Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
The shifting balance of economic power is also beginning to be seen globally, where
Chinas economic presence in Africa, Latin America and Europe also challenges the
long-standing economic primacy of the United States. Chinas growing global
economic and political role will also begin to reshape international norms, rules and
institutions. It will reverberate across geopolitics, global trade, investment, capital
flows, reserve currency status, climate change, other environmental challenges and
global people movements. And it will also influence the great questions of war and
peace in the decades ahead.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
Americans offer their own variations on the same theme concerning Chinese mirror
imaging. Nonetheless, the report argues that Chinese leaders have begun to form a
worrying consensus on what they believe to be the core elements of U.S. strategy
towards China, despite Washingtons protestations to the contrary. These are
reflected in the following five-point consensus circulated among the Chinese
leadership during 2014, summarizing internal conclusions about U.S. strategic
intentions: To isolate China; To contain China; To diminish China; To internally
divide China; and To sabotage Chinas leadership. While these conclusions sound
Climate Change
NO INHERENCY ALREADY WORKING BILATERALLY
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044
In the often fractious U.S.-China relationship, climate change has emerged as one of
the few areas of genuine bilateral cooperation. Both countries have developed a
long list of cooperative ventures in areas such as clean coal technology and electric
grid development and have adopted side-by-side pledges to reduce carbon
emissions (albeit at different paces and scales) with an eye toward providing
momentum to global climate change negotiations. To build upon this foundation of
cooperation, the two leaders should focus on the following three areas:
STUFF TO DO
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Some of the most significant opportunities for tactical cooperation lie beyond the
Asia-Pacific region. The just-completed second round of joint U.S.-China anti-piracy
exercises in the Gulf of Aden is a prime example. Other avenues for beyond-the-
region cooperation could include global sea-lane policing, an issue of great concern
to both nations and for the global energy market more broadly. Closer to home, the
United States and China could work together on joint projects related to climate
security, such as building more resilient infrastructure to protect local communities
from sea-level rise, which is an increasing concern in both nations. The two
countries should also expand the mechanisms for U.S.- China cooperation on shortlived climate forcerssuch as hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs; black carbon; and
methaneand work together on the research and development of alternatives to
global warming substances. Moreover, there is now the opportunity for the United
States and China to work together to establish and implement environmental best
practices for shale gas development.
Human Rights
HUMAN RIGHTS KEY AFFECT ALL OTHER RELATIONSHIP
FEATURES
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044
As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit, the vexing question
of human rights looms larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the
bilateral relationship like a low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with Chinas rights
record is only matched by Beijings displeasure with Washingtons judgmental
attitude. This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that have
made it difficult leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The
result is that the two countries have struggled to establish the lan and comfort
level required for solving problems where real common interest is shared.
President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not heading in
any teleological direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that
China has its own model of development, one that might be described as Leninist
capitalism, with rather limited protection of individual rights. This is a model with
so-called Chinese characteristics, which, in the world of human rights, means that
China will emphasize collective welfare rights, such as the right to a better
standard of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle, rather than emphasizing individual
rights like freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion.
But if this is the model, then the United States and China are heading in divergent
historical directions. A host of new friction points now center around the
abridgement of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing
restrictions on civil society activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more
heavily censored media, more limited public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press,
and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more burdensome
forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of
governance and values.
https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-us-should-use-dialogue-halt-rightserosion#.VYMERvlVhBc
Since President Xi came into power the Chinese government has redoubled efforts
to criminalize online speech, silence journalists, and to insist that university
lecturers, academic researchers, and Communist Party members adhere to the
leaderships line. Urgent legal reforms have stalled, and the legitimate underlying
grievances of ethnic minorities, religious groups, and other vulnerable communities
have been exacerbated through repression rather than addressed. Draft legislation
on counterterrorism, national security, and the management of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reflect Beijings growing hostility domestically
and internationally towards independent civil society, the freedoms of association
and expression, and the rule of law. The worsening human rights environment and
the extraordinary damage done to Chinas civil society should be given greater
prominence in the bilateral relationship.
We share the US governments assessment that the human rights environment in
China is deteriorating. We appreciate US advocacy in pushing back against the draft
foreign NGO law and in support of human rights defenders in China, including the
five feminists detained this past spring for their planned advocacy around sexual
harassment.
https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-us-should-use-dialogue-halt-rightserosion#.VYMERvlVhBc
Publicly call for the release of individuals imprisoned for doing nothing more than
peacefully exercising their rights; doing so may bring them a degree of protection in
detention and will certainly bring their families a modicum of hope. We are aware
that there aredisturbinglythousands of cases from which to choose; we suggest
you prioritize those who represent particular communities targeted for reprisals,
including political reform advocate and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
prominent Uighur economist Ilham Tohti, Tibetan Buddhist leader Tenzin Delek
Rinpoche, veteran journalist Gao Yu, human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, and house
church Pastor Yang Rongli. As China has increasingly asked the US for assistance in
returning to China allegedly corrupt officials who have fled to the US, we hope that
US officials have on those occasions rejected such cooperation unless and until
individuals such as these activists are freed and able exercise their rights peacefully
inside China.
U.S. and Chinese officials may have struck conciliatory tones at high-level talks this
week amid festering mutual mistrust, but their annual bickering over human rights
has resumed unabated.
A day after the U.S. State Department issued global human-rights scorecards that
included criticism of China, Beijing offered a scathing rejoinder that accused
Washington of showing not a bit of regret for or intention to improve its own
terrible human rights record.
Plenty of facts show that, in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights
defender, saw no improvements in its existent human rights issues, but reported
numerous new problems, said the Chinese report, published Friday by the
information office of Chinas State Council, the countrys Cabinet. While its own
human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights in
other countries in a more brazen manner.
Americas record remained blotted by rampant gun crime, racial discrimination, the
pernicious influence of money in politics, widening income and social inequality, and
state infringements of individual privacy, according to the State Councils latest
yearly assessment. Americas record remained blotted by rampant gun crime, racial
discrimination, the pernicious influence of money in politics, widening income and
social inequality, and state infringements of individual privacy, according to the
State Councils latest yearly assessment.
Beijings diminishing tolerance for activism and dissent since Mr. Xi took power
more than two years ago.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/26/china-issues-report-on-terrible-u-shuman-rights-record/
China has also been quick to point out what it describes as U.S. hypocrisy on human
rights. In its latest assessment, the State Council took particular aim at institutional
discrimination against ethnic minorities in the U.S., citing recent high-profile police
killings of black citizens that have stirred racial tensions, as well as reports of
disenfranchisement of minority voters in the 2014 mid-term elections.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/26/china-issues-report-on-terrible-u-shuman-rights-record/
For its part, China has long defended its human-rights record by arguing that
individual rights sometimes need to be sacrificed for the more immediate needs of
social stability and economic growth. Just this month, Beijing issued a white paper
on its human rights record, touting its burgeoning television and film industry, legal
reforms and expanding access to public services, among other markers of economic
and social progress.
and other serious problems in the United States are facts now known to all," Hong
told a daily news briefing.
The death of Michael Brown, whose killing sparked the unrest, is a stark reminder
for Uncle Sam that there are a lot of human rights violations on its own soil, says
Chinas official news agency Xinhua.
It should first fix its own problems before criticizing other countries.
Xinhua adds that few other countries are as self-righteous and complacent as the
United States when it comes to human rights issues, but the Ferguson tragedy is
apparently a slap in the face.
you do. A large percentage of them are serving long terms for nonviolent crimes,
especially drug offenses. African-Americans represent only about 13 percent of our
population but more than 40 percent of state and federal prisoners serving time for
drug offenses.
We don't usually think of drug arrests as a human rights violation, but the effects of
our drug policies on families, communities, and entire ethnic groups have been
downright devastating, creating a long-term underclass with minimal access to
education, jobs, and support services. I'm trying to reducing the length and disparity
of drug sentences, and to respect the right of states to decriminalize the sale and
use of marijuana, but I admit I haven't given this matter the attention it deserves.
Within our prisons, mistreatment continues at some institutions, but perhaps no
abuses are worse than widespread and prolonged use of solitary confinement. Tens
of thousands of prisoners are in some form of segregation at any given time. This
incredibly harsh form of punishment is considered by some authorities as a form of
psychological torture. It reflects badly on our country that it remains so widespread,
and looking back I wish I had led greater reforms in this area as well.
This won't come as any revelation, but our criminal justice system especially
penalizes the poor, who cannot afford rising bail costs, and who bear the brunt of
many municipal fines that are designed to raise local revenue. Reforms are taking
place in some jurisdictions following the riots in Ferguson, Missouri, but it remains a
widespread stain on our practice of justice.
The exodus of Syrian refugees to Europe has recently called the world's attention to
the plight of migrants. Our country has little to boast about on that score. In one
recent 12-month period, our customs and border protection forces arrested more
than 68,000 children who fled terrible poverty and violence in Central America and
Mexico.
I confess that my own administration has -- in response to political pressure over
immigration -- greatly increased the number of people detained and deported in
recent years. Even when families have good reason to seek asylum, we treat them
like criminals or national security threats. On the plus side, last year I signed an
executive order to give temporary legal status to more than 400,000 immigrants
who have lived in the United States for five years or more, or have legal children.
Our country is surprisingly backward on some issues of women's rights, including
the right to an abortion and even to contraception. As you know, ongoing struggles
with religious conservatives make these issues extremely contentious. We face a
potential shut-down of our government over the issue of federal funding of Planned
Parenthood clinics which provide basic health services to women -- even though
funding of abortion is already banned.
Finally -- and I could go on with many other issues -- I'm saddened and embarrassed
that at this late stage of my second term in office, the United States still holds more
than 100 prisoners without charge or trial at Guantanamo Bay. I would never have
imagined when I first took office that this blot on our record would remain. I am
pleased to say, on a related matter, that I did end the use of torture when I took
office, though critics still take me to task for not holding anyone accountable for
breaking U.S. and international law relating to this practice.
Why am I telling you all this? Because I know my government can't be credible
when it speaks up about human rights in China or any other country until we take
steps to address our own shortcomings at home. It's a lot easier for me to
righteously condemn your government's mistreatment of dissenters than for me to
look in the mirror at our own misdeeds, but if we aren't willing to do the hard work
of making change happen at home, we won't stand much chance of making change
abroad.
I know that if I just smugly sit here and tick off all the human rights problems in
China, as if we have none in our own land, you will consider me a hypocrite. Our
effective communication will end.
I don't expect any response from you now, but I hope you'll reflect on my words. I
challenge you someday to try a little self-criticism of your own -- not the rote kind
you and your father were subjected to during the Cultural Revolution, but a genuine
kind that leads to self-improvement and improvement of your nation. Thank you.
We hold the view that human rights are universal, and that such rights should not
be replaced or ignored by any government citing internal affairs, nor substituted
with subsistence rights and development rights. Nor shall human rights be
suppressed under the pretense of anti-terrorism and stability maintenance. It is
undeniable that previous China-US Human Rights Dialogues provided platforms for
the two governments to exchange views and drew public attention through the
media. Even so, these Dialogues did not substantially help improve Chinas human
rights situation, which, on the contrary, has deteriorated in the past two years.
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_
Harding.pdf
Despite the tightening of domestic political controls in China over the last several
years, most participants in the current debate place far less emphasis on promoting
human rights and political liberalization in China than there was in the past. None of
the proposals summarized so far argues for an extensive U.S. effort to democratize
China. Some explicitly say that it was always futile, provocative, and even
hypocritical for the United States to give human rights so prominent a place on the
bilateral agenda with China. Lyle Goldstein says flatly that human rights should not
be a major issue in U.S.China relations, and cites Australian analyst Hugh White,
Henry Kissinger, and Michael Swaine as believing that democratization should not
be the main goal of U.S. China policy. Instead, he suggests that a hands-off
approach will make it more difficult for Chinese leaders to discredit domestic
demands for political reform as being directed by the United States.56 The
paradoxical conclusion, then, is the less effort the United States expends, the
greater its chances of success in seeing eventual political liberalization in China
may be.
Similarly, although recommending a fundamentally different strategy toward China
than Goldstein, Blackwill and Tellis also believe that pressing for human rights
through high-level discussions was a waste of time and should be dropped from
future bilateral dialogues.57 And while Steinberg and OHanlon offer a balanced
summary of the debate over the role of human rights in U.S. policy toward China,
they also appear sympathetic to those who call for a non-confrontational approach
and who propose instead to continue dialogues on human rights and the rule of
law to make progress. They conclude that there is no support in any camp for an
active regime change strategy, given Chinas growing power and its economic
importance to the United States.58
The dueling reports were issued just days after senior U.S. and Chinese officials held
annual talks in Washington where the public statements mostly focused on bilateral
cooperation rather than criticism.
China has long complained about U.S. criticism of its rights record, saying such
statements represent inappropriate interference in Beijing's internal affairs. It also
argues it should not be held to the same standards as more developed countries.
That impression is heightened by the sense that America is less strident than it was
in upholding its values of human rights, freedom and democracy. Cynics have
always suspected that these ideals were subject to political exigencies. Last month
they pointed to new evidence of this when the State Department promoted Malaysia
from the bottom tier of countries listed in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP)
report. It insisted this was because Malaysia was indeed cracking down on
traffickers. Most Malaysians (and Thais, whose country was denied a similar
upgrade) saw it as political: under American law a bottom-tier ranking would have
meant that Malaysia would have to be excluded from TPP. The perception that TPP is
so important to America to lead it to such distortions is damaging. It makes it look
as if the stable, transparent and rules-based order Mr Kerry said America was
promoting 70 years on from the war is one where America not only sets the rules,
but twists them when they get in the way.
Two weeks ago, the CAT directly asked why the UNHCR has not been provided access to the border
areas where North Korean asylum-seekers are likely to be found. In the concluding observations that
should be released on December 9, 2015, it would be a solid first step if the Committee recommends
that the government facilitate the UNHCRs presence in the relevant parts of Liaoning and Jilin
provinces and permit the UNHCR to operate there without restrictions or limitations on visas for key
personnel and with security guarantees for staff as well as for vulnerable persons seeking protection.
[15] If those persons applying for refugee status are not really eligible under international refugee and
human rights law, then UNHCR could affirm the position of the Chinese government. If they are
eligible, UNHCR could provide China with the technical assistance and support it needs to provide them
protection. Either way, this would be an enormous boost to Chinas credibility on efforts to address
torture and its human rights commitments more broadly. It is difficult to imagine a reasonable
argument explaining why the UNHCR has been denied access to the Yanbian Autonomous Korean
Prefecture or other areas populated by ethnic Koreans.[16] In reality, none has ever been given. In the
follow-up mechanism of the CAT, several recommendations are selected for particular attention over
the coming year.[17] Perhaps CAT members should consider making the plight of North Koreans in China
the subject of one of those recommendations.
Chinas reaction to criticism of its human rights practice has been nothing short of
hostile. Not only has the Chinese regime dismissed such criticism as a cynical
attempt by the West to meddle in its internal affairs an act which, it is claimed,
represents a serious violation of Chinas national sovereignty but it is also seen as
part of a wider conspiracy by the developed world, in particular the United States,
to contain a resurgent China in an effort to prevent it from assuming its rightful
place in the international community (Guo Qing, 1991, p. 18; GXB, 1991, p. 69; Xi
Laiwang, 1991; Sun Yinghua, 1992; Zhang Mingqian, 1992). The suspension of
bilateral and multilateral aid to China after June 1989, the linking of trade privileges
to Chinas human rights record by the US Congress, and the decision not to allow
Beijing to host the 2000 Olympics are all instances where, in the eyes of the
Chinese government, the West has been guilty of using human rights issues as a
tool of hegemony and power politics.
China said the work of the Council should focus on dialogue, cooperation, technical
assistance and capacity building. Country specific dialogues and mandates were in
opposition with this goal and with the United Nations Charter. Regrettably, the
United States and European countries had made false allegations against countries
of the South, including China. China pointed at human rights problems in the United
States, including torture, police violence and racism. In European countries, bills on
terrorism restricted freedoms, migrants suffered violations, and xenophobia was on
the rise.
http://www.capitalistreview.com/why-america-opposing-human-rights-abuses-by-beijing-wouldbenefit-china/
A campaign to pressure China into stopping its human rights abuses would be to
Beijings long-term benefit. Chinas 4,000-year history may have persuaded it that
order and repression to maintain that order are paramount for organizing a society.
Americas 240-year history, during which the government (with some exceptions)
tolerated and even encouraged dissent, suggests that the exact opposite is true.
China would prosper more than has been the case if it allowed alternate ideas to
enter the marketplace, to compete freely so that the best rises to the top.
However, this does not mean that all is fine in the current international order and its
ethics. Far from it. For we know that the contemporary international order and its
ethics are also a targeta target, especially for not being democratic enough in its
values, or for not being true to its democratic values. Accusations of hypocrisy,
double-standards, self-serving policies, and of national interest primacy over human
rights, particularly directed at major democratic powers, are often mentioned to
express doubts about the ethics of the present international order or the
seriousness of its commitment to progressive ethics.
This is to say that it would be a mistake to remain idle, satisfied with the status quo.
Rather, we should be working on clarifying and improving the moral advantage that
liberal and democratic values continue to lend, despite their problems, to the
current international order and its ethics.
To do so, we have to push forward in at least four directions. First, the gap between
the reality of the current international system and liberal and democratic values has
to be reduced. This entails making international order, its (international) law and its
ethics less captive to the interests of the powerful, including the powerful
democratic countries. Second, the liberal and democratic values supporting a more
inclusive ethics of international order have to be extended and enhanced. Third,
liberal and democratic values have to be called upon at the international level in a
non-righteous way; they should be able to help draw the line between what is right
and what is wrong on the basis of a greater self-awareness. Fourth, the ethics of
international order needs to address better than is the case today the structural
violence, the embedded disparities of power between rich and poor, and the
damages they create.
Econ
WEAK CHINA ECON LEADS TO ADVENTURISM, WAR WITH US
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/07/09/partnership-china-avoid-world-war/
The US government has little to gain and much to lose by treating the relationship
with China as a zero-sum game. In other words it has little bargaining power. It
could, of course, obstruct Chinas progress, but that would be very dangerous.
President Xi Jinping has taken personal responsibility for the economy and national
security. If his market-oriented reforms fail, he may foster some external conflicts to
keep the country united and maintain himself in power. This could lead China to
align itself with Russia not only financially but also politically and militarily. In that
case, should the external conflict escalate into a military confrontation with an ally
of the United States such as Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that we would be
on the threshold of a third world war.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese
national power, on balance we should assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium
to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the period under
review. This takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent
slowing of the rate. It also takes into account lower levels of global demand for
Chinese exports, high levels of domestic debt, the beginning of a demographically
driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high levels of domestic savings, at
EZPZ SOLUTIONS
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
America and China should both continue to take down barriers to job-generating
investment in each others countries. America must continue to provide more
guidance about how Chinese firms can navigate the American regulatory system, as
we discuss below. For its part, China needs to continue to reduce barriers to market
entry, particularly in services. Having more individuals with stakes in each others
economies is stabilizing. Concluding a high-standards Bilateral Investment Treaty
will be an important step.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-waramerica
All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate
domestic crisis. But the Chinese Communist party does face a long-term
legitimation crisis. For decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive
economic growth, which is now slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive
Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a
complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly
educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leaderships crude attempt to
command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King
Canutes confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging.
They can almost certainly keep the lid on for several years but, as always happens
when necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point,
the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card,
perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one of Chinas
Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct
confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation
would be high. With angry, nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the
Chinese nor the American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear
weapons.
This is not idle scaremongering; its something the US military, intelligence and
thinktank communities think about all the time, in order to avoid it.
the past few months is a sign of much deeper problems in the broader
economy. The official growth rate has been knocked down to 7 percent, but few
economists believe the figure, and it is entirely likely that China is already in
stagnation. That means, as trade figures showed, dropping industrial production and
shrinking imports. When the slowdown hits the pocketbooks of Chinas nouveaux
middle class, then social stability will be even more at risk.
The U.S. economy remains resilient and continues to be a major driver of the global
economy. We have seen steady growth in jobs and output, following on swift and
essential financial reforms and strong fiscal and monetary policies in response to
the financial crisis some seven years ago. Yet the U.S. cannot be the only source of
strength. This summers events demonstrate that Chinas economic policies can
have a significant impact on the global economy. While Chinas financial markets
remain domestically focused, a slowdown in its core economy raises concerns about
spillover to other economies, particularly emerging economies.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
Structurally, Chinas rapid growth in the post-Tiananmen era was driven principally
by one-off favorable factors or events, and not by the purported superiority of an
authoritarian state. Among these factors or events, the most important is the
demographic dividend, which provided a seemingly endless supply of cheap and
able-bodied young workers for Chinas industrialization. Besides their low wages,
young migrants from rural areas to urban centers can gain an instant and large
increase in labor productivity simply by virtue of being paired with operating capital,
without need for extensive educational preparation. Consequently, the mere
redeployment of the countrys excess rural labor force to factories, shops, and
construction sites in the cities can make the economy more productive. According to
Chinese data, an urban workers productivity is four times higher than that of a rural
peasant. In the past three decades, about 270 million rural laborers (excluding their
families) have moved to cities and now account for 70 percent of the urban work
force. Some economists estimate that about 20 percent of Chinas GDP growth in
the 1980s and 1990s came from the rural-urban labor relocation.5 But because
Chinas population is aging rapidly and the mass migration from rural to urban areas
has peaked, this one-off favorable structural factor cannot be replicated.
Another one-off positive shock that powered Chinas growth since Tiananmen was
its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In the 1990s Chinas
export growth averaged 15.4 percent per annum, thanks to its integration into the
global economy. But after its entry into the WTO, China achieved annual growth in
exports of 21.7 percent over the period 200208. Export-driven growth began to
slow after 2011. Between 2012 and 2014, export growth averaged 7.1 percent, a
third of the growth in the prior decade. In the first seven months of 2015, exports
contracted around 1 percent, the development that probably prompted Beijing to
devalue its currency.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Chinas long-term economic outlook is the
diminishing return from its investment-driven growth strategy. As a developing
country with relatively low stocks of capital, China initially benefited immensely
from a sustained rise in its investment rate. In the 1980s, China ploughed an
average of 35.8 percent of GDP into factories, infrastructure, and housing. The rate
rose to 42.8 percent on average in the 2000s and has reached 47.3 percent since
2010. Such massive increase in investment, accounting for more half of Chinas GDP
growth, has been the primary engine of economic expansion in the past two and
half decades.
However, investment-driven growth in the Chinese context has had three negative
consequences. One is the diminishing returns on investments, because each
incremental increase in output requires more investment, as measured by capital
output ratio (the amount of investment needed to produce an additional yuan of
GDP). In the 1990s, Chinas capital output ratio was 3.79. In the 2000s, it rose to
4.38. This trendgrowth requiring ever-rising investmentis simply not sustainable.
China is already investing nearly half of its GDP, an extraordinary number made
possible by state control of infrastructure development. The extent of overcapacity
and misallocation of capital are equally extraordinary.
Another harm inflicted on the economy is that investment squeezes out household
consumption (36 percent of GDP in 2013, compared with 60 percent in India),
causing a massive structural imbalance and making sustainable growth impossible.
That sustainable growth must come from moving away from export-led modalities
to domestic market growth, but it cannot set roots with household consumption so
artificially low.
The final cost of Chinas investment-led growth is that much of it has been financed
by credit and ploughed into industrial sectors already plagued with excess capacity.
With debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 280 percent of GDP today (compared with 121
percent in 2000), risks of a full-blown financial crisis have risen because the largest
borrowerslocal governments, state-owned enterprises, and real estate developers
have poor repayment capacity due to a narrow tax base (local governments),
overcapacity and poor profitability (state-owned enterprises), and a deflating
property bubble (real estate developers). If Chinas long-term economic woes are
purely structural, the countrys prospects are not necessarily dire. Effective reforms
could reallocate resources more efficiently to make the economy more productive.
But the success of these reforms critically hinges on the nature of the Chinese state
and its political institutions. Sustained wealth generation can only take place in
states where political power is constrained by the rule of law, private property rights
are effectively protected, and there is wide access to opportunity. In states
dominated by a small ruling elite, the opposite happens: Those in control of political
power become predators, using the coercive instruments of the state to extract
wealth from society, defend their privileges, and impoverish ordinary people.6
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Chinas long-term economic outlook is the
diminishing return from its investment-driven growth strategy. As a developing
country with relatively low stocks of capital, China initially benefited immensely
from a sustained rise in its investment rate. In the 1980s, China ploughed an
average of 35.8 percent of GDP into factories, infrastructure, and housing. The rate
rose to 42.8 percent on average in the 2000s and has reached 47.3 percent since
2010. Such massive increase in investment, accounting for more half of Chinas GDP
growth, has been the primary engine of economic expansion in the past two and
half decades.
If long-term economic stagnation were to set in, the Chinese middle classs support
for the status quo will erode. Co-optation of the fast-growing middle-classanother
key pillar of the CPCs post-Tiananmen survival strategyhas been enabled by the
past quarter centurys economic boom. Chinas secular economic slowdown will
undoubtedly reduce opportunities, curtail expectations, and limit upward mobility
for members of this critical social group, whose acquiescence to the CPCs rule has
been contingent upon its ability to deliver satisfactory and continuous economic
performance.
China-US War
NO US-CHINA WAR FOR THE NEXT 10 YEARS
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/07/09/partnership-china-avoid-world-war/
Indeed, military budgets are rapidly increasing both in Russia and in China, and they
remain at a very high level in the United States. For China, rearmament would be a
surefire way to boost domestic demand. China is already flexing its military muscle in the
South China Sea, operating in a unilateral and often quite belligerent manner, which is
causing justifiable concern in Washington. Nevertheless, it may take a decade or more
until a RussianChinese military alliance would be ready to confront the US directly.
Until then, we may expect a continuation of hybrid warfare and the proliferation of proxy
wars.
CONTAINMENT FAILS
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations
The blueprints for containment drawn from Cold War strategies used by both sides
against an expansionist Soviet Union do not apply to current conditions. The
economy of the Soviet Union was weak (except for military production) and did not
affect the global economy. Once China broke off ties and ejected Soviet advisers,
few countries except those forcibly absorbed into the Soviet orbit had a major stake
in their economic relationship with Moscow. Contemporary China, by contrast, is a
dynamic factor in the world economy. It is a principaltrading partner of all its
neighbors and most of the Western industrialpowers, including the United States. A
prolonged confrontation between China and the United States would alter the world
economy with unsettling consequences for all.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations
Important domestic political considerations are involved for all parties. But if China
and the United States come to regard each others trade-pact efforts as elements in
a strategy of isolation, the Asia-Pacific region could devolve into competing
adversarial power blocs. Ironically, this would be a particular challenge if
China meets frequent American calls to shift from an export-led to a consumptiondriven economy, as its most recent five-year plan contemplates. Such a
development could reduce Chinas stake in the United States as an export market
even as it encourages other Asian countries to further orient their economies
toward China.
UNLIKELY
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
We conclude that while these historical examples can provide us with valuable
lessons, they do not point to inevitable hostility in the U.S.-China relationship.
Moreover, the modern era is different in important ways. Nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of most major powers provide a deterrent. Economic interdependence is
far deeper than at any time before. Threats such as climate change are shared, and
gaining territory is not the key to economic success to the degree that it was in
earlier times.
WONT HAPPEN
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and Chinas neighbors have
concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security
interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of
direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next
decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to
occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world.
Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them
yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think
puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it
should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it
once was.
between Chinese military assets and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously
Japan or the Philippines.
