1,1 Moya v Del Fierro: Laurel,J.

Facts: Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the CA declaring the
respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of
the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three
votes over his rival, Irineo Moya.
In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were
contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the
municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes.
On December 27, 1937, the respondent filed a motion of protest in the CFI of
Camarines Norte, the CA, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore
mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the
errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent,
8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable
Court, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro, 72 ballots
marked "P. del Fierro."

Issue:Whether or not the technical rules should be permitted to defeat the

intention of the voter discoverable from the ballot itself.
Held: No! technical rules should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself. The SC dismissed the
petition because in result even if the ballots contested are counted in favor of
Moya. Del Fierro still wins by one vote. The SC avers that in republicanism, the
enfranchised citizen, as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate
source of the established authority. He has a voice in his representative type of
government. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary to when called upon to act in
justifiable cases to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. The ballots should
be read and appreciated, it not outmost with reasonable liberality
1.2). Badelles vs. Cabili, 27 SCRA 11, February 27, 1969 Fernando, J.
Facts: Mariano Badelles together with Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon
who along with the five protestees were among those who were registered
candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, who
contested the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of
the said city.

It was then alleged that there are irregularities on the said election and that illegal
votes were cast by those not qualified to do so. Protestees moved to dismiss in
different suits the petition on the following grounds:
1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the
Revised Election Code;
2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present
case, the Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same;
3. That the complaint states no cause of action.
On march 23, 1968, in a single order, the election protests were dismissed
based on the lack of a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal issued by COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is
valid.
Held: No. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a
free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that
corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
1.3.
2.1. Purisima v. Salonga L-22335 December 31, 1965
FACTS: Petitioner Purisima is a candidate for any of the three offices of Provincial
Board Member of Ilocos Sur. During the canvass, he notes that the returns from
precints (41) showed on their face that the words and figures for Gregorio Cordero
had been obviously and manifestly erased and superimposed with other words
and figures. For comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of returns were
submitted to the board of canvassers and discrepancy was found.Purisima
requested for suspension of the canvass, which the board denied upon the ground
that it was not yet ascertainable whether the discrepancies would materially affect
the result. After the canvass, Cordero got the last spot with 1, 857 votes more than
Purisima.The petitioner again called the attention to the erasures which the board
again denied and proceeded with the proclamation of Cordero. Purisima went to
the COMELEC to annul the canvass and proclamation to which the Commission
respinded by passing a resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation. He filed
a petition for recount with the CFI which was dismissed. It was argued that the
Nacionalista copies cannot be made basis of a petition for recount accdg to Sec.
163 of the Revised Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether the Court is correct in dismissing the petition for recount and its
interpretation of Sec. 163 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD: The dismissal of petition for recount set aside. There is no more question
now that the number of votes involved in said discrepancy is more than enough to
alter the result. The record shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to

submit to the board the COMELEC copies of returns was because the board
declined to suspend the canvass and proclamation. He should not be prejudiced
by such. It is the duty of canvassers to suspend in case of patent irregularity in the
returns as in the present case.Interpretation of election laws should give effect to
the expressed will of the electorate.

II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

2.2.
2.3.
2.4. G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACTFINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials
from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections
in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage.

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate
and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively
insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The
constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section
265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is
vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the
Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant
to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the
constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its
mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection
clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against
GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others,
should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole
purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They
insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as
well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the

performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is

intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
DISMISSED.
2.5. OCTOBER 22, 2013 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN,
Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June
25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission
on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner
submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed
on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on
May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the
Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not
by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of
Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy
are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner
was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10
October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of
the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and
that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to

petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation
that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support
such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A.
No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
3.1. ROMULO MACALINTAL VS COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the
validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions
the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others: 1. That the
provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines, is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election; 2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vicepresident, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress
which is empowered to do so.

Facts: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held
on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted
while laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based
on section 2642, in connection with section 432 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Said Section 432 reads as follows: The following persons shall be
disqualified from voting: (a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. (b) Any person who has
violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States. (c) Insane of
feeble-minded persons. (d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write. (e) Electors
registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after
failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at
any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated
for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present
themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of whether
such incapacity be real or feigned. And section 2642 provides: Whoever at any
election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled so to do, ... shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year
and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right of suffrage and
disqualification from public office for a period of not more than four years.
Issue: WON the State has the right to deprive persons, or the appellant, in this
case, to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No. 1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required
to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for nonabsentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident
are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention
to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of
being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not
execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter. 2. The said
provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential
and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was
in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
3.2. PEOPLE VS. CORRAL, G.R. No. L-42300, JANUARY 21, 1936

Held: It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court
promulgated on March 3, 1910, to suffer eight years and one day of presidio
mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had
been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general
elections held on June 5, 1934, he voted in election precinct No. 18 of the
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. The modern conception of the suffrage
is that voting is a function of government.
The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the
representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was
limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic
ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace
the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among
the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts. The
right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of
their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose
of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections.

The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or

other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of
suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a
privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.) Upon the facts
established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote
on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code
which disqualified from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August,
1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer not less than eighteen
months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a
plenary pardon. Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter
voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be
prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934.
This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime
imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once

attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a

plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at
the general elections of 1934. Neither is there any merit in the contention
advanced by counsel for the appellant that the disqualification imposed on the
latter must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his
sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the
correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,.
the withholding of a prvilege and not the denial of a personal right." Judicial
interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.