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Macedon, Illyria, and Rome, 220-219 B.C. Author(s): John Van Antwerp Fine Source: The Journal of

Macedon, Illyria, and Rome, 220-219 B.C. Author(s): John Van Antwerp Fine Source: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 26, Part 1 (1936), pp. 24-39

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA, AND

ROME,

220-2I9

By JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

B.C.

One of the most interesting problems in the political history of the last three decades of the third century B.C. is the appearance of the Romans east of the Adriatic. Whether Rome in the First and Second Illyrian Wars was inaugurating a definite imperialistic policy with the conscious aim of gaining control in the Balkan peninsula, or whether at this time she was acting purely on the defensive against Illyrian piracy, are questions with which I am not concerned at

primary importance is that, by establishing

herself in Illyria, Rome came into contact with Macedon, and this contact was bound to lead to hostilities ; for the Antigonids could not fail to resent the intrusion of a stranger in what they considered their own sphere of influence. In this paper I propose to consider the attitude of Philip V to the Roman protectorate in Illyria at the beginning of his reign. Since his whole life was one long struggle with Rome, the importance of understanding his policy in regard to this question is obvious. Before entering upon the subject, however, it will be necessary to try to determine how far westward Macedonian authority extended. A knowledge of this western frontier will not only inform us on the proximity of Macedonian possessionsto the Roman protectorate, but will also reveal some of the problems which the barbaric Illyrian and Dardanian tribes presented to Philip in this quarter. Once we have these matters clearly in mind, we shall be in a much better position to form an unbiased estimate of Philip's attitude to what may be called his Illyrian problem.

present. 1 The fact of

I.

THE

WESTERN

FRONTIER

OF

MACEDON

The northern and north-western boundaries of Macedon were constantly menaced by the Dardanians, barbarians who apparently were closely related to the Illyrians.2 The northernmost district of the Macedonian kingdom was Paeonia. Since the time when Philip II had subdued them, 4 the Paeonians, who also were of

1 For a discussion of this Roman 'imperialism'

see M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, et les s;onarchies hellenistiques au iije siecle avant 7.C. (Paris, 1921). Cl. also Walek's not too successful replies,

Rev.

Holleaux's retorts to these criticisms, Rev. Phil. 1

(1926), 46-66, 194-218.

Phil.

xlix

(1925),

28-54,

118-142,

and

315 f., says the Dardanians

were an Illyrian tribe, and describes the boundaries

of their territory by saying that on the west the

2Strabo

vii,

5, 6-7,

Drilo river was navigable as far as Dardania, that on the south the Dardanians bordered on Macedonian and Paeonian tribes, and that on the east, through the Galabrii and the Thunatae who belonged to them, they extended as far as the Maedi, a Thracian tribe.

3 Strabo vii, 4,

I,

3I3

and vii,

frag. 4,

roughly

defines the boundaries of Paeonia.

4 Diod.

xvi, 4.

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-219

B.C.

25

Illyrian stock, 5 had been sometimes subject to Macedon, sometimes independent, and sometimes overrun by the Dardanians.6 Shortly after his accession early in 229, 7 Antigonus Doson succeeded in driving back the Dardanians, who in the latter part of the reign of Demetrius II had invaded the Macedonian realm.-8 Immediately after the battle of Sellasia, Doson had to return hurriedly to Macedon to oppose another invasion of barbarians. According to our sources

to the party

of Demetrius of Pharos, then an ally of Antigonus, 10 or to that of Scerdilaidas, whose cause at this time seems to have been identical with that of the Pharian. 11 More probably the reference is to those Illyrians who lived further inland, and therefore were more closely associated with the Dardanians, the perpetual enemies of the Macedonians.12 Doson was victorious, but we are not told what were the actual results of his victory. All we know is that Philip V in the first years of his reign was threatened by Dardanian invasions, 13 and when he made an expedition against them in the early summer of 217 Bylazora, the chief city of the Paeonians, was in their hands. 14 Hence it is probable that at Philip's accession the Dardanians con- trolled territory in Paeonia along the Axius as far south as Bylazora. Concerning western Paeonia we derive some information from a passage in Livy (xxvi, 25, 2-6). Here we are told that in 2II Philip, after he had ravaged the parts of Illyria near Oricum and Apollonia, marched into Pelagonia and took Sintia, a city of the Dardanians, which afforded them a passage into Macedon. Then he descended through Pelagonia, Lyncus, and Bottiaea into Thessaly and from there he led his army into Thrace. From this it appears that Sintia must have been on the northern boundary of Pelagonia. Geyer15 very reasonably suggests that it lay in the north of the plain of Monastir at the entrance of one of the passes into the Vardar (Axius) valley. 16 Philip's taking of this city in 2 I I would lead one to suppose that he had not held it previously and, therefore, it is probably legitimate to assume that at his accession the Dardanians, by holding Sintia, controlled the northern part of the plain of Monastir.

Directly to the west of Macedon and extending indefinitely northward was the region of Illyria. The boundary line between Macedon proper and Illyria proper ran through a place called Pylon,

these were Illyrians. 9 Certainly they did not belong

I Kazarow, ' Die ethnographische Stellung der

Paonen,' Klio XViii

(1922),

20-26.

6 See Geyer in P-W, s.v. 'Makedonia,' coll. 720-

750. 7 Holleaux, REG xliii (1930), 254 ff., has definitely shown that Demetrius II died before May 229.

