BOA vs meralco

Poles
-

was used to denote the steel towers of an electric company engaged in the
generation of hydro-electric power generated from its plant

Facts:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board
of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street
railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila.

G.R. No. L-47943 May 31, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan

Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission
wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission
wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel
towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its hydro- electric plant in the
province of Laguna to the City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40
of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property
tax under Tax.

vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF
BATANGAS and PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Respondent paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court
of Tax Appeals

This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by
Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex
(Phil.), Inc. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They have a total capacity of
566,000 barrels. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants.

Issue:

According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the
spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer, a
sand pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt stratum as the top
layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer,

Whether or not the Meralco poles constitute real properties so as they can be
subjected to a real property tax.

Held:
The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of
paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers
were considered personalty because they were removable and merely attached to
square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when
unscrewed and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.

Note:

The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular wall made of concrete,
eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from sliding. Hence, according to Meralco, the tank is not
attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom
plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank
merely sits on its foundation. Each empty tank can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location
with water four feet deep. (pp. 29-30, Rollo.)
On the other hand, according to the hearing commissioners of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, the area where the two tanks are located is enclosed with earthen dikes with electric
steel poles on top thereof and is divided into two parts as the site of each tank. The foundation of
the tanks is elevated from the remaining area. On both sides of the earthen dikes are two separate
concrete steps leading to the foundation of each tank.
Tank No. 2 is supported by a concrete foundation with an asphalt lining about an inch thick.
Pipelines were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the Manila
Enterprises Industrial Corporation whose buildings and pumping station are near Tank No. 2.
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself and
the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the
pipelines are attached to the tanks. (pp. 60-61, Rollo.) In 1970, the municipal treasurer of Bauan,
Batangas, on the basis of an assessment made by the provincial assessor, required Meralco to

pay realty taxes on the two tanks. For the five-year period from 1970 to 1974, the tax and penalties
amounted to P431,703.96 (p. 27, Rollo). The Board required Meralco to pay the tax and penalties
as a condition for entertaining its appeal from the adverse decision of the Batangas board of
assessment appeals.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals (composed of Acting Secretary of Finance Pedro M.
Almanzor as chairman and Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development Jose Roo as members) in its decision dated
November 5, 1976 ruled that the tanks together with the foundation, walls, dikes, steps, pipelines
and other appurtenances constitute taxable improvements.
Meralco received a copy of that decision on February 28, 1977. On the fifteenth day, it filed a
motion for reconsideration which the Board denied in its resolution of November 25, 1977, a copy
of which was received by Meralco on February 28, 1978.
On March 15, 1978, Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's decision
and resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave error of
law in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.

regarded as personal property(84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things
classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
The case of Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Company, 119 Phil. 328, wherein
Meralco's steel towers were held not to be subject to realty tax, is not in point because in that case
the steel towers were regarded as poles and under its franchise Meralco's poles are exempt from
taxation. Moreover, the steel towers were not attached to any land or building. They were
removable from their metal frames.
Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil.
501, where the tools and equipment in the repair, carpentry and blacksmith shops of a
transportation company were held not subject to realty tax because they were personal property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The Board's questioned decision and resolution are
affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property
enumerated in article 415 of the Civil Code and, therefore, they cannot be categorized as realty by
nature, by incorporation, by destination nor by analogy. Stress is laid on the fact that the tanks are
not attached to the land and that they were placed on leased land, not on the land owned by
Meralco.
This is one of those highly controversial, borderline or penumbral cases on the classification of
property where strong divergent opinions are inevitable. The issue raised by Meralco has to be
resolved in the light of the provisions of the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, and the
Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464 which took effect on June 1, 1974.
Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including
land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof.
This provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real Property Tax Code which provides:
Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. They shall be levied, assessed and collected in all
provinces, cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as land,
buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property not hereinafter
specifically exempted.
The Code contains the following definition in its section 3:
k) Improvements is a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition,
amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and
intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.
We hold that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence
as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. Atlantic City,
15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which should generally be

