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TodayisMonday,July25,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.86439April13,1989
MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTA,petitioner,
vs.
SENATORJOVITOR.SALONGA,COMMISSIONONAPPOINTMENTSCOMMITTEEONJUSTICE,JUDICIAL
ANDBARCOUNCILANDHUMANRIGHTSANDHESIQUIOR.MALLILLIN,respondents.
MaryConcepcionBautistaforandinherownbehalf.
ChristineA.TomasEspinosaforprivaterespondentHesiquioR.Mallillin

PADILLA,J.:
TheCourthadhopedthatitsdecisioninSarmientoIIIvs.Mison,1wouldhavesettledthequestionofwhichappointments
by the President, under the 1987 Constitution, are to be made with and without the review of the Commission on
Appointments.TheMisoncasewasthefirstmajorcaseunderthe1987ConstitutionandinconstruingSec.16,Art.VIIofthe
1987Constitutionwhichprovides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission onAppointments, appoint the
headsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthe
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawto
appoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresident
alone,inthecourts,orintheheadsofthedepartments,agencies,commissionsorboards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.
this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and the country's
experienceunderthe1935and1973Constitutions,heldthatonlythoseappointmentsexpresslymentionedinthefirst
sentence of Sec. 16,Art. VII are to be reviewed by the Commission onAppointments, namely, "the heads of the
executivedepartment,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherank
ofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution."Allother
appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Accordingly,intheMisoncase,theappointmentofthereinrespondentSalvadorM.MisonasheadoftheBureauof
Customs,withouttheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments,washeldvalidandinaccordancewiththe
Constitution.
The Mison case doctrine did not foreclose contrary opinions. So with the very provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII as
designed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. But the Constitution, as construed by this Court in appropriate
cases,isthesupremelawoftheland.AnditcannotbeoverstressedthatthestrengthoftheConstitution,withallits
imperfections,liesintherespectandobedienceaccordedtoitbythepeople,especiallytheofficialsofgovernment,
whoarethesubjectsofitscommands.
Barely a year after Mison, the Court is again confronted with a similar question, this time, whether or not the
appointmentbythePresidentoftheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights(CHR),an"independentoffice"
createdbythe1987Constitution,istobemadewithorwithouttheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments
(CA,forbrevity).Oncemore,asinMison,theCourtwillresolvetheissueirrespectiveofthepartiesinvolvedinthe
litigation,mindfulthatwhatreallymattersaretheprinciplesthatwillguidethisAdministrationandothersintheyears
tocome.
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SincethepositionofChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsisnotamongthepositionsmentionedinthefirst
sentenceofSec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987Constitution,appointmentstowhicharetobemadewiththeconfirmationof
theCommissiononAppointments,itfollowsthattheappointmentbythePresidentoftheChairmanofthe(CHR),isto
bemadewithouttherevieworparticipationoftheCommissiononAppointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specificallyprovidedforintheConstitutionitself,unliketheChairmenandMembersoftheCivilServiceCommission,
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
ConstitutioninthePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments.2
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentenceinSection16,Art.VII,thatis,withouttheconfirmationoftheCommissiononAppointmentsbecausethey
areamongtheofficersofgovernment"whomhe(thePresident)maybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."AndSection
2(c),ExecutiveOrderNo.163,5May1987,authorizesthePresidenttoappointtheChairmanandMembersofthe
CommissiononHumanRights.Itprovides:
(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
Presidentforatermofsevenyearswithoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyfor
theunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.
Theaboveconclusionsappeartobeplainlyevidentand,therefore,irresistible.However,thepresenceinthiscaseof
certainelementsabsentintheMisoncasemakesnecessaryacloserscrutiny.Thefactsarethereforeessential.
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as
"ActingChairman,CommissiononHumanRights."Theletterofdesignationreads:
27August1987
Madam:
YouareherebydesignatedACTINGCHAIRMAN,COMMISSIONONHUMANRIGHTS,tosucceedthe
lateSenatorJoseW.DioknoandJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes.
Verytrulyyours,
CORAZONC.AQUINO
HON.MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTA3
RealizingperhapstheneedforapermanentchairmanandmembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights,befitting
an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, 4 the President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. The appointment letter is as
follows:

17December1988
TheHonorable
TheChairman
CommissiononHumanRights
Pasig,MetroManila
Madam:
Pursuanttotheprovisionsofexistinglaws,thefollowingareherebyappointedtothepositionsindicated
oppositetheirrespectivenamesintheCommissiononHumanRights:
MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTAChairman
ABELARDOL.APORTADERA,JRMember
SAMUELSORIANOMember
HESIQUIOR.MALLILLINMember
NARCISOC.MONTEIROMember
Byvirtuehereof,theymayqualifyandenterupontheperformanceofthedutiesoftheofficefurnishing
thisOfficeandtheCivilServiceCommissionwithcopiesoftheiroathofoffice.
Verytrulyyours,
CORAZONC.AQUINO5
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Itistobenotedthatbyvirtueofsuchappointment,petitionerBautistawasadvisedbythePresidentthatshecould
qualifyandenterupontheperformanceofthedutiesoftheofficeofChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights,
requiringhertofurnishtheofficeofthePresidentandtheCivilServiceCommissionwithcopiesofheroathofoffice.
On22December1988,beforetheChiefJusticeofthisCourt,Hon.MarceloB.Fernan,petitionerBautistatookher
oathofofficebyvirtueofherappointmentasChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights.Thefulltextoftheoath
ofofficeisasfollows:
OATHOFOFFICE
I,MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTAof3026GeneralG.delPilarStreet,Bangkal,Makati,MetroManila
havingbeenappointedtothepositionofCHAIRMANoftheCommissiononHumanRights,dosolemnly
swearthatIwilldischargetothebestofmyabilityallthedutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheofficetowhich
IhavebeenappointedupholdtheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,andobeyallthelaws
ofthelandwithoutmentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
SOHELPMEGOD.
MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTA
SUBSCRIBEDANDSWORNTObeforemethis22nddayofDecemberintheyearofOurLord,1988in
Manila.
MARCELOB.FERNAN
ChiefJustice
SupremeCourtofthePhilippines6
Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista
discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as
previouslystated,shehadoriginallyheldmerelyinanactingcapacitybeginning27August1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
requestinghertosubmittotheCommissioncertaininformationanddocumentsasrequiredbyitsrulesinconnection
withtheconfirmationofherappointmentasChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights.7On10January1989,the
Commission on Appointments' Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting of the
CommissiononAppointmentsCommitteeonJustice,JudicialandBarCouncilandHumanRightssetfor19January1989at9
A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her
appointmentasChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights.8

On13January1989,petitionerBautistawrotetotheChairmanoftheCommissiononAppointmentsstating,forthe
reasonsthereingiven,whysheconsideredtheCommissiononAppointmentsashavingnojurisdictiontoreviewher
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The petitioner's letter to the Commission on
Appointments'Chairmanreads:
January13,1989
SENATEPRESIDENTJOVITOR.SALONGA
Chairman
CommissiononAppointments
Senate,Manila
Sir:
We acknowledge receipt of the communication from the Commission onAppointments requesting our
appearanceonJanuary19,1989fordeliberationonourappointments.
We respectfully submit that the appointments of the Commission commissioners of the Human Rights
CommissionarenotsubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
TheConstitution,inArticleVIISection16whichexpresslyvestedonthePresidenttheappointingpower,
hasexpresslymentionedthegovernmentofficialswhoseappointmentsaresubjecttotheconfirmationof
the Commission on Appointments of Congress. The Commissioners of the Commission on Human
Rightsarenotincludedamongthose.
Where the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is required, as in the case of the
Constitutional Commissions such as the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission and the
CommissiononElections,itwasexpresslyprovidedthatthenominationswillbesubjecttoconfirmation
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of Commission on Appointments. The exclusion again of the Commission on Human Rights, a

constitutional office, from this enumeration is a clear denial of authority to the Commission on
AppointmentstoreviewourappointmentstotheCommissiononHumanRights.
Furthermore,theConstitutionspecificallyprovidesthatthisCommissionisanindependentofficewhich:
a.mustinvestigateallformsofhumanrightsviolationsinvolvingcivilandpoliticalrights
b.shallmonitorthegovernment'scomplianceinallourtreatyobligationsonhumanrights.
We submit that, the monitoring of all agencies of government, includes even Congress
itself,intheperformanceofitsfunctionswhichmayaffecthumanrights
c.maycallonallagenciesofgovernmentfortheimplementationofitsmandate.
The powers of the Commission on Appointments is in fact a derogation of the Chief Executive's
appointing power and therefore the grant of that authority to review a valid exercise of the executive
powercanneverbepresumed.Itmustbeexpresslygranted.
TheCommissiononAppointmentshasnojurisdictionundertheConstitutiontoreviewappointmentsby
thePresidentofCommissionersoftheCommissiononHumanRights.
In view of the foregoing considerations, as Chairman of an independent constitutional office. I cannot
submit myself to the Commission on Appointments for the purpose of confirming or rejecting my
appointment.
Verytrulyyours,
MARY
CONCEPCION
BAUTISTA
Chairman9
InrespondentCommission'scomment(inthiscase),dated3February1989,thereisattachedasAnnex1aletterof
the Commission on Appointments' Secretary to the Executive Secretary, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. making
reference to the "adinterim appointment which Her Excellency extended toAtty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on 14
January 1989 as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights" 10 and informing Secretary Macaraig that, as
previouslyconveyedtohiminaletterof25January1989,theCommissiononAppointmentsdisapprovedpetitionerBautista's
"adinterimappointment'asChairpersonoftheCommissiononHumanRightsinviewofherrefusaltosubmittothejurisdiction
oftheCommissiononAppointments.Theletterreads:

1 February
1989
HON.CATALINOMACARAIG,JR.
ExecutiveSecretary
Malacanang,Manila
Sir:
This refers to the ad interim appointment which Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion
Bautistaon14January1989asChairpersonoftheCommissiononHumanRights.
Asweconveyedtoyouinourletterof25January1989,theCommissiononAppointments,assembled
in plenary (session) on the same day, disapproved Atty. Bautista's ad interim appointment as
ChairpersonoftheCommissiononHumanRightsinviewofherrefusaltosubmittothejurisdictionof
theCommissiononAppointments.
This is to inform you that the Commission onAppointments, likewise assembled in plenary (session)
earliertoday,deniedSenatorMamintalA.J.Tamano'smotionforreconsiderationofthedisapprovalof
Atty.Bautista'sadinterimappointmentasChairpersonoftheCommissiononHumanRights.
Verytrulyyours,
RAOUL
V.
VICTORINO
Secretary11
Onthesamedate(1February1989),theCommissiononAppointments'SecretaryinformedpetitionerBautistathat
themotionforreconsiderationofthedisapprovalofher"adinterimappointmentasChairmanoftheCommissionon
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HumanRights"wasdeniedbytheCommissiononAppointments.Theletterreadsasfollows:
1February1989
ATTY.MARYCONCEPCIONBAUTISTA
CommissiononHumanRights
IntegratedBarofthePhilippines
Bldg.Pasig,MetroManila
DearAtty.Bautista:
PursuanttoSec.6(a),ChapterIIoftheRulesoftheCommissiononAppointments,thedenialbythe
Commission onAppointments, assembled in plenary (session) earlier today, of Senator MamintalA.J.
Tamano'smotionforreconsiderationofthedisapprovalofyouradinterimappointmentasChairpersonof
theCommissiononHumanRightsisrespectfullyconveyed.
Thankyouforyourattention.
Verytrulyyours,
RAOUL
V.
VICTORINO
Secretary12
InAnnex3ofrespondentCommission'ssamecomment,dated3February1989,isanewsitemappearinginthe3
February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard" reporting that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case which had
beenelevatedtotheSupremeCourt.Thenewsitemisherequotedinfull,thus
AquinonamesreplacementforMaryCon
President Aquino has named replacement for Presidential Commission on Human Rights Chairman
MaryConcepcionBautistawhoseappointmentwasrejectedanewbytheCongressionalcommissionon
appointments.
The President designated PCHR commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as acting chairman of the
CommissionpendingtheresolutionofBautista'scasewhichhadbeenelevatedtotheSupremeCourt.
The President's action followed after Congressional Commission on Appointments Chairman, Senate
PresidentJovitoSalongadeclaredBautistacannolongerholdontoherpositionafterherappointment
wasnotconfirmedforthesecondtime.
Forallpracticalpurposes,SalongasaidBautistacanbeaccusedofusurpationofauthorityifsheinsists
tostayonheroffice.
Ineffect,thePresidenthadaskedBautistatovacateherofficeandgivewaytoMallillin(MariVilla)13
On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission onAppointments had acted on her "ad interim
appointmentasChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRights"petitionerBautistafiledwiththisCourtthepresent
petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and
unconstitutionalandwithoutanylegalforceandeffectanyactionoftheCommissiononAppointmentsaswellasof
theCommitteeonJustice,JudicialandBarCouncilandHumanRights,onthelawfullyextendedappointmentofthe
petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and
constitutionalauthoritytoconfirmandtoreviewherappointment."14
The prayer for temporary restraining order was "to enjoin the respondent Commission on Appointments not to
proceed further with their deliberation and/or proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner ... nor to enforce,
implementoractonanyorder,resolution,etc.issuedinthecourseoftheirdeliberations."15
Respondents were requiredtofile commentwithinten(10)days. 16 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an amended
petition, with urgent motion for restraining order, impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the designated acting
chairmanaspartyrespondentandprayingforthenullificationofhisappointment.Thesucceedingday,asupplementalurgent
exparte motion was filed by petitioner seeking to restrain respondent Mallillin from continuing to exercise the functions of
chairman and to refrain from demanding courtesy resignations from officers or separating or dismissing employees of the
Commission.

Acting on petitioner's amended petition and supplemental urgent exparte motion, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order directing respondent Mallillin to cease and desist from effecting the dismissal, courtesy
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resignation,iremovalandreorganizationandothersimilarpersonnelactions.17Respondentswerelikewiserequiredto
comment on said amended petition with allowance for petitioner to file a reply within two (2) days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

RespondentsSenatorSalonga,theCommissiononAppointmentstheCommitteeonJ&BCandHumanRightsfiled
a comment to the amended petition on 21 February 1989. 18 Petitioner filed her reply. 19 On 24 February 1989,
respondentMallillinfiledaseparatecomment. 20TheCourtrequiredpetitionertoreplytorespondentMallillin'scomment. 21
Petitionerfiledherreply.22

In deference to the Commission on Appointments, an instrumentality of a coordinate and coequal branch of

