ConocoPhillips

BE&K Engineering

Pressure Relief System Analysis Guidelines

Trainer Refinery
Pressure Relief System Analysis
Guidelines

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BE&K Engineering

Pressure Relief System Analysis Guidelines

Purpose
This document is not intended to be a detailed procedures manual, but rather, a summary of key
assumptions and practices that will be utilized in the evaluation.
General
1.

The simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated contingencies ("double contingency" or

multiple contingency) will not be considered.

2.

Credit for automated process control systems and operator intervention will not be considered in
lieu of pressure relief protection for individual equipment.

3.

Per ConocoPhillips REP 3-7-1, Credit for protective instrumentation in lieu of relief devices will
only be taken if such systems are classified as Category 1 in accordance with REP 3-7-4 and
included in the Register of Pressure Relieving Systems as specified by REP 3-7-3.

4.

For purposes of the flare header hydraulic analysis, the additional load from any open blowdown
valves will be based on the normal upstream pressure and composition (initial flow).

5.

Purging, cleanout, and steamout operations will be considered overpressure contingencies for all
equipment with connections present for these operations.

6.

However, startup and shutdown operations are not considered within the study scope, as no
accurate process basis data is available for such operations.

Contingency Selection and Evaluation

Operation of Manual Valves
7.

Any single block valve located within the process that is not indicated as locked or carsealed (i.e.
ensured to be open by administrative controls) may be inadvertently opened or closed while the
process is on-line.

8.

Per API 521 Section 4.3.2, if the pressure resulting from the failure of administrative controls can
exceed the hydrotest pressure [of the equipment], reliance on administrative controls as the
sole means to prevent overpressure might not be appropriate.

Open Communication
9.

Any system of equipment in which no manual block valves are present between equipment or
credit may be taken for carsealed-open or locked-open valves between equipment is said to be in
open communication and therefore subject to common overpressure scenarios.

External Fire
10. The maximum extent of a single fire zone will be 2,500 ft 2 for process areas. Areas around tanks
will be evaluated on a case by case basis.
11. If a piece of equipment within a given fire circle is identified as part of a system of equipment in
open communication, the global external fire relief requirement for that system will be considered
in the evaluation of the fire circle.
12. If adequate firefighting and drainage are found to be present, the heat input to the vessel from the
external fire will be equal to 21,000FA0.82.
13. If adequate firefighting and drainage are not found to be present, the heat input to the vessel from
the external fire will be equal to 34,500FA0.82.

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14. Wetted areas of vessels with a MAWP of 15 psig or greater will be determined based on the
following guidelines:

For horizontal drums: The calculated wetted area exposed to the fire will be based on the total
surface area up to 25 ft. above any surface capable of sustaining a pool fire.

For vertical drums: The wetted surface area will be the entire wetted surface area (as determined
using the high liquid level) up to 25 ft. above any surface capable of sustaining a pool fire.

For fractionators and other trayed vessels: The wetted area will be quantified in the same way as
for vertical vessels using a tower dumped high liquid level. This high liquid level will be the
high liquid level at the bottom of the tower plus the hold-up on each tray. The hold-up will be
assumed to be 4 per tray unless specific data indicates otherwise. In the case of packed column
sections, each 2 ft. of height within a packed section shall be considered a tray.

The bottom head area of vertical vessels will be excluded from the calculation of the wetted
surface area exposed to fire if the vessel is supported by a skirt with a single manway opening.
Such credit will not be taken if the vessel skirt has multiple manway openings.

For spheres or spheroids: The wetted area will be the total surface area within 25 feet of any
surface capable of sustaining a pool fire or the surface area up to the maximum horizontal
diameter, whichever is greater.

For heat exchangers:

The liquid level for heat exchangers in two phase service (i.e. two-phase feed and two-phase
effluent) or condensing service (i.e. vapor feed and liquid effluent) will be assumed to be
50%.