Davao Saw Mill

Facts:
TheDavaoSawMillCo.,Inc.,istheholderofalumberconcessionfromtheGovernmentofthe
PhilippineIslands.IthasoperatedasawmillinthesitioofMaa,barrioofTigatu,municipalityof
Davao,ProvinceofDavao.However,thelanduponwhichthebusinesswasconductedbelongedtoanother
person.Onthelandthesawmillcompanyerectedabuildingwhichhousedthemachineryusedbyit.
Inanotheraction,whereintheDavaoLight&PowerCo.,Inc.,wastheplaintiffandtheDavao,
Saw,MillCo.,Inc.,wasthedefendant,ajudgmentwasrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffinthataction
againstthedefendantinthataction;awritofexecutionissuedthereon,andthepropertiesnowinquestion
werelevieduponaspersonaltybythesheriff.Nothirdpartyclaimwasfiledforsuchpropertiesatthetime
ofthesalesthereofasisborneoutbytherecordmadebytheplaintiffherein.
Issue:
Whetherornotthemachinerymountedonfoundationsofcementandinstalledbythelesseeonaleaseland
beregardedasrealproperty.
Held:
Themachinerywhichismovableinitsnatureonlybecomesimmobilizedwhenplacedinaplantbythe
ownerofthepropertyorplantbutnotwhensoplacedbyatenant,ausufructuary,oranypersonhavingonly
atemporaryright,unlesssuchpersonactedasagentoftheowner.
Immobilizationbydestinationorpurposecannotgenerallybemadebyapersonwhosepossessionof
propertyisonlyTEPORARY,otherwisewewillbeforcedtopresumethatheintendedtogivetheproperty
permanentlyawayinfavoroftheownerofthepremises.

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by
motor vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned
a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The
machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then
assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed to the

Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) sustained the same.
Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in remembering the important points of a case. It is still
advisable for any student of law to read the full text of assigned cases.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and
thus subject to a realty tax
Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and equipments are
not subject to the assessment of real estate tax.
Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not esential and
principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without
repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop
belonging to another.
INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V. RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26
September 1922)
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity
& Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property,
while another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and
registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the
mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez
and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property
RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the
property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a
personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All
personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the
document is sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the
mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any
other person, after reasonable inquiry and investigation, to identify the same. In the
case at bar, his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez,
located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine
Islands" is sufficient.
3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in
possession Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable
as neither the debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the property mortgaged, which
is, and since the registration of the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the
surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can
the mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in
question; as there was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date, but
not a mortgage upon property, and much less upon the property in question.

SIBAL v. VALDEZ
FACTS: The deputy sheriff of Tarlac attached and sold to Valdez the sugarcane planted
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for the redemption of the sugarcane. Valdez said
that it cannot be subject to redemption because it is a personal property.

ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real property.

HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana provided that standing crops are considered as part of the land to which
they are attached but the immovability provided for is only one in abstract. The
existence of a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as
it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein.
-A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs
to the lessee and may be sold by him.
-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as personal property.
Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when produced by annual
cultivation, is not part of realty.
Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by Sec. 450 of Code of
Civil Procedure and Act no. 1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and
execution and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of
personal property.
VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY, represented by M.O.
Leoncia Pacquing, R.V.M., respondents.
Elpedio N. Cabasan for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, 1 affirming in toto that of the Trial Court, 2 the
petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the factual
determination that she had sold the lot in controversy to private respondent, and (2) the legal
conclusion that neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitution disqualifies the corporation known as
the Religious of the Virgin Mary, from acquiring the land in question and registering it in its name.
In light of the time-honored rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final, and
the doctrine lately laid down by this Court on the precise legal issue now raised by petitioner, her
appeal must fail.
The controversy at bar arose in connection with cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of
Lands, in behalf of the Republic, for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land
measuring 261.5791 hectares, divided into 1,419 lots, situated in the City of Iligan. 3
Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented an answer to the petition. She
alleged that she was the owner, by purchase, of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries
comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No. 1272, measuring 256 square meters, and Lot
1273 a road lot, measuring 21 square meters; and that as owner, she had been in possession of
both lots for fifteen (15) years, and her predecessors-in-interest, for sixty (60) years. 4 Title to the
same parcels of land was however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin Mary. 5 In its answer, it
averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as
owner thereof for over four years, and its possession and that of its predecessors was immemorial.
Evidence was received on these conflicting assertions after which the Cadastral Court rendered
judgment, declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in
truth sold Lot No. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12,
1956 (Exhibit 1), and Lot No. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of Iligan. The
judgment contained the following dispositive portion, viz: 6
WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272, Iligan Cadastre, to the
Religious of the Virgin Mary, a duly registered domestic religious corporation, the members of
which are all Filipino citizens, with main office in the City of Manila, but the building existing
thereon is hereby declared to be the property of claimant Victoria Ong de Ocsio who is hereby
ordered to remove Said building out of the premises within 90 days from date hereof. The claim of
Victoria Ong de Ocsio with respect to said cadastral lot is dismiss. No pronouncement is made as
to costs.

Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this decision shall have become final.
As aforestated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the cadastral court's decision in toto. So, too, will this
Court.
Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion, after analysing and
weighing the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, that Virginia Ong de
Ocsio's version of the facts was not true-that it was another property, not Lot No. 1272, that she
had conveyed to the religious corporation but that it was indeed Lot No. 1272 that was subject of
the sale and had indeed been transferred to the latter. Now, findings of fact of this sort, contained
in a decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and uniformly observed rule conclusive on the
parties and on the Supreme Court, as well; 7 subject only to a few specified exceptions, 8 none of
which obtains here, said findings may not be reviewed on appeal.
As regards the issue of law raised by her, petitioner fares no better. Citing Manila Electric Co. v.
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (1982), in
relation to Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, she asserts that as the private
respondent is a religious corporation, it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural persons. The
cited rulings no longer control. Current doctrine, first announced by the Court en banc in Director of
Lands v. I.A.C. 146 SCRA 509 (1986), is that open, continuous and exclusive possession of
alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure
converts the land to private property, and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may
have title thereto confirmed in its name. Virtually the same state of facts obtained in said case that
now obtain here. A private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from
parties who had, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, possessed and
occupied it since time immemorial. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. In upholding its right to do so, the court held that the
fact that the proceedings had been instituted by said purchaser in its own name and not in the
name of the transferors was "xx simply xx (an) accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed." The ruling was reaffirmed in two later cases, Director of Lands
v. Manila Electric Co., 153 SCRA 686 (September 11, 1987), and Republic v. C.A., 156 SCRA 344
(October 30, 1987) where the same question of law was raised. In the latter it was expressly held
that the prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands
by or in behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private
ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the present case,
Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. 1272 for the
period and under the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public
land prior to the sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary, confirmation of title thereto
in the latter's name is, under the precedents referred to, entirely in order.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review on certiorari
is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner.

Menchavez vs. Teves

Facts:
On February 28, 1986 a Contract of Lease of a Fishpond was executed between the
plaintiffs, as lessor and the respondent as lessee. On June 2, 1988 the fishpond dikes
constructed by respondent was demolished as ordered by Cebu RTC. As a result, he
filed a Complaint for damages alleging that petitioners violated their contract of lease
specially the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of property for the entire duration of
the contract. The RTC declared the Contract as void and declared both parties in pari
delicto. The CA however reversed the decision. Thus the present appeal.
Issue:
Are the parties of the Contract of Lease in Pari delicto?