For these reasons, the report concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in
the medium to long term remains remote. This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to
the idea of expanding Chinas regional and global footprint by economic and
political means. This is where he will likely direct Chinas diplomatic activism over
the decade ahead.
Lets not mince words: a U.S.-China war would be hell on earth. It would likely start
World War III. Millions maybe billions of people would die if nuclear weapons
were ever used in such a conflict. The global economy would likely face ruin thats
what happens when the worlds biggest economic powers start shooting at each
other. Thankfully the chances are remote it will ever happen. Yet, the threat of such
a conflict remains thanks to the many different pressure points in the U.S.-China
relationship. Forget the challenge of ISIS, Ukraine, Syria or whatever the flavor of
the moment is. The U.S.-China relationship and whether it remains peaceful or not
is the most important challenge of our time. Period.
Financial Reform
REFORM BENEFITS BOTH PARTIES US MUST LEAD
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/07/09/partnership-china-avoid-world-war/
The areas for cooperation may prove to be wider than is obvious at first sight.
Cooperating with China in making President Xis financial reforms successful is
definitely in the common interest. Success would fulfill the aspirations of the everincreasing Chinese middle class. It may also allow Xi to relax some of the restrictions he
has recently introduced and that would, in turn, increase the probability that his reforms
will succeed and improve global financial stability. The weak point of his current
approach is that both implementing and monitoring the reform process are in the same
hands. Opening up the process to criticism by the media and civil society would greatly
improve the efficacy of his reforms. This is particularly true of Xis anticorruption
campaign. And if China followed this path, it would become increasingly attractive to the
US as a strategic partner.
Regional stuf
US-CHINA FAILURE LEADS TO ASIAN COLD WAR
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/07/09/partnership-china-avoid-world-war/
If a bona fide attempt fails, the US would then be fully justified in developing a strong
enough partnership with Chinas neighbors that a ChineseRussian alliance would not
dare to challenge it by military force. That would be clearly inferior to a strategic
partnership between the US and China. A partnership with Chinas neighbors would
return us to a cold war, but that would still be preferable to a third world war.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-chinarelationship-passed-the-14168
Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi
announced that Chinas proposed new model of major-country-relations
would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this
proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made.
Because U.S. leaders believe that the new model of major-country relations
is not in Americas best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed
Chinas proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its
power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework
alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount
of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of Chinas
proposal might give other states in the international system the impression
that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic
Thucydides trap. Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United
States to respect Chinas core interests as many Chinese and foreign
scholars have notedis a loaded statement. While the United States is not
opposed to respecting a states national interests, it tends to be unwilling to
respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for
the majority of Chinas core interests. In addition to traditional Chinese
national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, Chinas core
interests also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is
concerned that Chinas new model of major-country relations is a ploy
designed to trick the United States into acknowledging Chinas extensive
territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and longtime strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in
the weakening of the American-led hub-and-spoke security structure, a
security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security
Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that Chinas proposal
is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama
administration has been consistently opposed.
US-CHINA RELATION KEY TO ALL OTHER RELATIONS
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Other countries want the United States and China to get along, yet they do not want
a Group of 2, or G-2. The U.S.-China relationship is only one link, though an
influential one, in a global network of many bilateral and multilateral nodes, all of
which are of critical importance to the overall peaceful global order.
The Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Partnerships, which are currently being negotiated,
could offer an excellent opportunity for a two-pronged strategy but the current approach
is all wrong. At present China is excluded; indeed the partnerships are conceived as an
anti-Chinese alliance under US leadership. The president has asked Congress to give him
and his successor authority for up to six years to negotiate trade agreements under fasttrack rules that would deprive Congress of its right to introduce amendments. The bill has
passed the Senate and at this writing is before the House. If the House approves,
President Xi may be presented with an apparent threat on his visit in September. This is
an appropriate response to Chinas aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and
elsewhere, but it leaves little room for an alternative approach. It would, as a result, be
difficult for President Obama to make a bona fide offer of strategic partnership.
It is to be hoped that the House will not authorize putting the bill on a fast track. Instead
of railroading the bill through Congress, it ought to be taken off the fast track. In that
case, Congress would have plenty of time to correct the fundamental flaws in the
proposed treaties that make them unacceptable as they are currently written. And that
would also allow President Obama to make President Xi a genuine offer of a strategic
partnership with China when he visits Washington in September.
US-China Relations
TIPPING POINT NOW
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168
Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most
realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a
point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this
point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more
challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two
great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard
power tactics. Thats especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the
single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While
there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is
necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain
unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to
move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to
cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in
the sand and preparing for the worst.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
By contrast, despite the difficulties, the U.S.-China relationship remains in decidedly
positive territory. Since 1972, U.S.-China relations have remained more functional
than those between the U.S. and the Soviet Union ever were, and have never
escalated to a comparable level of hostility.9 As noted above, both China and the
United States have private and semi-public strategic narratives about each other.
But as yet they do not have a shared strategic narrative between each other. Such a
common strategic narrative for U.S.-China relations may be difficult, but it is
certainly not impossible. And given the stakes involved for the future, it is
increasingly necessary.
strike, or took down each others electric grid. That discourages such drastic acts. In
the economic realm as well, China cannot afford to dump its dollars onto world
markets because such an act would hurt them as much, or more than, it would hurt
the U.S. As Robert Keohane and I wrote about power and interdependence forty
years ago, where there is symmetrical interdependence, there is not much power.
http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-isupon-us-part-i/
We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for
predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled,
today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to
see China as a threat to American primacy. In China, increasing fractions of the
elite and public see America as an impediment to Chinas achieving its rightful
international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability.
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative
of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National
Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: In
Beijings eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to Chinas rise American strategy
toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish
it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership. The American narrative, as Rudd
described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: Beijings long-term policy is
aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere
of influence spanning the region.
Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments
and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have
grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents
in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to
quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in
America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its
foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion,
and black hands unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.
What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both
countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of
intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will
enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts;
and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done?
interests, this suggests that admittedly enormous shared economic and cultural
interests may not prevail over diverging security concerns.
There is more than one way for one nation to contribute to the security anxieties of
another nationOne is to identify perceived challenges to your own security and
then propose muscular ways to respond. Such voices are gaining strength in the
United States, though they are not yet policy. These views suggest that: the past
decades of engagement efforts with the PRC have created a national security
challenge for Washington, not a cooperative partner; that America needs a new
grand strategy relating to China that maintains U.S. primacy; that tighter export
controls and more allied unity are needed with respect to China; that more defense
spending and hardware deployments to the region are needed, along with further
allied cooperation on missile defense[4]; and, that responses that impose costs on
Beijing for cyber intrusions are required.[5]
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934.htm
On June 25 local time, the State Department of the United States released its
country reports on human rights practices once again, making comments on the
human rights situations in many countries while showing not a bit of regret for or
intention to improve its own terrible human rights record. Plenty of facts show that,
in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights defender, saw no improvements in
its existent human rights issues, but reported numerous new problems. While its
own human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights
in other countries in a more brazen manner, and was given more "red cards" in the
international human rights field.
The U.S. was haunted by spreading guns, frequent occurrence of violent crimes,
which threatened citizens' civil rights. Statistics showed that the use of firearms in
the U.S. was behind 69 percent of murders, while for robberies, the figure was 40
percent, and for aggravated assaults, 21.6 percent (edition.cnn.com). The excessive
use of force by police officers led to many deaths, sparking public outcry. An
unarmed 18-year-old African-American Michael Brown was shot dead by a white
police officer named Darren Wilson in Ferguson, a town in Missouri. After the grand
jury of both Missouri and New York decided to bring no charges against the white
police officer, massive protests broke out in more than 170 cities nationwide
(cn.nytimes.com, November 25, 2014).
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934_4.htm
The voting rights of racial minorities and other groups are under suppression. The
voting rights in the U.S. are restricted by economic income, race and other factors,
and many citizens were prevented from voting. Preliminary exit polls showed that
voters of African origins accounted for 12 percent in the 2014 midterm election,
down from 13 percent in the 2012 presidential election. Hispanic voters dropped
from 10 percent in 2012 to 8 percent and the proportion of Asian voters also
reduced to two percent from three percent (www.usatoday.com, November 5, 2014).
In 2014, the Supreme Court said that Texas could use its controversial new voter
identification law for the November election. Roughly 600,000 voters, many of them
black or Latino, could be turned away at the polls because they lacked acceptable
identification (www.dailymail.co.uk, October 18, 2014). Voting rights advocates were
up in arms over the socioeconomic and racial factors of these new restrictions
(www.upi.com, November 3, 2014). In addition, criminal disenfranchisement
removed massive swaths of society from the democratic process as a collateral
consequence of conviction. A striking 5.85 million Americans could not vote because
of a criminal conviction before. Many disenfranchised citizens lived in Iowa,
Kentucky, or Florida -- the three states with extreme policies of disenfranchising
anyone with a felony conviction for life (www.aclu.org, November 17, 2014).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934_7.htm
Racial discrimination has been a chronic problem in the U.S. human rights record.
Facing discrimination in employment and payment, the ethnic minorities are
trapped in graver poverty. In 2014, multiple cases of arbitrary police killing of
African-Americans have sparked huge waves of protests, casting doubts on the
racial "equality" in the U.S. and giving rise to racial hatred factors.
Racial bias in law enforcement and judicial system is very distinct. Compared with
other ethnic groups, African-Americans are more likely to become victims of police
shooting. Police killings of African-Americans during law enforcement have
practically become "normal" in the U.S. According to an analysis of federally
collected data, young black males in recent years were at a far greater risk of being
shot dead by police than their white counterparts -- 21 times greater. The 1,217
deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012 captured in the federal data show that
African-Americans, age 15 to 19, were killed at a rate of 31.17 per million, while just
1.47 per million white males in that age range died at the hands of police
(www.propublica.org, October 10, 2014). Victims of the high-profile deaths caused
by police enforcement in 2014 were all African-Americans. The above-mentioned
Ferguson case exposed the feature, gravity and complexity of human rights
problems in the U.S. caused by the country's institutional racial discrimination,
highlighting the racial discrimination problem in the law enforcement and judicial
system. The protests staged around the U.S. were directed against violent law
enforcement and injustice, as well as the underlying problem of racial
discrimination. When commenting on the cases in Ferguson and other places, a
former senior American official said the U.S. criminal justice system was "out of
balance" (www.washingtonpost.com, December 4, 2014). Amid sweeping protests
against judicial injustice in relevant case, another fatal shooting of an AfricanAmerican man Rumain Brisbon by a white police officer took place in Phoenix,
Arizona. "It gives the impression that it's open season for killing black men," some
comments said (www.usatoday.com, December 4, 2014).
Ethnic minorities are targeted in law enforcement sting operations. The U.S. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives overwhelmingly targeted racial and
ethnic minorities as it expanded its use of controversial drug sting operations. At
least 91 percent of the people agents have locked up using those stings were racial
or ethnic minorities, and nearly all were either black or Hispanic
(www.usatoday.com, July, 20, 2014). Just under a quarter of Boston's population is
black, but black residents are 63 percent of those stopped-and-frisked by the Boston
Police Department (www.washingtonpost.com, October 8, 2014). African-Americans
are far more likely to be arrested than any other racial group in the U.S. More than
1,581 police departments across the U.S. arrest African-American people at rates
over three times higher than people of other races. At least 70 departments
arrested African-Americans at a rate 10 times higher than people who are not black.
According to reports submitted by Dearborn police, the arrest rate for AfricanAmericans, compared with the city's population, was 26 times higher than for
are minorities with African Americans three times more likely to be homeless
compared to the overall U.S. population. Black children under age 5 are 29 times
more likely to end up in an emergency shelter than their white counterparts
(www.christianpost.com, November 27, 2014).
Racial discrimination sows the seeds for race-related hate crimes. According to the
Southern Poverty Law Center, the number of domestic hate groups rose from 602 in
2000 to 939 in 2013. An annual Justice Department survey of crime victims found
that more than 293,000 hate crimes were committed in 2012. That's 800 a day.
Nearly 20 percent of the hate-crime perpetrators were 17 and younger
(www.usatoday.com, April 16, 2014). On April 13, 2014, Frazier Glenn Cross, a 73year-old white supremacist, shot and killed three people at two Jewish sites of
Greater Kansas City (edition.cnn.com, April 14, 2014).
2014 marks the 50th anniversary of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
According to a survey by the Pew Research Center, only 45 percent of Americans
said the U.S. had made substantial progress toward racial equality since the event.
A CBS News poll found that 46 percent of Americans said there would always be a
lot of prejudice and discrimination (www.pewresearch.org, April 9, 2014).
breathing, or other serious symptoms while working in tobacco fields. Many of these
symptoms were consistent with acute nicotine poisoning (www.politico.com,
September 16, 2014).
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-06/26/c_134357934.htm
On June 25 local time, the State Department of the United States released its
country reports on human rights practices once again, making comments on the
human rights situations in many countries while showing not a bit of regret for or
intention to improve its own terrible human rights record. Plenty of facts show that,
in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights defender, saw no improvements in
its existent human rights issues, but reported numerous new problems. While its
own human rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights
in other countries in a more brazen manner, and was given more "red cards" in the
international human rights field.
The U.S. was haunted by spreading guns, frequent occurrence of violent crimes,
which threatened citizens' civil rights. Statistics showed that the use of firearms in
the U.S. was behind 69 percent of murders, while for robberies, the figure was 40
percent, and for aggravated assaults, 21.6 percent (edition.cnn.com). The excessive
use of force by police officers led to many deaths, sparking public outcry. An
unarmed 18-year-old African-American Michael Brown was shot dead by a white
police officer named Darren Wilson in Ferguson, a town in Missouri. After the grand
jury of both Missouri and New York decided to bring no charges against the white
police officer, massive protests broke out in more than 170 cities nationwide
(cn.nytimes.com, November 25, 2014).
The U.S. used cruel tortures indiscriminately, notably those carried out by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). To acquire intelligence from suspects of terrorism
and extremism, the CIA used brutal methods, such as sleep deprivation,
waterboarding, long-term solitary confinement, slamming prisoners against the wall,
lashing, death threat and even "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding. United Nations
human rights convention institutions such as the UN Human Rights Committee and
the Committee Against Torture had raised their concerns over issues in the U.S.,
including terrible detention conditions for convicts awaiting execution, abuse of
brutal methods, secret detention, indefinite arbitrary detention, and illegal wiretapping which infringed citizens' privacy. These institutions called on the U.S. to
conduct swift, effective and fair investigations into all brutal behaviors and abuse of
forces of the police force (www.un.org).
The U.S. is a country with grim problems of racial discrimination, and institutional
discrimination against ethnic minorities continued. Serious racial bias persisted in
the police and justice systems. Minority groups and indigenous people are subject to
Council, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of UN, the council's
working groups and special rapporteurs.
Senior Chinese leaders, perceiving a threat to their power, now explicitly reject the
universality of human rights, characterizing these ideas as foreign infiltration, and
penalizing those who promote them. Freedoms of expression and religion, already
limited, were hit particularly hard in 2015 by several restrictive new measures.
the right direction, the draft falls short of international standards, particularly in its
definition of domestic violence. Cases of domestic violence in which local authorities
fail to respond appropriately continue to occur with worrying regularity. In July, for
example, a woman was killed by her husband during a mediation session in a police
station.
CHINA ABLEIST
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in
2008, but persons with disabilities continue to face barriers and discrimination,
including lack of access to education.
More students with low vision and blindness took the national university entrance
exams, orgaokao, this year, following the Education Ministrys 2014 decision to
make Braille and electronic versions available. In April, the ministry also
promulgated new regulations requiring exam administrators to provide one or
more forms of reasonable accommodation, such as extending the time allowed
for completing exams and providing sign language services to students with
disabilities taking the gaokao. Given that other laws and regulations do not clearly
require education institutions to provide such students with reasonable
accommodation as defined in the CPRD, the April decision is a significant step
forward.
Regulations drafted in 2013 on access to education for people with disabilities have
still not been adopted. Official guidelines continue to allow universities to deny
enrollment in certain subjects if the applicants have certain disabilities.
Consequently, although more students with disabilities can now take the gaokao,
many universities continue to deny them entry to their chosen field of study or
entry to the university altogether.
The 2013 Mental Health Law stipulates that treatment and hospitalization should be
voluntary except in cases where individuals with severe mental health conditions
pose a danger to, or have harmed, themselves or others. In April, however, a
Shanghai court ruled against Xu Wei, the first patient ever to invoke the law to
challenge his confinement. Xu Wei has been held against his will for over a decade
for schizophrenia.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
Homosexuality was decriminalized in 1997 and removed from an official list of
mental illnesses in 2001. There is still no law protecting people from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, however, and there is no legal
recognition of same-sex partnership.
Diplomacy Framework/Major
Country Relations
CURRENT APPROACH WILL FAIL SOON
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168?page=2
Americas approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the
United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one
area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles
Chinas old shelving disputes and pursuing joint development strategy for Asia. As
this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it
is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later,
unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on
the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived
its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid
addressing Chinas demands that the United States acknowledge Chinas rise to
great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages
the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the new model of major-country
relations. China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic
stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great
power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or
implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition
continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into
conflict.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Over the course of our meetings, several important themes emerged. First, as one
expert noted, the very concept of a new model of major power relations changed
the tenor of our track II discussions. Searching for a new model is an inherently
positive framework, rejecting the debate over whether a rising power and an
established power are destined to clash. It provides an aspirational goal for a longterm process of seeking a peaceful path. While we debated the many areas of policy
where the United States and China do not agree, the group primarily focused on
how we can cooperate together and make the relationship more flexible and
durable, while seeking to manage the important areas where our interests do not
coincide.
NO META NOW
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
The United States and China have yet not articulated a clear understanding of how
they could continue to coexist in peace a decade or two down the road. Chinas rise
is a major geostrategic shift, and without a credible alternative, predictions for the
interaction between a rising power such as China and an established power such as
the United States tend to default to the historical pattern of inevitable violent
conflict, as we discuss in detail below. Until the United States and China develop a
shared vision for where they want the relationship to go, it is difficult to determine
what mutually beneficial policy steps they should take now.
latter has the singular advantage of meeting both countries fundamental but often
unstated need to avoid a return to the anarchic systems or non-systems that we
have seen in previous chapters of the sorry history of international relations
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
A common strategic framework for U.S.-China relations would offer many
advantages. First, in Washington, it would help provide strategic direction to
Government agencies competing for policy attention and space, as well as those
multiple agencies 9 The only exception which could be made would be the height of
U.S.-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War, which occurred in an
entirely different strategic context to the post-1972 world order. engaged in aspects
of the China relationship but not on a daily basis, thereby helping to provide policy
coherence in engaging on an interagency basis, as well as with Chinese
interlocutors; Second, in Beijing it would go beyond that because of the more
hierarchical nature of the political and bureaucratic decision-making process,
providing direction to the system at large; and Third, for both powers, a coherent
strategic framework would also inject additional positive ingredients: a common
determination to manage significant differences effectively in order to avoid
unnecessary confrontation; a common commitment to collaborate in difficult policy
areas with a view to resolving them; and a common sense of purpose to build
political capital and strategic trust over time. For these reasons, the report argues
that the ideational content of a common strategic framework for the relationship
should be: realist about those areas of the relationship which are not possible to
resolve within the foreseeable future; constructive about those areas that could
be resolved with high-level political effort at the bilateral, regional and global levels;
and guided by a common purpose to build strategic trust, step by step, over time,
not based on declaratory statements, but instead on common action in resolving
common problems.
global order itself that is capable of effective global decision-making and dispute
resolution. China has a deep philosophical reservation, born of millennia of historical
experience, of chaos under heaven (tianxia daluan ). Whereas historically
this has applied to Chinas domestic arrangements to preserve the unity and good
government of the empire, Chinas now unprecedented global engagement creates
a new imperative for order in the international domain as well. Chinese interests are
now at stake in every region in the world. In some cases, these are not marginal,
but, in fact, are core interests of the Chinese state, such as a functioning global
energy supply and distribution system. Try as China might, it will be in no position to
rely on unilateral diplomatic or military effort to guarantee Chinese energy interests.
This therefore points to Chinas broader need for an effectively functioning global
order for the future, given Chinas expanding global interests and its inability to
secure those interests by purely national means. Securing a stable, effective global
order for the future, and avoiding global chaos under heaven of the type offered
by the proliferation of non-state actors such as ISIS, may well constitute the
beginnings of a common strategic purpose for China and the United States for the
future. This may be able, over time, to transcend the considerable ideational divide
that at present separates them on the question of precisely what sort of order that
should be. Furthermore, if the preservation and evolution of a functioning order
could become an animating vision for the future of U.S.-China relations, not only
could it provide a global dividend to the rest of the international community, it could
also provide an even deeper momentum for managing the more basic tasks
confronting the bilateral relationship: i.e. 36 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping avoiding conflict; managing ideational differences on
democracy, human rights and the rule of law; as well as the range of bilateral,
regional and global problem-solving referred to above. This question on future
Chinese and American collaboration in defending and enhancing the global order is
discussed further in the conclusion of this summary report.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
National political leadership in both Beijing and Washington, and the leadership they
choose to deliver to the future direction of their bilateral relationship, can have a
major, and possibly decisive, effect on which of these scenarios, or blend of
scenarios, becomes the more probable. There is nothing determinist about the
future relationship between China and the United States. It is a matter for leaders to
decide on an approach, and to execute it, either con-jointly or separately. That is
why the narrative they use to describe their relationship to each other, and to their
respective political constituencies, is important. And that is where the current U.S.China relationship is lacking. This report has focused on one such possible scenario
for the future (namely the second scenario), and how it might in practical terms be
The lack of clear understanding and trust between the two countries has hastened a
drift toward a self-fulfilling prophecy of strategic rivalry, even as the economic and
geopolitical stakes in U.S.-China cooperation become more deeply rooted and
fundamental. The relationship is no longer as asymmetric as it was when the basic
framework of U.S. policy toward China was formed, and the corresponding levers
the United States could pull to channel Beijings behavior are no longer as available
or effective. Yet the need to solve problems in the relationship has never been more
important, even as the United States faces a domestic political divide and grim
fiscal realities affecting its ability to manage multiple global crises and China stands
at an economic (and possibly political) crossroads in its own domestic development.
Here is the tragedy of a policy on which so much depends for us all. The United
States has a sophisticated policy community capable of generating the bipartisan
and multilateral grand strategy towards China that we need. Unfortunately it has
developed a way of doing politics which makes it impossible to sustain such a
strategy. To adapt a famous observation by putative special China envoy Bill Clinton:
its the politics that are stupid.
http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-isupon-us-part-i/
To inject balance into this somber portrait, there have been some significant and
positive recent developments in U.S.-China relations and Chinese foreign policy, not
least President Xi Jinpings oft-expressed desires to avoid conflict, emphasize
cooperation, and to pursue mutually beneficial outcomesa New Type of Major
Power Relationship. Other developments include: agreement to pursue a bilateral
investment treaty; some progress on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Vietnamese relations;
progress in the climate change area; somewhat improved military-to-military
exchanges; and, the recent and upcoming summits between presidents Obama and
Xi. Trade, finance, and other economic relations are making progress, and U.S.China student and cultural exchange is thriving, with one-third of ALL foreign
students in the U.S. from the PRC.
http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-isupon-us-part-i/
Nonetheless, the leaderships in our two countries also have headed in undesirable
directions in some of their remarks and actions. President Obamas February 18
instructions to White House staff disseminated publicly said: That is why we have
to make sure the United Statesand not countries like Chinais the one writing this
centurys rules for the world economy. Such remarks (later alternately softened
and hardened as domestic politics seemed to suggest) are unrealistic and
counterproductive, alienating the United States not only from those already
suspicious of America, but also from allies. This attitude contributed to the initial
U.S. decision to resist the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
eventual outcome in which fifty-seven nations, many American friends or allies,
agreed to become charter members of the AIIB despite initial U.S. preferences. For
an unnamed U.S. official to criticize, publicly, Britains constant accommodation of
China, saying that this is not the best way to engage a rising power,[2] erodes
influence with friends and competitors alike.
Similarly, Chinas senior leader set off alarm bells by saying that: Let people of Asia
run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of
Asia.[3] Earlier remarks in 2010 by another senior official set off reaction when
saying: China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and thats
just a fact. These remarks, whether made by Washington or Beijing, are unhelpful.
While Beijing and Washington now are using the rhetoric of competitors in polite
public discussion, increasingly strategic thinkers in both nations are acting on the
assumption that we are adversaries in the security realm. If one believes, as I do,
that in the final analysis perceived security threats trump economic and cultural
interests, this suggests that admittedly enormous shared economic and cultural
interests may not prevail over diverging security concerns.
There is more than one way for one nation to contribute to the security anxieties of
another nationOne is to identify perceived challenges to your own security and
then propose muscular ways to respond. Such voices are gaining strength in the
United States, though they are not yet policy. These views suggest that: the past
decades of engagement efforts with the PRC have created a national security
challenge for Washington, not a cooperative partner; that America needs a new
grand strategy relating to China that maintains U.S. primacy; that tighter export
controls and more allied unity are needed with respect to China; that more defense
spending and hardware deployments to the region are needed, along with further
allied cooperation on missile defense[4]; and, that responses that impose costs on
Beijing for cyber intrusions are required.[5]
Maritime
MOST LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168?page=2
The problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous
and diverse, but if you are looking for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you
need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the territorial
disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the
United States are threatening Chinas territorial sovereignty. For China, because of
its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate regime survival in a way that
transcends all other quarrels and disagreements. The United States, on the other
hand, views Chinas territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese
expansionism, aggression against American allies and strategic partners, and a
threat to the guiding principles of the liberal world orderwhich the United States
views as crucial for the preservation of Americas global hegemonic power.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationshippassed-the-14168?page=2
In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island
construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities
have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that
China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and
negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed
Americas demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in
order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within
the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in
violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international
commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty
issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute,
as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal systema
cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order.
Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the
Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, China mustnt tolerate rampant US
violations of Chinas adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands.
The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to
Washingtons level of provocation. The article further stated, If the US encroaches
on Chinas core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop
it. The article stated plainly, If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will
breach Chinas bottom line, and China will not sit idly by. Other reports from this
newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the
bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation
activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this
issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United
States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine
the relationship between these two great powers.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
The United States and China should explore the idea of a multilateral maritime
security partnership in East Asia. As other nations, including China, build up their
naval capacity, it is only fair that they should help in collectively securing sea-lanes
that are as vital to them as they are to the United States.73 As a U.S. 60 Center for
American Progress | U.S.-China Relations Navy report suggests, Maritime forces will
be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective
security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open,
multi-polar world.74 The multilateral effort would not only have a positive effect on
combating nonstate actors, such as terrorists and drug smugglers, but also could
potentially reduce Chinese suspicions of American maritime activities. Furthermore,
it would give China a greater share in the cost of protecting sea-lanes, which the
United States has largely been responsible for up until now.75 Among other things,
participation in the maritime security partnership would be contingent on agreeing
to settle maritime territorial and resource disputes peacefully.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached
unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late 2014 to
de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines between the
two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility of accidental
conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the South China Sea,
where China continues its large-scale land reclamation efforts, where tensions with
Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and where mil-to-mil protocols are
undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the interest, room for maneuver or personal
predisposition to refrain from an assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to
submit them to any form of external arbitration.
