Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
CIVIL PROCEDURE
MAGNO
S.
GATMAITAN
At the outset, it may worthwhile to note that 1971 is noteworthy because the Supreme Court reversed' itself on a doctrine which it had enunciated and stuck to from 1964 in the matter of conflict of jurisdiction. 1
1. PARTIES
A. Necessary
* Professorial
2 14
(VOL. 47
parties concerned therewith would as a result be befo re the CQun and the
latter's adj udicat ion would be complete upon them.
Settmg aside the order o( the lower court dism issing the complaint
all the grou nd of lack of jurisdiction, in Gabifa \I. Barriga," the Supreme
Court held that while it is true that the amended complai nt has included
the Director of Lands as a party plaintiff, the said ' govern ment offi cial is
it. plaintiff in name and the amended complaint is signed by the lawyer
admittedl y representing the plaintiff.
B. I lIIcrvellor
In Eatama Farmers' CooperafiJ'c Marketing Ass. , / IIC. v, HOll. Rosal.'
the Supreme Court gra nted the writ of certiorari 10 correct the lower's
courl error in admitting Teves' complaint in intervention. The record shows
that Teves signed a separate independclll comraCl with the petitio ner associat ion, while Villegas has likewise a separate independent cont ract with
the said pe.titioner which he a lone signed, without any intervention on the
part of Teves. Conse'l llently. Teves has no lega l in terest in the subject
matter of the contract signed by Villegas with the petitioner. Th is case
reiterates the ruling that a mere colla tera l interest in the subjoct mailer of
the litigation can not justif.y inlervcnt ion.
C. Foreign corporation
The Supre me Court ruled in General Garments Corp. v. Director of
Patems.1 that under $cction 21 -A of the Trade Mark Law, a foreign corpor'lIion or juristic person can bring an action in the Philippine courts for
infringement of OJ trade mark or trade name, f.or unfair competition, or
false designation or origin and false descri ption, "whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen
Hundred and Fifty Ni ne, as amended, othe rwise known as the Corporation
Law. at the lime it brings the complaint:'
11 . CAUSE OF ACTION
A. A Cliol1ahfe Wrongs
Tn RaJllcar, / IIC. v. SlI lIuuJchm,8 the o rder of the lower court dismissing
the complain! was affirmed because there was no contractual relationship
between the plaint iff and the defe ndant inasmuch as the latter had held
and later on released the metals under the authority and order of the Bureau of Customs, the validity of which had not been impugned.
~ G . R . No. L-28917. September 30. 197 1, 4 1 SCRA 131 (197 1).
' G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, [971 . 42 SCRA 408 (1971 ).
1 G.R. No. L-24295. September 30. 1971. Q SCRA 50 (1971).
I G.R. No. L27693, January 29'. 1971. 37 Se RA 112 (1 97 1) .
1972]
REMEDIAL LAW
215
AgJ eda v. Agr,eda 10 reiterates the rule that the re'medy ptl"ovided for
in Section, 38 of Act No. 496 is not exclusive and does not bar any other
to which the aggrieved party may be entitled.
In holding in. Lee v. CommissionL?r of Immigration,H that the petition
of the appellee in the court a quo is really one for declaratory relief, considering the prayer therein that "she be adjudged to have acquired the
citizenship of her husband, Jackson Barra, who is a Filipino xxx", the
Supreme Court stated that, in a long line of decisions, it has repeatedly
held that there is no pmceeding established by law, or the rules, for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
B. Conditions precedent
It was held in Ma-ao Sugar Central v. .Manila Port Service 12 that the
computation of the I5:-<:Iay period for filing claims must start from the
day following the event.
216
[VOL. 47
1972]
REMEDIAL LAW
217
III.