Ruling:
Under the 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all lands of the public domain,
waters, fisheries and other natural resources belong to the State. 18Included here are
fishponds, which may not be alienated but only leased, thus making the Contract of
Lease void. We apply the maxim NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET - meaning ONE
CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE. Petitioners are applicants of the fishponds.
Even if the State grants them the lease, the law also prohibits sublease of the
fishponds.
The parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault and the law deny them aid for any
claims against the other and courts leave them as they are. However Article 1412 of
the Civil Code provides the exception.
"Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
"(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others
undertaking;
"(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he
has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been
promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has
given without any obligation to comply with his promise."
The petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18, ROXAS CITY, CAPIZ, RIZAL RECIO, TERESITA
RECIO, PACIENCIA RECIO, and HEIR OF OSCAR RECIO, HARRIET VILLANUEVA vda. DE
RECIO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS, ROXAS CITY, CAPIZ, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, filed by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (RP), seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision1 dated May 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, 18th Division, in CA-G.R. SP No.
72691. The Court of Appeals had dismissed RPs petition for annulment of judgment2 of the
Decision3 dated September 14, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,
which ordered the confirmation and registration of title to Lot No. 900 of the Pilar Cadastre, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 50963 located at Marita, Pilar, Capiz in the names of the applicants and
private respondents herein Rizal Recio, Teresita L. Recio, Paciencia L. Recio, and the only heir of
Oscar L. Recio, his mother, Harriet Villanueva Vda. de Recio.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On September 14, 1984, said RTC rendered a decision in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N785 granting the Application for Registration of Title4 dated June 20, 1977 filed by Rizal Recio for
himself and in behalf of his brother Oscar Recio and sisters Teresita Recio and Paciencia Recio.
The RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the confirmation and registration of title to
land, Lot No. 900 of Pilar Cadastre, LRC Cadastral Record No. 50963 situated in Marita,
Municipality of Pilar, Province of Capiz, Island of Panay, described in the technical description
(Exhibit "E") and the approved plan AP-06-000028 (Exhibit "X") in the names of the applicants
Rizal Recio, of legal age, married to Alita B. Laada, with residence in Loctugan Hills, Roxas City;
Teresita L. Recio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pio Acelentaba and a resident of Panay, Capiz;
Paciencia L. Recio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Nestor Donado and a resident of Dayao,
Roxas City, and to the only heir of Oscar L. Recio, his mother Harriet Villanueva Vda. de Recio,
who is of legal age, Filipino, a widow and a resident of Roxas City, and a decree may issue after
this decision shall have become final.

SO ORDERED.5
The abovementioned decision became final, and pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-21076 covering the 11,189-square meter piece of land, was issued in the Recios
names on April 17, 1985.
In 1997, a number of occupants of Lot No. 900, namely Joselito Alba, Virginia Bengora, Teodosia
Alba, Celso Bullos, Elizabeth Barrosa, Noel Gallardo, Paquita Ducit and Arturo Borleo filed a
protest before the DENR, Roxas City against the issuance of OCT No. 0-2107 on the ground that
the land covered therein is within forest lands or timberlands, hence it cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
Acting on the protest, Lorna L. Jomento, Special Investigator II of the Lands Management
Department (LMD), DENR, Region VI, Iloilo City conducted an ocular inspection and investigation
on the status of Lot No. 900.
On January 19, 1998, Jomento rendered a written report7 that Lot No. 900 falls within the forest
lands of Project No. 20-A, established on January 17, 1986 under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1777, per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3132.8 Jomento recommended that an action be
instituted in the proper court for the cancellation of OCT No. 0-2107.
On September 9, 2002, RP, represented by the DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
Decision dated September 14, 1984 on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
title over the subject parcel of land which forms part of the public forest. 9 In the petition, the OSG
cited Section 1410 of Presidential Decree No. 152911 which allows the court to adjudicate only
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of those who have successfully
acquired title to said lands by acquisitive prescription. The OSG argued that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudicated the subject land which is forest land and, accordingly,
its decision is null and void.12
In their Answer to the Petition for Annulment of Judgment,13 the Recios argued that the RTC of
Roxas City, Branch 18 has jurisdiction over the case. They contended that petitioner hastily and
negligently filed the petition without first examining the records of LRC No. N-785 and despite its
knowledge of their duly approved Plan LRC-SWO-14402 for Lot No. 900 of the Pilar Cadastre.
They pointed out that said approved plan clearly showed that Lot No. 900 was not within LC
Project No. 20-A, but LC Project No. 20 which was duly certified as alienable and disposable on
September 28, 1960 as per BFD Map LC-2401. They also argued that the Decision dated
September 14, 1984, has been declared final and executory, and OCT No. 0-2107 has been
issued on April 17, 1985, in their names. Hence, LRC No. N-785 is already a closed case and res
judicata has set in.14
On September 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution15 directing the Executive Judge
of the RTC in Roxas City to conduct a pre-trial conference and reception of evidence. However,
since the Executive Judge presides in the same branch where the decision in LRC No. N-785 was
rendered, the incident was assigned by raffle to another judge in the RTC of Roxas City.16 In a
Report and Recommendation17 dated December 13, 2005, Judge Juliana C. Azarraga, RTC of
Roxas City, Branch 15, recommended that the petition for annulment of judgment be
dismissed.1avvphi1
Subsequently, on May 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of sufficient
evidence. The decision states:
After going over the evidence offered by both parties, the Court finds it proper to dismiss the
petition.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently prove its allegation that Lot 900 forms part of the forest lands of the
public domain. The evidence offered by the petitioner that Lot 900 falls within forest lands consists
only of the testimonies of its two witnesses, the written report of Lorna Jomento (Exhibit A), and the
ordinary photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900 (Exhibit E) and the verification (Exhibit E-1)
appearing on it.