government,theCourtdidnotissueatemporaryrestrainingorderdirectedagainstit.However,thisdoesnotmean
that the issues raisedbythepetition,asmetbytherespondents'comments, will not be resolved in this case.The
Courtwillnotshirkfromitsdutyasthefinalarbiterofconstitutionalissues,inthesamewaythatitdidnotinMison.
Asdisclosedbytherecords,andaspreviouslyadvertedto,itisclearthatpetitionerBautistawasextendedbyHer
Excellency, the President a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17
December1988.Beforethisdate,shewasmerelythe"ActingChairman"oftheCommission.Bautista'sappointment
on 17 December 1988 is an appointment that was for the President solely to make, i.e., not an appointment to be
submittedforreviewandconfirmation(orrejection)bytheCommissiononAppointments.Thisisinaccordancewith
Sec.16,Art.VIIofthe1987ConstitutionandthedoctrineinMisonwhichisherereiterated.
The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17
December1988,andafterpetitionerBautistahadqualifiedfortheofficetowhichshehadbeenappointed,bytaking
the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend another
appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by the respondent
CommissiononAppointmentsoranyotherkindofappointmenttothesameofficeofChairmanoftheCommissionon
HumanRightsthatcalledforconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
TheCourt,withallduerespecttoboththeExecutiveandLegislativeDepartmentsofgovernment,andaftercareful
deliberation,isconstrainedtoholdandruleinthenegative.WhenHerExcellency,thePresidentconvertedpetitioner
Bautista'sdesignationasActingChairmantoapermanentappointmentasChairmanoftheCommissiononHuman
Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of
suchappointment,shecouldqualifyandenterupontheperformanceofthedutiesoftheoffice(ofChairmanofthe
Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously,sheacceptedtheappointmentbytakingheroathofofficebeforetheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,
Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
CommissiononHumanRightswasacompletedactonthepartofthePresident.Toparaphrasethegreatjurist,Mr.
ChiefJusticeMarshall,inthecelebratedcaseofMarburyvs.Madison.23
xxxxxxxxx
Theanswertothisquestionseemsanobviousone.TheappointmentbeingthesoleactofthePresident,
mustbecompletelyevidenced,whenitisshownthathehasdoneeverythingtobeperformedbyhim.
xxxxxxxxx
Somepointoftimemustbetakenwhenthepoweroftheexecutiveoveranofficer,notremovableathis
will must cease. That point of time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised.Andthispowerhasbeenexercisedwhenthelastact,requiredfromthepersonpossessing
thepower,hasbeenperformed.....
xxxxxxxxx
But having once made the appointment, his (the President's) power over the office is terminated in all
cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person
appointed,andhehastheabsolute,unconditionalpowerofacceptingorrejectingit.
xxxxxxxxx
THE"APPOINTMENT"OFPETITIONERBAUTISTAON14JANUARY1989
ItisrespondentCommission'ssubmissionthatthePresident,aftertheappointmentof17December1988extended
to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend another appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista, this time,
submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
Andyet,itseemsobviousenough,bothinlogicandinfact,thatnoneworfurtherappointmentcouldbemadetoa
positionalreadyfilledbyapreviouslycompletedappointmentwhichhadbeenacceptedbytheappointee,througha
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validqualificationandassumptionofitsduties.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16,Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court
perceivesit,liesinthesuggestionthatthePresident(withCongressagreeing)may,fromtimetotimemove power
boundaries,intheConstitutiondifferentlyfromwheretheyareplacedbytheConstitution.
The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned
withpowernotpoliticalconvenience,wisdom,exigency,orevennecessity.NeithertheExecutivenortheLegislative
(Commission onAppointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional
intentistostrikeacarefulanddelicatebalance,inthematterofappointmentstopublicoffice,betweenthePresident
andCongress(thelatteractingthroughtheCommissiononAppointments).Totiltonesideortheotherofthescaleis
todisruptoraltersuchbalanceofpower.Inotherwords,totheextentthattheConstitutionhasblockedoffcertain
appointmentsforthePresidenttomakewiththeparticipationoftheCommissiononAppointments,soalsohasthe
ConstitutionmandatedthatthePresidentcanconfernopowerofparticipationintheCommissiononAppointments
overotherappointmentsexclusivelyreservedforherbytheConstitution.Theexerciseofpoliticaloptionsthatfinds
nosupportintheConstitutioncannotbesustained.
Nor can the Commission onAppointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidentialappointments,createpowertoconfirmappointmentsthattheConstitutionhasreservedtothePresident
alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such
appointmenttotheCommissiononAppointmentsandthelatter'sactofconfirmingorrejectingthesame,aredone
withoutorinexcessofjurisdiction.
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN
APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO
VACANCYTOWHICHANAPPOINTMENTCOULDBEMADEON14JANUARY1989
Underthisheading,wewillassume,exgratiaargumenti,thattheExecutivemayvoluntarilyallowtheCommissionon
AppointmentstoexercisethepowerofreviewoveranappointmentotherwisesolelyvestedbytheConstitutioninthe
President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the
positionofChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightswiththeadvicetoherthatbyvirtueofsuchappointment
(not,untilconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments),shecouldqualifyandenterupontheperformanceofher
duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the
Constitution,istobemade,inthefirstplace,withouttheparticipationoftheCommissiononAppointments,wasthen
andthereacompleteandfinishedact,which,upontheacceptancebyBautista,asshownbyhertakingoftheoathof
office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the
subjectofficeon14January1989towhichanappointmentcouldbevalidlymade.Infact,thereisnovacancyinsaid
officetothisday.
Norcanrespondentsimpressivelycontendthatthenewappointmentorreappointmenton14January1989wasan
ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to
appointmentssolelyforthePresidenttomake,i.e.,withouttheparticipationoftheCommissiononAppointments.Ad
interimappointments,bytheirverynatureunderthe1987Constitution,extendonlytoappointmentswherethereview
of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentof Congress but appointments that
areforthePresidentsolelytomake,thatis,withouttheparticipationoftheCommissiononAppointments,cannotbe
adinterimappointments.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163A, 30 JUNE 1987, PROVIDING THAT THE TENURE OF THE CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBERSOFTHECOMMISSIONONHUMANRIGHTSSHALLBEATTHEPLEASUREOFTHEPRESIDENTIS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Respondent Mallillin contends that with or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, petitioner
Bautista, as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, can be removed from said office at anytime, at the
pleasureofthePresidentandthatwiththedisapprovalofBautista'sappointment(nomination)bytheCommissionon
Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal by the President and her replacement with respondent
MallillinThus,accordingtorespondentMallillinthepetitionatbarhasbecomemootandacademic.
Wedonotagreethatthepetitionhasbecomemootandacademic.Toinsistonsuchapostureisakintodeluding
oneself that day is night just because the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive
questionsofconstitutionallawraisedbypetitioner,therecordsclearlyshowthatpetitionercametothisCourtintimely
mannerandhasnotshownanyindicationofabandoningherpetition.
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Reliance is placed by respondent Mallillin on Executive Order No. 163A, 30 June 1987, full text of which is as
follows:
WHEREAS,theConstitutiondoesnotprescribethetermofofficeoftheChairmanandMembersofthe
CommissiononHumanRightsunlikethoseofotherConstitutionalCommissions
NOW,THEREFORE,I,CORAZONC.AQUINO,PresidentofthePhilippines,doherebyorder:
SECTION 1. Section 2, subparagraph (c) of Executive Order No. 163 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
TheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononHumanRightsshallbeappointedbythePresident.
TheirtenureinofficeshallbeatthepleasureofthePresident.
SEC.2.ThisExecutiveOrdershalltakeeffectimmediately.DONEintheCityofManila,this30thdayof
June,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandeightyseven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C.
AQUINO
President
of
the
Philippines
BythePresident:
(Sgd.)JOKERP.ARROYO
ExecutiveSecretary24
PrevioustoExecutiveOrderNo.163A,oron5May1987,ExecutiveOrderNo.163 25wasissuedbythePresident,
Sec.2(c)ofwhichprovides:

Sec.2(c).TheChairmanandtheMembersoftheCommissiononHumanRightsshallbeappointedby
the President for a term of seven years without reappointment.Appointments to any vacancy shall be
onlyfortheunexpiredtermofthepredecessor.
It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights which is seven (7) years without reappointment the later
executiveorder(163A)speaksofthetenureinofficeoftheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononHuman
Rights,whichis"atthepleasureofthePresident."
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office.As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his
concurringopinioninAlbavs.Evangelista,26stated:
Thedistinctionbetween"term"and"tenure"isimportant,for,pursuanttotheConstitution,"noofficeror
employeeintheCivilServicemayberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcause,asprovidedbylaw"(Art.
XII, section 4), and this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make the
tenureofsomeofficialsdependentuponthepleasureofthePresident,byclothingthelatterwithblanket
authoritytoreplaceapublicofficerbeforetheexpirationofhisterm.27
WhenExecutiveOrderNo.163wasissued,theevidentpurposewastocomplywiththeconstitutionalprovisionthat
"thetermofofficeandotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersoftheCommission(onHumanRights)shall
beprovidedbylaw"(Sec.17(2),Art.XIII,1987Constitution).
As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years,
withoutreappointment,asprovidedbyExecutiveOrderNo.163,andconsistentwiththeconstitutionaldesigntogive
theCommissiontheneededindependencetoperformandaccomplishitsfunctionsandduties,thetenureinofficeof
saidChairman(andMembers)cannotbelatermadedependentonthepleasureofthePresident.
NorcanrespondentMallillinfindsupportinthemajorityopinionintheAlba case, supra, because the power of the
President,sustainedtherein,toreplaceapreviouslyappointedvicemayorofRoxasCitygiventheexpressprovision
inSec.8,Rep.ActNo.603(creatingtheCityofRoxas)statingthatthevicemayorshallserveatthepleasureofthe
President,canfindnoapplicationtotheChairmanofanINDEPENDENTOFFICE,creatednotbystatutebutbythe
Constitution itself. Besides, unlike in the Alba case, here the Constitution has decreed that the Chairman and
MembersoftheCommissiononHumanRightsshallhavea"termofoffice."
Indeed,theCourtfindsitextremelydifficulttoconceptualizehowanofficeconceivedandcreatedbytheConstitution
to be independent as the Commission on Human Rightsand vested with the delicate and vital functions of
investigatingviolationsofhumanrights,pinpointingresponsibilityandrecommendingsanctionsaswellasremedial
measurestherefor,cantrulyfunctionwithindependenceandeffectiveness,whenthetenureinofficeofitsChairman
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andMembersismadedependentonthepleasureofthePresident.ExecutiveOrderNo.163A,beingantitheticalto
the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared
unconstitutional.
TheCourtisnotaloneinviewingExecutiveOrderNo.163Aascontainingtheseedsofitsconstitutionaldestruction.
Theproceedingsinthe1986ConstitutionalCommissionclearlypointtoitsbeingplainlyatwarwiththeconstitutional
intentofindependencefortheCommission.Thus
MR. GARCIA (sponsor). Precisely, one of the reasons why it is important for this body to be
constitutionalizedisthefactthatregardlessofwhoisthePresidentorwhoholdstheexecutivepower,
thehumanrightsissueisofsuchimportancethatitshouldbesafeguardedanditshouldbeindependent
ofpoliticalpartiesorpowersthatareactuallyholdingthereinsofgovernment.Ourexperienceduringthe
martial law period made us realize how precious those rights are and, therefore, these must be
safeguardedatalltimes.
xxxxxxxxx
MR. GARCIA. I would like to state this fact: Precisely we do not want the term or the power of the
CommissiononHumanRightstobecoterminouswiththepresident,becausethePresident'spoweris
such that if he appoints a certain commissioner and that commissioner is subject to the President,
therefore, any human rights violations committed under the person's administration will be subject to
presidentialpressure.Thatiswhatwewouldliketoavoidtomaketheprotectionofhumanrightsgo
beyondthefortunesofdifferentpoliticalpartiesoradministrationsinpower.28
xxxxxxxxx
MR. SARMIENTO (sponsor). Yes, Madam President. I conferred with the honorable Chief Justice
Concepcion and retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes and they believe that there should be an independent
Commission on Human Rights free from executive influence because many of the irregularities on
humanrightsviolationsarecommittedbymembersofthearmedforcesandmembersoftheexecutive
branch of the government. So as to insulate this body from political interference, there is a need to
constitutionalizeit.29
xxxxxxxxx
MR. SARMIENTO: On the inquiry on whether there is a need for this to be constitutionalized, I would
refertoapreviousinquirythatthereisstillaneedformakingthisaconstitutionalbodyfreeorinsulated
from interference. I conferred with former Chief Justice Concepcion and the acting chairman of the
PresidentialCommitteeonHumanRights,retiredJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,andtheyareoneinsayingthat
thisbodyshouldbeconstitutionalizedsothatitwillbefreefromexecutivecontrolorinterferences,since
manyoftheabusesarecommittedbythemembersofthemilitaryorthearmedforces.30
xxxxxxxxx
MR.SARMIENTO.Yes,Congresscancreatethisbody,butasIhavesaid,ifweleaveittoCongress,
thiscommissionwillbewithinthereachofpoliticiansandofpublicofficersandthattomeisdangerous.
Weshouldinsulatethisbodyfrompoliticalcontrolandpoliticalinterferencebecauseofthenatureofits
functionstoinvestigateallformsofhumanrightsviolationswhichareprincipallycommittedbymembers
ofthemilitary,bytheArmedForcesofthePhilippines.31
xxxxxxxxx

