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G.R. No.

107930 October 7, 1994


HEIRS OF GEORGE BOFILL, IGNACIO BOFILL, VICTORIA B. ANASTACIO, REGINA FRANCISCA B.
CHUACHINGCO, EVELYN B. SERRA, MANUELITA B. VIZCONDE, LAGRIMAS B. DULLANO, LOURDES B.
DASAL, MANUEL BOFILL, JR., HEIRS OF PLARIDEL BOFILL, EDUARDO BOFILL, MARIA LUISA
BOFILL,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ENRIQUE BEGALAN and FLORDELIZA BEGALAN, SPS. JOSE
CATALAN and BERNARDITA CATALAN, and HEIRS OF MANUEL BARREDO, namely, NORMA B. ALEJAGA,
LEONY BARREDO, MAGILYN BARREDO, MARIA BARREDO, RAMY BARREDO, RELLY BARREDO,
ENRIQUETA B. SARTORIO, represented by VILMA BARREDO BALATAYO, respondents.
P.E. Cases, Jr. & Associates Law Offices for petitioners.
J.D. Villanueva Law Office for private respondents.

FACTS:
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case arose from an action for declaration of ownership over Lot No. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre, situated in
Bo. Linatiran, Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19894, filed by petitioners against the Sps.
Enrique and Flordeliza Begalan and Sps. Jose and Bernardita Catalan, two (2) of private respondents herein.
Joining their cause, the heirs of Manuel Barredo, claiming also to be the owners of the lot in litigation, filed a
complaint in intervention against the petitioners herein, heirs of Manuel Bofill.
On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioners the owners of the lot in question and
entitled to the possession thereof, ordering respondents as defendants therein to vacate the premises.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 31 August 1992 reversed and set aside the decision of the
lower court. It directed the Register of Deeds of Capiz to divide TCT No. 19894 into two titles: one in the name of the
plaintiffs without including the portion covered by Lot No. 2954-A; the other title covering Lot No. 2954-A in the name
of the heirs of Manuel Barredo after payment of the required taxes and fees."
ISSUE: Should the petitioners be declared as owners of the lot in question?

HELD: Yes. The claim of the plaintiff-intervenors and defendants over this land mainly anchored on the supposed
Deed of Exchange of March 8, 1994, executed between Manuel Bofill and Cornelio Barriatos, was a mere exchange
of collateral(s) from Lot 526 to Lot 2954-A for a loan of P450.00 obtained by Manuel Bofill. The said loan having
been paid one year thereafter, said deed of exchange as collateral for said loan was rendered without legal force
and effect, hence no entry in the title covering the lot was made regarding said loan, nor was the title in the name of
Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody else up to the present time.
The case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill . . . on November 17, 1975 for the registration of the Deed of
Exchange of 1944 and for the surrender of the original title was done thirty-one (31) years after its execution,
considering laches and prescription, is also without force and effect. Moreover, the order in said case has become
moot and academic upon the death of Sotera Bofill and the surrender of RO-1456 by her heirs and the cancellation
of the same upon the execution of an Extra-Judicial Partition by the heirs of Manuel Bofill and Sotera Bofill and the
issuance of the present Certificate of Title No. 19894 in the name of the plaintiffs.
The issue as to who of the parties paid the property in good faith is not really paramount in the determination of
ownership considering that generally municipal treasurers simply accept payments regardless of conflicting claims
of ownership. After all, statements in the tax receipts showing such payment are far inferior to the recitals in the
certificate of title.
Bofill did not lose ownership of his lot by imposing on it a right of way in favor of another lot belonging to him.
Besides, we cannot ignore the practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession usually
goes with it. At the time the Casugot was entered into between the parties, this was a common practice. This further
explains the real transaction between them and why Bofill had to demand a right of way over his own land, so that
when possession thereof should be transferred to a third person he could still pass through it, otherwise, he may
have no ingress to or egress from his estate.