The liquid level for heat exchangers in vaporizing service (i.e. liquid feed and vapor effluent)
will be conservatively assumed to be 100%.

The wetted area exposed to fire shall include an extra allowance for piping of either 10% of the
initial calculated area or 100 ft2, whichever is less.

15. Wetted areas of tanks with design ratings below 15 psig will be determined using API 2000
Table 3.
16. Relief loads for external fire cases involving multiple pieces of equipment within the same fire
zone will be based on the sum of the relief loads for each individual piece of equipment
(adiabatically mixed) as opposed to the sum of the areas.
17. Fireproof insulation will include corrosion resistant steel banding and sheeting (e.g. stainless,
galvanized). In the event that fireproof insulation is present, the environmental factor will be
determined per API 521.
18. Equipment that was fabricated from pipe with a NPS less than 24 and is not ASME VIII code
stamped will not be required to have external fire protection.
19. For air coolers:

The external fire contingency will be considered for air coolers that operate liquid-full and are
located within 25 feet of any surface capable of sustaining a pool fire. Such calculations will
be performed as prescribed in API 520, Part 1.

In accordance with API 521 Section 5.15.7, external fire will not be considered for air coolers
in condensing service provided the tubes of these exchangers are self-draining and there is no
control valve or pump connected directly to the condenser liquid outlet that would prevent
liquid from draining during the fire.

20. A dedicated relief device is not required for the fire contingency on a heat exchanger unless the
possibility exists of isolating the exchanger during an external fire event. Such instances will be
evaluated on a case-by case basis. Per ConocoPhillips APP # O-016 and REP 3-7-1 (section

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15.2), heat exchangers will be drained when manual isolation block valves are closed. Check
valves, control valves (without minimum stop), and emergency isolation valves will be considered
automatic means of isolation.
21. For shell and tube heat exchangers, any additional heat input to the cold side fluid from the hot
side during an external fire will not be considered.
22. Latent heats will be based on the heat required to vaporize the first 50% by mass of the normal
liquid composition at the relief pressure. Sensible heat will not be included in the quantification of
the latent heat. The relieving temperature and vapor composition will be based on the 50%
vaporization point.
23. Per API guidelines, the potential for liquid or two-phase flow in the event of an external fire will
not be considered in the sizing of the relief valve. To restate, all fire cases will be sized for the
vapor relief requirement.
24. Materials having a predicted bubble point temperature greater than 1,100 o F (lube oil, vacuum
residue, etc.) at the relief pressure will be evaluated for liquid expansion rather than liquid
vaporization.
25. In the event that a vessel operates vapor filled and external fire is the only possible source of
overpressure, the relief requirement will be based on the API 521 external fire on vapor-filled
vessel equations.
26. For external fire cases in which the vessel fluid latent heat is below 50 Btu/lb at the relieving
pressure, the fluid will be evaluated for consideration as a supercritical fluid.
27. In the event that a relief device is present and supercritical external fire is the only possible
overpressure contingency for a given system, the orifice area required to maintain pressure in the
vessel will be determined in the following manner: The wetted area is determined using
assumptions defined above for vessels containing liquid. The heat input will then be based on API
521 correlations for vessels that contain liquid. The initial relief temperature will be based on the
calculated dewpoint temperature of the residing liquid at relief pressure. The relief rate will be
modeled over time for a blocked-in vessel using small temperature increments, and relief device
will be sized by modeling the mass flux through an isentropic orifice up to the limit of choked
flow. A list of all supercritical fluid-filled vessels will be provided to ConocoPhillips.
28. As specified in API 521 Section 5.15.4.2, no reduction in the environmental factor will be taken
for the presence or application of firewater.
Column Systems
29. The relief requirements for column system process cases will be determined using a process
simulator and performing a heat and material balance on the system at relief conditions.
30. Loss of overhead cooling with continued reflux and loss of both overhead cooling and reflux cases
will be considered for each column. Loss of reflux cases will be assumed to eventually result in
loss of cooling due to flooding of the overhead condensers.
31. Boil-up of the column inventory may require relief in the event that feed and reflux are lost.
Consideration will be given to continued operation of the condenser depending on the
contingency. The latent heat of vaporization of the fluid will be based on the first 50% by mass of
the bottom tray composition or the Reboiler liquid composition. This scenario is most often
associated with a global power failure scenario.
32. Reduced LMTD at relief conditions for unfired reboilers will only be considered in the event that
the existing relief capacity is determined to be inadequate for a given column system process case
when the normal operating reboiler duty is applied.
33. Overfilling will be considered a credible scenario for columns.