In addition, it is past time for the U.S. to act as the guarantor of regional stability
that it claims to be. That means sending U.S. ships and planes right up to the edges
of Chinas manmade islands in the South China Sea, something that Obama
Administration admitted in Senate testimony last week that it was not doing. By not
challenging Chinas territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and
sending a message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A China that knows we
will employ our military strength where it is most in question will be far more
circumspect in its attempts to undermine the rules of international behavior.
OCEAN CONSERVATION
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China intend to pursue actively cooperation on polar and
ocean matters, including projects related to ocean conservation and expanding joint
polar research efforts, and will work together on the proposal to establish a Marine
Protected Area (MPA) in Antarcticas Ross Sea. The two sides also plan to support
additional bilateral efforts in these fields, including ocean acidification monitoring
and a partnership between the coastal cities of Xiamen and Weihai in China and San
Francisco and New York in the United States to share best practices to reduce the
flow of trash into the ocean.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/09/23/obama_taiwan_deter_china_1114
55.html
A bemused Beijing stayed on its course of building a counter-deterrent to U.S.
intervention in any future Taiwan crisis. As voices in the United States increasingly
questioned the wisdom of even the ambiguous commitment to Taiwan, Beijing
decided its strategy was proving effective and extended it to the entire region. In
2009, it announced a "nine-dash line" claiming 90 percent of the South China Sea as
Chinese waters and territory. Its aggressive claims have resulted in numerous
maritime clashes with other regional claimants as well as the United States. In
recent years, China has upped the ante by building up rocks and reefs, making
them large enough to support airfields and other military installations.
No sane Chinese or American official wants a major war between the two countries.
Nor would anyone in a responsible position on the U.S. side welcome even a limited
military conflict with China, for fear of miscalculation, escalation, and unintended
consequences, including the significant endangerment of economic relations.
American restraint is demonstrable in the South China Sea (SCS) but it has also
characterized the U.S. response to China-initiated situations in the East China Sea
and across the Taiwan Strait.
That prudent approach, however, is not sufficiently shared by Chinese government
and military leaders. Some seem willing to push the envelope to see just how much
aggressive behavior Washington will tolerate in the region. They appear prepared to
risk a direct clash at sea or in the air and expect the U.S. to make the necessary
efforts to avoid it for instance, to back away from exercising full navigational and
overflight rights.
Beijings belief in its new military prowess and in Americas failing will and
capabilities emboldens Chinese leaders to persist in their defiance even if planes or
ships collide, and potentially, if shots are actually fired. Chinese officials are
convinced that Washington fears escalation more than they do and that it will
accept a compromise resolution rather than take U.S. resistance to the next level.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-must-hold-firm-in-south-china-sea-dispute/
In the unfolding crisis in the SCS, however, the U.S. no longer has the option to look
away. As Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared at the Shangri-La defense
ministers meeting last week, the United States has a direct and enduring interest in
freedom of navigation and overflight in all international waters and airspace.
Beyond self-interest, America has kept the maritime and aviation public commons
open to all nations for more than seven decades. Allowing China unilaterally to
carve out a gigantic exception to Washingtons global role in the vital SCS shipping
lanes would constitute an incalculable diminution of U.S. power and prestige.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/maritime-asia-responding-to-the-china-challenge/
Chinas assertive rise is creating growing turbulence in maritime Asia. Despite a
slowdown in Chinas economic growth, Beijing is investing heavily in military and
paramilitary capabilities designed to project greater influence over the East and
South China Seas and beyond. More importantly, Chinese leaders are increasingly
willing to risk short-term reputational costs to maximize long-term gains with
respect to sovereignty claims.
Asian Nations (ASEAN). It conceals hard power behind the seemingly more benign
image of white-hulled coast guard and law-enforcement forces, even though it often
uses those forces as weapons, equips many of them with arms, and is deploying
them in both greater number and tonnage than any other nation in the region. It
mixes the carrots of trade and finance with the sticks of information warfare and
mounting military deployments and operations.
determine who uses the maritime and air commons of the Asia-Pacific region.
Whether you consider Chinas growing internal suppression of political rights and
free speech, or its use of tailored coercion in the East and South China Seas, relying
on the benevolence of future Chinese leaders is a high-risk strategy. Hence, the
policy imperative is to find a way to safeguard national interests and regional order
in the face of Chinas expanding challenge to both.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/maritime-asia-responding-to-the-china-challenge/
Meanwhile, bad behavior such as the militarization of islands in the South China Sea
should incur costs. One might imagine aggressive actions by China being met with
international cooperation to prevent the flow of certain advanced technologies, such
as those associated with quantum computing, to China. But beyond legal remedies
and the possibility of targeted sanctions, the best response remains building up a
regional system based on the interests and values of like-minded countries opposed
to unilateral changes to the status quo through coercion and force.
Put differently, these economic and diplomatic pillars are necessary, if insufficient,
means of bolstering regional order. The United States also needs to invest
adequately in its own defenses and in security cooperation. Washington must not
allow the desire for strategic partnership and cooperation with large neighboring
states to interfere with a clear-eyed and persistent focus on building of defense
capacity. All countries deserve to have a minimal level of self-defense capacity, and
large countries such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and
others can and should be keen to offer assistance.
watch, and deploy more elements of Americas diplomatic and military toolkit to
match his words with action.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/22/time-for-america-to-step-up-in-the-south-chinasea/
Chinas strategy to date building artificial structures and claiming the surrounding
waters as national territory has been to salami-slice. Beijing has secured
incremental gains below the threshold of any actual conflict, while Washington is
distracted elsewhere.
It is time for America to call Chinas bluff with a more robust and proactive strategy
to deter further attempts to redraw the map of Asia. Rather than ceding the
initiative to Beijing in the South China Sea through a reactive and purely localized
policy, the Obama administration needs to demonstrate that continued military
aggression in maritime Asia could endanger Chinas wider interests.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/22/time-for-america-to-step-up-in-the-south-chinasea/
Soft power aside, the primary instrument for defending Asias fragile status quo
must be American military strength. The United States must be more creative with
its superior military toolkit in defending the existing liberal order.
First, Washington must back its words with action. Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter says U.S. forces will operate wherever international law allows. American
forces must systematically challenge Chinas self-declared Air Defense Identification
Zone over the East China Sea, and its Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea,
challenging Chinas ability to enforce its questionable claims.
Second, the United States should encourage its allies to undertake similar patrols
through Southeast Asias maritime commons. Japan and Australia are considering
doing so; Indias increasingly powerful navy should do the same as part of its
ambitious Act East policy. The United States and its allies should undertake joint
exercises in the South China Seas international waters, challenging Chinas claims
to control access to them.
Third, the United States should work with its allies to help them deploy the same
kind of anti-access and area-denial capabilities that China is developing to exclude
foreign forces from Asias regional commons. These include missile defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and more sophisticated patrol and combat aircraft.
The goal is not to present China with an offensive military threat, but rather to cast
doubt on the viability of aggressive Chinese military operations.
Fourth, the United States must focus more intently on the military dimensions of its
pivot to Asia. American forces are concentrated in Japan and South Korea, a legacy
of 20th-century conflicts; they should be dispersed across the region. This could
include permanent bases in the Philippines and Australia, a more active rotational
presence in countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, and an increase in the operations
tempo of submarine and surface patrols.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/22/time-for-america-to-step-up-in-the-south-chinasea/
Chinas economic lifeline runs westward across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf,
and eastward across the Pacific, all areas where the U.S. Navy remains
predominant. Chinas economic health requires an open international trading order
and the countrys access to the dollar-based financial system. Chinas core interests
would be undermined by stronger American military partnership with Taiwan, and
greater U.S. support for the rights of restive Chinese citizens in Tibet, Xinjiang, and
Hong Kong.
Geographic proximity may mean China has the upper hand in a localized dispute
over the South China Sea. But if leaders in Beijing understand that their interests
beyond Southeast Asia are at risk, they may find that the costs to Chinas global
position outweigh the prospect of narrow gains closer to home. Ironically, China has
more to lose than any other country from the threat it is posing to the ground rules
of an international system that has until now facilitated its rise to prosperity
and power.
no certainty it would not utilize the same economic strong-arm tactics used against
Japan to secure its objectives.
Promoting the rule of law and equal access by all countries to the maritime
commons will require a far more comprehensive set of activities from the United
States.
US KEY
http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/concrete-steps-for-the-u-s-in-the-south-chinasea/
Lastly, the United States must present a vision for what a vibrant and open South
China Sea could look like. Currently, zero-sum national interests combine with
resource and political constraints to impede countries bordering the South China
Sea from working together to achieve positive outcomes. The United States must
partner with littoral states to build the case that countries in the region have more
to gain working together than they have to lose.
If the United States is unwilling to commit to these actionsor a comparably
ambitious slatethen we should all begin to adjust to a South China Sea that is
controlled according to Chinese, rather than international, law.
resources, and vital sea lines of communication. But it realizes that the postWorld
War II order largely built by the United States still obstructs this objective. Thus,
many Chinese hope to displace the United States while gradually dominating its
neighbors in a manner unlikely to trigger any decisive or timely response. This is
effectively Chinese regional hegemony in slow motion. In Washington, too often the
urgent crowds out the important. If we wait for the important changes presently
underway in Southeast Asia to develop on their current trajectory, the United States
and its allies and partners will soon not only lose substantial leverage over the rules
and norms of behavior in this region but also may well face larger security risks in
the future.
http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-chinasea/8/
For starters, China policy has to compete right now with serious and immediate
national security threats in the Middle East and Europe. Im the first to defend the
rebalancing to Asia and have argued that the pivot deniers dont really know what
theyre talking about. Still, theres no question that crises elsewhere are attracting
U.S. government attention and resources.
ACT NOW
http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-chinasea/8/
The long-standing and bipartisan U.S. policy of forbearance toward China has run its
course. Resisting Chinas assertions will now require a much higher tolerance for
risk. That risk-taking should begin with legal, diplomatic, and public diplomacy
actions where the United States, its partners, and the global community can do
much more.
http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/chinas-menacing-sandcastles-in-the-south-chinasea/8/
For the first time in the 21st century, the status quo in East Asia is under severe
pressure. Chinas so-called gray zone activities most notably its confrontational
air and maritime actions and its building spree in the South China Sea undermine
regional security. To date, U.S. responses have failed to deter Chinese coercion
against frontline states, such as Japan and the Philippines. If the United States
wishes to uphold the status quo, it will have to accept more risk in the gray zones.
Through careful management of vertical and horizontal escalation risks, the United
States can exploit these asymmetries to deter further Chinese coercion.
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/high-stakes-for-australia-in-limiting-chinas-southchina-sea-incursions-20150521-gh6nwv.html
China's South China Sea gambit is fundamentally different from the challenge posed
by its establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. The AIIB presents a
potential threat to global economic governance but it does not endanger peace and
stability or violate international law. Actions taken by China in the South China Sea
are destabilising and in some cases are in breach of the United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention.
influence, jeopardize the sovereignty of neighboring states, and sink the general
postwar regional order.4
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Maritime
%20Strategy%20Series%20Capstone.pdf
No responsible official desires war. Policymakers in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo,
Seoul, Taipei, Canberra, and throughout Southeast Asia are unanimous on this point.
Yet between war and peace there is an ever-widening no mans land of
assertiveness, coercion, and distrust. Especially within the gray zones of maritime
Asia there is increasing competition over the rules, rulemaking, and rule
enforcement. The United States has been at the center of regional post-World War II
order-building and security maintenance, but it appears to be experiencing a slow
erosion of its credibility. A re-emerged China is recasting itself as a maritime power,
calling at times for an exclusionary Asia for Asians architecture, and using its
comprehensive instruments of power to unilaterally change facts on the ground, in
the sea, and in the air. Left unchecked, rising maritime tensions will further
undermine American influence, jeopardize the sovereignty of neighboring states,
and sink the general postwar regional order. This study is meant to contribute to
thinking about how to preserve a peaceful system based on the rule of law.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
One does not have to gain access to classified PLA plans to understand the potential
purpose of such island fortifications: they extend Chinese power projection
capability and they erode American power projection capability. In the event of
Mainland attempts to coerce Taiwan, for instance, the United States will have a far
more difficult time demonstrating support for Taiwan than it did when it was able to
dispatch two aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait during the 1995-1996 crisis.
Moreover, the potential runways and other facilities in the Spratlys and Paracels
create the infrastructure that will give China a genuine ability to try to impose air
and sea control, not to mention an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). When
China suddenly declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013, it was
not long before it was obvious China could not enforce such a declared area.12
Through land reclamation, the PLA will be more able to create vital control over who
can go where in the South China Sea, thereby raising future costs on U.S. attempts
to patrol in international waters within Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Significantly, China will be better poised to create a ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) sanctuary, something it may wish to establish as part of an enhanced
nuclear posture. An SSBN bastion strategy would provide a more survivable, mobile
nuclear deterrent force capable of threatening the United States with an assured
second-strike capability. Although the aim is not to use nuclear weapons, the main
effect could be to undermine Americas nuclear umbrella over regional allies,
thereby hastening the pace of Chinese dominance over the region. Here in Asia, as
elsewhere, perceptions often matter as much or more than reality.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
A few former U.S. officials and noted experts contend that the United States must
not let the South China Sea hijack our relations with China. I agree. The question is
not whether or not to accommodate a rising China but whether and how to draw the
line on certain types of bad behavior.13 But the risk of a catastrophic fissure is
small, not least because China does not want that to happen. Instead, my esteemed
colleagues should instead consider the consequences of not standing up for allies
and partners. If misdeeds and bad behavior incur no penalties, if actions have no
consequences, then there is very little incentive for any power to bother with
standards, codes of conduct, and international law. In short, the challenge is not the
risk of war (as opposed to inadvertent incidents, which remain all too real a
problem), but instead how to embrace the contradiction of mostly supporting U.S.China cooperation but sometimes lowering the boom when it comes to clarifying
what constitutes violations of regional norms. The real risk is that an unchecked
China will realize domination of its near seas for all the irrational and rational
reasons suggested above. After all, China managed to exercise what some consider
a case of textbook extended coercion on the United States during the 2012 crisis
over Scarborough Shoal. In that crisis, Washington walked its ally in Manila down
and convinced it to de-escalate but did nothing to prevent China from moving in to
exercise permanent control over the disputed shoal, which lies well within the EEZ
of the Philippines. From this vantage point, we appear ready to let China hijack the
South China Sea out of the untested fear that Beijing will forfeit its interest in
cooperation with the United States and other regional states.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
Yet even ultra-cautious Malaysia, which enjoys the largest trading relationship with
China among any ASEAN member state, managed a show of unity in April of this
year, declaring that reclamations in disputed waters in the South China Sea had
eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security and stability.15
This recent declaration is a reminder what unites ASEAN members: namely, the fear
of meddling by outside powers. For the past several years, China has been the main
concern. The Philippines and Vietnam have been on the frontiers of Chinas
assertiveness in the South China Sea. Even so, attempts by the United States to
provide military reassurance and presence, or to offer assurances to particular
members such as the Philippines, incur a predictable backlash out of fear that
Americas stabilization efforts may also roil the region. That is why it is incumbent
on U.S. officials to calibrate efforts to strengthen our access and security
cooperation in Southeast Asia with a sharp understanding of how far the region will
go based on the balance of political forces. In 2010, Southeast Asian states turned
to the United States to provide a clear counterweight to Chinese assertiveness; but
most of those official entreaties were behind closed doors and seldom to their own
publics.
The majority of ASEAN members, particularly its maritime members, are at least
quietly advocating that the United States remains firmly footed in the region, while
simultaneously building out a wider network of security partners. On the other side,
almost all ASEAN countries prefer non-confrontational ways to deal with China.
United in both is the consensus fear that larger outside powers will run roughshod
over Southeast Asian interests. Chinas flirtation with tailored coercion over the past
several years has yielded a number of united front statements, including the April
response to the Great Wall of Sand reclamation efforts of China. But ASEAN unity
can also be aimed at the United States, should we allow China to maneuver us into
over-reacting or losing the battle of narratives over the best approach for defining
and address the problems.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
The second way to counter Chinas provocative moves in the South China Sea is to
deny China the benefits of salami slicing tactics and coercion. The principal and
easiest way to do this is by building greater capacity, both a minimal coastal
defense and defense capacity, among the regions maritime powers. A putative
common operating picture for the region as a whole can be augmented by
advancing bilateral cooperation on maritime domain awareness. Most of this
cooperation will happen on a bilateral basis, although in some cases countries can
derive benefit by working with U.S. allies (e.g., on coast guard capacity) or through
mini-lateral exercises among three or more countries. Some specific steps that
Congress might take to foster capacity building and otherwise help deny China
political gains from maritime coercion are as follows: Congress should request from
the Department of Defense a clear long-term capacity-building plan for Southeast
Asian maritime countries. This should encompass plans for building capacity,
bilaterally and multilaterally, including ways to leverage the natural development of
an Asian power weba loose network of intra-Asian relations. Among the highlights
of any bilateral plans ought to be a clear blueprint for how to move forward with the
Enhanced Cooperation Defense Agreement with the Philippines. Here we should
consider not just rotational forces but human capacity building, literally supporting
the Philippines as it seeks to develop future strategic concepts. We undertook a
similar program in the early 1990s with Japan, and today Japans Ministry of Defense
is awash with strategic depth. Similar plans of action with Vietnam should be spelled
out, particularly as the United States builds on a strong foundation of strategic
dialogue. Indonesia remains a looming opportunity, and President Joko Jokowi
Widodos maritime fulcrum should be seized as an open door for expanded maritime
cooperation. In all these cases, as well as with others, we must be mindful to
approach cooperation in ways that can be absorbed and sustained. Bear in mind
there will be political pressure on these capitals to dilute cooperation with the
United States in order to balance national interests with China. The final leg of the
policy response should focus on engagement and, more broadly, doubling down on
serious implementation of a comprehensive policy of rebalancing to Asia. This must
begin with economic and diplomatic approaches and be undergirded by a quiet and
sustained strength. Economically, this means the completion of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and Trade Promotion Authority, which are essential for our future
prosperity and security. But it also mean going back to the drawing board to think
through a long-term development initiative that gives the United States a more
effective and positive approach to development rather than being portrayed as an
obstacle to development. Any objective analyst standing back and looking at recent
U.S. development initiativessuch as the Lower Mekong Initiative and the attempt
at building energy plants in Pakistanand comparing them with the major promises
of China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, would be forced to conclude
that China is the rising power and America is in steep decline. But our failure of
imagination, our failure of bipartisanship, and our failure of execution should now
give way to a creative, serious, long-term way to demonstrate anew why the United
States and its allies and partners have so much to contribute to problem-solving,
human development, and regional integration. It takes nothing away from China but
rather emphasizes our soft power offense.
NOT CONTAINMENT
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
Countering bad behavior is not the same thing as containment; neither is using a
mixture of hard and soft power instruments to impose costs on bad behavior going
to prompt the South China Sea to hijack U.S.-China relations. Only China can contain
China and only China can derail U.S.-China relations by underestimating our resolve
to ensure that stability and prosperity are not undermined by unilateral changes to
the status quo through coercion or force. Some highly respected colleagues have
called to halt activities that perpetuate the continued emergence of China; I would
modify that call to more narrowly circumscribe what is within our power: namely, to
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
But cost-imposition and bigger muscle moves must be emplaced within a larger
diplomatic framework of comprehensive policy in which each move is designed to
support a larger political objective. That objective relates to Americas long-term
interest in being integrated into the most dynamic region in the world. The IndoAsia-Pacific region will be the locus of economic and military power in this century.
We can ride with this trend or put our heads in the sand. We can build on our
historic post-World War II role in erecting a system by which most, including China
have thrived or we can accept to the gradual diminution of our considerable
influence and position and accommodate ourselves to a reduced role and stature in
the world, ceding at the same time our ability to respond to external events. The
main reason we can cooperate through strength is because the pursuit of an open,
rulesbased system does not genuinely threaten China but in fact continues to
support it. We have convergent and divergent interests. We should never stop trying
to maximize convergent interests. But when we have divergent interests, we should
not pretend that they do not exist. China will not stop pressing its favorable
narrative and points, many of which will be contradictory and based on half-truths;
neither should the United States let up in pressing its interests, and vision, all the
while ensuring that we have the capabilities to back them up. The aim, once again,
is to win the peace, not catalyze a war. But preserving prosperity and stability
does not mean always averting confrontation.
http://www.spartacist.org/english/spc/185/china.html
We defend Chinas development in the Spratlys against the U.S. and Japanese
imperialists and their local regional capitalist lackeys, such as the Philippines,
Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, all of whom have their own claims in the Spratlys. We
also oppose the treacherous role being played by the Vietnamese Stalinist
bureaucracy, which has aligned itself with U.S. imperialism against China.
http://www.spartacist.org/english/spc/185/china.html
Contrary to the American propaganda barrage, the Chinese military has shown
remarkable restraint while standing its ground. Imagine Washingtons response if
Chinese planes were carrying out surveillance over Californias Santa Catalina
Island! While increasing military pressure on China, U.S. imperialism is also bringing
economic pressure to bear and promoting counterrevolutionary political forces like
Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement.
JAPAN IS IMPERIALIST
http://www.spartacist.org/english/spc/185/china.html
The Japanese imperialists have aggressively joined the U.S.s military provocations.
The U.S. and Japanese ruling classes have their own distinct and competing
interests, but they are united in their determination to bring capitalist
counterrevolution to China. In April, the U.S. and Japan announced an agreement
that will increase the involvement of the Japanese military in regional disputes. The
U.S. has encouraged Japan to extend its naval patrols to the South China Sea, and in
July, Japan will take part in the U.S. and Australian war games there.
In 2010, the Obama administration announced that a pivot toward Asia would be
a top priority. This military rebalancing has been constrained by the U.S.s
continued involvement in the slaughter in Afghanistan and in the Near East.
Nonetheless, as the recent American aggression in the South China Sea makes
clear, Washingtons strategic goal remains to destroy those countries where the
capitalist system of exploitation has been overthrown. As part of the struggle to
mobilize the U.S. working class against its capitalist rulers, we demand: All U.S.
troops and bases out of Asia!
The pivot toward Asia has included a growing U.S. military presence in the
Philippines. Seized in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippines was one of
the first colonies of the rising U.S. imperialist power. U.S. forces brutally suppressed
anticolonial uprisings in the colony, slaughtering up to half a million Filipinos
between 1899 and 1902. After gaining formal independence following World War II,
the Philippines remained a semicolonial U.S. vassal, serving as a linchpin of its antiCommunist machinations in the region. The U.S. is pushing for an enhanced
defense cooperation agreement that would allow even more U.S. troops, planes
and ships to flood into Filipino military bases.
Workers from the U.S. to Japan to the Philippines must be won to the defense of the
deformed workers states as part of the struggle to overthrow their own capitalist
ruling classes. To smash the U.S. imperialist war machine will require an American
workers revolution. The Spartacist League/U.S. is dedicated to building the party
that can lead such a struggle as the American section of a reforged Fourth
International, world party of socialist revolution. The victory of proletarian
revolutions on a world scale will eliminate forever the drive for war inherent in the
global capitalist system and, by eliminating the exploitation of man by man, lay the
basis for unimagined material abundance to fulfill human needs.
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/04/fishing-in-troubled-waters-the-u-spushback-against-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
In June Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken, addressing something called the
Center for a New American Security, called Chinas island-building activities a
transgression. He called on the world to unite against Chinas island building, and
demanded its cessation in accordance with the rule of law.
But there is in fact nothing illegal about building up maritime possessions you claim
as your own. Another nation may challenge you, as when PRC warships clashed with
Vietnamese transport ships in the Spratlys in 1988. (Right was established by
might; 70 Vietnamese died and some reefs changed hands.) But if you can acquire
control over reefs you can surround them with as much concrete as you want.
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/04/fishing-in-troubled-waters-the-u-spushback-against-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
I dont think island militarization is the issue. I think the cause of mounting South
China Sea (and East China Sea) tension is more fundamental. The U.S. is not
concerned with the construction of artificial islands (in a broader or narrower
definition), or even with Chinas claims to a 12-mile territorial waters limit around
some islands, so much as with Chinas rise as a global economic competitor.
CHINA IS CAPITALIST
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/04/fishing-in-troubled-waters-the-u-spushback-against-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
State Department functionaries who have been to China repeatedly know that its a
capitalist country much like the U.S. It has been for some decades now. It competes
with the U.S.but not in the realm of ideology. Its certainly not trying to spread
communism anywhere; its leadership has indeed been won over by the teachings
of Harvard Business School.
On the other hand, there are surely also within this the ten-percent of the onepercent of the people who steer U.S. policy alongside the Sinophobic war mongers
some so personally invested in China and the preservation of its status quo that
they would never want to provoke confrontation in the South China Sea.
do not feel the need to confer legitimacy upon anyone else; on the contrary, they
emphasize Chinas principle of non-interference in other countries affairs.
But they have surely inherited the expectation that other, neighboring nations so
indebted to China culturally would defer to China on territorial issues andas a
matter of courserecognize Chinas maritime boundary as indicated in the ninedash map of 1947,endorsed by the Republic of China (Taiwan) as well as the
Peoples Republic.
It might in part reflect Han chauvinism and the history of (bullying) Chinese
interactions with Vietnam and with Malay peoples. But theres no doubting Beijings
contention that the Chinese claims have the deepest historical roots. In her fine
book, When China Ruled the Seas, Louise Levathes describes the voyages
undertaken by colossal Chinese fleets of Zheng He between 1405 and 1433, which
reached the coasts of India and Africa. They also of course visited the Paracels and
Spratlys. The South China Sea was then, more than ever, unquestionably ruled by
the (Ming) Empires maritime forces, its islands frequented and sometimes settled
by its subjects. China did, in fact, once rule the seas. That is the undoubted and
relevant history.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-controlsouth-china-sea-hainan
It would be wrong to conclude that the Chinese position merely consists of
cosmological bluster, even if it is true that there is plenty of that. Beyond the often
glorified and euphemised imperial past, when neighbours reputedly prostrated
themselves before the emperor in order to enjoy the privileges of trade, China
draws on far fresher sources of motivation. Beijings attitudes toward the South
http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/asia/china/4148-cs231115
The escalation of the South China Sea territorial disputes represents the latest front
in the conflict between imperialism and any nation that attempts to protect its
economic independence..
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
Another tactic is for China to play the history card, or, in the case of the South China
Sea, the historical rights card. Offering up an artificial island for regional
cooperationan island that under international law is not clearly Chinas and which
would also not engender even a territorial claim if it were originally a submerged
land featureis a way for China to take one more wild stab at buying acceptance of
its vague claims of historical rights. But as Bill Hayton has shown in his exemplary
volume on the history of the South China Sea, the concept of sovereignty is
relatively new, historical contact is not the same thing as modern sovereignty, and
contemporary international law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea established a different basis for determining sovereignty.7
modern, diverse, and ultimately fragile China. Bearing in mind Chinas sources of
insecurity and its vulnerabilities will be critical in fashioning an effective posture to
dissuade China from a course that relies more on unilateral coercion in favor of a
course more rooted in multilateral cooperation.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Cronin_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015.pdf
Because the United States and others throughout the region seek to maximize
cooperation with a reemerging China while minimizing conflict, we are caught
between a rock and hard place as to how to handle brash acts of forcefulness such
as the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea. China is well on its way to
doubling the preexisting land mass in that sea, seeking to make its ambiguous ninedash-line claim to most of the South China Sea which, in its most expansive
forms, the U.S. government has stated has no basis in international law8 a de
facto reality. It also refuses to participate in the current case lodged by the
Philippines before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, thereby calling
into question Chinas interest in abiding by international law. Australian academic
Alan Dupont describes what China is trying to do as terraforming its way to control
over the South China Sea.9 Chinas strategic intent may be as simple as a desire to
exercise greater capability over its near seas, consistent with its growing power,
capability, and confidence and infused by a sense of historical injustice, nationalism,
and political exigency.
