FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166577. February 3, 2010.]

SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and
SOCORRO CARPO, petitioners, vs.
AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED,
respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the
Decision 1 dated December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and set aside the
Summary Judgment 2 dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also subject of
the present petition is the CA Resolution 3 dated December 16,
2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier
decision.
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case,
follows:
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro
Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title 4 with the
RTC of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property
Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las
Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292.
In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a
171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their names. 5
They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have
titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368)
over the property covered by the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and
that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity
contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential
subdivision. Attached as annexes to the complaint were
photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August
13, 1970 in the name of the
Carpos, covering a parcel of
land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007)
located in the Barrio of
Almanza, Las Pias with an
area of 171,309 square
meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6,
1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel
of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu80886) located in Bo. Tindig

na Manga, Las Pias with an

area of 171,309 square
meters; EcTCAD
(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18,
1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel
of land (Lot 2, plan Psu47035) located in the Sitio of
May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza,
Las Pias with an area of
218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18,
1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel
of land (Lot 3, plan Psu47035) located in the Sitio of
May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza,
Las Pias with an area of
155,345 square meters.
No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.
According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367
and T-4368 and their derivatives "appear to have been issued in
the name of Ayala and purport to cover and embrace the Carpo's
property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the
already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are
inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly
issued derivatives of the Carpos' title." 6 The Carpos additionally
applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing construction and
development works on the properties in purported violation of the
Carpos' rights.
The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT
Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367,
T-4368 and all alleged
derivatives thereof, issued in
the name of Ayala
Corporation and/or APVC
over the properties or portion
thereof embraced in the
Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and
issuing a writ of possession in
favor of the Carpos and/or
ordering Ayala Corporation
and APVC to surrender to the
Carpos the properties or
portion thereof being
occupied by the said
corporations under inherently

invalid or void titles; (2)

declaring TCT No. 296463
issued in their names as valid
and the Carpos as the owners
of the property described
therein "including the parcels
of land being claimed and
occupied by Ayala
[Corporation] and APVC
withou[t] valid and
enforceable titles"; and (3)
ordering Ayala Corporation
and APVC to pay jointly and
severally the amount of
P100,000 as attorney's fees
plus costs of suit and litigation
expenses. 7
On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer,
petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent
Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after
purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias that
the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI
and not Ayala Corporation. 8
On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer
with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction 9 and Pre-trial Brief with
Motion to Admit Amended Answer, 10 respectively. EAHcCT
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists
having been merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the
areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not
overlap with the Carpos' claimed property and the dispute
pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos' TCT No.
296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures,
Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name
of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation
contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also
merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of
the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title
to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while
the Carpos' title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in
1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos' complaint was barred by res
judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San
Pedro 11 which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico
over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of
a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the
same under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own
name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by
TCT No. T-5333. 12

In the Order 13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that
the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of
the case to the RTC of Las Pias where the disputed property is
located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the
Las Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the only issue for the court to
resolve was a purely legal one which of the two (2) titles should
be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on
their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to
OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years
earlier than the Carpos' predecessor's title (OCT No. 8575), its
title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were
"genuine issues and controversies to be litigated."
In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI's motion for
summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for
certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision 14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI's
petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment.
Both parties moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI
filed a motion for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to
render the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy
and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their
motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that
must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the
CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998. 15 ECISAD
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions
for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CA's
refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440,
the Carpos assailed the CA's ruling that trial was unnecessary.
In separate minute Resolutions, 16 the Court denied both
petitions. Both parties' motions for reconsideration were likewise
denied.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated
December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos' title superior to that of
ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not
inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of
the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in
their complaint. A reading of the
defendant's answer reveals that OCT
No. 242 covers the property surveyed
under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail
to allege that the same was approved by

the Director of the Bureau of Lands,

thereby justifying this court to be
skeptical of the validity of the issuance of
OCT No. 242. In original land registration
cases, it is mandatory that the
application should be accompanied by a
survey plan of the property applied for
registration, duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey
plan without the approval of the Director
of the Bureau of Lands has the character
of being of dubious origin and it is not
therefore worthy of being accepted as
evidence. The property being claimed by
the defendant ALI, allegedly registered
under OCT No. 242, is shown to have
been surveyed under SWO and not
bearing the approval of the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued
emanating from a survey plan without
the approval of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands is tainted with
irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in
Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the
said case, the Supreme Court held:
"That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the
same is of dubious value and is not
acceptable as evidence. Indubitably,
therefore, the reported survey and its
alleged results are not entitled to credit
and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character and
unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of
much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120
SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled
that the Land Registration Commission
has no authority to approve original
survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs.
Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68
SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the
property which defendant ALI claimed to
have been originated from OCT No. 242
had not been approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently
prepared and approved by the then Land

Registration Commissioner and under

the law, the same is void.
It will also be noted that aside from the
admissions made by defendant ALI in its
answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT
No. T-5333 that the date of survey was
on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs' property
covered by TCT No. 296463 was
surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This
means that plaintiffs' predecessor-ininterest had claimed ownership of the
property ahead of that of defendant ALI's
predecessor-in-interest. The principle of
prior registration cannot be applied in
this case because the land previously
surveyed cannot anymore be the subject
of another survey, and there is already a
record of a prior survey in the Bureau of
Lands. This is precisely the reason why
the survey plan has to be approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This
must be the reason why the later survey
in favor of Ayala's predecessor-ininterest did not anymore bear the
approval of the Director of Lands
because had it been submitted for
approval, the records of the Bureau of
Lands will show that an earlier survey of
the same land had already been made
and approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. HTaSEA
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of
its title over that of the plaintiffs' cannot
therefore be sustained. Be that as it may,
the fact that cannot be disputed on the
basis of Ayala's answer is its admission
that SWO survey without the approval of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands was
submitted in the alleged registration
proceedings, rendering the decree and
the title issued thereunder to be tainted
with irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463
in the name of the
plaintiffs Spouses
Morris G. Carpo

and Socorro R.
Carpo as valid and
legal, and superior
to that of
defendant Ayala's
TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333,
TCT No. 125945,
TCT No. T-6055,
TCT No. 4366,
TCT No. 4367 and
TCT No. 4368 and
their derivatives as
null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant
Ayala Land, Inc. to
pay the sum of
P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
and
(d) To pay the costs. 17
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was
dismissed by the CA in a Resolution 18 dated May 14, 1999 for
failure to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for
reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full amount
assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Pias. The
motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI's
petition meritorious, the Court, in a Decision 19 dated November
22, 2000, reversed the CA's dismissal of ALI's appeal and
remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged
decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING
DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is
GRANTED, the assailed Summary
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias, Branch 255, dated December
22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered
as follows:
(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T5333, in the name of defendant-appellant
Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby
declared to be the VALID title to the
subject property;

(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name

of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be
NULL and VOID;

After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and

concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the
trial court should be reversed and set aside.

(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is

hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffsappellees' TCT No. 296463, and any and
all titles issued covering the subject
property, for being spurious and void,
and of no force and effect. 20

Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the

controversy

The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and
the heirs of Morris Carpo. 21 The Petition contained the following
assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF
RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY
PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY
OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC
"RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED
"ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF
THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF
PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED
PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES
JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS
BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V.
SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415,
WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION
OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID
CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE
ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE
PRESENT. 22
Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing
and setting aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and
affirming in toto the RTC's Summary Judgment dated December
22, 1998; or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC
for further proceedings. aDSIHc

At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary
Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its
antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land
with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a
land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a
land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with
a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of
evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the
Carpos' TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed
by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of
the trial court considering that the property being claimed by the
Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309
square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles
invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving
the same parties, the CA ruled that:
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its
responsive pleading did not deny the
existence of a title in the name of the
plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it
alleged:
"14. The parcel of land
described in TCT No. 296463,
issued in the name of the
plaintiffs, completely overlaps
the property covered by ALI's
TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No.
T-296463 traces itself to OCT
No. 8575 which was issued
on August 12, 1970, long after
OCT No. 242 (the title from
which ALI's TCT No. T-5333
was derived) was issued on
May 9, 1950 (on the basis of
Decree of Registration No.
2917, Record No. 43516).
Hence, ALI's TCT No. T-5333
is superior to TCT No.
296463. . . . ."
This is an admission that the private
respondents have a title to the property
in question, and that the property
described in private respondents' TCT

No. 296463 completely overlaps the title

of petitioner ALI. This fact is further
substantiated by an affidavit of Jose
Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer
who, after attesting to his
qualifications, competence and
experience, declared under oath:
"9. In connection with the
subject case, Affiant was
requested to find out, based
on the technical descriptions
in their respective titles, if the
lots described in the title of
plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463,
overlaps the lots of ALI
covered by TCT No. 41262
(formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of
LPVI, and, more previously,
TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A,
in the name of Ayala
Corporation), TCT No. 4366,
TCT No. 4367 and TCT No.
4368, . . . . HETDAC
'9.1. To accomplish
this task, Affiant
resorted to the
plotting of the
technical
descriptions found
in the plaintiffs' and
ALI's respective
titles. The standard
operating
procedure,
adopted by Affiant
in this particular
instance, in
plotting properties
is to study the
technical
description in the
titles and at the
same time, to get
all the available
survey plans
described in the
titles for reference.
'9.2. To evidence
this plotting that
Affiant conducted,

Affiant prepared a
Sketch Plan
reflecting Plaintiffs'
title vis-a-vis ALI's
title. Attached
hereto as Annex
"G" is an original
copy of the Sketch
Plan prepared by
the Affiant.
'9.3. The orangeshaded portion on
the Sketch Plan
indicates the area
covered by the title
of the plaintiffs and
it is clearly shown
in this plan that
plaintiffs' claimed
property entirely
overlaps ALI's
property
delineated in TCT
No. T-41262.
Plaintiffs' claimed
property (Lot 3,
PSU-56007) is in
fact identical to
ALI's lot (Lot 3,
PSU-80886).
'9.4. The blue,
pink and green
lines on the
Sketch Plan
indicate the
boundaries of
ALI's TCT Nos.
4366, 4367 and
4368,
respectively, and
it is clearly
shown that these
do not overlap
with plaintiffs'
claimed
property.'"
The Sketch Plan attached thereto
clearly indicates the overlapping and
identical boundaries between the
private respondents' TCT No. 296463

and petitioner's TCT No. 125945,

(formerly TCT No. T-5333). 23 In
addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic
Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached
to its Motion for Summary Judgment
copies of the following titles:
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, the private respondents
never controverted the petitioner's
allegation that their (private
respondents') title, TCT No. 296463
traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued
on August 12, 1970, while that of the
petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242,
issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the
private respondents attached no
supporting document to its
Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for
the grant of summary judgment appear
to have been satisfied . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since the existence of two titles over
the same property, as well as the fact
of overlapping of the technical
descriptions of the two titles are
admitted in the pleadings, and
substantiated by the supporting
documents attached by the
defendant-movant (petitioner herein)
to its Motion for Summary Judgment,
there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. If at all, the sole issue is
a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to
the conflicting ones) is superior and
must be upheld. This issue may be
decided on the basis of the affidavits
and supporting documents submitted
by the parties, as well as the
applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter. In other words, there need
not be a protracted trial thereon, since all
that the trial court should do is to apply
the law to the issue, taking into
consideration the documents attached by
the parties in their respective pleadings
and/or submitted together with the
motion or the opposition thereto. The

same is true with the other defenses

raised by the petitioner in its
responsive pleading, to wit: res
judicata, prescription and laches
which may likewise be resolved
without going to trial. 24 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.) ETHSAI
The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the
separate petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties
were denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court,
were bound by the CA's factual finding therein that the only lots
whose technical descriptions overlap are those covered by the
Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and ALI's TCT No. T-5333 which later
became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the trial
court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the
Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No.
T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan
Psu-47035). Petitioners' claims with respect to these properties
are already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 25 petitioner Morris Carpo
already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties
based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan
number (Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his
claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALI's predecessor in interest, 26 is the
one with valid title to these properties. The relevant portions of the
Realty Decision are quoted here:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located
in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila,
having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq.
m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala
Alabang Project and BF Homes
Paraaque are covered by three (3)
distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on
May 29, 1975 in
the name of Realty
Sales Enterprise,
Inc., which was
derived from OCT
No. 1609, issued
on May 21, 1958,
pursuant to Decree
No. N-63394 in
LRC Cases Nos.
657, 758 and 976,
GLRO Record
Nos. N-29882, N33721 and N-

43516,
respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on
October 13, 1970
in the name of
Morris G. Carpo,
which was derived
from OCT No.
8629, issued on
October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree
No. N-131349 in
LRC Case No. N11-M (N-6217),
GLRO Record No.
N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985, issued on
July 27, 1971 in
the name of
Quezon City
Development and
Financing
Corporation,
derived from OCT
No. 8931 which
was issued on July
27, 1971 pursuant
to LRC Case No.
P-206 GLRO
Record No. N31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo
filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided
over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
(hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for
"declaration of nullity of Decree No. N63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named
defendants were Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc.
and the Commissioner of Land
Registration. . . . . TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it appears that it was
Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador
Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of
Realty, who originally filed on June 24,
1927 a registration proceeding docketed

as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record

No. N-29882 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over
parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2
and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3
are the subject of the instant litigation
among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.)
Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two
other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO
Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo
Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO
Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino
Baltazar, as the three cases involved
identical parcels of land, and identical
applicants/oppositors.
xxx xxx xxx
Carpo bought the disputed property from
the Baltazars, the original registered
owners, by virtue of a deed executed
before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public
of Manila dated October 9, 1970. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest
of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar,
an oppositor in the original application
filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As
stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed
the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and
3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando
oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con
respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such
successors of Florentino, they could
not pretend ignorance of the land
registration proceedings over the
disputed parcels of land earlier
initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as
when as the decisions rendered
therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the
title in the name of Dominador
Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its
title, was issued in 1958, or twelve
years before the issuance of the title
in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he
general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in

date prevails . . . . In successive

registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is
the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof . . . ." 27 (Emphasis and
underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.
First Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of
respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CA's
ruling on this point. It is the CA's view that the trial court's
pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without an
approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the
presumption of regularity that said title enjoys. SIcTAC
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the
following portion of the Summary Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not
inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of
the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in
their complaint. A reading of the
defendant's answer reveals that OCT
No. 242 covers the property surveyed
under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail
to allege that the same was approved by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands,
thereby justifying this court to be
skeptical of the validity of the issuance of
OCT No. 242. In original land registration
cases, it is mandatory that the
application should be accompanied by a
survey plan of the property applied for
registration, duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey
plan without the approval of the Director
of the Bureau of Lands has the character
of being of dubious origin and it is not
therefore worthy of being accepted as

evidence. The property being claimed by

the defendant ALI, allegedly registered
under OCT No. 242, is shown to have
been surveyed under SWO and not
bearing the approval of the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued
emanating from a survey plan without
the approval of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands is tainted with
irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in
Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the
said case, the Supreme Court held:
"That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the
same is of dubious value and is not
acceptable as evidence. Indubitably,
therefore, the reported survey and its
alleged results are not entitled to credit
and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character and
unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of
much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120
SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled
that the Land Registration Commission
has no authority to approve original
survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs.
Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68
SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the
property which defendant ALI claimed to
have been originated from OCT No. 242
had not been approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently
prepared and approved by the then Land
Registration Commissioner and under
the law, the same is void. 28
To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or amended
answer would show that, contrary to the trial court's allusions
thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242
was issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on
record to support the trial court's finding that the survey plan
submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950
land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land
Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands.

It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT
No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply
because the notation "SWO" appeared in the technical description
of the said title which was attached to the answer and due to ALI's
failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan submitted in
support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. 29 cDHAaT
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the
survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the
appropriate authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared
beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a
failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey
plan exists. We quote with approval the discussion of the CA on
this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a
quo erred when, in ruling that the validity
of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave
emphasis to defendant-appellant's failure
to allege that the survey plan of OCT No.
242 was duly approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a
survey plan is one of the requirements
for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of
such decree, it can most certainly be
assumed that said requirement was
complied with by ALI's original
predecessor-in-interest at the time the
latter sought original registration of
the subject property. Moreover, the
land registration court must be assumed
to have carefully ascertained the
propriety of issuing a decree in favor of
ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by
public officers. The court upon which the
law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed
to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction, and to have
exercised it effectively. This is as it
should be, because once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens
system, and the time has passed within
which that decree may be questioned
the title is perfect and cannot later on
be questioned. There would be no end
to litigation if every litigant could, by
repeated actions, compel a court to
review a decree previously issued by
another court forty-five (45) years ago.

The very purpose of the Torrens system

would be destroyed if the same land may
be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration, as what the court
a quo did when it faulted ALI's failure to
allege that its predecessor-in-interest
submitted a survey plan approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands in the
original land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is
not for ALI to allege in its pleadings,
much less prove, that its predecessor-ininterest complied with the requirements
for the original registration of the subject
property. A party dealing with a
registered land need not go beyond the
Certificate of Title to determine the
true owner thereof so as to guard or
protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI
was not required to go beyond what
appeared in the transfer certificate of title
in the name of its immediate transferor.
It may rely solely, as it did, on the
correctness of the certificate of title
issued for the subject property and the
law will in no way oblige it to go
behind the certificate of title to
determine the condition of the
property. This is the fundamental nature
of the Torrens System of land
registration, to give the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further. 30 (Underscoring ours;
citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a
result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its
derivatives, including ALI's TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the
presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its
title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides: DCAHcT
Section 3. Disputable presumptions.
The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly

performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere,
was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue
raised in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it; and in like
manner that all matters within an issue
raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the
arbitrators and passed upon by them; . . .
.
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna: 31
In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book,
LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that
Decree No. 4244 was issued on March
3, 1911, is presumed to have been
regularly issued by the accountable
public officers who enjoy the legal
presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. Thus,
the proceedings that led to the
issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of
the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be
overturned without any countervailing
proof to the contrary. In the words of
Tichangco v. Enriquez: 32
To overturn this legal
presumption carelessly
more than 90 years since the
termination of the case will
not only endanger judicial
stability, but also violate the
underlying principle of the
Torrens system. Indeed, to do
so would reduce the vaunted
legal indefeasibility of Torrens
titles to meaningless
verbiage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree
issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the
presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title
had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly
approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242
in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to

overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present

adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This,
petitioners did not even attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners' proposition that they did not have
the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALI's title since
the burden of proof purportedly did not shift to them since no fullblown trial was conducted by the RTC.
This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section
1 of the Rules of Court provides: ADTCaI
Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of
proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have
alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their
allegation that ALI's title is null and void and that such title should
be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show
that petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved
survey plan as a defect of ALI's title. All that the complaint alleged
is that ALI's titles should be declared void for not being derivatives
of the Carpos' title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners
were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over
ALI's. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its
Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a
duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the
same as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed
with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CA's Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive
issue of which between the two titles, purporting to cover the
same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As
petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he
general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails . . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is
the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the

earliest certificate issued in respect

thereof . . . ." 33 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, 34 we held that
"[w]here two certificates of title purport to include the same land,
whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the
original certificates from which the certificates of title were
derived."
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it
applied the principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time,
Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALI's title was the
valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Second Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that
their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches.
According to them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title
is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of
action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the
conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not
sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily, the
premise upon which petitioners build their theory of
imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA's finding that:
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242
of ALI's predecessor-in-interest was
issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45)
years before plaintiffs-appellees filed
their complaint on March 10, 1995. As
such, it is the Court's firmly held view
that plaintiffs-appellees' claim is barred
not only by prescription, but also by
laches. CTSAaH
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242
had become incontrovertible after the
lapse of one (1) year from the time a
decree of registration was issued, any
action for reconveyance that plaintiffsappellees could have availed of is also
barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees'
complaint was for quieting of title, it is in
essence an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust,
considering that plaintiffs-appellees were
alleging in said complaint that there was
a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the
issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of
ALI's predecessor-in-interest. It is now
well-settled that an action for
reconveyance, which is a legal remedy

granted to a landowner whose property

has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name, must be
filed within ten years from the issuance
of the title, since such issuance operates
as a constructive notice. Since ALI's title
is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the
ten-year prescriptive period expired in
1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. It does not involve
mere lapse or passage of time, but is
principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to
permit. In the instant case, plaintiffsappellees, as well as their predecessorin-interest, have not shown that they
have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT
No. 242, from which ALI's title was
derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow
them to do so now, and if successful,
would be clearly unjust and inequitable
to those who relied on the validity of said
OCT, the innocent purchasers for value,
who are protected by the precise
provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:
"SECTION 32. Review of
decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value.
The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or
revised . . . subject, however,
to the right of any person . . .
to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later
than one year from and after
the date of entry of such
decree of registration, but in
no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser
for value has acquired the
land or an interest therein,

whose rights may be

prejudiced. Whenever the
phrase innocent purchaser for
value or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall
be deemed to include and
innocent lessee, mortgagee
or other encumbrances for
value." 35
Third Assignment of Error
The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial
court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily
on the alleged admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos'
title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a quo
relied heavily on the alleged admission
by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence
and validity of plaintiffs-appellees' title.
We have read the pertinent pleading and
We find ALI's statement to be of no
moment. aTHCSE
Nowhere in ALI's statement was there an
admission of the validity of plaintiffsappellees' title. . . . .
The Court cannot comprehend where
and how the court a quo could have
gotten the impression that ALI was
admitting not only the existence, but also
the validity of plaintiffs-appellees'
certificate of title. . . . . 36
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would
readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI's supposed
admission of the existence of Carpos' title in ruling which of the
conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely
declared:
The existence of plaintiffs' TCT No.
296463 has been admitted by defendant
Ayala in its answer to have been
originated from OCT No. 8575 which was
issued on August 12, 1970. It is very
significant that defendant ALI admitted it
in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and
plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 both
originated from Decree No. 131141
issued on October 15, 1969 in the name
of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to
defendant ALI's answer. This admission
made by the defendant in its answer

is conclusive upon it. It cannot

therefore take position contrary to or
inconsistent with its answer, and the
facts are to be taken as true
(Westminister High School vs. Sto.
Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July
5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil.
248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not
inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of
the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in
their complaint. . . . . 37
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI
admitted the validity of Carpos' title with its admission of the said
title's existence, that is the unmistakable import of the trial court's
statements that ALI's admission of the existence of Carpo's title
"are conclusive upon it" and bars ALI from taking a "position
contrary to or inconsistent with its answer" followed by the
statement that the trial court is "not inclined to concur with Ayala's
claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242,
absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs." This
is yet another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court
which the CA correctly pointed out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro 38 was binding on the
Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme
Court resolved the conflicting claims over
a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na
Manga, Paraaque, Rizal, which was
subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The
subject land was sought to be registered
by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the
basis of an accompanying plan Psu80886, which interestingly is also the
basis of ALI's TCT No. T-5333, now TCT
No. 41262. Guico's application was
opposed by, among others, Florentino
Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007,
under which plaintiffs-appellees' title was
derived. HTCESI
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were
adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the
instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar
on the basis of Psu 56007, under which

plaintiffs-appellees' title was based, and

the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga.
While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the
basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was
rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to
Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim
plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject
property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu56007, through their predecessor-ininterest, Florentino Baltazar, the same
had been clearly and finally denied by
the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San
Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites
must be met: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there
must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections
with respect to the fourth requisite,
offering the lame excuse that it is not
bound by such decision, there being no
identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro
and the instant case. 39
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an
examination of Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the
predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the
subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar,
especially since the parties' respective OCTs were not issued in
these persons' names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and
Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there was
identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case.
Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there must
be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is
lacking. In any event, the CA's questioned Decision had sufficient
basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary
Judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated
December 16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
||| (Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 166577,
[February 3, 2010], 625 PHIL 277-304)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 171631. November 15, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ,
ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R.
DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA
PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA
PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N11514, granting respondents' application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz,
Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz,
represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an application for registration of land 3 under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of
land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan
Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together
with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that
the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application;
(2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with
the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj.
No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3)
Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6)
Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated
March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not
covered by any land patent or any public land application; and (9)
Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003
has been paid. EAIaHD

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property,

which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob 4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents
Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who
earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay 5
dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed
that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse
possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they
acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of
tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner
even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50)
years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial
court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said
date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than
thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to
private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other
oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default
6 against the whole world except as against the Republic.
Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of
their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted
respondents' application for registration of the subject property.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of
general default hereto entered, judgment
is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R.
DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all

married and residents of and with postal

address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of
land described and bounded under Plan
Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots
No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing
Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters,
more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under
the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration
Decree.
After the decision shall have been
become final and executory and, upon
payment of all taxes and other charges
due on the land, the order for the
issuance of a decree of registration shall
be accordingly undertaken. aAHSEC
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8
The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that
respondents were able to show that they have been in
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject property through themselves and their predecessors-ininterest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land
from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise,
held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to
establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF
AN OWNER.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF
THE SUBJECT LOT IN
RESPONDENTS' NAME
CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE
WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE
THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the
concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June
12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show
actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject
land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to
establish that the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property
remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to
present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in
the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they
presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974,
1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented
a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of
Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real
property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations
appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as
sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the
issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the
Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
TAacHE
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts. 10 It is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless
there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made
by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves
or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12,
1945 or earlier. 12 These the respondents must prove by no less
than clear, positive and convincing evidence. 13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. 15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application
for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan
Ccn-00-000084 16 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos.
3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping)
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the
following annotation: SIaHTD
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623
Proj. No. 27-B classified as

alienable/disposable by the Bureau of

Forest Development, Quezon City on
Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is
misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court ruled that the notation of
the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation, 18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to
prove the character of the subject lands
as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in
effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this
is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that
the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification
refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and
has nothing to do whatsoever with the
nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit
a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19
the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the
status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he

must present a certificate of land classification status issued by

the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the
approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not
the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land
falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed
to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
establish that the subject land is part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
the same as still inalienable public domain. 20
Anent respondents' possession and occupation of the subject
property, a reading of the records failed to show that the
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier. CDAcIT
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession
and occupation over the subject property consists of the
testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of
the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish
respondents' predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation
of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was
born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that since he attained the
age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case
belonged to them. 22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the
land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about
the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the
subject land. 24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general
statements with no specific details as to when respondents'
predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land
subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was
previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier
inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear
evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition
of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on
or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by
law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions
of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice. 25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot

just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application

but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing
the alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26
Respondents' earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax
declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest
only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove
possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 27 Respondents failed to explain
why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even
before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessorsin-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the
disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes
in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a
clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable
land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD
1529 should be denied. STaCcA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of
title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented
by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of
twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square
meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio Morales, * Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
||| (Republic v. dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, [November 15, 2010],
649 PHIL 106-120)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108998. August 24, 1994.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.
LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT;
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; REQUIREMENTS;
POSSESSION IS TACKED TO THAT OF APPLICANTS
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. It must be
noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law
employs the terms "by themselves," "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest." Thus, it matters not whether
the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by
his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his
possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the
land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of
the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and
continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm
what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. As could
be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessorsin-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessorsin-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy
of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia
was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land
were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro
Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest
Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the
alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no

forestry interest was affected (CA G.R. No. 28953, Records, p.

33).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE THAT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, THE OCCUPANT IS NOT IN THE
JURIDICAL SENSE THE TRUE OWNER OF THE LAND,
ALREADY ABANDONED. At this juncture, petitioner's reliance
in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the
certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Suffice it to
state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already
been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991])
where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Narvasa, declared that: "(The weight of authority is) that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property. . . . "Nothing can
more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b])
that the possessor(s) '. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of
the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment
the required period of possession became complete. As was so
well put in Cario, '. . . (There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'"
(Emphasis supplied)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS OF ALIENABLE
PUBLIC LAND IPSO JURE CONVERTS THE SAME TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY. Subsequent cases have hewed to the
above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure
converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC,
214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This

means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by

an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such
applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land
(National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. The Public Land Act requires
that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]).
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor
of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such,
the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
5. ID.; ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; NOT
A MEANS FOR ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PRIVATE LAND.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of
Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but
does not confer ownership.
6. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; BUYCO RULING (216 SCRA 78
[1992]) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. In the main,
petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration
of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling
in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree. In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise
foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the
similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large
tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and
was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of
Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title
not merely because they were American citizens at the time of
their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial
or possession in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested
rights over the parcel of land. In the case at bar, private
respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof,
acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of
time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land
Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of

strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by

respondent Lapia's mother.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A
TRANSFEREE OF PRIVATE LANDS. But what should not be
missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article
XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit: "Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." "Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." (Emphasis
supplied) Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above
quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads: "Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of
private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide." Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg.
185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter
into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square
meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total
area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. "In the
case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of
an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized." From the adoption of the
1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been
passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what
governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born
Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to
be BP 185.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Even if private respondents
were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by

respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels

of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof
under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937.
The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case or rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of
a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For
the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered
the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply
for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character
of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 6 OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 185 PRIMARILY DIRECTED TO THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS THAN TO APPLICANT. The dissenting
opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must
also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it
refers to Section 6, which requires the submission of the relevant
sworn statement by the applicant. The Court is of the view that
the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant
case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register
of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land
registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not be confused with the issuance
of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the
judgment of the land registration court approving the application
for registration has become final that a decree of registration is
issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP
185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted
to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate
of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree
of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of
registration is yet to be issued.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL

ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN WHO
HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE TRANSFEREE OF
PRIVATE LAND; TRANSFER MUST BE MADE AFTER LOSS OF
CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. This separate statement is
concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the
dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be
stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this
case: i.e., the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17
June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born
Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been
naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as
I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons
who were already foreign nationals at the time they became
transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were
previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore,
to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present
situation even at the subsequent time when the respondent
spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements,
including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more
than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an
amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the land of
which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land
taken together with other land previously acquired by such foreign
national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185) B.P. Blg. 185
would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the
respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE
TRANSFEREE OF PRIVATE LAND; LIMITATIONS PROVIDED
FOR IN BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185; ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR OF COMPLIANCE THEREWITH.
With all due respect, I have to dissent. There is no question
that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by
qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco,
which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling
case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is
not challenged in this petition. But I think the ponencia misses the
point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born
Filipinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the
question posed. The important point is that the respondent
spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of
the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in
their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos. Section 7 of
Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not
disputed that the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire

the land in question when it was transferred to them. Section 8 of

the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a
transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines after he became a foreigner. Even if it be assumed
that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private
respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law." The
ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land
in the private respondents' name have been complied with. I do
not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced. The view has been expressed that we should confine
ourselves to the requirements for registration under the Public
Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185
have been read into the Act and should also be applied. Strict
compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted
to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own
choice. If we can be so strict with our citizens, I see no reason
why we should be less so with those who have renounced our
country.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this
Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed
the judgment of the court a quo in granting application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question. llcd
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348,
Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m.
situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristela Dazo Belen (Rollo,
p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then
natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to
embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have
presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
this court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over
Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the
names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and

Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino

citizens by birth but now Canadian
citizens by naturalization and residing at
14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton,
Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
"Once this Decision becomes final, let
the corresponding decree of registration
be issued. In the certificate of title to be
issued, there shall be annotated an
easement of 6.25 meters road right-ofway."
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial
court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that
both applicants were still Filipino citizens
when they bought the land in controversy
from its former owner. For this reason,
the prohibition against the acquisition of
private lands by aliens could not apply. In
justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering
also that they had paid for it quite a large
sum of money. Their purpose in initiating
the instant action is merely to confirm
their title over the land, for, as has been
passed upon, they had been the owners
of the same since 1978. It ought to be
pointed out that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. The
Torrens System was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one
may already have (Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-31189, March 31, 1987). With
particular reference to the main issue at
bar, the High Court has ruled that title
and ownership over lands within the
meaning and for the purposes of the
constitutional prohibition dates back to
the time of their purchase, not later. The
fact that the applicants-appellees are not
Filipino citizens now cannot be taken
against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in
question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R.

No. L-29442, November 11, 1987)."

(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit
petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which was
belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having
been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue
presented therein. prcd
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not
acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately
owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under
the principle that land of whatever classification belong to the
State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of
the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to
the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
"The evidence thus presented
established that applicants, by
themselves and their predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
the two adjacent parcels of land applied
for registration of title under a bona-fide
claim of ownership long before June 12,
1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the
conditions essential to the confirmation
of their title over the two adjacent parcels
of land are sought to be registered have
been complied with thereby entitling
them to the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title pursuant
to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree." (Rollo, p.
26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
"The land sought to be registered has
been declared to be within the alienable
and disposable zone established by the

Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit

`P'). The investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources
District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed
realty had been occupied by the
applicants `whose house of strong
materials stands thereon'; that it had
been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of applicants-spouses since
1979; that they acquired the same by
means of a public instrument entitled
'Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan' duly
executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo
Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits 'I' and
'J'); and that applicants and their
predecessors in interest had been in
possession of land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application
for registration. But what is of great
significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens
such that when they filed their
application for registration in 1987,
ownership over the land in dispute had
already passed to them." (Rollo, p.27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of
possession and argues:
"17. The Court of Appeals found that the
land was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of respondent spouses only
since 1979. However, tax declarations or
realty tax payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing
cases)
"18. Then again, the appellate court
found that applicants (respondents) and
their predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land for more than
30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration.' This is not,
however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession
'since June 12, 1945.' (PD No. 1073,
amending Sec. 48 [b], CA No. 141; see
also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is
a void in respondents' possession. They
fall short of the required possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

And, even if they needed only to prove

thirty (30) years possession prior to the
filing of their application (on February 5,
1987), they would still be short of the
required possession if the starting point
is 1979 when, according to the Court of
Appeals, the land was declared for
taxation purposes in their name." (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of
petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact
that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in
open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30)
years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides. cdll
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA
141) reads:
"Sec. 48. The following-described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming
interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereof under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by wars or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this
charter." (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)
and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the

Public Land Act are hereby amended in

the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945."
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
law employs the terms "by themselves", the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether
the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by
his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his
possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the
land sought to be registered only in 1987 and therefore short of
the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and
continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm
what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. cdphil
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114
SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was
held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra),
has already been abandoned in 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where
the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Narvasa, declared that:
"(The weight of authority is) that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or

other sanction, ceases to be public land

and becomes private property. . . .
"Herico in particular, appears to be
squarely affirmative:
". . . . Secondly,
under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1942, which
the respondent Court held to
be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as
to segregate the land from
the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free
patent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'As interpreted in
several cases, when the
conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired,
by operation of law, a right to
grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceases to
be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose
of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said
patent.'
"Nothing can be more clearly
demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land

which is of the character and duration

prescribed by the statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself
(Section 48[b]) that the possessor(s) '. . .
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof
being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more
than formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession
claims is of the required character and
length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was
so well put in Cario, '. . . (There are
indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law." (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement
such that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least
30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992];
Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in- interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]). Cdpr
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that
(a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v.
Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the

necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power

Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part
of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of
Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but
does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the
evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the
nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence
was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon
(Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed
by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally
offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a
report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest
was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality.
Accordingly, the ruling in the Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra)
supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals
but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their
supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the
similarity ends. the applicants in Buyco sought to register a large
tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and
was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of
Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
LibLex
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
"As we could be gleaned from the
evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple
ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under
Section 19 of the Land Registration Act;
the private respondents did not present
any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title
from an old Spanish grant such as (a)
the 'titulo real' or royal grant (b) the

'concession especial' or special grant; (c)

the 'composicion con el estado' title or
adjustment title; (d) the 'titulo de compra'
or title by purchase; and (e) the
'informacion posesoria' or possessory
information title, which would become a
'titulo gratuito' or a gratuitous title
(Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their
claim is possession, by themselves and
the predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
"If indeed private respondents and their
predecessors have been in possession
since time immemorial, the rulings of
both courts could be upheld for, as this
Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of
Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
'. . . All lands that
were not acquired from the
Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be
any land that should have
been in the possession of an
occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the
presumption that the land had
never been part of the public
domain or that if had been a
private property even before
the Spanish conquest (Cario
v. Insular Government, 41
Phil. 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come
under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot
by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.'
'. . . alienable
public land held by a
possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period

(30 years under the Public

Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property
by the mere lapse or
completion of said period ipso
jure.' (Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
supra)
"It is obvious from the foregoing rule that
the applicant must prove that (a) the land
is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial, as
ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez
Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178
SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule
enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per
then Associate Justice Hugo R.
Gutierrez, Jr., . . . , that an applicant for
registration under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act must secure a
certification from the Government that
the lands which he claims to have
possessed as owner for more than thirty
(30) years are alienable and disposable.
It is the burden of the applicant to prove
its positive averments.
"In the instant case, private respondents
offered no evidence at all to prove that
the property subject of the application is
an alienable and disposable land. On the
contrary, the entire property . . . was
pasture land (and therefore inalienable
under the then 1973 Constitution).
". . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence
miserably failed to establish their
imperfect title to the property in question.
Their allegation of possession since time
immemorial, . . ., is patently
baseless. . . . When referring to
possession, specifically 'immemorial
possession,' it means possession of
which no man living has seen the
beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned form his elders (Susi v.
Razon, supra). Such possession was
never present in the case of private
respondents. . . .

". . ., there does not even exist a

reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land for more than eighty (80) years. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"To this Court's mind, private
respondents failed to prove that (their
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed
the property allegedly covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853 and made the
subject of both his last will and testament
and the project of partition of his estate
among his heirs - in such manner as to
remove the same from the public domain
under the Cario and Susi doctrines.
Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest)
died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no
right whatsoever, with respect to the said
property, to his heirs. This being the
case, his possession cannot be tacked to
that of the private respondents for the
latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application. . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
"Considering that the private
respondents became American citizens
before such filing, it goes without saying
that they had acquired no vested right,
consisting of an imperfect title, over the
property before they lost their Philippine
citizenship." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title
not merely because they were American citizens at the time of
their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial
or possession in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested
rights over the parcel of land. llcd
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly naturalborn Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the
properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner
and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-ininterest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private

respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the

contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapia's mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is
the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7
and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following
pertinent provisions, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain."
"Sec. 8 Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is
similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution
which reads:
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 14 of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his citizenship may be a transferee
of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa
may provide."
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law,
the relevant provision of which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of
one thousand square meters, in the case
of urban land, or one hectare in the case
of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted; Provided, That if
both shall avail of the same, the total
area acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.

"In case the transferee already owns

urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural
lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by
him, shall not exceed the maximum
areas herein authorized."
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same
subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in
favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship remains to be BP 185. LLpr
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the
time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the
registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private
in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.
m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private
land, were natural born citizens of the Philippines. For the
purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered
the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply
for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character
of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in
BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents.
Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
"Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements
provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private
land shall be transferred under this Act,

unless the transferee shall submit to the

register of deeds of the province or city
where the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and place of
birth; the names and addresses of his
parents, of his spouse and children, if
any; the area, the location and the mode
of acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside
permanently in the Philippines; the date
he lost his Philippine citizenship and the
country of which he is presently a citizen;
and such other information as may be
required under Section 8 of this Act."
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185
do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are
primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision
is it stated much less implied, that the requirements must likewise
be submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application for registration of title. An application for
registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court
approving the application for registration has become final that a
decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the
requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds
should be complied with by the applicants. The decree of
registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register
of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the
application for registration of title as the decree of registration is
yet to be issued. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J ., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still
a citizen of the Philippines, from a

vendor who has complied with the

requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus
subject to registration by qualified persons. It was really needless
to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can
agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the
respondent spouses were natural-born Filipinos at the time they
acquired the land does not settle the question posed. prLL
The important point is that the respondent spouses were no
longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It
does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines
when they acquired the land, they can register it in their names
now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it
is not disputed that the respondent spouses were qualified to
acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it
speaks of a transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen
of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not
appear that the private respondents have observed "the
limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the
land in the private respondents' name have been complied with. I
do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also
been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to
the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I
respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been
read into the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege
granted to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their
own choice. If we can be so strict with our citizens, I see no
reason why we should less so with those who have renounced
our country. LexLib
Padilla and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

FELICIANO, J ., concurring:
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2)
paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion, of the majority
opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which
took effect on 16 March, 1982, does not purport to cover the set
of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses
became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved
while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened
sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another
country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself
only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals
at the time they became transferees of private land in the
Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine
citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can
become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come
before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6
thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific
limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square
meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation
which must not be exceeded both by the land of which such
foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign
national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185) LLjur
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of
land by the respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after
they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, [August 24,

1994])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA
NILLAS, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether
prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a
land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in
a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and
instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent
Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of
Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional
in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De
Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros. 1 In the decision, the
CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together
with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who
had established their title to their respective lots and their
continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and
ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon
the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of
registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan
Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married
to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A.
Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia
Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No.
771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other
hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various
purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the
years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three
separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses
Abierra. 4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a
Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple
transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open
and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977
sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No.
771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas
sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the

corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records

do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the
Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the
1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the
commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in
December of 1941. ESCacI
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May
1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing
and in all subsequent proceedings. 5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas
and received her documentary evidence. No evidence was
apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC
rendered a Decision 6 finding merit in the petition for revival of
judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well
as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision.
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had
already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least,
Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a
decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had
been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in
its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of
Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for
enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions
and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases.
The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been
especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to
comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been
established that the original records in the 1941 case had already
been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription
and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes
that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon
judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues. 8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be
enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations. 9 It
bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity
of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the
original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the
property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.

The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v.

Court of Appeals 10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro. 11 Shipside
was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action
instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that
declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be
revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for
revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of
the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the
other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the
same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of
applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their
favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The
Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had
set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for
nearly seven (7) years. cEDIAa
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there
exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors
Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that
"neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision
in a land registration case." 12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta.
Ana v. Menla, 13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an
argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case
wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26
years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, through
Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of
the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it
supports his theory that after a decision
in a land registration case has become
final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and
after five years but within 10 years, by an
action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as

provided in the Rules makes the

decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings[,]
the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to
be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership
is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the
Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6,
Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal. . . .
. . . There is nothing in the law that
limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is . . . that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party.
Furthermore, the issuance of a decree
is a ministerial duty both of the judge
and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of
the clerk to issue the decree for the
reason that no motion therefor has
been filed can not prejudice the
owner, or the person in whom the land
is ordered to be registered. 14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render
inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated
five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et
al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that case, it was similarly argued
that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in
1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by

prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was

content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from
Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some
years later in Rodil v. Benedicto. 16 These cases further
emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras 17 and
Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente, 18 respectively, that the right
of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance
of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. 19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the
inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land
registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the
three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine was
reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de
Barroga v. Albano, 20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 21 and Paderes
v. Court of Appeals. 22 The doctrine of stare decisis compels
respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent
strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to
feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it
never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court,
which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for
execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases
either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. 23 The Republic further observes that
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution
of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registration
proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we
recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing
refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil
actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other
specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to
establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent
with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by
judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a
decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required
to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the
part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the
LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD
No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is

precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for

execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and
applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the
prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain
the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not
applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39
of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and
Certificate of Title. After the judgment
directing the registration of title to land
has become final, the court shall, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment,
issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title. The clerk of court shall
send, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, certified copies of the
judgment and of the order of the court
directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title, and a certificate stating
that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has
become final. Thereupon, the
Commissioner shall cause to be
prepared the decree of registration as
well as the original and duplicate of the
corresponding original certificate of title.
The original certificate of title shall be a
true copy of the decree of registration.
The decree of registration shall be
signed by the Commissioner, entered
and filed in the Land Registration
Commission. The original of the original
certificate of title shall also be signed by
the Commissioner and shall be sent,
together with the owner's duplicate
certificate, to the Register of Deeds of
the city or province where the property is
situated for entry in his registration book.
EHTADa
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between
the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of
title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the
prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the
issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are
levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the
Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the
corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the

Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is

to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the
transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations
are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and
thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their
part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the
prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of
such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate
goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final
and definitive determination of real property ownership in the
country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner
after the judgment in the land registration case had attained
finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration
cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to
be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not
have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the
purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory,
there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar
circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since
revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure
and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is
susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with
the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the
decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established
before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or
order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented,
then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree
of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of
necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has
passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented
decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should
not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a
judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the
veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a
determination of causes other than prescription or laches that
might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration. IcESaA
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and
Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of
prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that
neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor
did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover,
both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite
distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and
the present case.

The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did

not arise from an original action for land registration, but from a
successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title
previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might
argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we
note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the
revival of the order of cancellation was made in the course of
dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to
that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of
prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and
the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by
an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained
finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not
addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly
more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the
revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held
interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the
Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the
action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the
applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as
precedent on still another point, relating to its pronouncements
relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum
shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since
been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and
laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth
mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the
Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as
recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual
milieu proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside.
The property involved therein was the subject of two separate
applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in
1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who
was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished
as early as 1968. 24 On the other hand, the petitioners were able
to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time
the property had already been registered in the name of the other
claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the
petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because
the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment
and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2)
years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the
petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for
the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the
petition on that score. IHSTDE
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of
title are issued to different persons covering the same land in

whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail . . . ," and indeed
even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a
certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor,
such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The
Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their
pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect
their interests over the property, marked by their inability to
oppose the other application for registration or to seek
enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5)-year
reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual
dilemma that negates its application as precedent to the case at
bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter.
The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in
Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different
final judgment which had already been executed and which was
shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light
of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial
duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the
judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither
could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the
judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier
decree of registration over the same property accorded to a
different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general
presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding
decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not
been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior
court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that
presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued
application of Sta. Ana as precedent. 25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal
viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability
of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases.
Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the
continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that
neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final
judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said
judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately
or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands
not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it
does as an exercise in stating the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing
that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred
subsequent attacks to the adjudicates' title over the subject
property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate
as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued,
which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decision's
status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own
execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a
defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether.

Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic's arguments on

this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941
Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree
of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her
predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the
then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of
registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that
she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates her
predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of
registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing
parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was
proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling argument
to dispute such proof. cCESaH
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168913. March 14, 2007.]
ROLANDO TING, petitioner, vs. HEIRS
OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A.
LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L.
ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO
and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
ALCOVER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application
filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration
of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12
Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on
January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of
November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission
to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration
of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No.
1437-N. 1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A.
Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida
L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were
afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner's
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2
calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977
and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application
on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the
Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's
application on the ground of res judicata. 3
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises
the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983
constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983
had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree
of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA); 4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision
belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents' motion to dismiss

LRC No. 1437-N; 5 and as no action for revival of the said

decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year
prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment
pass[d] into extinction." 6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the
basis of res judicata. 7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final;
duty to cause issuance of decree. The
judgment rendered in a land
registration proceeding becomes final
upon the expiration of thirty days 8 to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice
of the judgment. An appeal may be taken
from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and
executory, it shall devolve upon the court
to forthwith issue an order in accordance
with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the
decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title in favor
of the person adjudged entitled to
registration. (Emphasis supplied)
SaHTCE
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a
private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court
confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may
be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when
final, res judicata against the whole world. 9 It becomes final
when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a
judgment of confirmation and registration. 10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land
registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego
Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot
settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including
petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in
LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that
the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr.
Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the
survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all
resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be

approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR,

Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court;
and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special
work order. 11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged
claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the
land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of
the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the
respondent land registration officials to
issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is
ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation
to the preparation and issuance of the
decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. They act, in this
respect, as officials of the court and
not as administrative officials, and
their act is the act of the court. They
are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration
proceedings." 12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by
independent action. A final and
executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of
limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of
the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-ininterest to execute the same within the prescriptive period,
the same does not lie. ISHaTA

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d'etre why

Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND
REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER
28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS
AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL
AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of
the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision
in a land registration case has become
final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and
after five years but within 10 years, by an
action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because
a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings
the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to
be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership
is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the

Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6,
Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, [March 14, 2007], 547
PHIL 237-244)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123346. March 31, 2009.]
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and
MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 134385. March 31, 2009.]
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE, INC., petitioner, vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON,
REPRESENTED BY HIS
COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS
SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R.
DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN,
NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON
AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND
CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND
RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R.
DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MALABON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
In the Court's Resolution dated 14 December 2007, 1 the Court
constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the
instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of
three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice
Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas
Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B.
Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructed the Special
Division to proceed as follows:
The Special Division is tasked to hear
and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three (3) months from
finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting
claims of title should prevail, the Special
Division is directed to make the following
determinations based on the evidence
already on record and such other
evidence as may be presented at the
proceedings before it, to wit: ICASEH

i. Which of the contending

parties are able to trace back
their claims of title to OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws
in the titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta, as recounted in
the 2005 Decision, are borne
by the evidence? Assuming
they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims
of title of the Manotoks and
Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and
legal bases of 1966 Order of
Judge Muoz-Palma and the
1970 Order of Judge Sayo
are true and valid. Assuming
they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to
the subject properties in favor
of the Dimsons and CLT as
opposed to the claims of
Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject
properties had been the
subject of expropriation
proceedings at any point
since the issuance of OCT
No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if
so what are those
proceedings, what are the
titles acquired by the
Government and whether any
of the parties is able to trace
its title to the title acquired by
the Government through
expropriation.
v. Such other matters
necessary and proper in
ascertaining which of the
conflicting claims of title
should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are
hereby REMANDED to the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings in accordance with
Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED. 2

The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in

accordance with the Resolution. The parties to these cases,
namely CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok
Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the
Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were directed by the Special
Division to present their respective evidence to the Court of
Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page
Report 3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division
submitted the sealed Report to this Court. EHaCID
Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a
preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a
motion beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the
parties "so that they may submit their comments and objections
thereon in accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32
of the Rules of Court". We deny the motion.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to
the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in
accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule
authorizes the referral of the case to a commissioner "by written
consent of both parties", whereas in the cases at bar, the Court
did not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before
effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our
earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted
procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power
under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode
of proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the
Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means
necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. HEaCcD
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report
would not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the
promulgation of the Court's action on the Sealed Report and the
adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present Resolution
quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other
substantive segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of
the issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than
adequate basis for this Court to make the following final
dispositions in these cases.
I.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made
by the Special Division in its Report:
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
DIMSON v. ARANETA
CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
[SC-G.R. No. 134385]

On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed

with the then Court of First Instance
["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Damages against
ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON
amended his complaint and included
Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his
co-plaintiff.
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON
claimed that he is the absolute owner of
a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero,
Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT
No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the
Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly,
DIMSON had transferred the subject
property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an
absolute and irrevocable sale on 14
November 1979. Unfortunately though,
DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered
that the subject property was being
occupied by ARANETA wherein an
"agricultural school house" is erected
and that despite repeated demands, the
latter refused to vacate the parcel of land
and remove the improvements thereon.
IECcaA
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said
allegations and countered that it is the
absolute owner of the land being claimed
by DIMSON and that the real properties
in the Araneta Compound are "properly
documented and validly titled". It
maintained that it had been in
possession of the subject parcel of land
since 1974. For this reason, the claims of
DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly
barred by prescription.
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA
marked in evidence, among others,
certifications from the Land Registration
Commission attesting that TCTs Nos.
13574 and 26538, covering the disputed
property, are in the names of ARANETA
and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA
also offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to
prove that it is the registered owner of
the land described therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered
a Decision upholding the title of DIMSON
over the disputed property . . .

Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an

appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was
later consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No.
34819 in view of the inter-related issues
of the two cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883,
sustained the RTC Decision in favor of
DIMSON finding that the title of
ARANETA to the disputed land is a
nullity. In CA-G.R. SP No. 34819, the
Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the
titles of ARANETA, relying on the
Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals, which declared null
and void the certificates of title derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may
1917. It was also held that ARANETA
failed to sufficiently show that the Order
sought to be nullified was obtained
through extrinsic fraud that would
warrant the annulment thereof. SIHCDA
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and/or New Trial
espousing therein as basis for its
entreaty the various letters from different
government agencies and Department
Order No. 137 of the Department of
Justice, among others.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of
ARANETA were denied by the Court of
Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered
DIMSON to maintain status quo until the
finality of the aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition
before the Supreme Court. Refuting the
factual finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended
that there is only one OCT 994 covering
the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917
pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued
by the Court of Land Registration on 19
April 1917 and added that there were
subsequent certifications issued by the
government officials, notably from the
LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the
Senate Committees' Joint Report which
attested that there is only one OCT 994,

that which had been issued on 3 May

1917. AHDTIE
CLT v. MANOTOK
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the
Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A
COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer
Certificates of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages against the
MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds
of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City,
Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN RD"].
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the
registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate located in Caloocan City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-177013, a derivative title of OCT
No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary
claim, CLT averred that on 10 December
1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its
former registered owner, Estelita I.
Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a
Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage.
HIPOLITO's title was, in turn, a direct
transfer from DIMSON, the registered
owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter
having acquired the same by virtue of a
Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Civil Case No. 4557. CAaDSI
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS
maintained the validity of their titles,
which were all derivatives of OCT No.
994 covering over twenty (20) parcels of
land located over a portion of Lot 26 in
the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was
contented that the title of CLT was an
offspring of an ineffective grant of an
alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by
way of attorney's fees to its predecessorin-interest, Jose B. Dimson. The
MANOTOKS, in this connection, further
contended that the portion of Lot 26,
subject of the present controversy, had
long been disposed of in favor of
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and

hence, there was nothing more in said

portion of Lot 26 that could have been
validly conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates
of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged that
TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No.
994, had been issued in the names of
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on
September 1918 by virtue of an Escritura
De Venta executed by Don Tomas
Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21
August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly
covered an approximate area of
19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On
even date, TCT No. 4211 was
transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the
strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3
March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261,
covering an area of 871,982 square
meters was issued in the name of one
Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina
Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling
TCT No. T-5261, was issued to Rufina
Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was
later replaced with the names of
Gonzales six (6) children. The property
was then subdivided and as a result of
which, seven (7) certificates of titles were
issued, six (6), under the names of each
of the children while the remaining title
was held by all of them as co-owners.
Eventually, the properties covered by
said seven certificates of title were
expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines. These properties were then
later subdivided by the National Housing
Authority ["NHA"], into seventy-seven
(77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified
vendees. As it turned out, a number of
said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these
lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1)
lot was purchased by the Manotok
Estate Corporation.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial
court, upon agreement of the parties,
approved the creation of a commission
composed of three commissioners
tasked to resolve the conflict in their
respective titles. Accordingly, the created

Commission convened on the matter in

dispute.
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and
Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an
exhaustive Joint Final Report ["THE
MAJORITY REPORT"] finding that there
were inherent technical infirmities or
defects on the face of TCT No. 4211,
from which the MANOTOKS derived their
titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No.
5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro
Victoriano submitted his Individual Final
Report ["THE MINORITY REPORT"]
dated 23 October 1993.
After the conduct of a hearing on these
reports, the parties filed their respective
comments/objections thereto. Upon
order of the trial court, the parties filed
their respective memoranda. caHCSD
Adopting the findings contained in the
Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May
1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of
CLT and ordered, among others, the
cancellation of the certificates of title
issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse
RTC Decision on appeal before the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated
28 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision,
except as to the award of damages
which was deleted. The MANOTOKS
then moved for reconsideration, but said
motion was denied by said appellate
court in its Resolution dated 8 January
1996. After the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a
Petition for Review before the Supreme
Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the
Petitioners for Review, * separately filed
by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto.
Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.,
["STO. NIO"], were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the
Supreme Court were the report of the
Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August

1997 and the Senate Committee Report

No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which
concluded that there was only one OCT
No. 994 issued, transcribed and
registered on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005
["THE SUPREME COURT 2005
DECISION"], the Supreme Court,
through its Third Division, affirmed the
RTC Decision and Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, which declared the
titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the
Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the
factual and legal findings of the trial
courts, which had heavily hinged on the
imputed flaws in said titles. Considering
that these trial court findings had been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court highlighted the fact that
the same were accorded the highest
degree of respect and, generally, should
not be disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled
rule that because the Supreme Court
was not a trier of facts, it was not within
its function to review factual issues and
examine, evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the
parties.
THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration of the Supreme
Court 2005 Decision.
Resolving said motions for
reconsideration, with the Office of the
Solicitor General ["OSG"] intervening on
behalf of the Republic, the Supreme
Court, in its Resolution of 14 December
2007 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2007
RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its
2005 Decision and categorically
invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
1917, which was the basis of the
propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON.

However, the Supreme Court resolved to

remand the cases to this Special Division
of the Court of Appeals for reception of
evidence. EHCDSI
To guide the proceedings before this
Special Division of the Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court made the following
binding conclusions:
"First, there is only one OCT
994. As it appears on the
record, that mother title was
received for transcription by
the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be
the date which should be
reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may
also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT
No. 994 resulted from the
issuance of the decree of
registration on (19) * April
1917, although such date
cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces
its source to OCT No. 994
dated (19) April 1917 is void,
for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that the
Dimson and CLT titles made
specific reference to an OCT
No. 994 dated (19) April 1917
casts doubt on the validity of
such titles since they refer to
an inexistent OCT. This error
alone is, in fact, sufficient to
invalidate the Dimson and
CLT claims over the subject
property if singular reliance is
placed by them on the dates
appearing on their respective
titles.
Third. The decision of this
Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals cannot
apply to the cases at bar,
especially in regard to their

recognition of an OCT No.

994 dated 19 April 1917, a
title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent.
Neither could the conclusions
in MWSS or Gonzaga with
respect to an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under
the factual setting the same
as or similar to that at bar. 4
II.
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their
evidence before the Special Division. The Report names the
evidence submitted to the Special Division for its evaluation:
ACHEaI
CLT EVIDENCE
In its Offer of Evidence, [ 5 ] CLT
adopted the documentary exhibits and
testimonial evidence of witnesses
submitted in the case filed by CLT
against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C15491, ["CLT-STO NIO CASE"]. These
pieces of evidence include, among
others, the Majority and Minority
Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in
the presentation of the evidence-in-chief
and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO
NIO CASE consisting of various
certificates of titles, plans by geodetic
engineer, tax declarations, chemistry
report, specimen signatures and letters
of correspondence.
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
The MANOTOKS sought admission of
the following evidence: Senate and DOJ
Committee Reports; certificates of title
issued to them and their
vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the
Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro
Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del
Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of
absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax
declarations and real property tax
receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence
of Philville Development & Housing
Corporation; ["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case
No. 15045; this Court of Appeals'
Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606

between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders

of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and
16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and
the billing statements of SSHG Law
Office. They also submitted in evidence
the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits
of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora;
Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio, Atty. Ma.
P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie
P. Bernabe; a copy of a photograph of
BM No. 9; certified true copy of
coordinates and reference point of L.M.
No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad
Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT. [ 6 ]
SCDaHc
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence, [ 7 ] DIMSON
submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative
to these cases, various certifications of different government
agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations
of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative
positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of
Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948
between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of
Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some
of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official
receipts.
ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence
various certificates of title, specifically,
OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No.
21857; TCT No. 26538; TCT No. 26539;
TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT No. 13574.
It also marked in evidence the certified
true copies of Decree No. 36577; the
DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of
correspondence to the Land Registration
Commission and the Register of Deeds
of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A
and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the
affidavit of Engineer Felino M. Cortez
and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also
offered the certified true copy of TCT No.
6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT
No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA;
certifications issued by Atty. Josephine
H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of
Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy

of Judge Palma's Order dated 16 August

1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17
(which pertains to the rules on
reconstitution of titles as of 19 February
1947) and its official receipt and; the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 994. [
8 ] 9 DHETIS
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the
Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to
determine the following issues based on the evidence:
i. Which of the contending parties are
able to trace back their claims
to Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May
1917:
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws
in the titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta, as recounted in
the Supreme Court 2005
Decision, are borne by the
evidence. Assuming they are,
are such flaws sufficient to
defeat said claims?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases
of the 1966 Order of Judge
Muoz-Palma and the 1970
Order of Judge Sayo are true
and valid. Assuming they are,
do these orders establish a
superior right to the subject
properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed
to the claims of the Araneta
and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties
had been the subject of
expropriation proceedings at
any point since the issuance
of OCT No. 994 on 3 May
1917, and if so, what are
those proceedings, what are
the titles acquired by the
Government, and is any of the
parties able to trace its title
acquired by the government
through expropriation?
DaTICE

v. Such other matters necessary and

proper in ascertaining which
of the conflicting claims of title
should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of
Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants
were entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to
which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was
disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was
disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to
obtain an order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of
which he was able to register in his name properties belonging to
the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayo's order in turn was sourced from
a 1966 Order issued by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of Rizal. Dimson's titles
reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which
apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by
TCT No. 13574 and 26538. 11 Araneta was then and still is in
possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their
mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently,
Dimson filed an action for recovery of possession against
Araneta.
Another property in Dimson's name, apparently taken from Lot 26
of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in
turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT
under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its mother title,
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. 12 Said property claimed by
CLT encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the
Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and
4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title,
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. acHDTA
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily
relied on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the
basis of their claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007
Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was
inexistent. The proceedings before the Special Division afforded
the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to prove the
validity of their respective claims to title based on evidence other
than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just
as much was observed by the Special Division:
Nonetheless, while the respective
certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT
refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917
and that their previous postulations in the
present controversies had been

anchored on the supposed validity of

their titles, that which emanated from
OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and
conversely the invalidity of the 3 May
1917 OCT 994, the Supreme Court has
yet again allowed them to substantiate
their claims on the basis of other
evidentiary proofs:
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and
CLT bear the onus of proving in this
special proceedings, by way of the
evidence already presented before and
such other forms of evidence that are not
yet of record, that either there had only
been an error in the course of the
transcription or registration of their
derivative titles, or that other factual and
legal bases existed to validate or
substantiate their titles aside from the
OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917. 13
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made
it clear that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge
Sayo's Order dated 18 October dated 18
October 1977, was issued separate
certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166,
15167, 15168 and 15169, covering
portions of the Maysilo Estate.
Pertinently, with respect to TCT No.
15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25A-2 of the said estate, the following were
inscribed on the face of the instrument.
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED
that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of
April in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen in the
Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA
page NA, as Original
Certificate of Title No. 994
pursuant to Decree No.
36455 issued in L.R.C. Case
No. 4429 Record No. ______

This Certificate is a transfer

from Original Certificate of
Title No. 994/NA, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in
so far as the above-described
land is concerned. [ 14 ]
HCIaDT
From the above accounts, it is clear that
the mother title of TCT No. 15169, the
certificate of title of DIMSON covering
the now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No.
994 registered on 19 April 1917.
Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to
DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the
derivative title later issued to CLT, should
both be voided inasmuch as the OCT
which they emanated had already been
declared inexistent. 15
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer
any explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19
April 1917. At the same time, it rejected CLT's explanation that the
transcription of the erroneous date was a "typographical error".
As can be gleaned from the records,
both DIMSON and their successor-ininterest CLT, had failed to present
evidence before this Court to prove that
there had been a mere typographical
error in the transcription of their
respective titles with regard to the date of
registration of OCT No. 994. CLT
specifically harps on this assertion that
there had only been a typographical
error in the transcription of its title. [ 16 ]
On the other hand, while DIMSON had
refused to categorically assert that there
had been such a typographical error
causing the invalidity of their title, their
failure to proffer any reason or argument
which would otherwise justify why their
title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May
1917 leads this Court to conclude that
they simply had no basis to support their
proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible
explanation as to what led to the
erroneous entry of the registration dated
of OCT 994, DIMSON are left without
any recourse but to substantiate their
claim on the basis of other evidence not
presented during the proceedings below,

which would effectively prove that they

had a valid proprietary claim over the
disputed properties. This is specifically
true because DIMSON had previously
placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to
prove the validity of their title. 17
Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly
constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was
allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma.
On that issue, the Special Division made the following
determinations: cDTSHE
It should be recalled that in their
appellee's brief in CA-G.R. CV No.
41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson
specifically denied the falsity of TCT No.
R-15169 alleging that the contention "is
already moot and can be determined by
a controlling decision". [ 18 ] Jose
Dimson expounded on his reliance as
follows:
"In Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System (for
brevity MWSS) case, Jose B.
Dimson's (as private
respondent) title TCT No.
15167 issued for Lot 28 on
June 8, 1978 derived from
OCT No. 994 registered on
April 19, 1917, is overlapping
with MWSS title TCT No.
41028 issued on July 29,
1940 derived from the same
OCT 994, registered on May
3, 1917.
(Same facts in the case at
bar; Jose B. Dimson' (plaintiffappellee) title TCT No. R15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2,
on June 8, 1978, is
overlapping with defendantappellant's title TCT Nos.
13574 and 21343, not derived
from OCT No. 994." [ 19 ]
So viewed, sans any proof of a
mechanical error in the transcription or
annotation on their respective certificates
of title, the present inquiry then hinges
on whether the Order dated 13 June

1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia

Muoz-Palma of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557
["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayo's
Order dated 18 October 1977 ["SAYOS
18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be
validated and authenticated. It is so
since the brunt of the proprietary claims
of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots
on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the
foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD
ISSUE as presented by the Supreme
Court, to wit: IcHDCS
"Whether the factual and
legal bases of Palma's 13
June 1966 Order and
Sayo's 18 October 1977
Order are true and valid.
Assuming they are, do
these orders establish a
superior right to the subject
properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as
opposed to the claims of
Araneta and the
Manotoks?"
As it is, in contending that their
certificates of title could be validly traced
from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994,
DIMSON point out that their title was
issued pursuant to a court order issued
by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and
entered in the memorandum of
Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON
also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857
and 26538 were mere microfilmed or
certified copies and, therefore,
inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated
the flaws and irregularities which voided
the titles of the ARANETA in the previous
proceedings and focused on the burden
of ARANETA to present evidence to
defeat their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON
find to factual and legal basis. * As we
see it, Sayo's 18 October 1977 Order,
which apparently confirmed Palma's 13
June 1966 Order, raised serious

questions as to the validity of the manner

by which it was arrived at.
It is worthy to note that as early as 25
August 1981, counsel for the ARANETA
applied for a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to the Clerk of Court of CFI
Pasig for the production of the records of
LRC Case No. 4557 for purposes of
determining the genuineness and
authenticity of the signature of Judge
Palma and also of her Order granting the
confirmation. A certain Atty. Contreras,
Officer-in-Charge of the said court,
appeared and manifested in open court
that the records pertaining to the petition
for Substitution of names of Bartolome
Rivera, et al. could no longer be located
inasmuch as they had passed hands
from one court to another.
What is perplexing to this Court is not
only the loss of the entire records of
Case No. 4557 but the admission of
Judge Sayo that he had not seen the
original of the Palma Order. Neither was
the signature of Judge Palma on the
Order duly proven because all that was
presented was an unsigned duplicate
copy with a stamped notation of "original
signed". Equally perplexing is that while
CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file,
said file pertained not to an LRC case
but to a simple civil case. [ 20 ] Thus:
"Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces
tecum is to present your
Honor the Order Order (sic) of
Judge Palma in order to
determine the genuineness
and authenticity of the
signature of Judge Palma in
this court order and which
order was a basis of a petition
in this court to be confirmed.
That is the reason why we
want to see the genuineness
of the signature of Judge
Palma. EACTSH
COURT:

No signature of Judge Palma was

presented in this court. It was
a duplicate copy not signed.
There is a stamp only of
original signed.

Atty. Ignacio:

Atty. Directo:

Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and

ARANETA insist that Palma's 13 June
1966 Order had been recalled by a
subsequent Order dated 16 August
1966, ["RECALL ORDER"], [ 21 ]
wherein the trial court dismissed the
motion filed by DIMSON on the court's
findings that ". . . whatever portion of the
property covered by OCT 994 which has
not been disposed of by the previous
registered owners have already been
assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome
Rivera and his assignees, as a result of
which there is no portion that is left to be
given to the herein supposed assignee
Jose Dimson".

That is the reason why we want to see

the original.
Court:
I did not see the original also. When the
records of this case was
brought here, I checked the
records, there were so many
pages missing and the pages
were re-numbered but then I
saw the duplicate original and
there is a certification of a
woman clerk of Court, Atty.
Molo. EcHIDT
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see
this document, we are
surprised why it is missing.
Court:
We are surprised also. You better ask
Judge Muoz Palma.
Atty. Contreras:
May I make of record that in verifying
our records, we found in our
original vault LRC application
no. N-4557 but the
applications were certain
Feliciano Manuel and Maria
Leao involving Navotas
property because I was
wondering why they have the
same number. There should
be only one.
Atty. Directo:
Aside from that, are there other cases of
the same number?
Atty. Contreras:
No, there should be only number for a
particular case; that must be a
petition after decree record.

This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a

simple civil case.
xxx xxx xxx

However, We are reluctant to recognize

the existence and due execution of the
Recall Order considering that its original
or even a certified true copy thereof had
not been submitted by either of the two
parties relying on it despite having been
given numerous opportunities to do so.
STaIHc
Be that as it may, even if We are to
consider that no Recall Order was ever
issued by then Judge Palma, the validity
of the DIMSON titles over the properties
in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful
in light of the fact that the supposed
"share" went beyond what was actually
due to Jose Dimson under the
Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It
should be recalled that Palma's 13 June
1966 Order approved only the
conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of
whatever share of Bartolome Rivera has
over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of
OCT 994 . . . subject to availability of
undisposed portion of the said lots." [
22 ]
In relation to this, We find it significant to
note the observations contained in the
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that,
based on the assumption that the value

of the lots were equal, and

"(C)onsidering that the share of Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal was only 1189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate,
the Riveras who claimed to be the
surviving heirs of Vidal will inherit only
197,405.26 square meters
(16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7
hectares as their share. [ 23 ] Even if we
are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on
the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras,
it would appear that Jose Dimson would
only be entitled to more or less five (5)
hectares of the Maysilo Estate.
Obviously, basing only on TCT No.
15169 of Dimson which covered a land
area of 50 hectares (500,000 square
meters), [ 24 ] it is undisputable that the
total properties eventually transferred to
Jose Dimson went over and beyond his
supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palma's 13 June 1966
Order specifically required that ". . .
whatever title is to be issued herein in
favor of Jose Dimson, the same shall be
based on a subdivision plan duly
certified by the Land Registration
Commission as correct and in
accordance with previous orders issued
in this proceedings, said plan to be
submitted to this court for final approval.
Interestingly however, despite such
requirement, DIMSON did not submit
Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429
SWO-5268 which allegedly was the
basis of the segregation of the lands, if
only to prove that the same had been
duly approved and certified correct by
the Land Registration Commission. What
was submitted before the RTC and this
Court was only the Subdivision Plan of
Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear
the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even
an inspection of the exhibit for CLT does
not bear this Survey Plan, which could
have, at the very least, proven the
authenticity of the DIMSON title.
Indeed, We find the absence of this
piece of evidence as crucial in proving
the validity of the titles of DIMSON in

view of the allegation of contending

parties that since the survey plan upon
which the land titles were based
contained the notation "SWO", meaning
that the subdivision plan was only a
product of a "special work order", the
same could not have passed the LRC.
Neither was it duly certified by the said
office. 25 ISTDAH
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities
attending Dimson's TCT No. R-15169.
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot
25-A of the Maysilo Estate was originally
surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911,
October 4-21 and November 17-18,
1911". Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the
date of the original survey is reflected as
"Sept. 8-27, 1911" and nothing more. [
26 ] The variation in date is revealing
considering that DIMSON's titles are all
direct transfers from OCT No. 994 and,
as such, would have faithfully adopted
the mother lot's data. Unfortunately, no
explanation for the variance was ever
offered.
Equally worthy of consideration is the
fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates that
not only was the date of original
registration inexistent, but the remarks
thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994
had not been presented prior to the
issuance of the said transfer certificate.
This manifest from the notations "NA" on
the face of DIMSON's title meaning, "not
available". It bears emphasizing that the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title to
the purchaser without the production of
the owner's duplicate is illegal
(Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and
does not confer any right to the
purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs.
Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The
Registrar of Deeds must, therefore, deny
registration of any deed or voluntary
instrument if the owner's duplicate is not
presented in connection therewith.
(Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil.
19 [1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of the
Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927]. [ 27 ]

In has also been held that, in cases

where transfer certificates of title
emanating from one common original
certificate of title were issued on different
dates to different persons or entities
covering the same land, it would be safe
to conclude that the transfer certificate
issued at an earlier date along the line
should prevail, barring anomaly in the
process of registration. [ 28 ] Thus,
"(w)here two certificates purport to
include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails. . . . . In successive registration,
where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder or whose claim is derived directly
from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. . . ." [ 29 ]
xxx xxx xxx
Still another indication of irregularity of
the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A is
that the issuance of the Sayo Order
allegedly confirming the Palma Order
was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the
records, DIMSON filed the Motion only
on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years
after obtaining the supposed sanction for
the issuance of titles in this name.
Besides, what was lodged by Jose
Dimson before the sala of then Judge
Palma was not a simple land registration
case wherein the only purpose of Jose
Dimson was to establish his ownership
over the subject parcels of land, but, as
reflected in the Palma Order, the subject
of the case was the confirmation of Jose
Dimson's claim over the purported rights
of Rivera in the disputed properties. The
case did not partake of the nature of a
registration proceeding and thus,
evidently did not observe the
requirements in land registration cases.
Unlike in a land registration case,
therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an
action before Judge Sayo to seek
"confirmation" of Palma's Order dated 13
June 1966.

So viewed the general rule proscribing

the application of laches or the statute of
limitations in land registration cases, [ 30
] as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to its
provisions on revival of judgment applies
only to ordinary civil actions and not to
other or extraordinary proceedings such
as land registration cases, is clearly not
applicable in the present case. The legal
consequences of laches as committed
by DIMSON and their failure to observe
the provisions of Rule 39 should,
therefore, find application in this case
and thus, the confirmation of DIMSON's
title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of
DIMSON would further show that they
derive the validity of their certificates of
title from the decreased Jose Dimson's
25% share in the alleged hereditary
rights of Bartolome Rivera ["RIVERA"] as
an alleged grandson of Maria
Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"]. However,
the records of these cases would
somehow negate the rights of Rivera to
claim from Vidal. The Verification Report
of the Land Registration Commission
dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera
was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as
gathered from the records of Civil Case
Nos. 4429 and 4496). [ 31 ] It can thus
be deduced that, if Rivera was already
65 years old in 1963, then he must have
been born around 1898. On the other
hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in
1912; hence, she could have been born
only on 1905. This alone creates an
unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous,
situation wherein Vidal, Rivera's alleged
grandmother, was seven (7) years
younger than her alleged grandson.
Serious doubts existed as to whether
Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for
him to claim a share in the disputed
portions of the Maysilo Estate. 32
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by
Justice Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
on our 2007 Resolution. To wit: TcDaSI

TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the

Maysilo Estate with an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from
TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name of
Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand,
TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from
TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B.
Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a
direct transfer from OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title
revealed that Hipolito acquired
ownership by virtue of a court order
dated October 18, 1977 approving the
compromise agreement which admitted
the sale made by Dimson in her favor on
September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly
acquired ownership by virtue of the order
dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal,
Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4557
awarding him, as his attorney's fees,
25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A,
26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed
of in the intestate estate of the decedent
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the
registered owners of the properties
covered by OCT No. 994. This order was
confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a
decision dated October 13, 1977 and
order dated October 18, 1977 in SP
Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the
annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly
the following entries, showed:
AP-6665/0-994 Venta:
Queda cancelado el presente
Certificado en cuanto a una
extencion superficial de
3,052.93 metros cuadrados y
16,512.50 metros cuadrados,
y descrita en el lote no. 26,
vendida a favor de Alejandro
Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
primer casado con
Deogracias Quinones el
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y
se ha expedido el certificado
de Titulo No. 4210, pagina
163, Libro T-22.

Fecha del instrumento

Agosto 29, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion
September 9, 1918
10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 Venta:
Queda cancelado el presente
Certificado el cuanto a una
extencion superficial de
871,982.00 metros
cuadrados, descrita en el lote
no. 26, vendida a favor de
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P.
Leuterio, el primer casado
con Deogracias Quinones el
segundo con Josefa Garcia y
se ha expedido el certificado
de Titulo No. 4211, pagina
164, Libro T-22. IcTEaC
Fecha del instrumento
Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion
September 9, 1918
10:50-AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in
OCT No. 994, it has an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to
the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to
the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at
the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was
made on June 13, 1966, no portion of
Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of,
there was nothing for the heirs of Maria
de la Concepcion Vidal to convey to
Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had
nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by
logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152
covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate
described in Hipolito's certificate of title
was not approved by the chief of the
Registered Land Division as it appeared
to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079,
Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos.
4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to
secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore
perplexing, to say the least.

All these significant facts were

conveniently brushed aside by the trial
and appellate courts. The circumstances
called for the need to preserve and
protect the integrity of the Torrens
system. However, the trial and appellate
courts simply disregarded them. 33
The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on
the validity of Jose Dimson's titles, which he obtained consequent
to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give
due legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the
Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either
the purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977
Order of Judge Sayo.
B.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the
MANOTOKS and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and
those of DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and
the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were
issued much earlier than the titles of the latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect
and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive
ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which
acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito
who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much
was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated CLT's
claims. DEIHAa
For its part, CLT contended that even at
the trial court level, it maintained that
there was only one OCT No. 994 from
where its claim emanates. It argued that
its case against the MANOTOKS,
including that of STO. NIO, was never
decided based on the doctrines laid
down in Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals [
34 ] and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals. [ 35 ]
Before this Special Division, CLT insists
that the MANOTOKS failed to submit
"new" competent evidence and,
therefore, dwelling on the alleged flaws
of the MANOTOK's titles, "the findings
and conclusions of the court-appointed
commissioners as adopted by the trial
court, then upheld by the Honorable
Court in its Decision dated 28
September 1995 and finally affirmed in
the Supreme Court's Decision dated 29

November 2005, therefore stand, as

there is no reason to disturb them".

remand proceedings remain damning to

CLT's claim of ownership.

Furthermore, CLT contends that the

Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo
are no longer open to attack in view of
their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the
properties covered by the MANOTOKS'
titles and those covered by the
expropriation proceedings did not
property pertain to and were different
from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it
maintains that the MANOTOKS cannot
use as basis for the validity of their titles
the expropriation undertaken by the
Government as a means of staking their
claims.

Moreover, considering that the land title

of CLT carried annotations identical to
those of DIMSON and consequently
included the defects in DIMSON's title,
the fact that whatever typographical
errors were not at anytime cured by
subsequent compliance with the
administrative requirements or subjected
to administrative correction bolsters the
invalidity of the CLT title due to its
complete and sole dependence on the
void DIMSON title. 38

To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43

square meters of land covered by TCT
No. T-177013 [ 36 ] located in Malabon,
Caloocan City and designated as "Lot
26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268".
TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother
titles is OCT No. 994 registered on 19
April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita
Hipolito executed a Deed of Sale with
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CLT on
10 December 1988. By virtue of this
transfer, Hipolito's TCT No. R-17994 [
37 ] was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
CLT's TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT
No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand,
was a transferee of the deceased
Dimson who was allegedly the registered
owner of the subject land on the basis of
TCT No. 15166. SIcTAC
In view of the foregoing disquisitions,
invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title
of CLT should also be declared a nullity
inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of
DIMSON necessarily upended CLT's
propriety claims. As earlier highlighted,
CLT had anchored its claim on the
strength of Hipolito's title and that of
DIMSON's TCT No. 15166. Remarkably
and curiously though, TCT No. 15166
was never presented in evidence for
purposes of tracing the validity of titles of
CLT. On this basis alone, the present

IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the
claims of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the
Special Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held
by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled by
the courts below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and
Araneta reflect, as their valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3
May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were raised as to the
validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their
reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the inexistent
19 April 1917 OCT No. 994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division
quoted the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimson's
claim over that of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of
TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from which Araneta derived its titles,
thus: ISAcHD
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT
26539 both in the name of Jose Ma.
Rato from where defendant was said to
have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784
now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta
and the other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its
Decree No. and Record No. are both
4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also
shows that it has Decree No. 4429 and
Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued
by the Court of First Instance, Province
of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No.
4429, issued for Ordinary Land
Registration Case, was issued on March

31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna

(Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.)
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT
No. 26539 both have Decree No. 4429
and Record No. 4429, which were issued
in Court of First Instance, Province of
Isabela and issued in Laguna,
respectively.
2) TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in
the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not
annotated in the Original Certificate of
Title 994, where they were said to have
originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de
Philippine Land Improvement Company
(Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was
only registered and was stamped
received by the Office of the Securities
and Exchange Commission only April 29,
1953 when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage
was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh.
5 defendant) and the Novation of
Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage
executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh.
M). So, that when Philippine Land
Improvement was allegedly given a
special power of attorney by Jose Ma.
Rato to represent him in the execution of
the said two (2) documents, the said
Philippine Land Improvement Company
has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT
26539 both in the name of Jose Ma.
Rato, both cancel 21857 which was
never presented in Court if only to have
a clear tracing back of the titles of
defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of
Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is
TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of
defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196
instead of TCT 26539. That was never
explained. TCT 6196 was not even
presented in Court. IDASHa
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma.
Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was
cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of
only 390,282 sq.m.

7) How was defendant Araneta able to

have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when
the registration of the document entitled
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale &
Mortgage (Exhibit M) was
suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no
title was received by the Register of
Deeds of Pasig at the time the said
document was filed in the said Office on
March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new
certificate of title shall be entered, no
memorandum shall be made upon any
certificate of title by the register of deeds,
in pursuance of any deed or other
voluntary instrument, unless the owner's
duplicate certificate is presented for such
endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of
defendant Araneta is not reflected on the
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT
26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning
that TCT 26538 still exists and intact
except for the encumbrances annotated
in the Memorandum of Encumbrances
affecting the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A
and 16-N David & Santos)
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the
back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant)
there appears under entry No. 450 T6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering
parcel of land canceling said title (TCT
26539) and TCT 6196 was issued (. . .)
which could have referred to the Deed
(sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47
(Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before
Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine
Land Improvement Company, with Date
of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of
Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement
Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but
the document, Novation of Contract,
Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated
November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not
appear. IcaEDC

Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT

26538 shows only the extent of the value
of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma.
Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement
Company. Said entry was also entered
on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would
seem that all the documents presented
by defendant Araneta are not in
possession of said defendant, for
according to witness Zacarias Quintan,
the real estate officer of the said
defendant Araneta since 1970, his
knowledge of the land now in possession
of defendant Araneta was acquired by
him from all its documents marked in
evidence which were obtained only lately
when they needed for presentation
before this Court. [ 39 ] 40
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual
contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to
title was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings
of the Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA,
it maintains that it has established by
direct evidence that its titles were validly
derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it
asseverates that these were unfounded
and thus, labored to refute all of them.
ARANETA further expounded on the
nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders
which was the basis of DIMSON's titles.
The documentary exhibits it proffered
traced its certificates of title to OCT No.
994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the
titles submitted, its predecessor-ininterest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon
["RATO"], one of the co-heirs named in
OCT No. 994, who was allotted the share
of nine and five hundred twelve one
thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share
of the Maysilo Estate. [ 41 ] For this
reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the
derivative title of ARANETA, the origin
and authenticity of the title of RATO need
to be reassessed.
Verily, attesting to RATO's share on the
property, Entry No. 12343/O-994 of the

Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994,

records the following:

In accordance with the decree, RATO

was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT No.
8692 [ 43 ] which covers "Lote No. 25 A3 del plano del subdivision, parte del
Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible),
"Hacienda de Maysilo", situado en el
Munisipio de Caloocan, Provincia del
Rizal . . . ." [ 44 ] The parcel of land
covers an approximate area of "UN
MILLION CUATROCIENTOS CINCO
MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO
metros cuadrados con NOVENTA
decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90)
mas o menos". As reflected under Entry
No. 14517. . . T-8692, [ 45 ] the parcel of
land covered under this certificate of title
was subdivided into five (5) lots under
subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order
of the court of First Instance of Rizal.
Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856,
21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued.

"12343/O-994 Auto: Jose

Rato y Tuason Queda
cancelado el presente
seartificado en cuanto a una
estension superficial de
1,405,725.90 metro
Cuadrados mas o menos
descrita en el Lote No. 25-A3, an virtud del auto dictado
por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Riza, de fecha
28 de Julio de 1924, y que en
au lugar se had expedido el
Certificados de Titulo No.
8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35
del Libro de Certicadads de
Transferencia. ASCTac
Date of Instrument Julio
28, 1924.
Date of Inscription Agosto
1, 1024 10:19 a.m.
SGD. GLICERIO OPINION,
Register of deeds
A
g
o
s
t
o
1
9
,
1
9
2
4
"
[
4
2
]

Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on

23 May 1932, this certificate of title
issued in RATO's name, [ 46 ] cancelled
TCT No. 8692 [ 47 ] with respect to the
property it covers. On its face, TCT No.
21857, [ 48 ] was a derivative of OCT
No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. It
covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision
plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No.
25-A-3, G.L.R.O Record No. 4429.
Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was
cancelled by TCT No. 26538 [ 49 ] and
TCT No. 26539 [ 50 ] which were both
issued in the name of Jose Ma. Rato y
Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the
certificate of title showed that it covered
a parcel of land designated as Section
No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114,
being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having
an approximate area of 581,872 square
meters. [ 51 ] Thereafter, TCT No. 26539
was cancelled by TCT No. 6196 [ 52 ]
whose registered owner appears to be a
certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land
has an area of 581,872 square meters
designated as section No. 2 of
subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. CAcIES

As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196

issued on 18 October 1947 in the name
of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title
were traced from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT
No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 13574 was issued in
favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture
on 20 May 1949. [ 53 ] It covers a parcel
of land designated as section No. 2 of
subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It has an
aggregate area of 581,872 square
meters.
On the other hand, appearing under
Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT No.
6196 is the following:
"Entry No. 16086/T-No.
13574 SALE in favor of the
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE, vendee:
Conveying the property
described in this certificate of
title which is hereby cancelled
and issuing in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 13574, page 74, Book T345 in the name of the
vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page
98, Book II, S. of 1949 of
Notary Public for Manila,
Hospicio B. Bias).
Date of Instrument May
18, 1949
Date of the Inscription May
30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m. [ 54 ]
TCT No. 26538 [ 55 ] in turn showed on
its face that it covers a parcel of land
designated as Section 1 of subdivision
plan Psd-10114 being a portion of Lot
25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90
square meters. [ 56 ]
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was
cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which was
issued in favor of Araneta Institute of
Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four
(4) parcels of land with an aggregate

area of 390,282 square meters. [ 57 ] It

would appear from the records of CAG.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with
CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No.
7784 was eventually cancelled by TCT
No. 21343. [ 58 ] As per attachment of
ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 March
1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere
copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it
covers a parcel of land designated as Lot
6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962
being a portion of Lot 6, described as
plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No.
4429 with an approximate area of
333,377 square meters. [ 59 ] However,
for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No.
21343, whether original or certified true
copy thereof, was not submitted before
this Court. aAEHCI
In summation, ARANETA had shown that
RATO, as one of the co-owners of the
property covered by OCT NO. 994, was
assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of
ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692
issued in his name. RATO held title to
these parcels of land even after its
subdivision in the 1930's. Further
subdividing the property, RATO was
again issued TCT No. 21857, and later
TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still
covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his
certificates of title, including those that
ultimately passed ownership to
ARANETA, the designation of the lot as
either belonging to or portions of Lot 25A-3 was retained, thereby proving
identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail
of land titles showed that all of them
were derived from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. For purposes
of tracing ARANETA's titles to Oct No.
994, it would appear that the evidence
presented ultimately shows a direct link
of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said
mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin
and legitimacy of the proprietary claim of
ARANETA had been well substantiated
by the evidence on record and on this
note, said titles deserve validation.

Under the guidelines set, we shall now

proceed to evaluate the imputed flaws
which had been the previous bases of
the trial court in invalidating ARANETA's
titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of
ARANETA's predecessor-in-interest was
that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539
in Rato's name refer to Decree No. 4429
and Record No. 4429, as basis of their
issuance. This is being questioned
inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a
decree issued by the CFI of Isabela
while Record No. 4429 was issued for
ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31
March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA
insisted that the same was a mere
typographical error and did not have any
effect on the validity of their title. It further
contended that the number "4429" was
the case number of Decree No. 36455
and was used interchangeably as the
record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry
with respect to the Decree and Record
Number appearing on the title of
ARANETA's predecessor-in-interest
cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of
ARANETA's predecessors-in-interest
and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the
mind of this Court, the incorrect entries
alluded to would not have the effect of
rendering the previous titles void sans
any strong showing of fraudulent or
intentional wrongdoing on the part of the
person making such entries. Fraud is
never presumed but must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. [ 60 ]
The strongest suspicion cannot sway
judgment or overcome the presumption
of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no
shore, and the court that embarks upon it
is without rudder or compass. [ 61 ]
cDCHaS
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v.
National Bookstore, Inc. [ 62 ]
acknowledged that certain defects on a
certificate of title, specifically, the
interchanging of numbers, may occur

and "it is certainly believable that such

variance in the copying of entries could
be merely a typographical or clerical
error". In such cases, citing with approval
the decision of the appellate court, the
technical description in the title should
prevail over the record number. [ 63 ]
Thus, what is of utmost importance is
that the designation and the technical
description of the land, as stated on the
face of the title, had not been shown to
be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent
with the source of titles. In ARANETA's
case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No.
25 had been verified to be an offshoot of
Decree No. 36455 and are all located in
Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite
the incorrect entries on the title, the
properties, covered by the subject
certificates of title can still be determined
with sufficient certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538
and TCT No. 26539 in the name of
RATO had not been annotated on OCT
No. 994 from which said titles had
supposedly originated. It should be
stressed that what partially cancelled
OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject
lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539
but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August
1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538 and
26539 are not even the immediate
predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were
mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857.
Logically therefore, these two certificates
of title could not have been annotated on
OCT No. 994, they not being the
preceding titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994
shows an entry, which pertains to Jose
Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical
condition of the copy submitted to this
Court, the entry remains illegible for us to
make a definite conclusion. [ 64 ] On the
other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994
found on the Owner's Duplicate Copy of
OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the
issuance of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No.
25-A-3. [ 65 ] CTDAaE

The other flaws noted on ARANETA's

certificates of title pertained to its failure
to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and
21343. As we have discussed, ARANETA
offered in evidence a certified microfilm
copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified
true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as
Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively.
However, it failed to submit a copy of
said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may,
we will not hasten to declare void TCT
No. 7784 as a consequence of such
omission, especially so since TCT No.
21343 appears to be a mere derivative of
TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of
TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly
proven in these proceedings, the
authenticity of said title must be
sustained. Besides, ARANETA's failure
to submit TCT No. 21343 had never
been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area
of more than 200,0000 * square meters
between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No.
26538, we find that the trial court failed
to consider the several conveyances of
portions of TCT No. 26538 before they
finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on
the Memorandum of Encumbrance of
TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that
portions of this piece of land had been
sold to various individuals before the
same were transferred to ARANETA on 4
March 1948. Naturally, since the subject
land had been partially cancelled with
respect to the portion disposed of, it
could not be expected that the area of
TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at
the time of its transfer to ARANETA.
Even assuming that the entire area
covered by TCT No. 26538 had been
disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend *
us to conclude that the conveyance was
irregular. An anomaly exists if the area
covered under the derivative title will be
much more than its predecessor-ininterest. Evidently, this is not so in the
case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N",
further asserted that ARANETA should
not have been issued TCT No. 7784

considering that the registration of the

Novation of Contract, deed of Sale &
Mortgage was suspended/denied and no
title was received by the Register of
Deeds of Pasig at the time the said
document was filed in the said Office on
March 4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N"
submitted before the trial court, shows
that the suspension or denial was merely
conditional considering that the person
seeking registration had give days *
within which to correct the defects before
final denial thereof. As we see it, the
Notice merely contained a warning
regarding the denial of the registration of
the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it
affect the vested rights of ARANETA to
be land. The fact that the title to the land
was subsequently issued free from any
notation of the alluded defect creates a
reasonable presumption that ARANETA
was in fact able to comply with the
condition imposed. This is especially true
since the notice itself contained a note,
"Just Completed", written across the face
of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTC's
observation with regard to Araneta's
failure to disprove the result of the
plotting made on the subject land
(Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538
overlaps 1/2 portion of TCT 15159 and
TCT 26539 also overlaps the other 1/2
portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial
court further noted that "TCT R-15169
(Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose
Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are
overlapping each other within Lot 25-A.
That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose
Dimson) along bearing distance points to
17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2
shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not
covered by TCT 21343 (Araneta)". [ 66 ]
SCHTac
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K", it becomes
apparent that the said evidence relied
upon was only a private survey
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Reggie
P. Garcia which had not been duly

approved by the Bureau of Lands and

was based only on photocopies of
relevant land titles. [ 67 ] What is more,
said geodetic engineer also failed to
adequately explain his observations,
approach and manner of plotting the
relative positions of the lots. [ 68 ] From
all indications, the conclusions reached
by said geodetic engineer were
anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETA's title
was the absence of any entry on the
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT
No. 26538 of the alleged sale between
RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by
ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. 26538
submitted to the trial court contained
entries only up to the year 1947, thus,
explaining the (1) lack of entry with
regard to the issuance of TCT No. 7784
in favor of ARANETA considering that the
same was issued a year later and; (2)
entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine
Land Improvement Company which was
entered way back on 21 August 1929.
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that
Rato and ARANETA together with Don
Salvador Araneta, entered into a
voluntary agreement with the intention of
transferring the ownership of the subject
property. Moreover, no conclusion should
have been reached regarding the total
cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch
as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the former
certificate of title to the extent only of
Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square
meters.
Notably also, with the evident intent to
discredit and refute the title of ARANETA,
DIMSON submitted TCT Nos. 26538 [ 69
] and 21857, [ 70 ] which are both
derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on
3 May 1917 and cover parcels of land
located in Malabon, Rizal. However,
these certificates of title reflect different
registered owners and designation of the
land covered.
Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating
to TCT No. 26538, registered on 12 June

1952, points to one Angela Bautista de

Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240
square meter of land designated as Lot
No. 19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan
Psd-5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT
No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain
TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions.
EIAScH
Exhibit "N-Dimson", on the other hand,
pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was issued
on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I.
Tuason de Perez married to Antonio
Perez. This certificate of Title covers a
parcel of land described as Lot No. 21,
Block 16 of the consolidation and
subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 4429. It has an area of 436
square meters and cancels TCT No.
21856.
Exhibit "Q-Dimson" [ 71 ] consisting of
TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of land
designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block
No. 44 of the consolidation Subdivision
Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372
square meters. It was issued to Gregorio
Araneta, Incorporated on 7 May 1948.
This certificate of title cancelled TCT No.
46118.
Comparing these titles to those of the
ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity
of the land could be found. The Supreme
Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City
Country Club, Inc. [ 72 ] agreeing with
the Court of Appeals' dissertation in said
case, ruled that there is nothing
fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear
the same number as another title to
another land. On this score, the
Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
"On the question that TCT
No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears
the same number as another
title to another land, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that
there is nothing fraudulent
with the fact that Cebu
Country Club, Inc.'s
reconstituted title bears the
same number as the title of

another parcel of land. This

came about because under
General Land Registration
Office (GLRO) Circular No.
17, dated February 19, 1947,
and Republic Act No. 26 and
Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated
August 5, 1946, which were
in force at the time the title
was reconstituted on July 26,
1946, the titles issued before
the inauguration of the
Philippine Republic were
numbered consecutively and
the titles issued after the
inauguration were numbered
also consecutively starting
with No. 1, so that eventually,
the titles issued before the
inauguration were duplicated
by titles issued after the
inauguration of the Philippine
Republic . . . ." cCaSHA
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of this Court's
Resolution dated 30 October 2008,
DIMSON objected to the admissibility of
Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground
that ARANETA failed to submit the
original copies of these certificates of title
and contended that the "originals"
contain different "contents" from their
own Exhibits M, N and Q. [ 73 ] The fact
that the entries contained in ARANETA's
pieces of evidence are different from that
of DIMSON's do not automatically make
ARANETA's exhibits inferior replications
or a confirmation of their falsity.
Interestingly, the objection regarding the
non-submission of the "original copy"
had not been raised by DIMSON in their
Comments/Objections to Consolidated
Formal Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Inc.). [ 74 ] In any
case, we find the objections unwarranted
considering that certified true copies or
certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by
ARANETA in these proceedings.
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of
Philippine Land Improvement Company

at the time the special power of attorney

was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to
represent him in the execution of the
deed of conveyances, the same only
proves that Philippine Land Improvement
Company was not yet registered and this
does not go as far as proving the
existence or non-existence of the
company at which time it was executed.
In effect, the company was not precluded
to enter into contracts and be bound by
them but it will do so at the risk of the
adverse effects of non-registration under
the law.
Ultimately, the question of whether the
aforesaid certificates of title constitute as
clouds on ARANETA's titles are not for
this Court to rule upon for purposes of
the present remand. Needless to state, it
is not for the Heirs of Dimson to rely on
the weakness of ARANETA's titles and
profit from it. Rather, they should have
focused on the strength of their own titles
since it is not within our office to decide
in whose hands the contested lands
should go, our task being merely to trace
back the parties' claims to OCT No. 994
dated 3 May 1917. 75
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of
Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No.
994. The Special Division correctly assessed, among others, the
reference to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of
the antecedent titles of Araneta 76 as mere clerical errors that
could not have invalidated said titles, "4429" being the case
number of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the
technical description of the land on those titles not having been
shown to be erroneous or variant with the source title. The
Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court had
failed to take into account the several conveyances of TCT No.
26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948,
which explain the difference in area between TCT No. 7784 and
TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and TCT
No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based on a private
survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the Memorandum of
Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale of the property
between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special
Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta entered into a
voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the
ownership of the subject property. Finally, the Special Division

noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had
submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to
properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta
titles.
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions
of the Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we
affirm the same. HEIcDT
B.
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat
more controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact
that there could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles
between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of
the Manotoks. However, the significant event was the
expropriation proceedings undertaken by the Republic of the
Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the titles in the
name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to and
subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division
explained the milieu in full:
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O994, found on page 17 of OCT 994 of the
Owner's Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot
No. 26 had been a subject of sale in
favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P.
Leuterio. [ 77 ] The notation reads:
"Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta:
Queda Cancelado el presente
Certificado en cuanto a una
extension superficial de
3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y
16,512.50 metros Cuadrados
y descrita en el Lote No. 26
vendida a favor de Alejandro
Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
primar casado con Diogracias
Quinones y el Segundo con
Josefa Garcia y se be
expedido el Certificado de
Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163,
Libro T-22.
Date of the Instrument
Aug. 29, 1918
Date of Inscription Sept. 9,
1918 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO,
Register of Deeds"

"Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta:
Queda Cancelado el presente
Certificado en cuanto a una
extension superficial de
871,982.00 metros
cuadrados, descrita en el
Lote No. 26, vendida a favor
de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano
P. Leuterio, el primar casado
con Deogracias Quinones y
el Segundo con Josefa
Garcia y se be expedido el
Certificado de Titulo No.
4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No.
22.
Date of Instrument Aug.
21, 1918
Date of Inscription Sept. 9,
1918 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO,
Register of Deeds"
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled
by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in
the name of Francisco Gonzales.
Inscribed on the "Memorandum of the
Incumbrances Affecting the Property
Described in this Certificate" was the
sale executed in favor of Francisco
Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on
6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued
in the name of Francisco Gonzales. [ 78 ]
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was
cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the
names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso
married to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo
Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to
Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco
Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato
de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y
Narciso married to Delfin Hilario;
Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso
married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion
Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to
Melquiades M. Virata, Jr. aEACcS
Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT
No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads
as follows: [ 79 ]

"A/2111 Adjudicado el
torreno descrito en este
certificado de titulo, a Rufina
Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a
cuenta de la participacion de
osia esta en (not legible) los
tienes de la eseledad de
genanciales. Habida entre la
misma y el finado Francisco
J. Gonzales, per una orden
del Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Juez del Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila Sala II,
dienada el 20 de Septiembre
de 19 (not legible), en el
Expidiente de intestado del
nombrado Francisco J.
Gonzales, No. 49034, se
cancela el presente
certificado de tituto y se
expide otre a hombre decha
Rufina Narciso, con (not
legible) No. 35486, folio 86,
Tomo T-168 del libro de
transferencias, archivando se
la copia de dicha orden da
que se ha heche referencia
en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD.) TEODORO
GONZALES,
Registrado de Titulos."
ICASEH
The property was later subdivided into
seven lots in accordance with
subdivision plan Psd-21154. [ 80 ]
Partitioning the lots among the coowners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually
cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6)
certificates of titles were individually
issued [ 81 ] to Francisco Gonzales's six
(6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 13681373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in
favor of all the children. [ 82 ]
As previously mentioned, the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were
expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually
subdivided and sold to various vendees.
Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI
from the years 1965 to 1974, while it

acquired the lot covered by TCT No.

165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC
acquired from PhilVille Development
Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by
virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in
its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was
issued on 9 May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced
by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in
the name of MRI covers Lot
No. 2 of consolidationsubdivision plan (LRC) Pcs1828 which has an area of
4,988 square meters. MRI
purchased this lot from one
Basilio Caina who was issued
TCT No. 7526 which
cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62
registered in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. [
83 ]
2) TCT No. 7762, covering
Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI
from one Narcisa
Buenaventura. The Parcel of
land has an approximate area
of 2,876 square meters.
Buenaventura's ownership
was evidenced by TCT No.
7525, [ 84 ] deriving the same
from TCT No. 36657-63. [ 85 ]
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name
of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1
having an area of 20,000
square meters. [ 86 ] This
certificate of title was traced
from one Filemon Custodio
who held TCT No. 7792.
Custodio was in turn a
transferee of Guillermo
Rivera, the latter having been
issued TCT No. 7760 by
virtue of sale between him
and then People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation
["PHHC"]. The latter title
eventually cancelled TCT No.
36557-63 of the Republic. [ 87
] SADECI

4) TCT No. 9866 issued to

MRI covers Lot No. 21 and
has an approximate area of
23,979 square meters. MRI's
certificate of title was derived
from TCT No. 9854 registered
in the name of Filemon
Custodio, a transferee of Jose
Dionisio, who was issued TCT
No. 9853. Dionisio's title in
turn cancelled the Republic's
TCT No. 36657-63. [ 88 ]
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to
MRI covers Lot 22 with an
approximate area of 2,557
square meters. MRI acquired
the same by virtue of sale
between him and Francisco
Custodio, holder of TCT No.
21040. Francisco Custodio
was a transferee of Lorenzo
Caina, registered owner of
TCT No. 21039 as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale between
Caina and the PHHC, the
latter's certificate of title
canceling TCT No. 36557-63
of the Republic. [ 89 ]
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued
to MRI by virtue of sale
between it and Francisco
Custodio, registered owner of
TCT No. 21484. The
certificate of title covers Lot
20 with an approximate area
of 25,276 square meters
Custodio was in turn a
transferee of Lorenzo Caina,
the latter being the registered
owner of TCT No. 21013 by
reason of sale between him
and PHHC. [ 90 ] Under Entry
No. 6277/T-21485, it would
appear that portions of the
property covered under TCT
No. 21485 and TCT No.
232568 had been subject of
an expropriation proceedings
to which the Manotok Estate
Corporation, et al. interposed
no objections subject to the

payment of just
compensation. [ 91 ]
7) TCT Nos. 26405 [ 92 ] and
26406, [ 93 ] both registered
in the name of MRI, cancelled
TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774,
respectively. TCT Nos. 9773
and 9774 were registered in
the names of Romulo,
Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and
Emilia all surnamed Jacinto,
["JACINTOS"], before the
same were transferred to MRI
by reason of sale in favor of
the latter. The JACINTOS'
certificates of title were in turn
derived from TCT Nos. 8014
and 8015 issued in the name
of Filemon Custodio [ 94 ]
Both TCT Nos. 8014 and
8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T39. However, for purposes of
tracing TCT No. 7792/T-39 to
the Republic's certificate of
titles, this certificate of title
was not submitted in
evidence. EcATDH
8) TCT No. 26407 [ 95 ]
issued to MRI was traced
back to the title of Lourdes
Mercado Cloribel who was the
registered owner of TCT No.
8404 by virtue of sale
between the two, thereby
transferring ownership to MRI.
On the fact of TCT No. 8404,
it would show that it cancelled
TCT No. 8013/T41 but there
is no showing in whose name
TCT No. 8013 was registered
and what certificate of title it
cancelled.
9) TCT No. 33904 [ 96 ] of
MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017
of Filemon Custodio by virtue
of sale between the latter and
MRI. [ 97 ] We note that TCT
No. 8017 cancelled TCT No.
7792/T-39 but there is no
showing whether the same

could be traced back to the

Republic's certificates of title.
10) TCT No. 34255, covering
Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797
with an area of 11,000 square
meters, reflects MRI as the
registered owner. This
certificate of title cancels TCT
No. 36557-63 of the Republic.
[ 98 ]
11) TCT No. 254875 [ 99 ]
bears MRI as the registered
owner of Lot 55-A with an
area of approximately 1,910
square meters. This certificate
of title cancelled TCT No.
41956 which covers Lot 55,
also registered in the name of
MRI. It would appear that MRI
acquired the lot covered
under TCT No. 41956 from
one Joaquin Caina who was
the registered owner of TCT
No. 25715 being a vendee of
PHHC. [ 100 ]
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI
covered Lot No. 15, [ 101 ]
which was purchased by MRI
from one Maria V. Villacorta
who held TCT No. 53155.
Villacorta in turn acquired the
same land from one Eufrocina
Mackay whose TCT No. 7827
was eventually cancelled by
Villacorta's land title. [ 102 ] It
would appear that TCT No.
7827 cancelled TCT No.
7826/T-40 but there is no
trace to whom the latter title
was registered and what
certificate of title it cancelled.
13) TCT No. 55897 shows
MRI as the registered owner
of Lot 3 of the consolidationsubdivision plan (LRC) Pcs1828 of the Maysilo Estate
covering an area of more or
less 20,531 square meters.
This certificate of title
cancelled TCT No. 53122 in

the names of MRI (19,531

square meters) and one
Silvestre Domingo (1,000
square meters). TCT No.
53122 in turn cancelled TCT
No. 21347 registered in the
names of Jesus Hipona
(19,531 square meters) and
Silvestre Domingo (1,000
square meters). Notably, TCT
No. 21347 cancelled TCT No.
21315/T-107 but there is no
indication to whom TCT No.
21315 was registered and
what certificate of title it
cancelled. [ 103 ] cIECaS
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects
MRI as the registered owner
of Lot 6-C which has an
approximate area of 27,850
square meters. MRI's
certificate of title cancelled
TCT No. C-17234 registered
in the names of MRI (27,750
square meters), Roberto S.
David (3,0000 * square
meters) and Jose Madulid
(500 square meters). It would
appear that TCT No. C-17234
cancelled TCT No. 53124
registered in the names of
MRI, Spouses Priscila and
Antonio Sebastian and Jose
Madulid. [ 104 ] MRI also
submitted in evidence a Deed
of Partition between itself,
Roberto David and Madulid
thereby subdividing the
property into Lots 6-A, 6-B
and 6-C as per subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-277091. [ 105
] Again, we note that TCT No.
53124 cancelled TCT No.
21350/T-107 but the records
are bereft of any indication
what certificate of title it
cancelled and to whom the
same was registered.

15) TCT No. C-35267,

covering Lot 56-B of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd292683 with an approximate
area of 9,707 square meters,
was a by-product of TCT No.
25146, also registered in the
name of MRI, after the same
was subdivided into two lots,
namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and
56-B. TCT No. 25146
cancelled TCT No. 25145
registered in the name of
Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of
sale in favor of MRI. In turn,
TCT No. 21545 cancelled
TCT Nos. (36557) 12836 to
(36563) 12842. [ 106 ]
16) TCT No. T-121428,
registered in the name of MRI
covers Lot No. 5-C of
subdivision plan (LRC) psd315272 which has an
approximate area of 4,650
square meters. It was
previously registered in the
names of MRI (4,650 square
meters), Ricardo Cruz (941
square meters) and Conchita
Umali (1,000 square meters)
under TCT No. 53123 by
order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan
City, Branch XII and as per
agreement of the parties in
Civil Case No. C-424. TCT
No. 53123 in turn cancelled
TCT No. 21346 whose
registered owners were
Conchita Umali (1,000 square
meters), Ricardo Cruz (941
square meters) and Jesus
Hipona (4,650 square
meters). [ 107 ] Like some of
the other titles, TCT No.
21346 cancelled TCT No.
21316 but there is no trace of
this latter certificate of title.
aCcEHS
17) TCT No. 163902,
registered in the name of

MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2

and has an area of more or
less 6,354 square meters and
a by-product of TCT No.
9022, also in the name of
MRI, after the same was
subdivided under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT
No. 9022, in turn, cancelled
TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered
in the name of Filemon S.
Custodio whose ownership
thereon was transferred to
MRI by virtue of a voluntary
sale. [ 108 ] TCT No. 8894
cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45
but this latter certificate of title
was not submitted in evidence
for purposes of tracing back
to the Republic's title.
18) TCT No. 165119 [ 109 ]
was issued to MRI by virtue of
a Deed of Sale between
Spouses Francisca Labing-isa
and Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES
IGNACIO] and MRI, as a
result of which, TCT No. C36960 of the SPOUSES
IGNACIO was cancelled. [
110 ] It would appear that TCT
No. C-39690 cancelled TCT
No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No.
35266/T-173 was not
submitted in evidence.
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the
Manotok Estate Corporation,
covering Lot No. 19-B of
subdivision plan Psd13011152 with an area of
23,206 square meters, was
derived from the certificate of
title held by PhilVille
Development and Housing
Corporation under TCT No.
197357. MEC acquired the
subject parcel of land by
virtue of Deed of Exchange
between it and PHILVILLE
DATED 9 May 1991. [ 111 ]
TCT No. 197357 cancelled
TCT No. 195730/T-974 but

there is no trace what

certificate of title the latter title
cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title
submitted by the MANOTOKS, including
their derivative titles, were all traced to
OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917.
Likewise, they declared all the lots
covered by such titles for taxation
purposes. Without doubt, MRI had
successfully traced back some of their
certificates of title to the valid OCT No.
994, they having acquired the lots from
some of the vendees of the PHHC after
the same were expropriated by the
Republic from the Gonzalezes. TCcSDE
The fact that these lots were subjected to
expropriation proceedings sometime in
1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539
for resale to tenants is beyond question,
as also enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Republic of the Philippines v.
Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this
fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report
noted that the seven properties covered
by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were
expropriated by the Republic from the
Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to
expropriation proceedings sometime in
1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539
for resale to tenants is beyond question,
as also enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this
fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report
noted that the seven properties covered
by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were
expropriated by the People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation which were
later consolidated and subdivided into 77
lots for resale to tenants. No sign of
protest was ever raised by CLT on this
point. 112
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles
acquired by the State by way of expropriation are deemed
cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these
titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
113 and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno
reiterated in Reyes v. NHA: 114 "In an rem proceeding,

condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the

paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;
thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance". 115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of
then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen
Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S., 116 which in turn cited the
pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack
117 that "[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance". 118
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged
defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However,
TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was
expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended
that particular title would have been purged when the property
covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through
eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much: DcTAIH
As it is, the validity of most of MRI's
certificates of title should be upheld
because they were derived from the
Republic's valid certificates of title. In
fact, some of the MANOTOKS' titles can
be traced back to the Government's titles
as a result of the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as
the predecessor-in-interest of the
MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by
virtue of their acquisition resulting from
the exercise of its inherent power of
eminent domain that need not be
granted even by the fundamental law.
Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the
certificates of title issued previous to the
exercise of the State of its inherent
power did not affect or render invalid the
subsequent transfers after the forced
sale. Indeed, when land has been
acquired for public use in fee simple
unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the
land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted
to a different use, without any impairment
of the estate or title acquired or any
reversion to the former owner. 119

The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of

the Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the
trial court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The
Majority Report had arrived at several conclusions with respect to
the TCTs from which the Manotok titles were derived. 120 The
Special Division, however, concluded that such report was in fact
tainted by the fact that it was determined "outside the scope of the
issues framed and agreed upon by the parties". To wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS
disproved the "opinion" with regard to the
alleged defects of their titles inasmuch
as the majority report submitted before
the trial court was made outside the
scope of the tasks which the trial court
confined them to perform. The
MANOTOKS also argued that before this
proceeding on remand, CLT failed to
introduce evidence of such flaws neither
were the concerned geodetic engineers
presented as witnesses. Moreover, the
MANOTOKS further maintained that CLT
failed to submit any factual or legal
bases to prove the authenticity and
validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders.
They insisted that the Palma Order was
a void one for being conditional and
having resulted to the issuance of
"duplicate certificates of land title".
With respect to the imputed flaws on the
MANOTOKS' titles which were based on
the Majority Report, we find that the
bases of the alleged defects proceeded
from unreliable sources thus, tainting the
veracity of the said report.
The records of the case between CLT
and the MANOTOKS reveal that the
parties approved the creation of a
commission to resolve only these two
issues, to wit:
"xxx xxx xxx
These issues to be resolved
by the 3 Commissioners are
as follows:
1) Whether or not
the property
covered by the
Transfer
Certificates of Title
of defendants

pertain to or
involve Lot No. 26
of the Maysilo
Estate presently
titled in the name
of the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not
the property
covered by the title
of the plaintiff and
the property
covered by the
titles of the
defendants
overlap. [ 121 ]
ACTIcS
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon
which the trial court's conclusions were
based, it would appear that the findings
therein were outside the scope of the
issues framed and agreed upon by the
parties. Specifically, the deductions with
regard to the technical infirmities and
defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261
and 35486 do not involve the question of
whether or not the subject properties
were identified as Lot No. 26 of the
Maysilo estate or whether there was
overlapping of titles. Records bear out
that the MANOTOKS took exception to
the procedure taken citing therein the
"ultra vires" acts of the two
Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused
on the alleged flaws and inherent
technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211,
5261 and 35486, ranging from the
language of the technical descriptions,
absence of subdivision plan, lot number
and survey plan. Evidently, these defects
go only as far as the certificates of title
issued prior to those of the Republic.
Remarkably, no specific flaw was found
on the MANOTOKS' titles indicating any
irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the
Commissioners who signed the majority
report even concluded that only TCT
Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru
1324 (sic) [ 122 ] were irregularly and
questionably issued without any

reference to the MANOTOKS' certificates

of title. [ 123 ] Otherwise stated, the
imputed flaws affect only those
certificates of title issued prior to those
registered in the name of the Republic.
No flaw had been specifically identified
or established in the proceedings below,
which would taint the titles held by the
MANOTOKS in so far as the regularity of
their issuance is concerned. 124
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold
the validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the
particular titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired
by the Republic of the Philippines by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced
their title from the vendees of PHHC,
there are, however, some certificates of
title which could not be traced back to
the titles previously held by the Republic
specifically, MRI's TCT Nos. 26405 and
26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and
MEC's TCT No. T-232568. As to these
certificates of title, the MANOTOKS
failed to make any specific reference to
the preceding certificates of title which
they cancelled and to whose names they
were subsequently transferred and
registered. Thus, we find no sufficient
basis to make a conclusion as to their
origins. 125 TaSEHD
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise
summary of its conclusions:
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present
controversy and the evidence on record
clearly establish the failure of DIMSON
and CLT to substantiate their titles and
overcome the onus of proving that said
titles are derivatives of OCT 994
registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19
April 1917, as what is reflected in their
titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA, both of which had
consistently anchored their proprietary
claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3
May 1917, have, in this remand
proceeding, been able to support their

claims of ownership over the respective

portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in
the case of the MANOTOKS which had
failed to substantiate the validity of some
of their certificates of title, the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA presented
evidence proving the identity, the extent
and the origin of their titles. HSIDTE
Answering the issues assigned by the
Supreme Court relative to the tenability
of the respective imputed flaws in the
titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA
and whether such flaws are sufficient to
defeat said claims, this Court finds that,
as discussed above, such flaws are
inconsequential and ineffectual in
invalidating the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective
certificates of title of herein contending
parties are contradictory to each other
and stand to refute the validity of their
opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that
said certificates of title have
correspondingly been subjected to
dispute on the basis of separate and
distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial
difference between the imputed flaws
allegedly tainting said contending titles,
DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the
other, is that the imputed flaws
purportedly beleaguering the respective
certificates of title of the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA relate to the mechanical
and technical aspect of the transcription
of their titles and are therefore
inconsequential to the import and validity
thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart
from the fact that the predecessors-ininterest of the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA had been clothed with the
right of ownership over the disputed
portions of the Maysilo Estate.
On the other hand, the flaws attending
the titles of DIMSON and CLT primarily
stem from infirmities attending or
otherwise affecting the very crux of their
claim of ownership. Having derived their
titles from RIVERA, whose title is

questionable and dubious to the core,

DIMSON and CLT cannot rightly insist on
the validity of their titles. Such flaws are
hard to overcome as they delve into the
substance of their proprietary claims. As
stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably
failed to overcome their onus and
instead opted to hap on the supposed
flaws of the adverse parties. For these
reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT
should be declared a nullity. aSDCIE
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing evaluation and in
conformity with the Supreme Court 2007
Resolution, this Court arrived at the
following conclusions as to the status of
the original title and its subsequent
conveyances:
1. As categorically declared
by the Supreme Court, there
is only one OCT 994, the
registration date of which had
already been decisively
settled as 3 May 1917 and not
19 April 1917. OCT 994 which
reflects the date of 19 April
1917 as its registration date is
null and void.
2. In view thereof and in
addition to other grounds we
have already discussed, the
certificates of title of the
deceased Jose Dimson and
his successor-in-interest, CLT,
having been traced back to
OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917,
are NULL and VOID and thus
vest no legal right or claim in
favor of DIMSON and CLT.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma
Order and the 18 October
1977 Sayo Order, on which
DIMSON and CLT anchor the
validity of their respective
titles, do not substantiate their
proprietary claims. While the
existence of said Orders are
admitted, the legal import
thereof nonetheless fails to

confer a semblance of legality

on the titles of DIMSON and
consequently, of CLT, more
so, a superior right to defeat
the titles of the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA, respectively.
4. Portions of Lot No. 26
pertinent to this controversy,
particularly that being
disputed by the MANOTOKS
and CLT, were expropriated
by the Republic of the
Philippines sometime in 1947
under Commonwealth Act No.
539 for resale to tenants. The
MANOTOKS, thus as
successor-in-interest of the
Republic, were able to
establish that some of their
certificates of title had indeed
originated or were derived
from said expropriated
parcels of land. ADSTCI
5. The evidence on record
confirm that the certificates of
title covering the land being
claimed by ARANETA were
derived from OCT NO. 994
registered on 3 May 1917
thereby ultimately showing a
direct link of TCT Nos. 7784
and 13574 to said mother
title. By reason of which, that
is either belonging to or
portions of Lot 25-A-3 as
previously owned by RATO,
had been well substantiated
and proven to be superior to
that of DIMSON.
6. For reasons above-stated
and in view of the established
rights of ownership of both the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA
over the contested properties,
we find that the imputed flaws
on their titles cannot defeat
the valid claims of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA
over the disputed portions of
the Maysilo Estate. 126

Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of

the Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As
we earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or
CLT to establish their claim to title for reasons other than the fact
that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do
so. It should be noted that the instant cases arose from separate
actions filed by Jose Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of
possession and/or annulment of title against Araneta and the
Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on Dimson
and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of
ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in
the claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action
to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it
should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but
by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his. 127 In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 128

c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot

No. 12-1 having an area of
20,000 square meters.

We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the

Special Division. They are as follows:

h) TCT No. 254875 covering

Lot 55-A with an area of
approximately 1,910 square
meters.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court
hereby respectfully makes the following
recommendations regarding the validity
of the conflicting proprietary claims as
interposed by the herein contending
parties:
1. To declare with finality that the
certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT
including other derivative titles issued to
their successors-in-interest, if any, are
NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their
legal claims over the subject parcels of
land. SEHACI
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the
proprietary claims the MANOTOKS over
the parcels of land covered by the
following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in
the name of MRI covers Lot
No. 2 of consolidationsubdivision plan (LRC) Pcs1828 which has an area of
4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot
1-C, with an approximate area
of 2,287 square meters.

d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot

No. 21 and has an
approximate area of 23,979
square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering
Lot 22 with an approximate
area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering
Lot 20 with an approximate
area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering
Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797
with an area of 11,000 square
meters.

i) TCT No. C-35267 covering

Lot 56-B of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-292683 with an
approximate area of 9,707
square meters.
With regard to the following certificates
of title, namely: ASaTCE
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC.
a) TCT No. 26405 covering
Lot No. 12-E with an area of
1,0000 * square meters.
b) TCT No. 26406 covering
Lot No. 12-F with an area of
1,000 square meters.
c) TCT No. 26407 covering
Lot No. 12-B with an area of
1,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering
Lot No. 12-H with an area of
1,802 square meters.

e) TCT No. 53268 covering

Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI
from one Maria V. Villacorta
with an approximate area of
3,163 square meters.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering
Lot 3 of consolidationsubdivision plan (LRC) Pcs1828 of the Maysilo Estate
covering an area of more or
less 20,531 square meters.
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering
Lot 6-C which has an
approximate area of 27,850
square meters.
h) TCT No. T-121428
covering Lot No. 5-C of
subdivision plan (LRC) psd315278, which has an
approximate area of 4,650
square meters.
i) TCT No. 163902 covering
Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of
more or less 6,354 square
meters allegedly a by-product
of TCT No. 9022, which in
turn, cancelled TCT No.
8994/T-45 registered in the
name of Filemon S. Custodio.
j) TCT No. 165119 which
allegedly cancelled TCT No.
C-36960 of the SPOUSES
IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed
of Sale between said
Spouses and MRI.
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION
a) TCT No. T-232568
covering Lot No. 19-B of
subdivision plan Psd13011152 with an area of
23,206 square meters.
The foregoing certificates of
title (3.A and 3.B), failing to
make specific references to
the particular certificates of

title which they cancelled and

in whose name they were
registered, may be declared
NULL and VOID, or in the
alternative, subject the same
to further technical
verification.
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title
of ARANETA respecting parcels of land
covered by the following certificates of
title:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a
parcel of land designated as
Section No. 2 of subdivision
plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with
an aggregate area of 581,872
square meters; cHSTEA
b) TCT No. 7784 covering
four (4) parcels of land with
an aggregate area of 390,383
square meters. 129
The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as
they logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined
by the Special Division, which this Court adopts.
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by
the Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further
technical verification warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third
recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division,
sufficiently indicate that they could be traced back to the titles
acquired by the Republic when it expropriated portions of the
Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles
that were affirmed by the Special Division are traceable to the
titles of the Republic and thus have benefited, as they should,
from the cleansing effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws
that attached to the previous titles. However, although the Special
Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok
titles named in the third recommendation, at the same time it did
not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired.
Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step
of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be
a valid mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in
stark contrast with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the
Manotoks, which all advert to an inexistent mother title. On their
face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and
certainly the Special Division do not point to any such flaw in

these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for the
Court to annul the same. DCSTAH
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt
the Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the
Manotoks and CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the
perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks
derived their claim. The Special Division concluded that such
findings had been reached by the Commissioners in excess of
their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such
flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the
expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated
earlier, such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the
prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles enumerated in the third
recommendation could not be sourced from the titles acquired by
the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the
Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could
not form the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed,
the Special Division's rejection of the Majority Report further
diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to in
the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok
titles specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired
by the Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt
somehow. In addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized
by the Special Division in rejecting the Majority Report that the
determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed
and agreed upon by the parties does not categorically refute
the technical findings made therein. Those circumstances, while
insufficient for now to annul the Manotoks' titles listed in the third
recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special
Division's third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to
require the Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this
Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently notify the public of
their unclear status, more particularly the inability of the Manotoks
to trace the titles without any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on
3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the annulment of
those titles from a proper party's end, then let the proper case be
instituted before the appropriate court. aETAHD
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special
Division and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the
DIMSONs and CLT including
other derivative titles issued
to their successors-in-interest,
if any, are declared NULL and
VOID, thus invalidating their
legal claims over the subject
parcels of land;

2. The proprietary claims of the

MANOTOKS over the parcels
of land covered by the
following certificates of title
are declared LEGAL and
VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in
the name of MRI
covers Lot No. 2 of
consolidationsubdivision plan
(LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area
of 4,988 square
meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot
1-C, with an
approximate area
of 2,287 square
meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot
No. 12-1 having an
area of 20,000
square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot
No. 21 and having
an approximate
area of 23,979
square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering
Lot 22 with an
approximate area
of 2,557 square
meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering
Lot 20 with an
approximate area
of 25,276 square
meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering
Lot No. 11-Bm,
Psd-75797 with an
area of 11,000
square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering
Lot 55-A with an
area of
approximately

1,910 square
meters. AScHCD
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering
Lot 56-B of
subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-292683
with an
approximate area
of 9,707 square
meters.
3) The following certificates of titles in
the name of ARANETA are
hereby declared LEGAL and
VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a
parcel of land
designated as
Section No. 2 of
subdivision plan
Psd-10114, being
a portion of Lot 25A-3-C with an
aggregate area of
581,872 square
meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering
four (4) parcels of
land with an
aggregate area of
390,383 square
meters.
4) On the following titles in the name of
Manotok Realty, Inc. or
Manotok Estate Corporation,
to wit:
a) TCT No. 26405 covering
Lot No. 12-E with
an area of 1,000
square meters;
b) TCT No. 26406 covering
Lot No. 12-F with
an area of 1,000
square meters;
c) TCT No. 26407 covering
Lot No. 12-B with
an area of 1,000
square meters;

d) TCT No. 33904 covering

Lot No. 12-H with
an area of 1,802
square meters;

j) TCT No. 165119 which

allegedly cancelled
TCT No. C-36960
of the SPOUSES
IGNACIO by virtue
of a Deed of Sale
between said
spouses and MRI;

e) TCT No. 53268 covering

Lot No. 15
purchased by MRI
from one Maria V.
Villacorta with an
approximate area
of 3,163 square
meters;
f) TCT No. 55897 covering
Lot 3 of
consolidationsubdivision plan
(LRC) Pcs-1828 of
the Maysilo Estate
covering an area
of more or less
20,531 square
meters; cCHITA

k) TCT No. T-232568

covering Lot No.
19-B of subdivision
plan Psd-13011152
with an area of
23,206 square
meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that
as determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered
owners of the said titles "failed to make any specific reference
to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to
whose names they were subsequently transferred and
registered", thereby leading the Supreme Court "to find no
sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins". 130

g) TCT No. C-17272 covering

Lot 6-C which has
an approximate
area of 27,850
square meters;

Costs against private respondents.

h) TCT No. T-121428

covering Lot No. 5C of subdivision
plan (LRC) psd315278, which has
an approximate
area of 4,650
square meters;

Puno, C.J., took no part due to relationship to counsel.

i) TCT No. 163902 covering

Lot No. 4-B-2 with
an area of more or
less 6,354 square
meters allegedly a
by-product of TCT
No. 9022, which in
turn, cancelled
TCT No. 8994/T45 registered in
the name of
Filemon S.
Custodio;

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Nachura, JJ., took no part.
Austria-Martinez, J., is on official leave.
||| (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R.
No. 123346, 134385, [March 31, 2009], 601 PHIL 571-638)

Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.

THIcCA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142549. March 9, 2010.]
FIDELA R. ANGELES, petitioner, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the
Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a
"vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an
area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican."
1 What we have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest
and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history." 2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court
dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding
this particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases
squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated,
on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with
thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and
fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost
forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking
respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to comply with the Order 3 dated January 8, 1998
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil
Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de
Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of
Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of
them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional
share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal,
commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting
of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by
OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil

Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer

Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate.
They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was
registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, 4 reiterated in Heirs of Luis
J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court held that OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title
by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D.
Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by
plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds
of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of
title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for
twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One
Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square
meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said
parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court,
and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to
their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
recommendation of the Commissioners
in their Joint Commissioners' Report
dated October 21, 1997 and
Supplemental Commissioners' Report
dated December 30, 1997 that the
following lots with transfer certificates of
title to be issued by the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of
all co-owners be sold and the proceeds
thereof divided among themselves in
proportion to their respective interest in
the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
and of Quezon City are hereby directed
to issue transfer certificates of title in the
names of all the co-owners for the
following lots, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall
be subject to confirmation by this Court
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of
Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC
Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA

Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then

requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds
to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for
petitioner a letter-reply 7 dated March 27, 2000, with two
attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement 8 dated September 22, 1997
(the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2)
LRA Circular No. 97-11 9 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The
letter-reply reads in part: SHDAEC
We regret to inform you that your request
cannot be granted in view of the directive
of the Department of Justice in its 1st
Indorsement dated 22 September 1997,
copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry
conducted by the Composite FactFinding Committee (created under DOJ
Department Order No. 137) finding that
there is only one OCT No. 994 which
was issued by the Rizal Register of
Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19
April 1919) pursuant to Decree No.
36455 in Land Registration Case No.
4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this
Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11
to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached,
stating the following:
xxx xxx xxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive,
this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement
dated 27 March 1998, . . . had
recommended to the Office of the
Solicitor General the filing of an
appropriate pleading relative to the said
Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994
are in fact sustained by the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights
and Urban Planning in its Senate
Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25
May 1998 . . . . 10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on
Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the
following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued
or registered on May 3, 1917[.]

ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19,

1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication
perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez,
Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of
Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not
have been the true and legal heirs of the
late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
government findings showed the
physical and genetic impossibility of
such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former
Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and
in bad faith, by issuing "certifications"
and/or written statements to the effect
that OCT No. 994 was issued or
registered on April 19, 1917 when in
truth and in fact it was issued or
registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of
Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
when she signed the TCTs issued in the
name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a
wrong date of the registration of OCT
No. 994. Malice was evident because
she had previously issued certificates of
title in the names of other individuals
which were derived from OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact
questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917
as the correct date of the registration of
OCT No. 994. 11 (Underscoring in the
original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and
was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and
tampering." We quote the last portion of said letter-reply: HESAIT
As found by the Senate Committees, the
mess caused by the former Register of
Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in
making it appear that OCT No. 994 was
issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the
wrong impression that there were two (2)
OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if
not multiple, issuance of transfer
certificates of title covering the
subdivided portions of the Maysilo
Estate, including the parcels of land

mentioned in the subject Order dated 8

January 1998. Our Authority, as the
protector of the integrity of the Torrens
title is mandated to prevent anomalous
titling of real properties and put a stop to
further erode the confidence of the public
in the Torrens system of land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8
January 1998 which directs the issuance
of transfer certificates of title as direct
transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from
certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994
had long been cancelled totally by the
issuance of various certificates of title in
the names of different persons; and that
the plan and descriptions of the lands
were not based on a subdivision plan
duly approved by the proper government
agency but merely sketch plans, in
violation of Section 50 of PD 1529.
Obviously, compliance with the Order will
result to duplication of certificates of title
covering land previously registered in the
names of other persons. Besides, in
MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did
not declare the nullity of the certificates
of title which emanated from OCT No.
994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely
invalidates the title of MWSS and
recognizes as valid the title of Jose B.
Dimson. There was no such declaration
as to the various transfer certificates of
title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under
the law, there must be a separate action
in court for the declaration of nullity of
certificates of title pursuant to the due
process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA
874), "there are too many fake titles
being peddled around and it behooves
every official of the government whose
functions concern the issuance of legal
titles to see to it that this plague that has
made a mockery of the Torrens system
is eradicated right now through their
loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in
the interest of our country and people at
large." 12

Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st

Indorsement, 13 made a substantive modification of the ruling
made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of
Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot
even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set
aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of
the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed
to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3,
1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of
the decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No. 994."
Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a
decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify,
much less set aside the same" and that respondent Guingona
usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered
the Order of no effect. 14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who
caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 9711 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on
other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the
parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and
contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of the
highest degree." 15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a
purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by
the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action."
In his Comment, 16 respondent Guingona raises the following
grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action
against respondent Guingona
in that the latter is no longer
the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement
dated September 22, 1997
was pursuant to the report
dated August 27, 1997 made
by the committee created by
Department Order No. 137
dated April 23, 1997 after
conducting an independent
fact-finding investigation. It
did not in any way alter or
modify any judgment of this
Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process
as her rights, if any, under the
Order dated January 18, 1998

were not yet in existence at

the time the 1st Indorsement
was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate
remedy to enforce claims of
damages. 17 IDaEHC
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the
Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the
mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by
way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from
the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to
said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the
powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore
not a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ
Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a
committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the
Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the
complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by
the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions
involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was
tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of original
Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting
to cover a mass of land encompassing
Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon
City as well as the issuance and
regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the
event of a finding of the irregular
issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to
determine the involvement of and to
recommend the actions to be taken
against person(s) and/or officials and
employees of this Department or its
agencies who may appear to have
participated therein, and (b) to
recommend the administrative and/or
judicial actions, if any, that may directly
be undertaken by this Department, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Land
Registration Authority, and other units
and attached agencies of this
Department, with respect to such
irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of
Title, taking into account the final
decisions of the courts affecting the
Maysilo Estate." 18

Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the

purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding
investigation was merely administrative to formulate and
recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the
DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other
agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the
proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the
Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee's report
dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement
which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action
which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only
with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the
Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of
title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an
administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that
it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement
dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order
dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner
was denied due process as her rights and interests were nonexistent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges
that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA
Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner's counsel to
present petitioner's case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent
Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the
requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona
argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in
the course of a trial where petitioner's claim for damages can be
fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of
facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to
include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the
amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim
should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no
showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her
claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be
outrightly dismissed. 20
In her Reply, 21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary
Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he
was the cause of public respondents' failure to comply with their
ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of
such private respondent to appear and defend, both in his own
behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected by the
proceedings . . . ." He is not charged with any improper act, but
he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by
petitioner shall require private respondent's active participation.
22

Anent private respondent's argument that the 1st Indorsement did

not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable
Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent
acts of private respondent . . . resulted in the altering or
supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The complaints praying
that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of
titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent
by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3,
1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent's claim, she
is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her coplaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from
damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the
wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following
provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement
of order or judgment. A certified copy
of the judgment rendered in accordance
with the last preceding section shall be
served upon the court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person concerned in such
manner as the court may direct, and
disobedience thereto shall be punished
as contempt. An execution may issue for
any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final
judgments or orders. Execution shall
issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes
of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected
and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments
or final order or orders sought to be

enforced and of the entry thereof, with

notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in
the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of
origin to issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a
function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because
he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade
compliance with a court order that had already become final and
executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation
of powers called for each branch of government to be left alone to
discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit. 23
DAEaTS
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City filed their Comment 24 on November 16, 2000. Public
respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the
rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for
partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs
and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994,
and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership,
and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI
to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to
deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of
the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the
result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office
of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of
new transfer certificates of title in their names. 25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of
[a] Senate investigation. On May 25,
1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth
Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines reached the conclusion that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not
and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria
de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33,
Senate Report). . . . .
As early as 1917, subject property of the
instant case had already been
partitioned and divided among the true
owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y
Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y
Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason,
Pedro Baos, Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino

Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua

Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose
Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason
y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y
de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de
la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la
Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz,
Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita
Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y
Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patio, Maria
Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O'Farrell y
Patio, German Franco y Gonzales,
Concepcion Franco y Gonzales,
Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma
Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y
Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores,
and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in
proportion to their respective shares, as
evidenced by the document entitled
PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA
HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION
PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO)
consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is
attached as Annex "D", and its faithful
translation into English consisting of
forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex
"E", and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer
certificates of titles covering the same
subject parcels of land were legally
issued in the names of aboveenumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and Caloocan City, through the
undersigned counsel, filed the
aforestated Motion for Reconsideration
of the questioned Order of the lower
court.
The resolution of said motion and other
incidents in related cases pending before
the lower court has been held in
abeyance to await the resolution by
higher courts of other cases involving the
Maysilo Estate. 26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public
respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by
their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have
unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment

of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a

writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence
related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that
it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance
with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not
their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the
petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will
not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to
which a substantial doubt exists. 27 It is nonetheless likewise
available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either. 28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and
see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by
mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt
exists to justify public respondents' refusal to comply with said
Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse
to grant petitioner's request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land
Registration Authority 29 instructive, to wit:

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a

decree of registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its
duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable,
even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, such issuance
may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the
integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration. AcDaEH
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Likewise, the writ of mandamus can
be awarded only when the petitioners'
legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. Under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear
legal right is a right which is indubitably
granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law. If the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded.
But where the right sought to be
enforced is in substantial doubt or
dispute, as in this case, mandamus
cannot issue. 30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by
the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely
ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to
the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we
find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer
certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by
mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were
existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of
land and there was reason to question the rights of those
requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent
LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the
Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in
the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letterreply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent
Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report
No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioner's request.
31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to
refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained
in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly
anchored their rights, did not exist.

It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case

resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty,
Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation 32 (the 2007
Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution 33 in the
same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the
controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of
the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to
rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such
as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set
forth in said resolutions. HIcTDE
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases
decided by this Court 34 which have held that there are two
existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which
she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their
rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably,
petitioner's claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in
the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve
whether the prior decision of this Court
should be affirmed or set aside is
whether or not the titles invoked by the
respondents are valid. If these titles are
sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are
void or otherwise should not be
recognized by this Court. Since the true
basic factual predicate concerning OCT
No. 994 which is that there is only one
such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said
rulings have become virtually functus
officio except on the basis of the "law of
the case" doctrine, and can no longer be
relied upon as precedents. 35
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994
allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists,
given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007
Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994.
As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917, and that should be the
date which should be reckoned as the
date of registration of the title. It may
also be acknowledged, as appears on
the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from
the issuance of the decree of registration
on [19] April 1917, although such date

cannot be considered as the date of the

title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its
source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and
CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts
doubt on the validity of such titles since
they refer to an inexistent OCT. . . . .
Third. The decisions of this Court in
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot
apply to the cases at bar, especially in
regard to their recognition of an OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title
which we now acknowledge as
inexistent. Neither could the
conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga
with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated
19 April 1917 bind any other case
operating under the factual setting the
same as or similar to that at bar. 36
(Emphases supplied.)
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate
reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this
Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to
hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s],
we are not prepared to adopt the findings
made by the DOJ and the Senate, or
even consider whether these are
admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the
Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the
parties. . . . The reports cannot
conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they
may be taken into account as evidence
on the same level as the other pieces of
evidence submitted by the parties. The
fact that they were rendered by the DOJ
and the Senate should not, in itself,
persuade the courts to accept them
without inquiry. The facts and arguments
presented in the reports must still
undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis,
and certainly the courts will have the
discretion to accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions

looming over the properties that could
only be threshed out in the remand to the
Court of Appeals. . . . . aHcACT
xxx xxx xxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear
and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three (3) months from
finality of this Resolution. 37
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the
evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the
latter's conclusions as to the status of the original title and its
subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding

that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which
had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19
April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which
reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is
null and void."
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil
Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear
several attempts of different individuals to represent her as
counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced age
and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a
favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the
partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that
she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper
because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very
basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No.
994, does not exist.

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of

mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
||| (Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142549, [March 9,
2010], 628 PHIL 381-401)