The mere photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900 (Exhibit E) as well as the verification (Exhibit E1) appearing thereon is without probative value and inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the best
evidence rule. In Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:
"The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had.
Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, the photocopy must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an
inadmissible evidence."
The testimonies of petitioners two witnesses and the written report of Lorna Jomento, a Special
Investigator, stating that based on the records Lot 900 falls within the forest lands reserved for
fishpond created under Project 20-A dated January 17, 1986 under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1777 per Land Classification Map No. 3132 do not overcome the Certification (Exhibit 1-D
for private respondents) dated November 8, 1976 of the then Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources (now DENR, the representative of herein petitioner) certifying
that Lot 900 falls within the alienable and disposable land Block LC Project No. 20 of Pilar, Capiz
certified as such on September 28, 1960 per BFD Map LC-2401. If, indeed, Lot 900 falls within the
forest lands reserved for fishpond purposes created under Project 20-A dated January 17, 1986
under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1777 per Land Classification Map No. 3132, petitioner
should have presented such land classification map indicating that Lot 900 lies therein and not in
Block LC No. 20 of Pilar Cadastre per BFD Map LC-4201 as stated in the Certification dated
November 8, 1976 of the then Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources.
Thus, for failure of the petitioner to adduce sufficient evidence to prove its allegation that Lot 900
falls within the forest lands the petition has to be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18, IN ROXAS
CITY BECAUSE:
A. SAID RTC JUDGMENT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AS IT ALLOWED THE
REGISTRATION OF INALIENABLE LAND IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
B. PETITIONER HAD DISCHARGE[D] THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE INALIENABLE
AND INDISPOSABLE CHARACTER OF SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND BY THE QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW.19
Simply stated, the issues raised are: (1) Did the RTC act without jurisdiction in allowing the
registration of the subject land? And (2) Did petitioner fail to discharge the burden of establishing
the inalienable character of the land?
Petitioner, through the OSG, contends in its Memorandum20 that it is a well-entrenched rule that
the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not of the courts.21 In this case, it was ascertained in the investigation conducted
by Special Investigator Jomento that the land in question falls within the forest land reserved for
fishpond purposes created under Project No. 20-A dated January 17, 1986, under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1777 per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3123 dated August 25,
1983. The land, therefore, is inalienable and indisposable and can never be subject to
appropriation. The OSG reiterates that under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, the court is allowed to
adjudicate only "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" in favor of those who have
successfully acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription. In adjudicating forest land in favor of
the private respondents, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 18 exceeded its jurisdiction, and its
decision confirming title to the subject land in favor of private respondents is null and void and
should have been annulled by the Court of Appeals.22 Petitioner also argues that the claim of

private respondents that the present appeal is barred by res judicata is incorrect since the present
petition ultimately seeks the nullification of the decision of the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 18,
allowing the registration of inalienable land in their favor.23
The OSG also argues that it had discharged the burden of establishing the inalienable character of
the subject parcel of land by the quantum of evidence required. The actual presentation of LC Map
No. 3132 is no longer necessary because the determination of the nature and character of public
land in a land investigation conducted by government authorities on land classification is binding
on the courts.24 It further argues that Special Investigators Lorna L. Jomento and Eugenio B.
Bernas were merely performing their official duties as special land investigators of the LMD,
DENR, Region VI, in Iloilo City when they conducted an investigation on the land in question;
hence, in the absence of any evidence showing that said special investigators were biased in favor
of one party, their testimonies and the investigation report should be accorded the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties as public officers.25
Private respondents, in their Memorandum26 dated June 14, 2007, for their part maintain that the
Decision dated September 14, 1984 had become final, the Land Registration Commission had
issued a final decree of registration after one year and OCT No. 0-2017 was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Capiz in their names on May 14, 1985. The decision in LRC No. N-785 has therefore
become the law between RP, the applicants and the whole world, and is already a closed case that
could no longer be revived in subsequent unnecessary litigations. 27
As to the first issue, did the RTC act without jurisdiction in allowing the registration of inalienable
land?
Petitioner contends that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in allowing the registration of the subject
land because the land is forest land and thus, inalienable. Verily, jurisprudence is replete with
cases which iterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation,
and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property.28
If indeed the subject land is forest land, then the decision of the RTC is void. A void judgment may
be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the
same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such judgment in any action or
proceeding wherein it is invoked.29
Moreover, an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property registered in favor of any
party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never prescribes. Verily, nondisposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State
at any time and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to
dispose of such lands of the public domain.30
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however, we disagree with petitioner that the
subject land is inalienable.lawphil

