PEOPLE V BALUTE

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA, AccusedAppellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant ArnelBalutey Villanueva
(Balute)assailing the Decision2 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 05649 which affirmed the Decision3 dated June 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 03-211951, finding Baluteguilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
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The Facts
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294(1) 4 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, the accusatory portion of which reads: 5
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Crim. Case No. 03-211951

That on or about March 22, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still
unknown and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at one SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS, forcibly
grabbing and snatching his Nokia 3210 cellular phone, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the same valued at P6,000.00 against his will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS in the aforesaid amount of P6,000.00
Philippine Currency; thereafter shooting said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS with an unknown
caliber firearm, hitting him at the back, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal gunshot wound
which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
According to the prosecution, at around 8 oclock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1
Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita
and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop
position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute
and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute
poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying putangina, ilabas mo! Thereafter, Balute
grabbed SPO1 Manaoiss mobile phone from the latters chest pocket and shot him at the left side of
his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he
was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital
where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention. 6
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In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He
maintained, inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol)
wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 oclock in the morning until 10:00 oclock in the
evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was busy working the entire time.
Nicol corroborated Balutes story, and imputed liability on Blaster and a certain Intoy.7
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The RTC Ruling

In a Decision8 dated June 11, 2012, the RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, in lieu of the
death penalty, as well as ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO1 Manaois the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P6,000.00 as compensatory damages for the value of the stolen mobile phone,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.)
from the filing of the Information.9
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It found that the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the elements of Robbery with
Homicide, as it proved that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaoiss side, took his mobile phone,
and shot him, resulting in the latters death. In this relation, the RTC gave credence to Cristita and
Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the assailant, as compared to the latters mere denial
and alibi.10
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Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA.

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The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated February 3, 2014, the CA affirmed Balutes conviction with modification in
that: (a) the aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution
failed to allege the same in the Information;12(b) the civil indemnity was increased to P75,000.00 in
view of existing jurisprudence;(c) the P6,000.00 compensatory damages, representing the value of
the mobile phone, was deleted in the absence of competent proof of its value, and in lieu thereof,
actual damages in the aggregate amount of P140,413.53 representing SPO1 Manaoiss hospital and
funeral expenses was awarded to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for damages are with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. from the date of finality of the CA Decision until fully
paid.13
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Hence, the instant appeal.

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The Issue Before the Court

The lone issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balutes
conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial
evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of
the court below.14Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
RTCs factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People v. Ibaez,15 the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special complex crime of robbery
with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of
the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to
gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.16 Homicide is said
to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of
the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in
the commission of the crime.17
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In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the prosecution was able to

establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is
buttressed by Cristita and Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the
crime as opposed to the latters denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and
the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that alibi and denial are outweighed by
positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of
the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.18This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the
relatives of the victim such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1
Manaois, respectively since [t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than
the true culprits.19
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In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the RPC, as amended. However, the Court deems it
appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of SPO1 Manaois due to the highly reprehensible and/or
outrageous conduct of Balute in committing the aforesaid crime. 21
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WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 finding accused-appellant ArnelBalutey Villanueva GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubtof the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article
294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is
ordered to pay the heirs of SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P140,413.53 as actual damages, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent(6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.

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Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

See Notice of Appeal dated February 17, 2014; rollo, pp. 30-32.

Id. at 2-29. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Franchito
N. Diamante and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
2

CA rollo, pp. 45-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Carolina Icasiano-Sison.

Article 294(1) of the RPC, as specifically amended by Republic Act No. 7659, entitled AN ACT TO
IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE
REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
reads:
4

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Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
xxxx

See rollo, p. 3.

See id. at 4-8.

Id. at 9-11.

CA rollo, pp. 45-64.

Id. at 63-64.

10

11

Id. at 60-63.
Rollo, pp. 2-29.

12

Id. at 26.

13

Id. at 26-27.

See People v. Baraga, G.R. No. 208761, June 4, 2014, citing Seguritan v. People, G.R. No.
172896, April 19, 2010, 618 SCRA 406, 408.
14

15

G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 161.

16

Id. at 170, citing People v. Algarme, 598 Phil. 423, 446 (2009).

17

Id. at 177, citing People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 718 (2009).