8 Jtustin xxviii, Livy xxxi, 28, 2.

3,

I4

;

Trogus

Prolog. xxviii;

ii,

9 Polyb. ii, 70;

1 0 Demetrius

6,

Plut. Cleoi,n.27;

Doson

aided

at

5;

iii,

i6, 3-

30.

Sellasia;

Polyb.

IIAt

least in their

piratical expedition

in

they were acting in concert;

Polyb. iv, i6, 6.

IL Cl. note

2.

Alsosee p. 28.

220

13 Polyb. iv, 29,

'0-II.

I

;

66, I and 6-7;

Justin xxix, I,

314 Polyb.v, 97, 1I2

3a Op. Cit. p. 748.

16 Kiepert, FOA, xvi, p. 4a, places Sintia on the Strymon river, but this is incompatible with the passage in Livy just cited.

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26

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

a little to the eastof the city of Lychnidus.1 1 It will be remembered- that the Illyriankingdom,which was consolidatedabout the middle of the third century B.C. through the effortsof the powerfultribe of

the

231 B.C.' 9 In 229 occurredthe first Romanwar with Illyria.20 At the end of that campaignthe Romanswere definitelyestablishedon the easterncoast of the Adriatic. Their protectorate,thus formed, extended on the north to the neighbourhoodof Lissus and on the south to the vicinity of Phoenice in Epirus,includingthe district of Atintania. This strip of land was about 120 miles long and from

20 to 40 miles broad.21 The question arises-how close was the territory under Mace- donian control to the district now under Roman protection ? Polybius' account of the revolt of Scerdilaidasfrom Philip in the summerof 217 is of importancein deciding this point.22 We are told that Scerdilaidaspillaged Pissaeum,a town of Pelagonia,won over, through fear or promises, three cities of the Dassaretae,

Antipatreia,Chrysondyonand Gertus, and overran a large part of Macedon bordering on these places. These towns unquestionably belongedto Macedon; for Polybiusexpresslysaysthat they revolted from Philip and that he recoveredthem.23 Pissaeumalmost surely lay in the plain of Monastirin western Pelagonianear the sourceof

the Erigon.2 4

known (near the modern Berat).

be identified definitely, but they must have been near Antipatreia.

After recoveringthese towns Philip proceededto take Creoniumand Gerusin the land of the Dassaretae,Enchelanae,Cerax, Sation, and Boei in the region of Lake Lychnis, Bantia in the district of the Caloecini and Orgyssusin that of the Pisantini. Of these towns Gerus and Orgyssusare undoubtedly the same as Gerrunium and Orgessus,which accordingto Livy's account25 were situated near Antipatreia. Both Leake26 and Geyer2 7 agree that Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, and Boei were on the west bank of Lake Lychnis Leake28suggeststhat Bantiaprobablylay on the site of the modern Koritza,and Kiepert 2 9 followshim in this hypothesis.

Ardiaeans,18 entered into friendly relations with Macedon in

The location of Antipatreia on the Apsus is well

Chrysondyonand Gertus cannot

17 While describing the Egnatian Way, Strabo vii,

7, 4, 323 (fromPolyb.; cl. Polyb.xxxiv, 12, 6), says:

'

F7 ,uev

obv

7ao-a

i7ri

Kav5aovuas

'E-yvariLa

Xfe',ye-rt,

KaXe?Tacu,

oe

7pwrTq

6povs

'IXXVpLKo6,

5cL

AvXvL5oD 7reXew9 KacL IIvuXvos -r6rov bplovros eiv

7-

6&3 7-'v Te 'IJXXvpLa Kat 7'iv

MaKe0ovLav.

'8

See Holleaux,

CAH, vii,

826-827.

9 See p.

29.

20 Holleaux, REG xliii (I930),

243-26i,

has

definitely fixed the date of this wvar.

21 For the territory which the Romans took under

their protection,see Polyb. ii, II-I2;

Appian, Illyr. 7-8.

this question, Rossseetc., pp. I04-II2,

p. I Io, n. i, and CAH vii, 836-837.

See Holleaux's

22 Polyb. v, io8, i-8.

Vii,

9,

I3;

treatments

of

particularly

p.

23

Polyb. v, I08, 3 and 8 ; cl. Holleaux, Rome etc.,

167, n. 3-remark

on contrast between dVEK-rsaO

(recovered) and KacTeXcif3e7o (took).

24 G. Zippel, Die r6miiische Herrschalt in Illyrien

Augustus (Leipzig, 1877), p. 6i ; Geyer,

bis auf

op. cit., p- 747-

cl. Zippel, op. cit., p. 6i, and

Holleaux, Romle etc., p. i67, n. 3. Creonium was probably in the immediate vicinity.

25

Livy xxxi, 27,

2;

26 W.

(London,

27 op_

tentatively places Sation and Boei on the east bank.

Northernt Greece

Travels

M.

I835),

Leake,

iii,

in

p.

328.

Kiepert, FOA

cit. p. 747.

xvi, however,

28 op. cit. p. 329.

2 9 FOA

xvi.

