[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 08-13915
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 6, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

Agency No. A95-265-503

ALIANE SAINT-CLAIR,

Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.

________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(April 6, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Aliane Saint-Clair, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions this Court for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). For the reasons set forth below, we deny her
petition.
I.
In January 2005, immigration authorities served Saint-Clair with a notice to
appear (NTA), alleging that she entered the United States on August 8, 2001,
without being admitted or paroled. As a result, the NTA alleged that she was
removable, pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Saint-Clair then filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief that she had prepared back in April 2002. In her application, SaintClair stated that she had worked as a cosmetologist in a beauty salon in Port Au
Prince, Haiti, until the time she left the country in August 2001. She also noted
that one of her parents remained in Port Au Prince. She explained that she was
seeking political asylum in the United States because supporters of the Lavalas
political party tried to kill her on account of her political opinion. She explained
the primary incident giving rise to her application as follows:
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I am seeking political asylum in the United States because I am

scare[d] for my life, May 30th 2001 Those men came by night 3am
kidnaped me, interrogated me, on my political opinion and about . . .
Convergence, my relation with U.S.A. I received all kind of bad
treatment from them, they released me with pain continuously hard.
She stated that she suffered continuous pain and that she feared that she would be
tortured and killed if returned to Haiti.
At an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Saint-Clair admitted
the allegations in the NTA and conceded to the charge of removal. Saint-Clair
then filed an amended application. In this application, she added that she was
married to a Haitian man who lived in Canada. She also gave the following
description of the May 30, 2001, incident:
I am seeking Political Asylum because my life was in real danger in
Haiti. . . . I used to speak with my clients in the Beauty Salon against
the Government Lavalas and participated in demonstration as AntiLavalas. I have been reported by my own client since then, I received
several phone calls threaten[ing] me because I am anti-Lavalas and
th[at] I must be killed. On May 30, 2001 at 3:00 oclock in the
morning; a group of Chimeres [Lavalas supporters] came at my house,
they broke the entrance door, they beat me severely, I was kidnaped
and transported away from my house I was interrogated regarding my
political opinion, I was badly injured but after 35 minutes I have been
released then in order to save my life, I left Haiti to come here on
August 8, 2001.
At the removal hearing, Saint-Clair testified on her own behalf as follows.
She married a man in New York in January 2004, but she did not know his
immigration status. In Haiti, she had worked as a hairdresser and beautician in a
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Port Au Prince studio that had three other employees. She often used to express
her political opinions to her clients in the studio and, because she expressed
dissatisfaction with the governing Lavalas party, she was persecuted as a result.
Saint-Clair testified that she started receiving calls at [her] home because
[of] the way [she] was talking. She testified that she didnt know that they could
become something serious at first and could not remember what month or year
she received the calls. When asked how many calls she received, Saint-Clair
testified that she received a lot but could not remember exactly how many . . . .
Counsel then asked her to estimate whether she received more than 20 calls or
more than 50 calls and, after the government objected that counsel was leading,
Saint-Clair responded, Yeah, I received more than 30 calls. She did not know
whether it was the same person who called or whether there were different callers,
she did not recognize the voices on the telephone, and she testified that they always
said: [Y]ou talking, you badmouthing the president, were going to come and get
you.
With respect to the May 30, 2001 incident, Saint-Clairs entire testimony
was as follows:
COUNSEL:

Now other than the phone calls, what else did you
mean by persecution?

SAINT-CLAIR:

When I say that for instance in May, on May 30th,

2001, they came to my home. They entered my
home and they came in at 3:00 in the morning.
...

COUNSEL:

Okay, when you say they, who do you mean?

SAINT-CLAIR:

Chimere Lavalas.

COUNSEL:

Okay, how many?

SAINT-CLAIR:

I dont know exactly but they [broke in] and they

came in, they [broke in]. They broke in the door.

COUNSEL:

Okay, and . . . how did they break the door?

SAINT-CLAIR:

I dont know with what they did it, but they just
came in, they broke in, they came in, they entered.

COUNSEL:

Now when you say they, I assume you mean more

than one. How many did you see?

SAINT-CLAIR:

No, they were, it was not just one, there were

many. I dont know how many, but they were
more than one. And when they broke in, they
robbed me, they throw me on the floor, and they
start beating me all over my body.

COUNSEL:

Okay, what did they look like?

SAINT-CLAIR:

They wore masks.

COUNSEL:

Masked with what?

SAINT-CLAIR:

You can, you could only see their eyes.

COUNSEL:

Okay, and what, what did the rest of them look

like? What did the rest of their body look like?
How were they clothed?

SAINT-CLAIR:

They were all wearing pants and shirts.

COUNSEL:

Okay, did they carry any weapons?

SAINT-CLAIR:

Yeah.

COUNSEL:

Okay, what kind of weapons did they carry?

SAINT-CLAIR:

I dont know anything about weapons.

COUNSEL:

Well, Im not asking you for the specifics of them.

SAINT-CLAIR:

Different kind of weapons. I dont know if youre

talking about guns, if youre talking about
machete[s].

COUNSEL:

Yes, did you see any of those or all of them?

SAINT-CLAIR:

Yeah.

COUNSEL:

All right. Now you said that they threw you down
and they did what?

SAINT-CLAIR:

And they start beating me when they throw me on

the floor and they were saying thats the one who
is badmouthing the president.

COUNSEL:

All right, how many of them beat you?

SAINT-CLAIR:

How many of them?

COUNSEL:

How many of them, how many chimeres beat you?

SAINT-CLAIR:

There were many.

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Counsel then asked Saint-Clair how she knew that the men were Lavalas
supporters, but before she was given the opportunity to answer the question, the IJ
granted a five minute recess.
When the hearing reconvened, the IJ expressed concern over the fact that
Saint-Clair did not know the immigration status of her husband. The IJ therefore
questioned Saint-Clair about her marriage and, after learning that her husband
might be a Canadian citizen, ultimately decided to continue the hearing so that the
parties could explore that issue. The IJ clarified that he was not taking any action
on the asylum application at that time. At a subsequent hearing, counsel for SaintClair informed the IJ that, regardless of however the Canadian issue was resolved,
Saint-Clair wished to proceed on her asylum application.
At the next hearing, and after hearing legal argument from both parties, the
IJ issued an oral decision denying Saint-Clairs application. After noting, inter
alia, that there [wa]s little disagreement between the application for asylum and
the respondents testimony, the IJ concluded that Saint-Clair did not meet those
standards of proof necessary in order to make a case in which this Court may make
a grant of asylum or any of its lesser remedies . . . . (Id. at 48). First, the IJ found
that she did not establish a nexus between any political activity and her alleged past
persecution. The IJ next found that Saint-Clair did not have a well-founded fear of
persecution, as she did not report her alleged persecution to the authorities in Haiti
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and, instead of attempting to relocate in Haiti, came directly to the United States.
The IJ further found it evident that Saint-Clair did not demonstrate a countrywide
fear of persecution, reiterated that she did not assert that she could not relocate to
other cities in Haiti or even other neighborhoods in Port Au Prince, and highlighted
that at least one family member . . . remained in Port Au Prince. Returning to the
previous issue of past persecution, the IJ found that he could not conclude that
past persecution is present in this case in any respect, as the anonymous telephone
threats and a single assault in [Saint-Clairs] home . . . by nameless men who the
applicant could not identify with any particular group did not rise to the level of
persecution. Accordingly, the IJ denied Saint-Clair asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under CAT.
The BIA dismissed Saint-Clairs appeal. The BIA agree[d] with the [IJs]
determination that respondent failed to establish a sufficient nexus between her
attack in May 2001 and one of the protected grounds. Furthermore, the BIA also
found that this single incident did not rise to the level of persecution, as SaintClair was not seriously harmed and did not seek out any medical treatment for her
injuries. In addition, the BIA found that Saint-Clair has not demonstrated a wellfounded fear that she will now be targeted throughout Haiti on account of a
statutorily protected ground given the changed political climate in Haiti. Finally,
with respect to her CAT claim, the BIA affirm[ed] the IJs conclusion that
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Saint-Clair had not shown that it was more likely than not that she would be
tortured if returned to Haiti or that she would be harmed by, or with the
acquiescence of, public officials.
II.
When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJs decision. Al Najjar v. Aschroft, 257
F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Insofar as the [BIA] adopts the IJs reasoning,
we will review the IJs decision as well. Id. In this case, because the BIA drew
its own conclusions on the issue of past persecution and whether Saint-Clair had a
well-founded fear of persecution, we review only the BIAs decision on those
issues.
To the extent that the BIAs decision was based on a legal determination,
review is de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir.
2001). Factual determinations, however, are reviewed under the highly
deferential substantial evidence test, which requires this Court to view the record
in the light most favorable to the agencys decision and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that decision. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 102627 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). We must affirm the BIAs decision if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284 (quotation omitted). We
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may not reweigh the evidence and may not reverse the BIAs findings of fact
unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. Arboleda v. U.S. Atty Gen.,
434 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2006).
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum. INA 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1). The Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets
the INAs definition of a refugee. INA 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1). A
refugee is:
any person who is outside any country of such persons nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
INA 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory refugee
status. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(a); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. To establish asylum
eligibility, the alien must, with specific and credible evidence, establish past
persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or a well-founded fear that
the statutorily listed factor will cause such future persecution. Yang v. U.S. Atty
Gen., 418 F.3d 198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R.
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 208.13(a)-(b). An applicant for asylum who has established past persecution on

