Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146683
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this
appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied
reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the
testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of
documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's
surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning
payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law
wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular
cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been
committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
was the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is
not correct and is a reversible error because it is based
on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the
chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the
evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in
Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993
ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of
evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes,
39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908,
and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records,
we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE;
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES
DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals
decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159521
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, Petitioner, v.
ERMINDA F. GONZALES,Respondents.
8.
White Plains
5.
Corolla 92 model
9.
Corinthian lot
6.
L-300 90 model
7.
P 10,000,000
8.
Pick-up 89 model
5,000,000
9.
18,000,000
10.
2,500,000
11.
8Tamaraws
30,000,000
None
10,000,000
7,000,000
12,000,000
P 6,000,000
10,000,000
80,000
5,000,000
150,000
23,000,000
500,000
Valuation of respondent
2,000,000
180,000
(Record,
24,000,000
350,000
15,000,000
220,000
10,000,000
100,000
None
300,000
p. 110)
p. 111)
None
1.
Acropolis property
2.
3.
4.
1.
Galant 83 model
5.
Sagitarius condominium
2.
6.
Office
3.
Coaster 77 model
7.
Greenmeadows lot
4.
Pajero 89 model
120,000
200,000
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner
used to beat respondent without justifiable reasons,
humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of
people and even in front of their children. He has been
afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder
characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger
The trial
P 1,150,000
6,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
12,500,000
2,250,000
P 47,750,000
2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model ---------------
500,000
350,000
200,000
P 1,050,000
P 20,500,000
2. Office -----------------------------
27,000,000
P 47,500,000
2) Personal:
80,000
150,000
180,000
220,000
100,000
300,000
120,000
SO ORDERED.
GONZALES VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 December 16 2005 [Article 147Property Regime of void marriage]
FACTS: After two years of living together, Francisco and
Erminda got married in 1979. Four children were born
from this union. During the time they lived together, they
acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza
business.
In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of
their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological
incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties. She managed their pizza
business and worked hard for its development. Mario
denied she was the one who managed the pizza business
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
"existing during their marriage."
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition
for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
69797, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of September 16,
2005, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for
Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by
the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent
Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then
the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the
services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between
Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being
a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together
in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of
their union, two children were born. However, after the
birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour
until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati
City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said
court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the
subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the
property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the
property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime
SO ORDERED.
We DENY.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went
on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein
arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that
she purchased the disputed property in her own name
February 6, 2007
February 6, 2007
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving
a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this
case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court
stated:
Facts:
defeat the purpose for which the motion was filed. The
fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely
incidental, it having been made pursuant to the desire of
respondent Tinitigan Sr. premised on the former's interest
over the disputed property as tenant therein. Quintin
Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and willingness
to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity
prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his preemptive right but he failed to exercise the same for one
reason or another. The urgency of the need to settle
pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could
immediately pay for the property Chiu, to whom the
property was subsequently offered, immediately paid the
full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's approval of
the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3,
1976 order is a reaffirmation of the order of September
29, 1975.
Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on
purely circumstantial ground that Pentel whose
President and General Manager is Quintin Lim, had the
option to buy the premises. While this may be so,
petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of
lease between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy has
been entered into in violation of Civil Code provisions. A
close scrutiny of the facts would reveal that Payumo has
contravened the law by encumbering the disputed
property as well as other conjugal properties without her
husband's consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code
provides that "the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in
cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the
administrative still her act of leasing the lots covered by
TCT No. 15923 and TCT No. 160998 is unjustified, being
violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code which states
that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an
administrative of the husband's property cannot alienate
or encumber the husband's property or that of the
conjugal partnership without judicial authority."
Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot
be invoked as a source of right or valid defense. True, the
contract may bind persons parties to the same but it
cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely because
he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of
Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217). So goes the "res inter
alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that a
The Issues
xxx
"1.
Whether or not the decision of the honorable
trial court dated February 5, 1985 exonerating (sic)
defendant husband, private respondent herein, from the
obligation contracted by the wife in the pursuit of her
business also absolves the conjugal partnership from
liability.
xxx
x x x.'
is not applicable in that -'This Code (Family Code) shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws (Art. 255, Family Code; underscoring supplied).'
Plaintiff (petitioner herein), having acquired a vested
right prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, said code
is not a propos (sic). Even granting arguendo that the
same is befitting, movant defendant failed to realize that
although Delilah Vinluan suffered losses in her legitimate
business, the experience she has gained redounded to
the benefit of the family, and as such, the conjugal
partnership must bear the indebtedness and losses (I
Paras 464, 1981 ed.). Moreover, had the business Delilah