Zimmerman evidence.
4. Our MPX come first- The technological mindset creates a false
sense of empowerment in humans. We have become a culture
of technicity. This creates a false sense of value of life. This
mutation of being outweighs their nuclear war scenarios.

60

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

On Our MPX1. At the end of the round we get Zimmerman; Means you look to our
MPX first; the biggest threat that we face is humanities
technological conception of being. It is this mindset that
justified the Holocaust by labeling Jews as waste that was to be
discarded. It is in this same way that we objectify nature by
assigning value allowing mindless consumption of the earth.
2. Our MPX are Systemic- the impacts in the 1ac are rooted in the
status quos technological mindset. We are the necessary first
step.
-In a world absent the af all of their impacts become
inevitable because humanity is itself confined into a standing
reserve. Political evaluations only trap humanity in this
standing reserve because it is co-opted by the technological
minset. The af is a precursor to ethical action and political
action. Thats the de Beistegui evidence from the 1AC.
7. A vote negative only serves to entrench the technological mindset
of the status quo and makes their scenarios inevitable. Thats
our Zimmerman 90 evidence.
8. Death is an integeral part of our being; Their attempts to save
humanity from death only serve the technological mindset to
deny our questioning of being. That is our Dallmayr 92
evidence.
9. Their attempts to insulate humanity from death prevent the
ontological questioning of being and an authentic existence; we
only become worried about the next threat to our lives. Thats
our Singer and Zimmerman Evidence.

61

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Tech Good

1. Our af isnt a rejection of technology; it only suggests a question
of our relationship to technology. Means none of your tech good
arguments link.
2. Interesting but irrelevant, even if some technology might have
benefits our af is specific to the way a technological enframing
of the world justifies its abuse and objectification.
3. Heideggers argument isnt that all technology is bad, its a
question of how the technology is framed and what grid is use
DeLuca 05
Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in
the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, Thinking With Heidegger:
Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice, Ethics & the Environment 10.1
(2005) 67-87, Project Muse/JRC
Conversely, then, Heidegger's trajectory prompts a fundamental questioning of technology
and the regime of modern technology , but neither in the sense of a particular
device being good or bad nor in the sense of abandoning technology (as if that is ever an option).
Rather, the questioning for environmentalists is two-fold. Most basic and troubling, can humans even
think outside of the regime of modern technology? Has modern technology
foreclosed the possibilities of thinking of the way of Being-in-the-world on earth?
Second, the question to every manifestation of technology is: Does it or does it not
promote modern technology's enframing of earth and world? For example, does the computer promote the regime
of modern technology and further enmesh environmentalists in that regime or does the computer enable other ways of revealing and other ways of Being-in-the-world on earth? Arguably, different computer

, one should never analyze a technological device

outside of its context, that is, what technology grid it is hooked into. The same
device hooked into different technology regimes becomes a different technological
device.
practices would lead to different answers to these questions. That is

4. We dont claim to solve for Technology as a human achievement

rather our Af indicates that Technology is a mode of revealing
to us our being. A vote for the af isnt a rejection of technology
but a rejection of technologys enframing of the earth and
humanity into a standing reserve.

62

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

5. Our argument isnt that technology is bad, the way calculative

thought structures the earth is what allows for misappropriation
of actual technologyThiele 95
Leslie Paul Thiele, 1995, Timely Meditations, pgs. 196-197 markoff
In the technological drive for efficiency, the earth, its creatures, and our fellow
human beings are reduced to the status of raw material Heidegger's word is
"standing-reserve" (Bestand). Technologically conceived, the world as a whole
becomes standing-reserve. It exists in the mode of awaiting our use, of its being
put to most efficient use. In a technological world, Heidegger writes, "everywhere
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering" (QT 17).' Heidegger
suggests the term "enframing" (Gestell) for the mode of disclosure that displays
everything as standing-reserve. Enframing, then, is the essence of modern
technology, being that ordering which challenges everything forth as standingreserve. Technology, in this sense, is totalizing. The development of any particular
machine, artifact, or set of procedures is not the point. Heidegger's concern is that
such developments are merely the symptoms of an expansive technological drive
that recognizes no boundaries and makes no (ontological) distinctions in its effort
to en- frame the entire experiential field of human being. Machines, techniques,
and elaborate artifactswhat we generally understand as technologyremain of
secondary concern to Heidegger. Foremost in his mind is the totalizing reach of
enframing as a particular mode of human being. It follows that enframing, as the
"way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology . . . is
itself nothing technological" (QT 19-20). Machines are only the most patent
examples of that which awaits use as standing-reserve and integrates the world as
standing-reserve. The essence of modern technology is itself nothing technological
because technology is grounded not in the production of machines (its most
apparent effect), but in the ontological disclosure of the Being of being as
standing-reserve. Technology is no mere means but a way of revealing, Heidegger says, because from a I A Sierra Club newsletter describes the modern attitude toward forests as a
standing reserve: "The truth is, we've been managing our national forests as though they were outdoor warehouses of living trees, held in inventory until the lumber companies are ready to take delivery."

technology cannot be neutrally applied within

manifold modes of disclosure because technology imposes a single mode of
disclosure: everything, everywhere, uniformly, is revealed as standing- reserve.
technological viewpoint all _disclosure is reduced to a mere means. In other words,

6. Turn technological thinking drives technology into darknessonly the af creates the capacity of reclaiming technology for
non-aggressive endsWolcher 04
Louis E. Wolcher, February 2004, Professor of Law, University of Washington School of
Law, Washington Law Review
Like all things human, the essence of modern technology makes a world - an
odious world, perhaps, but a world nonetheless. In a world in thrall to technological
thinking, freedom's mode of abiding consists for the most part in its withdrawal
and quiescence. A manifestation of human being-i n-theworld, technological thinking stands in the sharpest possible contrast to what we will now call freedom for responsibility. The
latter is also a manifestation of human being-in-the-world, but unlike technological thinking it maintains a certain critical distance between itself and its world. In it, freedom awakes.

Technological thinking falls into its world wholeheartedly, becoming its world to
such a degree that it is incapable of imagining any other possibility of existence. In a
manner that will become clear later, however, freedom for responsibility always remains on the hither side of its world in the form of freedom's possibilities and freedom's responsibility. Modern
technology, in the sense of technics, has been "captured" by technological
thinking to such a degree that the latter has driven the ultimate end of technology
as such into darkness and obscurity. It is high time for freedom to rediscover that end - namely,itself - and in so doing to transform modern technology's
essence, its mode of being.

63

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Tech Solves

(

) Mans techno-scientific mastery of the world merges the Real

with pleasure seeing the Other as malleable; a system which
is ruled by continual yearning for perfection. Af solves this
mindsetCopjec 06

Joan Copjec, 2006, Directory of the Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and
Culture, University of Buffalo, Lacan: the silent partners: May 68, the Emotional
Month
The myth is probably inspired by the section of Civilization and its Discontents where Freud speaks of modern man's
capacity to remake himself as 'a kind of prosthetic God', to replace every lost appendage or damaged organ with another,
superior one endowed with fantastic powers.' In this alethosphere (alethosphere because this space and everything in it is built on the demonstrable truths, rigorous and
mathematical, of modern science) the prosthetically enhanced, plugged-in subject does not need to
flee reality in order to indulge his pleasure principle, for he is now able to remold
reality in accordance with it. In other words, in the ultra-modern, advanced
capitalist world, the pleasure principle and the reality principle are no longer in
competition, but have merged to form a kind of corporation. The image Freud paints is of a friendly takeover of reality by the pleasure principle, which presents the former with a set of
blueprints for the global cyber-city of its dreams. But Lacan stresses the underside of this merger. As the twentieth century wore on, and the
utopian view of science gave way to dystopian visions, while capitalism grew more
muscular, it became more difficult to hold on to the idea that pleasure had the
power to programme reality. The reality (of the market) principle was clearly
calling the shots, telling the pleasure principle in what to invest and what
pleasures ought to be sacrificed to get the best returns on those investments. One of the
best depictions of the takeover of pleasure by reality is still to be found in Walter Benjamin's notion of aura. Benjamin writes as though aura was destroyed when we began, by means of capitalist production,
to bring things closer to us, yet he taught us enough to know that it could not have existed before capitalism, that aura appeared for the first time only with capitalism, specifically as that which had been lost.
This loss, however, had a rather odd effect, since the eradication of the intervening existence between us and things created 'the unique phenomenon of a distance' and a now more rigid, indestructible aura.
How are we to understand this logic if not in the terms Freud gave us: an original loss, the difference between satisfaction anticipated and satisfaction obtained, is recuperated by being embodied or imagined