VENUE
Ocampa v. Domingo20 reiterates the rule that where the defendant fails
to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by section 4
of Rule 4, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he
cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly
the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.21
In Time, Inc. v. Hon. Reyes,22 it was noted that under the first proviso
in Section 1, Republic Act No. 4362, the venue of a civil action for damages
in cases of written defamations is localized upon the basis of, first, whether
the offended party or plaintiff is a public officer or a private individual; and
second, if he is a public officer, whether his office is in Manila or not in Manila, at the time of the commission of the offense. If the offended party
is a public officer with office in the City of Manila, the proviso limits
him to two choices of venue, namely "in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or in the citY' or provinCe! where the libelous article is printed
and first published x x x." In the case at bar, the complaint lodged in the
court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the libelous article was
printed and first published in the province of Rizal, and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for
them wherein to file their action is the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Universal Insurance ,and Indemnity Co . v. Hon. Consino 23 reiterates
the rule that, where ther,e is no agreement in the insurance policy as to where
an action for recovery thereon should be filed, Rule 4, Section 1 (b) (2),
G.R. No. L-23024, May 31 , 1971 , 39 SCRA 221 (1971) .
G.R. No. L-27632, Ma rch 27, 1971 , 38 SCRA 134 (1971) .
Iuanino v. De la R ama, 74 Phil. 43 (1942).
G.R. No. L-28882, May 31 , 1971 , 39 SeRA 303 (1971).
23 G.R. No. L-2S082, November 23 , 1971 , 42 SeRA 216 (1971) .
19
20
21
22
218
[VOL. 41
IV.
J UR ISDICTION
BCllilQ Go v. Civil Registrar, DeiplIrill'! v. Republic, Castaneda v. Republic, Civil Registrar v. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, and Republic v. Capalla,U.
reiterate the rule that Article 412 of the Civil Code sanctions the correction
of mere "clerical erro rs of a harmless or innocuous nature," not changes involving civil status, nationality or citizenship which arc substantial and/or
controversial.
I n Mani/a Stevedoring QJld General Worker's Unioll v. Lamin,2S the
actionable wrong sought to be redressed consists in exclusion, by means of
violence and intimidation of an independent contractor and his men from
work which properly belongs to them , by another contractor and the latter's
followers under the guise of le5itimate unionism. It was ruled that the subject matter of the complaint, thus understood , clearly faJ ls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First I nstance. ~7
Holding that the Court of First Instance should yield to the decision
of the Collector o( Customs, in Lopez v. Commissioner of Cusloms,2B the
Supreme Cou rt noted that the ju risdiction o( the Collector of Customs is
provided for in Republic Act No. 1937 which took effect o n J uly I , 1957,
much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948, and it is axiomatic that a later
law prevails over a prior statule. Moreover, on grounds o( public policy.
it is more reasonable \0 conclude that the legislators intended to divest the
Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a
subject of a seizure and forfei ture proceedings for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation o( Cuslom!: Lnws cou ld easily be undermined by the sim ple device of
24 84 Phil. 674 ( t949) .
Z5G. R. No. L-29544, May 31. 1971. 39 se RA 350 (1971) ; G.R . No. L-30227,
May 31, 1971. 39 seRA 350 (197 1); G.R. No. L30228. fl.by 31, 1971, 39 SCRA
350 ( 1971); C.R. No. L_3099. May 31. 1971. 39 seRA 350 ( 197 1); and O.R. No.
L-31075. May 31. 1971. 39 SCRA 350 (1971).
26G. R. No. L29785, January 28.1971. 37 SCRA 88 (197 1).
27 1n Racaw \'. De Ocampo, C.R. No. L.-22328.1anuary 30, 197t, 37 se RA 190
(!971) , it was held th at as the price at which the defen cL'lnt sold the jeep was only
' 1,000.00. the actiun was within the originat jurisdiction of the munic ipal cOurt.
28G. R. No. L-28235. January 30. 1971. 37 Se RA 327 (1971 ).
1972]
REMEDIAL LAW
219
220
[VOL, 47
matively allege that the approval of the Department of Justice had not been
previously secured and that the exercise of authority over the case by the
aforesaid branch was not demanded by the interest of the administration
of justice~ In the case at bar, this was not done.