MR. GARCIA. The critical factor here is political control, and normally, when a body is appointed by
Presidents who may change, the commission must remain above these changes in political control.
Secondly, the other important factor to consider are the armed forces, the police forces which have
tremendous power at their command and, therefore, we would need a commission composed of men
whoalsoarebeyondthereachoftheseforcesandthechangesinpoliticaladministration.32
xxxxxxxxx
MR MONSOD. Yes, It is the committee's position that this proposed special body, in order to function
effectively,mustbeinvestedwithanindependencethatisnecessarynotonlyforitscredibilitybutalso
for the effectiveness of its work. However, we want to make a distinction in this Constitution. May be
what happened was that it was referred to the wrong committee. In the opinion of the committee, this
need not be a commission that is similar to the three constitutional commissions like the COA, the
COMELEC,andtheCivilService.Itneednotbeinthatarticle.33
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xxxxxxxxx
MR.COLAYCO.TheCommissionersearlierobjectionwasthattheOfficeofthePresidentisnotinvolved
intheproject.HowsurearewethatthenextPresidentofthePhilippineswillbesomebodywecantrust?
Remember,evennowthereisagrowingconcernaboutsomeofthebodies,agenciesandcommission
createdbyPresidentAquino.34
xxxxxxxxx

....LeavingtoCongressthecreationoftheCommissiononHumanRightsisgivinglessimportancetoa
trulyfundamentalneedtosetupabodythatwilleffectivelyenforcetherulesdesignedtoupholdhuman
rights.35
PETITIONERBAUTISTAMAYOFCOURSEBEREMOVEDBUTONLYFORCAUSE
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
CommissiononHumanRightsbyvirtueofherappointment,assuch,bythePresidenton17December1988,and
heracceptancethereof,isnottosaythatshecannotberemovedfromofficebeforetheexpirationofherseven(7)
year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process
properlysafeguarded.InthecaseofNASECOvs.NLRC, 36thisCourtheldthatbeforearankandfileemployeeofthe
NASECO,agovernmentownedcorporation,couldbedismissed,shewasentitledtoahearinganddueprocess.Howmuch
more,inthecaseoftheChairmanofaconstitutionallymandatedINDEPENDENTOFFICE,liketheCommissiononHuman
Rights.

IftherearechargesagainstBautistaformisfeasanceormalfeasanceinoffice,chargesmaybefiledagainstherwith
theOmbudsman.Ifhefindsaprimafaciecaseagainsther,thecorrespondinginformationorinformationscanbefiled
withtheSandiganbayanwhichmayinturnorderhersuspensionfromofficewhilethecaseorcasesagainstherare
pendingbeforesaidcourt.37Thisisdueprocessinaction.Thisisthewayofagovernmentoflawsandnotofmen.
AFINALWORD
ItistothecreditofthePresidentthat,indeferencetotheruleoflaw,afterpetitionerBautistahadelevatedhercaseto
thisTribunal,HerExcellencymerelydesignatedanActingChairmanfortheCommissiononHumanRights(pending
decisioninthiscase)insteadofappointinganotherpermanentChairman.Thelattercoursewouldhaveaddedonly
morelegaldifficultiestoanalreadydifficultsituation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondentMallillinenjoininghimfromdismissingorterminatingpersonneloftheCommissiononHumanRightsis
madepermanent.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Bidin,CortesandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
Fernan,C.J.,tooknopart,havingadministeredpetitioner'soathofoffice.
Sarmiento,J.,tooknopart,respondentMallillinismygodson.