Analysis
Since 2014 reports have proliferated about dredging work by Chinese vessels,
seemingly focused on turning reefs, atolls and rocks in disputed parts of the SCS
into artificial islands and, in some instances, military bases. This work has profound
territorial implications: according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
uninhabitable rocks have a 12mile territorial zone, while habitable islands have
12mile territorial waters and a 200mile exclusive economic zone. In 2015 China's
efforts were focused primarily on the Spratly Islands, which comprise 100 small
islands and reefs, subject to competing territorial claims from China, Malaysia,
Vietnam and the Philippines. However, in February 2016 it was also revealed that
China had deployed surface-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands further to the
north, prompting an official protest from Vietnam, among others. With China already
mired in multiple island disputes elsewhere, including with South Korea and Japan,
there is a risk that China's growing assertiveness will lead to a military build-up in
the region, which in turn raises the danger of an accident or miscalculation that
might lead to a wider military escalation.
Conclusion
Any worsening of the row could seriously undermine intra-regional economic ties,
and potentially interrupt global trade flows and simultaneously depress global
economic sentiment more broadly.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250
One way a U.S.-China war could commence is by Washington getting sucked into a
regional war in Asia. Looking beyond a straight-up U.S.-Chinese great-power war
there is another clash in Asia that could be almost as terrifyingand would likely
draw in America: a China-Japan war in the East China Sea.
Though ASEAN itself may never serve as a vehicle for countering Chinese
assertiveness, China's regional posture is spurring member states to strengthen
military ties with each other and with outside powers, namely the United States and
Japan. Since the beginning of the year, several bilateral security ventures have been
announced among various Southeast Asian states. These have primarily involved
Vietnam and the Philippines, but also Malaysia, Indonesia (two states with more
limited overlapping claims that Beijing works hard to keep on the sidelines) and
Singapore. China is also compelling domestic naval and coast guard buildups, to
varying degrees.
Though ASEAN itself may never serve as a vehicle for countering Chinese
assertiveness, China's regional posture is spurring member states to strengthen
military ties with each other and with outside powers, namely the United States and
Japan. Since the beginning of the year, several bilateral security ventures have been
announced among various Southeast Asian states. These have primarily involved
Vietnam and the Philippines, but also Malaysia, Indonesia (two states with more
limited overlapping claims that Beijing works hard to keep on the sidelines) and
Singapore. China is also compelling domestic naval and coast guard buildups, to
varying degrees.
Vietnam's buildup has been particularly pronounced. Its defense spending increased
by nearly 60 percent between 2010 and 2014, and it has developed sophisticated
maritime and missile capabilities. Washington partially lifted its 40-year ban on
lethal arms sales to Vietnam in October 2014, and Communist Party General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong made a historic visit to Washington earlier this year.
But since the buildup still pales in comparison to China's military modernization
drive, the shift in Hanoi's strategic outlook is more concerning to Beijing.
China Status
INCREASE STATUS SOLVES THE REST IDEALISM, NOT POLICY,
KEY
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-continuing-impasse-of-us-china-relations/
From a cultural perspective, U.S.-China interactions are difficult because the two
nations do not sing the same tune. Xi likes to talk about lofty principles and express
vision on a large scale. He sees the U.S.-China relationship as complicated; but like an
entangled fishing net once the head rope is pulled, the meshes will open. In other
words, if the two nations leaders can grasp the key link, they can set the complicated
issues in order; and from Xis view, the key link is strategic trust and mutual respect.
RESPECT KEY
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-continuing-impasse-of-us-china-relations/
Second, strategic trust must be based on mutual respect. On this point, Xi insists that
China has suffered a respect deficit from the United States. In other words, the U.S.
challenge to Chinas form of government, its quest for territorial integrity, and Chinas
rightful place in the world, all of which are Chinas core interests. Xi reminds the
United States that China is now more powerful and deserves due respect accordingly.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-continuing-impasse-of-us-china-relations/
Xi came to the Washington of the West on the same day Pope Francis made his
historic visit to the Washington of the East. U.S. attention was all on the lovable Pope.
The Chinese presidents arrival did not even make any of the major U.S. network news
broadcasts.
Xis delegation included 15 of the richest Chinese. They represent a combined wealth of
more than $1.3 trillion, about the size of South Koreas GDP (2013 measures), the 13th
largest economy in the world, and were ready to spend. Indeed, for their first purchase,
they bought 300 Boeing passenger planes, the largest single order on record.
Unfortunately, this was not enough to attract any American attention. The Chinese
delegation, like many Chinese tourist groups nowadays, was left to spend their money at
the gigantic Seattle Outlet Mall.
When Xi Jinping finally arrived in Washington DC, he was once again ignored as U.S.
attention was focused elsewhere. House Speaker John Boehner had suddenly
announced his resignation. His earlier-than-expected move had instantly become the
talk of the town in Washington. When Xi and Obama came to meet the press, U.S.
journalists could not help but to turn the presidential joint press conference into a U.S.
domestic politics forum. Xi stood by the podium awkwardly watching Obama talk about
domestic politics.
There was no joint statement following the Xi-Obama meetings. This was an apparent
disappointment for Xi. Worse, the two sides were left to provide their own account of
what had taken place in the presidential meetings; and there were oddly large
inconsistencies. The Chinese side listed 49 consensuses as the accomplishments of
Xis visit to the United States whereas the U.S. side listed fewer items and had them in
a different order. (Concerned readers are left to figure out the agreements.)
The biggest difference was on Xis model for major-country relations. The Chinese
foreign minister claimed that Xi and Obama had an extensive discussion of the new
model. The No. 1 item on the Chinese list states that the two sides commended the
important outcomes of the meeting at Sunnylands in 2013, the meeting in Beijing in
2014, and the meeting in Washington in 2015 between the two presidents, and agreed to
continue their efforts to build a new model of major-country relationship between China
and the United States based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation. However, the
White House documentation has no record of Obama discussing the model with Xi and
there is no mention of the Chinese initiative in any of the statements and releases either.
We dont know which side is telling the true story. Yet one can see that the different
accounts are clearly bumps in the U.S.-China power transition. As this journey
continues, the Chinese side will continue to press for mutual trust and respect; and
insist that practical issues will go away if they have the strategic commitment from the
United States. The U.S., however, always goes after specific problems in the two nations
relations; and believes that trust and respect can only come from measurable
cooperation. This journey will continue to be bumpy if the two nations continue to talk
past each other with neither side willing to break the impasse.
STATUS KEY
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
The desire for statusto be known and recognized as a great powercan also lead
to tension. In the example we discussed above, Germany desired all of the
trappings of being a great power, including a mighty naval fleet and colonies, as
well as a greater say in regional affairs. These were all seen by Great Britain as
direct threats to its status as an imperial power. China has been a bit more
circumspect since the reform era began, but it also sees itself as returning to a
natural position of great influence. While not directly threatening American
leadership or the Western order, China has called for a greater say and acted more
assertively to defend its national interests in recent years. An increasingly
nationalistic Chinese public cheers on many of these actions. On the U.S. side, while
Americans themselves are not troubled by the idea of a stronger China per se, they
are concerned about Chinas growing military capabilities.
A proposal to change the name of the plaza in front of the Chinese Embassy in
Washington D.C. to "Liu Xiaobo Plaza," after the famous Chinese Nobel Prize Winner
and jailed political dissident, continues to gain steam in the United States Congress.
The bill, unanimously approved by the Senate last week, would change the
Embassy's address from "3505 International Place" to the more controversial "1 Liu
Xiaobo Plaza."
Party mouthpiece The Global Times has called the move "no big deal" while also
detailing why it is such a big deal:
The apparently provocative move intends to outrage and unsettle China. But this is
no big deal. In addition to anger, it will enable us to learn more about the US from
another perspective: the US has big problems in abiding by the rules and keeping
self-respect and its Congress acts so rashly.
The US has been at its wits' end in dealing with China as it is reluctant to employ
military threats or economic sanctions that may backfire. The only option for
Washington seems to be petty actions that disturb China. But these can help China
better understand what vile characters it will meet during its rise and face whatever
awkwardness comes by dealing with them.
This latest move by Congress cannot change the fact that Liu jeopardized China's
national security and was sentenced to jail. The rise of China is being confronted by
external forces like the US. Whether Liu feels proud of such turbulent embraces
from the West or not, he has become a tool of the West against China.
The not terribly political subtle bill was proposed by Republican presidential
candidate and Texas senator Ted Cruz, as a show of solidarity with Chinese
dissidents. It still must make it through the House of Representatives and be signed
by the president before it becomes law and the Chinese Embassy thinks about a
move.
Liu Xiaobo, is perhaps the most famous jailed Chinese dissident. He is currently
serving an 11-year prison sentence due to his involvement in the manifesto Charter
08, which called for 19 changes to made to China's government, including the
elimination of one-party rule. In 2010, on his fourth year in detainment, he was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to non-violent protest and
human rights.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf
Chinas worldview, as for all nation-states, is deeply shaped by its past. In Chinas
case, this means one of the worlds oldest continuing civilizations, with a continuing
written language and literary tradition over several thousand years. For China, the
mark of history is profound, as are the scars of collective memory. This applies to
Chinas philosophical tradition; its core, continuing values; its historical experience
of its neighbors and those which invaded it; and its cumulative perceptions over
time of the United Kingdom, the United States and the collective, colonizing West.
China also takes great pride in its civilizational achievements; the glories of its
imperial past; and the resilience of its people across the millennia, celebrating the
material and cultural achievements of the Han () people. Within those
achievements, China has also generated a self-referential body of philosophical
thought and way of thinking (siwei ) that does not readily yield to the
epistemological demands and intellectual taxonomies of the Western academy. And
within this philosophical system, Confucianism in its various forms lies at the core.
Westerners may find Chinese public formulations arcane. But that is the way the
Chinese system conducts its official discourse, in which case we have some
responsibility to understand what these formulations really mean, rather than once
again simply dismissing them as propaganda.
US STANCE IS INFANTILIZING
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations
The American debate, on both sides of the political divide, often describes China as
a rising power that will need to mature and learn how to exercise responsibility
on the world stage. China, however, sees itself not as a rising power but as a
returning one, predominant in its region for two millennia and temporarily displaced
by colonial exploiters taking advantage of Chinese domestic strife and decay. It
views the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural,
political, and military affairs not as an unnatural challenge to world order but rather
as a return to normality. Americans need not agree with every aspect of the Chinese
analysis to understand that lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its
need to grow up and behave responsibly can be needlessly grating.
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/11/24/uschina_relations_thucydides_t
rap_108717.html
So in the long run, the US seeks a modus vivendi with a rising, peaceful China. The
two countries annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue and growing trade figures
underline that objective (bilateral trade has grown by 7,550% 1985-2014). But read
Lawrence Summers latest piece for The Washington Post: the worldincluding
Chinais unprepared for Chinas rise. Summers believes the US still has serious
questions to answer in relation to the relationship. Does it want a more prosperous
China or a less prosperous one? Does it have a coherent picture of its preferences in
terms of Chinas policy choices? Does it have a sensible picture of future
architectural arrangements?
Similar questions exist in the strategic field: does the US want a stronger China
whose weight is felt more around the region or a weaker China whose weight is felt
less? For the USand Australiathe answer, of course, varies depending on what
sort of great power China turns out to be. In the South China Sea we see a coercive
power, not a consultative onea power unwilling to accept international arbitration.
Nationalisms a potent driver in Chinese foreign policy at the moment. Moreover,
Chinas growing weight is felt most starkly along the Eurasian rimlands, in ways that
are corrosive of the current strategic order. The contests in the East China Sea and
South China Sea arent really about rockstheyre about hierarchy in a future
regional security environment.
LOST
TIT-FOR-TAT US RATIFY LOST CHINA DEVELOP MARITIME
RELATIONS W ASEAN
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1. Along with other nations, the United States and China should continue to develop
commonly accepted international rules and guidelines in areas where they currently
are lacking, including in regional maritime relations, cyberspace, and outer space. In
areas without shared guidelines, misunderstandings are more likely to surface.
International standards on issues such as conduct in outer space and online could
be important vehicles for reducing potential bilateral clashes. In the maritime
domain, while there is already a robust body of international law, the United States
should seek to ratify the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, while China should make
as rapid progress as possible toward developing a Code of Conduct with ASEAN. The
United States and China should build on recent bilateral naval cooperation in the
Gulf of Aiden and the 2014 Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, invitation that was
extended to the Chinese navy to foster deeper maritime cooperation and lay
groundwork for new rules and guidelines for resolving disputes and avoiding crises.
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On territorial disputes and maritime conduct, China and ASEAN should continue
their work toward a code of conduct in as rapid a timeframe as is possible. The
United States needs to ratify UNCLOS; unfortunately, given the political dynamics in
Congress, this may prove difficult. The United States will also continue to encourage
China and Japan to reduce tensions and establish means of communication so that
minor skirmishes do not escalate to something more serious.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chinas_undeclared_arctic_foreign_pol
icy.pdf
There are eight self-declared Arctic states, five with sovereign territory within the
Arctic circle. The sovereignty of the remaining territory within the Arctic Ocean is
currently disputed; with rival claims for extended seabed rights submitted to the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by Russia, Canada, Norway,
Denmark/Greenland. The United States has signed, but not ratified the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), so is currently unable to make a claim.
Apart from UNCLOS, there are a range of international agreements and
organisations that govern Arctic affairs including the International Maritime
Organisation, the Svalbard Treaty, the International Seabed Authority, and the Arctic
Council.
stand outside the international system and have a limited capacity to leverage
international law to counter Chinese actions.
Disasters
REGIONAL COOPERATION SOLVES BEST
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The United States and China should look for opportunities to coordinate regional
activities. For example, the United States and China could develop regional
mechanisms for coordinating better on development assistance. They should
consider supporting a permanent multilateral hub in Asia for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. That would provide opportunities for operational level
cooperation and would greatly benefit the victims of disasters.
CAN DO
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Officials should build bilateral and multilateral crisis-management mechanisms,
especially with regard to maritime conduct. For example, the U.S. military and the
PLA could set up a video link to connect senior military officials
SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT
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The United States and China, along with Japan and other key Asian actors, should
also consider establishing a permanent multilateral outpost for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Such a center would become a concrete symbol of
cooperation and could greatly assist in coordinating actors in the region, both
civilian and military, when disaster strikes.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China decided to expand cooperation on humanitarian
response to disasters. The United States and China plan to participate
constructively in the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The two sides plan to
expand existing cooperation on disaster response through increased support to
multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations International Search and
Rescue Advisory Group. The two sides intend to conduct capacity building
cooperation for the post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal through mechanisms
that promote collaboration between the international community and the
Government of Nepal.
North Korea
MAKE KJU DISAPPEAR CHINA CAN DO
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/trump-kim-jong-un-219068
I mean, this guys a bad dude, and dont underestimate him, Trump said, referring
to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whom he didnt mention by name. Any young
guy who can take over from his father with all those generals and everybody else
that probably want the position, this is not somebody to be underestimated.
Trump maintained that China has control over North Korea and the U.S. has control
over China thus China should do that, he said.
China has control absolute control over North Korea. They dont say it, but
they do, Trump explained. And they should make that problem disappear. China is
sucking us dry. Theyre taking our money. Theyre taking our jobs. Theyre doing so
much. We have rebuilt China with what theyve taken out.
extreme given Xi Jinpings dissatisfaction with Kim Jong-Un over his continuing
nuclear program, and his concern that a nuclear crisis on the Peninsula would
fundamentally derail Chinas 20 U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations
Under Xi Jinping economic transformation. Under Xi, U.S.-China strategic dialogue
on North Korea is deepening, but anything is always possible on the part of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, as are the consequences for
regional stability. As for Taiwan, the period of six years of political and economic
engagement between Beijing and Taipei under Ma Ying-jeou s (Ma Yingjiu )
administration may be coming to an end. If the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) wins the Taiwanese Presidential elections in 2016, and if it
were to flirt again with the idea of a referendum on independence, Xi would likely
take a harder line than his predecessors. And for the U.S., the provisions of the
Taiwan Relations Act have not changed.
Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a
nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine Chinas economic rise.
Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate
period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S.
This explains Xis determination to oversee the professionalization and
modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and
war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and
would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S.
would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice
not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength.
Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of Chinas military expansion and modernization is
not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in
Chinas immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American
strategists as to their ability to prevail.
bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as
creatively as it can while it still lasts.
If the Korean peninsula were to unify under Seoul, China would have a friendly neighbor and enjoy a
stable relationship. With peace and stability being the common goal of China and the US, there
would be no further reason for an American military presence.
Communities of Interest
MANY POTENTIAL TIES COMMUNITIES NOT WELL DEFINED
AND CONNECTED NOW
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The U.S.-China relationship would benefit from creating more communities of
interest to serve as a ballast for the relationship. While a growing number of people
in both societies have various projects and engagements with their counterparts in
the other people-to-people contact, many more do not and that gap is particularly
acute at the subnational level. More work is needed to bring our subnational
commercial and public spheres closer together. Local leaders in both nations are
already working to develop state-to-province and city-to-city business networks, and
we should promote those types of local-level commercial exchanges. We can
supplement existing local initiatives, such as state-province trade initiatives, by
pairing them with local-level educational exchanges. For example, exchanges
between grade school teachers and other local-level community professionals in the
United States and Chinaparticularly if focused on second- and third-tier cities in
the heartlands of both nationswould build deeper understanding of what types of
cooperation can be mutually beneficial. The two societies should carry out the
memorandum of understanding on U.S.- China High-Level Consultation on Peopleto-People Exchange, or CPE, agreed by the two governments in November 2013, to
promote future cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and
technology, sports, and youth and womens issues. The 100,000 Strong Initiative
announced by President Obama in late 2009 to send 100,000 American students to
China has already helped some 68,000 Americans study in China.5 Meanwhile, the
Chinese government has also provided scholarships to some 10,000 Chinese
students to purse PhD programs in the United States while inviting more than
10,000 Americans to China to visit or study.6 We should highlight these productive
exchanges when possible.
States and China to ensure a quality visitor experience for increasing numbers of
travelers to and from both nations. (2) A One Million Strong initiative led by the
100,000 Strong Foundation that aims to have one million American students
studying Mandarin by 2020. One Million Strong goals include doubling the number
of Mandarin language teachers in the United States through a major investment in
teachers colleges; employing technological tools to engage students in underserved
and underrepresented communities; and creating 100K Strong States, a
subnational consortium of U.S. governors committed to expanding Mandarin
language-learning in their states.
Tourism
TOURISM COULD BE GREATER US CAN SOLVE UNILATERALLY
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The United States and China should further encourage tourism, especially Chinese
tourism to the United States. More tourism will create jobs and increase
understanding, and Chinese tourists visiting the United States will also help address
the trade imbalance. The United States should examine whether it can safely
streamline further the processing of tourism visas. While great progress has been
made, there may be other steps that the U.S. State Department can take to
facilitate visa processing, shorten waiting times, and build goodwill without radically
altering quotas or existing regulations
Food Safety
US CAN SOLVE
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Washington and Beijing should explore the potential for public-private partnerships
to address difficult issues. For example, food safety is emerging as a major concern
for U.S. imports from China and for Chinese consumers as well. Both nations would
benefit from strengthening Chinas food safety system, and American companies
could play a role in that process. American companies, well-versed in food safety
and energy efficiency, could partner with Chinese government entities to streamline
regulatory implementation in these areas and others.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China decided to enhance cooperation on global food
security. The two sides intend to enhance communication and coordination with the
government of Timor Leste and share lessons learned in agricultural development
and food security while exploring prospects for further cooperation. Separately, the
two sides intend to explore opportunities to cooperate on climate smart agriculture
to produce more and better food for growing populations, while building the
resilience of smallholder farmers. Such efforts may include technical cooperation,
such as on climate friendly irrigation and mechanization for smallholder farmers in
Africa to advance our shared interest in addressing the impact of climate change
and enhancing food security.
BIT
BIT IMPORTANT
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The United States and China should make the Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT,
negotiations a top priority. A high-standard BIT will make investing in each others
economies easier while still allowing both sides to continue to safeguard national
security in procedures that should be as transparent as possible. It is notable that
China agreed to national standards and negative-list conditions for future BIT
negotiations, and Beijing should be commended for taking that important step. We
should keep this momentum moving forward toward the establishment of a highstandards investment agreement that will serve the interests of both nations.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
The conclusion of the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. This is because of the
long-term transformative effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in each others
economies, and because of the direct interest in the future growth of each others
economies that this creates. This is in contrast to trade, which has a more transient
effect on the institutional underpinnings of an economic relationship;
BITS SUCK
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2409&context=law_and_economics
Although it is certainly at least partially true that the United States was concerned
with the development of international investment law and hoped that these treaties
would help American investors, there are several reasons to doubt that this
investment-centric view of the U.S. BITs program is the fully story. First, U.S. BIT
negotiators have warned treaty partners that they should not expect a wave of new
investments as a consequence of these agreements (Alvarez 2010, 621 n.69;
Vandevelde 1998a, 212), which is evidence that U.S. officials themselves are aware
that the economic impact of these agreements is likely quite limited. Second, if the
United States were motivated by a desire to promote the development of
international investment law and to protect American investors, it would have
entered into a BIT with any country that would agree to its terms. This, however,
was not the case (Vandevelde 1993, 169-70). Third, there is scant evidence of any
pressure from American interest groups on the United States to ratify the BITs that it
has signed, suggesting that U.S. investors are not eager to avail themselves of any
new opportunities or protections that BITs may provide. Fourth, evidence suggests
that U.S. BITs do not have a positive impact on investment flows between the United
States and partner countries (Peinhardt and Allee 2012; Yackee 2008). Fifth, there is
reason to believe that BITs do not influence companies investment decisions
(Yackee 2010), which calls into question whether BITs are negotiated to provide
increased protections for capital exporters.
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2409&context=law_and_economics
Taken together, this evidence suggests the United States may have had other
motivations for negotiating BITs generally, and for picking which countries to
negotiate them with specifically. My theory is that, counter to the conventional
narrative, the United States BITs program was not used primarily as a means of
influencing the development of international investment law and protect American
investments abroad, but instead as a means of improving relationships with
politically important developing countries. The foundation of this theory is the idea
that there are four features of BITs make them a particularly useful foreign policy
tool from the United States perspective. First, BITs are inexpensive. Unlike other
tools that can be used to improve alliancessuch as foreign aid BITs do not
require the United States to outlay funds. Second, BITs require the United States to
only make redundant promises (or at least they were initially seen by U.S.
policymakers that way (Gann 1985, 374)). That is to say, investors with capital in
the United States are already given access to U.S. courts, and the government
believed that it was unlikely to expropriate foreign investment in any event.6 Thus,
the promises extracted from the United States were things the government had
already pledged to do and thus created no new obligations. Third, BITs are easy to
sell domestically. To both the United States Congress and the public, these treaties
can be presented as a way to ensure that American investors are protected and
given the same legal rights abroad that America extends to foreigners. Fourth, there
is a standard model in place so that negotiating additional BITs requires relatively
little effort.7
http://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-InvestmentTreaty.pdf
The United States and China recently began negotiating a much anticipated, highlevel bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that is intended to significantly increase
reciprocal capital flows. The United States believes that a BIT will help level the
playing field for U.S. companies because many lucrative sectors in China are either
completely closed to foreign investment or are subject to substantial restrictions.
The United States also believes that a BIT will bring new business opportunities for
While the economic benefits to the United States are widely known, the benefits to
China are not so commonly recognized. On a market level, China could enjoy new
business opportunities and see an increase in its FDI outflows and inflows similar to
those of the United States. For China, however, increased business opportunities
cannot be the sole motivation for entering into a BIT.24 Any analysis of Chinas
decision to enter into a BIT must consider, in addition to business reasons, factors
that relate to the interests of Chinas Communist Party leadership. The Communist
Party governs China and exercises control over all aspects of the State,25 including
state-owned and private companies.26 The Party endeavors not only to increase
commercial gain but also to achieve strategic national policy goals.27 The StateParty might use state-owned enterprises (SOEs),28 now among the largest
multinational companies in the world,29 to further Chinas own national strategic
interests through a U.S.-China BIT.30 Chinas strategic interests in a BIT, however,
appear to have received little attention in the U.S. media and academia compared
to the glowing reports concerning the potential economic benefits to the United
States from a U.S.-China BIT.31 This Article identifies three strategic interests that a
BIT will promote for the State-Party in China. First, a BIT may allow China to expand
the reach and influence of Chinas SOEs, which are likely to benefit most from the
BIT. China has a national policy of promoting SOEs to become national champions
that can compete with the worlds largest multinational companies.32 Three of the
ten largest companies by revenue in Fortunes Global 500 are from China.33
Furthermore, China leads the list of newcomers to the Global 500 in 2014 with
seven of the twenty-three new companies.34 U.S. federal laws subject FDI by
Chinese SOEs to scrutiny and allow the United States to block such investments
unilaterally to protect U.S. national interests.35 In addition, U.S. politicians can
informally pressure U.S. and Chinese companies to abandon various FDI projects.
For example, in 2005, the U.S. Congress, citing national security concerns,
pressured a Chinese stateowned oil company to withdraw its bid to purchase
Unocal, a U.S. energy company.36 The United States concern is that SOEs, as
instruments of the State and the Communist Party, make their decisions in
accordance with policy goals of the State-Party, which may threaten the economic
viability of U.S. firms at home and abroad.37 China asserts, on the other hand, that
SOEs make decisions based solely on commercial considerations.38 Part I.B will
examine this issue in further detail.39 For now, it is important to emphasize that
once China enters into a BIT with the United States, it could become more difficult
for the U.S. government to block FDI by Chinese SOEs in the United States. Under
the 2012 Model BIT, used by the United States in negotiating all of its BITs, China
will acquire rights and protections not currently enjoyed under U.S. law.40 These
new rights and protections could prevent the United States from unilaterally
blocking FDI projects by Chinese SOEs.41 Moreover, not only does the Model BIT
contain important new rights and protections for foreign investors, but it also offers
a dispute resolution mechanism in which the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an international tribunal, resolves investment
disputes through binding arbitration.42 In other words, while the United States
currently has the final say on whether to approve a Chinese investment (just as the
Chinese government has the final say over FDI in China), once a U.S.-China BIT is
effectuated, the final determination could be in the hands of a neutral international
tribunal. Second, a BIT could help China achieve another major national goal the
acquisition of advanced technology and innovation.43 When China invests in the
United States, China may either set up a greenfield investment (i.e., a new
company)44 or acquire an existing U.S. company through a mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) transaction.45 As M&A is the most common mode by which FDI
occurs today, China will likely acquire existing U.S. companies instead of setting up
greenfield investments.46 When China acquires an existing U.S. company, China
obtains not only the tangible assets (the bricks and mortar) of the company, but
also its intangible assets, such as its portfolio of intellectual property (IP) rights
protected by statute (i.e., patents and trademarks), trade secrets, know-how, and
confidential business information. In a recent transaction, Huawei Technologies, an
SOE and a leading information technology giant, purchased certain intellectual
property assets of 3Leaf Systems, an insolvent U.S. technology firm, for $2
million.47 Leading U.S. officials, including the Secretary of the Treasury, argued that
Huaweis acquisition of U.S. technology would pose a threat to U.S. national security
interests.48 Under pressure, Huawei withdrew its application to acquire the IP.49
Once a BIT enters into force, however, it may be more difficult for the United States
to block the acquisition of U.S. IP by Chinese SOEs. A BIT might facilitate the
acquisition by Chinas SOEs of U.S. technology and allow China to further its
national goal of becoming a global leader in technology innovation.50 Third, a BIT
could allow China to accomplish an increasingly important objective: to evade or
mitigate the effects of border measures imposed by the United States on imported
goods from China. Currently, the United States aggressively pursues a wide array of
trade sanctions against imports from China, including anti-dumping duties,
countervailing duties, quantitative restrictions (quotas), and safeguards.51
Moreover, the increasing use of border measures, including double remedies, to
prevent the growth of the expanding U.S. trade deficit with China52 evinces a
general reluctance on the part of the U.S. government towards Chinas trade
practices.53 There are even bills pending in Congress that threaten to subject every
import from China to punitive trade sanctions.54 Trade measures are imposed on
imports from China at the border and are administered by U.S. Customs
authorities.55 While trade sanctions are authorized by the agreements of the World
Trade Organization (WTO),56 any particular U.S. action may be challenged both in
the United States57 and before the WTO.58 A BIT would allow China to establish or
acquire U.S. business entities that will manufacture some of the goods that are now
the target of U.S. trade sanctions imposed at the border. Of course, goods that are
manufactured in the United States are not subject to border measures imposed on
imports.59 In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan followed a similar strategy, successfully
shifting manufacturing operations to the United States to avoid the effect of U.S.
quotas on imports of automobiles from Japan.60 Under a U.S.-China BIT, China may
be able to emulate this strategy.
technologies may leak knowledge to the foreign country, crowd out domestic firms,
or use the invested firm to spy on local activities. The negative list associated with
the BIT prevents firms from investing in critical sectors, but the aim is to whittle
down the negative list to expand the playing ground for investors.
