G.R. No.

165427

March 21, 2011

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The
CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City
declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to himP100,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being
already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979. 3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to
establish a manpower services company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were
registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as
follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224
and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan." 5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301
and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan." 6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy." 7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193
and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy." 8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT
No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy." 9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents
and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son
transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights. 10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both
parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique
Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
respondent refused.13 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979
without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting
toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the
properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991,
respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning. 18 Petitioner likewise claimed that
they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent
established.19
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends,
allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with
petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the
possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that
he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or
construction of a new building.22

On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. 23 In resolving the
issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties
were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which
she owns a measly 3.33% share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the
properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said
properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to
thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. 25
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least,
misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the
record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an issue
correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of
action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only
to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation.
To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted
falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly
failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically
brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal
issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and,
second assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided
between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the
simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to
the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in
appellants claim of co-ownership.26
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondents interest
as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on
self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondents selfserving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the
decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the
said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of
fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition;
and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the
existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff

is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It
may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by
the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. x x x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains
otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie
if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties. 31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, 32 but that rule is not material to
the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. 33 The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by
law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. 34 Petitioner apparently confuses
title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. 35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof
can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of
ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but
may be the best evidence thereof.
1avvphi1

Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest,
in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we
rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which
he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. 38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c)
be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving
and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters
which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument
would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may
also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever
share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to
amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to
attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled
that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him
an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who

impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of
representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his
legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his
deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner
of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The
award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152195

January 31, 2005

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His

Estate, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Danao City, Branch 25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle,
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession
and ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration
(T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots
covered by T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310, 26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in
Danao, Cebu); and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which the private respondents
mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of
Partition2 dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the formers
estate, duly approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0. Under the said deed,
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his
brother and Dulces uncle Santiago Sepulveda, was the undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of
land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and Santiago, were
likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other parcels of land, each with an undivided
one-third (1/3) share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944,
and aside from himself, was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda.
Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920, 3 and Dulce was then only
about four years old. According to the private respondent, his grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded
the delivery of her mothers share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then
was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her
share in the eleven parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he needed to
continue to possess the property to reap the produce therefrom which he used for the payment of the
realty taxes on the subject properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the
delivery of his mothers share in the subject properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in
1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit 4 on November 28, 1961,
stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate on June 5, 1921, when, in fact, the
latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale5 on July 24, 1968 over the property covered by T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in
favor of the City of Danao for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle received this
amount without his (private respondents) knowledge.

The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion of the TWO (2) parcels of
land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the NINE (9)
parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters ONE-THIRD (1/3) share of the
SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO PESOS (P7,492.00) representing the
purchase price of the parcel of land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with interest
thereon until the amount is fully paid;
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2) portion belonging to the plaintiff of
the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion belonging to the plaintiff
of the remaining EIGHT (8) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the amount of which is left to the
discretion of this Honorable Court;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters share of the fruits of the ELEVEN (11)
parcels of land subject-matter of this complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, the value of which will be
proven during the trial;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P12,000.00);
6. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be entitled to in accordance
with law and equity.6
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a deed of sale over the
parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay
the purchase price thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the
said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of the subject
properties from the latters mother Carlota, or from the private respondent.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for the settlement of his estate was filed on
May 8, 1975 with the RTC of Cebu, docketed as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter, petitioner
Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate in July 1976. In compliance with the
decision of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,7 docketed as G.R. No. L-45809 and promulgated on
December 12, 1986, the deceased was substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulces share under the project of partition, the petitioner presented the Affidavit
of Consolidation she executed in October 1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty-five (25) parcels of
land which were deeded to her under the Project of Partition, 8 as well as the Order9 dated March 24, 1962
of the then CFI in Special Proceeding No. 778-R, denying Carlotas motion for the reconstitution of the
records of the said case, and for the delivery of Dulces share in the eleven parcels of land. The court
likewise declared therein that Dulce, through her grandchildren and her mother, Carlota, had already
received her share of the estate from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as early as January 10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal agreement wherein the eleven
parcels of land covered by the complaint would serve as the latters compensation for his services as
administrator of Dionisias estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and