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28

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

It is obvious, therefore, that the geographical situation of many of these towns is very problematical. Of this much, however, we can be certain. Before 217 Philip held only a few towns of the Dassaretae, namely Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, and possibly a few more. It was not until ScerdilaYdas'abortive attempt at revolt that Philip, by bringing practically all the territory between Lake Lychnis and the Apsus under his control, caused still more of the western boundaries of Macedon to march with the eastern limits of the Roman protectorate. At his accession to the throne Anti- patreia was the furthermost Macedonian outpost (at least of any importance), and it was at this point that Rome and Macedon con- fronted each other. 3 0 Regarding the various tribes of Illyrians residing between the Roman protectorate and Macedon, north and east of Antipatreia, we have no definite information. The Macedonians held a few places, 31 but it was apparently not until Philip's expedition against Scerdilaidas in 217 that the district around Lake Lychnis came almost completely under MViacedoniancontrol. Very possibly these people were closer to the Dardanians 3 2 than to the Ardiaean Illyrians who had become so powerful under Agron and Teuta. In the time of the latter, we hear that some of her Illyrian subjects went over to the Dardanians. 3 3 The trouble which ScerdilaYdas also had later with his subjects would suggest that the Illyrian princes were not always able to control these tribes. 3 4

II.

POLITICAL

RELATIONS

OF

THE

MACEDONIAN

KINGS

AND

THE

 

ILLYRIAN

PRINCES

The following table shows the chronological order of the events discussed:

231

B.C.

Demetrius II of Macedon Illyria.

makes alliance with

Agron of

229.

First Roman War in Illyria.

229

or 228.

Antigonus Doson recovers Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis

from Aetolians.

222.

Demetrius of Pharos in alliance with Antigonus Doson.

 

221

(Autumn).

Accession of Philip V.

220

(June).

Battle of Caphyae.

220

(July-August).

Piratical expedition

of

Demetrius

of

Pharos

and ScerdilaYdas.

3 0 It has generally been agreed that the districts of Parauaea and Tymphaea belonged to Macedon in 22I B.C. (cf. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte iv, 2, pp. 378-379). If this is correct, it would mean that in this direction also Macedonian territory bordered on the Roman protectorate, for Atintania was under Roman influence. In a recent paper, Trans. of the AmiiericanPhilol. Assoc. lxiii (1932),

I26-130, however, I think I have demonstrated that all through Philip's reign Parauaea and Tymphaea belonged to Epirus.

31 E.g. Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus.

32 See p. 24;

33Polyb.ii,

34 Polyb. iv, 29, 3;

also n. z.

cf. 8,

6, 4;

5.

v, 4,

3

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-219

B.C.

29

220-219 (Winter). Philip V makes alliance with ScerdilaYdas.

219

(June-August).

Philip

V

besieges Ambracus and campaigns

along the Achelous.

 

219

(June-August).

Second Roman War in Illyria.

218.

Philip V fails against Cephallenia.

217. Philip V regulates affairs of Zacynthus.

217. Romans defeated by Hannibal at Lake Trasimene.

2i6.

Philip V

fails against Apollonia.

215. Philip V makes alliance with Hannibal.

It was in 231 B.C. that Philip's father, Demetrius II, entered into relations with Illyria. For the major part of his reign he had been engaged in a war with the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, and in this particular year he was confronted with still more enemies. The Dardanians were invading Paeonia in such numbers that he had to direct all his energies to that quarter. Consequently he was unable to go to the aid of the Acarnanian city Medeon, which was being besieged by the Aetolians. So as not to desert his ally, he bribed Agron, the powerful Illyrian king, to raise the siege. This Agron promptly did.36 In the following year Agron died and was succeeded by his widow Teuta. She whole-heartedly encouraged the piratical enterprises of her people in the Adriatic, with the result that Rome was finally aroused. An embassy was sent to her in 230, but she dismissed it with contempt. Such treatment naturally angered the Romans, and in the following year they sent a large force to Illyria. Despite the suggestions of Holleaux37 and De Sanctis, 38 it seems probable that Teuta was not reposing any confidence in her alliance with Macedon ; for she must have realized that Demetrius

was too much occupied in struggling against the Aetolians, Achaeans, and Dardanians to offer her any assistance. Nor was Antigonus Doson3 9 able to go to her aid in 229 and, as we have seen, the result of the First Illyrian War was that Rome established a protectorate over the eastern shore of the Adriatic from Lissus southward to the neighbourhood of Phoenice. According to the terms of the peace treaty, the Illyrians were not to sail south of Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. Demetrius of Pharos as reward for his defection to the Romans was put in charge of Pharos and the neighbouring

Appian informs us that the Romans in

parts of the

mainland.40

35Cl.

p.

25,

n. 8.

36 Our knowledge of the relations between Macedon, Illyria, and Rome from the time of Agron down to the accession of Philip V is derived from

the following sources: Polyb. ii,

2-I2;

65, 4;

iii, i6, 3; Dio xii, 49 and 53; Zonaras 8, i-zo2;

Appian, Illyr. 7-8. The following give no additional

information:

Livy, Per. xx;

Romans made a victorious campaign against the

See

Histrians in zzi does not concern us here.

Whether the

Orosius iv,

Florus i,

I3,

2I

2 ;

(ii,

Eutropius iii,

5).

7;

Zippel, op. cit., p. iOI, for the sources. Holleaux,

Rossseetc., p. I34, is apocryphal.

n. I, claims that the expedition

37 Rosse etc., p. IOO;

38 G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Rosssani (Turin,

CAH vii, 833.

I9I6)

iii,

I,

p. 296.

39 Doson

was too

see p.

