CANON 3

Pimentel vs. Judge Salanga

G.R. No. L-27934September 18, 1967
Facts: Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz :(1) Civil Case 21-C, entitled "Pablo Festejo et
al., petitioners, vs. Marciano Cabildo et al.,respondents," a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of
elective and appointive municipal officials;(2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs.
Constante Anies, accused," for frustrated murder;(3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo
Pimentel, accused," for frustrated homicide;(4) Election Case 2470, entitled "Avelino Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente Abaya,
protestee," an election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur; Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact
that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon
averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence." Petitioner seeks in
the complaint therein to have respondent judge immediately suspended; On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below
to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case
2470aforesaid.On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. A move to reconsider the foregoing
resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23,
1967.Hence, the present petition.
Issue:Whether or not the judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for oneof the parties is his
adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him?
Held:The petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied, respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify
himself. Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which reads in full: Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges . No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case inwhich he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consaguinity or affinity, or tocounsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which behas been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided inany inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consentof all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above
PARAYNO VS MENESES
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This petitionfor
certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated 22 October 1993 and 16 November 1993,of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses
of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases and
denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof. Claiming impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner
Parayno assailed before this Court the order of the Executive Judge. The Court issued a temporary restraining order and
promptly remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court set aside the questioned order
of 26 October 1992, and it directed the Executive Judge to instead include the case in the regular raffle for re- assignment. The
case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors' protests were then pending. The following day, respondent
judge issued the assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing the two cases. The motion for a reconsideration of the
order was denied by the judge. Hence, this petition for certiorari
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is inhibition acted by Judge Meneses.
RULING: Yes, the jurisprudence sees merit in the petition. Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 1. Disqualification
of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferiorcourt when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge
may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above. The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a judge, sitting in a case, will at all times
be free from inclinations or prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent judgment. A litigant, we often hear,

is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge. Due process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so act
without bias but should even appear to so be.
Impartiality is a state of mind; hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its reality. Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of
his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds,
or for just and valid reasons. We take note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite some
time now. Any further delay in the disposition of the cases, particularly election protests where public interest is heavily
involved, cannot be countenanced. All told and given the circumstances, we view the call for judge's inhibition, and his acceding
thereto, in this particular instance to be bereft of legal basis and improper. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Orders of the respondent Judge are SET ASIDE and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at
bar. No costs. SO ORDERED.

MARTINEZ v GIRONELLA
Facts:
Martinez was the principal accused in a murder case. Duclan and Bayongan were alleged to be accessories afterthe fact.
Gironella is the Judge of CFI of Abra that tried the case.
Bayongan was the only one arraigned so trial proceeded only against him. Bayongan was acquitted.
Thereafter, Martinez surrendered to the police. He pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Counsel for Martinez moved that the Gironella inhibit himself on the grounds that Gironella already had a chanceto pass upon
the issue and has formed an opinion as to who committed the murder. That the judge is no longerfair and impartial. Motion was
denied.
During the rebuttal stage, this petition for prohibition was filed.Issue:
W/N there should be a new trial for Martinez
Held:
No.
Due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested.
In this case, there was no proof shown that the judge was unfair and impartial.
After the motion for inhibition was denied, petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner nolonger took
any action until the rebuttal stage.
The conclusion that can be inferred is that the trial was fair and impartial.
Issue:
W/N the judge should inhibit himself from proceeding in the case
Held:
Yes.
A judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also to render it in such a manner as tobe free from
any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as also to the judges integrity.
The statement of the judge in the decision acquitting Bayongan to the effect that the crime was committed byMartinez
render it impossible for the judge to be free from suspicion of impartiality.

Basilio Palang vs. Judge Mariano Zosa

G.R. No. L-38229
August 30, 1974
FACTS:
After respondent Judge had acquitted Julieto P. Herrera of the crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion that the
charge was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies being" rehearsed and rehashed therefore,
maliciously presented by the offended party, now petitioner, causing great damage and prejudice to Herrera's moral and
social standing and a destruction of his image as well as his character, the aforesaid Herrera, thus acquitted, now private
respondent here, filed an action for damages against the complainant, now petitioner. It is his submission here that

considering the language used by respondent Judge, he would not be able to decide such civil case justly and
impartially.
The respondent Judge respectfully manifests that he voluntarily inhibits himself from conducting the trial of the said
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is allowed to inhibit
RULING:
This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up to what is expected of occupants of
the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide
cases without bias and favoritism. It does not suffice that they in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation
must inspire that belief. This is an instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a
judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is
deference to the due process mandate.

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, enter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other
obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban,
Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be
ordered removed or destroyed. The original complaint was subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or
waterways mentioned therein.
On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to be held
before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void
because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. This motion was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958.
On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for prohibition which was
subsequently amended twice against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Florencio Moreno, the
Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his complainants, to prevent
the carrying out of the investigation referred to above. Main contentions of petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was
unconstitutional because it granted judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that
the nature and character of the streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the Department of Public
Works and Communications was already res judicata, having been the subject of an agreement between the Zobel Family
former owners of petitioner's fishponds and the Municipality of Macabebe. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No.
1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said court, presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department Investigator filed their answer to the petition for
prohibition alleging therein several affirmative defenses. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his
own, while the other respondents filed a separate pleading invoking virtually the same defenses pleaded by their co-parties.
On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding
the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez,
in an administrative investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in
the course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner
Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could
be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court.
After the hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 16, 1959 disqualifying himself and
endorsing the case to the Second Branch of the court, for reasons stated as follows:

Meanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated February 24, 1959, is seeking the disqualification of the
presiding judge from sitting in the instant case on the ground that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been
counsel for some fishpond owners, "like petitioner herein", as evidenced by photostatic copies of two (2)
communications, annex A and annex B (par 2 of the motion); and that under section 1, Rule 125 of the Rules of
Court, "no judge shall sit in a case in which he has been a counsel" (par. 4, some motion).
The motion is being objected to by the petitioner for reasons stated in his written opposition dated March 14, 1959.
A perusal of the legal provisions, invoked by said respondent, does not show that the presiding judge is included in
any of their prohibitions, because he is not pecuniarily interested in the case; he is not related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity; he has not been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee,
or counsel; neither has he presided in any inferior court, whose ruling or decision being the subject of review (sec. 1,
Rule 126, supra).
It is true that while in the practice of law as a member of a law firm, the presiding judge, in behalf of Roman Santos,
Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, wrote the then Secretary of the Interior a letter dated June 1, 1948,
annex A of the motion, requesting that the proposed lease, in public bidding, of certain streams listed in resolution
No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga be held in abeyance until after the
Committee on Rivers and Streams, created under Administrative Order No. 32 issued by the President of the
Philippines, would have determined their nature whether private or public.
But, nowhere in the letters, annex A and annex B, could be found any showing that the presiding judge has ever
appeared as counsel for Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner; contrary to the contention of the respondent,
Senator Rogelio de la Rosa. Had he been his counsel, the presiding judge should have disqualified himself from
sitting in the present case even without motion, as he did in a case pending in the second branch of this court,
wherein Manuel Borja is the petitioner.
On the other hand, in the petition, annex 1 of the reamended petition, filed by Benigno Musni and others on August
15, 1958, they stated that the respondents named therein, one if them being Ricardo Gutierrez, "constructed dams,
dikes and other works in public navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds in the
Municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga"; and that such navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing
grounds are those specified in the list, annex A of the and petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition.
A reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal
council of Macabebe, Pampanga, included in the fishponds of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de
Guzman, were the ones, which the presiding judge, then law practitioner, contended in his letter, annex A of the
motion, to be private and not public; and that the said streams, as shown by the plan, Exhibit A - De la Rosa, were
more or less similar to those included in the fishpond or fishponds of the petitioner, Ricardo Gutierrez, which were
being investigated by Mr. Julian C. Cargullo, upon order of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion, by disqualifying himself to sit in this case,
not because he has been a counsel for the above-named petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of
"extremada delicadeza", but because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some way or another, influence
on his decision in the case at bar. While this would be a too remote possibility, yet it is the duty of the court to
administer justice without any suspicion of bias and prejudice, otherwise a party-litigant might lose confidence in the
judiciary that must be avoided as much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity.
Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order mentioned above, but the respondent Judge denied
said motion in his order of August 11, 1959 where the following is stated:
While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached
to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of
Proceso de Guzman, he informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be leased at
public caution by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26. were private and not
public.
In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26 were furnished the persons
mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner, because the streams and rivers
subject of the instant petition were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman
Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo

Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior then would benefit the
interests of the said petitioner.
Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse but to disqualify himself from
sitting in this case.
On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Department Investigator and the parties who filed the complaint
against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge "to proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance
of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga."
Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of the respondent judge
does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that
a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be
forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for
the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the m atter
before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767).
Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law
stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because
. . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his
unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his
present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not
be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory;
there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by
that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process. . . . (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p. 1235) .
In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated
June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the
motion for disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of
April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus expressed of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment does not appear
to be capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams
and rivers to be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, were private and not
public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were
among those that he considered as private in nature; that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were
identical to the interest of the herein petitioner etc." In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His
Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the case
before him.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus under consideration is hereby denied, without costs.

LEON UMALE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HONORABLE BENJAMIN AQUINO, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO FELICIANO,
ANTONIO DAVID, CECILIO CHICO, BENJAMIN ESCANDOR, ROLANDO SAMSON, and ALFONSO CO, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoes, Yap, Parlade, & Associates for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno for respondents Alfonso Co.
Noel Ramal Salaysay for respondent Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15, 1971 of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused including the six (6) herein
private respondents Eduardo Feliciano, Antonio David, Virgilio Chico, Benjamin Escandor, Rolando Samson, and Alfonso Co, entitled "People
vs. Marina Geronimo, et al." and docketed as CCC-VII-660-Rizal.
Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case, the robbery having been allegedly committed on September 21, 1970 in his
warehouse in Pasig, Rizal from which were assorted textile materials valued at P229,659.904. The original information was dated January 11,
1971, while the first amended information was dated March 4, 1971. The case was filed by the acting state prosecutor, who conducted the
preliminary investigation directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, who from January 19 to April
12, 1971, issued several orders for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail bonds, allowing an accused to post cash or surety bond for his
provisional liberty, for their arraignment, or for their commitment to the provincial jail, as well as issued subpoena duces tecum and contempt
citations against certain police officers who failed to appear on the days set for hearing.
However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited
himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice" on the ground
that before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and directed the immediate forwarding of
the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said order of inhibition was denied on April 16, 1971 by said respondent Judge. Another motion of petitioner for the deferment
of the raffling of the case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was denied by the Executive Judge, who likewise rejected petitioner's motion for
the return of the case to the Circuit Criminal Court. The case was, after raffling, assigned to Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
then presided by then Judge Benjamin Aquino and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729.
OUR resolution dated May 18, 1971 required respondents to answer and authorized the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting
by petitioner of a bond of P1,000. Petitioner posted the bond and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 21, 1971 enjoining
respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino from taking cognizance of and exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Only respondent Alfonso Co, thru counsel, filed an answer.
In a motion dated September 20, 1971 and filed on September 22, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson, two of
the defendants in CCC-VII-660 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729 on the Court of First Instance, Branch VIII, Pasig, Rizal, prayed for the
modification of the said preliminary injunction so as to allow respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino to act on their motion for bail.
In a resolution dated September 28, 1971, petitioner was required to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner failed however
to submit the required comment.
In a motion dated October 25, 1971 and filed on November 20, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson reiterated
the aforesaid motion.
In a resolution dated November 25, 1971, the Court resolved to defer action thereon until the case is considered on the merits.
On November 4, 1971, petitioner filed his memorandum; while private respondent Alfonso Co filed his memorandum on November 20, 1971.
The issues posed by the petition are:
(1) whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit himself,
without any motion therefor by the parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was
filed; and
(2) whether, after having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Circuit Criminal Court can transfer the hearing of the same to
the regular court of first instance.
Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of
Rule 137 authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other
than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.
Before the rule was amended in 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds of extreme delicacy, 1 or prejudice or bias or