SeparateOpinions

GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:DissentingOpinion
WithallduerespectforthecontraryviewofthemajorityintheCourt,Imaintainthatitisaskingtoomuchtoexpecta
constitutionalrulingwhichresultsinabsurdorirrationalconsequencestoeverbecomesettled.
ThePresidentandCongress,theappointeesconcerned,andthegeneralpublicmayintimeaccepttheSarmientoIII
v.MisonrulingbecausethisCourthasthefinalwordonwhatconstitutionalprovisionsaresupposedtomeanbutthe
incongruitywillremainstickingoutlikeasorethumb.SeriousstudentsoftheConstitutionwillcontinuetobedisturbed
untilthemeaningoftheconsentpoweroftheCommissiononAppointmentsisstraightenedouteitherthroughare
examinationofthisCourt'sdecisionoranamendmenttotheConstitution.
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Section16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionconsistsofonlythreesentences.Theofficersspecifiedinthefirstsentence
clearlyrequireconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.Theofficersmentionedinthethirdsentencejustas
clearlydonotrequireconfirmation.Theproblemarealieswiththoseinthesecondsentence.
IsubmitthatweshouldreexaminethethreegroupsofpresidentialappointeesunderthethreesentencesofSection
16.
Thefirstgrouparetheheadsofexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersof
thearmedforcesfromcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentby
theConstitution.ThefirstsentenceofSection16statetheymustbeconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments.
ThethirdgroupareofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongresshasbylawvestedinthePresidentalone.
Theyneednoconfirmation.
Thesecondgroupofpresidentialappointeesare"allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenot
otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." To which group do they
belong?GroupIrequiringconfirmationorGroup3whereconfirmationisnotneeded?
NomatterhowoftenandhowlongIreadthesecondsentenceofSection16,Isimplycannotassociatetheofficers
mentionedthereinasformingpartofthosereferredtointhethirdsentence.
WhyamIconstrainedtoholdthisview?
(1) If the officers in the first group are the only appointees who need confirmation, there would be no need for the
second and third sentences of Section 16.They become superfluous.Any one not falling under an express listing
wouldneednoconfirmation.IthinktheCourtiswrongintreatingtwocarefullycraftedandsignificantprovisionsofthe
fundamentallawassuperfluities.Exceptforthemostcompellingreasons,whichdonotexisthere,noconstitutional
provisionshouldbeconsideredauselesssurplusage.
(2)AsstronglystressedbyJusticeIsaganiCruzhereandinourearlierdissent,themajorityviewresultsintheabsurd
consequence where one of several hundred colonels and naval captains must be confirmed but such important
officersastheGovernoroftheCentralBankwithbroadpowersoverthenation'seconomyandfuturestabilityorthe
ChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightswhoseofficecallsfornolessthanaconstitutionalmandatedonot
havetobescrutinizedbytheCommissiononAppointments.WhyshouldaminorconsultoTimbuktu,Malineedthe
thoroughscrutinyduringtheconfirmationprocesswhiletheUndersecretaryofForeignAffairswhosendshimthere
andwhoexercisescontroloverhisactscanbeappointedbythePresidentalone?WhyshouldweinterpretSection
16 in such a strange and irrational manner when no strained construction is needed to give it a logical and more
traditionalandunderstandablemeaning.?
(3)ThesecondsentenceofSection16startswith,"Heshallalsoappoint...."Wheneverweseetheword"also"ina
sentence,weassociateitwithprecedingsentences,neverwiththedifferentsentencethatfollows.Ontheotherhand,
thethirdsentencespecifies"otherofficerslowerinrank'whoareappointedpursuanttolawbythePresident"alone."
This can only mean that the higher ranking officers in the second sentence must also be appointed with the
concurrenceoftheCommissiononAppointments.WhentheConstitutionrequiresCongresstospecifywhomaybe
appointed by the President alone, we should not add other and higher ranking officers as also appointed by her
alone.ThestrainedinterpretationbytheCourt'smajoritymakestheword"alone"meaninglessiftheofficerstowhom
"alone"isnotappendedarealsoincludedinthethirdgroup.
(4)ThethirdsentenceofSection16requiresapositiveactofCongresswhichvestsanappointmentinthePresident
alone before such an appointment is freed from the scrutiny of the Commission on Appointments. By express
constitutionalmandate,itisCongresswhichdetermineswhodonotneedconfirmation.Underthemajorityrulingof
theCourt,ifCongresscreatesanimportantofficeandrequirestheconsentoftheCommissionbeforeapresidential
appointmenttothatofficeisperfected,sucharequirementwouldbeunconstitutional.IbelievethattheConstitution
wasneverintendedtosorestrictthelawmakingpower.TheCourthasnojurisdictiontolimittheplenarylawmaking
power of the people's elected representatives through an implied and, I must again add, a strained reading of the
plaintextofSection16.Anyrestrictionoflegislativepowermustbecategorical,express,andspecificneverimplied
orforced.
(5)TheConstitutionspecifiesclearlythepresidentialappointeeswhodonotneedconfirmationbytheCommission.
The reason for nonconfirmation is obvious. The members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts and the
OmbudsmanandhisdeputiesarenotconfirmedbecausetheJudicialandBarCouncilscreensnomineesbeforetheir
namesareforwardedtothePresident.TheVicePresidentasacabinetmemberneedsnoconfirmationbecausethe
Constitution says so. He or she is chosen by the nation's entire electorate and is only a breath away from the
Presidency.ThosefallingunderthethirdsentenceofSection16,ArticleVIIdonothavetobeconfirmedbecausethe
ConstitutiongivesCongresstheauthoritytofreelowerrankingofficialswhosepositionsarecreatedbylawfromthat
requirement.IbelievethatweintheCourthavenopowertoaddbyimplicationtothelistofpresidentialappointees
whomtheConstitutioninclearandcategoricalwordsdeclaresasnotneedingconfirmation.
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(6)AsstatedinmydissentinSarmientoIIIv.Mison,theCommissiononAppointmentsisanimportantconstitutional
bodywhichhelpsgivefullerexpressiontothedemocraticprinciplesinherentinourpresidentialformofgovernment.
TherearethosewhowouldrenderinnocuoustheCommission'spowerorperhapsevenmoveforitsabolitionasa
protestagainstwhattheybelieveistoomuchhorsetradingorsectarianpoliticsintheexerciseofitsfunctions.Since
thePresidentisagenuinelylikedandpopularleader,personallyuntouchedbyscandal,whoappearstobemotivated
onlybythesincerestofintentions,thesepeoplewouldwanttheCommissiontoroutinelyrubberstampthosewhom
sheappointstohighoffice.
Unfortunately,wecannothaveonereadingofSection16forpopularPresidentsandanotherinterpretationformore
mediocre disliked, and even abusive or dictatorial ones. Precisely, Section 16 was intended to check abuse or ill
consideredappointmentsbyaPresidentwhobelongstothelatterclass.
ItisnotthejudiciaryandcertainlynottheappointedbureaucracybutCongresswhichtrulyrepresentsthepeople.We
shouldnotexpectCongresstoactonlyastheselflessIdealists,thewellmeaningtechnocrats,thephilosophers,and
the coffeeshop pundits would have it move. The masses of our people are poor and underprivileged, without the
resources or the time to get publicly involved in the intricate workings of Government, and often illinformed or
functionallyilliterate.Thesemassestogetherwiththepropertiedgentryandtheeliteclasscanexpresstheirdivergent
views only through their Senators and Congressmen. Even the buffoons and retardates deserve to have their
interests considered and aired by the people's representatives. In the democracy we have and which we try to
improveupon,theCommissiononAppointmentscannotbeexpectedtofunctionlikeamindlessmachinewithoutany
debatesorevenimperfections.Thediscussionsandwranglings,thedelaysandposturingarepartofthedemocratic
process. They should never be used as arguments to restrict legislative power where the Constitution does not
expresslyprovideforsuchalimitation.
TheCommissiononHumanRightsisaveryimportantoffice.Ourcountryisbesetbywidespreadinsurgency,marked
inequity in the ownership and enjoyment of wealth and political power, and dangerous conflicts arising from
Ideological, ethnic and religious differences.The tendency to use force and violent means against those who hold
oppositeviewsappearsirresistibletotheholdersofbothgovernmentalandrebelfirepower.
ThePresidentisdoublycarefulinthechoiceoftheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights.
Fully aware of the ruling in Sarmiento III v. Mison, she wants the appointments to be a joint responsibility of the
PresidencyandCongress,throughtheCommissiononAppointments.Shewantsamorethoroughscreeningprocess
forthesesensitivepositions.Shewantsonlythebesttosurvivetheprocess.
WhyshouldwetellboththePresidentandCongressthattheyarewrong.?
Again, I fail to see why the captain of a naval boat ordered to fire broadsides against rebel concentrations should
receive greater scrutiny in his appointment than the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission who has infinitely
morepowerandopportunitytobringtherebelliontoajustandsatisfactoryend.
But even if I were to agree with the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling, I would still include the Chairman of the Human
RightsCommissionasoneofthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution"underthe