25,

n. 8.

busy with

the

Dardanians;

4 ? For the probable extent of Demetrius' realm,

see Holleaux, Rosneetc., p. IO5,

n. 6.

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30

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

granting certain places to Demetrius expressly said that this was only a temporaryarrangement. Becauseof his treacheryto Teuta,

they naturally could not feel convinced that he would remain loyal to them. The Romans were correct in suspecting Demetrius ; for in the ensuing years, when they utterly neglected eastern affairs, the Pharian came closer and closer to Macedon. We know definitely that by the time of the battle of Sellasia he was an ally of Antigonus Doson,41 and it is highly probable that the good relations between the two men dated back as far as 225 when Demetrius, thinking that the Romans were completely embroiled with the Gauls, felt that he could with impunity act independently of their wishes.42 We now come to the period which I wish to examine in detail in regard to the attitude of Macedon toward Illyria, and, therefore, towards Rome. Philip V came to the throne in the autumn of

221 B.C.43 In the years immediately following, events occurred

which throw light upon our problem. Polybius44 tells us that in

the summer of 220

treaty with Rome by sailing south of Lissus with a fleet of ninety vessels. From the context it is possible to assign the beginning of this expedition to the end of July or the early part of August.45 We have further information concerning these events. Polybius 4 6 prefaces his account of the Second Illyrian War with the following remarks, which are of such importance for our purpose that they must be quoted in full.

Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos broke their

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42 For the methodswhich Doson probablyused to win over Demetrius,see Holleaux'sconjectures in CAll vii, 815 andn. i ; cl. Holleaux,Romeetc.,

pp. I3I-I35.

4 This date is somewhat in doubt. Beloch,

iv,

1x p.

7I9,

iV,

2,

p.

II3,

places the accession in

the summerof 22I.

of Athents(Cambridge,Mass. I931), p. 509, placesit

in September222. The precisedate is not of im-

portanceto us.

W. B. Dinsmoor,TheArchons

I am acceptingthe suggestionof

W. W. Tarn as given in CAH vii, 763.

4 Polyb. iv, I6, 6.

45 As usual, it is impossible to set an exact date, but from an examination of the events of the year

220 it is possible to arrive at a sufficiently approxim- ate one. Aratus became strategosabout the middle of May (Polyb. iv, 7, I0; 37, 2; V, I, I. ct. Beloch iv, 2 p. 220; B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und miiakedonischenStaaten ii, p. 433, n. 2; Tarn,

46 Polyb.

iii,

I6,

Z-4.

xoc,& 7-v 'I1?upo8C

careful reading of Polyb. iv,

9-Iz, shows that the battle of Caphyae must have occurred in June. Shortly afterwards (Polyb. iv, I4) a meeting of the Achaean assembly was held. This occurred at the end of the 13gth Olympiad (Polyb. iv, I4, 9)-hence almost surely in July zzo. At the beginning of the I40th Olympiad the Achaeans sent ambassadors to the various members of the Hellenic League (Polyb. iv, I 5-I6) and immediately afterwards the Illyrians set out (i6, 6). Since Demetrius touched at Pylos, raided the Cyclades (i6, 7-8) and co-operated with Taurion (19, 7-9), and since after these events Philip spent considerable time in the Peloponnese (zz-z6)-all before Scopas was elected Aetolian strategos after the autumn equinox (Z7, I ; 37, z)-it seems inevitable to

assign the setting out of Scerdilaidas and Demetrius either to the end of July or to the beginning of August.

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-219

B.C.

3 I

wocp& -z&

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should break out).

-rrv Al\ynp[ou (before the

war

with

Hannibal

Polybius, as we have just seen, says that

Demetrius

broke his

treaty with the Romans because he had all his hopes centred iv -g Maxe8vC0v oxLxC (i.e. Philip). Relying on this statement, Holleaux48 asserts that the Pharian in his revolt received definite encouragement from Philip, or, to express it more clearly, that Demetrius was instigated by Philip to sail south of Lissus and devote himself to marauding enterprises. It is this conception of Macedonian policy which I wish to call in question. That Philip, surrounded by the councillors of Doson,4 9 resented the presence of the Romans in Illyria as much as his predecessor had done, is obvious. Possession of Illyria, or at least access to it, was essential for the prosperity of Macedon. The Antigonids wanted to have free access to the Adriatic, and the Roman protectorate prevented this.50 The interference of Rome in Illyrian affairscould not fail to make Macedon angry; for it meant not only that her sphere of influence was being encroached upon, but also that there was an ever present menace of further

Roman aggression. Granting then that Philip was anxious to have the Romans ousted from Illyria, let us examine our evidence and see if there are any reasons for assigning an active anti-Roman policy to him thus early in his career.

kept well informed

In the

first place Philip

was undoubtedly

concerning western affairs. 5

Rome and Carthage was becoming so critical that war would probably be unavoidable, but in the summer of 220 hostilities had not yet broken out. 52 He realized that if the two countries should take up arms against one another it would be a severe struggle which would tax the resources of Rome to the limit. Now, when Philip could be

He knew that the situation between

The use of the present and perfect infinitives makes it difficult to determine the exact order of these events. Holleaux, Rome etc., p. I34, n. 4, maintains (correctly, I believe) that Demetrius first pillaged Roman Illyria, then raided the Cyclades, and possibly on his return continued his plundering of Illyria.