People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646, 653, citingMalana v.
People, 573 Phil. 39, 53 (2008).
18

Ilisan v. People, G.R. No. 179487, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 658, 667, citingPeople v.
Quilang, 371 Phil. 241, 255 (1999).
19

People v. Buyagan, G.R. No. 187733, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 571, 579, citingPeople v.
NganoSugan, G.R. No. 192789, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 406, 413.
20

Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or qualifying.
However, there have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the lack of
an aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion in People v. Dalisay, where
it categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender x x x. (People v. Combate, G.R.
No. 189301, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 797, 813.)
21

PEOPLE V OROSCO
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05171 which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 10 finding the accused-appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.

Appellant, along with Abner Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe, were charged with Robbery with
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
Information reads as follows:
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That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent of gain and by means of violence, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned by one Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4,
Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City, and once inside said store, take, steal and carry away cash money, to
the damage and prejudice of said Lourdes Yap, and by reason of or on occasion of said robbery, and
for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking
advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab the aforesaid
Lourdes Yap, thereby inflicting upon her injury which directly caused her untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

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The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of Albert M.
Arca (Arca), the postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, and the victims grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one oclock in the afternoon, he went to the store of
Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet
hardened (frozen) so he went home. At around two oclock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice
at the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and
two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting
they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store.
From outside the store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm
around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her
back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie
Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair and
dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released her, she
fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious icon or
santo at the altar infront of the stores window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled
together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but
also left and went home afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts. 4
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Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the
faces of appellant and the dark thin man who stabbed Yap (John Doe). From a surveillance digital
photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two
men sitting beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against
appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at
large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal Report 5 stating:

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TRUNK:

1)

Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from
the anterior midline, 9 cm deep. The wound tract is directed posteriorwards,
upwards and medialwards, cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and piercing
the heart.

CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the trunk.

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He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as a

knife, was inflicted while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense
wounds.6
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For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in
Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in the
house until his wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his coaccused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family
transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any
motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped
reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the
rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for his sick child. 7
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Appellants wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the incident
he was at their house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On crossexamination, she was asked the distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it
will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.8
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On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged,
thus:
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WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of
the crime of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay the heirs of Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their
eventual arrest.
So Ordered.9

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Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it found no
compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.
In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial court erred
in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him
during the trial, and that even granting that criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should
only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was
not him who stabbed Yap.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a single,
trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a sole
witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate.10
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In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca,
convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he
initially desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yaps hands from behind
and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by appellants cohort (John Doe).
In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but
refused to pinpoint him in open court, thus:
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ACP NUQUI
xxxx
Q.
This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to
identify him?
A.
Yes, sir.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Do you know the name of this person?

Yes, sir. He is Charlie.
Do you know the family name?
Orosco, sir.
If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes
Yap, if he is in Court, would you please point to him?
WITNESS (answering)
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Please look around you and point at him.
A.
He is here.
Q.
If he is in Court, please point at him.
Q.
Why cant you point at him?
COURT INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling.
ACP NUQUI
Oh, you see.
ATTY. BAARES
The witness can not answer.
ACP NUQUI
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q.
Please point at him.
ATTY. BAARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone.
ACP NUQUI
No. He said that the.
ATTY. BAARES
Then, let him voluntarily do it.
ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAARES
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question
because we keep on waiting already.
ACP NUQUI
Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing
at the person.
COURT
Observations are all noted.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes
to the person of Charlie Orosco, Your Honor, he stopped and did not say ---he did not nod or do anything of what he has been doing when the other
persons were identified.
COURT
Okay. Noted.11
Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellants companion and appellant
taking the thick wad of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When asked for the
fourth time to pinpoint appellant, Arca was still hesitant:

Q.
A.

Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?

Yes, sir, he is around.

Q.

This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said he is in Court,
will you please look at him.

xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q.
Is he now in Court?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Please point at him.
ATTY BAARES
The same observation, Your Honor.
COURT
Oh, the same observation?
ACP NUQUI
Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.
xxxx
COURT (to the witness)
Q.
Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is
inside the Court?
WITNESS (answering)
A.
I cant afford to point at him.
ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
Q.
Why?
A.
I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied)
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At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint
appellant as among those persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:
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PROSECUTOR NUQUI
QYou mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who
are these persons you are referring to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
ACharlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
QWhy are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking,
how long have you known Charlie Orosco?
AHe always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I
know him.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
QYou mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you
look around and point to him if he is in Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow Tshirt with handcuff and when asked answered by the name of
Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor.13
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Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively identified
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz:
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Here, Albert Arca, the prosecutions main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as one of
[the] two men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed by the trial court
during the bail hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who robbed and killed the victim,
Arca was trembling and constantly looking towards the direction of accused Orosco. Though simpleminded, Arca was well-aware of the possible consequences his testimony could trigger. To the
Courts mind, Arcas act of constantly looking towards Oroscos direction whenever he was asked to
point out one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. As such, Arcas act is sufficient identification already.
Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was able to
gather enough courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of Lourdes Yap while
his companion stabbed her. Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out accused
earlier because he feared what Orosco might do to him. Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife
stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it appears that there is no
reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence,
Arcas positive identification of Orosco prevails over the latters alibi. 14
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We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its
evaluation of Arcas testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial courts
findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case. 15
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Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the
trial courts firsthand observation of said witness deportment revealed, Arcas fear of appellant
sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point to him in open court during his direct examination.
Arca was finally able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of
Yap during his additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough courage to
do so.
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides in part:
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Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
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The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.16 Homicide is said to have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or
the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the
crime.17 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery.18
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Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and
John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal
tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change
was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To verify whether the
cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the store but once inside
they got hold of her and stabbed her. Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any

offense, it was only robbery since Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin
man, who stabbed the victim.
We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with
his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation
until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe
wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the back. With the victim
pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her.
Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and fled
together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the
presence of conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused in the perpetration of robbery and
killing of the victim.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the
robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His
act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John Doe
stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant is
equally liable for the killing of Yap.
As we held in People v. Baron19

cralawred

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed
beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless
there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no evidence
adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the
acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in
conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a
result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same. (Emphasis
supplied)
cralawlawlibrary

In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide.
Appellant was positively identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated
the robbery and killing of Yap at the latters store on May 16, 2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This
positive identification prevails over accuseds defense of alibi. As pointed out by the trial court, it
was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime considering the presence
of many public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to
only a couple of minutes.20
cralawred

On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death and
P75,000.00 as moral damages, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. 21 We also find the award
of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 proper due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, though these were not alleged in the
information. While an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the
offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement
of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability.22
cralawred

The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 in Criminal Case No. 10916 is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded
as civil indemnity (P75,000.00), moral damages (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages
(P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of judgment

until full payment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

cralawla wlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza,* and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Designated additional Member per Raffle dated January 5, 2015.

Rollo, pp. 2-18. Penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
1

Records, pp. 285-291. Penned by Presiding Judge Maria Theresa G. San Juan-Loquillano.

Records, p. 1.

TSN, November 7, 2007, pp. 7-17, 22-32, 36-38.

Records, p. 28.

TSN, October 13, 2010, pp. 6-11, 18-19.

TSN, January 26, 2011, pp. 3-9.

TSN, February 23, 2011, pp. 3-5.

Records, p. 291.

People v. Porras, 413 Phil. 563, 588 (2001), citing People v. Listerio, 390 Phil. 337, 348
(2000); People v. Dela Cruz, 390 Phil. 961, 975 (2000); and People v. Bromo, 376 Phil. 877, 898
(1999).
10

11

TSN, November 7, 2007, pp. 17-22.

12

Id. at 33-35.

13

TSN, June 2, 2010, pp. 8-9, 11-12.

14

Records, p. 289.

People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009), citing People v. Yatco, 429 Phil. 163, 173 (2002),
see also People v. Boquirin, 432 Phil. 722, 728-729 (2002), People v. Taboga,426 Phil. 908 (2002).
15

16

People v. Doca, 394 Phil. 501, 516 (2000), citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 764 (1997).

People v. Quemeggen, et al., 611 Phil. 487, 498 (2009), citing People v. Jabiniao, Jr., et al., 576
Phil. 696, 710 (2008); People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 428 (2004).
17

18

People v. De Jesus, id. at 427.

19

635 Phil. 608, 624 (2010).

20

Records, pp. 288-289.

21

People v. Balute, G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015, pp. 5-6.

People v. Dadulla, 657 Phil. 442, 457 (2011), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119-120
(2001).
22

PEOPLE V CABBAB

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

OF

G.R. No. 173479

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

JUAN CABBAB, JR.,

Accused-Appellant.