Reaffirmed in Espanilla v. La Carlota Sugar Centra[36 is the rule that
under the Industrial Peace Act, Sec. 5 (a), the Court of II).dustrial Relations
has jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices.
Also reafilrmed in LurU[ v. Pacis 37 is the rule that Republic Act No.
1125, Sec. 7, which took effect on June 16, 1954, gave the Court of Tax
Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal, decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs, involving seizure, detention or release of
property affected x x x or other matters arising under the Customs Law or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs.
The ruling in Spouses Gonzales and Yusay v. Province of Iloitdls is to
the effect that where an assessment is disputed for whatever ground or improper, illegal or void, or excessive or unreasonable, the action challenging
the assessment after first exhausting the administrative remedy of appeal
to the assessment appeals board and regardless of whether the corresponding
real estate tax has been paid and refund sought, pertains to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tax court to the exclusion of the courts of first instance.
It was held in Sabulao V da. de D ecena v. Han. De Los Angeles3 9 that
since 6 years, 11 months and 10 days had elapsed since the decision of
the respondent court of first instance became final , the second demolition
order was void, as the court a quo had ceased to have jurisdiction to execute
the dormant judgment upon mere motion.
Reiterated in Sefieres v. Hon. Frias4 is the rule that the customs authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction ove r goods sought to be imported into
the Philippines, for the purpose of enforcement of Philippine customs laws,
from the moment the goods are actually under their possession and control,
even if no warrant for seizure or detention thereof wa~ previously issued
by the port collector of customs.
HOoey v. Aurelio & Co., Inc.i1 reiterates the established rule that when
a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there
for declsion, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding
of fact made by the trial court. The .only questions that may be raised are
those of law. However, following the ruling laid down in Justo v. Hernando 42
and considering the provision of Section 2, Republic Act No. 5440, further
36 G.R.. No. L-23722, Ma rch 31 , 1971 , 38 seRA 186 (1971) .
37 G .R. No. L-24237, March 31 , 1971 , 38 SeRA 189 (1971) .
38 G.R . No. 1.-24663 , March 31 , 1971 , 38 seRA 209 (1971).
39 G.R. No. 1.-29317 , M:J Y 29 , 1971 , 39 seRA 94 (1971) .
40G.R. Nos. L-32921-40, June 10, 1971 , 39 SCRA 533 (1971).
41G.R. No. L-31111 , June 30, 197 1, 39 SeRA 658 (1971).
42 89 Pill i. 268 (1951).
1972]
REMEDIAL LAW
22l
amending the J udiciary Act of 1948, the Supreme Court was constrained to
refe r the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In Union Obrera de Tabaco v. QJliclw,n the mischief sought to be re
moved was the flaunting by the defendants of the right of membersh ip of
the Union to change its leaders. It was ruled that the actionable wrong was
withi n the exclusive jUrisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, and
that the Court of First Instance had no power to hear the case.
TIle ruling in Ut/eg v. A rccr'4 is that on ly the Bureau of Forestry has
jurisdiction to grant licenses for the laking of forest products, pursuant to
Section 1816 of the Revised Admini st rative Code.
People v. Sa/anga <15 reiterates the settled rule that jurisd iction is vested
in the court, not in the judge. Any of the branches of the Court of First
Instance of 1I0cos Sur has jurisdiction to try and decide the said cases-the
c rimes involved therein being those of murder and frustrated murder and the
accused were al l validly brought before the court for trial. Under Section 7,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the assignment of cases to the different
branches of the court, or the- transfer, may be done by raffle or upon accord
among the judges. What is required is that the parties a re given notice so
that they may be present when the raffle is made or when the transfer from
one branch to another is ordered by a judge.
In Associllted Lahar Union v. Judge Cf//1.,~6 it was ruled that the fact
th at when the complaint for damages was filed in the court of firs t instance
no formal charge for unfair labor practice against any of the parties had as yet
been presented in the Cou rt of Industrial Relations. or that the Union's
charge against the company was subsequently withdrawn, would not affect
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to take cogn izance of
the labor dispu te. It may be pointed out that at the time the unfair labor
practice aga inst the Un ion 41 for having declared an illegal strike was al
ready pending in the Court of InduSlJ'ial Relalions.