first sentence of Section 16,Article VII. Certainly, the chairman cannot be appointed by Congress or the Supreme
Court. Neither should we readArticle XIII of the Constitution as classifying the chairman among the lower ranking
officerswhobylawmaybeappointedbytheheadofanexecutivedepartment,agency,commission,orboard.The
Constitutioncreatedtheindependentoffice.ThePresidentwasintendedtoappointitschairman.
I, therefore, regretfully reiterate my dissent from the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling and join in the call for a re
examinationofitsdoctrine.
CRUZ,J.,dissenting:
ThisisasgoodatimeasanytoreexamineourrulinginSarmientov.Mison,whichwasadoptedbytheCourtmore
thanayearagoovertwodissents.ThePresidentofthePhilippineshastakenasecondlookatit,andsotoohasthe
CommissiononAppointmentsrepresentingbothHousesoftheCongressofthePhilippines.Itappearsthattheyare
notexactlycertainnowthatthedecisioninthatcasewascorrectafterall.Ibelieveitwillnotbeamissforustoo,ina
spiritofhumility,toreadtheConstitutionagainonthepossibilitythatwemayhavemisreaditbefore.
TheponenciaassumesthatwewererightthefirsttimeandthattheMisoncaseissettledthereisnoneedtore
examineit.Itthereforeapproachestheproblemathandfromanotherperspectiveandwouldsustainthepetitioneron
anadditionalground.
The theory is that the petitioner's first appointment on 17 December 1988 was valid even if not confirmed,
conformablytoMison,andcouldnotbereplacedwiththesecondappointmenton14January1989becausethere
wasnovacancytofill.Bythisreasoning,theopinionwoulddefinitelyavoidthequestionsquarelypresentedtothe
Court,viz.,whetherornottheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsissubjecttoconfirmationasrequired
now by both the President of the Philippines and the Commission on Appointments. In effect, we are asked to
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reconsidertheMisonrulinginthelightofthissuperveningsignificantalbeitdecidedlynotcontrollingcircumstance.
The majority makes its ratiocination sound so simple, but I find I am unable to agree. I think we must address the
legalquestionfrontallyinsteadoffallingbackonalegalsleightofhandofnowyouseeitnowyoudon't.
Asonewhoneveragreedwiththebisonrulinginthefirstplace,Isuspectthattheseemingdiffidenceinapplyingit
categoricallytothecaseatbarisduetoadegreeofuneasinessoveritscorrectness.Ithinkthisisthereasonanother
justificationhadtobeofferedtobolsterMison.
In my dissent inAlison, I specifically mentioned the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights as among the
important officers who would not have to be confirmed if the majority view were to be followed. By contrast, and
inexplicably,thecolonelinthearmedforceswouldneedconfirmationalthoughheisnotaconstitutionalofficerwith
theseriousresponsibilitiesoftheformer.AlsonottobeconfirmedaretheGovernoroftheCentralBankunlikethe
relatively minor multisectoral representative of the regional consultative commission, and the Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs although the consul, who is his subordinate, would need confirmation. When I pointed to these
incongruous situations, I was told it was not our place to question the wisdom of the Constitution. What I was
questioningwasnotthewisdomoftheConstitutionbutthewisdomofourinterpretationwhichIsaidwouldleadto
absurdconsequences.ButonlyJusticeGutierrezagreedwithme.
Nowthechickenshavecomehometoroost.ThepetitionerasksustounequivocallyapplyourownrulinginAlison,
butweareequivocating.Theponenciawouldsustainthepetitionerbyacircumlocution,suchasitis,asifitdoesnot
thinkMison,willsufficeforitsconclusion.
AsIseeit,thesubmissionofthepetitioner'sappointmenttotheCommissiononAppointmentsisaclearindication
that the President of the Philippines no longer agrees with the Mison, ruling, at least insofar as it applies to the
presentcase.SignificantlytheCommissiononAppointments,whichwasalsoawareofMison,hasasclearlyrejected
itbyactingontheappointment.Thesemeaningfuldevelopmentsmustgiveuspause.Wemayhavecommittedan
errorinMison,whichisbadenough,andmaybepersistinginitnow,whichisworse.
Comingnowtothetheoryofthemajority,IregretIamalsounabletoacceptit.ConsistentwithmyviewinMison,I
submitthatwhatPresidentAquinoextendedtothepetitioneron17December1988wasan adinterimappointment
thatalthoughimmediatelyeffectiveuponacceptancewasstillsubjecttoconfirmation.Icannotagreethatwhenthe
Presidentsaidthepetitionercouldandenterintotheperformanceofherduties,"allthatremainedforBautistatodo
wastorejectoraccepttheappointment."Infact,ontheverydayitwasextended,theadinterim appointment was
submittedbythePresidentofthePhilippinestotheCommissiononAppointments"forconfirmation."
Theponenciasaysthattheappointmentdidnotneedanyconfirmation,beingthesoleactofthePresidentunderthe
Mison ruling. That would have settled the question quite conclusively, but the opinion goes on to argue another
justification that I for one find unnecessary, not to say untenable. I sense here a palpable effort to bolster Mison
becauseoftheapprehensionthatitisfallingapart.
Ofcourse,therewasnovacancywhenthenominationwasmadeon14January1989.Thereisnoquestionthatthe
petitionerwasstillvalidlyholdingtheofficebyvirtueofheradinterimappointmenttheretoon17December1988.The
nomination made later was unnecessary because the ad interim appointment was still effective. When the
CommissiononAppointmentssentthepetitionerthelettersdated9January1989and10January1989requiringher
tosubmitcertaindataandinvitinghertoappearbeforeit,itwasactingnotonthenominationbutontheadinterim
appointment. What was disapproved was the ad interim appointment, not the nomination. The nomination of 14
January1989isnotinissueinthiscase.Itisentirelyimmaterial.Atbest,itisimportantonlyasanaffirmationofthe
President'sacknowledgmentthattheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsmustbeconfirmedunderArticle
VII,Section16oftheConstitution.
Itdoesnotfollow,ofcourse,thatsimplybecausethePresidentofthePhilippineshaschangedhermind,andwiththe
expressed support of the Commission onAppointments, we should docilely submit and reverse Mison.That is not
howdemocracyworks.TheCourtisindependent.Idosuggest,however,thatthemajoritycouldhaveerredinthat
caseandthattheleastwecandonowistotakeamorecarefullookatthedecision.Letuscheckourbearingsto
makesurewehavenotgoneastray.ThatisallIask
I repeat my view that the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is subject to confirmation by the
CommissiononAppointments,forthereasonsstatedinmydissentinMisonAccordingly,IvotetoDENYthepetition.
GRIOAQUINO,J.:dissenting:
I believe that the appointments of the chairman and the members of the Commission on Human Rights by the
PresidentrequirereviewandconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointmentsinviewofthefollowingprovisionof
Section16,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
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officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution....
In my view, the "other officers" whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution are the
constitutionalofficers,meaningthosewhoholdofficescreatedundertheConstitution,andwhoseappointmentsare
not otherwise provided for in the Charter. Those constitutional officers are the chairmen and members of the
ConstitutionalCommissions,namely:theCivilServiceCommission(Art.IXB),theCommissiononElections(Art.IX
C),theCommissiononAuditArt.IXD),andtheCommissiononHumanRights(Sec.17,XIII).Theseconstitutional
commissions are, without excaption, declared to be "independent," but while in the case of the Civil Service
Commission,theCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit,the1987Constitutionexpresslyprovides
that"theChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommission
onAppointments" (Sec. 1[2],Art. IXB Sec. 1[2],Art. IX C and Sec. 1[2],Art. IXD), no such clause is found in
Section17,ArticleVIIIcreatingtheCommissiononHumanRights.Itsabsence,however,doesnotdetractfrom,or
diminish,thePresident'spowertoappointtheChairmanandCommissionersofthesaidCommission.Thesourceof
thatpoweristhefirstsentenceofSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionfor:
(1)theCommissiononHumanRightsisanofficecreatedbytheConstitution,and
(2)theappointmentoftheChairmanandCommissionersthereofisvestedinthePresidentbytheConstitution.
Therefore, the said appointments shall be made by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments,asprovidedinSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.
Itisnotquitecorrecttoargue,asthepetitionerdoes,thatthepoweroftheCommissiononAppointmentstoreview
andconfirmappointmentsmadebythePresidentisa"derogationoftheChiefExecutive'sappointingpower."That
powerisgiventotheCommissiononAppointmentsaspartofthesystemofchecksandbalancesinthedemocratic
formofgovernmentprovidedforinourConstitution.Asstatedbyarespectedconstitutionalauthority,formerU.P.Law
DeanandPresidentVicenteG.Sinco:
The function of confirming appointments is part of the power of appointment itself. It is, therefore,
executiveratherthanlegislativeinnature.Ingivingthispowertoanorganofthelegislativedepartment,
theConstitutionmerelyprovidesadetailintheschemeofchecksandbalancesbetweentheexecutive
andlegislativeorgansofthegovernment.(Phil.PoliticalLawbySinco,11thed.,p.266).
WHEREFORE,Ivotetodismissthepetition.
Medialdea,J.,dissenting:

SeparateOpinions
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:DissentingOpinion
WithallduerespectforthecontraryviewofthemajorityintheCourt,Imaintainthatitisaskingtoomuchtoexpecta
constitutionalrulingwhichresultsinabsurdorirrationalconsequencestoeverbecomesettled.
ThePresidentandCongress,theappointeesconcerned,andthegeneralpublicmayintimeaccepttheSarmientoIII
v.MisonrulingbecausethisCourthasthefinalwordonwhatconstitutionalprovisionsaresupposedtomeanbutthe
incongruitywillremainstickingoutlikeasorethumb.SeriousstudentsoftheConstitutionwillcontinuetobedisturbed
untilthemeaningoftheconsentpoweroftheCommissiononAppointmentsisstraightenedouteitherthroughare
examinationofthisCourt'sdecisionoranamendmenttotheConstitution.
Section16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionconsistsofonlythreesentences.Theofficersspecifiedinthefirstsentence
clearlyrequireconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.Theofficersmentionedinthethirdsentencejustas
clearlydonotrequireconfirmation.Theproblemarealieswiththoseinthesecondsentence.
IsubmitthatweshouldreexaminethethreegroupsofpresidentialappointeesunderthethreesentencesofSection
16.
Thefirstgrouparetheheadsofexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersof
thearmedforcesfromcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentby
theConstitution.ThefirstsentenceofSection16statetheymustbeconfirmedbytheCommissiononAppointments.
ThethirdgroupareofficerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentsCongresshasbylawvestedinthePresidentalone.
Theyneednoconfirmation.
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Thesecondgroupofpresidentialappointeesare"allotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenot
otherwiseprovidedforbylawandthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."Towhichgroupdothey
belong?GroupIrequiringconfirmationorGroup3whereconfirmationisnotneeded?
NomatterhowoftenandhowlongIreadthesecondsentenceofSection16,Isimplycannotassociatetheofficers
mentionedthereinasformingpartofthosereferredtointhethirdsentence.
WhyamIconstrainedtoholdthisview?
(1)Iftheofficersinthefirstgrouparetheonlyappointeeswhoneedconfirmation,therewouldbenoneedforthe
secondandthirdsentencesofSection16.Theybecomesuperfluous.Anyonenotfallingunderanexpresslisting
wouldneednoconfirmation.IthinktheCourtiswrongintreatingtwocarefullycraftedandsignificantprovisionsofthe
fundamentallawassuperfluities.Exceptforthemostcompellingreasons,whichdonotexisthere,noconstitutional
provisionshouldbeconsideredauselesssurplusage.
(2)AsstronglystressedbyJusticeIsaganiCruzhereandinourearlierdissent,themajorityviewresultsintheabsurd
consequencewhereoneofseveralhundredcolonelsandnavalcaptainsmustbeconfirmedbutsuchimportant
officersastheGovernoroftheCentralBankwithbroadpowersoverthenation'seconomyandfuturestabilityorthe
ChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightswhoseofficecallsfornolessthanaconstitutionalmandatedonot
havetobescrutinizedbytheCommissiononAppointments.WhyshouldaminorconsultoTimbuktu,Malineedthe
thoroughscrutinyduringtheconfirmationprocesswhiletheUndersecretaryofForeignAffairswhosendshimthere
andwhoexercisescontroloverhisactscanbeappointedbythePresidentalone?WhyshouldweinterpretSection
16insuchastrangeandirrationalmannerwhennostrainedconstructionisneededtogiveitalogicalandmore
traditionalandunderstandablemeaning.?
(3)ThesecondsentenceofSection16startswith,"Heshallalsoappoint...."Wheneverweseetheword"also"ina
sentence,weassociateitwithprecedingsentences,neverwiththedifferentsentencethatfollows.Ontheotherhand,
thethirdsentencespecifies"otherofficerslowerinrank'whoareappointedpursuanttolawbythePresident"alone."
Thiscanonlymeanthatthehigherrankingofficersinthesecondsentencemustalsobeappointedwiththe
concurrenceoftheCommissiononAppointments.WhentheConstitutionrequiresCongresstospecifywhomaybe
appointedbythePresidentalone,weshouldnotaddotherandhigherrankingofficersasalsoappointedbyher
alone.ThestrainedinterpretationbytheCourt'smajoritymakestheword"alone"meaninglessiftheofficerstowhom
"alone"isnotappendedarealsoincludedinthethirdgroup.
(4)ThethirdsentenceofSection16requiresapositiveactofCongresswhichvestsanappointmentinthePresident
alonebeforesuchanappointmentisfreedfromthescrutinyoftheCommissiononAppointments.Byexpress
constitutionalmandate,itisCongresswhichdetermineswhodonotneedconfirmation.Underthemajorityrulingof
theCourt,ifCongresscreatesanimportantofficeandrequirestheconsentoftheCommissionbeforeapresidential
appointmenttothatofficeisperfected,sucharequirementwouldbeunconstitutional.IbelievethattheConstitution
wasneverintendedtosorestrictthelawmakingpower.TheCourthasnojurisdictiontolimittheplenarylawmaking
powerofthepeople'selectedrepresentativesthroughanimpliedand,Imustagainadd,astrainedreadingofthe
plaintextofSection16.Anyrestrictionoflegislativepowermustbecategorical,express,andspecificneverimplied
orforced.
(5)TheConstitutionspecifiesclearlythepresidentialappointeeswhodonotneedconfirmationbytheCommission.
Thereasonfornonconfirmationisobvious.ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtandalllowercourtsandthe
OmbudsmanandhisdeputiesarenotconfirmedbecausetheJudicialandBarCouncilscreensnomineesbeforetheir
namesareforwardedtothePresident.TheVicePresidentasacabinetmemberneedsnoconfirmationbecausethe
Constitutionsaysso.Heorsheischosenbythenation'sentireelectorateandisonlyabreathawayfromthe
Presidency.ThosefallingunderthethirdsentenceofSection16,ArticleVIIdonothavetobeconfirmedbecausethe
ConstitutiongivesCongresstheauthoritytofreelowerrankingofficialswhosepositionsarecreatedbylawfromthat
requirement.IbelievethatweintheCourthavenopowertoaddbyimplicationtothelistofpresidentialappointees
whomtheConstitutioninclearandcategoricalwordsdeclaresasnotneedingconfirmation.
(6)AsstatedinmydissentinSarmientoIIIv.Mison,theCommissiononAppointmentsisanimportantconstitutional
bodywhichhelpsgivefullerexpressiontothedemocraticprinciplesinherentinourpresidentialformofgovernment.
TherearethosewhowouldrenderinnocuoustheCommission'spowerorperhapsevenmoveforitsabolitionasa
protestagainstwhattheybelieveistoomuchhorsetradingorsectarianpoliticsintheexerciseofitsfunctions.Since
thePresidentisagenuinelylikedandpopularleader,personallyuntouchedbyscandal,whoappearstobemotivated
onlybythesincerestofintentions,thesepeoplewouldwanttheCommissiontoroutinelyrubberstampthosewhom
sheappointstohighoffice.
Unfortunately,wecannothaveonereadingofSection16forpopularPresidentsandanotherinterpretationformore
mediocredisliked,andevenabusiveordictatorialones.Precisely,Section16wasintendedtocheckabuseorill
consideredappointmentsbyaPresidentwhobelongstothelatterclass.
ItisnotthejudiciaryandcertainlynottheappointedbureaucracybutCongresswhichtrulyrepresentsthepeople.We
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shouldnotexpectCongresstoactonlyastheselflessIdealists,thewellmeaningtechnocrats,thephilosophers,and
thecoffeeshoppunditswouldhaveitmove.Themassesofourpeoplearepoorandunderprivileged,withoutthe
resourcesorthetimetogetpubliclyinvolvedintheintricateworkingsofGovernment,andoftenillinformedor
functionallyilliterate.Thesemassestogetherwiththepropertiedgentryandtheeliteclasscanexpresstheirdivergent
viewsonlythroughtheirSenatorsandCongressmen.Eventhebuffoonsandretardatesdeservetohavetheir
interestsconsideredandairedbythepeople'srepresentatives.Inthedemocracywehaveandwhichwetryto
improveupon,theCommissiononAppointmentscannotbeexpectedtofunctionlikeamindlessmachinewithoutany
debatesorevenimperfections.Thediscussionsandwranglings,thedelaysandposturingarepartofthedemocratic
process.TheyshouldneverbeusedasargumentstorestrictlegislativepowerwheretheConstitutiondoesnot
expresslyprovideforsuchalimitation.
TheCommissiononHumanRightsisaveryimportantoffice.Ourcountryisbesetbywidespreadinsurgency,marked
inequityintheownershipandenjoymentofwealthandpoliticalpower,anddangerousconflictsarisingfrom
Ideological,ethnicandreligiousdifferences.Thetendencytouseforceandviolentmeansagainstthosewhohold
oppositeviewsappearsirresistibletotheholdersofbothgovernmentalandrebelfirepower.
ThePresidentisdoublycarefulinthechoiceoftheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononHumanRights.
FullyawareoftherulinginSarmientoIIIv.Mison,shewantstheappointmentstobeajointresponsibilityofthe
PresidencyandCongress,throughtheCommissiononAppointments.Shewantsamorethoroughscreeningprocess
forthesesensitivepositions.Shewantsonlythebesttosurvivetheprocess.
WhyshouldwetellboththePresidentandCongressthattheyarewrong.?
Again,Ifailtoseewhythecaptainofanavalboatorderedtofirebroadsidesagainstrebelconcentrationsshould
receivegreaterscrutinyinhisappointmentthantheChairmanoftheHumanRightsCommissionwhohasinfinitely
morepowerandopportunitytobringtherebelliontoajustandsatisfactoryend.
ButevenifIweretoagreewiththeSarmientoIIIv.Misonruling,IwouldstillincludetheChairmanoftheHuman
RightsCommissionasoneofthe"otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution"underthe
firstsentenceofSection16,ArticleVII.Certainly,thechairmancannotbeappointedbyCongressortheSupreme
Court.NeithershouldwereadArticleXIIIoftheConstitutionasclassifyingthechairmanamongthelowerranking
officerswhobylawmaybeappointedbytheheadofanexecutivedepartment,agency,commission,orboard.The
Constitutioncreatedtheindependentoffice.ThePresidentwasintendedtoappointitschairman.
I,therefore,regretfullyreiteratemydissentfromtheSarmientoIIIv.Misonrulingandjoininthecallforare
examinationofitsdoctrine.
CRUZ,J.,dissenting:
ThisisasgoodatimeasanytoreexamineourrulinginSarmientov.Mison,whichwasadoptedbytheCourtmore
thanayearagoovertwodissents.ThePresidentofthePhilippineshastakenasecondlookatit,andsotoohasthe