hostility 2 not even when he would be violating Sections 3, 26 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics because he is a paid
professor of law in the college owned by one of the litigants. 3 Neither was a judge disqualified from trying a prosecution for perjury
of an accused, who was ordered investigated and prosecuted as a perjured witness by said judge; 4 not even if the judge himself
took great interest and an active part in the filing of the criminal charge to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular
province fiscal refused to file the proper information. 5
But in 1961, We enunciated that a judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that the opinion he express in a letter addressed by
him as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in the case at bar and express his fear of not being able to render a truly
impartial judgment. 6

In 1962, We also ruled in the case of Del Castillo vs. Javelona 7 that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related

to a counsel within the fourth civil degree (no expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (the old
rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the
officers concerned."
And in 1967, We affirmed that a judge may voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 of Section 1 of
Rule 137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice engendered by the judge having "lost respect in the manner the prosecutor was handling the
case ..." 8; or when the lawyer for a litigant is his former associate. 9
Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some
incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind
some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the
other without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness. Herein respondent Judge therefore harkened to the
injunction announced by this Court in Pimentel versus Salanga 10 that when a Judge "might be induced to act in favor of one party or with

bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him."
It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the
merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after
some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and
thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-examination.
Herein respondent Judge should be commended this time for heeding Our ruling in the case of Geotina vs. Gonzales 11 that "a judge, sitting

on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity."
And Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court, in the case of Mateo, Jr., et al. vs. Honorable Onofre Villaluz, etc., supra, added that: "... it is
made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of
realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or Predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its
appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
Thus is due process vindicated."
Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the respondent Judge has the
discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 5179).
This transfer is all the more justified because there is no other judge sitting in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal or in the 7th Judicial District
which comprises the provinces of Rizal, Cavite and Palawan, as well as the cities of Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Cavite, Tagaytay, and Trece
Martires as there is only one circuit criminal court for each of the 16 judicial districts of the court (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 5179). Furthermore, under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5179, the "provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and
the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judges and the cases cognizable by them insofar as
they are not inconsistent with" its provisions. The Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court do not prohibit the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges
in the same station and in the same Judicial District of a case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibiting himself for valid and just causes. This has been done in many instances. It was likewise done in the case at bar after the
criminal case transferred to the regular Courts of First Instance sitting at Pasig, Rizal. The validity of the trial and the decision rendered in the
case depends solely on the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, to whom due process of law has
been accorded.
Consequently, herein respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion..
WHEREFORE THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADOR GOMEZ, CRESENCIO I. RICHARDS, J. BOYARSKI, PRUDENCIO UY, EDUARDO VELOSO, LEONCIO SORONIO,
IGNACIO DAGTAHAN and LAURO GINGCO, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor E.M. Salva and Attorney E. A. Agana for petitioner.
Eddy A. Deen and M.C. Osmea for respondents Cresencio Richards, et al.
Cesar Kintanar for respondents Eduardo Veloso, et al.
Hon. Amador E. Gomez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
David Velasco for respondent Lauro Gingco.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The State has filed this petition for certiorari to assail, as allegedly a nullity, an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing an
information for copra overshipment in violation of Section 4 of Monetary Board Circular 31 in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act 265.
At the request of the Monetary Board, the Secretary of Justice designated Special Prosecutor Enrique A. Agana to investigate and prosecute
crimes and offenses in connection with copra exportation from the Philippines.
Special Prosecutor Agana, acting pursuant to said designation, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on December 6, 1962, jointly with the
Fiscal of Cebu City, against seven persons, an information for alleged overshipment, over-export and/or smuggling out of the Philippines, from
February 1961 to March 1961, in Cebu City, of 1,700 long tons of Philippine copra valued at $255,000, in excess of the quantity duly licensed to
be exported, contrary to Section 4, Circular 31 of the Monetary Board in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act 265. Accused were: Cresencio I.
Richards, Richard J. Boyarski, Prudencio Uy (who were then general manager, assistant manager, and warehouseman, respectively, of
Corominas, Richards & Co., Inc.). Lauro Gingco, Eduardo R. Veloso, Leoncio Soronio and Ignacio Dagtahan (then representatives of the
Philippine Coconut Administration, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs and Philippine constabulary, respectively, to the Export
Coordination Committee).
Subsequent to the filing of the information, defendants filed motions to quash and for bills of particulars. The same were eventually denied and
by September 27, 1963, all of the accused had entered pleas of not guilty. The court thereafter set the case for hearing on October 23 and 24,
1963.
Notice of said trial was served on Assistant Fiscal Rafael Ybaez of Cebu City. Special Prosecutor Agana, however, was not separately
furnished a notice.
1wph1. t

As a result, on October 23, 1963, Special Prosecutor Agana was not present when the case was called for trial. At said time, he was attending to
another case in Tacloban City. Assistant Fiscal Ybaez, who appeared, manifested that he was not ready for trial, the records of the case being
with the Special Prosecutor, who was the one actively handling the case. Furthermore, he submitted to the court a telegram to him from one
Evangelista stating that the Chief of the Export Department (Central Bank) just received a subpoena in the case for the date in question, that
Special Prosecutor Agana was at Tacloban City, and requesting that he ask for postponement. A similar wire from one "F.R. Evangelista" was
addressed to the court and received by it.
Then "the Court tried to sound out the six accused" except Lauro Gingco, whose counsel filed a motion for postponement "whether they
are agreeable to either a postponement of the trial or a dismissal of the case without prejudice, but Atty. Eddy A. Deen, Atty. Luis Guerrero, and
Atty. Cesar Kintanar informed the Court that the accused whom they represent oppose vigorously the postponement of the trial and likewise
object to a provisional dismissal."* Whereupon respondent Judge ordered the case dismissed, except as to defendant Lauro Gingco.
A motion for reconsideration, filed by Special Prosecutor Agana, was opposed by defendants Veloso, Soronio and Dagtahan upon the ground of
double jeopardy. Said motion having been denied by the court on October 31, 1963, the Special Prosecutor instituted on January 20, 1964, the
present action for certiorari.
Respondents six accused filed their answer, and, later, their memoranda. Respondent Judge also separately filed an answer.
In their answer and memoranda, respondents adduced two arguments: first, that the petition fails upon the merits because respondent Judge did
not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount thereto; and, second, that the petition, if granted, would
place them in double jeopardy.
A return to the sources of the double jeopardy rule reveals that originally it was held to prohibit only a subsequent prosecution in a new and
independent cause. After the ruling of the United States Supreme Court, however, inKepner v. United States,1 a case from the Philippines, the
rule was extended to an appeal in the same case by the prosecution after jeopardy had attached, thereby in effect viewing such appeal as
presenting a new and separate jeopardy, repugnant to the fundamental law's provision against double jeopardy. And, since then, the stand
in Kepner has repeatedly been adopted here.2 For that matter, it is set forth in Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 2. Who may appeal. The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the appellant.

The present case, however, is not an appeal by the prosecution asserting a dismissal to be erroneous; it is a petition for certiorari, assailing the
order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity for having been made with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack, or excess, of jurisdiction. It
stands to reason that if petitioner's submission is sustained, there would in effect be no order of dismissal to speak of, since it would be legally
non-existent. And thus, there would be no dismissal or termination of the case as a basis for the plea of double jeopardy.
Accordingly, respondents' second argument on double jeopardy would be in point only if their first on validity(not simply correctness) of the
dismissal order proves tenable.
Now the record shows the dismissal order to have been capriciously issued. All the delay prior to the first date set for trial, which lasted
almost ten months after the filing of the information, was caused by the defendants who presented several motions to quash and for bills of
particulars, which, as respondent Judge later conceded, were "devoid of serious legal bases" and premised only on "trivial ground".3 The
prosecution's manifestation that it was not ready for trial on said first day amounted to a motion for postponement. It was the first postponement
asked for by .the prosecution, predicated upon reasonable ground. Since the reason given for the dismissal order was the delay that so far
attended the case, and since said delay was attributable to the defense rather than to the prosecution, the dismissal was totally devoid of
reason. Specially is this true, considering that previously, respondent Judge granted several motions for postponement of arraignment presented
by the defendants, and even Richards' motion to leave for the United States before he was finally arraigned upon his return (Respondent
Judge's Answer, p. 7). Furthermore, defense moves resulted in about ten months delay. And the prosecution's first request for postponement
was denied, altho one of the accused also requested for postponement. The dismissal was therefore purely capricious. It amounted to grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Such a dismissal order, made sua sponte for no proper reason at all, is void for being
issued without authority. And being void, it cannot terminate the proceedings. The same jeopardy that attached continues, the cause not having
been terminated thereby rendering the defense of double jeopardy without merit (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121, 125).
A purely capricious dismissal of an information, as herein involved, moreover, deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. It
denies the prosecution its day in court. Accordingly, it is a dismissal without due process and, therefore, null and void. A dismissal invalid for lack
of a fundamental prerequisite, such as due process, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy (People v. Balisacan, L26376, August 31, 1966*, Tilghman v. Mago [Fla.] 82 So. 2d 136; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 F. 2d 445).
Finally, respondent Judge states in his answer herein, that he took into account matters not in the record and outside of judicial notice, which
provided a real though unstated reason for his dismissal order. Said matter was an alleged dinner invitation from a stranger, styled as Col.
Miguel M. Moreno, extended thru Assistant City Fiscal Ybaez, which he regarded as suspicious and unusual; that after some investigation as to
this man, he concluded that "the indications were to the effect that some 'pillos' and opportunists were making the Court of First Instance of Cebu
the unwitting forum for extortion and exploitation of persons charged with crime." (Respondent Judge's answer, pp. 4-7).
Such consideration of extraneous matters by respondent Judge, albeit in good faith, rendered the dismissal as one affected with partiality and
bias, making it null and void, for lack of another fundamental prerequisite to due process in a criminal case, namely, an impartial Judge, not
moved by prejudice or bias (Becker v. Webster, 171 F. 2d 762; Wharton v. People, 90 P. 2d 615; 16A C.J.S. 834).
Respondent Judge states in his answer that it is his "hope and expectation" that this Court "would give vindication to his actuations"; that should
this Court, however, resolve otherwise and nullify the same, ordering the case to proceed upon trial on the merits, he prays that "he should be
disqualified therefrom and that the case should be ordered re-raffled among the other five branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu".
Stated as reason for the prayer is that "in all frankness, he has lost all respect in the manner the special prosecutor, Atty. Enrique A. Agana has
been prosecuting the case."
In justice to Special Prosecutor Agana, it should be pointed out that respondent Judge, in his order of October 23, 1963, said:
x x x In fairness, however, to Special Prosecutor Agana, the Court finds satisfactory his explanation that his failure to personally appear
before this Court on October 23, 1963 was due to reasons beyond his control, and that it was due to the fact that by a curious
coincidence he was designated by the Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 375, dated October 17, 1963, and had to leave
Manila for Leyte, to assist the Provincial Fiscal in the prosecution and investigation of old crimes and offenses arising within said
province. The Court likewise finds satisfactory the further explanation of Special Prosecutor Enrique A. Agana that his not having
vigorously resisted the various motions for (1) another preliminary investigation before arraignment, (2) bill of particulars, and (3)
motions for dismissal filed by the defense during the early stages of this case was due to the fact that he considered them all to be
devoid of serious legal bases, and that he knew all along that the presiding Judge of this Court was fully aware of the trivial nature of
the grounds for those various motions. . . .
Now considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already in effect when respondent Judge filed his answer herein containing the prayer to be
disqualified from the case, altho not yet in effect when the proceedings at issue were taken in the court below, states in Section 1 of Rule 137
that, "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons" other than the usual
grounds for disqualification, this Court, after considering all the circumstances of the case, finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-stated
request for disqualification from further sitting in the Richards case, and We rule that he is thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to have
inhibited himself from further taking cognizance of the case.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted and respondent Judge's dismissal order of October 23, 1963, in Criminal Case No. V-9350 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu is hereby declared null and void and without legal effect. Respondent Judge is, at his request, deemed to have
inhibited himself from taking further cognizance of said case, and said case is hereby ordered to be proceeded to trial upon the merits by another
Judge of the same Court to be chosen by raffle in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 22, Revised Rules of Court. No costs. So ordered.