Holding that the order of transfer of Case No. V-I0874 was null and
void in Osmriia Jr. v. Secretary of Jusrice,n the Supreme ' Courti concluded
that while Memorandum Circular No. 53 of the Department of J ustice does
not, on its face, si ngle out the anti-graft case against the petitioner, the I'
culiar facts surrounding the transfer of the said case to the circuit court
lead to no other conclusion than that thc transfer to the Circuit Court was
in effect one of a preselccted case.
~3 G.R. No.
4~G . R.
46 G.R.
~6 G.R.
47 Case
4I1G .R.
222
[VOL. 47
The ruling in Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan '5 1 is that whilej it is true! that
the jurisdiction of the Court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, yet where tenancy is, averred
as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court
should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
The six (6) cases of Minrapco v. Omandam, Dominguez v. Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co., Glipo v. Alatco, Democratic Labor Union v. Hon. Villasor,
Manila Cordage Workers' Union v. Han. Reyes, and National Mines and
Allied Worker's Union v. Hon. Quichci'2 involved a common basic issue,
namely, which court has jurisdiction over the same, the Court of First Instance or the Court of Industrial Relations. Since said cases involved labor
disputes, it was held that the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction
over them.
It was held in DUllop v. Court of Appeals 53 that a Court of First
Instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cogG.R. No. L-20442, October 4, 1971 , 41 SeRA 2'67 (1971) .
98 Phil. 856 (1956).
51 G.R. Nos. L-27897-98 , October 29 , 1971 , 42 SCRA 89 (1971).
62 G.R. No. 1...-23058, November 27, 1971 , 42 SeRA 250 (1971); G.R. No. L23473, November 27 , 1971 , 42 SeRA, 250. (1971) ; G .R. No. L-23871 , Novemberi 'lfT,
1971,42 seRA 250 (1971) ; G.R. No. 1...-24232, November 27, 1971,42 SeRA 251
(1971); G.R. No. 1...-24718, November 27. 1971, 42 SeRA 251 (1971); and G.R. No.
L-24956, November 27, 1971, 42 SeRA 251 (1971) .
53 Supra , note 1.
49
50
1972]
REMEDIAL tAW
223
nizance of, and to act in, a suit 10 annul a final a nd executory judgment
or order relldered by another court of first instance or by another branch
of the same court.
Mas v. Dumara-olf4 would give the impression thaI when a suit to
annul the judgment of a court of first instance or of a branch thereof is
filed with another court of fi rst instance or another branch of the same
court, the gueslioll of jurisdiction mevitably comes up. T his question was
squarely ruled upon in Vda. de Ursua v. Pelayo~ where it was held that the
said view is untenable, for the jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines,
as fa r as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of the litigation,
is defined in the Revised J udiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first
instance shall havo exclusive jurisdiction over civi l cases the subject matter
of which are not capablc of pecuniary estimation, and an 1action for annulment of a judgmen t and an order of a court of justice belongs to this
category. It was noted that Momesa v. Mallila Cordage C O. 56 is not in point,
for the! issue in volved therein was whether Ihe Court of First Instance may
indirectly-not in an action for the specific purpose of annulling a judgment- and by interlocutory order, or a writ of preliminaliy injunct ion, set
aside an attachment levied in pursuance of an order issued in another case
pendi~g bc[ore another branch of the same court.
The policy of judicial stability, whieh underlies the doctrine laid down
in Dwnara-og case,GO should be held subordinate to an orderl y administration of justice based on th e existing rules of procedure and the law. In
Garelli!orella I'. SQlein,61 the Supreme Court said:
~4G.R . No. L- 1625 2. September 29. 1964.12 SCRA 34 ( 1964) .
65 107 Phi l. 622 ( 1960) .