CommissiononAppointmentsrepresentingbothHousesoftheCongressofthePhilippines.Itappearsthattheyare
notexactlycertainnowthatthedecisioninthatcasewascorrectafterall.Ibelieveitwillnotbeamissforustoo,ina
spiritofhumility,toreadtheConstitutionagainonthepossibilitythatwemayhavemisreaditbefore.
TheponenciaassumesthatwewererightthefirsttimeandthattheMisoncaseissettledthereisnoneedtore
examineit.Itthereforeapproachestheproblemathandfromanotherperspectiveandwouldsustainthepetitioneron
anadditionalground.
Thetheoryisthatthepetitioner'sfirstappointmenton17December1988wasvalidevenifnotconfirmed,
conformablytoMison,andcouldnotbereplacedwiththesecondappointmenton14January1989becausethere
wasnovacancytofill.Bythisreasoning,theopinionwoulddefinitelyavoidthequestionsquarelypresentedtothe
Court,viz.,whetherornottheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsissubjecttoconfirmationasrequired
nowbyboththePresidentofthePhilippinesandtheCommissiononAppointments.Ineffect,weareaskedto
reconsidertheMisonrulinginthelightofthissuperveningsignificantalbeitdecidedlynotcontrollingcircumstance.
Themajoritymakesitsratiocinationsoundsosimple,butIfindIamunabletoagree.Ithinkwemustaddressthe
legalquestionfrontallyinsteadoffallingbackonalegalsleightofhandofnowyouseeitnowyoudon't.
Asonewhoneveragreedwiththebisonrulinginthefirstplace,Isuspectthattheseemingdiffidenceinapplyingit
categoricallytothecaseatbarisduetoadegreeofuneasinessoveritscorrectness.Ithinkthisisthereasonanother
justificationhadtobeofferedtobolsterMison.
InmydissentinAlison,IspecificallymentionedtheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsasamongthe
importantofficerswhowouldnothavetobeconfirmedifthemajorityviewweretobefollowed.Bycontrast,and
inexplicably,thecolonelinthearmedforceswouldneedconfirmationalthoughheisnotaconstitutionalofficerwith
theseriousresponsibilitiesoftheformer.AlsonottobeconfirmedaretheGovernoroftheCentralBankunlikethe
relativelyminormultisectoralrepresentativeoftheregionalconsultativecommission,andtheUndersecretaryof
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ForeignAffairsalthoughtheconsul,whoishissubordinate,wouldneedconfirmation.WhenIpointedtothese
incongruoussituations,IwastolditwasnotourplacetoquestionthewisdomoftheConstitution.WhatIwas
questioningwasnotthewisdomoftheConstitutionbutthewisdomofourinterpretationwhichIsaidwouldleadto
absurdconsequences.ButonlyJusticeGutierrezagreedwithme.
Nowthechickenshavecomehometoroost.ThepetitionerasksustounequivocallyapplyourownrulinginAlison,
butweareequivocating.Theponenciawouldsustainthepetitionerbyacircumlocution,suchasitis,asifitdoesnot
thinkMison,willsufficeforitsconclusion.
AsIseeit,thesubmissionofthepetitioner'sappointmenttotheCommissiononAppointmentsisaclearindication
thatthePresidentofthePhilippinesnolongeragreeswiththeMison,ruling,atleastinsofarasitappliestothe
presentcase.SignificantlytheCommissiononAppointments,whichwasalsoawareofMison,hasasclearlyrejected
itbyactingontheappointment.Thesemeaningfuldevelopmentsmustgiveuspause.Wemayhavecommittedan
errorinMison,whichisbadenough,andmaybepersistinginitnow,whichisworse.
Comingnowtothetheoryofthemajority,IregretIamalsounabletoacceptit.ConsistentwithmyviewinMison,I
submitthatwhatPresidentAquinoextendedtothepetitioneron17December1988wasanadinterimappointment
thatalthoughimmediatelyeffectiveuponacceptancewasstillsubjecttoconfirmation.Icannotagreethatwhenthe
Presidentsaidthepetitionercouldandenterintotheperformanceofherduties,"allthatremainedforBautistatodo
wastorejectoraccepttheappointment."Infact,ontheverydayitwasextended,theadinterimappointmentwas
submittedbythePresidentofthePhilippinestotheCommissiononAppointments"forconfirmation."
Theponenciasaysthattheappointmentdidnotneedanyconfirmation,beingthesoleactofthePresidentunderthe
Misonruling.Thatwouldhavesettledthequestionquiteconclusively,buttheopiniongoesontoargueanother
justificationthatIforonefindunnecessary,nottosayuntenable.IsensehereapalpableefforttobolsterMison
becauseoftheapprehensionthatitisfallingapart.
Ofcourse,therewasnovacancywhenthenominationwasmadeon14January1989.Thereisnoquestionthatthe
petitionerwasstillvalidlyholdingtheofficebyvirtueofheradinterimappointmenttheretoon17December1988.The
nominationmadelaterwasunnecessarybecausetheadinterimappointmentwasstilleffective.Whenthe
CommissiononAppointmentssentthepetitionerthelettersdated9January1989and10January1989requiringher
tosubmitcertaindataandinvitinghertoappearbeforeit,itwasactingnotonthenominationbutontheadinterim
appointment.Whatwasdisapprovedwastheadinterimappointment,notthenomination.Thenominationof14
January1989isnotinissueinthiscase.Itisentirelyimmaterial.Atbest,itisimportantonlyasanaffirmationofthe
President'sacknowledgmentthattheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsmustbeconfirmedunderArticle
VII,Section16oftheConstitution.
Itdoesnotfollow,ofcourse,thatsimplybecausethePresidentofthePhilippineshaschangedhermind,andwiththe
expressedsupportoftheCommissiononAppointments,weshoulddocilelysubmitandreverseMison.Thatisnot
howdemocracyworks.TheCourtisindependent.Idosuggest,however,thatthemajoritycouldhaveerredinthat
caseandthattheleastwecandonowistotakeamorecarefullookatthedecision.Letuscheckourbearingsto
makesurewehavenotgoneastray.ThatisallIask
IrepeatmyviewthattheChairmanoftheCommissiononHumanRightsissubjecttoconfirmationbythe
CommissiononAppointments,forthereasonsstatedinmydissentinMisonAccordingly,IvotetoDENYthepetition.
GRIOAQUINO,J.:dissenting:
IbelievethattheappointmentsofthechairmanandthemembersoftheCommissiononHumanRightsbythe
PresidentrequirereviewandconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointmentsinviewofthefollowingprovisionof
Section16,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution:
SEC.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,
appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,or
officersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose
appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution....
Inmyview,the"otherofficers"whoseappointmentsarevestedinthePresidentintheConstitutionarethe
constitutionalofficers,meaningthosewhoholdofficescreatedundertheConstitution,andwhoseappointmentsare
nototherwiseprovidedforintheCharter.Thoseconstitutionalofficersarethechairmenandmembersofthe
ConstitutionalCommissions,namely:theCivilServiceCommission(Art.IXB),theCommissiononElections(Art.IX
C),theCommissiononAuditArt.IXD),andtheCommissiononHumanRights(Sec.17,XIII).Theseconstitutional
commissionsare,withoutexcaption,declaredtobe"independent,"butwhileinthecaseoftheCivilService
Commission,theCommissiononElectionsandtheCommissiononAudit,the1987Constitutionexpresslyprovides
that"theChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommission
onAppointments"(Sec.1[2],Art.IXBSec.1[2],Art.IXCandSec.1[2],Art.IXD),nosuchclauseisfoundin
Section17,ArticleVIIIcreatingtheCommissiononHumanRights.Itsabsence,however,doesnotdetractfrom,or
diminish,thePresident'spowertoappointtheChairmanandCommissionersofthesaidCommission.Thesourceof
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thatpoweristhefirstsentenceofSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionfor:
(1)theCommissiononHumanRightsisanofficecreatedbytheConstitution,and
(2)theappointmentoftheChairmanandCommissionersthereofisvestedinthePresidentbytheConstitution.
Therefore,thesaidappointmentsshallbemadebythePresidentwiththeconsentoftheCommissionon
Appointments,asprovidedinSection16,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.
Itisnotquitecorrecttoargue,asthepetitionerdoes,thatthepoweroftheCommissiononAppointmentstoreview
andconfirmappointmentsmadebythePresidentisa"derogationoftheChiefExecutive'sappointingpower."That
powerisgiventotheCommissiononAppointmentsaspartofthesystemofchecksandbalancesinthedemocratic
formofgovernmentprovidedforinourConstitution.Asstatedbyarespectedconstitutionalauthority,formerU.P.Law
DeanandPresidentVicenteG.Sinco:
Thefunctionofconfirmingappointmentsispartofthepowerofappointmentitself.Itis,therefore,
executiveratherthanlegislativeinnature.Ingivingthispowertoanorganofthelegislativedepartment,
theConstitutionmerelyprovidesadetailintheschemeofchecksandbalancesbetweentheexecutive
andlegislativeorgansofthegovernment.(Phil.PoliticalLawbySinco,11thed.,p.266).
WHEREFORE,Ivotetodismissthepetition.
Medialdea,J.,dissenting:
Footnotes
1G.R.No.79974,17December1987,156SCRA549.
2SeeSection2(B),Section2(C),andSection2(D),ArticleIX,1987Constitution.
3AnnexA,Petition,Rollo,p.8.
4Sec.17(l),Art.XIII,1987Constitution.
5AnnexB,Petition,Rollo,p.9.
6AnnexC,Petition,Rollo,p.10.
7AnnexD,Petition,Rollo,p.1113.
8AnnexD1,Petition,Rollo,p.14.
9AnnexE,Petition,Rollo,pp.1516.
10Emphasissupplied.
11Annex1,Commission'scomment,Rollo,p.53.
12Annex2,Commission'scomment,Rollo,p.54.
13Annex3,Commission'scomment,Rollo,p.55.
14Rollo,p.5.
15Rollo,pp.56.
16Resolutionof2February1989,Rollo,p.17.
17Resolutionof9February1989,Rollo,p.92.
18Rollo,pp.145150.
19Rollo,pp.100144.
20Rollo,pp.153183.
21Resolutionof28February1989,Rollo,p.183A.
22Rollo,pp.189201.
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231Cranch60,2LawEd.,U.S.58.
24OfficialGazette,Vol.83,July29,1987,p.3307.
25OfficialGazette,Vol.83,May11,1987,p.2270.
26100Phil.at683.
27100Phil.at694.
28Recordofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.3,August26,1986,p.718.
29Ibid.,P.728.
30Ibid.,P.730.
31Ibid.,P.734.
32Ibid.,P.737.
33Ibid.,p.743.
34Ibid.,p.747.
35Ibid.,p.748.
36G.R.No.69870,Nasecovs.NLRC:G.R.No.70295,EugeniaC.Credovs.NLRC,29November
1988.
37Sec.13,Rep.ActNo.3019PeopleofthePhilippinesvs.Hon.RodolfoB.Albano,G.R.No.L
4537677,July26,1988Lucianovs,ProvincialGovernor,20SCRA516.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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