9. A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444

July 22, 2004

JORDAN P. OKTUBRE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern Leyte, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Jordan P. Oktubre
("complainant") against Judge Ramon P. Velasco ("respondent Judge") of the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte ("MTC
Maasin").
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise D'Arcy vda. De Paler ("D'Arcy"), a non-resident American. D'Arcy is the widow of
Abraham Paler ("Abraham"), a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew.
During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey commercial and residential building ("Paler building") in Maasin City on a lot he owned in
common with his siblings. After Abraham died, none of his heirs petitioned for the settlement of his estate. D'Arcy, through complainant,
administered the Paler building. At the time material to this case, three tenants 1 occupied the Paler building with some rooms reserved for
Abraham's relatives. While he had a room in the Paler building, complainant rarely used it as he stayed most of the time in Javier, Sogod,
Southern Leyte. The tenants pay their rent to complainant.
Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998, respondent Judge, with D'Arcy's permission, stayed in the Paler building for a
few days. He sought an extension of his stay but D'Arcy turned down his request since during her next visit to the country she would use the
room respondent Judge then occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a
room reserved for a sister of Abraham.
Complainant alleges that D'Arcy's refusal to grant extension to respondent Judge's stay triggered the following series of events narrated in his
Complaint:
6. In April 2000[,] Judge Velasco in a surprise move sent letters xxx to the tenants of the building in which he passed himself off as the
administrator of the estate of Gaspar Paler [Abraham's father] and co-heir of Abraham Paler, and directed said tenants to deposit their
monthly rentals to his office at [the] Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maasin City despite the fact that no action has been filed yet for that
matter in court;
xxx
10. In August 2000[,] Judge Velasco sent a strongly worded letter to Dr. [D'Arcy] with the very obvious purpose of intimidating the latter.
The letter contains categorical declarations that he is taking over possession of the building, misrepresentation among others of Judge
Velasco that he did it in collaboration with his other relatives, legal arguments, and mostly intimidating words coming from a JudgeLawyer. Worse, he used his office's (MTC) letterhead [for] this personal but threatening 5-page letter xxx;
xxx
12. [On September 9, 2000], Judge Velasco without my knowledge and permission moved out from the garage [of the Paler building]
the service jeep owned by Dr. [D'Arcy] and put it outside of the building causing it to be exposed to the sun and rain;
xxx
14. Worried about the vehicle, Dr. [D'Arcy] right away instructed me to return the vehicle (jeep) to the garage and to do som ething in
such a way that it could not anymore be removed by Judge Velasco;
15. On September 15, 2000, I proceeded to Maasin City with the sole intention of having the vehicle returned to its rightful place. Upon
arrival, I was thankful that Judge Velasco was then at Cebu City so that I could be able to return the jeep without fear of opposition by
or confrontation with him. With the assistance of xxx two [others], I returned the vehicle to the garage and removed one of its wheels
and placed it inside the computer room of the building;

xxx
17. On September 22, 2000, Judge Velasco destroyed the padlock of my room and changed it with another one including the second
floor entrance padlock to the third floor with the precise purpose of controlling the ingress and egress of the said building;2
On 28 September 2000, complainant filed a complaint against respondent Judge with the Punong Barangay of Abgao, Maasin City. Complainant
charged respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room and of the door leading to the third floor of the Paler building. Complainant also
charged respondent Judge for taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building. On 2 October 2000, complainant and respondent Judge
met at the Office ofPunong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there was no settlement as respondent Judge questioned complainant's
residency in Abgao. Complainant described what transpired after the meeting thus:
20. xxx After the hearing, a police officer approached and informed me that the chief of Police of Maasin City wanted to talk to me. As
expected [of] every law-abiding citizen, I went with them [to] the Police Station. Thereat, the Chief of Police confronted me with a
warrant of [a]rrest. The warrant and the supporting documents show[ed] that I was charged with Robbery in relation to the wheel I
removed [from the jeep] and it was issued/signed by Judge Velasco. While still [in a] state of shock because of this malicious
prosecution, the police authorities placed me behind bars;
21. That upon further examination of the complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 5485 of [the MTC Maasin] as well as the attached
document thereto, it was found out to the surprise of everyone that the complaint of Robbery filed by the Chief of Police was supported
by the sole affidavit dated September 29, 2000 of a witness in the person of no other than Judge Ramon Velasco himself, xxx;
22. That I was locked up in jail for about six (6) hours before I was able to put up a cash bond ofP24,000.00 before the RTC, Br. 25,
Maasin City. As I was about to be released in the afternoon of the same day, a subpoena was served at me in the City Jail which
required me to file my counter-affidavit to the complaint [for Robbery] xxx;
23. That on October 16, 2000, I received another Order dated October 4, 2000 issued by the respondent [J]udge directing me to submit
[a] counter-affidavit in another case [for] Malicious Mischief docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5486 of [MTC Maasin]. The Complaint xxx
was supported by the same and only affidavit of Judge Velasco dated September 29, 2000 which he used in the aforecited criminal
Complaint of Robbery xxx;
24. That about the first week of November 2000, I received another subpoena dated October 23, 2000 issued by Judge Velasco. This
time a Criminal Case of Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents was filed against Dr. [D'Arcy], my principal.
The Complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 5493 of [MTC Maasin], was supported by xxx yet [another] xxx affidavit of Judge
Velasco xxx dated October 18, 2000 xxx;3
Complainant sought to annul the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485 by filing a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 25, Maasin City. The RTC granted the petition and annulled the warrant in its Order of 7 December 2000. 4
Because of these events, complainant filed this complaint on 18 January 2001. Complainant prays that the Court discipline respondent Judge for
using his sala's letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own criminal complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. 5485.
In his Comment dated 18 April 2001, respondent Judge admitted doing the acts complainant recounted about the Paler building, its tenants, and
D'Arcy's jeep. Respondent Judge claimed, however, that he merely acted to protect his maternal co-heirs' interest in the Paler building and in the
other properties claimed by D'Arcy. Respondent Judge also stated the following qualifications: (1) he changed the padlock of the grill door
leading to the third floor as this was already "worn-out"; (2) he had to open forcibly complainant's room to clean it as it was already "stinking"; (3)
he temporarily transferred the jeep out of the Paler building because the garage had to be cleaned; and (4) he sent the demand letters to the
Paler building's tenants based on Rule 735 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge added that complainant illegally destroyed the lock of the
garage gate when he returned the jeep.6
On his filing and taking cognizance of his own complaints for Robbery, Malicious Mischief, and Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents,
respondent Judge alleges:
P-LVIII
That construing the actuation of the complainant [in filing the complaints before the Barangay Captain] to be deliberate in defiance of
my order and utmost disrespect of my person and my official capacity [sic] and to vindicate my name, honor and reputation, and evident
infractions of our penal laws, I filed the criminal complaint for ROBBERY against the private complainant Jordan Oktubre and docketed
as Crim. Case No. 5485 and another criminal complaint for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5486 xxx;
P-LIX
That the xxx institution of the criminal complaint for Robbery was not a malicious suit as it was anchored on facts as conveyed and
attested by [witnesses] and the corpus delicti of the crime of Robbery and Malicious Mischief are established as shown by the
destroyed garage padlock and the fact of loss of the right wheel rim and tire of the jeep;
P-LX