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Overfilling of Pressure Vessels and Low Pressure Tanks
34. Overfilling will be considered unless both of the following criteria are met:
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An independent high-level alarm is present. Independent alarms shall be separate from the control
system. Bridle valves shall be locked open in the event that both the alarm and the control system
utilize the same bridle.

The time to fill the vessel from the independent, high level alarm setting is greater than 20
minutes.

Fired Heaters
35. A relief device is required and will be sized for full outlet flow from the heater in the event that the
upstream pressure source can exceed the MAWP of the heater coils and a mechanism exists to
block the outlet.
36. In the event that the upstream pressure source cannot exceed the MAWP of the heater and a
mechanism exists to block in the heater outlet, a low flow heater fuel shutdown system is
considered adequate protection per ConocoPhillips REP 3-7-1 (Section 20.2.1).
37. Overpressure of fireboxes due to forced draft fans or tube failure will not be considered.
Blocked-in Pumps and Compressors
38. The maximum discharge pressure for centrifugal pumps will be based on the maximum suction
pressure, based on the upstream relief pressure in the event of blocked liquid outlet or overfilling
(or upstream vessel MAWP if no such case is applicable) plus the maximum upstream pressure
due to liquid head and the maximum differential head of the pump at the maximum rated motor
speed and the maximum rated impeller size. In the event a relief device is required, credit may be
taken for reduced throughput due to the increased differential across the pump.
39. The maximum upstream pressure due to liquid head will be determined based on the elevation of
the liquid outlet nozzle on the upstream vessel plus the height from the liquid outlet nozzle to the
top of the vessel in cases where overfilling is applicable or the vessel operates liquid full.
40. If the vessel does not operate liquid full and overfilling is not applicable, the maximum upstream
pressure due to liquid head will be determined based on the elevation of the liquid outlet nozzle on
the upstream vessel plus the height from the liquid outlet nozzle to the high liquid level.
41. The maximum discharge pressure for centrifugal compressors will be based on the upstream relief
pressure in the event of blocked vapor outlet (or upstream vessel MAWP if no such case is
applicable) and the maximum differential head at the maximum rated motor speed. In the event a
relief device is required, credit may be taken for reduced throughput due to the increased
differential across the compressor.
42. Electric motor driven or steam turbine driven positive displacement pumps and compressors
require external relief devices sized for the design throughput of the machine. The machine
manufacturers literature and the design conditions of the downstream system will be consulted in
determining the appropriate relief device set pressure.
43. Air or steam driven positive displacement pumps (i.e. diaphragm pumps, reciprocating pumps,
etc.) require external relief devices in the event that the maximum discharge pressure (based on the
maximum driving medium pressure) is greater than the pump casing or downstream equipment
pressure rating. In such cases, the machine manufacturers literature and the design conditions of
the downstream system will be consulted in determining the appropriate relief device set pressure.
44. In the event that the pressure downstream of a pump (from another source) could exceed the
design pressure of the pump casing, leakage across the discharge check valve should be
considered a potential overpressure contingency in the event that the pump is shutdown. The

