Constitutional Law 1

Cases
Origin of Judicial Review
Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 21, ed. 60 (1803)
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two
justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the
District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an
attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary
before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by
acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they
were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as
president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions,
claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered
by the end of Adamss term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as
justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons
Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
Issues
[if !supportLists]1 [endif]Does Marbury have a right to the
commission?
[if !supportLists]2 [endif]Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
[if !supportLists]3 [endif]Does the Supreme Court have the authority
to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
[if !supportLists]4 [endif]Can Congress expand the scope of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution?
[if !supportLists]5 [endif]Does the Supreme Court have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)

[if !supportLists]1
commission.

[endif]Yes. Marbury has a right to the

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives
constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the
power has been exercised when the last act required from the person
possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the
commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President
Adams.
[if !supportLists]2
[endif]Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who
considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.
The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a
justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the
appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a
consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a
plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him
a remedy.
[if !supportLists]3
[endif]Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority
to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts
are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

[if !supportLists]4
[endif]No. Congress cannot expand the scope of
the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had
been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and
is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this
court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their
jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of
jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
[if !supportLists]5
[endif]No. The Supreme Court does not have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to
be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not
create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed
to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a
paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the
commission.
See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding
that that the Constitution gives Congress the express power to make
exceptions to the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most
number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the
victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that
he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the
filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed
before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec.
Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of
Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the
merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the

necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of

authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
(Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
election protest filed by Ynsua.
Requisites of Judicial Review
G.R. No. L-5279
October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
OF
COLLEGES
UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF
TEXTBOOKS, respondents.

AND

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities

(PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of
private schools in the country. It is provided by these
laws that a permit should first be secured from the
Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also
gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private
schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education
can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in
schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
any law requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise said right,

amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice

abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU
also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not
specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power
to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable
controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of
Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact
control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of
all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational
efficiency,
and
instruction
in
the
duties
of
citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or
those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still
part of the power of control and regulation by the State
over all schools.
Tanv.Macapagal
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino
people.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating
Constitutional Convention was "withoutpower, under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present

Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other

than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to
the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down
therein."
Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute musthaveapersonal and substantial
interest in the casesuchthathehassustained,orwill sustain,direct
injury as
a result of its enforcement."Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works:
validityofastatutemaybecontestedonlybyonewhowillsustain a direct
injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds.
Expenditureofpublicfunds, by an officer of the State for the purposeof
administeringanunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplicationof
such funds,'whichmaybeenjoinedattherequestofa taxpayer."
2. NO.At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet
finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935 constitution
therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when
the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court
may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as
they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask
for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so
that it can fulfilitsdutieswell.Thecourtmaynotinterfereuntiltheproper
timecomesripeness