It is further qualified admitted [sic] that the institution of the suit against the private complainant Jordan Oktubre was by way of
protecting the interest of my co-heirs and to enforce the law as my judicial mandate dictates;
P-LXI
That it is likewise admitted that another criminal case for FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF
FALSIFIED DOCUMENT was filed against the principal of Jordan P. Oktubre in the person of Dr. Peggy D'Arcy Paler and docketed as
Crim. Case No. R-5493 on the basis of the unearthed evidently fraudulent and deliberate act of falsification by non-disclosure of a
material fact relative to her citizenship, she being an American citizen, on her Affidavit of Sole Adjudication xxx;
P-LXII
That after proper evaluation of the Complaint for Robbery against complainant Jordan P. Oktubre and referral to jurisprudence on this
matter, particularly the cited cases of PP. vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373, Webb vs. De Leon, et al., GR 121234, 63 SCAD 196, in utmost
good faith, with the end in view of dispensation of justice expeditiously [sic] and not to frustrate the ends of justice and finding probable
cause thereof for the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, [I] verily issued the Warrant of Arrest against complainant Jordan Oktubre;
P-LXIII
That it is further admitted that the Court [in the complaint for Robbery] issued a subpoena to the complainant to submit his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidences pursuant to Rule 112, Sec. 3, Rules of Court xxx; 7
Respondent Judge inhibited himself from the three criminal cases in his Orders of 4, 6, and 25 October 2000.
In its Report ("Report") dated 13 March 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") recommends that respondent Judge be
fined P10,000 for Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority. The Report reads:
The records of this case show that complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested and detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest xxx and
a Commitment Order xxx issued by the respondent [J]udge, the basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery supported by an
affidavit executed by the respondent Judge Ramon Velasco. Also, in Criminal Case No. 5486 for "Malicious Mischief", records show
that the complaint is supported by [the] lone affidavit of Judge Ramon Velasco xxx and in an Order marked Annex "I", accused Jordan
Oktubre was directed to submit his counter-affidavit by the respondent.
Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent [J]udge [of the warrant of arres], herein complainant elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte via "Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction". The RTC in its Order dated December 7, 2000 xxx ruled that "respondent [J]udge in issuing a warrant of
arrest violative of [Rule 112, Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court] may not only be committing grave abuse of discretion but gross
ignorance of the law xxx". Consequently, the warrant of arrest was declared null and void.
Considering that respondent [J]udge is the complainant o[f] the cases, his issuance of the warrant of arrest is in violation of Sec. 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 37 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. Having resorted to such act, he acted as the private complainant,
xxx judge and executioner.
It was also noted that in [the] letters xxx sent to the tenants of the Paler Building and to Dr. [D'Arcy], respondent [Judge] used the letter
head of his Office "Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte" and signed the same as its Presiding Judge. This to our mind,
constitutes undue influence.8
The OCA's recommendation finding respondent Judge guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority is
well-taken. However, the Court finds the recommended penalty disproportionate to respondent Judge's offenses and instead imposes on him the
penalty of dismissal from service.
Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave
Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority
Canon 2, Rule 2.03 ("Rule 2.03") of the Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:
A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.
Rule 3.12 of the Code ("Rule 3.12"), which is substantially similar to Rule 137, Section 1 ("Rule 137, Section 1") of the 1964 Rules of
Court,9 mandates that
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include,
among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former associate
of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows that the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition. (Emphasis added)
For inappropriately using his Office's letterhead and for acting on his own criminal complaints against complainant and D'Arcy, respondent Judge
violated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct10 and grave abuse of authority.
On Respondent Judge's Use of
His Office's Letterhead
Respondent Judge does not deny sending several letters bearing his sala's letterhead on matters involving an apparent dispute in the
administration of the estates of two relatives. His excuse for doing so is that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the Paler
building and other disputed properties. This explanation is flimsy. Even if he is the "administrator" of the estates of Abraham and Gaspar Paler
("Gaspar"), Abraham's father, and representative of his maternal co-heirs,11 respondent Judge has no business using his sala's letterhead for
private matters. Respondent Judge should know that a court's letterhead should be used only for official correspondence. Respondent Judge
aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he further required them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then
staying at the Paler building. By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended to "use the prestige of his
judicial office" to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs.
On Respondent Judge's Failure
To Recuse Himself from His
Criminal Complaints
As we noted in Perez v. Suller,12 the rule on disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Rule 137, Section 1
[S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is
intended to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he
should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. 13 Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to
the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed. 14
Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he
even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge
violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such
enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel
within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases
where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer
included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judge's subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of
the cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This
became fait accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging was the effect of respondent Judge's conduct on
the image of the judiciary, which without a doubt, immeasurably suffered from it. It is well to remind respondent Judge
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of
justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law xxx. If judges, who swore to obey and uphold the
constitution, would conduct themselves xxx in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of complainant, then the people, especially
those with whom they come in direct contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not to
mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which the judiciary is founded.15
Respondent Judge is
Liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent Judge does not deny that he did not conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaint for Robbery in Criminal Case No. 5485
where he issued the warrant of arrest against complainant. As justification, he claims that he acted in good faith based on pertinent
jurisprudence. This explanation deserves scant consideration. Section 3 of Rule 112 sets out in detail the procedure for conducting preliminary
investigation, thus:
Procedure. Except as provided for in Sec. 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official
file. The said affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any fiscal or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in
their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue
with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as
prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant. Within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the
parties or witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within the (10) days
therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold
the respondent for trial.16
Criminal Case No. 5485 involves Robbery punishable either with prision mayor (six years and one day to 12 years) or prision mayor in its
minimum period (six years and one day to eight years), depending on the value of the property taken. 17 In either case, the offense falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts for which Section 1 of Rule 112 mandates the conduct of a preliminary investigation. 18 As one of the
officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation under Section 219 of Rule 112, respondent Judge is duty-bound to know and strictly follow
the procedure and requirements in Rule 112.
Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when he proceeded to issue the warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides:
When warrant of arrest may issue. x x x (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial court judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
This is the same procedure prescribed in Section 2,21 Article III of the Constitution and in Section 5, Rule 12622 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying with such mandatory procedure23 is liable for gross ignorance of the
law.24 In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,25 we ruled:
We have held, in a number of cases before this Court, that the procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because
failure to follow the same would amount to a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of
arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1) through an examination under oath and in writing of the
complainant and his witnesses, which examination should be 2) in the form of searching questions and answers. This rule is not merely
a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law: the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the due process requirement. (Emphasis supplied)
The only instance where the judge may dispense with such procedure is when the application for the warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional
Trial Court judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the report of the prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. 26 Criminal Case No.
5485 does not fall under such exception.
The Penalty Appropriate to the Case
The OCA recommends the imposition of P10,000 fine on respondent Judge. As earlier stated, the Court finds this penalty disproportionate to the
gravity of respondent Judge's offenses. In several cases, 27 we have imposed the penalty of dismissal against judges for grave misconduct alone.

In OCA v. Judge Bara-acal,28 we dismissed a lower court judge for grave misconduct. Considering that respondent Judge's grave misconduct is
compounded by his other offenses of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, his dismissal from service is more than justified.29
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of
Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any
accrued leaves due him as of this date.
SO ORDERED.

10 .JUAN C. SANDOVAL, now deceased, represented by his surviving spouse, ADELAIDA M. SANDOVAL,petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO L. TAN, JR., respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p
Another dispute over land ownership rivets the attention of this Court even as it still grapples with similar issues involving fantastically vast tracts
of land considered prime real estate in Metro Manila.
That unscrupulous elements have been sparing neither energy nor resources to divert coveted properties from their actual owners through craft
and cabal with land officials concerned has not been lost on this court and has, in fact, made its task doubly difficult and complicated.
In recognition of these developments that have placed under a cloud the integrity of the once unassailable Torrens Title, spawned the
proliferation of fake land titles and encouraged the mushrooming of land grabbers and squatters on legitimately-titled lands, chief Justice Andres
R. Narvasa issued on July 15, this year, Administrative Circular No. 7-96 addressed to all judges of all court levels and their Clerks of Court
enjoining the strict observance of Land Registration Authority (LRA) circulars on reconstitution and land registration cases.
As an agrarian country with a substantial percentage of its population engaged in agriculture and allied occupations, the Philippines is
understandably concerned over the fate of large and small landholders. Since pre-Spanish times, land has been recognized as the source of
economic and political power. At the time the Spaniards took over the sovereignty of the Philippines, it rewarded its loyal subjects with grants of
large encomiendas whose metes and bounds were only circumscribed by the endurance of a horse running from sunup to sundown. Conversely,
some of those who did not show loyalty to the Church and the Crown were persecuted and divested of their lands, most notable example being
the family of the national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal.
In a mystical sense, the Filipinos draw strength and power from the soil. Not only is this attitude peculiar to the Philippines but in Greek
mythology, Antaeus, son of the sea god Poseidon and the Earth goddess Gaea renewed his strength in combat with Heracles by continually
touching the earth. When his opponent discovered the source of his strength, the former lifted the latter up from earth and crushed him to
death. 1
In the case at bar, it appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property lawfully titled in another's name by misrepresenting himself as the
latter.
The petition before us involves two issues: whether or not petitioner Juan Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith and whether or not Justice who
penned the assailed decision in the Court of Appeals should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case.
The property subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land on which a five-door apartment building stands. It is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196518 in the name of "Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. married to Carolina Mangampo" and located at No. 88 Halcon Street,
Quezon City.
Sometime in October 1984, private respondent Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. was notified of the need to present his owner's copy of the TCT to the
Registry of Deeds, Quezon City in connection with an adverse claim. Upon reaching the Office of the Register of Deeds, he explained that he
was still looking for his copy of the TCT. 2 In November 1984, he discovered that the adverse claim of one Godofredo Valmeo had

been annotated on his title in the Registry of Deeds. A Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr., obviously an impostor, had mortgaged the property to
Valmeo on October 9, 1984 to secure a P70,000.00 obligation.
On December 6, 1984, the real Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. herein private respondent, filed a complaint for cancellation of the annotation of mortgage
and damages against Bienvenido Almeda and Godofredo Valmeo before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96. 3
Sometime in April 1985, private respondent met petitioner Juan C. Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner at the site of the property. He
informed the latter of the case against Bienvenido Almeda and Godofredo Valmeo. Upon further investigation, petitioner discovered that as early

as September 13, 1984, someone purporting to be Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. sold the property to Bienvenido Almeda in a Deed of Sale of Registered
Land with Pacto de Retro.
Said person representing himself as Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr., with the marital consent of the alleged Carolina Mangampo Tan, also executed a
Waiver in favor of Bienvenido Almeda on January 11, 1985. Consequently, TCT No. 196518 in the name of Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. was canceled
and a new one, TCT No. 326781, was issued in the name of Bienvenido Almeda.
On March 29, 1985, Bienvenido Almeda sold the subject property to petitioner Juan C. Sandoval for P230,000.00. TCT No. 326781 was
canceled and TCT No. 329487 was issued in favor of Juan C. Sandoval on April 18, 1985.
Private respondent's original complaint was accordingly amended in August 1985 to implead petitioner Juan C. Sandoval and to add the
following as causes of action: the nullification of the deed of sale with pacto de retro, the waiver and the cancellation of TCT Nos. 326781 and
329487 in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that petitioner had prior knowledge of legal flaws which tainted
Bienvenido Almeda's title.
It was only on January 16, 1986 that private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 329487. 4
Petitioner, as defendant below, countered that he was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. He bought the property through
real estate brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property advertised in the March 3, 1985 issue of the Manila Bulletin. After guarantees
were given by the brokers and his lawyer's go-signal to purchase the property, petitioner negotiated with Bienvenido Almeda. The price, reduced
to P230,000, was paid in two installments. As earlier noted, Bienvenido Almeda executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner and a new TCT
was issued in the latter's name.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Tan, Jr. The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision dated February 22, 1991 reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. and Carolina Mangampo Tan as the absolute and exclusive owners of the property
known as and situated at No. 88 Halcon Street, Quezon City, Metro Manila, originally registered in their names under TCT No.
196518 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, together with its improvements;
2. Declaring as null and void and of no legal effect the deed of real estate mortgage (Exch. A) dated October 9, 1984 in favor
of defendant Godofredo Valmeo; the deed of sale of registered land withpacto de retro (Exh. B) dated September 13, 1984 in
favor of Bienvenido Almeda; and the waiver (Exh. C) dated January 11, 1985 in favor of Bienvenido Almeda;
3. Commanding defendant Juan C. Sandoval to reconvey to the plaintiffs the property described under TCT 329487 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the improvements thereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision;
4. Directing defendant Bienvenido Almeda to pay to defendant Juan C. Sandoval the amount of P230,000.00 plus interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the Crossclaim until full payment; and
5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, P15,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Only Juan C. Sandoval, herein petitioner, appealed the aforequoted adverse decision. Respondent Court of Appeals reduced appellant's sixteen
assignment of errors to two basic issues: the validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed on October 9, 1984 in favor of Godofredo
Valmeo and the Deed of Sale of Registered Land with Pacto de Retro dated September 13, 1984 in favor of Bienvenido Almeda and whether or
not Juan C. Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision rendered on May 26, 1992, 6 affirmed the trial court's findings modifying only the award for damages

