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220-2I9
B.C.
FINE
THE
WESTERN
FRONTIER
OF
MACEDON
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
B.C.
25
IIAt
least in their piratical expedition in 220
they were acting in concert; Polyb. iv, i6, 6.
IL
Cl. note 2. Also see p. 28.
13 Polyb. iv, 29, I ; 66, I and 6-7; Justin xxix, I,
'0-II.
314
Polyb. v, 97,
1I2
26
JOHN
VAN
ANTWERP
FINE
a little to the east of the city of Lychnidus.1 1 It will be rememberedthat the Illyrian kingdom,which was consolidatedabout the middle
of the third century B.C. through the efforts of the powerfultribe of
the Ardiaeans,18 entered into friendly relations with Macedon in
231 B.C.' 9
In 229 occurredthe first Roman war with Illyria.20 At
the end of that campaignthe Romanswere definitely establishedon
the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Their protectorate,thus formed,
extended on the north to the neighbourhoodof Lissus and on the
south to the vicinity of Phoenice in Epirus, including the district of
Atintania. This strip of land was about 120 miles long and from
20 to 40 miles broad.21
The question arises-how close was the territory under Macedonian control to the district now under Roman protection ?
Polybius' account of the revolt of Scerdilaidasfrom Philip in the
summer of 217 is of importance in deciding this point.22 We are
told that Scerdilaidaspillaged Pissaeum, a town of Pelagonia, won
over, through fear or promises, three cities of the Dassaretae,
Antipatreia, Chrysondyonand Gertus, and overran a large part of
Macedon bordering on these places. These towns unquestionably
belonged to Macedon; for Polybius expresslysays that they revolted
from Philip and that he recoveredthem.23 Pissaeumalmost surely
lay in the plain of Monastir in western Pelagonianear the source of
the Erigon.2 4 The location of Antipatreia on the Apsus is well
known (near the modern Berat). Chrysondyonand Gertus cannot
be identified definitely, but they must have been near Antipatreia.
After recoveringthese towns Philip proceededto take Creoniumand
Gerus in the land of the Dassaretae,Enchelanae,Cerax, Sation, and
Boei in the region of Lake Lychnis, Bantia in the district of the
Caloecini and Orgyssusin that of the Pisantini. Of these towns
Gerus and Orgyssusare undoubtedly the same as Gerrunium and
Orgessus,which according to Livy's account25 were situated near
Antipatreia. Both Leake26 and Geyer2 7 agree that Enchelanae,
Cerax, Sation, and Boei were on the west bank of Lake Lychnis..
Leake28suggeststhat Bantia probablylay on the site of the modern
Koritza, and Kiepert2 9 follows him in this hypothesis.
17
7, 4,
323
i7ri
'
oe 7pwrTq
'E-yvariLa KaXe?Tacu,
Xfe',ye-rt, 6povs 'IXXVpLKo6,
5cL
23
(London,
I835),
iii, p. 328.
5 $
. .. .. .. . .. ..
n...1
....;...................
Ke
j1(
; ..........
:', ..
w
'::1'.,
,I S,.,
CA~XP^
s<|i1
2v f
t -/
b~~~~~~~~~
i~~~~~~~~~~ryss
21
Lyc}:l
>'\t,
....,S
> o**s*v*Btia?*
\.s.
....-
FIG.esti
28
JOHN
VAN
ANTWERP
FINE
POLITICAL
RELATIONS
OF
THE
ILLYRIAN
MACEDONIAN
KINGS
AND
THE
PRINCES
229.
229
222.
221
220
220
B.C.
I26-130,
however, I think I have demonstrated
that all through Philip's reign Parauaea and
Tymphaea belonged to Epirus.
31 E.g. Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus.
32 See p. 24; also n. z.
33Polyb.ii,
6, 4; cf. 8, 5.
34 Polyb. iv, 29, 3; v, 4, 3
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
ROME,
220-219
B.C.
29
2i6.
215.
p. 25,
see p. 25, n. 8.
4 ? For the probable extent of Demetrius' realm,
see Holleaux, Rosneetc., p. IO5, n. 6.
30
FINE
y&p
XOC'
CP lpxpovv,x6-t
zz
7ovt -r
t~
\Le
~~~~~~~"
re Or ON rNov a'N
TCX6zg
8'
eov- o
iXeLVOUq
TOUq
peoxpov
7p"eo
t
XOXLpOUqAY^qTrpLOV TOV
eLv
0
-C71
X7L-80C
'V
aUO?LY0XZp(XZVOX XLVtUV&)V
XOZL pYXY6XtZVOX
-7
orpamv
FaXtc
TcP&ouLouq,
Mocxavv otXo at r
TV
0
'Av-rLy6vy,7topOzv ,uv xoa X0vr0F
rpeYeo0z
41
&s
aL&
auxTov
'7"
tr
FotpLOV,
7tpOgI
4
KropzvY
xoc,& 7-v 'I1?upo8C
p. 25, n. I0.