47

48 Holleaux, Rome etc., pp.

I41

i.

see particu-

larly p. 141 n. 4.

49 For

6-8.

Philip's

councillors

Polyb.

makedonischeHeeresver-

see

iv,

87,

Cf. F. Granier, Die

saninilung

so Cl.

839;

(Munich

Nicse,

ii,

1931),

p.

pp. 126-127;

326;

I32.

Holleaux, CAH vii, Walek, op. cit. 49,

Rome etc., pp. I I9-I20.

n. 3, is correct in emphasizing the importance to Macedon of maintaining her hegemony in Greece, but is wrong in minimizing her interests in Illyria. How vital control in that region was to Philip is evident from his activity in the vicinity after the Social War. See, for instance, Polyb. v, IOI, 8-IO; 108-I IO; vii, 9; viii, I3-I4; Livy, xxiv, 40.

51 Demetrius of Pharos knew beforehand of the Romans' intention of punishing him (Polyb. iii, i8, I). Philip, while at the Nemean festival in 2I7, received news that H4annibal had defeated the Romans at Lake Trasimene (Polyb. v, IOI, 5-6).

52 Polyb. ii, 36, 4-7;

cf. iii,

I5,

I2;

I6,

I.

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32

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

almost certain that it was only a question of time before the Romans would be so completely occupied with the Cathaginians that they would have to neglect eastern affairs, are we to suppose that he made the stupid blunder of inciting them to war in 220 at a time when they were quite capable of sending a large army to Illyria ?

I think not, unless we wish to believe that already in the first year of the new reign the cautious and discreet policies of Gonatas, Demetrius II, and Doson were entirely discarded. Certainly the best interests of Macedon would lead one to believe that Demetrius of Pharos violated the treaty with the Romans before Philip thought the proper moment had come.

Thus the setting of the political stage in 220

causes one to think

that Demetrius was acting independently of Macedonian influence.

It is true that he sailed south of Lissus relying 'v Tn Mome86oMv o'XLoc,

but such a statement need not mean that he was instigated by Philip.

All our information concerning Demetrius shows us that he was a

His

reckless, headstrong

person. 53

status of subservience to the

Romans was naturally distasteful to him, and very probably their

neglect of eastern affairs since 228 had lulled him into a false con-

and in his

depredations during the summer of 220 he was merely giving rein to his own nature. If he looked into the future at all, he possibly hoped that if he got into trouble with the Romans he would receive aid from Philip or, at least, in case of defeat would find refuge with

him-as he actually did in 2I9.55 General considerations, therefore, point to the belief that Philip had nothing to do with Demetrius' activities at this time. And there is positive evidence to support this assumption. When Demetrius and Scerdilaidas set out in 220, they first made an attack on Pylos

Ncw at this time Pylos belonged to the Achaean

in Messenia. 56

League, 57 and Polybius 58 tells us very clearly that in this enterprise the Illyrians were co-operating with the Aetolians. Are we to believe

then that Demetrius, after being incited by Philip to this expedition, immediately in conjunction with the Aetolians, enemies of Philip, attacked a town which was a member of the Achaean League and hence was allied to Macedon ? The answer must be in the negative. Holleaux59 says that as yet there was no rupture nor any definite menace of a rupture between Aetolia and Macedon, and consequently implies that in working with the Aetolians Demetrius was doing nothing against the wishes of Philip. This is a strange statement for a great historian to make ; for a glance at the events of the years

fidence. 54 He was a pirate by instinct and by race,

53 Polyb. iii,

54 Ct. Holleaux, Ronie etc., pp. I32 55 See below, p. 36. 56Polyb. iv, s6, 7-

57 Niese, ii, p. 4Ii,

i9,

9-I

I;

VI I2,

7, etc.

ff.

n. i, demonstratedthis very

clearly by pointing out that at the congress of allies at Corinth it was the Achaeans and not the

Messenians who complained of the attack upon Pylos (Polyb. iv, 25, 4). 58 Polyb. iV, 25, 4; ix, 38, 8. Good relations

between Scerdilaldas and the Aetolians continued

until the winter

of 220-219 ; see Polyb. iv, I6, 9-Il ;

29,

2-7.

59

Ronmeetc., p. I 3 5, n- 4.

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-2I9

B.C.

33

will demonstrateits falseness. For our present purposesa few remarkswill suffice. That the Macedoniansand Aetolianswere

22I-220

bitter enemiesall through the reignsof Demetrius II and Antigonus Doson is well known. After Doson inflicted a severe defeat on the

Aetolians in 229

recovering the Thessalian districts of

Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis,60 they remained comparativelyquiet

or

228

by

until his death in the autumn of 22I.