. Prosthetic gods, we do not simply bring our

fantasies closer to reality, more within reach, we experience their remodelling by
the market into mise en scenes of the postponement of desire. The gleaming,
globalized city erected in the alethosphere turns out to be ruled, as in Fritz Lang's
Metropolis, by an occult, maimed wizard, Rot[z]wang, the S1 placed in the bottom-left corner of the University Discourse, the master, castrated, fallen to the level of superegoic
urgings to 'Keep on yearning'. In the alethosphere, the merger of the principles of
reality and pleasure is coextensive with a merger of subject and Other. Patched into a surface
network of social circuitry, the subject 'interfaces' with the Other . This interface is not to be confused, however, with what is in Lacanian terms referred to as
in objects with a certain sheen which we no longer simply want, but want more of

`extimacy'. The notion of interface (which pretends to antiquate the psychoanalytic conception of the subject) is only the most recent retooling of that phenomenological assumption against which Lacan
repeatedly railed: namely, that the whole of the subject's corporeal presence is engaged or chiasmically intertwined with the Other, 'directed in what is called [its] total intentionality'.' At a certain historical

that moment when the social configuration Lacan calls the 'University Discourse' was
first set in place, reality including man began to be conceived as fully
manipulable. Man came to be viewed as a being without foundation, without roots, or as so intertwined with the Other as to be infinitely mouldable. This is the heart of the conception of
moment,

the cosmopolitical subject, nomadic, homeless man of the world. Capitalism drives and profits from this conception of the malleability of man, but we have not yet said enough to know how it does so, how it

: if the subject becomes conceivable as

completely intertwined with the Other, this is because modern science comes to
be conceived as universal, as having triumphed over and supplanted every other
realm and every other form of truth. Man is totally taken up, then, without exception, into the Other of the scientific world."
gets us to surrender ourselves to it, or what it is we surrender. The first point that needs to be made is this

64

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Heidegger= Nazi

1. Heidegger maintained his own interpretation of National Socialism
and concluded the Nazi model was metaphysically the same as
world destroying capitalism or socialismZimmerman 01
Michael E. Zimmerman, Martin Heidegger 2001, pgs. 6-7
Heideggers involvement with National Socialism lasted from 1933-1945, although he was most intensively committed the movement during 1933-1936. Like many philosophers, artists, and intellectuals in

seduced by Nazi promises to save Germany from communism, and to

restore depth, purpose, and meaning to a society ruined by lost war, inflation, and
economic depression. Far from being a mere fellow-traveler, however, Heidegger enthusiastically supported the regime and used his own philosophy to provide legitimacy for
the regime at a critical moment. Although later concluding that actual National Socialism was
metaphysically the same as world-destroying capitalism and communism, he long
remained loyal to his own version of National Socialism. According to this version, the decline of
the West into technological nihilism resulted from the gradual eclipse of
humanitys understanding of itself as the clearing for the self-showing of entities.
Germany at the time, he was

Environmentalists who engage in a totalizing critique of modernity need to understand how important that critique was not only to Heideggers thought, but also to much of National Socialist ideology.

environmentalists, in other words, need to understand that there was a perverse green
dimension to National Socialism, which celebrated the relation between pure and
healthy land and pure blood (Blut und Boden). The Nazis came to power partly by their fierce condemnations of Enlightenment modernity and its political
Todays

institutions, even though they were quick to seize upon and put to dark uses the fruits of modern science and technology.

2. Our Af criticizes the technological enframing that allowed the

holocaust to happen. Thats our Zimmerman evidence.
3. Heidegger rejected Nazi party ideology because of its involvement
in metaphysical subjectivityPolt 97
Richard Polt, 1997, Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophie
pg. 4
Heidegger diagnoses not only liberalism but all the totalizing ideologies he sees around
him as symptoms of this subjectivism. His own conception of "Dasein" intends to make a
radical break with subjectivity-and with the rest of the metaphysics of presence.
Thus, as I will show, he rejects official Nazi ideology, Russian Communism, and
liberalism all on the same grounds: these ideologies are metaphysically
subjectivist and have been superseded by his own interpretation of Dasein and
Being. For Heidegger, then, the self-interpretation of liberalism in terms of political
liberties is irrelevant to its essence, which is determined by the subjectivist
distortion of human freedom that dominates all modern ideologies. He writes in 1940, "Liberalism," if
with this word we think any sufficiently clear concept at all, is just a particular permutation [Abartung] of the libertas whose essence unfolds as the history of modernity The history of subjectivity is the
history of liberation for the new essence of freedom, in the sense of humanity's unconditional self-~e~islation.~ As insightful as Heidegger's attack on subjectivist metaphysics may be, his dismissal of a
political doctrine of individual liberties as merely "a particular permutation" of subjectivism should give us pause. Before we follow Heidegger, we have to ask ourselves whether the differences between
liberal and illiberal political prescriptions are really as trivial as he implies. We must also ask whether liberal politics is in fact founded on subjectivist metaphysics. And, if it is, we must investigate whether
this fact dooms liberalism or whether, instead, it challenges us to seek a more adequate metaphysical ground for liberal politics.

65

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

4. Fayes arguments are BS; Heideggers works have been

decentered from his own personal Nazi ties to influence many
great thinkers of the modern era without producing a single
Nazi; means that decentering has happened before and avoided
reverting to National Socialism and can be done in the instance
of the AfBlack 09
Tim Black, November 2009, Why Theyre Really Scared of Heidegger,
http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/7762/
But should readers beware? Will an afternoon with Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics or the work of one of Heideggers acolytes Arendts The Origins of
Totalitarianism, for instance really see readers washed away, unawares, by the
undercurrents of Nazi thinking? It doesnt really seem very likely, and thats not just
because theres very little actual Fuhrer-loving, Semite-hating stuff to be read in
these works. Its due to the fact that readers are not empty receptacles into which
ideas, good, bad and ugly, are just pumped. People interpret, engage, and yes
think about what they are reading. To worry that philosophical works, and works as
prolix as Heideggers, works that demand efforts of interpretation, might
accidentally turn readers into Nazis is as patronizing and absurd as the early1990s concern that kids, listening to Judas Priest records, were being turned into
the children of Beelzebub. Lets be clear about this: Martin Heidegger, a thinker many regard as the most important philosopher of the twentieth century, was indeed a
bona-fide, arm-aloft, palm-outstretched Nazi. Zealously renewing his party membership every year between 1933 and 1945, his commitment to the National Socialist cause was unstinting. Nowhere was this
more in evidence than in his public role as rector of Freiburg University, where he praised the inner truth and greatness of Nazism in his 1933 rectoral address, and later penned a paean to murdered Nazi thug
Leo Schlageter. Heidegger was no token fascist; he was jack-booted and ready. Wearing a swastika on his lapel at all times he, alongside his proud, virulently anti-Semitic wife, also practised private
discrimination against Jews, from fellow existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers to his one-time mentor Edmund Husserl. Not that he was without friends. In fact his friendship with Eugene Fischer, director of
Berlin Institute for Racial Hygiene, lasted years. Faye does enrich this portrait of Nazi-era Heidegger with new research. We learn that in seminars from the 1930s and 1940s he defined a people in terms of the
community of biological stock and race. And we now know that, according to witnesses, Heidegger would turn up to teach, dapperly attired in a brown shirt, and salute the students with a Heil Hitler. But

Fayes thesis. Rather he argues that Nazism underpinned

Heideggers philosophy. In other words, to read Heidegger is to encounter a philosophy of
thats not the central claim to fame of