CAH vii, 736). A careful reading of Polyb. iv,
For the methods which Doson probablyused 9-Iz, shows that the battle of Caphyae must have
to win over Demetrius,see Holleaux'sconjectures occurred in June. Shortly afterwards (Polyb. iv, I4)
in CAll vii, 815 and n. i ; cl. Holleaux,Romeetc., a meeting of the Achaean assembly was held. This
Cf.
42
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
ROME,
wocp& -z&
XAl
220-219
3I
B.C.
pOpXZVoc
4 7toXX&4
auVOnXoG oV-xuOV-o
Xvteoq
KuxX&c8cv
XociL Oecpo6v
eT6&.
tq & pXeov-q
TPopczot,
Nv Maxeavcnv o`x%0v, 6tZuaov & poyoor.
&CVOoi5Cv
TX tp6G
@
-rV
'I-tXLo, TC60VOL
-s
x~~TOZyan6L
8LOpO@6qLZVOL
pL9
'IxxupLcv ,yYv0LOV,
-qV /xypLaL[cv
vL[C0CvTe 8 XOL X0X&ZvT
xxv
xoa
I6, I.
32
JOHN
VAN ANTWERP
FINE
almost certain that it was only a question of time before the Romans
would be so completely occupied with the Cathaginians that they
would have to neglect eastern affairs, are we to suppose that he
made the stupid blunder of inciting them to war in 220 at a time
when they were quite capable of sending a large army to Illyria ?
I think not, unless we wish to believe that already in the first year
of the new reign the cautious and discreet policies of Gonatas,
Demetrius II, and Doson were entirely discarded. Certainly the
best interests of Macedon would lead one to believe that Demetrius
of Pharos violated the treaty with the Romans before Philip thought
the proper moment had come.
Thus the setting of the political stage in 220 causes one to think
that Demetrius was acting independently of Macedonian influence.
It is true that he sailed south of Lissus relying 'v Tn Mome86oMv o'XLoc,
but such a statement need not mean that he was instigated by Philip.
All our information concerning Demetrius shows us that he was a
reckless, headstrong person. 53 His status of subservience to the
Romans was naturally distasteful to him, and very probably their
neglect of eastern affairs since 228 had lulled him into a false confidence. 54 He was a pirate by instinct and by race, and in his
depredations during the summer of 220 he was merely giving rein
to his own nature. If he looked into the future at all, he possibly
hoped that if he got into trouble with the Romans he would receive
aid from Philip or, at least, in case of defeat would find refuge with
him-as he actually did in 2I9.55
General considerations, therefore, point to the belief that Philip
had nothing to do with Demetrius' activities at this time. And there
is positive evidence to support this assumption. When Demetrius
and Scerdilaidas set out in 220, they first made an attack on Pylos
in Messenia. 56 Ncw at this time Pylos belonged to the Achaean
League, 57 and Polybius 58 tells us very clearly that in this enterprise
the Illyrians were co-operating with the Aetolians. Are we to believe
then that Demetrius, after being incited by Philip to this expedition,
immediately in conjunction with the Aetolians, enemies of Philip,
attacked a town which was a member of the Achaean League and hence
was allied to Macedon ? The answer must be in the negative.
Holleaux59 says that as yet there was no rupture nor any definite
menace of a rupture between Aetolia and Macedon, and consequently
implies that in working with the Aetolians Demetrius was doing
nothing against the wishes of Philip. This is a strange statement
for a great historian to make ; for a glance at the events of the years
Polyb. iii, i9, 9-I I; VI I2, 7, etc.
Ct. Holleaux, Ronie etc., pp. I32 ff.
55 See below, p. 36.
56Polyb. iv, s6, 7n. i, demonstratedthis very
57 Niese, ii, p. 4Ii,
clearly by pointing out that at the congress of
allies at Corinth it was the Achaeans and not the
53
54
2-7.
5 9 Ronmeetc., p. I 3 5, n- 4.
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
ROME, 220-2I9
B.C.
33
22I.
TOUTOV,
-rV
lxiii
I3o-i55,
particularly140-142.
61 Polyb. iv, 5, IO.
62 Polyb. iv, 6, 3-IO;
25, 463 See above, p. 3O, n. 45(i932),
Oa'ia r-'a
aurOKpacLrwp ?flyelAwp aevcayopevUOEe.
For Philip as head of the Hellenic Leaguie, see
Polyb. iv, 24, 2 25, I ; ix, 37, 7, etc.