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investmentdialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf
Since the breakthrough of 2013, both the United States and China have been
optimistic that they can strike a deal in the near future. Both sides hope to expand
investment from what seems to be an artificially low level, removing barriers to
trade, establishing protections for private investors in China, and improving the
investment environment in both countries. A BIT has long been desirable. Direct
investment between the two countries is paltry when compared with US and
Chinese investments in other parts of the world. US foreign direct investment (FDI)
stock in China was $54 billion in 2012, less than 2 percent of total US FDI,1 while
Chinese FDI in the United States was $47.5 billion in 2014, less than one-tenth of
Chinas total outward stock.2 There is clearly pent up demand for more bilateral
investment, which a US-China BIT could facilitate. Large hurdles are in the way,
however. The United States feels that Chinas application of its antimonopoly law
(AML) favors Chinese private and state-owned firms when assessing large mergers
as well as alleged anticompetitive behaviors. Moreover, they feel Chinas stateowned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy unfair advantages ranging from cheap land, lowinterest loans, subsidized inputs, to favorable regulation. The United States has
backed US businesses in their pushing back against imports from Chinese firms it
believes are unfairly subsidized, including using countervailing duties on products
imported from those firms. A US-China BIT would have to address all these US
concerns: subsidies and other unfair advantages for SOEs, and uneven application
of competition policy, which US groups argue tilt the investment playing field toward
China. Many experts disagree about whether state-owned and state-supported
enterprises are fading in importance in the Chinese economy. But few would argue
that they are going away altogether. For a successful BIT, however, China will have
to address these US concerns. The United States would like to see provisions in the
treaty that ensure Chinas SOEs act in accordance with commercial considerations
only. These include confi ning SOE behavior to normal business practices of private
fi rms and certifying that special powers handed to SOEs are covered in the BIT,
such as when SOEs control ports, ensuring they provide services equally, including
for import licenses and fees charged. Making sure SOEs treat imports the same as
domestically produced products and services when making procurement decisions
is also a priority, as well as increasing the transparency of SOE actions. The United
States would also like assurances that Chinas antimonopoly regulators will not
unfairly target US fi rms when assessing anticompetitive practices. We describe
these issues more in depth later.
establishing good relations between foreign fi rms and the Chinese government. A
robust US-China BIT can improve trust and increase investment.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/fact-sheet-us-chinaeconomic-relations
President Obama and President Xi recognize the importance of economic relations
at the core of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. The two Presidents commit to
deepen bilateral economic ties. To this end, the United States and China commit to
pursue policies that promote more open and market-driven bilateral and
international trade and investment. This includes pursuing a high-standard and
comprehensive bilateral investment treaty that embodies the principles of nondiscrimination, fairness, openness, and transparency. The Presidents also commit to
work together to address global economic challenges, to deepen the cooperation
between the two sides under the framework of the G20, and improve and
strengthen the rules-based international economic system.
BIT GOOD
https://www.uschina.org/reports/bilateral-investment-treaties-what-they-are-andwhy-they-matter
A high-quality US-China BIT would give American companies better access to
Chinas market, and equal rights as Chinese firms. These guarantees would provide
American companies with a better opportunity to expand in China the worlds
second largest economy, with a middle class that will soon be larger than the
population of the United States. US companies overwhelmingly invest in China to
reach these customers not export back to the United States. In fact, according
to US government statistics, American companies in China sell only 7 percent of
goods they make in China back to the United States the rest is sold in China or
other foreign countries.
In addition, a BIT with China would also help bring more foreign investment to
America and create new opportunities here for American workers. US government
analysis shows that foreign investment not only supports 5.6 million jobs in the
United States one-third of which are in the manufacturing sector but that US
companies with foreign investments pay employees more on average than their
counterparts without overseas investments.
Chinese investment in the United States remains relatively small compared with
investments from other foreign countries. In fact, USCBC analysis shows that the
United States and China have less than a 5 percent share of investment in each
others markets. Since these are the two largest economies in the world, that means
there is significant room for growth.
A BIT is an essential tool for facilitating this growth, making the United States more
competitive internationally, and creating a stronger economy here at home. A BIT
also represents the most important single tool we have to address many of the
level-playing field issues US companies face in China.
http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/EC-Statements/The-Crisis-of-U.S.Manufacturing-in-the-Age-of-a-Global-Race-to-the-Bottom
Too many corporations, however, appear ready to double down on the failed
model of U.S-China trade relations through their advocacy of a U.S.-China Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT). Today, almost half (46%) of all Chinas exports come from
enterprises significantly funded by foreign investment. The proposed U.S.-China BIT,
with its special rights for investors and absence of labor and environmental
protections, reinforces the current dysfunctional and unbalanced model of U.S.China trade.1
Transparency is also a problem when it comes to Chinese investments in the United
States. Chinese state-owned enterprises are on a buying spree, with tens of billions
of dollars in announced acquisitions in recent weeks. These investments may pose
significant risks to U.S. national and economic security, but insufficient information
is available to make a determination. The current draft BIT does nothing to address
these transparency issues.
China also is seeking to reject the basic rules of economics and have the United
States, the EU and other countries grant them Market Economy Status. Granting
China Market Economy Status would undermine the most effective tools we have to
respond to Chinas unfair trade practices. A cursory review of the Chinese
governments interventions in its stock and currency markets over the last several
months demonstrates the degree to which China remains a non-market economy.
Government leaders in the United States, the EU and elsewhere should make it
clear that Chinas status will not be altered as long as it continues its current level
of state intervention in its economy and state support for its global firms. Should the
EU grant China Market Economy Status, the United States should reconsider
proceeding with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
negotiations.
http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateralinvestment-treaty-matters/
To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the
Paulson Institutewith its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council
and the China Development Reform Foundationconvened a US-China CEO
Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both
countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade
Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese
Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level
opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for
increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China
continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade.
BIT is worth $50 billion at least
http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateralinvestment-treaty-matters/
A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening
of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the
consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious
plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more
consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for
Chinese companies investing in the United States.
And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one,
it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in
China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage
more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese
governments going out initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn,
would create jobs and opportunities for American workers.
There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the
United States and China. So far, Chinese actual investment in the United States,
less than $4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China
invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the
United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs.
US investment in China, more than $50 billion, no doubt would increase as the
playing field becomes more level.
6 BENEFITS
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties
U.S. BITs provide investors with six core benefits:
U.S. BITs require that investors and their "covered investments" (that is,
investments of a national or company of one BIT party in the territory of the other
party) be treated as favorably as the host party treats its own investors and their
investments or investors and investments from any third country. The BIT generally
affords the better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment for the full
life-cycle of investment -- from establishment or acquisition, through management,
operation, and expansion, to disposition.
BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments and provide for
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation when expropriation
takes place.
BITs provide for the transferability of investment-related funds into and out of a host
country without delay and using a market rate of exchange.
BITs restrict the imposition of performance requirements, such as local content
targets or export quotas, as a condition for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, or operation of an investment.
BITs give covered investors the right to engage the top managerial personnel of
their choice, regardless of nationality.
BITs give investors from each party the right to submit an investment dispute with
the government of the other party to international arbitration. There is no
requirement to use that country's domestic courts.
DECREASES TENSIONS
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303532704579476720853893300
Nor are business benefits the only advantage to a U.S.-China investment treaty.
There would also be considerable political advantages to concluding a deal. The
difficulties faced by each country's investors in the other's economy have created
significant friction between Washington and Beijing over the years. This is the case
both when Chinese investments in the U.S. generate political controversy, and when
American companies discover they aren't allowed to invest in booming Chinese
industries. An investment treaty would help ratchet down such tensions by
improving market access and ensuring greater predictability.
CFIUS AMENDMENT CP
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investmentdialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf
The debate over security issues is heavily shaped by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency group that assumes
responsibility when investment in sensitive areas of the economy comes in the form
of foreign acquisition of a US company.1 Established in 1975, CFIUS is led by the
Treasury Department. Its purpose is to ensure acquisitions of US fi rms by foreigners
do not harm US national security, and its procedures have been amended and
revised many times in response to concerns raised by overseas investors. The
record of CFIUS is that it has approved far more investments than it has rejected,
although in some cases the investors have retreated before decisions were made
because of concerns that CFIUS would rule against them or in some cases because
of political protests and criticisms of investments in the US Congress. One result is
that CFIUS has become a kind of whipping boy for foreign investors who want its
procedures to be more effi cient, timely, and transparent. The United States and
China have continually sparred in the area of national security reviews for bilateral
investment. The current negotiations on an investment treaty between the two
countries cover a wide range of topics. The US-China bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) could be an opportunity to clear up issues relating to security reviews,
although both sides may end up disappointed. Chinas grievances stem from some
high pro- fi le acquisition attempts launched by Chinese fi rms that were ultimately
unsuccessful because they ran into political obstacles from the US Congress or the
CFIUS. But the high-profi le cases have skewed public perception and now some see
CFIUS as an unfair barrier to Chinese investments in the United States. The Chinese
will look to accomplish two things in the BIT. First they would like to ensure greater
transparency in order for Chinese fi rms, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
to have a clearer understanding of the decisions criteria in a CFIUS review. Second,
they would like CFIUS to apply the same criteria to a Chinese fi rm trying to acquire
a US fi rm as it would to a British fi rm doing the same. This is called most favored
nation (MFN) treatment.
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.
gov/files/documents/Thea%20Lee%20ISDS%20briefing%20Ways%20and%20Means
%20120215.pdf
The United States now has several decades of experience with Bilateral Investment
Treaties, as well as investment chapters in trade agreements that include many of
the same provisions as those in BITs namely, investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS), expansive definitions of investors and investment, and vague standards
such as Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST) and Fair and Equitable Treatment
(FET) that are not found in U.S. law. We have seen a dramatic increase in the
number of global investor challenges in recent years, as well as an expansion of the
scope of these cases, in troubling ways. If TPP is adopted as negotiated, we can
expect these problems to be significantly exacerbated -- with permanent and
negative consequences for the global environment and public health, as well as
democratic decision-making.
Mechanisms
OFFICER EXCHANGE GOOD
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
The U.S. military and the Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA, should consider further
exchanges of military personnel. More frequent contact will lead to more
understanding and a more mature relationship. American participants suggested
that these exchanges should include low-ranking officers and students so
participants can build trust as they move through their careers in their respective
countries.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Creating additional, consistent forums for regular dialogue between military
officials, especially at lower levels and including military academies, should be a
major goal in the near future. There are many areas of cooperation that could be
expanded, including counterpiracy efforts; U.N. peacekeeping operations, or UNPKO;
joint humanitarian, disaster-relief, and search-and-rescue exercises; multilateral
military exercises or exercises hosted by third countries; professional military
educational exchanges; maritime law enforcement; fisheries protection; taking
steps to counter nuclear proliferation; and international terrorism.76 Humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief especially present ready opportunities for further
expansion. U.S. and Chinese forces have already participated in a number of
dialogues and activities dealing with humanitarian assistance, including disastermanagement exchanges held in Beijing, Kunming, and Chengdu, as well as a joint
indoor war game to practice humanitarian rescue and disaster relief in case of an
earthquake and consequent nuclear leaks, which was held in Chengdu.77 Using
robust exchanges along these lines could build momentum for further cooperation
on other areas. Counterpiracy and search-and-rescue exercises are other areas ripe
for cooperation. The recent counterpiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden is a good
foundation to build upon. China should continue to join other multilateral military
exercises.
should also be continued. But actually implementing projects together should also
be the focus now. The United States and China share many security concerns, such
as the Korean peninsula, pathogens, climate change, energy, humanitarian
assistance, sea-lane security, disaster response, drug trafficking, and cybersecurity.
If America and China work together more closely and concretely on these discrete
challenges, they may be able to develop what we call tactical trust. Perhaps tactical
trust can evolve into strategic trust over time.
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=538
Key to managing this situation is ensuring that U.S. and Chinese militaries (and
other militaries in the region) cultivate better direct relations and an ability to
manage crises if and when they occur. The United States has been pushing for
closer military-to-military relations for years and has made some good progress.
However, efforts to create a structure based on conflict avoidance are hampered by
a variety of factors, including the imbalance in objectives (China is not at this point
seeking reciprocal ability to patrol the U.S. coast, for example); a fundamental lack
of trust between military establishments; and the fact that the Peoples Liberation
Army embraces non-transparency as a strategic tenet.
Rubio could offer the job to Jeb Bush, whose father was US envoy to Beijing in 1974
75 and whose brother, George W, presided over a good relationship with China.
The Asia-Pacific region faces mounting geopolitical competition. Rules and rulemaking are occurring against the backdrop of tailored coercion and the fear of
hybrid warfare. It is not enough to recognize the breaking of rules through coercion
or intimidation; the preservation of a rules-based system requires doing something
about such behavior. But what to do? We contend that engagement, backed by a
variety of tools that would impose costs on bad behavior, deny unilateral actions
from achieving their purpose, or offset unilateral actions to ensure they do not shift
the balance of power, constitutes the right toolkit for preserving rules in maritime
Asia. First, the United States should seek to further institutionalize military-tomilitary and high-level civilian-led engagement with China. At the same time, the
main goal ought to be achieving more effective cooperation, not just more contacts.
The United States must insist on following through with ongoing negotiations over
operational safety procedures between surface naval forces and ensure that the two
sides have completed a similar memorandum of understanding to help avoid midair
collisions by the end of 2015. More generally, discussions and agreements should
include both military and paramilitary forces operating in the East and South China
Seas not allowing China to pretend that white-hulled ships with arms are different
from many gray-hulled naval vessels that are lightly armed
Space
SPACE IMPORTANT TO US AND CHINA
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Some of the most worrisome issues in the current U.S.-China relationship are in
areas that lack common rules and institutions, such as cyber espionage and outer
space, where there are no established procedures or independent bodies to manage
such disputes.
CHINA STRONG
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
China is pursuing a broad array of counterspace capabilities and will be able to hold
at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime if these capabilities
become operational. Chinas 2007 test of the SC-19 direct-ascent antisatellite
(ASAT) missile destroyed an aging Chinese satellite and sparked worldwide criticism
for creating dangerous orbital debris. The test demonstrated Chinas ability to strike
satellites in low Earth orbit where the majority of U.S. satellites reside. Chinas 2013
DN-2 rocket test reached the altitude of geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites,
marking Chinas highest known suborbital launch to date and the highest worldwide
since 1976; this indicated China is developing the capability to target higher orbits
which contain U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and most U.S. ISR
satellites. Since 2008, China has also conducted increasingly complex tests
involving spacecraft in close proximity to one another; these tests have legitimate
applications for Chinas manned space program, but are likely also used for the
development of co-orbital counterspace technologies. Computer network operations
against U.S. space assets attributed to China have likely been used to demonstrate
and test Chinas ability to conduct future computer network attacks and perform
network surveillance. Finally, China has acquired ground-based satellite jammers
and invested heavily in research and development for directed energy technologies
such as lasers and radio frequency weapons.
Chinas space program has also progressed in the areas of spacebased command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR), space-based PNT, space-based communications, and space launch
functions. China now has approximately 142 operational satellites in orbit, with
approximately 95 of these owned and operated by military or defense industry
organizations. Chinas current system of C4ISR satellites likely enables its military to
detect and monitor U.S. air and naval activity out to the second island chain with
sufficient accuracy and timeliness to assess U.S. military force posture and cue
other collection assets for more precise tracking and targeting. Chinas regional PNT
satellite system, known as Beidou, became operational in 2012, with global
coverage expected by 2020. When completed, this system will provide PNT
functions, essential to the performance of virtually every modern Chinese weapons
system, independent from U.S.-run GPS. Although it lacks a designated civilian
space program, China since the mid-1990s has incrementally developed a series of
ambitious space exploration programs, categorized as civilian projects. China is one
of three countries, along with the United States and Russia, to have independently
launched a human into space, and has launched ten Shenzhou spacecraft and the
Tiangong space lab in recent years as part of its human spaceflight program. In the
programs next phase, scheduled for completion by 2022, China plans to launch a
permanent manned space station into orbit. Chinas lunar exploration program has
featured several lunar orbiting missions with multiple Change spacecraft and the
landing of a lunar rover, Jade Rabbit, in 2014. China plans to land and return a lunar
rover in 2017 and become the first nation to land a spacecraft on the Moons dark
side in 2020. Beijing is likely also conducting research for a manned mission to the
moon and a mission to Mars, although neither project has yet received official
approval.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
As Chinas developmental counterspace capabilities become operational, China will
be able to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime.
China is testing increasingly complex co-orbital proximity capabilities. Although it
may not develop or operationally deploy all of these co-orbital technologies for
counterspace missions, China is setting a strong foundation for future co-orbital
antisatellite systems that could include jammers, robotic arms, kinetic kill vehicles,
and lasers.
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf
In his own words, Wolf developed the Amendment to limit new collaboration with
China until we see improvements in its human rights record, as well as a reduction
in its well documented cyberattacks and espionage efforts against the U.S.88
Significantly, Representative Wolf has publicly opposed any involvement of NASA
with CNSA on both moral and security grounds. What concerns me most about the
Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is being led by the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe that the PLAs space program
will be any more benign than the PLAs recent military posture.89 Direct bilateral
cooperation with an agency controlled to at least some degree by Chinas military
given its repressive historycould tarnish NASAs image and diminish both its
ethical high ground as a paragon of science and exploration, and its credibility as a
trustworthy and peaceful agency.90 To address these concerns, Section 1340(a) of
the 2011 Appropriations Act stipulated: None of the funds made available by this
division may be used for [NASA] or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy,
program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such
activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of
this division.91
There's a growing debate over whether China and the Unites States should
cooperate in space, and the dialogue now appears to focus on how to create an
"open-door" policy in orbit for Chinese astronauts to make trips to the International
Space Station (ISS).
Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House, but
progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. Specifically at question is
how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from
engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China regarding space.
Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long
march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own space station in the 2020s.
Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China
collaboration in space.
POWERFUL SIGNAL
http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html
Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back
in 1975 serves as a history lesson.
"A similar initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be
a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work
together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said.
While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens
into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about
equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted.
"China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than
the converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage
in space cooperation with China is political, not technical."
"It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space," said Joan
Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island.
Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval
War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
"The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race
between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be
inclusive in ISS space partnerships," Johnson-Freese said.
Refusing Chinese participation in the International Space Station, at least in part,
has spurred China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be
the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited."
http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html
The European Space Agency (ESA) and China have blueprinted a work plan, said
Karl Bergquist, who's in charge of relations with China within the ESA international
relations department in Paris. [How China's First Space Station Will Work
(Infographic)]
ESA and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) signed a framework agreement in
December 2014, Bergquist said.
Since then, the two agencies have established three working groups: space
experiments and utilization; astronaut selection, training and flight; and space
infrastructure to analyze and propose concrete cooperation areas of mutual interest,
Bergquist told Space.com.
Outgoing ESA Director Jean-Jacques Dordain and CMSA Director Yu Tongjie met May
27 to continue strategic cooperation on long-term objectives and implementation
steps.
"As you can see, we are still in the early phases of the cooperation between ESA
and CMSA," Bergquist said, "but the idea is to identify a concrete cooperation plan
which then could be submitted for approval to the ESA member states."
http://www.space.com/30337-chinese-experiment-international-space-station.html
A Chinese experiment is being readied for launch toward the International Space
Station (ISS) in what could be the forerunner of a larger space-cooperation agenda
between the United States and China.
NanoRacks, a Houston-based company that helps commercial companies make
use of the space station, has signed a historic agreement with the Beijing Institute
of Technology to fly Chinese DNA research to the orbiting outpost next year. No
commercial Chinese payload has ever flown to the orbiting lab before.
Space-policy experts said they viewed the agreement as a significant step in
shaping possible future joint work by the two spacefaring nations.
US LONE HOLDOUT
http://www.space.com/30337-chinese-experiment-international-space-station.html
"Given that the rest of the world is working with China in space, being the lone
holdout has not worked in our favor in any of those areas," Johnson-Freese said.
"Hopefully, this experiment on the ISS will be a positive step forward toward all of
those goals."
http://www.space.com/30337-chinese-experiment-international-space-station.html
Statements by U.S. politicians show that there may be an interesting "chess
playing" factor in America's dealings with China.
Some U.S. lawmakers have said they don't want the Russians to have a clear, open
field with the Chinese. Better to have the U.S. engaged in working space deals with
China, they say but how best to evolve and work with China within the Wolf
amendment?
The 2011 NASA/OSTP ban on bilaterally working with China was the brainchild of
Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), chair of the House Appropriations CommerceJustice-Science (CJS) subcommittee until he retired last year. The two-sentence
clause imposing the ban was inserted into the NASA appropriations bill. Referring to
China as an evil empire in 1999, Congressman Wolf is a long and proud Dragon
Slayer. As an evangelical Christian he was and continues to be particularly
focused on Chinese human rights and freedom of religion issues. Linking those
obviously legitimate concerns to Chinese-U.S. space relations, however, has proved
problematic for several reasons.
In 2013, Bo Jiang, a Chinese national and contractor working on optics at NASA
Langley, was arrested at the airport before leaving for China, on suspicion of being
in possession of classified materials. Besides porn, nothing illegal was found on Bos
computer. He pled guilty to violating NASA computer use rules, but was cleared of
all espionage charges. Suspicion first fell on Bo after Rep. Wolf declared at a press
conference that anonymous NASA employees had alerted him about security
concerns. At the same press conference, Wolfcalled on (which equates to directed
since he controlled their budget) NASA to take down all public information for a
security review, including the voluminous NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
that contains virtually the sum-total of NASAs scientific studies, and begin a
massive review of all foreign nationals at NASA NTRS came back online with
almost zero changes. NASA, highly technical administration that it is, employs and
contracts a large number of foreigners, and the disruption was enormous. Besides
employing a high number of foreign nationals, NASA scientists also regularly work
with scientists from other countries, including China.
Though Wolf retired in 2014, the new House CJS chairman, Rep. John Culbertson (RTX), has said he agrees with Wolfs position. The final law that Wolf put in place, and
which remains in effect (P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015), bans funding by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of
any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China
or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by
law after the date of enactment of this Act. Supporting an anti-China agenda
accrues not insignificant domestic support among some voter constituencies. And
so Congress continues to act as though a bilateral snub by the U.S. will somehow
change Chinese policies, deny them technology, or perhaps just hurt their feelings.
In space, the ultimate goal of all U.S. strategies is for the U.S. to benefit from a
sustainable space environment. Risks to the space environment stem from
congestion (the U.S. owns more 40 percent of the satellites in orbit), space debris,
naturally occurring space objects, and debris potentially created by anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons. In recognition of its inability to deal with the space debris issues on
its own, the U.S. already works with China and 11 other countries on the InterAgency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC), which has done remarkable
work at the scientific and technical level in identifying issues and suggesting
mitigation approaches. Their suggestions are largely ignored, however, due to lack
of trust at the political level. Building trust takes dialogue.
Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, will have a
challenging task in identifying areas for civil space cooperation with China, given
the dual-use nature of space technology and the domestic Kabuki accompanying
Wolfs enduring ban. But acquiescing to talk about civil space cooperation is likely
the carrot required to get to what the U.S. really wants to talk about space
security.
The rhetoric of space competition has been escalating rapidly. Chest thumping,
accusations and curious lingo such as offensive counterspace from Congress and
the Pentagon do little to build trust. Preventing that escalating rhetoric from
evolving into military confrontation that would jeopardize U.S. interests is the job of
the State Department. Therefore, it makes sense that State, with larger, strategic
objectives beyond those of individual members of Congress or military services
inherently needing threats to justify enhanced budget requests, would step in to fill
the void created by the 2011 legislative action.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/
The next meeting between the U.S. and China is scheduled for October 2015. It will
take all of Frank Roses considerable talents with China and domestic political
communities to move a space agenda forward. But if sustainability of the space
environment is the ultimate goal, it is not one that can be pursued unilaterally, or
without China.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
The question before the Commission concerns how the United States (U.S.) can
achieve stated U.S. goals regarding space security given a rapidly expanding and
increasingly sophisticated Chinese space program. 1 The importance of protecting
the space environment and U.S. space assets in orbit, assets which provide
information critical to the U.S. civilian and military sectors and overall U.S. national
security, has required that goals be considered and reconsidered at many levels and
within multiple communities of the U.S. government. Therefore, it is appropriate to
begin by referencing the multiple and nested U.S. strategies related to or
referencing space, specifically the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2010
National Space Policy (NSP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
2011 National Security Space Strategy (NSSS)2 for analytic parameters.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
The 1999 Cox Committee Report and consequent State Department interpretations
of export licensing regulations were intended to impede Chinese space activities by
denying China technology, in effect, to isolate Chinese space activities. Instead,
China has worked with other countries that have been more than willing to expand
and increase their own aerospace business sector market share, or China developed
indigenous capabilities. Parts of U.S. regulations that categorized such items as
communications satellites as weapons systems and pointedly handicapped the U.S.
satellite industry rather than stunting Chinese space activities held until 2013.
Wolf further stated that the United States should not work with China based on
moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with
authoritarian and/or communist regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime
when it has served American interests, and continues to do so today. That is the
basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer
not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with Putin when it benefits us to do so.
Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few regimes to
work with at all in the Middle East. The U.S. provided supported Saddam Hussains
regime in the Iran-Iraq War.4
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
This rebuttal to Congressman Wolfs views assumes that the United States has a
choice regarding whether or not to work with China. If, however, sustainability of
the space environment upon which the U.S. generally and the U.S. military
specifically relies upon for advantages is to be maintained, the space debris issue
alone requires that the U.S. not exclude diplomacy as a policy option. While missile
defense/ASAT testing has been conducted in ways to minimize debris issues since
2007, the potential threat to the space environment in non-test circumstances has
become clear. If there was any upside to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the
frightening realization by all countries of the fragility of the space environment. With
regard to China specifically, since this 2007 test China has done nothing further in
space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set by the United
States. Mankinds dependence on space assets thereby makes it in the best
interests of all spacefaring nations to cooperate to maintain that environment.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
Pursuing efforts to enhance transparency, confidence-building measures, toward
identifying common ground among all space-faring nations, and resiliency for
military systems (NSSS, p.8) all must be pursued with the same energy and
commitment as counterspace operations. Otherwise, just as efforts to isolate
Chinese space activities have backfired on the U.S. in areas such as export control,
the unintended consequences of a principally deter, defend, defeat strategy could
trigger an arms race that puts the sustainability of the space environment at
significant risk, to the detriment of U.S. national security.
resistance from elements within as being too expensive or, as with space arms
control, just too difficult.46 The Air Force appears to be taking the time honored
approach of studying the problem rather than acting on it. Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments analyst Todd Harrison characterized part of the problem as
a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders. He stated, While everyone
recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from
low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target.
So it doesnt attract much interest from senior leaders.47 Counterspace, however,
offers that sexy option.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf
Regardless of various interpretations of Chinese intent, the United States must
pursue all policy goals of the NSS, NSP and NSSS. That will inherently involve
working with China in some areas, and pursuing a full range of approaches to policy
goals. The sustainability of the space environment is as key to protecting assets as
is protecting assets from hostile actions. They are inherently intertwined.
nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. Full
implementation of U.S. space strategies is the prudent way forward.
this perception? The answer, regrettably (but realistically), seems to be no. Though
the American public still supports the space program, the country is no longer
willing to allocate the levels of funding needed to deliver the space spectaculars of
yore, spectaculars that engender perceptions of leadership. As a result, perceptions
of U.S. primacy in space exploration will continue to decay. Contributing to the
problem are unrealistically high expectations, formed during the height of the U.S.
space program. Both the Apollo Program and, to a lesser degree, the space shuttle
programs, created expectations of space spectaculars on a regular basis. Similar
expectations are now difficult, if not impossible, to meet. The generous funding the
Apollo Program received was an anomalya function of the Cold Warand it was
not without cuts toward the end. Such vigorous financial support is not likely to be
repeated in the near future, and the American public will not be willing to bear the
costs of such a program again, particularly in an era of financial instability. Although
the International Space Station (ISS) continues to be the National Aeronautics and
Space Administrations (NASA) flagship for human spaceflight activity, the United
States has relied on Russia for transportation to and from the ISS since the space
shuttle stopped flying in 2011. This has created the perception that the United
States depends on others in spacea space hitchhiker rather than program leader.
Furthermore, todays NASA projects are no longer rousing the interest of the
American public. NASA is currently working on missions that involve capturing an
asteroid, developing a solar electric propulsion system, flying commercial
spaceflights that include crewed missions to alleviate reliance on the Russians, and
a menu of other sciencerelated missionsbut none of these have captured much
attention. It also has a largely aspirational Mars programaspirational because of
significant underfunding.3
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Johnson-Freese.pdf
The culture of American exceptionalism makes it difficult to give up the space
program all together. While some perceptions of decline might be tempered by
cooperation with countries like China, that option has been held hostage by U.S.
politics and is unlikely to change in the near future. Unless countries such as China
and India essentially halt their space programs (an unlikely scenario), the United
States will tacitly lose its perceived space leadership over the next ten years.
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Johnson-Freese.pdf
A 2014 Pew Research Center/Smithsonian Magazine poll on American public
attitudes toward space exploration showed that Americans are keen for space
exploration but disinclined to spend money on it.10 This is not a new attitude. Even
when America triumphantly leapt into space with the Apollo Program, enthusiasm
for actual space expenditure was lukewarm. Benjamin Wormald with the Pew
Research Center notes:
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Johnson-Freese.pdf
Leadership in space is still considered an indicator of national technological
prowess, which translates into geostrategic influence. The United States benefited
greatly from the considerable geostrategic influence generated from the success of
the Apollo Program. Apollo was an early soft power tool, an example of leadership
that drew admiration from nations around the world. Today, however, that global
space-related admiration is largely directed at other countries, primarily China, with
its highly visible human spaceflight and robotic lunar program.
what the public wants and what it is willing to pay for regarding space activity, the
chances that the United States will again be able to perform the space spectaculars
on a regular basis that the public seems to require as criteria for leadership are low.
http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Johnson-Freese.pdf
The U.S. space program is not moribund, military space activities continue to
outpace other countries, and no country is doing anything in space that has not
already been done by the United States. But having started with a space
spectacular of the Apollo Program variety, it is difficult to continue that kind of
momentum, particularly when the public sees space activity as a good thing to do,
but as expendable when ranked against other government supported programs. The
reality is that space, as in other areas of international relations, will be a multipolar
environment in the future. Americas unipolar moment is over in international
relations, and its incontrovertible space leadership is ending as well. That is not to
say that the United States will not continue to lead in some areas of space activity. If
only by virtue of a naturally heftier budget, the United States will be able to lead in
select capacities. But the days of total leadership are over. Without the necessary
funding and political support, the United States leadership in space will continue to
declineeffectively a victim of its own success. It will be a tough pill to swallow for
those who crave exceptionalismbut if we are unwilling to pay for space program
funding, the challenge to American exceptionalism will remain.
The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) refers to the space
environment as increasingly congested, contested and competitive.[4] Simply by
virtue of the increased number of spacecraft in orbit certain space orbits are
becoming more crowded, or congested. The United States, however, has more
spacecraft creating that crowded situation than any other nation. As of January 31,
2015, the United States has 528 satellites in orbit, compared to Chinas 132,
Russias 131 and all other nations combined 434. Unless, however, it is the U.S.
expectation that other countries would consider the unfettered use of space as a
U.S. entitlement, it is perhaps neither unexpected nor unreasonable that space is
increasing congested, and perhaps then by extrapolation contested and
competitive.
Since a 19th century formulation known as the Caroline test, preemptive selfdefense has been upheld as within the bounds of customary international law if the
necessity is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. Prevention, however, are actions taken in the short term
to fend off a longer-term, potential threat. As with Iraq, preventive actions are
frequently referred to as preemptive, for political and legal justification. Given the
ambiguous, dual-use nature of space technology and the difficulties that come into
play with determining accountability for actions taking place hundreds, maybe
thousands of miles in space, the potential for error in determining, anticipating and
reacting to the activities of others is significant.
Chinese space hawks are doing their share to up to provocative and bombastic
rhetoric as well. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Chief General Xu Qiliang
stated in 2009 that competition between military forces in space is a historical
inevitability.[7] Though quickly contradicted by then Chinese President Hu Jintao,
Qiliang continued to advance through the military ranks to the vice-chairmanship of
the Central Military Committee, the first air force officer to do so.
Overall, and in keeping with the government proclivity for tri-part descriptors, the
space environment between the U.S. and China is one where misunderstanding,
misinterpretation and mistrust prevail.
The policy shift appears to coincide with the 2014 Chinese missile defense/ASAT
test. Rhetoric since then, as space analyst Victoria Samson at the Secure World
Foundation phrased it, has been part of an effort to prime the pump[9] to a policy
heavily skewed toward military operations. Specifically, space control, a term
with a historically military, offensive connotation, has become the buzzword in
national security space discussion. That term had been widely used by the George
W. Bush administration, but put aside by the Obama Administration in favor of
strategic restraint, a policy that included a full spectrum of policy options,
including counterspace operations as well as diplomatic, multilateral approaches to
shape the space environment. The latter now seem to have been deemphasized at
best, or simply left in the dust.
It is likely that the tone of space rhetoric will continue on its current course, focusing
on military answers to challenges and threats. While those solutions are a necessary
part of maintaining the space environment so it is available for all responsible space
faring nations to use, they are necessary but not sufficient answers. Rhetoric and
accompanying action must also include earnest efforts to shape the space
environment.
Professor of Global Diplomacy John Stoessinger, writing about Vietnam, considered
the word tragedy. He asked whether it was an example of Greek tragedy, the
tragedy of necessity, in which the feeling aroused in the spectator is What a pity it
had to be this way or of Christian tragedy, the tragedy of possibility, in which the
feeling aroused is What a pity it was this way when it might have been
otherwise.[10] Space war neednt be inevitable. It is not a Greek tragedy.
dying in a commercial airplane crash. Yet we spend far less on avoiding the former
risk than the latter.
A new report from the National Academy of Sciences discusses efforts to detect
near earth objects (NEOs). Progress is mixed:
The United States is currently the only country with an active, governmentsponsored effort to detect and track potentially hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs)
Congress has mandated that NASA detect and track 90 percent of NEOs that are
1 kilometer in diameter or larger. These objects represent a great potential hazard
to life on Earth and could cause global destruction. NASA is close to accomplishing
this goal.
Congress has more recently mandated that by 2020 NASA should detect and track
90 percent of NEOs that are 140 meters in diameter or larger, a category of objects
that is generally recognized to represent a very significant threat to life on Earth
if they strike in or near urban areas.The administration has not requested and
Congress has not appropriated new funds to meet this objective.[Thus] the
current near-Earth object surveys cannot meet the goals of the 2005
NASA Authorization Act
Moreover, detection is only the first step towards deflection.
As a classroom discussion starter I like the video embedded below. The jovial
attitude of the announcers contrasts amusingly with the topic while subtly
illustrating some of our biases in perception yet the video does cover the main
points about the worldwide risk, the fact that asteroid deflection is a public good
and it hints at the free rider problem. I do doubt the bit about the riches available
from asteroid mining. Enjoy.
The U.S. and Chinese governments already discuss satellite collision avoidance and
conduct joint research into greenhouse gas monitoring, severe weather monitoring,
space weather and climate science. This cooperation seems to produce little fruit. It
certainly has not affected Chinese behavior vis--vis its relationship with the United
States. Indeed, last fall, hackers in China attacked a U.S. partner to these
cooperative relationships, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
leading the agency briefly to stop making satellite weather data available to the
public. If this is what it means to cooperate with China in space, the United States is
better off without it.
The U.S. and Chinese governments already discuss satellite collision avoidance and
conduct joint research into greenhouse gas monitoring, severe weather monitoring,
space weather and climate science. This cooperation seems to produce little fruit. It
certainly has not affected Chinese behavior vis--vis its relationship with the United
States. Indeed, last fall, hackers in China attacked a U.S. partner to these
cooperative relationships, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
leading the agency briefly to stop making satellite weather data available to the
public. If this is what it means to cooperate with China in space, the United States is
better off without it.
http://spacenews.com/op-ed-china-talk-and-cooperation-in-space/
Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems
developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this
and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and
defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit.
A U.S.-China dialog on space matters can be valuable. Both countries have interests
in collision avoidance, debris mitigation and promotion of the open language of
science. Greater transparency into Chinese antisatellite activities, of which there are
many, would be welcome by many in the international community. There is,
however, little compelling reason for those discussions to evolve into civil space
cooperation.
With that in mind, congressional oversight will be critical to ensure that the State
Departments regular bilateral governmental consultations do not take on a life of
their own or create misguided momentum toward an institutional partnership of
space programs.
The Apollo 17 astronauts left a plaque on the moon that read, May the spirit of
peace in which we came be reflected in the lives of all mankind. It is not a
sentiment China shares. Until Beijing subscribes to that philosophy, the U.S.-Chinese
space agenda should remain in the realm of conversation and information
exchanges, staying away from true cooperation.
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-space-cooperation-awelcome-dialogue-begins/
There are some fundamental questions about the U.S.-China relationship that might
prove useful in guiding future policy. Does it support or go against U.S. interests to
keep its friends close and enemies closer? If the answer to that is yes, then either
way, the U.S. should pursue expanded opportunities to work with China in space. Is
in the best interests of the United States to have China stable, or imploding? If the
answer is stable, then we inherently must learn to work with China in areas of
mutual interest. Is the sustainability of the space environment in the interests of the
United States? If it is, there is no choice but to work with China on a variety of space
issues. A second meeting is scheduled for 2016 in Washington, D.C. Hopefully real
progress will be made in advancing cooperation in at least one of the areas initially
broached at the recent September meeting.
Space cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was judiciously used as a
mechanism to build broader areas of trust during the Cold War, and Post-Cold War
years. The United States knows how to successfully conduct space diplomacy. It is
an aberration that today it has to be done in secret so as not to draw the
sensationalist ire of politicians and pundits. Fostering cooperation is an integral part
of the Space Act that created NASA. Ironically, perhaps through the continued,
unintended help of Hollywood the public will recognize the wisdom of allowing
NASA, OSTP and the State Department to do their jobs, and begin to take an active
role in demanding inclusive space cooperation.
Plans for this recent U.S. China Dialogue on Civil Space was first announced last
June, consequent to the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue. As online space-policy analyst Marcia Smith stated regarding the Sept 28
meeting, details are scant.[1] Mainstream media coverage has been virtually nonexistent. Most likely, flying under the radar has been okay with the U.S. State
Department, which chaired the Beijing meeting along with the Chinese National
Space Administration (CNSA). Otherwise, critics would have undoubtedly trotted out
their litany of reasonsranging from human rights and freedom of religion to
concerns, some valid and some overblown, about technology transferwhy the
United States should scrap one of its most valuable policy tools, diplomacy, and not
communicate with the Chinese regarding space. Thats the kind of convoluted
reasoning that resulted in a legislative ban since 2011 on bilateral cooperation cum
communication between NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) with China. Careful to stay within Congressional guidelines, that legislation
left it to the State Department to chair the recent Beijing meeting.
China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United
States, the country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive
interview.
Fifteen nations including the United States, Russia and Japan cooperate on
International Space Station missions, but China's involvement has always been a
non-starter because of longstanding resistance from U.S. legislators.
But the modern race to the stars is not just about money, it's driven by
technological advances and cooperation.
The International Space Station (ISS) houses a veritable United Nations in space
with 15 countries contributing including the U.S., Russia and Japan.
But not China.
China's 21 astronauts are locked out of the ISS, largely because of pressure from
U.S. legislators.
In 2011, Congress banned NASA from working bilaterally with anyone from the
Chinese space program on national security concerns.
But a recent exhaustive report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission says China's improving space capability "has negative sum
consequences for U.S. military security."
"China is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as a government that seeks to take our
intellectual property, national secrets and treasure and thus Congress is not willing
to partner with them," says CNN space and aviation analyst Miles O'Brien.
"I think it is ultimately a mistake."
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
On 14 April 2014, Xi was reported to have given a speech before a PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) audience in which he called for an integrated air and space capability.
This phrase was also used by former PLAAF commander General Xu Qiliang during
the 2009 PLAAF 60th anniversary, and by military academic commentators which
listed space weapons the PLA should acquire. Perhaps Xi Jinping also gave the
PLAAF specific space warfare preparation guidance. While there has been some
discussion in the PLA of a new service or a Space Force, today it appears that
current services of the PLA are being encouraged to develop individual space
combat capabilities. Based on an accumulation of data, it is possible to conclude
that the PLAs apparent goal is to exercise denial and then dominance in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) and then to extend control into the Earth-Moon system. Since the early
1990s China has developed four, possibly five, attackcapable space-combat
systems. China may be the only country developing such variety of space weapons
to include: ground-based and air-launched counter-space weapons; unmanned
space combat and Earth-attack platforms; and dual-use manned platforms. It is also
important to consider that the PLAs projection into space is an integral part of
Chinas development of military capabilities to dominate the Asia-Pacific region, and
then to project power globally into the 2020s and 2030s. The PLA requires
increasing space control in order to assure that space-based Information
Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) systems can provide targeting and other and
support for missile, air, naval and ground forces, future intercontinental Prompt
Global Strike (PSG) forces, and for the forces of client/partner states. Sustaining
superiority in LEO, in turn, will require control of the High Ground, or the Moon and
Deep Space.
For the United States, cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but
it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts
which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with
Chinese space officials, especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns
over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this juncture, before
China has achieved levels of space dominance, it is crucial to link any real
cooperation with China to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S.
security.
COOPERATION BAD
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space
corporations, or government institutions at this time presents two risks. First it could
encourage China to advance an illusion of cooperation with the U.S. and the West
while differences on Earth become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to
deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S. options and
actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any new access
for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
Chinas increasing space power, however, like its growing economic and political
power, cannot be contained. Russia appears ready to greatly expand space and
military cooperation with China as part of a larger strategic alignment, while the
European Space Agency is edging toward greater cooperation with China. These
attractions may only increase if China has the only LEO manned space station in the
mid-2020s. Already a top commercial space service and technology provider, China
will use its gathering space diplomacy tools to aid its pursuit of economic, political
and military influence in critical regions like Africa and Latin America.
likely less expensive option of a far cis-lunar presence to further develop manned
deep space capabilities.
COOPERATION BAD
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
As was the case with the former Soviet Union, relative peace on Earth or in space
will not truly be possible until China evolves beyond its Leninist dictatorship. In its
final years, the Soviet Union was on the cusp of deploying multiple space combat
systems despite years of U.S.-Soviet space diplomacy. Real space cooperation
between Russia the West became possible only after the fall of the Soviet Union,
and may again become threatened by Russias slide into authoritarian aggression.
Substantive cooperation with China in space offers no assurance that China will
change its threatening behaviors on Earth or in space, but does create opportunities
for China to exploit U.S. and Western space technology to gain potential military
advantages.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
Fears for political survival and ambitions for global leadership remain the basis for
Chinas current surge for global military power and space power. The greatest
impetus for the most recent phase of PLA modernization and buildup was the shock
of the 1989 Tiananmen rebellion -- the only time the Partys power position was
actually threatened by popular, though unorganized, reformist and democratic
demands. In addition to ruthlessly crushing any potential for democratic dissent, the
transitioning CCP leadership of Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin decided to begin the
broad military and space modernization and buildup we see today.
Provided the CCP survives to expand its power, by 2030 China will require
increasing space power in order to support its expanding global projection forces on
Earth, and because military competition in space will have become more intense,
largely due to Chinas continued development of space combat capabilities. It is
likely that an expansion in the number of space combat programs by individual
services will have prompted the PLA to create a unique Space Force. While
Chinas first manned forays to the Moon may not occur until soon after 2030, plans
will have advanced significantly toward the creation of a permanent Moon Base by
2050 or sooner. A proliferation of its space combat systems around the Earth will
push China to seek increasing advantage, setting the stage for its strategic-military
development of the Moon.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
What if, in about 100 years, breakthroughs in space propulsion make it possible to
reach Mars in weeks, versus months or years? Should the Earths economy come to
be dominated increasingly by access to resources on Mars, then the Moon and the
Langrangian Points become the nearest parking garages to support that
commerce. So from a very long term perspective it may be attractive to the PLA to
secure a dominant position on the Moon in order to have the option to secure
access to other potentially strategic positions in the Earth-Moon system.
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf
After nearly 25 years of continuous development of its current ASAT systems, China
shows little inclination to consider constraints on its space combat system
development. So far China has demonstrated four, possibly five, ASAT systems;
ground based lasers, two ground launched ASATs; and both an unmanned and a
possible manned co-orbital interceptor. It is reasonable for the United States to
conclude that it needs to develop appropriate capabilities to deter the CCP/PLA from
starting a shooting war in space. This should include capabilities that produce rapid
symmetrical effects following Chinese attacks against U.S. space assets. It may not
be necessary for the U.S. to match every Chinese space combat development, but
the U.S. may require its own variety of space combat capabilities.
As it seeks to deter via retaliation and resilience, the U.S. must also be investing in
strategic-positional deterrence, or simply put, make sure it can contest the high
ground-- which for the near term means the Moon. For the U.S. to bypass the Moon
and simply invest in a Mars program that many take many decades to materialize,
and leave China to build dominance over the Moon, would constitute strategic
myopia for the United States. Under national policies of civil-military integration
China likely seek military benefits from its presence on the Moon, perhaps to include
developing options to block U.S. access to Mars. Essential to exercising the option to
build a Moon or Cis-Lunar presence would be the development of the heavy lift
Space Launch System (SLS), and encouraging private companies to develop more
efficient medium-heavy lift SLVs. While the U.S. government may not necessarily
require a program to physically return to the Moon, it should retain the means to get
there if required, and it should actively encourage multinational government-private
initiatives to build an unmanned or manned Moon presence.
This could offer a new broad international program to succeed the ISS. It has the
advantage of allowing space-faring nations with interests in deep space, like India
and Japan, to own this project from the beginning and to leverage their
participation to develop respective national capabilities such as heavy SLVs. A large
multinational Moon program could create positive pressures for Russia and China
play nice and, depending upon relations on Earth, advance an opportunity for
peaceful cooperation that may offer a better chance to challenge Chinas
spacenationalist policies. If this does not work, then the West will have secured a
presence on the Moon that can at least offer options to respond to possible Chinese
or Russian military exploitation.
A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in space
with China cannot be separated from Chinas ambitions on Earth or out into space.
Likewise, for the United States to wall off space cooperation with China and to
treat it as a special realm only plays into Chinas game. As long as it is ruled by
the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan,
militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like
Pakistan, become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and
Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It is imperative
for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering Chinas
expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to U.S. security than is
space cooperation with China.
China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. It seeks increased influence and
independence from foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving Chinas
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political system. Over the long
term, China seeks to transform the international system to better suit its interests,
but seeks to integrate itself into the existing international system over the short
term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment into one in
which it is dominant. Chinas pursuit of space power is intended to carry out this
strategy. China views the development of space power as a necessary move for a
country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, Chinas goal is to
become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry
that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a
comprehensive, long-term approach to its space program that emphasizes the
accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By
placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing
ample funding, the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its
space program can prosper. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it
is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to
become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as
the United States is in space.
Chinas space program assists the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to
achieve information superiority, defined as the ability to freely use information and
the ability to deny the use of information to an adversary. Based on their analysis of
U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical
component in making the PLA into a force capable of winning informatized wars
and recognize the role space plays in the collection and transmittal of information
and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary. Indeed, nearly every
Chinese source describes space as the ultimate high ground, leading many
Chinese analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the
preeminence of the space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will
become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and
controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the
initiative is to achieve space supremacy.
CHINA STRONG
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Pollpeter_Testimony.pdf
China has made impressive progress in space technologies since 2000. China now
has nearly a full range of satellites to accomplish a variety of missions. These
include remote sensing satellites with various resolutions and covering various
spectrums, a satellite navigation system, communication satellites, and robust
human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs.
The PLA also recognizes that it must deny the use of information to its opponents.
Chinese analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR capabilities by
potential adversaries, especially the United States, requires the PLA to develop
capabilities to attack space systems. According to the U.S. Defense Department,
China has a broad-based development program for counterspace technology that
consists of jammers, direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directedenergy weapons, and
co-orbital spacecraft.1 Chinas development of counterspace weapons appears to
be aimed at developing an all-around capability to threaten satellites with a variety
of weapons at all orbits.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter
%202%2C%20Section%202%20-%20China%27s%20Space%20and
%20Counterspace%20Programs.pdf
China has become one of the top space powers in the world after decades of high
prioritization and steady investment from its leaders, indigenous research and
development, and a significant effort to buy or otherwise appropriate technologies
from foreign sources, especially the United States. Chinas aspirations are driven by
its assessment that space power enables the countrys military modernization and
would allow it to challenge U.S. information superiority during a conflict. As the
Commission has documented in previous reports, China has asserted sovereignty
over much of the East and South China seas, as well as Taiwan, and is engaged in a
course of aggressive conduct to enforce those claims against its neighbors. Among
other purposes, Chinas space and counterspace programs are designed to support
its conduct as part of its antiaccess/area denial * strategy to prevent or impede U.S.
intervention in a potential conflict. China also believes that space power drives the
countrys economic and technological advancement and provides the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) with significant domestic political legitimacy and
international prestige. Although Chinas space capabilities still generally lag behind
those of the United States and Russia, its space program is expanding and
accelerating rapidly as many other countries programs proceed with dwindling
resources and limited goals.
In the early 1980s, China set out to transform its military from a large infantrybased army designed to fight protracted wars into a smaller, well-trained, and
informationized force.* China accelerated this effort in 2004, when the PLA
formally institutionalized the concept of informationization. 30 Since then, the
PLA has based its preparations for military struggle on the strategy of winning
local wars under the conditions of informationization, ac cording to authoritative
PLA documents.* 31 This requires China to narrow the technology gap between the
PLA and the worlds most advanced militaries through a focus on information
technology and on developing and procuring new, high-tech communications and
data fusion systems for battle space management and for longrange, accurate
weapons. At the operational level, PLA writings identify information superiority as
the key factor in all antiaccess/ area denial tasks, which includes the fielding of an
integrated air defense and the coordination and synchronization of strikes against
an adversarys forces. According to Chinas most recent Science of Campaigns, an
authoritative document on PLA campaigns published by Chinas National Defense
University, the struggle for . . . information superiority has infiltrated into each
campaign phase . . . and become a decisive condition for seizing the battlefield
initiative. 32 PLA strategists and analysts recognize that space forces are crucial to
the PLAs transformation into an informationized force as well as its ability to
achieve information superiority during a conflict. According to Dean Cheng, senior
research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at the Heritage Foundation,
these PLA analysts have specifically noted that more and more essential data . . .
is gathered from or transits through satellites. They assess that space systems
now provide a majority of battlefield communication, battlefield surveillance and
reconnaissance, weather condition assessment, and precision guidance functions,
rendering space dominance an essential component of realizing information
dominance. 33 The PLA has accordingly developed space capabilities in pursuit of
achieving these and other functions, including ISR, ballistic missile warning, space
launch detection and characterization, environmental monitoring, satellite
communication, and position, navigation, and timing. Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance. Space-based systems can monitor areas of interest to help
provide Chinas political and military leaders with information on an adversarys
location, disposition, and intent; assist in tracking, targeting, and engaging an
adversarys forces; and provide a means to conduct battle damage assessment.
They also can provide situational awareness and warning of attack. Ballistic
Missile Warning. Space-based systems, in conjunction with ground-based systems
and operators, can provide Chinas political and military leaders with timely warning
and characterization of foreign ballistic missile events and nuclear detonations to
support threat/non-threat determination and followon decision making. Space
Launch Detection and Characterization. Space-based systems, in conjunction with
ground-based systems, can provide information necessary to assess both foreign
and domestic space launches. Launch detection data can be used to evaluate
events that could directly or indirectly threaten Chinas space assets so the PLA can
achieve timely warning and take appropriate countermeasures. This capability also
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Like other space powers, China uses its space program to enhance its international
prestige and influence. Analysis of authoritative Chinese documents indicates
Beijing believes successful space activities, particularly human spaceflight, provide
important geo-strategic benefits, such as bolstering Chinas international image,
promoting a role for China on the world stage commensurate with what it sees as its
growing international status, and increasing Chinas ability to influence international
policy generally and international space policy specifically.65 For example, as China
moves from a regional to global PNT service provider, Beijing could use the Beidou
system as leverage to obtain more influence over PNT-related decisions in
international and regional organizations such as the International
Telecommunications Union,66 the International Committee on Global Navigation
Satellite Systems, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization. The CCP also uses Chinas space program
to rally public support, a move indicative of the partys larger strategy to legitimize
itself by convincing the Chinese people it is delivering economic growth and a better
quality of life while restoring China to its rightful place as a world leader following
the countrys so-called century of humiliation from the mid-19th to the mid-20th
centuries. Mr. Pollpeter explains: The CCP is now communist in name only, and its
continued legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and nationalistic benefits
in an informal social contract with its citizens: the CCP agrees to increase the
standard of living and develop China into an internationally respected country, and
the people agree not to rebel. By developing a robust space program and
participating in high-profile activities such as human spaceflight and lunar
exploration, the CCP can demonstrate that it is the best provider of material
benefits to the Chinese people and the best organization to propel China to its
rightful place in world affairs.67 China collaborates with other countries on a range
of bilateral and multilateral space activities, including satellite development, space
exploration, human spaceflight, space object surveillance and identification, and
space R&D.68 Many of these engagements are designed to facilitate Chinas
acquisition of new technologies from technologically-advanced states and to
promote the export of Chinas space technologies to states with space programs
lagging behind its own.69 Others are intended to help China achieve a level of
space situational awareness that enables the PLAs offensive and defense space
missions and supports Chinas orbital debris detection, mitigation plans, and
operations.
