BORLONGAN VS PENA

Facts
Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees, against Urban Bank
and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago
City.- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency,
allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform
such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying
Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.- Petitioners filed a
MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.-Attached
to the MD were the following documents:1. A letter dated December 19, 1994
signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc.
(ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;2. An unsigned letter dated
December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from MarilynG. Ong;3. A letter
dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G.
Ong; and4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.- The
above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
wasappointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.Respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Bago City.He claimed that said documents were falsified considering that the
signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the
record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in
support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their
Pre- Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with
the Municipal Trial Courtin Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca
issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed
an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied due process because of the nonobservance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the
Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in
contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondents affidavit was
not based on the latters personal knowledge and therefore should not have been
used by the court in determining probable cause.-On the same day that the
Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly
provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for
the obvious reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to
be settled by the court.-MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by
petitioners): They upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was
issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners
could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.
Issue:
1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counteraffidavit;2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the
warrants for their arrest were properly issued;3) WON this Court can, itself,
determine probable cause; and4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a
waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.
Ruling:
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.
RD:
For issues numbered 1 and 3:-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the aforesaid issues:
SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose
of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. SEC. 3.
Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted in the following manner:(a) The complaint shall state the
known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his

witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. (a) Where
filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal
shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted
by the complainant.
-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by
the complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He
should not be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he
is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may
then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents
of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the
warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the
complainant. Section 2 of ArticleIII of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is
no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits
mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause.For issue number 2:For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the
affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause
exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing
the warrant of arrest.-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The respondents claims of
the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.- It must be emphasized that the
affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their
(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures
were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did
respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the
documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the
signatories. He simply made a bare assertion-A finding of probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable
doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless,
although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion. While
probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to
examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play,
and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless
charges.

SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged
with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back.
Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court
to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the
president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.

Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)

Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a lettercomplaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano
and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June
30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify
the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners:
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation
of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity
that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during
their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed

by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime
has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may
issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have
conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest
against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and
beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone withappellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the
police authorities whoimmediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team
members posted themselves along thenational highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00
p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person hetransacted with, and when the latter was
about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invitedhim to the police station as he
was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his
pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened
, yielded a small sachet containingthe suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and theconfiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinationson the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Appellant was charged in two
separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering;
and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.During the
arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTCrendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section
5, Article II, R.A. 9165 butacquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165. On appeal, the CA affirmedthe RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC
assailing for the first time he legality of his arrestand the validity of the subsequent warrantless
search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act thatwould indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. Wefind no cogent reason to depart from this wellestablished doctrine.Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did thearresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested hadcommitted, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had justalighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspiciousmanner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the police officers to suspect and conclude that hewas committing or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, thesachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by
any urgency that would allow them to do away with therequisite warrant. As testified to
by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that
appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the
following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
al.G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007

JESUS

NUEVAS,

et.

Facts:
Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a
delivery of marijuana dried leaves. Whilestationed thereat, they saw a male person
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas. They confronted the
latterand ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic
bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leavesand bricks wrapped in a
blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the
delivery of marijuanaweighing more or less five (5) kilos. The police officers
together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where according to Nuevas
waswhere his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there,
they saw and approached two (2) persons along theNational Highway, introducing
themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked,
Din disclosed thatthe bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and upon
inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper andwrapped therein." are
violated. All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial co
urt found them guilty with illegal possession ofmarijuana in violation of Section 8,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived
his right ofappeal.
The appellate court found Fami and Cablings version of how appellants were
apprehended to be cate
gorical and clear.However the other 2 filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals
base on their allegations that they are not guilty and their constitutionalrights
against warrantless arrest. However, the appellate court stated that the search in
the instant case is exempted from therequirement of a judicial warrant as appellants
themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
According tothe appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily
surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence torebut the same. Thus,
in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition
.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was valid?
Ruling:
No.
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless
searches and seizure made by the policeofficers and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virture thereof.Our Constitution states that a search and
seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search
and seizurebecomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutionalproscription,
however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence);2.Search of evidence in "plain view." The
elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
inwhich the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the

evidence was inadvertently discovered by thepolice who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified
mereseizure of evidence without further search; 3.Search of a moving vehicle.Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probablecause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity; 4.Consented warrantless search; 5.Customs search; 6.Stop and Frisk;
and 7.Exigent and emergency circumstances. In the instances where a warrant is
not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performedexcept without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinablefrom the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence ofprobable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articlesprocured. Arrest must preced
the search. A search
substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can make the arrest as the outset ofthe search.
Reliable information alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113. A peaceful submissionto a search or seizure is not a concent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegalwarrantless arrest.
In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the
incriminating bag to the police officers. Thus, the Court would have affirmed
Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. However, with respect to the
search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had
actually been given. Thus, their arrest was indeed a violation of their rights. The
arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest.