July 12, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the decision [1] dated February 22,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 which
affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding
appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo[2] which modified the
provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was

earlier[3] referred to the CA, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

No. 01978, for appropriate action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-inlaw Segundino Calpito, was charged with the crimes of Double Murder and
Attempted Murder with Robbery in an Information[4] alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay
Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Abra, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with the intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, while
armed with a firearm (not-recover), conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS
and EDDIE QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby multiple
gunshot wounds on the different parts of their bodies, killing Winner
Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly
thereafter, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, shot William Belmes, said accused having commenced the
execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to perform all the acts
of execution, which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence thereof, due to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll and
poor marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his death, then and there
willfully and unlawfully and feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal
and carry away the money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency..
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1)
uninhabited place.

On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito

separately entered their pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the prosecution
presented the oral testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police
investigator at Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a
member of the Integrated National Police at the Villaviciosa Police Station;
Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner Agbulos; Dra. Leona GarciaBeroa, medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of

Winner Agbulos; and Dr. Godofreco Gasa, a physician at

the Abra ProvincialHospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino
Calpito; and George de Lara, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The Peoples version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Appellees Brief,[5] to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner
Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer
(PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to
attend a fiesta celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the
fiesta celebration was already over, thus, they decided to go home in
Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, the group took their
lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag.
After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by accusedappellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to
play pepito, a local version of the game of russian poker.
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played pepito with the group of
accused-appellant. Winner Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the game
while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as players
therein. Around 3:00 oclock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they should be going home after three
(3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner Agbuloss group wrapped-up the
game and were set for home together with his group. Winner Agbulos won
the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who
was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits
from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Segundino Calpito and a
companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the
group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the
continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards
Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the group, and
informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were
ambushed by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3)

proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead body of Winner
Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The
three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to
the scene of the crime where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still
alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito
who ambused them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of
Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was
brought to the Abra ProvincialHospital but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death
was cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple
gunshot wounds. On the other hand, Eddie Quindasans cause of death was
cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to multiple
gunshot wounds.

For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the
morning of April 22, 1988, he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit
his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all surnamed Borreta. He stayed
there almost the entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived
home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He declared that
his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He likewise averred that
he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal
Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him.
Appellants co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged.
He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of April 22, 1988, he went fishing at
Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an
examination on the paraffin cast taken from appellant to determine the
presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on appellants hands. The results
of the said examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He
opined that certain factors may affect the result of the test such as
perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the type of gun used. He also
theorized that a paraffin test would yield a negative result if fertilizers or
cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.
The Trial Courts Decision

In a decision[6] dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino
Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1)
robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. Dispositively, the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder with robbery or better put, robbery
with double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery
with double homicide defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to
Art. 6 of the Same Code with aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place with no mitigating circumstances and sentences him with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of Winner Agbulos and for
robbing the said victim after killing him and for the killing of Eddie
Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in
Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. These offenses
attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no
mitigating circumstances and sentence him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayoras
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as maximum.
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of
them plus P20,000.00 also for each of them as actual expenses and finally,
the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as moral and exemplary
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic
review. As stated at the onset hereof, the Court, in its Resolution [7] of January
17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo,[8] referred the case
and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial
courts decision and found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion

perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellants conviction, as well as the penalty

imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review.
In its Resolution[9] of September 20, 2006, the Court resolved to require the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee
People, informed the Court that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief
and was merely adopting its appellees brief before the CA as its
supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental
brief on the lone assigned error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE VERSION
IS MORE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, appellant pleads for acquittal. He avers that the witnesses for the
prosecution failed to positively identify him as the perpetrator of the crime
as they did not actually see him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on
the results of the paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder
nitrates.
The appeal must fail.
Appellants contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify
him as the perpetrator of the crime is belied by the testimony of PO William
Belmes, who was with the victims when the incident happened. We quote
from the transcripts of the stenographic notes:
William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:

Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly
eight (8) days after the incident when the incident wherein you
were investigated upon still very very fresh in your mind (sic).
Now, in your statement which you gave to the investigator, Pat.
Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the persons shot at Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after the two (2) had fell down
then you also likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were
rolling to the ground. Do you affirm and confirm this statement of
yours which you subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?
ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie
Quindasan and Winner Agbulos was not seen. He only saw the
persons who were firing at him namely: Juan Cabbab and
Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw
Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shot at Eddie Quindasan and
Winner Agbulos. Reform the question.
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino
Calpito shoot at you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they
were firing at you?
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?
A. If Im not mistaken it was 4:00 oclock in the afternoon.[10]
xxx xxx xxx
William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and
Juan Cabbab but you did not see them shoot at Winner Agbulos
and Eddie Quindasan?

