TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR.

THE PARISH
PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitionerappellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA
ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
FACTS:
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its
order of December 5, 1935. In addition to the devices contained therein, the will had a provision
to the effect that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who
would become a priest. It was stated therein that the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative
of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a
priest and he was excommunicated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose identity at the time of the testators death
cannot be ascertained, may be efficacious.
RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative
living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be
capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them
as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the
provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could
not have been his intention.
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time
of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or
was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew
entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and
receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor
died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his
desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally
alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood."
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the

unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was
likewise inoperative.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative,
it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists."
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to
the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should
be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.
ONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA, 29 SCRA 864,October 30, 1969
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on
May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title
remained in the donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the
donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he
refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and
won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his
younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano
stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
issued under respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In
1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two
lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription,
having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the
donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by

494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by
will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The
donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to
Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for
being inofficious.
HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of
dismissal sustained.
Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of
the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the
disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the
present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any
position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction
and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
ROLANDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA
FACTS: Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are half-blood siblings both asserting their
claim over a 39-square meter lot in Manila. It was registered in the name of their father who died
intestate in 1986. During his lifetime, Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter
accepted. By virtue of the deed of donation annotated on Gregorio's title, a transfer certificate of
title was issued in Rolando's name. In 1991 Constancia Santos filed with the RTC of Manila a
complaint for partition and reconveyance against Rolando alleging that during the lifetime of
their father, he denied having sold the subject lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in
1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. Rolando countered
that respondent's suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware of his possession of

the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by Gregorio.
Hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime. Affirmed on appeal are the findings of the
trial court which declared as invalid contract the Deed of Absolute Sale since it was not signed
by the parties nor registered in the Registry of Deeds and sustained as valid the deed of donation
as it was duly executed by the parties and registered.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the donation is inofficious
(2) Whether or not action of respondent is barred by prescription
RULING: (1) Yes. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Civil Code, a donation is inofficious if it
exceeds this limitation - no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may
give or receive by will. Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. At the time of
his death, he left no property other than the entire lot he donated to petitioner and that the
deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir.
The donation is therefore inofficious as it impairs respondent's legitime which, under Article 888
of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother.
Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being
entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.
(2) No. "Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime
(as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, as held in Imperial vs.
Court of Appeals but by ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce
inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair
the legitime of compulsory heirs. The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, which involved the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent, since it is only then that the net estate
may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. Since Gregorio died in
1986, respondent had until 1996 within which to file the action. She filed her suit in 1992, well
within the prescriptive period.
Garcia v. Calaliman , G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On his
death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his
late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion
Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled, Extra-judicial
Partition and Deed of Sale.
Heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the spouses Jose
Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents an action for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion
of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their
co-heirs to the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right of
legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.
Yes. Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains
exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive
method for written notification of redemption
ANGELA I. TUASON vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. GR# L3404, April 2, 1951
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother
Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by
Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves
was offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The
offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying
that if the property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken
advantage of her daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta
Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in
lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three co-owners
agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the
proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in
a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages,
dated June 30, 1941. Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6),
Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two coowners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he
was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc. The
pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three
co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and
curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to
finance the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of prices
and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other coowners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to
be subdivided, and execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was
also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that
remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising
expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including
expenses in instituting all actions to eject all tenants or occupants on the property;
and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio
Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and

collections made thereon. In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed
by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the
gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the
property, while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in
equal portions among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33 per cent
of the gross receipts. Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the
contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are reproducing them below: (9) This
contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be
necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small
and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being
understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there are no purchasers
thereof; (11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby
given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of
said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this
property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE
SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers
under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons; (15) No coowner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose
of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to
the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and
conditions as those offered by any other prospective purchaser. Should none of the
co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said
preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be
made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract;
provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be
bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the
GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the Araneta family, who
are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract
and/or their lawful heirs; On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the
powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a
letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged
breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of
powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said contract and
she asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20,
1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the
court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of
the same including rents collected during the time that the same including rents
collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said property. The suit was
administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr.,
one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he
evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a
co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence introduce,
oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Pea in a long
and considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to

costs. The plaintiff appealed from that decision, and because the property is valued
at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court. Some of the reasons
advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null
and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was
given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal
adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a
parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the
heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely
differed from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more
favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio
Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because
he was one of the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company
has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the
plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not
introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her
her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales. We have examined Exh. "L" and
compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court that
in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both contracts were
shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had every
opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or
disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio
Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of
Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the
party with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust.
According to the evidence Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks
covering her receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial,
Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received as
proceeds on the sale of the lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote
with approval that portion of the decision appealed from on these points: The
evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio Araneta in
connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above board. He
committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary relationship existing between
him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of
exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for
said copy contains all that appears now in exhibit 6. Plaintiff charges the defendant
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of the contract in that the defendant
corporation has failed (1) to make the necessary improvements on the property as
required by paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from
time to time schedule of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots are
to be sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of the
monthly gross collections from the sale of the property. The Court finds from the
evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has substantially
complied with obligation imposed by the contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and

that for improvements alone, it has disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has
likewise paid taxes, commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as
denied in the agreement. With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated has failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plains, list of
prices and the conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly
statement of collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it
has no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the
plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the
subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her. But without any
justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted
by the plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to
continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and other things. She had
shown on various occasions that she did not want to have any further dealings with
the said corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the
subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the
correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority coowners is binding upon all the three. The Court feels that recission of the contract
exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is
that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but
only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the
object of the parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. HawaiianPhilippine Co., 47 Phil. 821). As regards improvements, the evidence shows that
during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc.
although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment and gasoline
necessary for filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence
shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the lots during the Japanese
occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in Japanese military
notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankfull because
otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the receipts, which
currency later became valueles. But the main contention of the appellant is that the
contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly
paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art.
400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below: ART. 400.
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any
time, demand the partition of the thing held in common. Nevertheless, an
agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement. We agree with the
trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The
contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being
obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object
the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held
in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The
obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots
shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-

owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient
means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end
when the object of its creation shall have been attained. This aspect of the contract
is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or contract (Exh.
"L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into
partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We
repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the parties entering
into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable. Looking
at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground
for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done
by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel
held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained
unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent
had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in
the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that
Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement
may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there
should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within
the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400. We deem it unnecessary
to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal and which counsel for
appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we
have already said, we have viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing
aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations of the contract, and in
deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced that the trial court and this
Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious way the intentions and the
agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the
community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said parties. In
view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.