subsequent to the distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. then became the
sole owner of Dulces shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate and was survived by his
wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then minor children. 10 It was pointed out that the private respondent
failed to implead Paz Sepulveda and her minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint.
It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered by T.D. No. 18199 11 under
his name for taxation purposes since the beginning of 1948. 12 It was likewise alleged that the eleven (11)
parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the Project of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes
under the name of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon. 13
On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment 14 in favor of the private respondent. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant by declaring that the plaintiff is legally and rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the
two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of the
nine (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner thereof, and ordering the
partition and segregation of the said one half (1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the
said one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the mechanics of
partition outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court must be followed (Magallon vs. Montejo, 146
SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro Lawas, as administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr., to deliver to plaintiff the latters one third (1/3) share of theP7,492.00 representing the purchase price
of the parcel of land sold to Danao City with interest of twelve [per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina
vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the date of filing of the Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully
paid, to pay attorneys fees to plaintiffs attorney in the sum of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs. The
counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.15
The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had
not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale
of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof
was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming
the appealed decision with modification.
The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate
court erred as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT A TRUST
RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.].
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES TO THE FACTS AS PROVEN IN THE CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 25 IN DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT WAS MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF
THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN RESPONDENT
SHOULD BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE PURCHASE PRICE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A
SHARE IN THE RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS FINDING
THAT ATTORNEYS FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND EVEN INCREASING THE AMOUNT
THEREOF.16
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the
indispensable parties in his complaint.
As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for therein, the private
respondent, as plaintiff therein, sought the recovery of the ownership and possession of the ten (10)

parcels of land and the partition thereof; and for the payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of
the property which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to P7,492.00, which Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was left unpaid. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint,
his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2,
1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent. Under Article 996
of the New Civil Code,17 Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any
betterment. The rights of the usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil
Code.18 In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,19 we held that:
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a
share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime corresponds
or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not been bettered or have not
received any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving spouse to
have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such spouse
cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must
be express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in
the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition
of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of
his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. 20 The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,
first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares.21 As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:22
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally
proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a coownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In
either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final
one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the
court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself
and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon,
and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question.23
In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the
following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz
Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804
(T.D. No. 35090) from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price
of the property.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the
respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to
usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be
dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 24 One who is a party to a case is not
bound by any decision of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief
in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as
parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of judicial
power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.25
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 26 Hence,
the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint. 27
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161720 November 22, 2005

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R. RENTINO, LUCIA
RESTAR, RODOLFO RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA R. RAMOS, MANUEL RESTAR,
NENITA R. BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ, ROSELLE R. MATORRE, POLICARPIO RESTAR
and ADOLFO RESTAR,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON, namely: RUDY R. CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, NILDA C.
JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, and NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF PERPETUA R. STA. MARIA,
namely GEORGE STA. MARIA, LILIA M. MANIAGO, DERLY M. CONCEPCION, GERVY STA. MARIA,
DORY M. INDULO; HEIRS OF MARIA R. ROSE, namely: TERESITA R. MALOCO, ROLANDO ROSE,
EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA R. PASTRANA, DOMINICA RESTAR-RELOJERO and
PACIENCIA RESTAR MANARES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores
Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica RestarRelojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit 1 he executed with one
Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 6696 2 in Restars name covering a
5,9183 square meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which
was among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restars Tax Declaration No.
6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134 4 in his name.
On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and Maria Rose
who had in the meantime died, together with Flores surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and
Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint5 against Flores heirs for "partition [of the lot], declaration of
nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aklan.