and attorney's fees. 7 Respondent court confirmed the invalidity of the aforementioned documents and held that the circumstances
outlined by the trial court should have so aroused petitioner's suspicion as to impel him to conduct further inquiry into his vendor's
tittle.
Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for
resolution. First, petitioner contends that he was denied due process when theponente of the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis
Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. Second,
petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against private
respondent Tan, Jr.
As regards the first issue on the inhibition of Justice Luis Victor, we examine the objective norms set forth by the Court.
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, Section 1 reads:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Judicial Conduct, which was promulgated on September 5, 1989 and made effective October 20, 1989, spells out in Rule 3.12 the
disqualifications of a judge:
Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former
associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree;
(e) the judge knows that the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary or otherwise, in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics 8 provides us with more general guidelines:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should
be beyond reproach.
xxx xxx xxx
31. A summary of judicial obligations
A judge's conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious,
thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influenced should
administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow
outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.
From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge,
he presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff's evidence and ruled on motions. 9 The decision itself, however, was penned

by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted.
Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his "ruling in a lower
court is the subject of review" or "in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review." Granted that
Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot
be said to have been placed in as position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally
bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement
in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and
partiality, 10 which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. 11 While

he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the case
below constitutes a "just or valid reason," under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.

The second and more substantial question in the instant petition is whether or not Juan Sandoval, herein petitioner, is a purchaser n good faith
or an innocent purchaser for value.
A finding that petitioner is a purchaser in good faith will inevitably be followed by a declaration that, as such, he is the rightful owner of the
property in question. For even granting, as held by both the trial and respondent appellate courts, that the deed of sale from the fake Lorenzo L.
Tan, Jr. to Bienvenido Almeda is a forged instrument which, being a nullity, conveys no title, 12 still a forged deed can be the basis of a valid

title. The Court has held that a fraudulent or forged document of sale may give rise to a valid title if the certificate of title of has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the same indicated by the forger and while it remained as such, the
land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. 13 Unquestionably, the vendee had the right to rely upon the certificate of
title. 14
It is settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on
the title. 15 He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. 16
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry17 or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in

his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. 18 The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. 19 One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of
the law.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 20 in support of the aforementioned principles, provide:
Sec. 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may
be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required
to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before
that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not estate that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have
been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27
or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in
the property. 21 He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could

convey title to the property. 22 A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
claim he acted in good faith. 23
The Court, after an exhaustive examination and review of the evidence on record, affirms the trial and appellate courts' findings that the
petitioner is not a purchaser in good faith.
Respondent Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's claim of being a purchaser in good faith and adopted the trial court's explanation to the effect
that:
Even if Sandoval acquired the property after it was advertised for sale in the Bulletin issue of March 3, 1985, the Court strongly
doubts his claim of good faith. There are circumstances extant in the records of the case which belie Sandoval's defense. In
the first place, it was testified to by Viterbo Cahilig of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (tsn, Jan. 15, 1987)
that there were two copies of TCT No. 196518 in the Register of Deeds, only one of which could be genuine. This apparently
came about following the loss of the owner's copy of said TCT from its usual place of safekeeping by plaintiff Tan when a
forged copy was made. One copy was used to inveigle Valmeo while the other was used by the mysterious Almeda. The two
copies of the TCT soon found their way to the Registry of Deeds. By the time that the sale to Sandoval was being negotiated,
therefore, the two copies of TCT No. 196518 were already in the files of the Register of Deeds. Since Sandoval's lawyer
apparently made a verification at the Register of Deeds, it was inevitable for him to come across the two copies. Sandoval was
thus aware in fact of the irregularity attending TCT No. 196518 and its derivative certificates.

Secondly, the Court finds to be unconvincing and improbable Sandoval's testimony that he actually met with Almeda at the
latter's residence in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila prior to the execution of the deed of sale, in light of the fact that such deed of
sale, Exhibit D, contained the erroneous address of Almeda, i.e., 776 S. Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. D-1 and D1-A). The explanation of the error, that such detail had been merely phoned in, is unacceptable. Having just come from
Almeda's alleged residence to talk about a transaction as important and memorable as the purchase of realty for substantial
consideration, it was not likely that Sandoval could have been mistaken about the street where his vendor allegedly resided.
Thirdly, equivocations were obviously committed by Sandoval in his testimony, which, taken together, tender to render
improbable Sandoval's claim of good faith. Testifying on August 7, 1987, Sandoval claimed to have met Almeda to talk about
the price (tsn, pp. 6-7); yet, in his cross-examination by plaintiff on September 11, 1987, Sandoval admitted that he had never
really met Almeda in person (p. 4); a few minutes later on, on redirect examination, Sandoval clarified that he had also met
Almeda in the property (Sept. 11, 1987, p. 13), only to vary this testimony on re-cross examination by stating that he did see
Almeda in the apartment but was not able to talk to him (ibid, p. 15). The lack of consistency in Sandoval's enumeration and
recollection of his alleged meetings with Almeda warrants disbelief in and inspires doubt of Sandoval's claim.
Fourthly, Sandoval could have unavoidably noticed the several but varying addresses of Almeda which were suspicious, to
say the least. It was expected of him to have thereby been alerted to the questionability of Almeda's title on the property. As
such, he is now to be deeded to have had actual notice of the defects in Almeda's title, which is antithetical to his pretended
good faith.
And, lastly, the certification appearing on the deed of sale (Exh. D) that the property was not tenanted was plainly untrue. The
making of the untruthful certification, the contrary to which was something well-known to Almeda and Sandoval, betrayed an
awareness on their part of flaws in the transaction. As parties interested in the transaction, they should not have permitted
such falsehood to taint the instrument.
The conclusion has become inexorable that Sandoval had actual knowledge of plaintiff's ownership of the property in question.
Sandoval, however, must be paid back by Almeda the sum of P230,000.00. 24
It has been well-settled that absent any circumstance requiring the overturning of the factual conclusions made by the trial court, particularly if
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this court necessarily upholds said findings of fact. None of the exceptions to the affirmation of factual findings,
as previously noted in Chua Tiong Tay v. Honorable Court of Appeals, 25 is present in the case at bar. Moreover, a study of the case

records reveals that the factual conclusions of the court a quo are firmly grounded on the evidence presented during the trial.
On balance, the Court is of the view that petitioner is not a purchaser in good faith since he should have been aware of his vendor's fraudulent or
forged title. Accordingly, he is ordered to reconvey subject property with its improvements to private respondent who was deprived of his
property through subterfuge and without any fault on his part. Whatever damage and injury has resulted will have to be borne by petitioner and
his co-defendants below, Bienvenido Almeda and Godofredo Valmeo.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in "Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. v. Bienvenido
Almeda," (CA G.R. CV No. 33265) is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402 April 3, 1998

ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the Court of Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave misconduct and immorality, allegedly committed as follows:

1. In Consignation Case No. 0940, "Tengco Homeowners' Association vs. Susana Realty, Inc.," assigned to and tried in her Branch,
Judge Mijares placed the plaintiff association's rental deposits in her private bank account, instead of turning them over as she should
have done, to the City Treasurer; only some time in September, 1989 when some members of the association sought a certification that
they had in fact been depositing rentals in Court, did she turn over to the City Treasurer the accumulated amount of P222,377.18 by

way of UCPB Cashier's Check No. 0996682 dated September 14, 1989; Judge Mijares kept for herself the interests earned by said
deposits while they were in her personal bank account.
2. Judge Mijares took cognizance of and decided Special Proceedings No. 3946, a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of
her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the child of her daughter Ma Pilita M. Gurango, notwithstanding such close relationship;
and this notwithstanding the fact that even if said petition had regularly been raffled off to her sala, a sense of propriety, if not the letter
and spirit of the Code of Judicial Ethics, should have made her refuse the assignment and procure the transfer of the case to any of the
five other branches of the Court equally qualified to take over and decide the case; and to compound and aggravate the corrupt practice
of taking on and deciding the case of a very close relative, she also dispensed with the required publication of the petition which sought
to correct the entry of the subject's citizenship from the stated "Filipino" to "American."
3. In Special Proceedings No. 90-54652, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, entitled: "In Re: Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Primitive Mijares," where Judge Mijares was the petitioner, she falsely declared her residence to be at No. 2247
Coral St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, which in fact is the residence of Teresita Arceo, formerly employed at Branch 7 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, which was at one time presided by her (Judge Mijares); and this, to illegally vest jurisdiction over the petition in the
proper Manila Regional Trial Court, rather in Quezon City where she actually resides for decades;
4. Judge Mijares made a false declaration of her residence as at No. 869 Pestaas Street, Pasay City, in her application for Marriage
License No. 0572927 accomplished as of December 20, 1993, on the strength of which she contracted a sham marriage with me,
solemnized by Judge Myrna Lim Verano of Carmona, Cavite, a former trial fiscal in her sala; her purpose in procuring such sham
"marriage" with me, was to use the same as a defense to charges of immorality brought against her by one Joseph Ligorio Naval before
the Supreme Court. 1

In a resolution dated 14 February 1996, the Court directed the respondent to comment on the letter-complaint.
On 16 May 1996, respondent filed her Comment on the afore-quoted charges in this wise:
On the first charge, respondent denied any participation in the collection of deposits from the Tengco Homeowners Association claiming that the
accusation was the concoction of her disgruntled employees, Joseph Ligorio Naval and Anita Domingo, who had a falling-out with her.
Specifically, respondent maintained that:
. . . [I]t is never the duty of a Presiding Judge to collect from litigants any money or amount for deposit with the court. It is, as always,
the duty of the Branch Clerk of Court or the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for that matter. The reason why the Branch Clerk or the OIC is
provided with a cabinet-safe vault is to safeguard the loss of properties/evidence, whether money or otherwise, in his/her custody. Anita
Domingo was then the property and records custodian as well as OIC when the Tengco Homeowners deposited with her. The individual
collections were duly receipted by her as reflected in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D" & "E" (samplings of receipts Anita Domingo issued). In
no occasion did the respondent receive money and/or issue receipts to any litigants, and particularly in this case where the
Homeowners individually paid their dues regularly or once in every month with Anita Domingo (as reflected in the Joint Affidavit
[See Annex "F"]). On request of Cris Agtuca, she issued a certification (See Annex "G") that the deposit was made with her.
Respondent, upon receipt of the copy of the letter complaint of Villaluz, took time out to secure from the UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch, a
certification regarding a Cashier's Check as indicated in the complaint and UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch obliged and delivered to
respondent the CERTIFICATION requested (SeeAnnex "H"). The certification clearly states as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that our branch (nor UCPB) does not issue an instrument named "CASHIER'S CHECK." The name
of the instrument we issue is a "MANAGER'S CHECK." Moreover, check number 996682 is not in our branch
manager's check (MC) number series.
We further certify that our branch has no record of the issuance of a "Cashier's Check No. 996682 on September 14,
1989."
This certification is issued upon the request of (Judge) Priscilla C. Mijares for whatever purpose it may serve her.
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES:
(Sgd) Illegible (Sgd) Illegible
FERDINAND C. MUYARGAS RAMON B. HENSON, JR.
Asst. Manager/BOO AVP & Branch Head 2