Nazism. A thinker deemed by many to be the most important thinker of the twentieth century is a Nazi
thinker. There are many problems with this view, not least the fact that Heideggers
opus, Being and Time, was conceived during the early 1920s and published in 1927 - that

is, during a time when the Nazi Party went from being nothing to being as
significant as the BNP is now. Stranger still, if Heideggers thought was so riven
with Nazism, why have its principal proponents not been Nazis? Surely, given the
breadth of Heideggers influence, one would have expected at least a few
Heidegger-inspired putschists to have made a stab for Aryan domination in the 80odd years since his work began its sinister conquest of Western culture. Instead
Heidggers influence is such that any attempt to see the fascist thread loses itself in the weave
and weft of an immense, largely leftish legacy. In Germany itself, such radical, or semi-radical, icons
as Herbert Marcuse or Jurgen Habermas, or liberal paragons like Hannah Arendt, were
all at one stage in thrall to the secret king of thought, as Arendt herself dubbed
him. In France, his impact was even more spectacular. From the identikit Heideggerian
existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, to the post-subject, anti-humanist philosophizing
of Louis Althusser or Jacques Derrida, Heidegger provided the inspiration. In Derridas words an
authority, a legitimacy clung to Heideggerian discourse during the 1950s and 60s. So much so, in fact, that Althusser, a prominent theoretician in the French Communist Party, used his thinking to inform his
own nominally Marxist offerings. As he was later to admit, Heideggers 1946 Letter on Humanism influenced my arguments concerning theoretical anti-humanism in Marx and to be fair, if you read
Althussers 1964 essay Marxism and Humanism the influence is bordering on plagiarism. In fact its probably fair to say that the empyrean of continental philosophy, so starry-eyed and radically risqu during

. There are of course many

more strands to Heideggers decidedly un-Nazi fanbase, from Jewish theologians
like Emmanuel Levinas or poets like Paul Celan, to liberal political theorists like Richard
Rorty. Take political philosopher Leo Strauss, the supposed granddaddy of American
neo-conservatism, for example. A student of Heideggers in the 1920s, he drew much
of his critique of the privations of modernity from his masters pre-Socratic
utterings. Little wonder that Strausss own student, Allan Bloom, an arch-conservative 1980s cultural
the 1970s and 80s, was carried aloft on the thought of a rustic, Lederhosen-wearing German, with a politics to match his Hitler-era tache

warrior and real-life basis for Saul Bellows Ravelstein, called Heidegger in The Closing of the American
Mind the most powerful intellectual force of our times. What such a brief sketch of the

influence of Heidegger shows is that keen students of Heidegger do not become

Nazis. They dont even become his friends. But Heideggers vast influence does hint at why the
controversy over his Nazism erupts into public life again and again. Never have so many owed so much

66

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

to the work of such a small man, to use George Steiners damning epithet. More pointedly, Heidegger
is just too central to a culture for which the one remaining claim to moral authority is anti-fascism. His
moral failure as a man niggles.

67

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

5. By decentering Heideggers theories from his choices we can

avoid the regression to National Socialism and use it as a kritik
of those ideologiesRubin 90
Charles T. Rubin, 1990, The Review of Politcs,Heidegger's Ecology of Modernity
Zimmerman justifies what might be called his caution by further reference to Heidegger himself: "Heidegger argued that because creative works - including philosophical ones have a measure of autonomy, the author's views about those works are not
privileged. Hence the fact that he chose to interpret his own texts as
consistent with National Socialism does not mean that others must
interpret them in the same way" (p. 38). Thus, Zimmerman regards it as a key virtue of his analysis that he has "decentered"
Heidegger's thought, that he has not concentrated on the "one- dimensional
hermeneutic circle" of textual interpretation , as if Heidegger's thought occupied some "suprahistorical position." Rather he
sought to re- veal that Heidegger's work on technology was "not so unique as it
might appear, but was, rather, one important voice in a cultural conversation into
which Heidegger himself had been 'thrown'" (p. 249). This decentering,
Zimmerman asserts, is what allows him to take a critical

6. The author is not the argument- even if Heidegger was a Nazi it

doesnt mean you vote negativeDallmayr 90
Fred Dallmayr, 1990, Rethinking the Political: Some Heideggerian Contributions,
The Review of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, 524-552
Recent literature on Heidegger concentrates heavily on his (temporary) involvement in or collusion with Nazi ideology and policies. Without belittling the gravity of the issue, this article shifts the focus

, the distinction between "politics" and

"the political" or between politics viewed as partisan ideology or policy making, on
the one hand, and politics seen as regime or paradigmatic framework, on the
other. The main thesis of the article is that Heidegger's promising contributions to
political theory are located on the level of ontology or paradigmatic framework
rather than that of ideological partisanship . While not neglecting the dismal intrusions of the latter plane, the article probes Heideggerian
somewhat by invoking a distinction which recently has emerged (or reemerged) in political thought: namely

cues for a "rethinking of the political" by placing the accent on four topical areas: first, the status of the subject or individual as political agent; second, the character of the political community, that is, of the
polity or (in modern terms) the "state"; thirdly, the issue of cultural and political development or modernization; and finally, the problem of an emerging cosmopolis or world order beyond the confines of
Western culture. In discussing these topics, an effort is made to disentangle Heidegger from possible misinterpretations and to indicate how, in each area, his thought pointed in the direction of an
"overcoming of Western political metaphysics.

68

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Heidegger= Violence

We dont advocate a violent abortion of human existence; human
existence is key to holding open the clearing in which entities
disclose themselves. We reject the anthropological humanist
mode of domination over the environmentZimmerman 01
Michael E. Zimmerman, Martin Heidegger 2001, pg. 6
Heideggers convictions that only humankind understands the difference between being and
entities, and that human existence is crucial for holding open the clearing in which
entities can show themselves, give pause to many environmentalistsincluding deep ecologistswho otherwise are attracted to his critique of technological
modernity and his call to let things be. Far from being a biocentric egalitarian, he agreed with the traditional idea that humankind is constituted
ontologically in a dramatically different way than all other entities. As an indication of the importance he
assigned to humankind, he wrote that the loss of the clearing would be even worse than the
destruction of the natural world by nuclear war. Heidegger would have agreed with todays environmentalists who criticize
anthropocentric humanism for justifying the destruction of nature, but he would also have criticized those
environmentalists who conceive of humans as nothing more than intelligent animals.

69

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Ontology Good/First

1. Ontology comes first; it shapes our responses to ethics and
politicsDillon 99
Michael Dillon, 1999, Prof of Politics @ University of Lancaster, Moral Spaces:
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, p. 98
In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you
subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than
another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way
of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of
being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human
way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent
political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

2. The discursive representations of technology in the resolution

must be evaluated prior to questions of policy derived from the
resolutionpolitical action cant exist apart from its
representational context and our ontological questioning gives
way to better policyDoty 96
Roxanne Lynn Doty, 1996, assistant professor of political science at arizona state
university, [roxanne lynn, imperial encounters, p. 5-6]
This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global
political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International
relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into
circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these
practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations
underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these
representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered
presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the
material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are
constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across
a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to
the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise,"

What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the

discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely
linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomiesthought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objectivethat a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the
perspective taken here affirms the material and' performative character of
discourse. 'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to
do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational
practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these
relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined
by the representational practices of the first world. Focusing on discursive
practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and
"knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political , military, and
a "rescue," and so on.

economic power.

3. Ontology first- policies divorced from ontological grounding leave

us in a nihilistic position where existence loses its meaning
Cropsey 87
Josepth Cropsey, 1987, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, History of Political
Philosophy, 891)
On the surface there is little indication that this project has a practical or political motive. Indeed, the work presents itself only as an attempt torecover the foundations of science. In this sense it stands within

. The question of Being,

is the source and ground of all ontologies or orderings of beings and thus of all human
understanding. In forgetting this question, man thus forgets the source of his own
the horizon of phenomenology. A somewhat closer examination, however, reveals a fundamental continuity of the theoretical and practical
according to Heidegger,

70

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

knowledge and loses the capacity to question in the most radical way, which is
essential to both real thought and authentic freedom. Without it, man is reduced
to a calculating beast concerned only with preservation and pleasure, a "last man," to use Nietzsche's terminology, for
whom beauty, wisdom, and greatness are mere words. The nihilistic brutality of this last man thus seems to lie behind Heidegger's
concern with the foundations of science.