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With its headquarters located in Beijing, APSCO is Chinas primary entity for
multilateral cooperation on space. China led the founding of the formal,
membership-only organization in 2008 as a successor to the Asia-Pacific Multilateral
Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications organization.70 Aside from
China, APSCO has seven other member countries,* all of which have less advanced
space programs than that of China. APSCO members hold conferences, engage in
joint training efforts, and cooperate on multilateral research and development
projects. 71 These efforts allow China to position itself as a purveyor of space
technology and expertise to lesser-developed states; China has, for example,
donated ground systems and will provide remote sensing data to other member
countries. 72 Chinas leaders also likely use Beijings central role in APSCO to
promote the export of its space technology and services in order to gain support for
its space goals in the Asia Pacific region, as well as to obtain supplementary data
and geographic coverage for its space situational awareness efforts.
China for satellite launch services. Following the loss of the space shuttle Challenger
in 1986, which effectively ended the United States plan to launch future military
and commercial satellites aboard space shuttles, the United States faced a shortage
of satellite launch facilities and began contracting launches out to other countries,
including China. During this period, China launched a total of 19 U.S.-manufactured
commercial satellites. Cooperation ended in 1999 when Congress passed a law
prohibiting the launch of U.S. satellites by China, following revelations that several
U.S. companies involved in the Chinese launches had illegally transferred potentially
sensitive military information to China and that China had stolen classified
information on advanced U.S. nuclear weapons technology.194 Since this decision,
aside from limited instances of cooperation, U.S.-China space relations have
stagnated due to ongoing U.S. government concerns about Chinas efforts to illicitly
procure U.S. space technology.* Washington also remains wary of Chinas intentions
as a growing space power, particularly with respect to Chinas lack of transparency
regarding its intentions in space and Chinas focus on developing counterspace
capabilities to restrict U.S. freedom of movement in space.
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The law further applies this limitation to any funds used to effectuate the hosting
of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA. It only
allows for NASA to engage in activities which NASA or OSTP have certified pose no
risk of resulting in technology transfer, data, or other information with national
security or economic security implications to China or a Chinese-owned company,
requiring the certification to be submitted to Congress 14 days beforehand.199
Language added in 2013 requires that these activities also not involve knowing
interactions with officials who have been determined by the United States to have
direct involvement with violations of human rights. 200 Under this law, NASAs
administrator has still been able to meet with Chinese counterparts in China and in
official multilateral settings, and visits by Chinese nationals to NASA facilities are
permitted if certified and presented to Congress as required.201 The law has
notably disallowed participation by Chinese astronauts in missions to the
International Space Station, though Chinas noninvolvement in the program
predates 2011.* 202 Additionally, a ban mistakenly placed by NASA officials on
Chinese scientists participation at an international NASA conference in 2013 was
misattributed to the law.203 Chinas pursuit of enhanced bilateral space
cooperation has included efforts to persuade the United States to lift these
restrictions, with a 2013 commentary in state-run PLA Daily specifically calling for
the removal of the Wolf Clause that bans China-U.S. space cooperation,
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Other observers have suggested it is possible for the United States to improve
space cooperation with China while also protecting U.S. security interests and
supporting the U.S. space programs development. In his testimony to the
Commission, Philip Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Affairs of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, argued, there are other areas such as many scientific applications and
manned space flight where the United States can share information and
experiences without compromising national security and can benefit from growing
Chinese investments in space capabilities and Chinas potential contributions to
international space cooperation. 211
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Space activities are critical to the United States technological advancement,
scientific discovery, security, and economic growth. As outlined in the Obama
Administrations 2010 National Space Policy, the utilization of space has
transformed every aspect of U.S. society, and the benefits of space permeate daily
life in the United States: Satellites contribute to increased transparency and stability
among nations and provide a vital communications path for avoiding potential
conflicts. Space systems increase our knowledge in many scientific fields, and life
on Earth is far better as a result. The utilization of space has created new markets;
helped save lives by warning us of natural disasters, expediting search and rescue
operations, and making recovery efforts faster and more effective; made agriculture
and natural resource management more efficient and sustainable; expanded our
frontiers; and provided global access to advanced medicine, weather forecasting,
geospatial information, financial operations, broadband and other communications,
and scores of other activities worldwide. Space systems allow people and
governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty,
navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance.214 Space capabilities also
have enhanced U.S. security and have been a key element of warfighting for more
than 30 yearsto the extent that U.S. national security is now dependent on the
space domain. According to the joint DODIntelligence Community National Security
Space Strategy, published in 2011: Space capabilities provide the United States and
our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military
operations, and homeland security. Space systems provide national security
decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a decision advantage by
enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. Moreover, space
systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as well as
supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification. Space systems are also
critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor
long-term environmental trends.215
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In addition to the implications it poses for U.S. military interests, the rapid
expansion of Chinas space industry could also have economic consequences for the
United States. First, Chinas persistent global marketing of its commercial satellite
and space launch services has the potential to cut into U.S. market share in these
areas, though it has had little effect on established satellite manufacturers or the
international launch market thus far. Although Chinas current effort focuses on
growing its satellite exports to lower-income buyers, it almost certainly will
eventually expand to higher-end markets, following a business plan similar to that of
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Chinas launch service costs compare
favorably with those of Arianespace, the major European provider, and may match
those of SpaceX, the low-cost leading U.S. private firm, as described earlier. In
addition, according to one former European space executive, China has broken into
the launch services market by offering prices at as low as three-quarters of the
launches cost, suggesting heavy government assistance on top of low initial costs
will enable China to successfully compete for broader market share in the future.
Furthermore, China often packages its satellite exports and launch services
together, and also reaps cost and experience bene fits from blending its civilian and
military space infrastructure, which is expected to provide additional competitive
advantages. An executive for U.S. company SpaceX, which has led a resurgence in
U.S. commercial launch market share after U.S. organizations were priced out of the
market until recently, stated in 2013 that the company views China as its main
competition. However, in a July 2015 meeting with the Commission, the China Great
Wall Industry Corporation asserted that it is unable to compete with Western
counterparts due to U.S. export controls, indicating that obstacles remain despite
Chinas cost advantages.221 Second, Chinas designation of the Beidou satellite
navigation systemplanned to provide global service by 2020as national
infrastructure, and introduction of preferential policies to promote its place in
Chinas domestic satellite navigation market, will directly impact the market share
of GPS and related products within China.222 While GPS usage provides no
revenues to the United States, Beidou is also intended to foster development in
downstream industries such as mobile internet applications, which may affect U.S.
firms market share in these industries.223 Third, U.S. International Trafficking in
Arms Regulations (ITAR), altered by the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act to
no longer include exports of many satellites and satellite technologies but still in
force for China, have prompted many European countries and their industries to
pursue ITAR-free exports in order to reach the Chinese marketby definition
necessitating the exclusion of U.S. technologies from these products. Mr. Nurkin
testified to the Commission that concern over U.S. export controls on space-related
items and confusion over which items are on the list of banned items for export and,
importantly, which ones will be in the future, has led international industry,
especially the European space industry, which has far less severe export guidelines
for space technologies, to endeavor to design ITAR-free solutions, effectively cutting
out U.S. based suppliers of ITAR-restricted items from international supply chains.
224 Mr. Nurkin suggested that export control reform should focus on increasing
protection on a small number of systems and technologies that the United States is
and should be unwilling to offer on the open market instead of focusing on the
many technologies that China probably already has access to from foreign partners,
particularly Europe.225 In May 2015, General James Cartwright, former vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Honorable Sean OKeefe, former NASA
administrator, reiterated that U.S. ITAR regulations are not currently in line with the
pace of technological innovation and are therefore in need of reform in order to
protect the U.S. space industrys global competitiveness.
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Chinas thriving space programs have important political implications as well, most
importantly in their potential to present a future challenge to the United States
position as a leading space power. Chinas human spaceflight program may be
repeating many of the same accomplishments the United States achieved in the
1970s, but it also is tempering U.S. superiority in civilian space capabilities and
lessening U.S. influence in the international space community. Roger Handberg,
professor at the University of Central Florida, testified to the Commission that
psychologically, momentum appears to be moving in Chinas favor with the
possibility of actually moving ahead of the United States over the next two
decades. 227 China is gaining sway among lesser space nations by sharing space
technologies, supplying training and financing for developing satellites, and
providing launch services. Beijings push into new space markets could undermine
U.S. efforts to prevent countries from obtaining certain dual-use space technologies.
China is developing capabilities that could allow it to compete in sending humans
and other payloads to the Moon and beyond, even as the United States now
depends on Russian launch vehicles and sites to send humans into space.228
Chinas new space station, slated for completion in 2022 while the deorbiting of the
International Space Station is scheduled for 2024, will provide Beijing greater
prestige in the international system and expand its growing space presence
concurrent with declining U.S. influence in space. Not only will China have the only
space station in orbit, but it also will have the ability to choose its partners and
determine the countries with which it will share technologies and experimental data.
In this sense, the space station likely will serve as a diplomatic tool China can
leverage to execute its broader foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, given current
Congressional restrictions on U.S.-China space cooperation, the United States would
not participate in Chinas space station program barring changes to annual
appropriations legislation. For the first time in decades, the United States could be
without a constant human presence in space.
China has become one of the top space powers in the world after decades of high
prioritization and steady investment from Chinas leaders, indigenous research and
development, and a significant effort to buy or otherwise appropriate technologies
from foreign sources, especially the United States. Although Chinas space
capabilities still generally lag behind those of the United States and Russia, its
space program is expanding and accelerating rapidly as many other nations
programs proceed with dwindling resources and limited goals.
China likely has capitalized on international cooperation to acquire the bulk of the
technology and expertise needed for most of its space programs. China probably
will continue to pursue close cooperation with international partners to overcome
specific technical challenges and to meet its research and development objectives
and launch timelines.
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%20Dream_Report.pdf
Nevertheless, Chinas efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a
military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S.
leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests. Even if U.S. space power
continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid advance in space
technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At
its current trajectory, Chinas space program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space
program, will at some point be good enough to adequately support modern military
operations, compete commercially, and deliver political gains that will serve its
broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of its own
destiny.
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The rise of Chinas space program presents military, economic, and political
challenges to the United States. As the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states,
Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging
threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and
enable global economic viability. 3 Chinas efforts to use its space program to
transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may thus come
at the expense of U.S. leadership in both absolute and relative terms.
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China has also been able to use its space program to further its diplomatic
objectives and to increase its influence in the developing world and among secondtier space powers. China conducts numerous international cooperative activities
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The importance of the space program is rooted in the importance of the role high
technology plays in Chinas development. According to one researcher, building
China as a strong space power is the only way that China can rejuvenate to have
wealth and power. 36 According to this view, space technologies are both high risk
yet a high value added strategic industry that places great demands on a countrys
research and development apparatus across many different industries.37 As a
result, the development of space technologies is both a display of a countrys
technological capability and by extension a display of its military, economic, and
scientific capabilities, but also a necessary move for a country that wants to
strengthen its national power.38
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The Chinese government also uses its space program for domestic and international
political gain. Space programs are described as an indicator of a countrys
comprehensive national power and as a measure of a countrys rank in the world.
The Chinese leadership believes that major powers have large space programs, and
to be considered a major power one must have the trappings of a big power. This
sentiment was most evident in the approval of the human spaceflight program,
when many in the top leadership voiced support for the program based on its effect
on prestige.112 The space programs effect on prestige is also directed inward. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now communist in name only, and its continued
legitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and nationalistic benefits in an
informal social contract with its citizens: the CCP agrees to increase the standard of
living and develop China into an internationally respected country, and the people
agree not to rebel. By developing a robust space program and participating in highprofile activities such as human space flight and lunar exploration, the CCP can
demonstrate that it is the best provider of material benefits to the Chinese people
and the best organization to propel China to its rightful place in world affairs. China
conducts numerous cooperative activities with other countries and states that it
holds international exchanges and cooperation to promote inclusive space
development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, peaceful utilization and
common development. 113 China pursues cooperative activities for a number of
reasons. These include improving its international position, increasing its influence
among less developed countries, and technology transfer. This section details
Chinas major multilateral and bilateral space cooperation activities.
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The law, however, did allow NASA to engage in activities which NASA or OSTP have
certified pose no risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other
information with national security or economic security implications to China or a
Chinese-owned company but that any certification shall be submitted to the
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate no
later than 14 days prior to the activity in question and shall include a description of
the purpose of the activity, its major participants, and its location and timing. 199
Since the passage of the law, NASA activities with China have been curtailed, and
no additional visits between NASA and CNSA have occurred in a bilateral setting. In
2013, however, Wolf accused NASA of not abiding by the notification clause when
NASA hosted Chinese officials at the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
(CEOS), a multilateral body made up of 23 countries to ensure international
coordination of civil space-based earth observation programs and promote the
exchange of data to optimize societal benefit and inform decision making for
securing a prosperous and sustainable future for humankind. 200 NASA, on the
other hand, argued that the restrictions and reporting requirements for Chinese
participation at NASA sponsored events only applied to bilateral events and did not
apply to multilateral events such as CEOS.201 This issue came up again in 2013
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Chinas rise as a space power also appears to have potential negative sum
economic consequences for the United States, although it appears to have had less
of an immediate effect. For example, Chinas entrance into the commercial satellite
sector so far has had little effect on established satellite manufacturers. The
satellites sold to Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Bolivia, and Laos were part of a
competitive package that included launch services, training for local operators, and
low-cost loans through its export-import bank. Indeed, Chinas approach to satellite
exports has been to target countries unable to afford satellites from more
established, higher-priced satellite manufacturers. In this way, Chinas satellite
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Whereas space can contribute to the hard power accumulation of military and
economic capabilities, it can also work to increase Chinas soft power. According to
Joseph Nye, soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people
by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract,
and attraction often leads to acquiescence. 629 Although measuring the effects of
soft power is difficult, Nye writes that it rests on the ability to shape the
preferences of others. 630 Chinas burgeoning space program is used as one of the
many barometers of its rise as a military, economic, and political power. It reinforces
the image that China is a dynamic country capable of doing things well and also a
country with which relations can be beneficial. This could make China more
attractive, especially to developing countries without strong democratic traditions.
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Even if U.S. space power continues to improve in absolute terms, Chinas rapid
advance in space technologies will result in relative gains that challenge the U.S.
position in space. The real question concerning U.S. competiveness may not be
whether Chinese satellites and launchers are the equal of their U.S. competitors, but
whether their products provide sufficient value. A Chinese industry that can offer
moderately priced but sufficiently capable products may be able to compete
effectively in the market. Similarly, a Chinese space program that can provide a
good enough solution to deter or raise the costs of military intervention for an
adversary may be all that is necessary.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/08/us-national-security-and-risingchina
Space. Space is tremendously important. China is already a first-tier space power.
Theyre launching satellites which can jam satellites; theyre launching satellites
which have operational arms which can pull other satellites out of orbit. A number of
years ago, they exhibited the ability to launch satellites with a kinetic quality, the
ability to hit other satellites. By 2020, theyll have the capacity to destroy or
severely disrupt Americas space architecture in every orbital regime.
Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment testified before the House Armed Services
Committee earlier this year that we cannot overstate the difficulty and the burden
that the U.S. is going to have to maintain information dominance. Our whole military
depends on our satellite structure. If those are struck downour command, our
control, our real-time intelligencewere deaf, dumb, and blind basically.
There are tremendous civilian implications to having the ability to attack the space
architecture as well, because our civilian infrastructure is also dependent on it. Its
the Achilles heel, really, and weve just begun to grapple with the problem. Its
going to take an enormous effort, and its not budgeted for at all now.
The Obama Administration has apparently decided that with nothing to lose
politically, it intends to make strategic and sometimes bold foreign policy moves
before leaving office, in spite of obstructionist roadblocks: normalizing relations with
Cuba, negotiating a nuclear treaty with Iran, and talking with the Chinese about
space among them. It is ironic that talking has become a bold policy move.
Joan Johnson-Freese in Found in Space: Cooperation
US DEDICATED TO SPACE
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1
By an overwhelming margin, Congress passed the US Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, whose intent is to stimulate commercial space development
including mining the Moon and asteroids. This is a major step forward and
demonstrates the commitment of the Obama Administration and of Congress to
commercial development of space. With the law now in place, the space industry is
expected to see the following:
knowledge and technologies exist somewhere in the world where the US may not
have an inherent competitive advantage.
The future that is being created through the new law will create more competitive
opportunities for US commercial space companies. But, this legislation cannot
guarantee them superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared
infrastructure in cislunar space that can reduce communications, transportation and
operating costs.
It is time for Congress to wake up to the emerging commercial space future and
work to fully unleash our commercial space potential rather than complaining about
a very high level meeting in Beijing where common challenges in the peaceful uses
of outer space were discussed with NASA experts present.
China is a country with which the US has very extensive commercial, academic,
financial, cultural and strategic ties. GE, IBM, Caterpillar, and numerous other major
US corporations have extensive R&D operations in China. But the US has no legacy
of collaboration with China in space in space, even dating back to the International
Geophysical Year in 1957 where China chose to not participate due to its perception
of US meddling. China was not invited to participate in ISS. And the Wolf
Amendment seeks to even prevent dialogue with China on the peaceful uses of
outer space.
China is both a developing country and a rapidly growing advanced industrial
economy with significant financial, industrial, and knowledge resources. China also
has a profound understanding of economic development and the role of education,
research, innovation, and technology commercialization as evidenced by its
sustained, rapid economic development. China appears to be an excellent potential
global partner, together with the US and the EU, to lead a global campaign to open
the space frontier to peaceful commercial development for the benefit of all
humanity.
http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/burns/remarks/2014/219501.htm
First, we should encourage more countries to participate in the activities of the
International Space Station. The Station remains the leading space platform for
global research and development. The Station is the foundation for future human
exploration to an asteroid, the Moon, and ultimately Mars. And it is a lasting
testament to how much more we can accomplish together than we can on our own.
spacefaring nations with one notable exception: the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC). The PRC and its national space program, the China National Space
Administration (CNSA), have remained strangely isolated from the rest of the
worlds forays into space. Deep-seated U.S. suspicion against their policies and the
recent enactment of the restrictive Wolf Amendment suggest that this is unlikely
to change in the near future. To examine the impact of this problematic legislation,
this Note will begin by considering the origins and development of the uniquely
isolated Chinese space program in Part I, from the period of SinoSoviet cooperation
after World War II through Chinas first successful taikonaut3 and on to the Change
lunar module and ongoing construction of the Tiangong space station. In Part II, this
Note will examine the modern relationship between the United States and China,
with particular focus on incidents that demonstrate the difficulties they face in
moving toward a shared future in space.
the historical signifi- cance of the ISS as a beacon of international cooperation that
would have been unimaginable a decade earlier, Chinas exclusion seems even
bleaker. What has made the possibility of peaceful cooperation with China so
apparently untenable to Congress?
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf
Such is the nature of the Wolf Amendment included in each annual appropriations
act governing the budget of NASA since 2011. Nicknamed for its drafter, former
Congressman of Virginia Frank Wolf, this budgetary stipulation forbids involvement
by NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) in any bilateral program or
forum with China. These appropriations acts grant funding to federal programs and
regulate the allowable uses for that funding.80 Through them, Congress has the
authority to delegate the annual budget for NASA (in addition to many other
government agencies and programs) and how it can and cannotbe spent.
division may be used for [NASA] or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy,
program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such
activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of
this division.91
However the 20142015 Wolf Amendments are interpreted, they will still have
resounding effects for U.S.China space-industry relations. Although a complete ban
of all visitors of Chinese nationality would be an almost unthinkably direct political
affront, even the blanket ban on CNSANASA cooperation that is the facial purpose
of the statute will have repercussions. The moratorium on bi- or multilateral industry
communications created by the 2013 Appropriations Act will severely constrain
information transfer between both space agencies, effectively blinding NASA to the
Chinese space programs current endeavors as well as the reverse (although
considering how closed-mouthed CNSA is about even public projects, it is likely that
this effect will hit NASA harder than China). Additionally, such a measure could
cause the already tenuous trust developed with the CNSA to deteriorate. Blocking
the United States and NASA from cooperating with one of the major space powers of
the worlda country with demonstrated ambition and an increasing capability to
achieve dominance in spacemay hobble us beyond recovery, at least for the next
generation of space advancements. Space exploration is no longer the province of
individual nations operating alone, and international cooperation is both widespread
and necessary. Just as the international sharing of such sensitive and cutting-edge
technology is a valid national security concern, so too should be rejecting the
contributions of a major developing power, especially considering the relative
political stagnation of space exploration in the United States and the burgeoning
enthusiasm for it in China. Although it is impossible to predict what the future will
hold for the space explorers of tomorrow, it seems fully necessary to initiate
cautious, but optimistic, cooperation with China in space: inviting them as a party to
the ISS, certainly, and potentially opening the door for future jointor even bilateral
projects. The Hughes/Loral debacle limited the U.S. communications-satellite
industry for decades,130 and its consequences have only recently been corrected in
part; Congress must take care not to make the same mistakes with regard to other
U.S. investments in space. Isolating NASA from a country that is both a space
superpower and one of the largest economies in the world will only hurt the United
States in the long run. China has a long history of self-sufficiency in space, and it is
demonstrably capable of overcoming the challenges posed by having to reinvent
the wheel (or, as it may be, the rocket) because its global neighbors have
historically been too afraid of its military capabilities and ambitions to share what
they know. Would a free flow of technologyif not launching systems or ballistic
information, then at least those many nonmilitary elements of space travel,
exploration, and studytruly hurt the United States? Or would it pique the desire of
the Chinese citizens to be free from their repressive government and experience the
freedom of a democratic society? If NASA is truly the pinnacle of American
ingenuity, courage, optimism, and grace, then (sensibly) open communication
between the scientists and engineers in the CNSA can only inspire the latter to
demand better for themselves, their country, and their space program.
Regarding the China and U.S. space agenda items, Marcia Smith, space policy
analyst at SpacePolicyOnline.com commented:
NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) have
been prohibited by law from dealing with China on space cooperation on a bilateral
basis for several years, Smith noted.
The prohibition was originally inserted in the appropriations bills that fund NASA by
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), who chaired the House Appropriations Commerce-JusticeScience (CJS) subcommittee before retiring last year, Smith explained.
The final law that he put in place (P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015), which is in effect today, Smith added, states
that no funds may be spent by NASA or OSTP to develop, design, plan, promulgate,
implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any
Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by law
after the date of enactment of this Act.
The new House CJS chairman, Rep. John Culberson (R-TX), agrees with Wolfs
position and the prohibition is continued in the House-passed version of the FY2016
Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations bill (H.R. 2578), Smith said.
Astrophysicist and Astronomer Royal, Martin Rees, has said, I think its very
important not to kid ourselves that we can solve Earths problems by mass
emigration into space. Theres nowhere in our solar system even as clement as the
top of Everest or the South Poleso its only going to be a place for pioneers on cutprice private ventures and accepting higher risks than a western state could impose
on civilians.
In other words, maybe some people will venture beyond the Earth and Moon. Even
live out subsistence-level lives on other planetary bodies. But a civilization growing
out of Musks million isn't likely. At least not until we can engineer on grander scales
terraform Mars, hollow out asteroids, build rolling bubble cities on Mercury.
Why blow billions of dollars on space exploration when billions of people are living in
poverty here on Earth?
Youve likely heard the justifications. The space program brings us useful
innovations and inventions. Space exploration delivers perspective, inspiration, and
understanding. Because it's the final frontier. Because it's there.
What you havent heard is anything to inspire a sense of urgency. Indeed, NASAs
struggle to defend its existence and funding testifies to how weak these
justifications sound to a public that cares less about space than seemingly more
pressing needs.
Presumably, this is why SpaceX founder Elon Musk, in afascinating interview with
Ross Andersen, skipped all the usual arguments in favor of something else entirely.
Space exploration, he says, is as urgent as easing poverty or diseaseits our
insurance policy against extinction.
As we extend our gaze back through geologic time and out into the universe, its
clear we arent exempt from natures carelessly terrifying violence. We simply
havent experienced its full wrath yet because weve only been awake for the
cosmological blink of an eye.
Musk says an extinction-level event would, in an existential flash, make our downto-earth struggles irrelevant. Good news, the problems of poverty and disease
have been solved, he says, but the bad news is there arent any humans left.
Weve got all our eggs in one basket, and thats a terrible risk-management
strategy. We should diversify our planetary portfolio to insure against the worst
and soon.
Musks line of reasoning isnt completely novel. It's what led science fiction writer
Larry Niven to say, The dinosaurs became extinct because they didnt have a
space program. And it drives Ed Lus quest to save humanity from a major asteroid
hit.
But while we may spot and potentially derail asteroids, not every cosmic threat can
be so easily predicted or preventeda blast from a nearby supernova; a gamma ray
burst aimed at Earth; a period of extreme volcanism. Any of these could wipe us
out.
Musk says he thinks a lot about the silence weve been greeted with as our
telescopes scan the sky for interstellar broadcasts from other civilizations.
Given the sheer number of galaxies, stars, and planets in the universeit should be
teeming with life. If even a tiny percent of the whole is intelligent, there should be
thousands of civilizations in our galaxy alone. So where are they?
This is known as the Fermi Paradox, and Musk rattles off a few explanatory theories
(there are many). But he settles on this, If you look at our current technology level,
something strange has to happen to civilizations, and I mean strange in a bad way.
It could be that there are a whole lot of dead, one-planet civilizations.
to get their points across. Author William E. Burrows writes, [t]he wherewithal to
protect Earth should be multidimensional and imaginative. That means outgrowing
the tendency to concentrate only on immediate danger and broadening the defense
against the wider array of potential threats. This requires resolve and tools. The
latter are in place or could be put there. But there is no resolve [17:39]. I propose,
at the very least, companies conduct more medical research in analog
environments, as well as further examining data gained from the ISS and future
Mars rover missions. Think tanks can also be helpful in understanding and
mitigating potential problems, such as personality conflicts and cultural
misunderstandings. Being cognizant will lead to more well-rounded research, both
quantitatively and qualitatively to prepare for the colonization of Mars. Companies
can put together interdisciplinary consulting teams to look into both the ethical and
cultural aspects of society and how their actions may impact the mission to Mars, in
order to lessen the effect of a diluted cultural agenda. Perhaps these organizations
can find ways to prevent negative outcomes by being somewhat diligent about their
decisions. Manned missions to Mars need to wait until researchers have had the
time to examine the potential problems thoroughly.
Popular culture offers a good analogy for the race to Mars. During the episode
Forces of Nature (S7E9) from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the Enterprise crew
is warned that traveling through a certain region of space may be problematic for
other space faring people, as well as people living on a nearby planet, but they
decide to start exploring anyway. Eventually, the crew learned that their actions
were harmful to others because they did not spend the time to think about the
consequences of their actions. Captain Jean-Luc Picard reflects at the end of the
episode, I spent the better part of my life exploring space. I have charted new
worlds, I've met dozens of new species. And I believe that these were all valuable
ends in themselves. And now it seems that, all this while, I was helping to damage
the thing that I hold most dear [104]. Maybe we can take a lesson from this
imaginative tale. If we truly love and care for space, ourselves, and our humanity,
then let us take the time necessary to do research to avoid unwanted predicaments.