On the second charge, respondent asserted that the rule on disqualification of judges under Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
does not apply since the proceedings called simply for the clarification and correction of an erroneous entry in the birth certificate
of Joshua Anthony M. Gurango regarding his father's nationality. Respondent averred that:

The attendant/clerk who testified admitted that she really committed a big mistake when she placed "Filipino" as the nationality of the
father of minor Joshua Anthony Gurango. The passport (Annex "I") very clearly showed the real nationality, that of a citizen of the
"United States of America." Both in her sworn statement (Annex "J") and her open court testimony, the clerk, Liza A. Peano, admitted
her mistake. Her apologetic attitude was reflected in both words and action while testifying as witness in the case.
Regarding the publication, respondent granted the exemption after considering the nature of the case. The publication fee of from
P4,000.00 to P6,000.00 was saved by the spouses (parents of the minor) who are just starting to have a family. 3

Anent the third accusation, respondent staunchly denied that she made a false declaration regarding her residence in the
proceedings she filed for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband Primitivo Mijares. She explained thus:
Regarding Coral Street, the same was the former residence of complainant's husband, Primitivo Mijares. This fact is not known to
respondent. And considering too the service of complainant for the City of Manila from 1957 to 1986, as employee, as Fiscal and later
as Judge, including the services of her own children in PGH, Manila Doctors, Comelec and Manila Hotel, nobody could refute
complainant's statement that she is a Manila resident. It is also a place where complainant may be served with summons. 4

As to the last imputation, respondent declared that she considers Pasay City her second home for the following reasons:
Complainant's appointment to RTC Pasay dated as far back as 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. Add to this fact her stay in the same
place since graduation from High School in 1953. Even until now complainant's letters addressed to 869 Pestaas Street are delivered
to her by her cousins as a lasting arrangement. 5

On 4 September 1996, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to Justice Salvador J. Valdez of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, evaluation, report and recommendation.
On 13 May 1997, Justice Salvador J. Valdez submitted to the Court the results of his investigation and the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES be found guilty of grave misconduct under
Charges No. 1 and No. 2, and that she be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits and
privileges, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the Government service, whether pertaining to the national or local
Government, including government-owned and/of controlled corporations, instrumentalities and agencies. 6

It is regrettable that the instant case be clothed in so much personal enmity. However, shorn of its emotional trappings, the Court
concurs with the report of Justice Valdez but finds the recommended penalty of dismissal from service to be too severe.
We shall deal with the imputed misdeeds in seriatim.
I
Reproduced hereunder an the testimonies and evidence adduced by the parties regarding the first charge as succinctly summarized by Justice
Valdez in his Report and Recommendation:
The parties agreed to the reproduction of the testimony of Anita Domingo in the earlier administrative complaint initiated by Joseph S.
Ligorio Naval, Jr.
Anita Domingo had therein testified that she used to be the "court officer-in-charge" and "property custodian" of Judge Mijares in
Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. She declared that in the consignation case in their court involving the Tengco
Homeowners Association, the petitioners offered to deposit with her office the rentals falling due but she referred them to the Clerk of
Court because she was not tasked with receiving such deposits. However, the Clerk of Court refused to receive the rental deposits
since there was no order to that effect from the presiding judge. Thereafter, Judge Mijares gave instruction to her (Anita Domingo), and
to other employees in her Branch, like Mrs. Gatdula and Mrs. Villamater, to receive and receipt for the rental deposits, and turn over the
money to her (Judge Mijares). Once deposits were thus made, they were given to Judge Mijares who, in turn, asked Mrs. Villamater to
deposit them, in her (Judge Mijares') personal account with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Holiday Plaza Branch. Anita Domingo
claimed that on February 14, 1990, the rental deposits accumulated in the aggregate amount of P222,377.18. Judge Mijares turned
over the amount to the Clerk of Court in the form of a check, which the latter, then deposited with the City Treasurer of Pasay City. In
this connection, the complainant presented in evidence these documents, to wit:
Exhibit "E" Official Receipt No. 1204413, dated February 14, 1990,
issued by the Clerk of Court, RTC, Pasay City, for the payment of
P222,377.18 in the form of UCPB Check No. FB-11-014578 dated 2-1490 (Exhibits "E-1" and "E-2").
"F" Report of Collections for Fiduciary Fund Deposited with the City
Treasurer, Pasay City for the Period from February 13 & 14, 1990 which
includes the P222,377.18 (Exhibit "E-1").

"G" Cashier/Treasurer's Report of the Daily Collections & Deposits,

February 14, 1990.
"H" Voucher No. 401-9002-269 dated February 14, 1990.
"J" Certification issued by Anita Domingo on August 18, 1989 that the
rental deposits in the total amount of P222,377.18 has been deposited
with the Court.
In the affidavit of respondent Judge Mijares, which the parties stipulated to constitute her direct testimony, she stated by way of
defense, viz:
That in 1986, November, upon respondent's assumption as Presiding Judge of Branch 108, RTC, Pasay City, Anita
Domingo, who was OIC, continued her designation and worked as administrative head of the Branch;
That as OIC and concurrent property custodian, she was the Chief of all employees and keeper of all evidence and
other valuable properties deposited with the Court;
That the case of Tengco Homeowners Association was one of the cases then pending in Branch 108, and the case
being civil in nature, respondent tried to intervene in the hope that the suit will end in a compromise agreement;
That the parties' intended compromise was reflected in the Order of then Judge Manuel Valenzuela dated February
22, 1984 (Annex "C"); the Order of March 29, 1984 (Annex "D"; the Order of May 24, 1984 (Annex "E"); the Order of
Judge Baltazar Dizon dated February 18, 1986 (Annex "F"); the Order dated March 5, 1987 (Annex "G"); the Order
dated September 3, 1987 (Annex "H"); the Order dated October 11, 1988 (Annex "I"); the Order dated October 18,
1988 (Annex "I-1");
That a copy of the Compromise Agreement (Annex "J") was submitted to this Court on October 18, 1988;
That on October 27, 1988, the officers and members of the Tengco Homeowners Association were directed to appear
to thresh out whatever problem/s there will be in connection with the proposed Compromise Agreement (Annex "L");
That the Tengco Homeowners requested that their money be deposited in Court for immediate turn-over to Susana
Realty the moment the compromise agreement is signed.
That the pleading of the homeowners was granted and Anita Domingo, as OIC and property custodian, received their
money. Receipts were issued to the members duly signed by Anita Domingo (Annex "K", "K-1" up to "K-4", and as in
all other courts, she kept the money in the cabinet/safe where she keeps the evidence and other properties of the
Branch;
That on February 14, 1990, Atty. Antonio Rosales submitted a Manifestation Motion (Annex "M"), but by midday of
February 14, 1990, the Court was informed confidentially by one of the Homeowners that the negotiation failed;
That on the same day, February 14, 1990, this respondent, also Presiding Judge of Branch 108, directed Anita
Domingo to turn-over the money of the homeowners to the Clerk of Court;
That on the same day, February 14, 1990, after she counted the money entrusted to her by the homeowners, Anita
Domingo told respondent that there were salary checks included with the cash;
That respondent told Anita Domingo that the solution is to have one check delivered to the Clerk of Court, and
respondent issued one check for the amount of P222,377.18 dated February 14, 1990;
That Anita Domingo delivered respondent's check to the OCC on the same date in exchange for the cash and check,
which circumstance account for the issuance of the voucher, and the preparation of the Official Receipt (OR) in the
name of Tengco Homeowners' Association, and the Official Receipt (OR) is dated February 14, 1990 (Annex "N");
Supplementing her affidavit, Judge Mijares testified that she first issued her personal check for the P222,377.18, but since it was not
accepted by the Clerk of Court, Mrs. Lucia Villamater, a social worker in her staff and her liaison with the United Coconut Planters
Bank, Libertad Branch, ran to the bank and purchased a manager's check with the Judge's personal check. It was this manager's check
that was used to cover the P222,377.18.
Lucia Villamater corroborated Judge Mijares.
The parties further stipulated on the truth of the contents of the affidavit of Isabel Gabriel, a member of the Tengco Homeowners
Association, that during the negotiations for the amicable settlement of the consignation case, they requested that they be allowed to

deposit the rentals due from them with the court presided over by the respondent Judge and that Anita Domingo had since been
receiving their deposits.
By way of rebuttal, Anita Domingo deposed that Judge Mijares' order for her to accept the subject rental deposits was verbal and never
reduced into writing; that she never kept the rental deposits in her safety cabinet because that was not intended for money but only for
evidence such as titles, guns and other documents; that she never changed any salary checks of her co-employees as she did not keep
cash from any source, whether "in trust" or otherwise; and that she never delivered Judge Mijares' personal check for P222,377.18 to
the office of the Clerk of Court but the said check passed through her when their cashier, Mrs. Marina Garcia, returned it because they
do not accept a personal check and, besides, the Clerk of Court was demanding payment of the commission due on the rental deposits,
plus legal research fees, which deposits she had all turned over to Judge Mijares on the very same days that she had received them.
But on sur-rebuttal, Felicisima Gatdula, a court stenographer of Judge Mijares, insisted that Anita Domingo presumably kept the rental
deposits in her safety cabinet and that she had never seen Anita giving the rentals to Judge Mijares. 7

On the basis of the foregoing, Justice Valdez did not find credence in respondent's evidence that she did not take possession of
the rental deposits and used them for her personal benefit. He pertinently pointed out the following:
1. There was a "marked variance" between respondent's comment and rejoinder on one band, and her affidavit which served as her direct
testimony and her testimony during cross-examination, on the other. In the former, respondent denied any involvement in the rentals deposited
by the Tengco Homeowners Association with Anita Domingo. Particularly in her rejoinder, respondent stated that "she never had the chance to
order Anita Domingo to receive or issue receipt for the deposits made by the members of Tengco Homeowners." However, in her affidavit and
during her cross-examination, respondent admitted that she ordered Domingo to receive and issue receipts for said rental deposits. Further, in
her affidavit, respondent disclosed that it was her personal check for P222,377.18, representing the accumulated rental deposits, that was first
transmitted to the Clerk of Court and when it was refused, respondent had it replaced with a manager's check; 8