Flores brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being unwilling coplaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores, they were given
their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991; after Flores death in 1989, his
widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children,
to which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it
would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants
Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it
from Flores.
By Answer6 filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed that they
had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been
paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce
of the lot or that upon Flores death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to
finance her childrens education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already finished their
respective courses.7
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the "new Tax Declaration
in 1945," Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his
siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar; 8 and an extra-judicial partition was
subsequently executed on September 28, 1973 by Restars heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose
Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. 9
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,10 alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of
action as against him for he interposed no objection to the partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer 11 acknowledged Flores as the owner of
the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was sold to him as shown by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981.12 He thus prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of
the lot among Restars heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores. 13
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores share in Restars estate was not the lot
but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs
had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had
acquired the lot by prescription.14
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the trial court
discredited the same upon noting that Flores signature in the purported Deed of Sale differed from those
appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged
to have been executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his
name in a "straight" manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was
"crooked," and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores wifes signature which read "Esmea"
in the deed, and not as "Esmenia."15
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. 16
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, by Decision of
October 29, 2002.17 reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores
failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a
separate conveyance to them by Restar.
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/coowners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by the
defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the
plaintiffs claim of ownership.18
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately take legal action to
protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest brother who had asked them to continue
cultivating the lot to support his childrens education. 19
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by Flores, the
appellate court sustained the trial courts rejection thereof.
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so far as plaintiffsappellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant
Policarpio Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30,
1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by
adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants Heirs of Flores filed
the present petition, assigning the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY
AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE
CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.20
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
xxx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire
ownership thereof by prescription21 where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the coowners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. 22
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten
years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character
which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary
prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct
factual conclusions based on the record.23
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners claim that
the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate
succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until
January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and exercised acts of dominion thereon
tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had
neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have
adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date
become aware of the adverse claim.24
Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty
years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval.
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in
question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen
Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It was
admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax
Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the
name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the coownership over the land in question. x x x
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan
way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale,
Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit "20"). If they were able to demand the partition, why then did
they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance
from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs
of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against
him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the
instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the
time when the tax declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to
run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership,
laches and prescription of the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his
heirs. 25
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the
land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight 26 and
can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. 27
As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land, it was
correctly discredited by the trial court.
[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce
cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay
produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after
excluding expenses for cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share of
the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan. 28
Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of facts which must, as a
matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect, they must remain. Respondents have not,
however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax
declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint
Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of
real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and

continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse
possession was continued by his heirs.
The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to immediately take legal action to
protect their rights forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the
land to support their childrens education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true,
why did not any of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed their
college education in 1977?
The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the
land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner which length of possession
had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by
substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is
unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151334

February 13, 2013

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely:

LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely:
FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M.
FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision2 dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49. The RTC decision (1) dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia)
complaint for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and (2)
annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudicationexecuted by petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion
(Carolina).
The Facts

The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner
Carolina is the surviving spouse. The other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion
(Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and
respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandros children. 4
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired
by Leandro during his lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square
meters originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P; 5 and (2) Lot No. 705
measuring 2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were registered in the name
of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the
above real properties in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not
delineated with particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for
their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an
area of 3,164 square meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento
(Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio
had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). 6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in
favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication9adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her
deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina.10 On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale11 over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names. 12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981.
Upon her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No.
707.13
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish
the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot
Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no
amicable settlement was reached by the parties. 14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the
herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No.
707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the respondents
cause of action had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing
the suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and
conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is no longer tenable
because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and
the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership. 16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1) whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are
the exclusive properties of Leandro; and (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern
half of Lot No. 707.17
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages is hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the
transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to
be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in

estate settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only
her one-half () share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina
was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia
since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken. 19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled that the
RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot
No. 707 under judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and
Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale
affected only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina. The proper action in such case is
not the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from
the third person, but for a division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should result in segregating
the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed premature
considering that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the
income from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for
which the lots appear to have been intended.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed
from in Civil Case No. U-5826 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Lot No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to be owned by appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
[herein respondent], pro indiviso share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro
indiviso share, and appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share, who are hereby
directed to partition the same and if they could not agree on a partition, they may petition the trial court for
the appointment of a commissioner to prepare a project of partition, in accordance with the procedure as
provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20
Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision
promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the CAs ruling that a
partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No.
705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate
of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed by the
CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing discussion shall concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership because
the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no
acceptance and thus, void. The petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on the
following portions, viz:
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single and a resident [of] San Vicenter
(sic), Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine
Currency and the services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino
citizen and a resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by these presentsw (sic)
RENOUNCE, RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM in favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and
assigns the ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern portion of the following parcel of land more particularly described
and bounded as follows to wit[.]22
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke questions of law,
because: (a) it has not been registered with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as