71

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

4. We arent a normal ontological questioning; ontology only

becomes blind and perverted when it doesnt address being
Heidegger 53
Martin Heidegger, 1953, Being and Time pg. 9
But such an inquiryontology taken in its broadest sense without reference to specific ontological
directions and tendenciesitself still needs a guideline. It is true that ontological inquiry is
more than the ontic inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains nave and opaque if its
investigations into being of beings leave the meaning of being in general undiscussed. And
precisely the ontological task of a genealogy of the different possible ways of being (a genealogy which
is not to be construed deductivley) requires a preliminary understanding of what we really mean by
this expression being. The question of being thus aims at an a priori condition of the posibility not
only of the sciences which investigate beings of such and such a typeand are thereby already
involved in an understanding of being; but it aims also at the condition of the possibility of the
ontologies which precede the ontic sciences and found them. All ontology, no matter how rich
and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal remains fundamentally blind and

perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously clarified the meaning of being
sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental task.

5. Ontology outweighs considering the relationship with Being is

a prerequisite to solving any relationships between human
beingsRae 10
Gavin Rae, PhD in Philosophy @ The University of Warwick Re-Thinking the Human:
Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology, and Humanism Hum Stud (2010) 33:2339 JM
At the start of his seminal work on Martin Heideggers Being and Time, Hubert Dreyfus notes that
Heidegger claims that the tradition has misdescribed and misinterpreted human
being. Therefore, as a first step in his project, he attempts to work out a fresh analysis of what it is to
be human (1991, p. 1). Importantly, however, while the human being plays a crucially important role
in Heideggers project, it does not have fundamental importance; as we will see, a study of the
human being is a necessary precursor to the study of that which Heidegger holds to be
fundamentally important: being. Heideggers attempt to re-think the human being in-line
with the question of being leads him to criticise traditional conceptions of the human
on two related accounts: first, that they forget the question of being; and secondly, that
they are underpinned by a binary logic that forestalls any thinking of being. To
correct what he sees as the fundamental failing of traditional accounts of the human being,
Heidegger, in Being and Time, emphasises the primary importance of being. However, the means
through which being can be understood is by rst analysing a specic type of being, namely, the human being; what Heidegger calls Dasein (1962, p. 27). This brings Heidegger to propose an ontological
analysis of the human being as the means to understand being. As Tom Rockmore (1995, pp. 9596) notes, however, frequently the second movement to being was forgotten or ignored and Heideggers

while philosophical anthropology can tell

us something about the human being, it can not tell us the whole truth. Disclosing
the truth about the human being requires that the being of the human being be
disclosed. But Heidegger does not simply suggest that traditional philosophical accounts of
thought was interpreted as a philosophical anthropology of the human being. For Heidegger, however,

the human being have forgotten and/or ignored the question of being. He goes further by suggesting
that traditional philosophical accounts of the human being cannot think of being

because their thinking is constrained within a logic of binary oppositions. Most

notable of these binary oppositions is that between essence and existence. For
Heidegger, the human being has traditionally been thought to possess a fixed
defining essence that either determines human being or that exists as a potential
to be made actual. The problem with this conception of the human being is,
according to Heidegger, that it fails to understand that the human being is defined by
existential possibility (1962, p. 33). Its existential possibility means that the truth of the human being cannot be captured within xed conceptual boundaries; the openended nature of the human being is dened by its existence (Heidegger 1962, pp. 32, 68). However, the problem with dening the human being in terms of its existence was that it appeared to many
commentators that Heidegger was simply inverting the privileging of essence constitutive of traditional conceptions of the human being. Such thinking misinterprets Heideggers thought. It assumes that
Heideggers notion of existence is the existence that has been thought to exist in opposition to essence. For Heidegger, dening the human being by its existence does not mean that the human being is simply

Defining the
human being by its existence means, for Heidegger, not that the human being is
what it does, but that the human being exists in such a relation to being that it,
and it alone amongst beings, is able to disclose being.
dened by its actions; by existence, Heidegger means something very specic. This specicity can only be understood by remembering his privileging of being.

72

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Ontology > Ethics

1. This argument makes no senseontology comes firstthe way we
think about something frames how the problem is perceived.
The moment of decisionthe way we act towards the otheris
determined by how we know the world, which means its
impossible to develop an ethics towards the other without
having an ontology first.
2. Cant reconstruct ethics without ontology they merely replicate
the Judeo-Christian model of sufering
Gilbert Larochelle 99 Philosophy Today (Summer), Proquest
While Levinas only made sporadic reference to the Holocaust in his work, his entire
philosophy is admittedly impregnated with the lessons it teaches. However, my
argument consists in demonstrating that he is not able to reconstruct metaphysics
without ontology, justice without identity, responsibility without subjectivity.
Instead of actually decentering all points of view, Levinas seems rather to displace
the final legitimacy of history from the persecutor to the persecuted, by giving the
victim the final right to ontology. Three propositions can serve here to establish
the framework for this reflection: a) reflexivity, as a form of identity, resurfaces in
Levinas through the status of the victim in the Holocaust; b) his notion of
responsibility is defined by the will to adopt the point of view of the victim and
opens onto, in accordance with Judeo-Christian tradition, an ontology of suffering
as a way to salvation; c) that conception of identity and responsibility ends up
justifying the moral superiority of the Jew, victim par excellence, and of his
universal model of justice. The paradox we wish to expose is that the weakness of
the victim curiously becomes the instrument of a will of power in which the Jew
takes on the form of the "last man" in history. To demonstrate these assertions, it
seems pertinent first to try to understand, through a rereading of Difficult
Freedom, Levinas' offensive against Western philosophy and paganism, then to
see how Nazism became its worst manifestation. Finally, bringing light onto the
victim will serve to unveil Levinasian ontology and the failure of his decentering
effort.

3. Ethics reifies responsibility over any other mode of revealing it

represents just another way of managing being.
LaDelle McWhorter, 1992, Professor of Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State, also of
the bumbles, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. McWhorter.
And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very
selves selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are,
modernity are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the state. As a result, guilt
is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost
safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to
live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling
guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is
a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we
are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not
respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves
in a fit of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to
take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When
we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a
discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take
precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist

73

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern

managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the
ethical tradition of the western world. But the history of ethical theory in the west
(and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the
history-of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and
the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as
surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human
sciences.

74

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

4. Ontology precedes ethicswe must know who we are before we

can know how we must act, otherwise, our ethical rules repeat
the errors of instrumentalismAntolick 02
Matthew Anolick; August 20, 2002; Deep Ecology and Heideggerian Phenomenology;
MA University of Florida MV
Traditional ethics, as based upon the traditional substance ontology , is typically an
instrumentalist ethics, grounded in the mathematical grid-framework out of which the
substance ontology functions. The isolation of fact from value, and the corresponding
distinction between them, is made possible through such a framework. Although
this distinction makes sense according to the architecture of the substance
metaphysical grid framework, Heideggers event ontology undermines the
inevitability of such a rigid distinction. This becomes clearer in what follows. We mentioned
how Naess speaks of Kants conception of beautiful actions (in Chapter Two). Such a ctions are
performed not merely out of a strict adherence to rules: they come out of
themselves. The event ontology that gets expressed in Heideggers writings, and
especially the concept of Ereignis, provides a basis for an ethics based in such
beautiful actions that the traditional substance ontology cannot provide.
Beautiful actions express the categoricalness of Kants Categorical Imperative. The Categorical
Imperative is not an isolated rule to which an individual subject has a duty. The Categorical Imperative
is truly fulfilled when the commanded action comes of itself. Kant claims that an action performed
out of inclination is higher than an action done merely because one has been ordered to do so, or
because one will feel guilty if one does not perform the action.
Naesss statement of the need in
Deep Ecology to move from ethics to ontology and back is founded upon the interrelatedness of
these two disciplines. Normative values are indeed, as Naess says, based upon non-

normative conceptions, although it remains an open question for our discussion

whether such a distinction can ever be truly made. The event ontology requires an
interpretation of this statement that holds the normative and the non-normative as inextricably
interwoven as a unity. Such interrelatedness is due to the mutual origin of ontology

