Source: Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence in Digital Ether

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001.
On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos.
The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice
President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions,
the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates
before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace
as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province
is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume
otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This
is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the
SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the
general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a
new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an
aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys

actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24,
2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing
material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship
and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on
ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency. ##
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
Brion Dissent (Highlights): COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a
Candidates Eligibility

Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary)

Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the express language of the
Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino
citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to
run for President. The natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for
President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution.
A Mockery of National Election Process
There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen
since 7 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the three others withheld their
opinion.
1.

Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected to the Office
of the President, an office expressly reserved by the Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino
citizens, will lead to absurd results.

2.

This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship status of petitioner
after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections, despite petitioner having already presented
before the COMELEC all the evidence she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status.

3.

If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as PET) for not possessing
a basic qualification for the Office of the President that of being a natural-born Filipino citizen those
who voted for petitioner would have utterly wasted their votes.
On Comelecs All-Encompassing Jurisdiction

The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly falls within the
all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

1.

The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections. The power to decide all questions affecting elections necessarily
includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for
election to public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is
designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal
remedy.

If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President,
the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no
need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
2.

In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance candidates.

It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for
President puts the election process in mockery and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such persons
certificate of candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which
empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election process in
mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015)
Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or mothers are
Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are Filipino citizens and were born before 17
January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
1.

The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those born before 17
January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect. (Co vs HRET, 1991)

The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under
earlier laws, if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born.
2.

Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born Filipino citizens. If
they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine citizenship only under Article IV,
Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution which refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution

There is no silence of the Constitution on foundlings because the majority of the delegates to
the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the proposed amendment of Delegate
Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as Filipino citizens.
1. Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafolss amendment, namely Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and
Roxas. Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, which
meant that Congress would decide whether to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children of

Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage /
foundlings.
If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens
as defined in the Constitution since Congress would then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as
Filipino citizens.
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship in accordance with law
under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5 Constitution.
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate Buslons opinion.
2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born in relation to the citizenship
of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would have created
an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a better position than a child
whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have
intended to create such an absurdity.
3. Delegate Rafolss amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the majority of the delegates to
the 1934 Constitutional Convention.
The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a
provision that children with unknown parentage are Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the
delegates of the idea or proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens.
While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate Rafolss amendment, they not only
rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines
at birth like children of Filipino fathers.
4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which
articulated the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935
Constitution. The 1930 Hague Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth. Therefore,
there was no prevailing customary international law at that time, as there is still none today, conferring
automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
International Laws Applicable to Foundlings
1.

There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring nationality to

foundlings at birth

2.

There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings.

 First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found. A foundling is
merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at
birth a domicile of origin which is the country in which the foundling is found.
Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the country where the
foundling is found. These two general principles of international law have nothing to do with conferment of
nationality.
3.

There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and citizenship at birth because
of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to
Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a
natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because of jus
sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

4.

Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law principle has the status
of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the
Philippines.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens

If a childs parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be considered a
Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance with statutory law under Art
IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution.
If a childs parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a
natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either the childs father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
Thus, the only way that a foundling can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen
There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born citizenship can
be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability.
On Adoption Laws
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of natural-born
citizenship.
On Burden of Proof
Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that
she is a foundling. The burden of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no
known biological parents. At that moment, it became her duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen

1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there
were, such a law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized.
Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person claiming
Philippine citizenship.
3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born
Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that
either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international law granting
automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a
customary international law. At best, there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the
country where the foundling is found.
5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the
country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents possessing the nationality of that country, such
presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to the Constitution, and must
yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then
petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of
course be rejected.
6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a
foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood
relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioners biological father
or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire
Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the
foundling has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically
governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary international law, namely:
the right of every human being to a nationality, and the States obligations to avoid statelessness and to
facilitate the naturalization of foundlings.
##

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Summary
On COMELECs Jurisdiction
COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the determination
of whether a candidate has made a false material representation in his CoC, and the
determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is true.
1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding
over a presidential candidate.
2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the
COMELECs jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding
before it. The ponencia disregarded the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC
Rules was published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of
determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.
In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes CoC
and affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.
The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in
response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in admitting newlydiscovered evidence that had not been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.
In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica
(a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica.
Kimberlys CoC is considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a
Section 78 proceeding.
2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.
Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in
the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate.
A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a

Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs jurisdiction in
determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding.
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78 cancellation proceeding and
a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the
COMELEC opted to provide that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which provides for
the grounds for a petition for disqualification.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office
are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after the
proclamation of the election results.
Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if
he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to determine Poes eligibility to
become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule
on Poes citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any
declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.
The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited jurisdiction in Section 78 would
only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and would have no effect in the determination of the merits of
the Section 78 case before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be
touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency, with her
eligibilities open to post-election questions, if still necessary at that point.
On the Citizenship of Foundlings
It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that foundlings are natural
born citizens.
1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the deliberations even reinforces the
position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitutions
parentage provisions.

 Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation.
2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the
mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the
children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage,
must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots.
On Burden of Proof
Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof
1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) from the
perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that
Poe made false material representations.
2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC
concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original
burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the
COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her
admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or
solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is
a natural-born citizen.
Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed
4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are.
5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive.
In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly
after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.
6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not
conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.

8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level
appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the
COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level,
the present petitioners own burden of proof in the present certiorari proceedings before this Court must
necessarily fail. ##