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FACTS: The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice to garnish the money of the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, authorized by deputy
sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court
contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105. Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of
Quezon City that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer
of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument.
ISSUE: WON the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character."
HELD: A government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that
of the Government. Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation. In the case at bench, PHHC is a GOCC possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence, then it
can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.
At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
(owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez), and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. The private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively,
of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and
the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the non-suability of the State.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando is immune from suit.
HELD: YES. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the
test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets." We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in
which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."We arrive
at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who
was then engaged in the discharge of governmental function/s. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and
deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
The DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on
accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products or
violations committed by them during their accreditation. In line with it, the former DOH Undersecretary Galon,
issued Memorandum, inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein respondent PPI to a
meeting. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled "Report on Violative

Products" issued by the BFAD, which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug
companies products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI products which were being sold to the public were unfit
for human consumption. During the meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10 days their
respective explanations on the adverse findings. Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day
period as required, PPI belatedly sent a letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred
the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply. However, PPI
did not indicate when its reply would be submitted. In a reply Undersecretary Galon found "untenable" PPI and
therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years. PPI through
counsel questioned the suspension of its accreditation without the benefit of notice and hearing, in violation of its
right to substantive and administrative due process. PPI filed a complaint seeking to declare null and void certain
DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH and Undersecretary Galon.
ISSUE: WON DOH can validly invoke state of immunity from suit.
HELD: YES. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. In this case, the DOH,
being an unincorporated agency of the government can validly invoke the defense of immunity from suit because
it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency
which performs functions of governmental character and PPIs claim for damages against DOH will not prosper.
FACTS: Petitioner was a member of United State Air Force assigned to oversee dormitories of Third Aircraft
Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the contract for maintenance of
dormitories with De Guzman Custodial Services. It was left to new contractor JAC Maintenance Service owned by
Joselito Cunanan and decide whether it would retain services. Cunanan decided to bring in his own workers.
Compaint was filed against Larkins, Lt. Cor Frankhauser for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages and added
claims for emergency, cost of living allowance, etc. Petitioner failed to answer the complaint and appear to hearings,
thus the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision granting all claims of private respondents and found both the Petitoner
and Lt. Col. Frankhauster guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed but NLRC affirmed the decision or the
Labor Arbiter, but declared that: In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced and considering our finding
that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces stationed at Clark Air Base,
let such execution be made subject to existing international agreement and diplomatic protocol.
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case, on the basis of lack of
proper jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and violation of RP-US Base Agreement and /or submission of
the Government of America to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Held: Petition was granted. The Labor Arbiter did not follow the procedure under RP-US Agreement under Article
XIV. In this case, summons was addressed to Lt. Col. Frankhauser instead to the Base Commander, or if he
withholds giving permission to serve the summons, he should instead designate another person to serve the process
and obtain the servers affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. It is basic that Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. Although petitioner,
participated in the NLRC, it does not constitute on the waiver of lack of summons and voluntary submission of her
person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
On the assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons, the case still not prosper since no allegation
that Lt. Col. Frankhausser and petitioner were being sued in their personal capacities for tortuous acts. NLRC
admitted that they are aware as to the real party respondent in the case, which is the Government of the USA which

is maintaining military facilities in the Philippines and Larkins and Frankhauser are mere elements of the USAF,
thus whatever awards, monetary or otherwise, the appellees are entitled to by virtue of this case are the primary
liabilities of their real employer, the United States Government and the state may not be sued without its consent or
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Under the Base Labor Agreement between Governments of RP
and US, if no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party
to a Joint Committee. In this case, no jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and the
person of petitioner and the judgment rendered is null and void.
FACTS: Loida Shauf, a Filipino and married to an American, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in
the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. By reason of her non-selection,
she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don
Detwiler and Anthony Persi for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex. Shauf was offered a
temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a
vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she
will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that
time, Mrs. Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf
was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the
appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. Shauf filed for
damages and other relief. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay Shauf of the actual damages,
moral and exemplary damages as well as the attorneys fee. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the
increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense
that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental
functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA,
defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this
is not a suit against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity
from suit.
ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD: No they are not immune. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. In the case at bar, there is
nothing in the record which suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of the trial
judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts of discrimination for which they should be held personally
liable. There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that plaintiff Shauf was refused appointment as
Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her sex, color and origin. In filling the said position, defendant
Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which appointed
Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the position. It bears stressing at this point that the above observation do
not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an