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required relief rate will be determined based on the normal forward-flow C V of the check valve as
stated in API 521 Section 4.3.4.2.
45. In the event that the suction side of a pump or compressor could be overpressured in the event of
leakage through discharge check valves and the machine itself, a relief device is required. The
required relief rate is determined based on a leakage rate of 10% of the normal flowrate through
the check valve.
46. A compressor settle-out calculation will be performed to determine the potential for overpressure
in the event that a recycle control valve fails open.
Blocked-in Exchangers
47. In the event that the cold side fluid is being vaporized by the hot side fluid at relief pressure when
blocked in, a relief device is required and will be sized for the vapor generation rate at the relief
pressure. The heat input at relief will be determined in the same manner as described for reboilers
under Column Overhead Systems shown above. The heat input will then be applied to the cold
side fluid at the relief pressure to determine the vaporization rate. Note that the latent heat of the
cold side fluid will be determined in the same manner as described under External Fire.
48. In the event that the cold side fluid remains liquid and a relief device is present, the required relief
rate will be quantified based on the liquid flow rate to the exchanger at relief conditions and the
relief valve capacity will be calculated.
49. Thermal expansion protection is required in the event that the cold side operates liquid-full and
can be isolated with continued heat input the hot side, and the cold side cannot be vaporized by the
hot side fluid at relief pressure.
50. Thermal relief is not required for blocked-in exchangers if the cold side isolation block valves are
sealed or locked open during operation, closed only under permit, and managed in accordance
with paragraph 6.9 of ConocoPhillips REP 3-7-1.
Automatic Control Valve Failure
51. All automatic control valves will be assumed to have the potential to fail in any position regardless
of fail position, with consideration made for mechanical minimum stops.
52. The simultaneous opening of the control valve and the bypass will be considered a double
contingency unless the bypass valve is determined to be fully or partially opened during normal
operation. Instances in which the simultaneous opening of the control valve and the bypass valve
is determined to be a double contingency will be brought to the attention of ConocoPhillips
personnel for further review.
53. Combinations of control valves and bypass valves will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the
following manner:

If the bypass is normally closed, the required relief load for control valve failure will be based
on the incremental flow due to a single failure. As such, the maximum incremental flow is
defined by the full capacity of the control valve (maximum trim) or the bypass, whichever is
greater.

If the bypass is normally partially open, the required relief load for control valve failure will
be based on the incremental flow as defined by the full capacity of the control valve
(maximum trim) plus the capacity of the bypass at its normal percentage open, or the capacity
of the fully open bypass valve by itself, whichever is greater.

If the bypass is normally fully open, the required relief load for control valve failure will be
based on the incremental flow as defined by the full capacity of the control valve (maximum
trim) plus the capacity of the fully open bypass valve.

54. The maximum trim for the given control valve type will be used to determine the relief
requirement for the failure open of that control valve.

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55. Loss of liquid level and subsequent gas flow through a failed open level control valve will be
considered. In addition, consideration will be given to the relative liquid volumes of the two
vessels to determine if a liquid release may occur in the downstream vessel.
Utility Failures
56. Per API 521 Section 5.18.2, Electric power failure should be analyzed in the following three
ways:
a) As a local power failure in which one piece of equipment is affected;
b) As an intermediate or partial power failure in which one distribution center, one motor
control center, or one bus is affected;
c) As a total power failure in which all electrically operated equipment is simultaneously
affected.
57. Per ConocoPhillips REP 3-7-1 Section 6.3.2, consideration must be given to the direct effect of the
failure of one utility upon other utilities. For example: in a plant in which electricity is generated
by steam turbine generators, a steam failure may directly result in a power failure.
Spare Equipment (Power and Steam Failure Cases)
58. Pump or compressor spares (with or without auto-start) are not considered 100% reliable and no
credit for a reduction in relief rate will be taken.
59. In the case of spared equipment, the worst case will be determined for each service. This may
result in the assumption that a spare operates or fails to operate whichever results in the most
significant relief load.
Air Fin Cooler Failure
60. For process cases, natural convection on air fin coolers is assumed to provide 20% of the normal
cooling duty in the event of fan shutdown, as specified in API 521 Section 5.6.4.
61. Any event causing closure of the louvers on an air fin cooler will be considered to result in total
loss of cooling duty to that air fin cooler.
Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture Relief Requirements
62. A tube failure will not be considered in the event that the tubes are greater than 1.5 diameter and
fabricated from process piping (NPS). This typically includes double pipe exchangers, waste heat
boilers, and tubular reactors.
63. A heat exchanger single tube rupture will be considered when the high-pressure side operating
pressure exceeds 1.5 times the low-pressure side MAWP (1.3 for vessels built after 1999). A
complete, single tube failure at the tube sheet will be considered. The required relief capacity will
be based on the flow through two orifices. The flow will be based on the high-pressure side
operating pressure and the low side relief pressure.
64. In accordance with API 521 Section 5.19.3, all cases in which the high pressure side MAWP is
more than 1,000 psi greater than the low pressure side MAWP, or cases in which the low pressure
side fluid is liquid and the high pressure side is vapor or liquid that is expected to flash across the
rupture, will be identified to ConocoPhillips personnel for consideration of transient analysis or
increased inspection frequency.
65. Credit for tube rupture relief via cooling water lines or other normally open pathways will be
taken by means of a steady state hydraulic analysis of the relief path. In addition, cases where