Then,

as Polybius61

puts it,

they proceededto makewar all at once on the Messenians,Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians,and Macedonians. Among other exploits they invaded the Peloponnesetwice in the early part of 220, each

time

in June Aratus led out the Achaean forces against them and was badly defeated at Caphyae.63 Now inasmuchas the Achaeanswere members of the Hellenic League of which Philip, as successorto Doson,64 waspresident,it is hardto see how one can fail to recognise in the battle of Caphyaethe beginningof war between the Aetolians and the Hellenic League. Certainly this was Polybius' opinion; for after his account of the battle, he writes65:

ravagingterritory belongingto the AchaeanLeague.62 Early

T'v V~ev oi6vociVtEoc%ocit -r7v ckopv~O~v

t

0

a A,, a, zvaA,It,

TOUTOV,

-rV

Wo'py3tV 'x

-,Oi

Cti T'Zoocitroc

auVywCzx0q 7rt6XZVOq 'eaZv

%

'e

ysvovvou

86yoCrTo4 OmcV(rcV

-0

o au61YCOF

V oa Guve?O6vTs4

e'

oCPOU'XLOv 'V

pOaaGVcUG0V-Oq

CovTV

KopLvO&v 7r6?&vCsxU6pCacV

@=z0ou

roca6Cs.0oi

Holleaux66 objects to this last statement ; he calls attention to the fact that, when the Achaeans after the disaster at Caphyae appealed to Philip for help, he decided to maintain peace with the Aetolians.67 This evidence is not so strongly in support of Holleaux's contention as it might seem at first glance. The Achaeans had also requested that the Messenians be admitted to the Hellenic League, and Philip readily agreed to this proposal.68 Now the Aetolians had voted to go to war with the Achaeans unless the latter abandoned their alliance with the Messenians.69 Thus we see that Philip, by agreeing to receive the Messenians into the Hellenic League, was in reality pledging himself to a war with the Aetolians; for when they should attack the Achaeans, he was bound to go to the aid of his allies. Consequently Holleaux's remark that there was no rupture nor any definite menace of a rupture between the Aetolians and Philip in July 220 seems to me to be wholly mis- leading. To say that the battle of Caphyae was not war is nothing more than quibbling. It is true that it was war between the

6 0 See my article, Trans. of Amer. Philol. Assoc.

lxiii

(i932),

I3o-i55,

particularly140-142.

25,

4-

the

Hellenic

61 Polyb. iv, 5, IO.

62 Polyb. iv, 6, 3-IO;

63 See above, p. 3O, n. 45-

64 For Doson

54,

'A7iryosovog e

as head of

4 ;

Leaguie,

see Polyb. ii,

38, 9:

iv,

9,

scar

4 ;

cf. also Pluit. Arat.

sKaia- YfV

Kat

KaTa

Oa'ia r-'a

aurOKpacLrwp

?flyelAwp

For

Polyb. iv, 24,

Philip

as head

2

25,

I

of

;

6 5 Polyb. iv, I3, 6-7.

the

ix,

Hellenic

37, 7, etc.

66 Romiieetc.,

67

68

Polyb. iv, See n. 67.

iv,

6 9Polyb.

p.

I5,

15,

149,

I-2;

9.

n.

1.

i6,

I-3.

aevcayopevUOEe.

Leaguie, see

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34

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

Aetolians and the Achaeans, but since Philip was the ally of the latter, Macedonwasalsoinvolvedin the hostilities. It is clear, therefore, that Macedon and Aetolia were enemies, and consequently, when Demetrius attacked Pylos in collaboration with the Aetolians,he was workingwith Philip's enemiesagainsthis

friends.

had not instigated the be made clearer in an

that relationsbetween Macedon and Aetolia were not strained, we have still to admit that Demetrius attackeda city belonging to the

AchaeanLeague,andhence an ally of Philip. This evidencein itself

Certainly this ought to be sufficient evidence that Philip

Pharianto the undertaking. The point can even simpler way. Granting for a moment

ought to be adequateto demonstratethat

Demetrius had not sailed

south of Lissusat Philip'ssuggestion. So far our evidenceseemsto provethat in his piraticalexpedition in 220 Demetrius was acting on his own initiative. In attacking

Pylos he was not deliberately opposing Philip, but was merely indulging the Illyrian habit of pillaging the coasts of Elis and

Messenia.7 0 That

clear from the fact that in his hasty retreat from the Cycladeslater

in the same summerhe put in

Taurion, the Macedoniangeneral in the Peloponnese,71 he agreed to aid the Achaeans and proceeded to raid some places on the Aetolian coast.72 This is the first testimony we have to any co- operation between Demetrius and the Hellenic League; before

this he had been an independent adventurer,just as Scerdilaidas continued to be. Some scholarsmight maintainthat Macedon was pursuinga definitely anti-Romanpolicy when Taurion entered into negotiationswith the man who had recently brokenhis treaty with

them. To considerthis episodeas an instanceof an aggressivepolicy

against the

matter. It was purely a businesstransaction. Since the Rhodians were in pursuitof Demetrius,he was only too glad to assistTaurion in return for having his ships hauled across the Isthmus. To illustrate my point I might ask the following question. The Aetolians had been co-operatingwith Demetrius shortly before he agreedto work with Taurion; who is going to maintainthat they had a definite anti-Romanpolicy at this time ? There is further and possiblymore conclusiveproof that Philip hadnothingto do with Demetrius'expeditionin 220 and,asa corollary to this, that Philip's attitude toward Rome in the first years of his reign was purely defensive, not offensive. In the summer of 2I9 the Romanssent an expeditionto Illyria to chastiseDemetrius. At this time the SocialWar was in full swing. As is well known,Philip spent the campaigningseason,first in besiegingAmbracus,and then in his campaignalongthe Achelous. I do not wish to discussany of

Romans is laying too much stress on an insignificant

his relationswith Macedon were still friendly is

at Corinth. There, at the requestof

7

7

0 Polyb. ii,

1 For Taurion's

5, v-2.

position, see Polyb. iv, 87, 8.

7 2 Polyb. iv,

I 9,

7-9.

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-2I9

B.C.