6 5 Polyb. iv, I3, 6-7.
66
67
68
i6,
I-3.
6 9Polyb.
34
JOHN
VAN ANTWERP
FINE
Aetolians and the Achaeans, but since Philip was the ally of the
latter, Macedonwas also involvedin the hostilities.
It is clear, therefore, that Macedon and Aetolia were enemies,
and consequently, when Demetrius attacked Pylos in collaboration
with the Aetolians, he was workingwith Philip's enemies against his
friends. Certainly this ought to be sufficient evidence that Philip
had not instigated the Pharianto the undertaking. The point can
be made clearer in an even simpler way. Granting for a moment
that relations between Macedon and Aetolia were not strained, we
have still to admit that Demetrius attacked a city belonging to the
AchaeanLeague, and hence an ally of Philip. This evidencein itself
ought to be adequateto demonstratethat Demetrius had not sailed
south of Lissus at Philip's suggestion.
So far our evidence seemsto prove that in his piraticalexpedition
in 220 Demetrius was acting on his own initiative. In attacking
Pylos he was not deliberately opposing Philip, but was merely
indulging the Illyrian habit of pillaging the coasts of Elis and
Messenia.7 0 That his relationswith Macedon were still friendly is
clear from the fact that in his hasty retreat from the Cycladeslater
in the same summerhe put in at Corinth. There, at the request of
Taurion, the Macedonian general in the Peloponnese,71 he agreed
to aid the Achaeans and proceeded to raid some places on the
Aetolian coast.72 This is the first testimony we have to any cooperation between Demetrius and the Hellenic League ; before
this he had been an independent adventurer, just as Scerdilaidas
continued to be. Some scholarsmight maintain that Macedon was
pursuing a definitely anti-Roman policy when Taurion entered into
negotiations with the man who had recently brokenhis treaty with
them. To considerthis episode as an instance of an aggressivepolicy
against the Romans is laying too much stress on an insignificant
matter. It was purely a businesstransaction. Since the Rhodians
were in pursuit of Demetrius, he was only too glad to assist Taurion
in return for having his ships hauled across the Isthmus. To
illustrate my point I might ask the following question. The
Aetolians had been co-operating with Demetrius shortly before he
agreed to work with Taurion; who is going to maintain that they
had a definite anti-Romanpolicy at this time ?
There is further and possibly more conclusive proof that Philip
had nothing to do with Demetrius'expeditionin 220 and, as a corollary
to this, that Philip's attitude toward Rome in the first years of his
reign was purely defensive, not offensive. In the summer of 2I9
the Romans sent an expedition to Illyria to chastiseDemetrius. At
this time the Social War was in full swing. As is well known, Philip
spent the campaigningseason,first in besieging Ambracus,and then
in his campaignalong the Achelous. I do not wish to discussany of
7 0 Polyb. ii, 5, v-2.
7 1 For Taurion's position, see Polyb. iv, 87, 8.
72
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
ROME, 220-2I9
B.C.
35
the details of these events in this paper, but thus much can be said.
with absolute certainty. While the Romans were in Illyria, Philip
was either at Ambracus or in Acarnania. 3 We know this because,
when the Romans captured Pharos by a ruse, Demetrius fled immediately to Philip and met him just as he was about to cross the
Ambracian Gulf from Acarnania to Epirus. 4 This situation in the
summer of 2z9 is extremely interesting and instructive for the light
it casts on Philip's attitude toward the Illyrian problem. As regards
the Romans his policy was purely a defensive one. His reason for
spending these months in western Greece may very well have been his
fear of Roman aggression.75 He wanted to be near home in case
the Romans, after subduing the Illyrians, should attempt to invade
Macedon. But he had no intention of undertaking an offensive
against them. Demetrius had incurred their wrath by his rash acts
in 220, and now he could pay the penalty alone. As far as military
forces on the scene of action were concerned, Philip was certainly a
match for the Romans. We have no information at all about the
fleet which Rome dispatched on this expedition. In regard to land
forces, Lucius Aemilius 76 probably had with him the normal consular
army of about 20,000 infantry and z,ooo cavalry. 7 7 Philip had with
him at the time about 20,000 men, 78 and these, if joined to the
7 3 As usual we can formulate only a general
chronological scheme, but, nevertheless, a sufficiently
accurate one for our purposes. From Polyb. iv, 37,
we learn that the following events all occuirred at
about the same time: the younger Aratuis assuimed
office as Achaean strategos (middle of May, see
above, p. 30, n. 45);
the Romans despatched
Lucius Aemilius to Illyria (cf. Polyb. iii, i6, 7ipa7ap.c.sd . . . .