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credit for flow through the low-pressure side line is taken and an isolation valve not identified as
locked or carsealed open is present will be brought to the attention of ConocoPhillips personnel.
Boilers
66. Waste heat boilers and other unfired steam generators will be evaluated consistent with ASME I
requirements with the exception that block valves are acceptable under the relief valves.
67. Direct fired boilers or steam coils in the convection section of heaters will be subject to ASME I
requirements.
Piping
68. A line-by-line contingency analysis for piping will not be performed as piping is generally
designed for more pressure than the equipment that it connects. However, relief devices
determined to be present to protect piping will be evaluated.
69. The design pressure of specialty piping items (strainers, etc.) will be based on actual design
information. Specialty piping items where the design pressure is not known will be brought to the
attention of ConocoPhillips personnel.
Low Pressure Tanks (under 15 psig)
70. Normal and emergency venting calculations will be based on API 2000.
71. Vent capacities will be based on manufacturers capacity curves. If capacity data is unavailable,
API 2000 equations will be used.
72. In the event the design pressure of an atmospheric tank is unavailable, this pressure will be
determined by a tank and vessel construction engineer prior to further analysis.
73. The vacuum capacity of vacuum vents or vent piping will not be evaluated unless the vacuum
design rating of the tank is known. Such cases will be brought to the attention of ConocoPhillips
personnel for further investigation.
Relief Device Capacity Calculations
74. API orifice areas and default discharge coefficients (Kd) will be used in the analysis as follows for
any new relief device installations:

All vapor discharge 0.975

Flashing liquid or two phase 0.85

All non-flashing liquid discharge 0.65

Initially subcooled liquid with flash 0.65

Non-standard relief device such as those certified to the ASME slope method or those with nonstandard orifice sizes and discharge coefficients will be sized based on manufacturers guidance.
The manufacturers Kd will be used for existing relief valves.
75. A default combination capacity factor (K c) of 0.9 will be used to derate the capacity of relief
valves with rupture disks on the inlet line.
76. Per ConocoPhillips REP 3-7-1 Section 23.5.9, Where a rupture disk is located upstream of a
pressure relief valve, a means of indicating that the rupture disk has failed shall be provided in the
form of a pressure gauge or an alarm installed between the rupture disk and the pressure relief
valve. Additionally, such installations should include a bleeder valve between the disk and the
pressure relief valve. Consideration shall be given to the installation of a pressure indicating