A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan (the witness using the word banat) and when they
already fell down, they continued firing attempt and in my case I
rolled and they also fired at me.[11]

The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and
see appellant at the time he perpetrated the crime. To our mind, Belmes
could not have made a mistake with respect to appellants identity, what with
the fact that just a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant
himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes
had a face-to-face encounter with appellant before the assault and thus
would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially because at the time
of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from appellant and
conditions of visibility were very good at the time of the incident as it was
only around 4:00 in the afternoon. Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the
most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of
the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime
was committed.[12]
Belmes testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who
was also with the group when the robbery and shooting took place. Again,
we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:

Vidal Agbulos on direct examination

FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your
son was already killed and Eddie Quindasan was injured?
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down.[13]

Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person

who robbed his son, Winner, of his winnings. Just like Belmes, Agbulos
could also not have been mistaken as to appellants identity considering that
it was appellant who personally approached Agbulos group and invited them
to play poker just a few hours prior to the commission of the crime. Further,
Agbulos testified that he was familiar with appellant as he would often see
him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at
first hand the demeanor of witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether
they are telling the truth or not, gave full faith and credence to their
testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance that
would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the
highest respect to the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of these
witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that
both his hands yielded no trace of gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for
appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not exculpate him. The
negative findings of said test do not conclusively show that a person did not
discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has

observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet
exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while
wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands
thereafter.[14] As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the
trial court, if a person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken,
gunpowder residue would not be found in that persons hands. He also
testified that certain factors could contribute to the negative result of a
paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In
fine, a finding that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded
negative results is not conclusive evidence to show that he indeed had not
fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of
prosecution witnesses Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to
falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant himself declared that he did not
know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate him in the
crime. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full
faith and credence.[15]
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao,
Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988
and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper, however,
the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place
at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.[16] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.[17]
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where
appellant allegedly visited his friends was only 30 minutes drive from
Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime was committed. In
short, appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date
and time of its commission.

The weakness of appellants alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that

appellant was positively identified by witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who
were with the victims at the time of the incident. For sure, appellants
positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of
alibi unworthy of credit.[18]
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the
appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.

To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the

prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
(1)

the taking of personal property is committed with violence or

intimidation against persons;

(2)

the property taken belongs to another;

(3)

the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and

(4)

by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is

committed.[19]

In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob,

the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial
that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons
are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide.[20]

Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant,
having lost to Winner Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest
Agbulos of his winnings amounting to P20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to
rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his
companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law), is reclusion
perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the
RPC provides that when in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. In this
case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of
the crime, as appellants attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly
walking on their way home was sudden and done without any provocation,
thus giving them no real chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659,[21] the trial court and the CA correctly imposed
upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting
appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO
William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed
during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the
crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that
remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or
injuries committed in connection with the robbery.[22]
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and
Eddie Quindasan are each entitled to civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00,[23] to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,[24] and to
exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00.[25]

With respect to actual damages, Winners father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that
he spent a total of P50,000.00 as burial expenses but he failed to present
receipts therefor.In People v. Abrazaldo,[26] we laid down the doctrine that
where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be
determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of
actual damages, temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 must be
awarded to the heirs of Winner because although the exact amount was not
proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred
expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim. We, however, cannot grant
the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the
matter. Finally, appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos
the amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CAG.R.
CR-H.C.
No.
00968 is
hereby AFFIRMED with
the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner
Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 representing the amount stolen
from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner
Agbulos the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
3. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie
Quindasan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the
separate crime of attempted murder against the person of PO
William Belmes.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

On leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-24.
[2]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 4, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[3]
In our Resolution of August 30, 2004.
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 12.
[5]
CA Rollo, pp. 134-154.
[6]
CA Rollo, pp. 27-34.
[7]
CA Rollo, p. 131.
[8]
Supra note 3.
[9]
Rollo, p. 29.
[10]
TSN, April 15, 1993, pp. 17-19.
[11]
TSN, April 15, 1993, pp. 14-15.
[12]
People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 603.
[13]
TSN, June 13 1991, pp. 7-8.
[14]
People v. Oliano, G.R. No. 119013, March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 158.
[15]
People v. Benito, G.R. No. 128072, February 19, 1999, 303 SCRA 468.
[16]
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102.
[17]
People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 149808, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 542.
[18]
People v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 103611, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 472.
[19]
People v. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA 519.
[20]
People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384.
[21]
Approved on December 31, 1993.
[22]
People v. Cabilto, G.R. Nos. 128816 & 139979-80, August 8, 2001, 362 SCRA 325.
[23]
People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, 400 SCRA 603.
[24]
People v. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA 519.
[25]
People v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 482.
[26]
G.R. No. 124392, February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 137.
[1]