,r6 1-H
M.aTa T6 7pSrov gTos 7Xs
eKaTO9Tr?
Kac
TeTTapaKOo-T7e
o\VU7rt6a6os-there-
fore, probably before July 219); Philip was marching from Macedon with his army. This would lead
one to suppose that Philip muist have set ouit toward
the end of May. Such an assuimption fits in with the
rest of our information. He spent forty days at
Ambracus (Polyb. iv, 63, 2). This brings us into
July. Since Philip returned home in time to let
his men gather in the harvest and since he spent
the remaining part of the summer in Larisa (Polyb.
iv, 66, 7), we must infer that the campaign along
the Achelous lasted about a month or a little longer.
Speaking roughly then, Philip spent June and part
of July at Ambracus, and the rest of July and part
of August in Acarnania. Since the Romans sailed
for Illyria before July and since Demetrius in his
flight met Philip as he was starting for home, we
can conclude that the Roman campaign in Illyria
must have lasted about two months. This coincides
with Polybius' statement (iii, 19, I2) that Aemilius
returned to Rome late in the summer (X-qsyo6vo
rTs Oepe'as).
If the above calculations are
approximately correct, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Romans arrived in Illyria while
Philip was engaged in his siege of Ambracus and
that they departed (after Aemilius had organised
Illyria, Polyb. iii, I9, I2) about the time Philip
reached Larisa (cf. Polyb. iv, 66, 7-8).
70
20,000.
36
JOHN
VAN
ANTWERP
FINE
(Polyb.
80 M. Nicolaus, Zwei
Beitrdge zzur Geschichse
KDnig Pbilipps IV von AMakedonien(Diss. Berlin,
1909), 52-53.
81 See above, p. 35, n- 7382
83
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
ROME, 220-2I9
37
B.C.
[LeV
UMt9ZVOU[LeVo4
OWt&)
'IXup[oc 7rpMyzt&-1&v,
troc s
ZUXOT)y(Op!lrm,
pqc&x
T
s?C6?
rwv
/UYXar6X?UlV
Xo-yopov
UyC7(peLvTo0L
-rv
-t
Alrw)?v,
7rpoxoXout?voLq(iv,
'Qvtc@v
29, 3).
87
and.
The
Polyb.iV,
87
29.
88
38
FINE
a hint that he had any other motive. To have the Illyrian as an ally
would be profitable to him in several ways. In the first place it would
put a certain number of ships at his disposal. This would be a great
asset, considering the bad state of the Macedonian fleet at that
time, 8 9 and also it would deprive the Aetolians of those same vessels.
In addition it meant that Philip would not have to worry about an
Illyrian invasion on his western frontier ; that a hostile Illyria could
cause considerable trouble for Macedon we learn from the events of
2I7 when Scerdilaidas turned against Philip. 9 0 It would be foolish,
however, to deny that in his Illyrian policy he was thinking of the
Romans. Naturally he wished to win allies for himself along the
eastern shore of the Adriatic, 91 and very possibly he was already
forming plans to drive the Romans out of Illyria. But these plans
were all for the future when a more fitting opportunity should offer.
As yet he had done nothing openly hostile to the Romans. Philip
had not instigated Demetrius of Pharos and Scerdilaidas to break
their treaty with the Romans in 220, and in procuring the latter as
an ally against the Aetolians and in promising to aid him in settling
some of the troubles in Illyria, he was in no way adopting a policy
which need be construed as aggressively anti-Roman. In conclusion,
to these remarks I might also add that by allying himself with
ScerdilaYdas Philip was indulging in offensive tactics against the
Romans no more than were the Aetolians when they were co-operating
Both Macedon and Aetolia wanted
with the Illyrian in 220.
ScerdilaYdasas an ally in the Social War, and on this particular
occasion Philip succeeded in outbidding his enemies.
There is one more point which should be discussed briefly. After
their defeat at Caphyae in June 220 the Achaeans, as we have seen
above, 92 sent ambassadors to the various members of the Hellenic
League requesting assistance. Regarding Philip's reception of these
envoys, Polybius (iv, i6, i) uses the following words: ox 3'
Hti?Lp@otL
zxo
@LX7r7
o 3O
PL?X?US
&xoCGav-req
T6V
7p?a?&V
XTX.
MACEDON,
ILLYRIA,
AND
B.C.
ROME, 220-2I9
39
96
101
Polyb. v, 3-6.
97 Polyb. v, I02, IO.
98 Polyb. v, IOI, 6-iO.
9 9 Polyb. v, iO8.
Cl. Holleaux, Rome etc.,
i66 and CAH vii, 855.
208-209.
(I925),
45.
v, II0.
vii, 9.