66 G .R. No. LA559, September 19. 1952.
S7 30~A AM. JUR. Judgmelll.T. Sec. fl3 1 cit ing T urgeon v. Bean. t09 Me. 189.
83 A. 5.~7 ( 1913) an d Brown v. Harding. 170 N. C. 253, 86 S.E. 1010 (1917).
&S id.
U G.R. No. L-22488. October 26, 1967. 21 SCRA 519 ( 1967).
60 Supru , nOle 54.
6174 Phil. 25. 32 ( 1942 ).
224
(VOL. 41
v.
A. Extension tu file
N aga Del'eloplllem Corpo}(ltion I'. Courl of Appeals 6Z reiterates the
10ngseUied rule that the granting of additional time within which to file
an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
B. MOlions
It was restated in Vda. tie Azarias 1'. /1 011. Maddl.la 63 that a motion
which docs not meet the requirement of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rul es of Court is a worthless piece of paper wh ich the Clerk has no
right to receive and the respondent courl a 'Ilia has no aut hority to act
upon .64
C. Notice
The ruli:1g in Citizen's Surety & InSl/rance Co. v. Han M elencio-H.cr
65
rera is to the effect that the proper course for a credi tor in the same
situation as the petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the
resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be
attached under Rule 57, Sec. I (), in which case, the attachment converts
62 G .R.
63G.R.
64 PNB
6fiG.R.
1972]
REMEDIAl. I.AW
225
the action into a proceeding ill rem or quasi in rem and the summons by
publication may then be accordingly deemed valid and effective. It was
added that because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also
quite adept at concealing their properties, the dismissal of the case below
by the respondent Judge sho uld be sel aside and the case held pending
in the court's archives, until the petit ioner as plaintiff succeeds in deter
mining the whcreabouts of: lhe defendant's person or properties.
Domingo de LO/Jez I' . Aquino and COllrt of Appeals S6 reiterates the
rule that notice on counsel of record at his address of record is valid.
D. Trials, defall/IS, due process
A. Disqualification
In Geotina v. H OIl. Gon zalez,6\! it was held that the refusal of the
respondent judge to disqualify himself and his insistence to hear the crimi
nal case in the face of the exprcss prohibition contai ned in Section I of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court constitutes grave abuse o[ discretion amount
ing to exccss or lack of jurisdictioIL
But it was also held in Be/Irall v. Judge Garcia10 mat mere suspicion
that respondents are partial to the accused is not enough. There should be
evidence to prove the charge.
B. Premu/
No.
No.
No,
No.
No.
No.
226
[VOL. 47
C. Consolidation
It was held in Raymllndo 1'. Felipe IS that the tri al court erred in its
rc(usal to consolidate the two cases, wh ich consolidation should have been
ordered as allowed under Section I of Rule 31 of the Revised Ru les of
Court.
D. Dismill"(11
Zenith Films, Inc. I' . /1on. Herrera H rct>latcs the rule thilt while it
devolves upon the court itsel f to observe the time limita tion thus flXed when
it issuell the summons, the clear i'mpoI1 of Section 4, Rule 5, is that the
defendant has up to the date set for trial within which to file his answer
to the complaint.
1972J
REMEDIAL LAW
227
upon the face of the complaint. Such inconsistency suffices to render the
ground for the motion to dismiss doubtfu!.76
E. Validity of judgment
In Solis v. Court of Appeals,77 it was held that it is firmly established
228
[VOL. 41
by the petitio ners for mandamus and prohibi tion wit h preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Man ila forecloses the right of
petitioners to fi le th is pet ition with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
Along the same line are the ful ings in Rasuy-LaJwz v. Leonor,S3 Go
011 v. ViVO,84 and Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Ullion I'. Dy PlIck & Co.} {nc. 85
H . A ctiol! NJI judgmems
In PItiIi,Jpine Refining Co. v. F fores,86 the company c hallenged the jurisdiction of the respondent court to enforce its 1947 judgment on the ground
that more than five years had passed since it became fi nal when the petilion for that purpose was fi led on December 28, 1956. It was held that
the petition below was not a mere motion for execution but a n act io n to
enfo rce the judgmen t within the meaning of Section 6 of Rule 39 of thl!