2. It was highly irregular for respondent to have issued her own check for the rental deposits. Assuming arguendo that salary
checks of the other court employees got mixed with the deposits, respondent should have issued her check only for the amount of
said salary checks; 9
3. The safety cabinets provided the Branch Clerks of Court are meant for exhibits and other important documents and are not fit
for keeping cash, especially big sums of money. 10
4. There was no justification for respondent in not requiring the Clerk of Court to collect the rental deposits and in allowing instead
her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to make the collection. She explained that if the rentals were deposited with the Clerk of Court, who
would in turn deposit them with the City Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the deposits withdrawn in the event a
settlement would be reached by the parties who were then in the process of negotiation. However, her motive cannot be
rationalized in the face of the strict requirement of a Supreme Court Circular relative to the optimum protection of deposits which
are fiduciary funds.
We quote the relevant portion of Justice Valdez's conclusions on the matter:
Truly, except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and hard evidence that Judge Mijares got and made personal use of
the rental deposits before they were turned over to the Clerk of Court. However, the proofs on hand produce a moral certainty that she
did so. For why did she issue her personal check for the deposits? Her explanation that was the solution she had thought of when Anita
Domingo disclosed that there were salary checks of her co-employees that were included in the cash deposits in her possession won't
wash for if that were the situation she (Judge Mijares) could have issued her check only for the amount of the salary checks. After all,
Lucia Villamater, her social worker, bank liaison and witness, testified that Anita Domingo encashed the salary checks of her coemployees but once and that could have amounted to only about P15,000.00 to P20,000.00, or, the salary checks could have easily
been encashed with the drawee bank, instead of Villamater buying a manager's check for P222,377.18, the aggregate amount of the
rental deposits. Besides, the so called safety cabinets provided the Branch Clerks of Court are not really fit for keeping cash, especially
such big sums as hundreds of thousands of pesos; these cabinets are meant only for exhibits and other important papers and
documents. So, it is more likely that Anita Domingo had really been turning over her collections to Judge Mijares, following the latter's
instruction. Then, too, Judge Mijares' initial false claim that "she never had the chance to order Anita Domingo to receive or issue
receipt for the deposits," can not but bring to light her lack of sincerity to tell the truth, if not an insidious ploy to conceal her hand that
had been in the cookie jar. Had not the complainant been able to track down her manager's check, in all probability she would have
forever kept mum about the matter.
In other words, the alleged bias of Anita Domingo, assuming it to be true, can not alter the fact that it was the manager's check which
Judge Mijares caused to be bought with her own personal check that was turned over to the Clerk of Court instead of the cash rental
deposits. Where had the cash been all along? Why did she have to buy the manager's check with her own personal check? 11

In any case, Justice Valdez opined that respondent violated certain circulars of this Court specifically, Circular No. 9 dated March
29, 1977 and Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982:
What is more, under Supreme Court Circular No. 9, dated March 29, 1977, it is the Clerk of Court who has been constituted as cashier
and disbursing officer, and as such, he/she receives by himself/herself, or through a duly appointed cashier, deposits, fines, and dues.

Judge Mijares violated Circular No. 9 in ordering Anita Domingo, who was then merely her Branch Clerk of Court OIC, to collect and
receipt for the rental deposits. She tried to cover this up by not reducing her order into writing although the case was for consignation.
Also, before the revocation of Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982 by Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992, all collections of
funds of fiduciary character, including rental deposits, were to be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof by the Clerk of Court
concerned with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his/her Court is located. There was, therefore, no justification for
Judge Mijares in not ordering the Clerk of Court to do the collection and in allowing instead her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to collect and
worse, keep the rental deposits in her safety cabinet, if this is true, for such a long period of time from 1986 or 1987 to February 14,
1990. She offered the explanation that the parties were then in the thick of negotiations for an amicable settlement and if the rentals
were deposited with the Clerk of Court who would, in turn, deposit them with the City Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the
deposits withdrawn in the event that settlement was reached; and so to help the parties cut the red tape, she ordered her OIC Branch
Clerk of Court to accept and keep the rental deposits. But the explanation flies in the face of the rationale behind the Supreme Court
Circular which was to provide the optimum protection to the integrity of the deposits as fiduciary funds. 12

We affirm the above findings of Justice Valdez which, after an exhausting review, we find to be amply supported by the evidence
on record. However, we take note of Justice Valdez's own admission that "except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no
direct and hard evidence that Judge Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits before they were turned over to the
Clerk of Court." 13 Despite the foregoing statement, his conclusion that respondent deposited the rentals in her private bank
account and kept for herself the interests earned is based, nonetheless, on circumstantial evidence. In Dia-Aonuevo
v. Bercallo, 14 we made a pronouncement that:
While the court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold
that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt.
and consequently penalized the erring judge.
In addition, we find Anita Domingo to have been remiss in her duties as acting Branch Clerk of Court. She should have strictly adhered to the
clear and mandatory procedure provided under Circular No. 5 (before it was replaced by Circular No. 13-92) regarding the collection and deposit
of rentals with the court. Being a responsible officer of the court she should not have been swayed to do otherwise.
II
Relative to Special Proceedings No. 3946 involving a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, respondent claims that
she was not disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court from taking cognizance of and deciding said case ratiocinating that: (a)
she, her daughter, son-in-law and grandson do not have pecuniary interest in the case; (b) the case was not controversial in nature and; (c) with
respect to respondent's dispensing with the requirement of publication of the petition which would have cost P4,000.00 to P6,000.00, the amount
was "unnecessary expense on the part of the petitioner that will not inure to the benefit of the government, anyway." 15

Respondent's conduct is inexcusable.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.
Respondent is clearly disqualified from trying the case under the aforequoted section and also under Rule 3.12 (d) Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. 16 Being related within the sixth degree of consanguinity to one of the parties (petitioner) in Special Proceedings

No. 9346, it was mandatory for respondent to have inhibited herself from hearing the case. While respondent or her daughter may
not have pecuniary interest in the case as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, which is her contention for her exculpation, what is
violated in Section 1 of Rule 137 was her taking cognizance of the case despite her relationship to a party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity.
Apart from the rules already cited, respondent violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Judicial Conduct which states that: "A Judge shall not
allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or tent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge."
In Garcia v. De la Pea, 17 we expounded on the rationale behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges in this wise:

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is
not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it
in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot
objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the
absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of
justice.
Respondent contends that the petition for correction of entry of the birth record of her grandson does not involve controversial matters such as
those relating to civil status, citizenship or nationality, but merely pertain to innocuous or clerical errors and, therefore, the correction can be
done through summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code 18 in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Even on the assumption that the petition for correction of entry of respondent's grandson is not controversial in nature, this does not detract from
the fact that she cannot be free from bias or partiality in resolving the case by reason of her close blood relationship to him. In fact, bias was
clearly demonstrated when she waived the requirement of publication of the petition on the dubious ground of enabling the patents of the minor
(her daughter and son-in-law) to save the publication fee as they were then just "starting to have a family."
In any case, notice and publication of the hearing of the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and cannot be waived,
particularly Sections 3, 4 and 5 thereof:
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of entry in the civil register is a sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claimed any interest which would he affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place of the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Even if the proceedings contemplated in Rule 108 are not controversial in nature, they are still essentially adversarial, hence, the need
of notice and publication of the hearing. As the Court in Republic v. Valencia19 elucidated:
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the Civil Registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded
therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system.
Being properly an adversary proceeding, respondent's flawed logic that her relationship to the petitioner does not disqualify her from deciding the
case because there are no opposing parties is untenable.
Respondent has neither the authority nor the discretion to dispense with the publication of the notice of hearing of the petition as provided in the
aforequoted Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Respondent knows or ought to know that said requisite is mandatory, without which the
court acquires no jurisdiction over the case. How the case was raffled to the sala of respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City when
the petition should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where the civil registry involved is located is baffling enough. But for the
respondent to waive with the required publication to enable the parents of the minor "who are just starting to have a family" to save the
publication fee does not speak well of respondent's grasp of the law. We agree with Justice Valdez in his observation that:
That relationship could account for the alacrity of Judge Mijares in favorably acting on the petition although the civil registrar was not
impleaded who, in this case, should have been the Civil Registrar of Manila since the minor Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, whose birth
certificate was sought to be corrected, was born and registered in Manila, and although the petition was erroneously filed with her court
as it should have filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 which directs that such a petition shall
be filed "with the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located." The relationship
furthermore led her to dispense with the publication requirement, which is jurisdictional, just to enable the parents of the minor (her
daughter and son-in-law), "who are just starting to have a family" to save the publication fee of P4,000.00 to P6,000.00. Any of these
flaws should have, instead, caused the outright dismissal of the petition.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice
by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter. 20

The Court, once again, earnestly reminds judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the performance of their duties for "(a)
judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis of the complaint and the very law he is supposed
to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration of justice if judges are not cursorily excused of apparent deficiency
in the analysis of the facts of the case and in the grasp of the legal principles. For service in the judiciary means a continuous
study and research on the law from beginning to end (Roa vs. Imbing, 231 SCRA 58 [1994]; Wingarts vs. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436