a protected ground is presumed to have a fear of future persecution on the basis of
the original claim. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(1). If [s]he cannot show past
persecution, then the petitioner must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Ruiz v.
U.S. Atty Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006).
III.
Although the term is not defined by the INA, we have held that persecution
is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation, and that mere harassment does not amount to
persecution. Sepulveda v. U.S. Atty Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quotations omitted). In determining whether an alien has suffered past
persecution, the IJ must consider the cumulative effects of the incidents. Delgado
v. U.S. Atty Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2007).
In this case, the record does not compel the conclusion that Saint-Clair
suffered past persecution because her descriptions of the threatening telephone
calls and the May 30, 2001, incident lack the requisite detail and specificity.1 With
respect to the telephone calls, the description in her amended application provided
1

We take Saint-Clairs testimony as true for purposes of this appeal because the IJ did not
expressly make an adverse credibility determination. Mejia v. U.S. Atty Gen., 498 F.3d 1253, 1255
n.2 (11th Cir. 2007); Yang v. U.S. Atty Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
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only that the callers threatened to kill her because she was speaking out against the
Lavalas party. In her testimony, Saint-Clair could not remember the month or even
the year that she received the calls or whether there were multiple callers. In
addition, she testified that she initially did not realize that the calls could develop
into something serious. Finally, Saint-Clair vaguely testified that she received a
lot of calls, and it was only after her attorney asked her a leading question
whether she received more than 20 or more than 50 calls that she testified that
she received more than 30 calls.
With respect to the May 30, 2001, incident, Saint-Clair stated in her original
application only that unknown men kidnaped and interrogated her, she received
all kind[s] of bad treatment from them, and they released [her] with pain
continuously hard. In her amended application, Saint-Clair provided that Lavalas
supporters broke into her house, beat [her] severely, kidnaped and interrogated
her, and badly injured her. Saint-Clairs brief testimony about this incident was
similarly lacking in detail. She was unable to estimate how many attackers there
were, could not speculate on how they broke in to her house, did not offer any
information on the duration of the beating or whether the men beat her with
weapons or objects, did not elaborate on the alleged kidnaping and interrogation,
and did not describe the extent of her injuries or whether she sought medical
assistance. Although Saint-Clair testified that the men wore masks, when asked by
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counsel what clothing the men were wearing, she simply responded that they wore
pants and shirts. And, although Saint-Clair ultimately testified that the men were
armed with guns and machetes, she provided this testimony in response to leading
questions by her attorney and after initially responding that she did not know
anything about weapons. In sum, Saint-Clairs accounts of the threatening
telephone calls and the May 30, 2001, incident are wholly lacking in the detail and
specificity required to compel the conclusion that she suffered mistreatment rising
to the level of persecution.2
Because Saint-Clair failed to establish that she suffered past persecution, it
remained her burden to establish a well-founded fear of persecution if she were to
return to Haiti. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257. In her brief, Saint-Clair does not point to
any evidence in the record on this point at all, let alone any evidence that would
compel the conclusion that she had a well-founded fear of persecution.
Instead, she quotes at length from our decision in Arboleda and states in one
sentence that the Immigration Judge did not discuss whether relocation would be
successful or reasonable under the factors in 8 C.F.R. 1208.13(b)(3).
See Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1226-27 (reversing the BIAs conclusion that the
government had met its burden to show that the petitioners could reasonably

Thus, we decline to address the IJs and BIAs alternative finding that Saint-Clair failed
to establish a nexus between the alleged past persecution and any imputed political opinion.
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relocate because the BIA did not mention any of the other factors it should have
considered [under the regulation] in making this determination).
As an initial matter, Saint-Clairs argument fails because we are not
reviewing the IJs decision on this issue, since the BIA made its own, independent
finding. In any event, this case is distinguishable from Arboleda because, unlike
the petitioners in that case, Saint-Clair did not establish past persecution and,
therefore, she had the burden to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
See Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1224 (In the instant case, as the government concedes,
the BIA presumed past persecution and therefore the burden was on the
government to show that internal relocation was reasonable.). Despite this
burden, Saint-Clair does not even attempt to explain how consideration of the
relocation factors would have demonstrated that she could not have reasonably
relocated to Haiti. Thus, even if the agency failed to properly analyze the
relocation factors, this error was harmless.
In sum, Saint-Clair has not demonstrated that the record compels the
conclusion that she suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of
persecution. Thus, because Saint-Clair has failed to meet her burden of proof with
respect to her claim for asylum, she has necessarily also failed to meet her burden
of proof with respect to her claims for withholding of removal and relief under

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CAT. Forgue v. U.S. Atty Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.

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