G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995


TEODORO ACAP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS REYES, respondents
PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT No. R12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses
Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975,
Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor
of Cosme Pido.
Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred
(9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the
registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his
widow Laurenciana.
Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre," : ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and
ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and participation over the
said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES
The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property continued to be registered in the name of
the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private
respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim
against the original certificate of title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy) had become the
new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Private respondent further alleged
that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of
palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however,
petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land.
After the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed
annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands. When Pido died, petitioner continued to pay
rentals to Pido's widow. Petitioner further claimed before the trial court that he had no knowledge about any transfer
or sale of the lot to private respondent. He denied having entered into a verbal lease tenancy contract with private
respondent and that assuming that the said lot was indeed sold to private respondent without his knowledge, R.A.
3844, as amended, grants him the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price. The lower court rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent, declaring forfeiture of defendant's preferred right to issuance of a Certificate
of Land Transfer.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS A
RECOGNIZED MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVER THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
HELD:
there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes
the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its
existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. 12 Private respondent,
being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, 13 or a donation, 14 or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is
not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.
While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing
in question

ALFREDO BOKINGO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the HEIRS OF


CELESTINO BUSA represented by FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and ERNESTO M.
CAMPOS
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
This complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 3 thereof, and docketed as Civil Case
No. 1003.
Herein respondents are co-owners of the land subject matter. By virtue of the right of representation, the heirs of
FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and CONCORDIA S. BUSA and REYNALDO S. BUSA. Defendants ALFREDO BOKINGO
[herein petitioner], WENCESLAO B. AMBRAY, JR., ROSA B. AMBRAY, CELIA A. ALMORA and JOSELITO B. AMBRAY, filed
an application for titling of a parcel of land before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources , Office of the
CENRO, Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City. The land subject matter of the application of defendants is a parcel of land located at
Baan (Buhangin), Butuan City, containing an area of 2.1600 hectares in TAX DECLARATION NO. GR.-10-002-0189-A.
When plaintiffs knew of defendants application, plaintiffs filed a protest against defendants application on February 5, 1996.
On November 24, 1998, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, HUGO I. BAOSIA, resolved the Protest
in favor of Plaintiffs-the protestant in the DENR case. On January 6, 1999, the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer, HUGO T. BAOSIA, issued a certification stating that the order dated November 24, 1998 has
become final and executory. On September 9, 1999, the same DENR Officer HUGO T. BAOSIA issued an Order of
Execution.
Plaintiffs requested on June 23, 1999, for a Survey Authority to survey the land subject matter of this case before the
CENRO Office of Butuan City. A Survey Authority was issued by the CENRO of Butuan City, authorizing plaintiff ENGR.
ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, JR., to survey the land. The Busa-Panals, personnel of the Butuan PNP and the personnel of
ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS went to the area to survey the land. Unfortunately, SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and
ALFREDO BOKINGO, stopped the said survey. Plaintiff[s] availed of the Barangay Justice System to resolve the
controversy regarding the survey but defendants still refused.
Bokingo moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging that the RTC did not have jurisdiction for the reason that the
assessed value of the land which is P14, 410 is not cognizable under it, but with the MTCC.
ISSUE: WON the defendants sought for the recovery of possession of the subject land. WON the RTC has Jurisdiction.
HELD: No. The cause of action of the respondents complaint is not, as yet, to recover the possession of the subject land. There are
three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property and these are distinguished in this wise:

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action
(accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from
the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to
judicially recover possession. Significantly, the respondents complaint has not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the
subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts that would tend
to prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs
in the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, need to establish the following requirements: (1) the existence of a right
to be protected; and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right. As such, the subject
matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court
under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation

G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985


FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
Roberto D. Dineros for plaintiff-appellee.
Veil D. Hechanova for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as
Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters.
Agustin Dumlao, owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sqm.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area
of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey
of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO
to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in
the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil
Code, it ordered for a forced lease over the disputed portion, Depra as lessor and Dumlao sa lessee.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34 square meters. DUMLAO alleged that the
present suit is barred by res judicata was ruled in favor of him. However, the case was ruled in favor of DEPRA.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal
Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions
affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.

ISSUE: WON the order of the Municipal Trial Court is valid.