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transmitter with a high pressure alarm for all new or modified installations of rupture disks on
relief device inlet lines. Instances where existing installations fail to meet the criteria specified in
REP 3-7-1will be brought to the attention of ConocoPhillips personnel.
77. In the absence of a manufacturers Kr value, a K value of 2.4 will be used to account for the
pressure drop from a rupture disk installed on a relief valve inlet line.
78. The capacity for stand-alone rupture disks will be determined based on pipe flow correlations
(coefficient of resistance method). The rupture disk resistance will be based on the manufacturer's
Kr, if available; otherwise a K value of 2.4 will be assigned.
79. Vapor and non-flashing liquid relief device capacity calculations will be based on API RP 520
equations.
80. Two phase and flashing liquid nozzle and pipe flow calculations will be based on the three point
Homogeneous Equilibrium Method (HEM).
81. For relief valves that discharge to a lower pressure process system, the back pressure is determined
by adding the lower pressure system relief pressure and the pressure drop in the piping from the
pressure relief valve to the lower pressure system.
82. Relief valve set pressures will be compensated for temperature per manufacturers
recommendations.
Relief Headers and Flare System
83. Inlet and outlet pressure drop calculations for individual relief valves will be based on the rated
valve capacity (as opposed to calculated required relief load).
84. In cases where a single relief valve protects multiple pieces of equipment, inlet pressure drops for
comparison to the 3% rule will be quantified from the closest piece of equipment. For large
systems (exchanger trains, etc.) pressure drop between equipment will be considered to ensure that
the MAWP of remote equipment is not exceeded.
85. Inlet pressure drop will be based on non-recoverable losses only (friction) and limited to 3% of the
set pressure. Note that valve capacities will be corrected for inlet pressure drop.
86. Pilot-operated relief valves with remote-sensing pilot lines shall be considered for the mitigation
of excessive relief device inlet pressure drop concerns.
87. Back pressures will be limited as follows:

Conventional relief valves:

Built-up backpressure limited to the allowable overpressure for the relevant scenario.

Bellows relief valves:

API capacity correction factor KB used when total backpressure is between 30% and
50%.

The maximum recommended backpressure for bellows relief valves shall be 50% of the
set pressure, and cases where the backpressure exceeds 50% will be evaluated using the
valve manufacturers KB curve.

Pilot-operated relief valves:

Capacity reduction due to subcritical flow accounted for using API RP 520 equations
(total back pressure greater than approximately 50%).

Maximum total backpressure is limited to 75% of the set pressure.

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The feasibility of pilot-operated relief valves for the intended protected system service
will be considered on a case-by-case basis and the manufacturers literature will be
consulted regarding their limitations.

88. For global scenarios, backpressure limitations relative to capacity will only be applied to those
relief valves that are expected to discharge as a result of the scenario. In addition, the
backpressure for non-flowing relief devices shall be limited to the set pressure due to the potential
for leakage across the relief valve. Finally, mechanical limitations (flange ratings, etc.) will be
considered for all valves tied into the relief header for each scenario.
89. For global scenarios, header backpressure calculations will be based on the combined required
relief rates through each device that is expected to relieve in the event of a particular scenario.
90. K values for all reducers and enlargements will be obtained from ConocoPhillips guidelines for
hydraulic evaluations.
91. Separation efficiency for flare knockout drums will be evaluated for the knockout drum most
immediately upstream of the flare stack. In the event that the scenario does not involve a liquid
release, the calculations will be based on a liquid with a specific gravity of 0.8. This accounts for
the possibility of release of liquids trapped within the relief header system. The maximum droplet
size exiting the knockout drum to the flare stack will be limited to 600 microns.
92. Knockout drums will be required to have 20 minutes of liquid retention time for any identified
liquid release scenarios. No credit will be taken for pump-out from the knockout drums.
93. BE&K Engineering will identify all discharges that result in temperatures below 20 o F
downstream of the relief device for mechanical evaluation.
94. The maximum acceptable Mach number for relief flows through the main flare header and the
flare tip shall be 0.75. The maximum acceptable Mach number for relief flows through laterals
and sub-headers feeding the main flare header shall be 1.0. Cases in which Mach numbers exceed
the acceptable values will be identified.

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