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove its allegation that Lot No. 900
forms part of the forest lands of the public domain since its evidence consists only of the
testimonies of two witnesses, a written report of Jomento, and a photocopy of the sketch plan of
Lot No. 900. It ruled that a mere photocopy is without probative value and inadmissible in evidence
and petitioner should have presented a land classification map indicating where Lot No. 900 lies to
refute the Certification dated November 8, 1976 of the then Bureau of Forest Development.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals, based on the abovementioned findings of fact, is upheld by this
Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited
to reviewing or revising errors of law. The findings of facts of the latter are conclusive for it is not
the function of this Court to analyze and weigh such evidence all over again. 34 Our jurisdiction is in
principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of
Appeals. Factual findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final
and conclusive on this Court unless these findings are not supported by the evidence on record. 35
Finding no reason to deviate from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove its allegation that Lot No. 900 falls within forest lands, we affirm such
ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, Eighteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 72691 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

JEAN TAN vs Republic

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated July 6, 2009 and
Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88995. The facts leading to its filing are as follows:
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application
for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated
in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920 square meters.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The
petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
After trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners application,
thus:

At the time of application for registration of the subject land by the Recios in 1977, the land was
classified as alienable public land. The Recios presented a Certification31 dated November 8, 1976
from the then Bureau of Forest Development certifying that the subject land containing an area of
11,189 square meters and described as Lot No. 900, Pilar Cadastre is found to be within the
alienable and disposable land block of LC Project No. 20 of Pilar, Capiz certified as such on
September 28, 1960 per BFD Map LC-2401. In contrast, petitioner presented Jomentos report
which stated that Lot No. 900 falls within forest lands for fishpond development of Project 20-A,
established on January 17, 1986 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1777 per LC Map No.
3132.32

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default,
decrees and adjudges Lot No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters, Cad. 459-D, Indang Cadastre and its
technical description as herein above-described situated in Brgy. Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. 1529, as it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and
registered in the names of Jean Tan, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Room 54 T. Pinpin
St., Binondo, Manila; Roseller C. Anaci[n]to, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Moncario
Villag[e], Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo Espineda, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at
Cluster F. Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Panghulo
Road, Malabon, Metro Manila.

It is clear that at the time the Recios filed their application for registration of title in 1977 and at the
time the RTC rendered its decision in 1984, the land was not inalienable forest land but was
alienable land. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the land.
As to the second issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of establishing the inalienable character of the land.

Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator,
Land Registration Authority.

In an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgments nullity rests upon the
petitioner. The petitioner has to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment being
challenged is fatally defective.33

The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the assailed
Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years. The CA posit:

SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]

We now determine if appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite the fact that their
possession commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees possession over the subject
property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject property
became alienable and disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title
over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus, appellees possession
of the subject property fell short of the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
30 years.
Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their predecessors-ininterest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate possession in the concept of owner.
The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual possession are belied by the absence of evidence on
actual use of or improvements on the subject property. Appellees presented only various tax declarations to
prove possession. However, except for the Certification, showing payment of tax due on tax declaration for
the year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax
declarations were in fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest.
In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner. Appellees failed to discharge their duty of
substantiating possession and title to the subject land.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 July 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] (citation omitted)
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its August 12, 2010 Resolution.
[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]

The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA, alleging that the evidence they presented prove
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject property
for more than 30 years. The petitioners claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that they acquired
title over the subject property by prescription:
[if !supportLists]a.
that:

[endif]the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating

[if !supportLists]
i.
[endif]the petitioners have been in actual,
notorious and open possession of the subject property since the time they purchased the same in 1996;
[if !supportLists]
ii.
[endif]the petitioners have regularly paid the
taxes due on the subject property;
[if !supportLists]
iii.
[endif]the petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
Victorio Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula, had been in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years and had religiously paid the taxes due thereon; and
[if !supportLists]
iv.
[endif]the subject property is agricultural,
alienable and disposable;
[if !supportLists]b.
stating that:

[endif]the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena,

[if !supportLists]
i.
[endif]he resides near the subject property;
[if !supportLists]
ii.
[endif]he witnessed the execution of the deed of
sale that petitioners entered into with Gregonio Gatdula; and
[if !supportLists]
iii.
[endif]the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years;
[if !supportLists]c.
[endif]the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), stating that:

[if !supportLists]
i.
application was filed before the LRA;
[if !supportLists]
ii.
wrong with the petitioners application; and
[if !supportLists]
iii.
previously issued;

[endif]no opposition to the petitioners

[endif]an examiner of the LRA found nothing
[endif]no title covering the subject property was

[if !supportLists]d.
[endif]Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and
1974 in the name of Victorio Garcia;[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
[if !supportLists]e.
[endif]Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the
name of Felipe Gatdula;[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
[if !supportLists]f.
[endif]Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in
the name of Gregonio Gatdula;[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
[if !supportLists]g.
[endif]Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the
name of the petitioners;[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
[if !supportLists]h.
[endif]Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang,
Cavite, which approved the reclassification of several lots, including the subject property, from agricultural
to residential/commercial;[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
[if !supportLists]i.
[endif]DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000,
issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on July 13, 2000, which converted several parcels of land,
including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
[if !supportLists]j.
[endif]Certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) CALABARZON dated October 29, 2002, stating that the subject area falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map 3091 certified on June 21,
1983.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Issue
This Court is faced with the lone issue of whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the
benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Our Ruling
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act governs the classification and
disposition of lands forming part of the public domain. Section 11 thereof provides that one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Section 48 thereof enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title
over an alienable and disposable public land.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is a
codification of all the laws relative to the registration of property and Section 14 thereof specifies those who
are qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens
system. Particularly:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] and Republic
of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Section 14(1)
covers alienable and disposable lands while Section 14(2) covers private property. Thus, for ones possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the same should
have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that his possession and
occupation of private property has ripened to imperfect title, the same should have been for the prescriptive
period provided under the Civil Code. Without need for an extensive extrapolation, the private property
contemplated in Section 14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to Articles 420
and 422 of the Civil Code.
Going further, it was explained in Heirs of Malabanan and East Silverlane, that possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert it to
patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be
alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Thus:
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public
land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private
property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no
longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be
acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against
the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the
period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in
determining the completion of the prescriptive period.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The petitioners application is obviously anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they do not claim to
have possessed, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. That it was thru prescription that they had acquired an imperfect title over the subject property is the
foundation upon which the petitioners rest their application.

Unfortunately, this Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to be wanting. The petitioners failed
to demonstrate that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite manner,
which this Court explained as follows:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is
open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of
prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random such
as in this case. Indeed, how can the petitioners claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period be
ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year
period from 1961 to 2001? In Wee v. Republic of the Philippines,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] this Court stated that:
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980
and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of
intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax
declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of title. [if !
supportFootnotes][20][endif]
(emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
In East Silverlane, it was emphasized that adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an
owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on the
applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of
actual possession.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence, the same is futile and
frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration and do
not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the petitioners.
Such witnesses did not state what specific acts of ownership or dominion were performed by the petitioners
and predecessors-in-interest and simply made that general assertion that the latter possessed and occupied
the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all means, is a mere conclusion of law. The
RTC should have tackled evidence of such nature with a disposition to incredulity, if not with an outright
rejection.
Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed after only (1) year from the time the subject property may
be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued
by the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period
for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such date.
Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by
prescription. This is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted above and in
Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] which states:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership
and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. [if !supportFootnotes][23]
[endif]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The July 6, 2009
Decision and August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED