Robert Jian A.

Melchor
CIVPRO SPL 12:00-5:00
Case Digest
1. International Container Terminal Services v. CA
Facts:
Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order opening pilotage
services in the Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots
regardless of their non-membership in existing harbor pilots association.
United Harbor and Manila Pilots made representations with then Acting
Secretary of Transportation and Communications, to set aside its
implementation, claiming that it violated their exclusive right to provide
pilotage services in the Philippines. Failing to seek reconsideration, United
Harbor and Manila Pilots filed with Manila RTC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for TRO against the secretary of Transportation and
Communications as well as the chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority. RTC
then rendered a decision in favor of Manila Pilots and United Harbor stating
that respondents acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in enacting the AO. This petition was denied on appeal both with
the CA and the SC. But still Intl Container took over pilotage services in the
Manila Harbor under a contract with Philippine Ports Authority. Thus United
Harbor and Manila Pilots filed petitions holding Philippine Ports Authority
General Manager and "International Container" officials in contempt of court.
The contempt petitions, however, have not been resolved because the Office
of the Solicitor General elevated it to the SC, the question of whether or not
the lower court still had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitions for
contempt in view of the finality of the decision. Pending all these, Manila
Pilots filed another case against petitioner "International Container" before
Manila RTC for damages suffered as a result of petitioner's usurpation of its
sole and exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the South and North Harbors
of Manila and Limay, Bataan, except the Manila Intl Port area. They also
instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages against petitioner "International Container" also
before Manila RTC. Manila RTC decided in favor of Manila Pilots, restoring
them as the exclusive provider of pilotage in Manila Intl Port area and
ordering Intl. Container to cease and desist operations. However they filed a
a petition for certiorari with respondent court contending that there is forum
shopping on the part of Manila Pilots.
Issue:
WON there was forum shopping on the part of private respondent Manila
Pilots.
Held:

There was none. The assailed decision is in accordance with the established
rule that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances. Furthermore, the
actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issue
and no such similarities to the actions involved. It cannot be said that private
respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to increase its chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
inasmuch as no unfavorable decision had ever been rendered against private
respondent "Manila Pilots" in any of the cases brought before the courts
below. On the contrary, private respondent "Manila Pilots" was one of the
prevailing parties in all of their petitions.
2. Metals Engineering Resources Corp. v. CA
Facts:
The appeal arose from Civil Case No. 55560 filed by petitioner against private
respondent Jose, for the annulment of an agreement to buy and sell executed
between the parties, before the RTC Pasig. Private respondent filed a
Counterclaim alleging a compulsory counterclaim but before the case could
be heard on pre-trial, private respondent filed a Motion to Expunge the
Complaint alleging that the same did not specify the amount of damages
sought either in the body or in the prayer of the complaint. RTC Pasig required
petitioner to amend its complaint by specifying the amount of damages
prayed for, otherwise the original complaint shall be dismissed. In
compliance, petitioner filed its Amended Complaint specifying the amount of
damages it seeks to recover from private respondent.
Issue:
WON dismissal of main complaint serves to dismiss the compulsory
counterclaim.
Held:
A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action
but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or
occurrence giving rise to it. Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a
separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis
pendentia, and or dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Compulsory
counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
complaint. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
the main action of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory
counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be
dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the
counterclaim.
3. Financial Bldg. Corp. v. Forbes Park Assoc. Inc

Facts: The Soviet Union was the owner of a residential lot located in Forbes
Park in Makati, whereas the petitioner is the duly authorized association in
said village. USSR engaged the services of petitioner for the construction of a
multi-level office and staff apartment building at said lot, to be used by the
trade representative of the USSR. Due to USSR's representation that it would
be building a residence for its trade representative, the respondent
authorized its construction and work began thereafter. Before the start of the
construction, respondent discovered the second plan submitted by the
petitioner to the Makati City government for the construction of a multi-level
apartment building in said property. As a result, respondent enjoined further
construction work. Petitioner filed with RTC Makati a complaint for injunction
and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondent for
the said action. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondent, but the CA nullified it and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner
then filed a petition to the SC, but same was dismissed. After the petitioner's
case was terminated with finality, respondent filed with the RTC Makati a
complaint for damages against petitioner arising from the violation of its rules
and regulations. On RTC Makati rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent and against herein petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court, hence this petition.
Issue:
WON filing of a motion to dismiss is an implied waiver of the compulsory
counterclaim.
Held:
Yes. The instant case is barred due to Forbes Parks failure to set it up as a
compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. 16540, the prior injunction suit
initiated by Financial Building against Forbes Park. A compulsory counterclaim
is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. If it is
within the jurisdiction of the court and it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed by
the opposing party. Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of
a separate action but it should instead be asserted in the same suit involving
the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it.[17] To determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the following
tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as
the defendants counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between
the claim and the counterclaim? Affirmative answers to the above queries
indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.

4. Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago

Facts:
5. Tomas University Hospital v. Surla
Facts:
6. Torres v. CA
Facts:
7. Anaya v. Palaroan
Facts:
8. Balbastro v. CA
Facts:
9. Rubio v. Mariano
Facts:
10.
Mercader v. DBP
Facts:

Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago

G.R. No. 170354
June 30, 2006
Facts:
The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that
Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting
wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a
counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which Pinga was
harvesting the fruits. However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend
the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal of said case. Respondents thus
filed an MR not to reinstate the case but to ask for the entire action to be
dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. RTC
granted the MR, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. RTC ruled that
compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs
cause of action vis-a-vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the
dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of
Rule 45.

Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of original complaint affects the compulsory counter
claims
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that dismissal of the complaint does not carry
with the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. Section 3
contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, although justified by
causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner's
failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3,
as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of
defendant or motu proprio by the court..The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of
action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of
evidence, adjudication on the merits.

Sto. Thomas University Hospital vs. Surla

G.R. No. 129718
August 17, 1998
Facts:
Respondent spouses sued petitioner hospital for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City based on their claim that their son,
Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been
born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing
serious harm on the child. In its answer with compulsory counterclaim,
petitioner asserted that respondents still owed to it hospital bills for their
son's confinement thereat, and claimed moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney's fees. Respondents sought dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim on
the ground that it was not accompanied with a certificate of non-forum
shopping pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Petitioner, however, contended that since its counterclaim was compulsory in
nature, the circular did not apply to it. The trial court dismissed petitioner's
counterclaim as the circular does not distinguish whether the counterclaim
should be permissive or compulsory. Petitioner's petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim should be permissive or compulsory
Held:
The Supreme Court held that that the language of Circular No. 04-94
distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading
or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The circular
has not been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very
nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately

pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution
except by the court where the main case pends. The appealed decision was
modified and the claim for moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees of
petitioner was ordered reinstated.|

Torres vs. CA
G.R. No. L- 25889
January 17, 1973
Facts:
The Sierras filed a complaint against praying that they (plaintiffs) be
allowed to repurchase the land under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The Chivis and the Laicos filed their answers to the complaint and counterclaimed for damages by reason of the alleged bad faith, misrepresentation
and fraudulent acts of the Sierras, as hereinbefore recounted. The Laicos filed
a cross-claim against the Chivis for collection of twice the amount of the price
paid under their sales contract for the latter's failure to deliver title to the
Laicos, alleging that "the defendants Chivi are/or will be liable on these
warranties and conditions should the plaintiffs finally obtain favorable
judgment in their favor" (sic).In an order dated 16 March 1966, the motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari brought
by the Laicos.
Issue:
Whether or not the cross-claim will stand after the complaint in the
same action was dismissed with prejudice
Held:
The Supreme Court held that A cross-claim, as defined in Section 7 of
Rule 6, Rules of Court, is "any claim by one party against a co-party arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein. The cross-claim in this case was
purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the complaint and could
prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above
enunciated, it could not be the subject of independent adjudication once it
lost the nexus upon which its life depended.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
G.R. No. L- 27930
November 26, 1970
Facts:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan
filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was

dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras
counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the nondivulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining
her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on
such ground.
Issue:
Whether or not the second set of averments in the reply were
improperly alleged
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the second set of averments which were
made in the reply is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is "apart,
distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the complaint. Said
allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a
reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action
as set forth in his complaint, there is more reason not to allow such party to
allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series
of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

Balbastro vs. CA
G.R. No. L- 33255
November 29, 1972
Facts:
Chiu Keng Iong, Lim Bun Kong, and Rajindar Singh, lessees of three
doors of a 10-door apartment situated at E. Rodriguez St., Quezon City, filed a
complaint for interpleader and consignation with the respondent Court of First
Instance against private respondent Francisco E. Fernandez and Angela M.
Butte, each of whom was claiming ownership over the aforementioned 10door apartment and of the right to collect the rents therefrom. In their

complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they have no means of knowing definitely to

whom they should pay rentals whether to defendant Angela M. Butte or
defendant Francisco E. Fernandez.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of
discretion in allowing inclusion of petitioners as parties in the aforecited
interpleader case on the basis of a pleading designated as "third-party
complaint
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the requirement that for a third-party
complaint to be available the third-party defendant must be liable secondarily
to the original defendant, in the event that the latter is held liable to the
plaintiff a third-party complaint is, under the rules, available only if the
defendant has a right to demand contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief from the supposed third-party defendants in respect to the
plaintiff's claim

Rubio vs. Mariano

G.R. No. L- 30404
January 31, 1973
Facts:
Petition for certiorari to review and set aside the order dated
September 13, 1968 issued by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 8632
entitled "Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc., et al. vs. Miguel Perez Rubio," denying
the motion of the defendant to admit his amended and supplemental answer
and third-party complaint, and to set aside as well the subsequent order
denying his motion for reconsideration. Pending determination of the issues
raised here the petitioner prayed that respondent Judge be restrained from
proceeding with the hearing of the case below and the other respondents

from transferring or proceeding with the agreement to transfer any of the

assets of Hacienda Benito, Inc., to any third person except in the ordinary
course of selling subdivision lots. This Court caused to be issued a temporary
restraining order as prayed for.
Issue:
Whether or not the amended answer should be admitted
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's counterclaim is to obtain
payment of the Phillips' admitted indebtedness, the amended and
supplemental answer which contains the extensive recitals regarding certain
events which transpired after the original answer had been filed, obviously
intended to emphasize the resulting difficulty on the part of petitioner to
collect from the Phillips said indebtedness, should have been admitted. The
narration of the steps allegedly taken by the debtors to make it extremely
hard for petitioner's counterclaim to be satisfied, does not necessarily mean
or imply that a new cause of action has been pleaded. What is being enforced
against the Phillips, both in the original answer and in the amended and
supplemental answer, is their obligation to the petitioner.

Mercader vs. Devt Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 130699
May 12, 2000
Facts:
In compliance with the condition of DBP for the approval of a loan,
Maderazo executed a lease contract for a right of way over the adjoining for
20 years with the Manreals, then the registered owners. Later, the spouses
Mercader also executed a lease contract with the Manreals for 20 years and 4
months over the remaining portion. Said lease contracts, however, were not
annotated on the TCT of Lot No. 2985. The Mercaders subsequently learned
that the same lot, including the improvements they have introduced thereon,
was offered by the Manreals as collateral for a loan to DBP. Mercader filed an
action to protect their interest on the property, but meanwhile, the lot was
sold on public auction with DBP as the highest bidder. At the pre-trial stage of
the case, the trial court acknowledged the possibility of a compromise

agreement, and the parties had agreed on a lease-purchase option. Mercader

filed a supplemental pleading insisting the consummation of the leasepurchase option with the payment of the earnest money. The trial court ruled
in favor of the Mercaders, but the Court of Appeals reversed the same,
disregarding as material the lease-purchase option on the ground that it was
not raised in the pleadings. Thus, the appellate court ordered the Mercaders
to immediately turn over the possession of the lot to DBP.
Issue:
Whether or not the lease-purchase option should not have been taken
cognizance since it was not raised in the pleadings
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that as a supplemental pleading, it served to
aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for judicial relief when the
original pleading was filed. As such, it was meant to supply deficiencies in aid
of the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter. Hence, it was
patently erroneous for the Court of Appeals to pronounce that the leasepurchase option was not raised in the pleadings. The DBP was even quite
aware and knowledgeable of the supplemental pleading because it filed an
opposition thereto.