and
ethics, fact and value, Ereignis and Da-sein. In terms of the event ontology, this
mutual origin gets expressed in answers to questions like: what exactly must Dasein do? What is the imperative for Da-sein according to the event ontology?
Heidegger writes: Only so far as man, ek-sisting in the truth of Being, belongs to Being can there come
from Being itself the assignment of those directives that must become law and rule for man. In Greek,
to assign is nemein. Nomos is not only law but more originally the assignment contained in the
dispensation of Being. Only such dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating. Otherwise, all
law remains merely something fabricated by human reason. More essential than instituting rules is
that man find the way to his abode in the truth of Being. This abode first yields the experience of
something we can hold on to. The truth of Being offers a hold for all conduct. Being is always

made possible by an event of truth. Da-sein must be open to receive this truth.
Truth comes by way of an assignment contained in the dispensation of Being. It is upon this
event-ontological basis that we get our answer to the question of what Da-sein
must do: Da-sein must both open itself to, and be the clearing for, Being. The
event ontology thus provides an answer to what Da-sein must do in
noninstrumentalist terms, since instrumentalism, as a function of the substance
ontology, remains in the mathematical realm of objecthood and efficient causality :
Today we are too easily inclined either to understand being responsible and being
indebted moralistically as a lapse, or else to construe them in terms of effecting. In either
case, we bar to ourselves the way to the primal meaning of that which is later
called causality. So long as this way is not opened up to us we shall also fail to see
what instrumentality, which is based on causality, actually is. We must now
proceed with an investigation into the nature of this mutual origin of ethics and
ontology: that which is the origin of all origins the primal source of the event
ontology.

75

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Realism Good

1.Turn: Objective views of reality stain the subjects ontology;
empirically reproducing the holocaust
Zizek 97 (Slavoj Zizek, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana,
The Plague of Fantasies, 1997,pg 214-215)
one should thus insist
on the distinction between the Real and (objective) reality to put it succinctly,
the trauma qua real is not the ultimate external referent of the symbolic process,
but precisely that X which forever hinders any neutral representation of external
referential reality. To put it more paradoxically, the Real qua traumatic antagonism is, as it were, the objective factor of subjectivization itself; it is the object which accounts for the
Against the criticism that the Lacanian Real continues to function as the ultimate referent which fixes/limits the play of signifying displace- ments,

failure of every neutral-objective representation, the object which 'pathologizes' the subject's gaze or approach, makes it biased, pulls it askew. At the level of gaze, the Real is not so much the invisible
Beyond, eluding our gazes which can perceive only delusive appearances, but, rather, the very stain or spot which disturbs and blurs our 'direct' perception of reality which 'bends' the direct straight line

Therein lies the unsurmountable divide that forever separates

dialectical materialism from discursive idealism, as well as from non-dialectical ('vulgar') materialism: for the latter, subjective
from our eyes to the perceived object.

perception is a distorted. 'pathologically' biased, 'reflection' of 'objective' reality which, ontologi-cally fully constituted, exists outside, 'independently' of the subject; for transcendental idealism, 'objective'
reality itself is constituted through the subjective act of transcendental synthesis. The true point of idealism is not the solipsistic one ('there is no objective reality, merely our subjective representations of it');
idealism claims, on the contrary, that the In-itself of 'objective reality' is definitely to be distinguished from mere subjective representations its point is only that it is the synthetic act of the transcendental
subject itself which transforms the multitude of representations into 'objective reality'. In short, idealism's point is not that there is no In-itself, but that the 'objective' In-itself, in its very opposition to subjective

(dialectical materialism) accepts idealism's basic ontological

premiss (the transcendental subjective constitution of 'objective reality'), and
supplements it with the premiss that this very act of ontological positing of
'objective reality' is always-already 'stained', 'tainted' by a particular object which
confers upon the subject's 'universal' view of reality a particular 'pathological' twist. This particular object, objet petit a, is thus
representations, is posited by the subject. Lacan

the paradox of a 'pathological a priori', of a particular object which, precisely as radically 'subjective' (objet petit a is, in a way, subject itself in its 'impossible' objectality, the objectal correlate of the subject),
sustains constitutive transcendental universality itself; in other words, objet petit a is not only the 'objective factor of subjectivization' but also the very opposite, the 'subjective factor of objectivization'.

Let us clarify this key point apropos of trauma as the Real. Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah alludes to
the trauma of the Holocaust as something beyond representation (it can be discerned only via its traces,
surviving witnesses, remaining monuments); however, the reason for this impossibility of representing the
Holocaust is not simply that it is 'too traumatic, ' but, rather, that we, observing subjects, are still involved in it, are still a part of the
process which generated it (we need only recall a scene from Shoah in which Polish peasants from a village near the concentration camp, interviewed now, in our present time, continue to find Jews 'strange,'

that is, repeat the very logic that brought the Holocaust about).

2. Turn: The use the threat of real world impacts to convince you
to make an ultimately meaningless decision. You surrender your
real political subjectivity when you capitulate to this
manipulation.
Badiou 06 (Alain Badiou, Professor of Philosophy, Universit de Paris - Vincennes at
Saint-Denis, Against Political Philosophy, METAPOLITICS, 2006, 22)
2. Revault d'Allonnes is right to highlight the particular, the pure phenomenon of the taking-place. But in my view she brings about a gradual transcendental reduction in this partic ularity. The supposed
existence of a generic faculty for the discernment of evil means that, for her, the matrix of political judgment is ultimately invariable. Phenomenal particularity is only the material for a judgment whose
maxim is fixed and which would take the following form: Always declare yourself in favor of the persistence of the share of the in-common. This explains why her vision of politics is in the last resort con-

Without the menace of radical evil, judgment is not absolutely requisite

servative.
. In order to liven
things up a bit, one shall say of course that evil is always impending. But how can we ground this imminence transcendentally, other than through some sinful tendency of human nature vis--vis the in-

One sees here the fundamental reason why it is so important for these
conceptions to maintain that the Beast is always lurking, that it stirs in each of us, and so on. Without
this everlasting latency of the Beast, politics doesn't even have reason to exist. In
order to hold firm to the particular, or the singular, we must set out on an entirely
different path. First, we must maintain that the inception of a politics - of its statements, prescriptions, judgments and practices - is always located in the absolute singularity of an event.
common?

Second, that a politics only exists within a sequence, that is to say, to the extent that what the event is capable of is deployed in an act of truth Finally, that what counts is never the plurality of opinions
regulated by a common norm, but the plurality of instances of politics [des politiques] which have no common norm, since the subjects they induce are different. Incidentally, one will reject the expression the
political, which precisely suggests a specific faculty, a common sense. There are only plural instances of politics, irreducible to one another, and which do not comprise any homogeneous history.

76

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: PO-MO
Postmodern philosophers reject Heidegger conception of Being.
Means your Postmodern bad arguments dont link.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fri Sep 30, 2005 Postmodernism,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodernism/
Many postmodern philosophers find in Heidegger a nostalgia for being they do not
share. They prefer, instead, the sense of cheerful forgetting and playful creativity in
Nietzsche's eternal return as a repetition of the different and the new. Some have gone so far as to
turn the tables on Heidegger, and to read his ruminations on metaphysics as the repetition of an original metaphysical gesture, the gathering of thought to its
proper essence and vocation (see Derrida 1989). In this gathering, which follows the lineaments of an
exclusively Greco-Christian-German tradition, something more original than being
is forgotten, and that is the difference and alterity against which, and with which, the tradition
composes itself. Prominent authors associated with postmodernism have noted that the forgotten and excluded other of
the West, including Heidegger, is figured by the Jew (see Lyotard 1990, and Lacoue-Labarthe 1990). In this way, they are able to distinguish their projects from
Heidegger's thinking and to critically account for his involvement with National Socialism and his silence about the Holocaust, albeit in terms that do not address these as
personal failings. Those looking for personal condemnations of Heidegger for his actions and his refusal to accept responsibility will not find them in postmodernist commentaries. They will, however, find
many departures from Heidegger on Nietzsche's philosophical significance (see Derrida 1979), and many instances where Nietzsche's ideas are critically activated

Heidegger and his self-presentation.