[1995]). A member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the
learning process in law never ceases." 21
III
Alleging that Quezon City is respondent's actual residence, complainant accused respondent of falsely declaring her residence (in the latter's
petition for declaration of presumptive death of her husband Primitivo Mijares) to be at No. 2247 Coral St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, in order,
allegedly, to lay the venue over said petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, instead of Quezon City.
Complainant's charge has not been sufficiently substantiated. We find adequate respondent's testimony that it was at this address that her
husband Primitivo Mijares resided and this was where respondent and her husband established their family residence after getting married and
before the latter's unfortunate disappearance.
IV
Finally, we find to be similarly baseless complainant's last charge that respondent falsely stated in her application for marriage license (with
herein complainant) filed on 20 December 1993 that her residence was at No. 869 Pestaas St., Pasay City. We adopt in toto the findings of
Justice Valdez, thus:
On the other hand, when she testified Judge Mijares maintained that she has three places of residence, to wit: No. 869 Pestaas St.,
Pasay City, the house of the older sister of her mother, where she had resided for more than 20 years since graduation from high
school in 1953; and No. 72, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, where she migrated. But she went to Pasay City in November 1986, when
she assumed office as RTC Judge in the City. She also considered No. 2447 Coral Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila, as her third place
of residence because it was the residence of her husband, Primitivo Mijares, and he brought her there. However, in 1990, when she
filed he petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her husband, she was no longer residing there. In fact, the place has
already been demolished but before that, Teresita Arcao, a member of her (Judge Mijares') staff when she was yet a Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, had also resided there.
Through Wilfredo Rejano, chairman of Barangay 69, Zone 09, which encompasses Pestaas Street in Pasay City, the complainant
endeavored to show that No. 869 Pestaas Street and, for that matter, No. 185 T. Pestaas Street, are non-existent.
However, Virginia Pestaas-Victa belied the claim of Rejano. She said that T. Pestaas St., Pasay City, was named after her
grandfather Tomas Pestaas, the father of her father. She was born on October 20, 1928 at No. 185 T. Pestaas, as indicated in her
marriage contract dated October 30, 1955. Her oldest son, Virgilio Pestaas, was born there. Her mother Emilia de Villa Pestaas, and
her sister, Victoria Pestaas, likewise lived there. Subsequently, the place was re-numbered 163 T. Pestaas, then 169 T. Pestaas,
but that she had mistakenly told Judge Mijares that the number is 869 T. Pestaas. So, that explain why Judge Mijares indicated No.
869 Pestaas Street, Pasay City, as her residence both in her application for a marriage license and in her marriage contract with the
complainant.
As between Wilfredo Rejano, who claimed that there is no such address as No. 869 or No. 185 T. Pestaas Street, Pasay City, and
Virginia Pestaas, who declared that there had been No. 185 T. Pestaas Street but subsequently re-numbered No. 163 and,
presently, 169 T. Pestaas Street; and that No. 869 T. Pestaas Street was just her honest mistake, the undersigned readily gives
credence to the latter. The former was only 31 years old when he testified on January 8, 1997, so he must have been born in 1966, and
could not be familiar with the full history of Pestaas Street, Pasay City. On the other hand, the latter was 68 years old and was born at
185 T. Pestaas Street on October 20, 1928, an address which she maintained up to her marriage on October 30, 1955, and even
thereafter. She claimed, without contradiction, that the street was named after her grandfather, Tomas Pestaas, and that Judge
Mijares, her niece, used to live with them there.
The falsities attributed to Judge Mijares in these charges have not, therefore, been substantiated. The complainant has not refuted her
assertion that she considered Manila as her residence at one time because that was where her husband established their family
residence. She treats Pasay City and Quezon City as her present places of residence since the former is where she has been working
up to now as a judge and where she had lived when still a student, and the latter is where she goes home after her work. In this
connection, in distinguishing domicile from residence, it has been held that, "It is . . . quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residence in various places." So, she could have acted in utmost good faith in filing her petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of her husband with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for it was in Manila where her husband was declared
presumptively dead, she could no longer consider Manila as a place of residence; hence, when she applied for a marriage license to
marry the complainant, she filed it with Pasay City where she works and which she presently treats as a place of residence aside from
Quezon City. 22

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct and resolves that:
(1) Under the first charge, respondent Judge Priscilla C. Mijares is hereby FINED in the amount of P20,000.00.
(2) Under the second charge, respondent Judge Mijares is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for violating Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
(3) Respondent Judge is further WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Further, the OCA is instructed to institute appropriate administrative charges against Anita Domingo, former Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 108.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40603 July 13, 1978

12. PALMARIN Q. HURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL G. JUDALENA and HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Judge in the CFI of Ilocos Norte, Batac
branch, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul the order of April 2, 1975, issued by
the respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, upon the
ground that the said order was issued in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the respondent
judge being the brother of the private respondent Isabel G. Judalena.
The record shows that on March 14, 1975, the private respondent Isabel G. Judalena filed a complaint against the petitioner
Palmarin Q. Hurtado before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 485-IV.
The substance of the complaint is that Isabel G. Judalena had sold a portion, containing an area of 75 square meters of her
parcel of land to Palmarin Q. Hurtado, with the condition that the latter shall cause a subdivision survey of the portion sold in
order to segregate said portion from the bigger portion, after which the said Palmarin Hurtado shall construct a concrete
fence between the two lots, but that the said Palmarin Hurtado contrary to their agreement, built a concrete fence much
beyond the 75 square meters portion and started construction of a house on the encroached portion. Isabel Judalena
prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Hurtado from construction the house mentioned on the controverted
parcel of land. 1
On March 31, 1975, the petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed his answer thereto, denying the claim of Judalena that he had
encroached on the property, claiming that they are the owners of the property on which they are constructing their house. 2
On April 2, 1975, the respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong, his close relationship with Isabel G. Judalena notwithstanding,
and despite the prohibition imposed by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, 3issued an order, exparte. directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00. On April 4,
1975, Isabel G. Judalena filed the required bond and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued, ordering Palmarin Q. Hurtado, his
father, and other persons acting on his behalf to refrain and desist from constructing a house on the land in controversy and stop
disturbing in any other manner the possession of Isabel G. Judalena. 4
The next day, April 5, 1975, the respondent judge issued an order voluntarily disqualifying himself from hearing the case in
view of his close relationship with the plaintiff therein and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the incumbent
Executive Judge for proper assignment to the other judges of the court. 5
On April 10, 1975, Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction in order to
preserve the status quo until the designation of another judge to try the case, with a prayer that the respondent judge hear
the motion to give him an opportunity to rectify the mistake error he had committed in taking cognizance of the case and in
granting, ex-parte, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. 6
The respondent judge, however, denied the motion on April 21, 1975. 7
Hence, the instant petition. On May 12, 1975, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, to stop the respondent judge
from enforcing his orders on April 2, 1975 and April 21, 1975. 8

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which any judge or judicial
officer is disqualified from acting as such. 9 The said section, in no uncertain terms, expressly prohibits a judge or judicial officer
from sitting in a case where he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguity or affinity. This is mandatory. 10 In
the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent judge is the brother of the respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their close
relationship notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition mentioned above, the respondent judge took cognizance of the case and
issued the controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after which he inhibited himself from sitting
on the case for the same reasons. Such action, to our mind, is reprehensible as it erodes the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the order of April 2. 1975, issued in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, is hereby annulled and set aside. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued
is hereby made permanent. With costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

13 .A.M. No. MTJ-94-936 November 6, 1995

MAYOR SALVADOR M. PEREZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HILARION A. SULLER, respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated March 23, 1994, Salvador M. Perez, Municipal Mayor of San Manuel, Pangasinan accused Judge Hilarion A.
Suller of grave abuse of discretion, misconduct, ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming of a judge relative to Criminal Case No. SM-7962
entitled "People v. Carlo Perez, Salvador Perez, Jr., and Jerico Perez," for qualified trespass to dwelling.
Complainant Mayor, father of the three (3) named accused, alleged that respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation in said case
although the complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr. is his nephew and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on the same
day the complaint was filed without requiring the accused and their witnesses to submit their counter-affidavits; that on the following day, a
Friday, respondent judge purposely left his station to thwart any opportunity for the accused to post bail.
In his comment, respondent judge averred that he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused when he found probable cause of the
commission of the crime by them; that issuance of the warrant was in accord with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 1 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure. He denied the allegation that he left his station on March 18, 1994, the day after the filing of the complaint;
that in a Joint "Sworn Statement" dated April 7, 1994, his Branch Clerk of Court, Staff Assistant and interpreter attested that
respondent judge, together with affiants reported for work on said date and maintained a skeletal force up to noon the next day.
His comment, however, was silent as to his relationship with the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, Cristobal Suller, Jr.
After an evaluation of the present complaint, we find that the resolution thereof hinges on two issues, to wit: (1) whether or not it is necessary to
first accord the accused their statutory right to submit counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses, prior to issuance of the warrant of arrest;
(2) whether or not it was proper for respondent judge to conduct the preliminary investigation and then order the arrest of the accused when the
complaining witness in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, as claimed by complainant mayor, is his nephew.
In resolving the first issue, this court finds guidance in its decision in Pangandaman, et al. v. Demaporo Casar, et al. 2 In said case, the court is

confronted with the same issue, though stated differently: "Whether or not the respondent judge had the power to issue the
warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation (i.e. the provisions of Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended)." 3 The Court stated:
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest
may be issued. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before
a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly
authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second phase 4 of the

investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.

xxx xxx xxx
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest.
Consequently in the case before us, we rule that no taint of irregularity attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest by respondent judge.
Respondent judge issued the warrant after complying with the provision of Section 6, Rule 112. He need not, as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the warrant of arrest require submission of the counter-affidavits of the accused and his witnesses, as insisted upon by complainant
mayor.
Additionally, the complainant questions the impartiality of respondent judge in conducting the preliminary investigation of the crime on the ground
that the complaining witness is his nephew, Cristobal Suller, Jr.
Respondent judge's comment, being silent on his relationship with complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr., the Court deems it an admission of
the alleged relationship.
Respondent judge could have easily denied the alleged relationship and adduced proof to that effect, but he chose to sidestep said issue by
being silent, notwithstanding that this constitutes one of the principal charges against him.
The Court finds that respondent judge should have refrained from handling the preliminary investigation since he was closely related to the
complainant, Cristobal Suller Jr., his nephew and a relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree.
The Court mandates that all judges strictly comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct 5 which provides, in Rule 3.12 that:
Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among the others, proceedings where:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree;
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 137 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court which applies suppletorily provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as "sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind
disqualification under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.
Clearly, respondent judge's participation in the preliminary investigation, involving his nephew is a violation of the aforequoted rules laid down to
guide members of the judiciary. The rationale for the rule on disqualification of a judge stems from the principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. 6 A judge should not handle a case in which he might be

perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. 7 The rule is intended to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts
of justice. 8
As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge may have been influenced or affected by his relationship to Suller, Jr. during the
preliminary investigation. Based on the documentary evidence presented, 9 it appears that during the preliminary investigation, respondent

judge ordered the accused to submit within the ten-day reglementary period, their counter-affidavit to controvert the complaint filed
against them; that prior to the expiration of said period, respondent judge issued a Resolution dated March 17, 1994 ordering,
among others, the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor despite protestations from the

accused. This, in effect, deprived the accused of their opportunity to adequately present their position during the preliminary
investigation. Such actuation of respondent judge demonstrated partiality in favor of the complaining witness, his nephew, thus
casting doubt on his fairness in conducting the preliminary investigation.
We have declared often enough that the behavior of judges and court personnel, must at all times, not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum, but must also be above suspicion. 10 Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part

of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just. 11Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, moreover, mandates
that a judge should avoid, not merely impropriety in all his acts but even the appearance of impropriety.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge is FINED in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for not having inhibited himself
in the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. SM-7962 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Carlo Perez, et al." with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Engineer Edgardo C. Garcia v. Judge Meljohn de la Pea, A.M. No. MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994
Facts: A criminal case for grave oral defamation was filed by Dr. Melencio de la Pea against Ignacia G. Garcia, petitioners wife,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577. Judge Meljohn de la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval,
Leyte took cognizance of the criminal case. He issued a warrant of arrest to petitioners wife and June 8, 1992 and was detained
for twenty hours since they cannot process the posting of bail due to respondent judges absence as well as of the Release Order
which was unknowingly left with his wife. On June 15, 1992, they received a copy of the criminal complaint, affidavit of the
witnesses and respondent judge's inhibition order dated June 15, 1992. Outraged, petitioner filed an administrative case against
Judge de la Pea for partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in connection with Criminal Case No. 2577 which
was filed by the Judges brother against his wife.
Issue: Whether or not Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority.
Ruling: Yes, Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides in part that
no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. In this case, respondent judge took
cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of consanguinity to private
complainant. With such situation, it is compulsory that the respondent judge should have inhibited from sitting in the case.
Hence, Judge de la Pea, in committing grave abuse of authority, was hereby dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.