35

the details of these events in this paper, but thus much can be said. with absolute certainty. While the Romans were in Illyria, Philip was either at Ambracus or in Acarnania. 3 We know this because, when the Romans captured Pharos by a ruse, Demetrius fled im- mediately to Philip and met him just as he was about to cross the Ambracian Gulf from Acarnania to Epirus. 4 This situation in the summer of 2z9 is extremely interesting and instructive for the light it casts on Philip's attitude toward the Illyrian problem. As regards the Romans his policy was purely a defensive one. His reason for spending these months in western Greece may very well have been his fear of Roman aggression.75 He wanted to be near home in case the Romans, after subduing the Illyrians, should attempt to invade Macedon. But he had no intention of undertaking an offensive against them. Demetrius had incurred their wrath by his rash acts in 220, and now he could pay the penalty alone. As far as military forces on the scene of action were concerned, Philip was certainly a match for the Romans. We have no information at all about the fleet which Rome dispatched on this expedition. In regard to land forces, Lucius Aemilius 76 probably had with him the normal consular army of about 20,000 infantry and z,ooo cavalry. 7 7 Philip had with

him at the time about 20,000

men, 78

and these, if joined to the

7 3 As usual we can formulate only a general chronological scheme, but, nevertheless, a sufficiently accurate one for our purposes. From Polyb. iv, 37, we learn that the following events all occuirred at about the same time: the younger Aratuisassuimed office as Achaean strategos (middle of May, see above, p. 30, n. 45); the Romans despatched Lucius Aemilius to Illyria (cf. Polyb. iii, i6, 7-

,r6 1-Hi pa7ap .c.sd

eKaTO9Tr?

Kac

.

.

.

.

M.aTa

TeTTapaKOo-T7e

T6 7pSrov

gTos 7Xs

o\VU7rt6a6os-there-

fore, probably before July 219); Philip was march- ing from Macedon with his army. This would lead one to suppose that Philip muisthave set ouit toward the end of May. Such an assuimptionfits in with the rest of our information. He spent forty days at Ambracus (Polyb. iv, 63, 2). This brings us into July. Since Philip returned home in time to let his men gather in the harvest and since he spent the remaining part of the summer in Larisa (Polyb. iv, 66, 7), we must infer that the campaign along the Achelous lasted about a month or a little longer. Speaking roughly then, Philip spent June and part of July at Ambracus, and the rest of July and part of August in Acarnania. Since the Romans sailed for Illyria before July and since Demetrius in his flight met Philip as he was starting for home, we can conclude that the Roman campaign in Illyria must have lasted about two months. This coincides with Polybius' statement (iii, 19, I2) that Aemilius returned to Rome late in the summer (X-qsyo6vo rTs Oepe'as). If the above calculations are approximately correct, it seems reasonable to con- clude that the Romans arrived in Illyria while Philip was engaged in his siege of Ambracus and that they departed (after Aemilius had organised Illyria, Polyb. iii, I9, I2) about the time Philip reached Larisa (cf. Polyb. iv, 66, 7-8).

74

70

76

Polyb. iii, I9, 8; iv, 66, 4.

Cf. Holleauix, Ronmeetc., 146 ff.

Polybius, in his account of this war (iii, I6-I9

cl. iv, 37, 4.; 66, 8)-by far the best

says that only one consul, Luicius Aemiliuis

Paullus,.

was sent to Illyria. Niese, ii, p. 436 and n. 4, and.

Holleaux, Romiieetc., p. I38 and n. 2, follow him. Beloch, iv, I, p. 732 and n. 3 (see for the sources) prefers the later tradition that the other consul,.

M. Livius

CAH, vii 848, changes his opinion and follows.

Beloch (cf. Munzer in P-W s.v.

893 and Gelzer, Hermiieslxviii (I933), 147). I do not see how we can arrive at any certainty in the matter. In my opinion none of the arguments advanced is sufficient to warrant rejecting the excellent testimony of Polybius in favour of the later, notoriously faulty, annalistic tradition. What- ever may be the proper answer, I think that the assumption that Philip's forces when joined to the Illyrians would have been a match for the Romans. is perfectly justified.

II This is Holleaux's suggestion, CAH vii, 849.

78 Macedonians-phalanx, I0,ooo; peltasts,. 5,000; cavalry, 8oo (Polyb. iv, 37, 7). Achaeans- 300; Cretans-500 (Polyb. iv. 6I, 2). Acarnanians -2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry (Polyb. iv, 63, 7). Philip also had the complete levy of the Epirots. with him (Polyb. iv, 6i, 2). Their numbers are not given. Holleaux, Ronie etc., p. I46, n. 3, points. out that at Sellasia the Epirots contributed i,000 infantry and 50 cavalry (Polyb. ii, 65, 4), and reasonably suggests that on this occasion they certainly put as many into the field-probably more. The total forces, then, were just short of

20,000.

one we have,-

Salinator, wyas also sent. Holleaux,

' Livius'

coil.