against

77

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Af = Metaphysics Turn

Every philosophy has a meta-level base within metaphysics; this
doesnt mean it co-opts the AfHeidegger 77
Martin Heidegger, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology, pg. 54
In what follows, metaphysics is thought as the truth of what is as such in its entirety, and not as the
doctrine of any particular thinker. Each thinker has at any given time his fundamental

philosophical position within metaphysics. Therefore a particular metaphysics can be called by his name. However, according to what is here
thought as the essence of metaphysics, that does not mean in any way that metaphysics at any given time is
the accomplishment and possession of the thinker as a personality within the public framework
of creative cultural activity. In every phase of metaphysics there has been visible at any
particular time a portion of a way that the destining of Being prepares as a path
for itself over and beyond whatever is, in sudden epochs of truth. Nietzsche himself interprets the course of Western history metaphysically, and indeed
as the rise and development of nihilism. The thinking through of Nietzsches metaphysics becomes a
reflection on the situation and place of contemporary man , whose destiny is still but little experienced with respect to its
truth. Every reflection of such a kind, however, if it is not simply an empty, repetitious reporting, remains out beyond what usually passes for reflection. Its going to beyond is merely a surmounting and is not

reflecting on Nietzsches metaphysics does not

mean that, in addition to considering his ethics and his epistemology and his aesthetics, we are
also and above all taking note of his metaphysics ; rather it means simply that we are
at all a surpassing; moreover, it is not an immediate overcoming. The fact that we are

trying to take Nietzsche seriously as a thinker. But also, to think means this for Nietzsche: to represent
what is as what is. Any metaphysical thinking is ontology or it is nothing at all.

Reflection on matters in debate rounds are inevitable; even if it

seems the af takes a step backwards it is really a step in the
right directionShanahan 93
William Shanahan, 1993, Kritik of Thinking,
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Shanahan1993HealthCare.htm
Kritiks of thinking uncover the ways of thinking underlying policies, arguments, and even debate itself.
Uncover here almost seems overly dramatic since the thinking under scrutiny is usually quite open.
Why then, uncover what is already present? Heidegger asks a similar question: "But what does
nearness mean?": As soon as we try to reflect on the matter we have already
committed ourselves to a long path of thought. At this point, we shall succeed only in
taking just a few steps. They do not lead forward but back, back to where we already are.
The steps do not form a sequence from here to there, except - at best - in their outward
appearance. Rather, they fuse into a concentration on the selfsame thing, and wend
their way back to it. What looks like a digression is in fact the actual proper movement
on the way by which the neighborhood is determined. And that is nearness.

78

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

***Kritiks***

79

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Doubling
1. The act of the reflection is based within metaphysics; it acts to
totalize the philosophical dissentHeidegger 77
Martin Heidegger, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology, pg. 115

2. The Double Affirmation is a form of will to will; this will is

technology that objectifies the real and enframes the world
assigning value to things as either consumable or redundant
Rayner 01
Timothy Rayner, 2001, Biopower and Technology: Foucault and Heideggers Way of
Thinking http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/2may2001/rayner.pdf
The second aspect of the inner life of technological enframing concerns the relationship between the objectification of the
real and the drive for power. To clarify this relationship, let us turn to Heideggers confrontation with Nietzsche and the doctrine of will to power. According to
Heidegger, Nietzsches philosophical accomplishment was to correctly grasp the fundamental interpretation of being that was to dominate the century to come. This is the thought of will to power. Nietzsche
argues that the apparent world of human existence is ordered, in each case, according to the viewpoint of utility in regard to the preservation and enhancement of the power of a certain species of animal.11

Will to power is the principle of this ontological ordering and selection.

As Heidegger reads
Nietzsche, power in this argument is not the goal towards which the will tends, as to something outside it.12 Neither is power something achieved in securing the conditions of preservation-enhancement.

power names that kind of willing that wills itself as will to power.13 Power is a
double affirmation of the conditions of an entitys heightened existence: an
affirmation of the conditions of the enhancement and securement of life, together
with an affirmation of that affirmation. Heidegger calls this double affirmation: will-to-will. He asserts that [t]he basic form
of appearance in which the will-to-will arranges and calculates itself ...can be briefly called
technology.14 What is the relationship between will-to-willandthe objectification of the real? Heidegger argues thatin
order to establish and maintain its conditions of enhancement of power, the willto-will requires a guarantee of stability regarding those conditions on the basis of which it posits and projects towards its goals. This guarantee of
stability, Heidegger claims, is just as essential for life as increase and escalation.15 Technological man seeks to accomplish this
stability through a complete ordering of all beings, in the sense of a systematic
securing of stockpiles, by means of which [its] establishment in the stability of
certainty is to be completed.16 Thus the world is ceaselessly objectified, qualified,
quantified, and systematizedin essence,reduced to the level of stock, or resource (Bestand).What
cannot be objectified cannot be put to use, and what cannot be put to use is
useless, and thus redundant.The human being is no exception. In the unconditional demand for objectification attendant on technological enframing.
In its essence,

80

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Nietzsche
1. Our critique of the technological culture addresses the nihilism
inherent in metaphysics; the complicity of its mode of disclosing
humanity as a standing reserve. Nietzsches philosophy is
trapped within the metaphysical mindset re-creating the
standing reserveZimmerman 01
Michael E. Zimmerman, Martin Heidegger 2001, pg. 3
During the 1930s, in connection with his analyses of Nietzsches philosophy and Hlderlins poetry, Heidegger developed his critique of the humanism (capitalist or
socialist) that characterizes modern Western societies. In a controversial interpretation, he read Nietzsches vision of the Overman as an aspect of the
nihilism characterizing modernity, which is ostensibly the final stage in the history of
Western metaphysics. By nihilism, Heidegger meantin contrast to Nietzsche--not the collapse of cultural norms, but instead humanitys
blindness to its own essential nothingness (nihil). Humankind is not one entity among others, but instead exists as the no-thingness, openness,
or clearing in which entities can show themselves. The ancient Greeks had some insight into the crucial relation between human existence and the being of entities. Gradually, however, Western
humanitys self-understanding became so constricted or inauthentic, that entities
are now able to reveal themselves only one-dimensionally, as flexible raw material useful for
enhancing human power and security. Heidegger maintained that Nietzsches conception of humans as
clever animals was in many ways consistent with the metaphysical Darwinism that allegedly
animates modern political ideologies. For such animals, blind not only to their extraordinary
ontological endowment but also to the responsibilities that it imposes, the drama of human
existence is reduced to the struggle for survival and power. Nature becomes a
gigantic filling station that fuels the frenzied and insatiable drive for ever greater
consumption. As an alternative to the will to power at work in the technological disclosure of entities, Heidegger urged people to cultivate the attitude of releasement (Gelassenheit) in
which they may let things be, that is, manifest themselves according to their own inherent properties, rather than in accordance with the demands placed upon them by the technological subject.

2. Other ways of defining our essence of being fail; these criticisms

are based in a modern humanist anthropology background that
separates man from being in the world and places humanity
above itGlendinning 98
Simon Glendinning, 1998, ON BEING WITH OTHERS pgs. 45-46
In both Being and Time and The Letter on Humanism, Heidegger characterises
humanist anthropology as that tradition in which what is called man is defined by
setting it off as one kind of entity present among others. Of course, human beings
are not then simply equated with mere things or even with other living creatures.
On the contrary, man is accorded a specific and special difference: man is the
animal endowed with the power of reason or language; or is the ens finitum which
is made in Gods image. According to Heidegger, modern philosophy has inherited
the essential features of this classical anthropology. That is, modern philosophy,
too, conceives the human being primarily as a kind of entity present in the world
alongside others and only then supplies it with a distinctive trait. It rejects the
baldly naturalistic assumption that the essence of man consists in being an
animal organism, but proposes that this insufficient definition of mans essence
[can] be overcome or offset by outfitting man with an immortal soul or by adjoining a soul to the
human body, a mind to the soul . . . and then louder than before singing the praises of the mind. (LH, pp. 2289). Thus, with respect to the issue of the background conception, Heideggers thesis is that in

where consciousness is the point of departure, humanism remains the

background conception: In principle we are still thinking of homo animalis even when anima is posited as animus sive mens, and this is later posited as subject, person
or spirit (ibid., p. 227).5 According to Heidegger, then, construing what is distinctive about human existence in this quasinaturalistic way has opened us up to a determination of ourselves which invites and sustains scepticism: the possibility of the human organism having access to the world can
be conceived only in terms of a (more or less mysterious) extra property of this entity, and one whose mechanism and success is
intrinsically problematic and uncertain. Heideggers alternative begins with the
complete rejection of the idea that something like access to the world is merely a
fortunate, secondary supplement, a supplementary benefit, to our existence: for
the entity that we are, being in a world is something that belongs essentially (BT,
p. 13). To emphasise that this is a basic state of Being, Heidegger coins the
modern philosophy,

81

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

compound expression Being-in-the-world to describe it, stressing thereby that the

in the world aspect of our existence is not an added extra but an essential and
irreducible feature of it. Existence, for human beings at least, is this unitary
phenomenon (ibid., p. 53). With this in view it is clear that, for Heidegger, the
fundamental and recurrent feature of modern philosophy informed by the
humanist background conception is that it splits the phenomenon which, in our
Being, we are.