1961; (b) a certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the
National Archives which is the depository of old and new notarized documents has no record of the Deed
of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification dated May 19, 2003; 23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who
supposedly notarized the Deed of Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification
dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an
onerous donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the
formalities for a simple donation.25
The Courts Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed under
Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners before the RTC and
the CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit the issue with regard to
Lot No. 707 as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No.
707. The petitioners supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28,
1961 was rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria." 27 On
appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by questioning the execution and
enforceability of the Deed ofQuitclaim. They claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in
the manner required by law.28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot
change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new
trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has
been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.29 The Court had likewise, in
numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot
be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It
would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material
to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the
trial court.30
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory,31 this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual
nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the
evidence already adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners
themselves have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several certifications 32 in support of
their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since
the Court is not a trier of facts.33
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the petitioners involving the
nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their failure to advance these questions during trial, the
petitioners are now barred by estoppel34 from imploring an examination of the same.
The respondent can compel the
partition of Lot No. 707

The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not
lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are
required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the
property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first
definitely resolved.35
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of
Quitclaimexecuted by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of
Eulalio. It is well to recall that the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of
Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of
Felipa and Hilariathis contention is, of course, flawed.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant
may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title. 36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707
was precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs,
they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was
predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share,
however, passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally
possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner
cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.38
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had
full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right
to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was affected. 39
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the
consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolinas pro indiviso share, and the
vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolinas share. A co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.40
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance
but only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolinas successors-ininterest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what
Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as coowner.41 Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already
been effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of
Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripinas share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia
took the formers place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any
time.42
The respondents right to demand
for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches
The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No.
707 on December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia.
Considering the period of time that has already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set
in and the respondent is now barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot.
The contention is specious.

Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or coowners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. 43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating
co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.44
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the
registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively
repudiate the co-ownership. The respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981
without any opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the
respondent, for the years 1983-1987.45 These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to
assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized
the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in
1962. Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the presence
of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly
appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his
co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership
before the alleged prescriptive period began to run. 46
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied
trust was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents
undivided share.47 As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration. In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not
vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and
records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens
system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens
system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands
in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For
Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs. The
beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
intended trust must be sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
1wphi1

Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession
exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only
evidence of possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared
the lot in their names for taxation purposes. 50 Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of
ownership, or in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other
co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised
are vague or uncertain.51
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based,
must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and
exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will
lie.52 The petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession essential for the reckoning of the
10-year period for acquisitive prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244
was issued but in 1994 when Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilias house thus explicitly excluding her
from the co-ownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known their denial of the coownership. On the same year, the respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the
period required by law for acquisitive period to set in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the coownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 53 More so, laches is a creation of equity and its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud
and injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.54

Partition of Lot No. 707

Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No.
707 was their conjugal property.56 When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to
Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. 57 Marcelas rights to the other half,
in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio. 58 Under Article 834
of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership
belonged to Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the
conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his second marriage
with Faustina.59
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the
conjugal partnership.60 The remaining were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios
children, Carolina and Agripina.61 However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available
for betterment.62
The usufructuary of Eulalio over the portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked
ownership.63 Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the
conjugal partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina 64 including
Faustinas usufructuary rights which were merged with Carolinas naked ownership. 65
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8 pertains to
Carolina. Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of
the subject lot. Since theDeed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor
of Emilia instead of Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by
Agripinas nearest collateral relative,66who, records show, is her sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No. 707
partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-discussed
apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290
dated December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: (1) 3/8 portion of Lot No. 707
shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and Felipa Figuracion-Manuel; (2) portion of Lot. No.
707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; and (3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate
of Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and
effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in
the foregoing manner. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the
proper share appertaining to each co-owner, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court. When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quomay order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or
sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to
sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.