892-

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36

JOHN

VAN

ANTWERP

FINE

Illyrian forces,79 would have considerably outnumbered the Romans. Nicolaus' suggestion8 0 that the Roman attack was so rapid that Philip was unable to bring help to Demetrius is obviously absurd. The Romans were certainly in Illyria for at least two months,81 and in this period Philip, having his army in readiness, had ample time to advance into Illyria if he so desired. Also he must have known beforehand that the Romans wvereplanning this expedition,82 and therefore could have sent reinforcements to Demetrius before

their arrival.

was anxious to have the Romans driven out of their protectorate in Illyria, he was too wise to become embroiled with them before their hands should be tied by a war with Carthage. He realized perfectly that even a victory over the Romans at this time would be dangerous to him; for they would probably have sufficient time to send other legions across the Adriatic to punish him before the storm from Carthage broke. Consequently he maintained strict neutrality. The large army he had with him was intended purely for defence against the Romans, if such should be necessary, and for offence against the Aetolians. The whole course of the Second Illyrian War proves that Philip

had nothing to do with causing Demetrius to break his treaty with the Romans. It was Demetrius' activity in 220 which induced them to cross the Adriatic in the following year; and, if Philip was responsible for this Roman expedition, certainly he would have gone to the aid of the Pharian. Or does one wish to believe that Philip abandoned Demetrius to his fate ? But Demetrius fled immediately after his defeat to Philip, and was kindly received. 83 Is this what one would expect the Pharian to have done if, at the instigation of the Macedonian king, he had become embroiled in a war with Rome and then, when hard pressed, had received not the slightest help from the man who really was responsible for his present plight ? One will have to admit that in those circumstances Philip was the last person to whom Demetrius would have been likely to turn. It is much more probable that he would have gone to the Aetolians with whom the Hellenic League was then at war, and would have done his best to take vengeance on the man who had left him in the lurch. We have already seen that Demetrius had been on good

As I have remarked above, however, although Philip

terms with the Aetolians early in 220, and we can

they would have gladly welcomed any ally against the coalition

be sure that

with which they were struggling.

7 9 Demetrius had 6,ooo men at Pharos anid had garrisoned Dimale and other cities (Polyb. iii, iS, It should be remembered that Scerdilaidas

also was now an ally of Philip (see below, p. 37). As regards a fleet, we know that Demetrius and Scerdilaidas together had at least 90 less,boi

I-z).

(Polyb.

iv,

I6,

6).

80 M.

Nicolaus,

Zwei

Beitrdge zzur Geschichse

KDnig Pbilipps

IV von AMakedonien (Diss.

Berlin,

1909),

52-53.

81 See above, p. 35, n- 73-

82 See above, p. 3I, n- 5I-

83 Polyb. iv, 66, 4-5

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MACEDON,

ILLYRIA,

AND

ROME,

220-2I9

B.C.

37

There are two more pieces of evidence which Holleaux cites to

demonstratethat Philip in 220 and 2z9 was pursuingan active anti-

accept his interpretation in either case.

The first episode concernsPhilip and ScerdilaYdas.84 In the winter

of

Aetolia, he

While discussingthis event, Polybius

makesthe followingremark:

over to the Hellenic League.

Roman policy.

220-2I9,

I cannot

while Philip was makingpreparationsfor his war with

went to Illyria and succeeded in winning Scerdilaidas

XUCL

IM

'IXup[oc

[LeV

UMt9ZVOU[LeVo4

7rpMyzt&-1&v,troc

ZUXOT)y(Op!lrm,

pqc&x s?C6?T

OWt&)

/UYXar6X?UlV

s

Xo-yopov

-rv

rwv

Alrw)?v,

UyC7(peLvTo0L

7rpoxoXout?voLq(iv,

-t

v

'Qvtc@v

29,

3).

To Holleaux8 5 this statement can only mean that Philip was promisingto help Scerdilaidasto interferein RomanIllyria. He also remarksthat by securingScerdilaYdasas an ally for the SocialWar,he was causingthe Illyrianonce againto breakhis treaty with Rome. An analysisof the situation will show that Holleaux is using an argumentume silentio to supporthis theory that Philip was carrying out an aggressive anti-Roman policy. In the summer of 220 Scerdilaidas had been working with the Aetolians against the Achaeans.86 The Aetolians,however, failed to give him his proper shareof the booty, and, ever since, ScerdilaYdashad been harbouring

a grudge against them.

Philip

had heard of this ill-will, 87

and.

undoubtedlyit was this knowledgewhich gave him hope of winning over the Illyrian. He succeeded without any difficulty. Now Scerdilaidasand Demetrius were princes of that part of Illyria which was north of the Roman protectorate, and in this instance

there is absolutelyno reasonto assumethat ScerdilaYdasand, con-

sequently, Philip, were trying to

numerousreasonsfor my conviction

Lissus. I have already given

that Philip at this period had no intention of undertakingany sort of offensive operationsagainst the Romans. How then are we to

interpret that passage of Polybius-xocL -oX pV U77CxVOUiLVO;

establish themselves south of

oavrw

auyXoCaxaFvXCFet-rcov XocT& 7-V

'IXupL'8U 7pMypoC0 V

The

explanation which seems obvious to me is that ScerdilaYdaswas having trouble with the various Illyrian tribes and despots such as we find to be the case in 2i8, 88 and that as a perfectly normalcon- dition of alliance Philip agreed to help him in quieting these disturbancesprovided that Scerdilaidasin return should aid him againstthe Aetolians. It seems almost certain, therefore, that in winning over Scer- dilaidas Philip was thinking primarilyof his approachingwar with the Aetolians. In the Polybian account of this episode there is not

84 Polyb.iV,

29.

85 Holleaux,

Rome etc., 142

and n. 3.