82

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

A2: Nietzsche You are Will To Power

(

) Heidegger realized the will to power was inherent in every

being. Nietzsche would still conclude afHeidegger 77

Martin Heidegger, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology, pg. 79

83

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Anthro K
1. Link turn: Technological ordering is what allows objectification of
nature to occur; Nature becomes enframed within the standing
reserve where every aspect is evaluated through a
subject/object dualism within technological though and
assigned value as preparation for either its consumption or
discard. Thats the Zimmerman, DeLuca, and Dreyfus evidence
from the 1AC.
A) C/A Best and Nocella from the 1AC: the movement of
questioning in the 1AC would remove nature from the standing
reserve by moving its essence beyond metaphysical
understandings. Independent reason to vote af.
2. A Technological View of Earth Pushes Us Into Anthropocentrism
because we see everything as having no inherent relationship.
Other species and animals become less than objects to us
allowing the justification of an anthropocentric view of the
worldTurnbull 06
Neil Turnbull, Cool Dude, The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus, Theory,
Culture & Society Journal, 2006, Vol. 23(1): 125-139, DOI:
10.1177/0263276406063232, pg. 131-132, 0
Thus, for the later Heidegger worlds are only conceivable as such such that the world
is attained as world only when they framed by the sky above and the earth beneath
(see Malpas, 2000: 227). Clearly, for the later Heidegger, the idea of the world is
conceptually inseparable from that of the earth (and in many ways, for the later
Heidegger, the idea of the world within which Dasein is is replaced by the idea of the fourfold within
which man dwells). The close relationship between earth and world for Heidegger can again be seen
in the Origins of the Work of Art, where Heidegger recognizes that [w]orld and earth are

essentially different from one another and yet never separated. The world grounds
itself in the earth and the earth juts through the world (1978b: 174).2 When seen in
this way, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for what Heidegger terms
the work of both artist and artisan and its corollary the thingly character of the world
(1978b: 180). More generally, Heidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all
appearance and the physys out of which the world emerges (a ground that supports the
nomos of the world). For, in Heideggers view, only a world supported by the earth can give
things their proper measure: and without this relation, things have no true
measure (and in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an
abstract [end of page 132] mathematicized facticity required for the efficient
maintenance of purely technological relationships becomes the anthropocentric
measure of all things).

3. Nature is ontologically prior to humanity in the afHeidegger only

rejects scientific-worldview natureZimmerman 83
Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy, Tulane University, Heidegger and Deep Ecology
http://www.tulane.edu/~mcgovern/zimmerman/essays/heidegger/heidegger_deep_ecology.htm

Despite early Heidegger's relative lack of interest in nature, his later meditations
on pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus offered him a way combining his
personal love for nature with his ontological concerns. He came to interpret physis
(a Greek word usually translated as "nature") not as a totality of material entities,
but rather as the ontological power that gives rise to all phenomena and

84

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

appropriates human Dasein as the clearing for their selfmanifestation. Since he

defined "nature" in what was for him an ontologically more satisfying manner,
Heidegger can be viewed as anti-naturalistic only in the sense of opposing modern
science's generally reductionistic and materialistic view of nature, a view also
opposed by deep ecology. Hence, Heidegger's critique of naturalism does not
automatically disqualify attempts to see connections between his thought and
deep ecology.

Generic Alt No Solvency/Turn

(

) Engaging one facet of inequality or oppression only replicates

the harm- only the re-examination of being can prevent spirit
murder and extinctionSpanos 00

William V. Spanos, 2000, The Question of Philosophy and Poiesis in the Posthistorical
Age: Thinking/ Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics,, boundary 2, 27.1 169)//JRC
And in thus focusing this indissoluble relay, which could be collectively subsumed under the silence that belongs to the totalized saying privileged by a metaphysical representation of being as Being ,
this reconstellation also points the way that the rethinking or retrieval of thinking (and
poiesis) must take when history has come to its end in the age of the world picture , which is
to say, in the posthistorical age of transnational capitalism. In the interregnum,
which bears witness to the massive displacement of human lives precipitated by
the globalization of the idea of liberal capitalist democracyand the utter
inadequacy of the Western interpretation of human rightsit is not enough to
engage capitalist economics or politics, or patriarchy, or racism , or classism, and
so on. All these pursued independently remain trapped within the strategic
disciplinarity of the dominant discourse. In the interregnum, rather, the thinker and the poet must
think the polyvalent manifestations of the spectrality released by the
consummation of the Pax Metaphysica if they are to prepare the way for a politics
that is adequate to the task of resisting the impending Pax Americana and, beyond that, of
establishing a polis that, in its always open-ended agonistics, precludes what Arendt,
far more clearly than Heidegger and all those postmodern critics of the city of
modernity, recognized as the banality of evil incumbent on the reduction of being
at large to a territory, planetary in scope, to be conquered, compartmentalized,
and administered. Which is to say on all self-righteous proclamations of universal
peace that justify the physical and spiritual slaughter and maiming of human life.

) Only questioning ontology accesses deeper questions of the

structural ismsSpanos 00

William V. Spanos, 2000, Americas Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, pgs. 56-57

markoff
The end of the pursuit of knowledge, according to this developed postcolonial form of imperial practice, is to produce
peace, but this peace will be achieved only by the total colonization and
pacification of the Other. Theory (understood as a mode of inquiry that privileges seeing, theoria) and practice are conterminous. The Pax Metaphysica and the Pax
Romana. My intention in invoking Heideggers ontological genealogy of imperialism has not been to offer an alternative to that of Foucault, Said, and most postcolonial critics who would interrogate
imperialism as an economic and/or political practice or as economic-political practice to which cultural texts contribute in a fundamental way. As Heideggers entanglement with the German National Socialist
project testifies, his restricted ontological focus is hardly adequate to the complex actualities of modern imperial practice. My purpose, rather, has been to demonstrate that the

contemporary postcolonial critique of imperialism is disabled by a significant lack or, perhaps more accurately, by a resonant
unthought in its discourse. What I have tried to make explicit by reconstellating
Heideggers destruction of the metaphysical thinking of the ontotheological tradition (and by thematizing the affiliative system
of sedimented tropes inscribed in it) into the context of more practical postcolonial critiques of
imperialism is that these oppositional discourses, whether Foucouldian or New Historicist or Marxist or nationalist, tend
to be blind to (or refuse to take seriously) the enabling degree to which Western imperialism is not simply a practice as such, but a

85

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

deeply inscribed ideological state of mind produced by a truth endemic to a

metaphysical ontology. More specifically, they overlook the fact that the modern imperial project is informed by a representational or a visual problematic that has its
constructed origins in the origins of the very idea of the West. These opositional discourses, in short, are blinded by their overdetermination of practice to the reality that the idea of the West and imperialism
are synonymous. To wring a turn on Enrique Dussels resonant insight into Descartess I think; therefore I am, the identity of the collective Western subject is epitomized by the statement: I think; therefore
I conquer.