ZALAMEDA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Zalameda was found guilty by the RTC of violating Section 11 of RA 9165.
Police Officer Orbeta received a phone call from a concerned citizen regarding an
on-going "pot session" in a certain area. The house number was specified. Acting on
the information the police officers went to the place to while they were in uniform to
verify the report. When they reached the intended destination they found the door
of the house slightly open. The police officer peeped inside and saw petitioner and
Villaflor sniffing smoke while sitting on a bed. Upon signal, they immediately rushed
inside the house and frisked the them in accordance with police procedure. They
recovered from petitioners right pocket a rectangular plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substances. The police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum
foils (later confirmed to have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing
traces of white crystalline substance, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag
with a plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter. The police handcuffed the petitioner
and Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their violation of R.A. No. 9165, and
brought them to the police station. At the police station, the confiscated items were
marked and submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The examination
found the seized items to be positive for the presence of shabu. Urine tests
conducted on the petitioner also yielded a positive result.
The petitioner denied that he and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu, and
maintained that they were just talking to each other when the police arrived at his
house. Moreover petitioner claimed that they were just framed-up by the police
officers.
Issue:
1. Is the defense of denial and extortion tenable?
2. Was the chain of custody of the seized items properly established?
Ruling:
1. NO. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the
facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence

that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby
positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. One such positive
evidence is the result of the laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Crime
Laboratory on the various drug and drug paraphernalia recovered from the
petitioner and Villaflor which revealed that the following confiscated items tested
positive for the presence of shabu: (a) one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
with marking "GSZ" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance; (b) two
aluminum foil strips both with markings "AHV," each containing white crystalline
substance; and (c) three unsealed transparent plastic sachets all with markings
"RSG" each containing white crystalline substance. In addition, the drug tests
conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor both yielded positive results.
Petitioners claim of extortion is similarly untenable. An allegation of frame-up and
extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous
drug cases. It is viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To
substantiate such a defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing.
2. YES. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the petitioner wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized
prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the
rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from the
petitioners possession and of the various drug paraphernalia on top of the
petitioners bed, the police immediately brought the petitioner and Villaflor to the
police station, together with the seized items. PO2 De Guzman himself brought
these items to the police station and marked them. When the prosecution presented
these marked specimens in court, PO2 De Guzman positively identified them to be
the same items he seized from the petitioner and which he later marked at the
police station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for
examination based on a duly prepared request. Thus, the prosecution established
the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were
first discovered until they were brought for examination.
People vs Aminuddin
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly
after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one
their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss thecharge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant,
who was eventuallyconvicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the
PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana,
the
investigator
hitting
him
with
a piece
of
wood in
the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations.
Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently
proved
the
injuries
allegedly
sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal. Whether or not accused
constitutional
right
against
unreasonable
serach
and
seizure
is
violated
Held: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of

the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime
was about to be committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation
of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon
9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was
certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own
authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not
law enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED

People vs. Molina

Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.
The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the
first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula
y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@
"Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At
about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that
the alleged pusher Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) will
be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at
around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City,
which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader),
SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to
proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the
alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in
the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At
that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula,
who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula

and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the
accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied.
The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule
122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing
provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2,
which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a
lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be
reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion"
of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to
effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable
or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and addresses of Mula and
Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested,
and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace
officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall
under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their
person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.

Malacat v Court of Appeals

Facts:
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force
of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,
near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslimlooking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade
from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum,
and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat

filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of
24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and
frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not certain
that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to
require probable cause would have been premature. The RTC emphasized that Yu and his
companions were confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as
petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an officer to
conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime,
but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then
ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of
bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention
is justified for any other lawful cause.