Rules of Court then in fo rce.
VII. A r PEA.l S
holds
that fail ure to fil e an appeal bond on time would be liS fatal as fa ilure
to fil e a record on a ppea l. Service of such record o n appeal on the ad verse
sa G.R.
84 G. R.
MG.R.
SG G.R.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Jrj G. R. No.
88See Rep.
siG. R. No.
9O G.R. No.
DO
1972]
REMEDIAL LAW
229
VIII.
A. Ejectment
230
[VOL. 47
duties of the office. TI1C reason for Ihis limitation is that title to public
office cannot be ]eft to continued uncertainty.
C. D eclaratory ,.elie!
The Supreme Court found in Jimell ez. 1'. ROlIf17 that the petitioner's
petition fail ed to make out a proper case for declaratory relief. This is
patent from the prayer of the petition , whereby he petitioned the lower
court "to exercise its power to determine the validity of peti tioner's ap
pointment should it be aUested pending final disposition o[ the criminal
case against herein pet it ion for alleged violation of section 2753 of the
Revised Administrat ive Code."
D . Certiorari
l n issuing the writ in Fernandez 1'. Ta iiada,98 the Supreme Court found
th at the lower court, in ordering the demolition at the stage of the proceed
ing in questi on, acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Di smiss in g the petition in Gllera,.a 1'. H ermoso,99 the Supreme Court
restated the sculed rule that where appea l as an ndeq uate remedy has been
lost through the petitioner's (;lUlt or negligence, he will not be permitted
to avail of certiorari as a substitutc for an appeal.
lX.
EXECUTION
A . Pendillg appeal
Tn Cucharo v. N Oli. SlIbi(/o ,IOO it was held that the Civil Service Com
missioner has the discretion to order the immediate execution in the public
interest of his decision pending appeal.
Concerning an ejectment proceeding is Bo,.dell v. H Oll. H Ofl/allosas 101
where the petitioners had fail ed not only to post a supersedeas bond but
also to pay the monthl y rentals adjudged by the Ci ty Court for their use
of the property, which failure makes it mandatory upon the lower cou rt to
order the immediate execution of the decision.
B. Whell appealable
The ruling in H eirs of J.D. F rancisco 1'. H OIl. MlniozPalma 102 is that
while it is true th at, as a general rule, an order o[ execution of a final judgment is not appealable, it is also recognizc:::d thai the rule is subject to
two excepti ons, v.z. : (I) when the order of execution varies aT tends to
S7 G.R. No. L-30496, May 31. 1971. 39 SCRA 329 (1971 ).
98G.R. No. L-31673. June 30. 1971. 39 SCRA 662 (1971).
9I1 G.R. No. L-2824]' Augml 6. 1971. 40 SCRA 335 (1971) .
IOOG.R . No. L-27887, February 22. 1971. 37 SCRA 523 (1971) .
101 S UPUl , nOle 95.
IO!G. R. No. L28746, February 27, t9 71 , 37 SCRA 753 (1971).
1972]
231
vary the tenor of the judgment, and (2) when the terms of the judgment
are not clear enough so that there remains room for interpretat ion thereof
by the trial cou rt. In such instances, appe:ll is to be allowed to the party
who may fee l aggrieved by the order of execution thus issued. In the present
case. it was noted tha t the decision left a number of things to be done, any
of which would involve the use of discretion .
C. Novatiol1
01
jUlIemems
Slindico v. HOIl. Piguing 103 restates the rule that courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions to q uash previously issued writs of execution
beeause courts have the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to
correct the errors of their ministerial officers and to control their processes.
In the instant case, the payment of the judgment debt by the respondent
although in a reduced amount but accepted by the petitioners as "in full
satisfaction of the money judgment ", warrants the quashal of the alias writ.
103G. R. No. L-2611S, November 29, t971, 42 SC RA 322 (1971).