86

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

***Perms***

87

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Generic K Perm Do Both

(

) Perm: sow the text languages together

The perm functions as a sowing of ideals together in the preparation

for cultivation of paths outside of metaphysics; this is essential
for their alt to have solvency; This isnt severanceHeidegger
77
Martin Heidegger, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology, pg. 55
That thinking, which is essential and which is therefore everywhere and in every respect preparatory,
proceeds in an unpretentious way. Here all sharing in thinking, clumsy and groping though it may
be, is an essential help. Sharing in thinking proves to be an unobtrusive sowinga sowing
that cannot be authenticated through the prestige or utility attaching to itby sowers who
may perhaps never see blade and fruit and may never know a harvest. They serve the sowing, and
even before that they serve its preparation. Before the sowing comes to the plowing. It is a
matter of making the field capable of cultivation, the field that through the unavoidable
predominance of the land of metaphysics has to remain in the unknown. It is a matter first of
having a presentiment of, then of finding, and then of cultivating, that field. It is a matter of taking a
first walk to that field. Many are the ways, still unknown, that lead there. Yet always to each thinker
there is assigned but one way, his own, upon whose traces he must again and again go back
and forth that finally he may hold to it as the one that is his ownalthough it never
belongs to himand may tell what can be experienced on that one way.

88

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Heidegger Perm 1AR

1. The negatives arguments of Mutual Exclusivity only feed the
warrants of the perm. Heidegger indicates that no idea or
criticism belongs to the thinker nor is it the only one path of
action. Thinking is inherently an activity of sharing ideology
that is required to fully understand the criticism.
2. The only way to give authenticity to their advocacy is to combine
it with the Af. This is the only way to move the advocacy past
its metaphysical foundations. The only way to cultivate any
positive net benefits from the advocacy is the perm.

89

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Perm Do Both- Adaptation

(

) Perm Do Both-

Voting for the af and embracing the alternative is a form of

adaptation that allows us to overcome enframing of actions.
This isnt a contradiction of our criticism; overcoming this
enframing allows us to define our being in the world diferently
Heidegger 77
Martin Heidegger, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology: And Other Essays,
pg. 37-38

90

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Juxtaposition Perm

(

) Perm Do Both: Criticism without constant opposition causes

co-optation, only juxtaposition allows constant criticism
Edelman 87

Edelman, 87, Constructing the Political Spectacle Professor of Political Science @

Wisconsin September.
Opposition in expressed opinion accordingly make for social stability: they are almost synonymous with it, for they
reaffirm and reify what everyone already knows and accepts. To express a prochoice or an anti-abortion position is to affirm that the opposite position is being expressed as well and to accept the opposition as
a continuing feature of public discourse. The well established, thoroughly anticipated and therefore ritualistic reaffirmation of the differences institutionalizes both rhetorics minimizing the chance of major

there will be anticipated support and opposition no matter what forms

of action or inaction occur. As long as there is substantial expression of opinion on both
sides of an issue social stability persists and so does regime discretion regardless of the exact numbers or of marginal shifts in members. The
persistence of unresolved with conflicting meaning is vital. It is not the expression of
opposition but of consensus that makes for instability. Where statements need not be
defended against counterstatements they are readily changed or inverted. Consensual agreements about the
foreign enemy of ally yield readily to acceptance of the erstwhile enemy as ally
and the former ally as enemy, but opinions about abortion are likely to persist. Rebellion
and revolution do not ferment in societies in which there has been a long history of
the ritualized exchange of opposing views of issues accepted as important, but rather where
such exchanges have been lacking, so that a consensus on common action to oust
the regime is easily built.
shifts and leaving the regime wide discretion; for

91

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Juxtaposition Perm: 1AR

Extend the 2AC Edelman evidence. Pure critique fails because it flips
the binarism, not engaging the discourse it criticized, creating a
new monolithic hegemony. Only the perm that combines the
1AC and the criticism creates constant criticism, using the af as
a target, solving better than the alternative.
Also, all of their perm theory and link arguments dont apply
because the perm combines the whole 1AC and the criticism,
using that contradiction to consider both sides, impact turning
their arguments.
Also, combining the af and the K solves betterSaid 94
Edward Said, 1994, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reich Lectures pg.
60
Because the exile sees things both in terms of what has been left behind and what is actual here and now, there is a double perspective that never sees
things in isolation. Every scene or situation in the new country necessarily draws on its counterpart in the old country. Intellectually, this means that an idea or
experience is always counterposed with another, therefore, making them both appear in a
sometimes new and unpredictable light: from that juxtaposition, one gets a better,
perhaps more universal idea of how to think say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another. I have felt that most of the alarmist and deeply flawed discussions of Islamic
fundamentalism in the West have been intellectually invidious precisely because they have not been compared with Jewish or Christian fundamentalism, both equally prevalent and reprehensible in my own
experience of the Middle East. What is usually thought of as a simple issue of judgment against an approved enemy, in the

to see a much wider picture,

intellectual
conventionally designated ones.

double

or exile

perspective

impels a Western

with the requirement now of taking a position as a secularist (or not) on all theocratic tendencies, not just against the

Also, pure criticism fails, only combination of contradictory ideas

solvesWalt 98
Stephen M. Walt, 1998, International Relations: One World, Many Theories,
No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics.
Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a
single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their
strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom.
Although we should take care to emphasize inventiveness over incentive, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.

92

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

Juxtaposition Perm: 2AR

The Edelman permutation is the only advocacy which provides for
the constant criticism. Juxtaposition takes the whole affirmative
speech act and the whole negative criticism and allows you to
vote for the process of constant criticism. It uses the plan to
uphold the system as a target for the neg criticism. Without
that, the criticism becomes inverted, embodying its own
opposite.
Also, none of their specific evidence applies. Its an in round
permutation about our speech acts and the best way to
maintain the integrity of criticism.

93

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff

C. Lande
2012-2013

2AC: Forget Perm

Perm- Vote Af and forget about the traumatic hetero normative
aspects of humanity. The memory of such trauma only serves to
sustain othernessZupancic 03
Alenka Zupancic, 2003, The Shortest Shadow pg. 57-60
This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean forgetting is actually about.
What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of great health? Nietzsche claims that memory
entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle
used in human mnemotechnics: If something is to stay in the memory it must be
burned in; only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory . Thus, if
memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of

what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects
of repression; yet pain is not the same as trauma, just as forgetting is not the
same thing as repressing). Then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to
nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our
actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but rather, the mental
pain that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and
appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in
relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already
its memory (the memory of the body). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of
the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its
foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (On the Utility and
Liability of History for Life). Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a
synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very
condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word.

The Perm solves; truth is constantly ebbing and flowing through a

hermeneutic cycle of revealing and concealing; concealment is a
forgetting or unknowing of a former truth that has given way to
the clearing for the possibility of truth in revealingRockmore
91
Tom Rockmore, 1991, On Heideggers Nazism and Philosophy,
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft6q2nb3wh;brand=ucpress
For Heidegger, phenomenological hiddenness, perhaps even hiddenness as such, is either accidental or necessary. A necessary form of hiddenness is grounded in the very being of what is to be elucidated.
According to Heidegger, a phenomenon is what shows itself and phenomena can in his words be "brought to light," or shown.[5] In Being and Time , Heidegger develops a view of truth as disclosure

assertion of truth presupposes the

uncovering of the entity as it is in itself.[7] According to Heidegger, what he calls Being(Erschlossenheit) based on the idea that the phenomenon shows itself.[6] He maintains that an

uncovering (Entdeckend-sein) must be literally wrested from the objects.[8] He sums up his view in two
points: First, truth belongs to Dasein. Second, Dasein is fundamentally in truth and in
untruth. The theme of concealment remains important in Heidegger's later writing.[9] He further
develops his doctrine of concealment in an important essay "On the Essence of Truth" first published in
1943. Here, in the context of the exposition of his view of truth as disclosure, he maintains that

concealment is undisclosedness, hence the untruth intrinsic to the essence of

truth.[10] Unlike Hegel, Heidegger does not regard untruth as essentially privative. Heidegger
maintains that untruth or concealment is inherent in the nature of truth itself, so that
disclosure, which reveals, also conceals. He insists that Dasein is marked by a
preservation of untruth as mystery, as well as the flight from mystery toward what is readily
available, which he designates as errancy. It is only in his late essay, "The End of Philosophy and the
Task of Thinking," which appeared in 1964, that the doctrine of truth is denied, or at least basically
revised. Here, as part of the effort to leave metaphysics and philosophy behind, he argues that
uncovering is not truth but makes truth possible: Insofar as truth is understood in
the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in
beings. but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of
Being, aletheia , unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be equated

94

Belton HS
Hyper Heidegger Aff
with truth. Rather,
truth.[11]

C. Lande
2012-2013
aletheia , unconcealment

as opening. first grants the possibility of

95