HELD: The order is null and void. The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the
parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a
lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance. Since the
Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to
the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res
judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was
the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced coownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to
exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF


APPEALS,
SPOUSES
RENATO
MACAPAGAL
and
ELIZABETH
MACAPAGAL, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter parcel of

land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41961.
Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361-square-meter lot covered
by TCT No. 40155. On September 18, 1986, they filed Civil Case No. 53835 with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 157 against petitioners for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot they
purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which private respondents sold the encroached
portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter.
On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70 square-meter-lot covered
by TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey was conducted, private
respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property was occupied by petitioners' house.
Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. A last notice to vacate was sent to
petitioners on October 26, 1989.
On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58,
Civil Case No. 61004 for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan decided in favor of the former,
with the following disposition.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 167, affirmed said decision.
On further appeal, the respondent Court found no merit in petitioners' plea: Petitioners were fully aware
that part of their house encroached on their neighbor's property, while respondents became aware of it only
after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannot claim good faith as against the respondents. Since
petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand that respondents sell the disputed portion; what
the law provides is that the builders in bad faith can be ordered to dismantle said structure at their own
expense. In the interim period that petitioners' structure remains, they should pay reasonable rent until they
remove the structure."
ISSUE: whether the possession of the portion of the private respondents' land encroached by petitioners' house

can be recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana


WON they are denied of their claimed pre-emptive right to purchase the encroached portion of the private
respondents' land

HELD: Yes. Petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not
negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in
ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in
unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is
[9]

not required.
NO. As there is already a factual finding that they Benitez was a builder in bad faith. And besides, Article
448 of the Civil Code[17] is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice.
Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the
Civil Code.[18] This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." [19] There can be no preemptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No

compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order
would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to
buy the encroached land.
Petitioners want this Court to declare them in good faith and to determine their rights under Article 448,
Civil Code. However, the mere fact that they bought their property ahead of the private respondents does not
establish this point. Nor does it prove that petitioners had no knowledge of the encroachment when they
purchased their property. Reliance on the presumption in Article 526 of the Code is misplaced in view of the
declaration of the respondent Court that petitioners are not builders in good faith.

G.R. No. 96644 June 17, 1994


HEIRS OF JUAN OCLARIT,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BALASABAS, respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioners.
Urbano Lagumay for private respondent.

FACTS: In 1953, the late Juan Oclarit, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, allegedly purchased from Martin
Macalos a parcel of unregistered land located in Antipolo, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, with no permanent landmarks
or boundaries in consideration of the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos. The deed of sale simply described the
property as bounded on the north and east by the property of Herminigildo Baja, on the south by Mariano Gales and
on the west by a brook.
In 1956, Oclarit bought five more parcels of land located in Antipolo and Ulbujan, also in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol,
from Dalmacio Gales in consideration of the sum of six hundred (P600.00) pesos.
n 1975, the heirs of Oclarit filed an action for the quieting of title and damages against respondent Balasabas before
the then Court of First Instance of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 3103. The complaint alleged that in January
1969, private respondent entered the properties subject of the action. Failing to work on the area planted to palay,
private respondent climbed the coconut trees, replaced the "J.O." markings on the trees with "F.G.", representing
Felipa Gales, his mother, and caused to be recorded in the cadastral survey of the land the name of Felipa Gales as
claimant against Juan Oclarit. The heirs of Oclarit considered the acts of private respondent as having cast a cloud
of doubt over their title to the property and therefore deprived them of the enjoyment of the fruits of the coconut
trees.
In his answer, respondent Balasabas claims to have actually and lawfully possessed the disputed parcels of land
"since time immemorial". According to respondent, the first parcel of land was owned by his mother, Felipa Gales, by
virtue of inheritance, and declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. D-1120; while the second parcel of land
was acquired by him from his own mother as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed on March 20, 1963
and which he declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. D-1006. In addition, respondent likewise alleged
possession of the parcels of land openly, peacefully, adversely and continuously without disturbance from any party
until he was molested by the heirs of Oclarit.
The trial court declared the defendant as the owner of the lots.4010 hectare and .8147 hectare, respectively and
ordering the plaintiffs to recognize such ownership by the defendant.
On appeal, respondent court ruled that petitioners failed to prove either legal or equitable title to the two parcels of
land which are necessary in an action for quieting of title. Petitioners claim of ownership was based principally on
tax declarations which, however, are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tax Declarations are conclusive of ownership.
HELD: tax declarations as bases for claim of ownership, petitioners capitalize on what was obviously anobiter in
(Ramos v. Court of Appeals) (supra) that no one in his right mind would be continuously paying taxes for property
that is not in his actual possession. On the contrary, any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations
must also prove he is in actual possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared
for taxation purposes from 1908 to 1945, did not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership in the
absence of the claimants actual possession of said property (De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).
In the same vein, tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property