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 041552 affirming with modification the August 24, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding
appellant Joseph4 Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide instead of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was
filed against appellant, to wit:
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That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, while armed with a
firearm, after gaining entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money
from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his
death, to the prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, examined the
corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem Report 7:
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Findings:

1.

Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at the mid left
frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at the site of entry.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

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MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT WOUND

Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted
edges of the point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot
at close range.8
Ricardo de la Pea testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his
way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light
of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and
poked a gun to the victims right forehead and demanded money. De la Pea hid behind a tree ten
meters away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him.
He went home and reported the incident the following morning. 9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victims house to
collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victims house. He inquired from
appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the victim was not around. Asor went
home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning
that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.10
The victims mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses in the
amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in
Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to
Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of robbery with murder.11 Appellants brother,
Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony.12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative testimony of

the prosecutions witnesses deserved more weight than the appellants defense of denial and alibi.
Thus, finding the prosecutions witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the victim to be by
reason of the robbery, the RTC decisions decretal portion read:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Joseph
Barra GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 291(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount of Php55,579.80, as moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement, otherwise he shall only
be entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof.13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide. It stated that:
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Regarding the trial courts finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Lagdaan,
WE will not disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence on record and in accord with
prevailing law and jurisprudence. However, WE disagree with its determination of the nature of the
crime that accused-appellant committed. Instead of robbery with homicide at its consum[m]ated
stage, accused-appellant should have been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the government to establish
robbery is the statement of De la Pea that when accused-appellant reached the victims place, the
latter barged into the said residence, poked a gun at the victims forehead, demanded money and
when the victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of
evidence was presented to establish that accused-appellant took away the victims money or any
property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly
established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed,
the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the
provisions of this Code.
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced the
commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime of homicide is
bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. That motive
was manifested by accused-appellants overt act of poking a gun at the victims forehead demanding
money from the latter. When the victim refused to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot
the former. The killing was an offshoot of accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. Accusedappellant was bent on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victims failure to give
his money, the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated. 15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:

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WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows 1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the following:

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a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the cost of suit.16
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Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011. 17

After appellants confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant manifested that they
would adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental briefs. 18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established by
the prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses were rife with
inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant argued that the elements for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the award of
damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that:

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[F]indings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative weight of the
testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court in observing at close range the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as
they testify, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which if considered will change the outcome of the case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses, he does
not present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored, misunderstood and
misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. We also found, after reviewing the records,
nothing that would indicate any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the
appellate court that would substantially alter its conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:
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Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
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1.

The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution for
appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
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1.

The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against

persons;
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2.

The property taken belongs to another;

3.

The taking is animo lucrandi; and

4.

By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. (Citation

omitted.)

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In the case before us, appellants intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the
victims refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in
the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of
taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to
the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code states:
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Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. When by
reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person
guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales,21 to wit:

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The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to
give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for
this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found appellants crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of existing rules and
recent jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need not be disturbed. 22
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 23
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04155 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages shall be
increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justices
Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Elihu A. Ybaez, concurring.
1

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Entitled People of the Philippines v. Joseph Barra y Doe.

CA rollo, pp. 46-50; penned by Presiding Judge Noel D. Paulite.

Also referred to as JOSE in some parts of the rollo.
Records, p. 23.
Id. at 27.

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Id. at 43.

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TSN, January 17, 2005, p. 3.

TSN, May 16, 2005, pp. 3-8.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

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TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 2-4.

TSN, June 22, 2007, pp. 4-5.

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TSN, August 19, 2008, pp. 9-10.

CA rollo, p. 50.

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Office of the Solicitor General.

Rollo, pp. 9-10.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13-15.

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Id. at 20-24 and 31-33.

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457 Phil. 472, 481 (2003).

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G.R. No. 178205, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 94, 103.
400 Phil. 1221, 1235-1236 (2000).

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See People v. Esoy, G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 552, 566.
People v. Deligero, G.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013.

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