My hope is that we will go ahead into the future with patience and insight. Stephen
Cave suggests: I find it helps to see life as being like a book: Just as a book is
bounded by its covers, by beginning and end, so our lives are bounded by birth and
death, and even though a book is limited by beginning and end, it can encompass
distant landscapes, exotic figures, fantastic adventuresthe characters within it
know no horizonsit makes no sense for you to fear what is outside of those covers,
whether before your birth or after your death. And you needn't worry how long the
book is, or whether it's a comic strip or an epic. The only thing that matters is that
you make it a good story [20]. For those of us who dream of living on other worlds,
if we do not make it to Mars in our lifetime, let us help with the preparation by
contributing to those humans that will go in the future. We can create our own
stories of adventure so that future generations can go to Mars in a positive way.
Until then, why not make the most of the time we have here? Our pale blue dot is
not such a bad place to live.
https://www.academia.edu/12123803/Selling_space_colonization_and_immortality_A
_psychosocial_anthropological_critique_of_the_rush_to_colonize_Mars
However, not all risk is destructive. Health clinicianSteve Morgan [79] suggests,
[w]e take risks with theintention of achieving positive gains, because we see astron
ger potential for opportunity than for failure
Therefore, risk itself is not the direct problem, butthe way in which
we take risks is what needs to beaddressed. We need to slow down and do the
research inorder to lessen the risk as much as we can before ourfellow humans go
off-world or else, as a result of impa-tience, they may experience sickness
and quite possiblydeath. Risk is involved in space travel. However, if I was
anastronaut, I would be more comfortable knowing that I amnot
going to get cancer within
a year of leaving Earthbecause researchers have figured out a way to protectastron
auts against significant radiation. Additionally,another reason for sending people
to Mars is for scientificresearch, so how useful would I be if I died soon afterarriving?
I would prefer to collect data for a few years atleast, to make my trip worth it.
[98:3621]. Where is theevidence for this? Would there truly be a sudden collapse
of racist attitudes around the world due to a multi-nationalpresence on Mars? Mars
One [70] alsofeeds intothis utopianideal by stating on their website,
How so? And in what ways?If we look at the historical evidence of colonization
onEarth, there is no reason to believe the colonization of Mars will unify humanity. In
an academic conception of
afuture society, human nature is a huge, confoundingvariable. Sociologist B.J. Bluth
suggests that when peoplemoved to the New World
[13]. In truth, a small fewBritish colonizers went back to England after settling
in Jamestown because their lives were not as they imagined,with many of their
fellow colonizers dying from disease[106]. Despite this, space advocates hold onto
that colonialstory for reference, asserting that the New World wasbetter.
[t]here are tons of white men [in the advertisingindustry] Yeah, I'd say that is a
problem. It can be afairly narrow socio-economic vision through which youevaluate
work. In any kind of country, that would beproblematic, but I think in a multicultural
society likeours, the risk is you end up speaking with a voice that
isultimately relevant to a much narrower group of people
scientific
work, then it will benefit allhumans. It is not the norm to suggest that practices
mustbe responsive to the possibility of causing social harms
developing countries often have differentdesires and respond to different goals, all
of which are anintrinsic part of their emotional make up
Where are the non-space faring nations in these deci-sions? How about the underprivileged and those who aremarginalized? Where is their voice in this
inclusive
[88:34]. Those whoare in power (whether government organizations or corporations) that make claims that humanity can be united arethey themselves far
from being diverse or inclusive. WhenPhilosopher, Stephen Cave, talks about the
pursuit of immor-tality he says,
a time when millions do not even haveclean drinking water, can seem like just
another expressionof the selfish ideology of exploitation that teaches that thewhole
world exists only to shore up the survival of a fewprivileged individuals
[19:77]. Therefore, claiming that thepursuitof colonizing Mars is forthe benefitof all
humanity isa falsehood
[46]. I agree that evenwith the most preparation possible, there might still
becasualties. However, beliefs including being
or we see them as something tobe easily discarded. Social psychology tells us that
if wethink of people as objects, they become
lesser than
andare more prone to harm that is typically limited to non-human objects [44:193].
To see people as disposable is
adangerous belief. Canadian Astronaut Bob Thirsk, saidabout the Mars One project,
we don't yet have the reliable technology to support aone-way trip to Mars
hard facts
over fantasy. In
Cosmos
, Carl Sagan writes,
[t]he suppression of uncomfortable ideas may be common in religion and politics, but it is not the path toknowledge; it has no place in the
endeavor of science
[96:74]. But yet, in the same breath, scientists and spaceadvocates push towards
their own idea of an afterlife as ametaphor: colonizing space. The idea of
immortality or theafterlife through space colonization gives some people apurpose
by lessening the uncomfortable feeling that thislife might be all there is. What would
happen if theseadvocates and/or candidates were made aware of theirpossible
quest for immortality as an underlying motiva-tion? Would they accept the
hard facts
when we bring out into the open the ways in which it canunconsciously bias us, then
we can at least start to try tominimize the influence it has
Id like to call attention to and expand upon several points recently raised by Jeffrey
Kluger, editor at large for TIME magazine, in his first-rate article: The Silly Reason
the Chinese Arent Allowed on the Space Station. Let me add my voice of support
for the U.S. to initiate dialogue with China on the countrys inclusion in the
International Space Station program. Doing so, however, requires not only White
House leadership, but also bi-partisan support in Congress to roll back public law
that bans NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China.
Its all about inclination. In this case, Im not just talking about the inclined orbit of
an object circling Earth, but also a will to lean forward and encourage collaboration
in space.
Working with Chinaas weve learned with other space powerspresents scientific
gains and boosts safety factors for all those engaged in human spaceflight. But
there is much more.
All 21st century spacefaring nations need to take stepping stones that lead to
humanitys bold leap to the Red Planet. For my part, I have spent considerable time
orchestrating Cycling Pathways to Occupy Marsby initiating government-private
sustained human presence around Earth and the Moon, including design assistance
of several lunar bases for all international and commercial uses as a prelude to
human activity on Mars.
can attain the vision and the will to reach for even larger goals all the way to the
distant dunes of Mars and beyond.
Cooperation key to solving Chinese counter-space
http://time.com/3901419/space-station-no-chinese/
Even if all of the fears were well-foundedeven if a Chinese Death Star were under
construction at this moment in a mountain lair in Xinjiangforbidding the kind of
international handshaking and cooperating that is made possible by a facility like
the ISS is precisely the wrong way to to go about reducing the threat. The joint
Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975 achieved little of technological significance, but it was
part of a broader thaw between Moscow and Washington. That mattered, in the
same way ping pong diplomacy between the U.S. and China in 1971 was about
nothing more than a gameuntil it was suddenly about much more.
Well before the ISS was built and occupied, the shuttle was already flying American
crews to Russias Mir space station. Russia later became Americas leading partner
in operating and building the ISSa shrewd American move that both offloaded
some of the cost of the station and provided work for Russian missile engineers who
found themselves idle after the Berlin Wall fell and could easily have sold their
services to nuclear nasties like North Korea or Iran.
The technology aboard the ISS is not the kind that a Chinese astronaut with ill will
would want to or need to steal. And more to the point, if theres one thing the men
and women who fly in space will tell you, its that once they get there, terrestrial
politics mean nothing at allthe sandbox silliness of politicians who are not relying
on the cooperation of a few close crewmates to keep them alive and safe as they
race through low Earth orbit. From space, as astronauts like to say, you cant see
borders. Its a perspective the lawmakers in Washington could use.
http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasaadministrator-charles-bolden-2186627
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden says a manned mission to Mars will happen in
the 2030s, but unlike the Apollo moon missions in the 1960s and '70s, it will take an
international coalition -- including Russia and China -- to get there.
America remains the unquestioned leader when it comes to space exploration, but
in a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday, Bolden said future efforts will
look like the International Space Station, an international effort that has kept
humans continuously living and working in space for the past 15 years.
http://spacenews.com/op-ed-align-u-s-space-policy-with-national-interests/
In a world in which space capabilities are increasingly global, no one state will be in
a position to impose rules unilaterally for the exploration and development of space.
Similarly, the diversity of competing national interests in space makes it unlikely
that a single international space authority or even a new space treaty will emerge
anytime soon. Thus, the task for the United States, if it wishes to influence how
space is developed and utilized, is to create attractive projects and frameworks in
which other nations choose to align themselves, and their space activities, with us,
as opposed to others. Just as the United States shaped the postwar world with a
range of international institutions, so we should look to the creation of new
arrangements to advance our interests, values and freedoms in space.
China is planning to deploy its own space station in less than a decade, about the
same time that the International Space Station may be ending. If China is able to
offer pragmatic opportunities for space cooperation on its own space station or as
part of efforts to send humans to the moon, and the United States cannot, then
other countries will likely find it attractive to forge closer relationships with China.
Such a shift in international space influence away from the United States and
toward China will, no doubt, impact a wide range of U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests, both in space and in other arenas.
The United States retains several advantages in space, however. We have decades
of experience and close relationships with almost every spacefaring nation on a
wide range of projects. The entrepreneurial energy of the private U.S. space
community, both large and small, is a source of admiration by and occasional
puzzlement to the international space community.
At the same time, a proud history and a nascent private industry cannot alone
substitute for national and international leadership in space, and they likely cannot
survive, much less thrive without it.
Both international cooperation and private-sector initiative are necessary aspects of
any effective American strategy in space, but are not by themselves sufficient. A
focused national strategy is also needed to provide a coherent context for both
cooperative agreements and private ventures.
It is plausible that China has a mix of domestic prestige, strategic, economic and
political motivations. For domestic audiences, a sophisticated space program
culminating in a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade would be a huge
political boost for the regime and ratification that its focus on economic
modernization without political reform is the right course.
others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to
the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack
them.13 It is unlikely that the threat to employ a variety of measures strikes fear
into the hearts of opponents. Imprecision is defended as necessary since giving
opponents explicit redlines would tell them what they could do with impunity. This
ignores the likely conclusion that opponents, judging from their actions, had already
deduced an implicit redline: that in peacetime, Washington will do nothing against
actions that fall below the threshold of the use of force. While Washington believes
that imprecision reinforces freedom of action, opponents may judge that the
generality of US declaratory policy reflects a deeper indecision as to how
Washington will respond to malicious actions against satellites.
Since April 2011, NASA has been legally prohibited from any cooperative activities
with China, at the insistence of Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) while he was Chairman
of the subcommittee responsible for NASA funding. Rep. John Culberson (R-Texas)
took over the role of Chairman after Wolf left Congress. Culberson has publicly
stated his desire to continue the ban, which reads, in part:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or
execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after
the date of enactment of this Act.[16]
NASA solicitations allow foreign participation via non-U.S. organizations, subject to
NASAs policy of no exchange of funds, in which each government supports its own
national participants and accounts for associated costs. Foreign nationals are
permitted to support NASA research if they are legally employed by a U.S.
organization and that organization follows U.S. export control restrictions. This
allows, for example, foreign graduate students at a U.S. university to contribute to
NASA space research activities.
However, the prohibition in place against China is significantly more restrictive, as
stated in a NASA solicitation: Proposals must not include bilateral participation,
collaboration, or coordination with China or any Chinese-owned company or entity,
whether funded or performed under a no-exchange-of funds arrangement.[17]
The reasons Rep. Wolf gave for imposing the restrictions on NASA, and the reasons
Rep. Culberson gives for extending them, are straightforward and threefold:
-Chinas government does not respect basic human rights for its people
Chinas restrictive policies are severe and do not reflect Western values of human
rights. Cooperation would imply tolerance of these policies.
threat, but excessive efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of
the United States.
Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of Chinese
military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire the necessary
capabilities either from the international space community or by developing the
capabilities themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral
to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This path has resulted in
the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances
we anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space
manufacturing infrastructure, the Chinese can become increasingly competitive in
the world market.
China is increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and
European nations. This supports the technological advancements and economies of
those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry, which is hurt in two ways: it
cannot compete for bilateral U.S.-Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to
international missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese
participation in or access to those missions.
As the Chinese increase their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to
employ counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military
space systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other
means) will also take out their own systems. The Chinese may be less inclined to
develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital
intercept, since this could lead to a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese
recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.
monitoring for search and rescue of ships (and aircraft) in distress. We should
encourage Chinese cooperation in such endeavors.
-Chinas government does not respect basic human rights for its people
The United States has a long history of engaging its enemies to pursue change. The
most recent example is the about-face in the U.S. relationship with Cuba. Isolation
complicates opportunities to have effective give-and-take dialogue.
Even when the broader posture is to restrict trade or other exchanges, at times the
United States has made space or science an exception, thus opening doors to an
adversary and providing valuable ways to learn more about how the other side
perceives the United States and the motivations and actions it uses to counter the
United States. A classic example is U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the 1970s, which gave
the United States valuable insight into the tightly closed Soviet space industry. This
cooperation during the Soviet era later opened the door to Russian cooperation,
eventually enabling the United States to complete the ISS and giving the Russians
access to a station after Mir was no longer available. More recently, when sanctions
were imposed on Russia after it began supporting Ukrainian separatists, the
restrictions did not include U.S.-Russian cooperation in the International Space
Station, avoiding an interruption of ISS operations.
Working with the Chinese is consistent with the U.S. position that space exploration
belongs to the people of the world, not one country or another, particularly if this
openness were extended to all emerging spacefaring nations. Truly ambitious
human space exploration, such as a human mission to Mars, will be incredibly
challenging and expensive, and may be possible only through international
cooperation and significant and obvious U.S. leadership.
Cyber
CYBER IMPORTANT TO US AND CHINA
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Some of the most worrisome issues in the current U.S.-China relationship are in
areas that lack common rules and institutions, such as cyber espionage and outer
space, where there are no established procedures or independent bodies to manage
such disputes.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
The United States is ill prepared to defend itself from cyber espionage when its
adversary is determined, centrally coordinated, and technically sophisticated, as is
the CCP and Chinas government. The design of the Internetdeveloped in the
United States to facilitate open communication between academia and government,
and eventually expanded to include commercial opportunitiesleaves it particularly
vulnerable to spies and thieves. As the largest and most web-dependent economy
in the world, the United States is also the largest target for cyber espionage of
commercial IP.
The Chinese government also imposes heavy-handed censorship on Internet
content and social media. These restrictions on free expression and access to
information and news have driven from the Chinese market those U.S. companies
unwilling to follow the authoritarian dictates of Beijing. The Chinese government has
also begun to censor material originating outside its borders by directly attacking
U.S.-based information providers. The Chinese government has infiltrated a wide
swath of U.S. government computer networks; the U.S. government response to the
challenge has been inadequate. Federal agencies are not governed by a uniform
system for defense against cyber intrusions. Other than to acknowledge an
unrelenting series of assaults on its networks, the Federal Government has yet to
devise adequate defenses, while top U.S. intelligence officials have grudgingly
praised Chinese hackers for their bold ingenuity.
NO HACKBACKSIES
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
The U.S. reaction to the increasing number and sophistication of foreign cyber
espionage and malicious network attacks has been mostly defensive. U.S. law does
not allow retaliatory cyber attacks by private citizens and corporations, nor does it
appear to allow counterintrusions (or hack backs) for the purpose of recovering,
erasing, or altering stolen data in offending computer networks. International law
has not kept up with developments in cyber warfare, and no international consensus
exists on how to attribute or appropriately respond to cyber attacks. However, a
policy discussion on the issue of offensive and retaliatory cyber operations has
begun.
do not yet govern them. Additionally, we cannot rule out the ever-present possibility
that mistakes, accidents, and/or misperceptions can trigger a dispute. The time for
action is now, before such an incident occurs. More robust military-to-military
communications, as we discuss below, can help prevent unintentional clashes.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
On cybersecurity, it is clear that, at a minimum, a common set of guidelines is
needed to prevent cyber concerns from derailing interstate commerce. If companies
around the world perceive a high risk that their proprietary intellectual property and
other internal data could be stolen by government actors conducting international
cyber espionage and handed over to their competitors, this will negatively impact
global research, investment, and commerce. Every nation shares the responsibility
to provide a modicum of security and investigate offenses within their own borders.
That responsibility should include providing cybersecurity for private companies and
individuals that are either operating within their borders or being targeted by actors
operating within their borders. If companies in the United States have solid
evidence of illegal cyber intrusions originating from China, the Chinese government
should have mechanisms in place to review and investigate those claims. Likewise,
the United States should have mechanisms in place to address complaints from
Chinese companies. As the worlds largest economic powers, it is in U.S. and
Chinese interests to address these cyber economic concerns before they further
damage our bilateral economic relationship and the global economy more broadly.
To do that effectively, China and the United States will need to forge some type of
common understanding about what types of practices are not acceptable and
develop common institutions for addressing those problems in a mutually agreeable
fashion. Given the scope of these challenges, multilateral approaches will be
needed, but as the United States and China are the worlds economic leaders,
bilateral dialogue is also critical.
Still, not everything on the cyber front is gloomy. The United States and China have
made a great deal of progress in cooperating on cyber-tracking of illicit movements
of funds and people. The Chinese will be pressing hard to get the United States to
cooperate in disrupting the illegal flow of cash from China to the United States, and
in repatriating both the funds and the fugitives who stole them. This discussion will
likely bleed over into the human rights arena, as evidenced by the case of Yang
Xiuzhu, who is wanted on corruption charges and applied for asylum in New York
after being detained by Interpol.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China agree that timely responses should be provided to
requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities.
Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a manner consistent with their respective
national laws and relevant international obligations, with requests to investigate
cybercrimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity
emanating from their territory. Both sides also agree to provide updates on the
status and results of those investigation to the other side, as appropriate.
The United States and China agree that neither countrys government will conduct
or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade
secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify and promote
appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international
community. The United States and China welcome the July 2015 report of the UN
IR theories
REALISM: CONFLICT IS [NOT] INEVITABLE
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
Undergirding all realist thought is the idea that the international system is anarchic,
with no overarching law or enforcing authority to govern state relations. How
powerful a state ismeasured by a variety of factors, including economic and
military variablesessentially determines its standing in the world. States are
rational actors that have survival as their main goal. Much of realist thought on
great power transitions stems from hegemonic stability theory, which suggests A
New Model of Major Power Relations | www.americanprogress.org 39 that the
international system is more likely to be stable with the presence of one world
power, the hegemon, and feature a corresponding lack of stability when the
hegemon declines or outright loses power. Building off of hegemonic stability theory
is power transition theory, which suggests that the possibility of serious conflict
emerges when a rising power and declining power approach a crossover point in
terms of national strength, though how this is measured is up for interpretation.27
The rising power becomes frustrated that the status quo is biased toward the
declining power, while the declining power sees its window of opportunity to check
the rising power closing.28 For this reason, the chance of war increases when the
states have roughly similar, but not necessarily equal, capabilities.29 China is
obviously rising both economically and militarily, and it is likely that friction with the
United States and other major powers will persist as it continues to expand. Some
offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, believe that this will make conflict with
the United States inevitable, unless America is willing to step aside.30 Randall
Schweller, professor of political science and social behavior at Ohio State University,
believes that, though China has worked within the current international system to
regain its great power status, it will be difficult to further integrate into the world
order because of the insular and defensive character of Chinese politics and
nationalism.31 Other adherents of realism such as Cornell University Professor
Jonathan Kirshner, however, suggest that China will not necessarily challenge the
United States and conflict is not inevitable.32 Chinese policymakers can learn from
the lessons of previous rising powers and, contrary to the view of Mearsheimer and
others, conclude that achieving regional hegemony carries unacceptable levels of
risk.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf
As opposed to realisms emphasis on anarchy and power being the sole determinant
of relations between countries, liberal internationalists discuss other factors that
influence state behavior, such as international organizations and economic
interdependence. Liberal internationalists believe that international organizations,
such as the United Nations and World Bank, provide a forum for dispute resolution
and negotiation that has a positive impact on conflict levels and increases
cooperation between states. Political scientists Sara Mitchell and Paul Hensel show
that international institutions have a very positive effect on mediation, even on the
thorniest issues such as conflicts between states. 33 Liberal international- 40 Center
for American Progress | U.S.-China Relations ists also believe that economic
interdependence reduces the chance of conflict by increasing the costs of conflict
a country is less likely to attack another if in so doing it will harm its own economy.
In addition to economic interdependence, there is also the idea of security
interdependence. Similar to economic interdependence, security interdependence
has become more profound in the era of globalization. As Center for American
Progress Senior Fellow Nina Hachigian wrote previously, Newly virulent threats
profoundly affect pivotal power relations. Terrorists and pathogens represent big
challenges that must be faced globally by all.34 While the interactions between
states when working on these challenges can encourage further cooperation, there
is always the risk of states freeloading off the investments made by others. 35
International institutions, however, not only encourage cooperation and make
communication between states easier, they also introduce enforcement
mechanisms as a way of preventing freeloading, though these obviously vary from
institution to institution. Economic interdependence has created strong incentives
for both sides of the U.S.- China relationship to search for ways to reduce tension
and conflict when problems emerge. Bilateral trade rose from around $8 billion in
1985 to $536 billion in 2012, and those numbers only continue to increase.36 As
scholars have pointed out, Chinese membership in international institutions has
increased dramatically since Chairman Mao Zedongs death.37 China has also
refrained from attempts to significantly change institutional rules and continually
stated its desire to rise within the current international system, albeit with
adjustments for its enhanced stature.
CONSTRUCTIVISM: NO DETERMINATION
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Advanced most notably by political scientist Alexander Wendt, constructivism holds
that it is possible for states, through repeated interactions, to form collective
identities and interests.38 In addition to interactions between states, the rise of
common othersissues or threats that cannot be faced by one state alone, such
as climate changereduce states ability to act unilaterally and encourage
cooperation.39 Over time, this leads states toward greater degrees of collective
identity and reduced conflict. Of course, the inverse is also possible. Just as
G20 CP
G20 SUCKS
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The United States agrees with China that the international system needs reform.
The actors and issues are changing faster than the bureaucracies are able to keep
up. For instance, there were no routine, high-level leadership summits that included
all major powers until 2008. The Group of 8, or G-8, excluded China and India. The
U.N. Security Council excluded Japan and India. The establishment of the Group of
20, or G-20, in 2008 as a major global leaders forum has filled that void. The G-20
has played a key role in bringing existing and emerging powers together to discuss
the most pressing economic issues of the day. Through it, China and the United
States have played significant roles in stemming the global financial crisis and
implementing banking reforms, among other accomplishments. The G-20 provides a
setting in which leaders can try to assign responsibility for reform to every major
economy in a fair way that allows progress to continue. Because of its early success,
expectations of what the G-20 can accomplish often outstrip what it can deliver. Yet
it remains a key fire station for crisis management and addressing global economic
challenges, as well as a steady reminder to capitals that their individual actions
affect the globe.
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CAP and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR,
conducted a joint study, entitled The US-China Study Group on G-20 Reform, and
produced a variety of recommendations to strengthen the G-20 as an institution. As
noted in that study: With greater cooperation through the G-20, there is an
opportunity for China and the United States to further strengthen both that forum
and their bilateral relationship. Such cooperation can contribute to the development
of a new type of major power relationship.70
Human Trafficking
Middle East
SOLVE ONGOING CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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Finally, there are regional issues that attention from outside major powers can help
to solve. Chief among these is the Middle East. Given Chinas and the United States
status as the largest and second-largest oil importers, respectively, both have a
major interest in peace and stability in the region. There are four areas in particular
on which America and China both must find common ground to help find a solution.
The first is the Iran nuclear crisis. Both China and the United States want to avoid
the sort of regional instability that could arise as a consequence of Iran acquiring a
nuclear weapon, whether due to airstrikes on Iranian facilities or an arms race with
Iran and its neighbors. Another area is the IsraeliPalestinian peace process in which
China, with U.S. encouragement, has been playing a greater role in recent months,
with the former hosting both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in May 2013.66 President Xis four-point plan
for peace, which he released after those meetings, shows that China and the United
States are largely on the same page with regards to the framework for a solution.67
A third area is the ongoing crisis in Syria. The United States and China must take
mutual actions to promote an end to the civil war that has already killed more than
130,000 Syrians.68 And finally, the United States and China should find ways to
promote investment and economic development in Egypt, as well as the
development of an inclusive society, to reduce tensions and help get Egypt back on
track.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China decided to maintain communication and cooperation
with one another on Afghanistan to support peaceful reconstruction and economic
development in Afghanistan, support an Afghan led, Afghan owned reconciliation
process, and promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China, and
Afghanistan. Together with Afghanistan, the United States and China will co-chair a
high-level event on Afghanistans reconstruction and development on the margins
of the UN General Assembly on September 26. This event will convene
Afghanistans neighbors and the international community to discuss the importance
of continuing robust regional and international support for the Afghan government
and regional economic cooperation. The United States and China jointly renew their
call on the Taliban to enter into direct talks with the Government of Afghanistan.
The United States and China also noted their mutual interests in supporting peace,
stability, and prosperity in neighboring countries of Afghanistan, and to working in
partnership with these countries to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and
the region.
IMF CP
QUOTA REVISIONS NEEDED CHINA ALREADY APPROVED
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Member states pledged to accept a revision in the quota system, discussed above,
that would give far more weight to China. This has yet to be approved by the U.S.
Congress.72 We would recommend that the Obama administration push this
forward as quickly as possible, as it is another demonstration that the current
international order is fair and embraces emerging powers. For its part, China should
help empower the IMF to monitor issues of currencya critical task in a global
economy. China should also continue to carry out its plans to move to a market
determined floating exchange rate, reduce controls on portfolio capital flows,
liberalize foreign direct investment in financial services, and liberalize interest rates.
Consult CP
TRANSPARENCY KEY
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In the areas of outer space, oceans, and cyberspace, the United States and China
must work with the rest of the international community toward a common set of A
New Model of Major Power Relations | www.americanprogress.org 59 rules that can
guide behavior. Transparency is crucial. By being straightforward about their plans
and activities in these areas, both the United States and China will help overcome
strategic tensions between the two sides.
Nuclear Policy
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
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Just as important may be establishing a dialogue on nuclear weapons, which China
has been reluctant to do to date.78 Even the United States and the Soviet Union,
mortal enemies during the Cold War, were able to have regular dialogues on nuclear
forces and strategy.79 One possible confidence-building measure when it comes to
space is the United States and China notifying each other of certain satellite
launches. Greater transparency on Chinas military budget would also help the
relationship.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and
policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States,
albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for Chinas future, and
his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of Chinas one-party state.
When, therefore, Xi uses the term win-win (shuangying ) to describe his
desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of
Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political
collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and
security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi
Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions
are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is
capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic
bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as
creatively as it can while it still lasts.
CHINA IS SECRETIVE
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
China is secretive about the details of its official nuclear policy, leading to
uncertainty regarding key principles of its nuclear weapons doctrine. Key elements
of Chinas nuclear policy, such as its no-first-use pledge and presumptive dealerting policy, may be under reconsideration but are unlikely to change officially.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
China is pursuing a credible second-strike capability with an emphasis on
survivability against an adversarys first strike. By diversifying its nuclear strike
capabilities away from solely land-based systems in silos, China seeks to ensure its
ability to absorb a nuclear strike and retaliate in kind. Examples of this
diversification include road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and potentially air-launched land-attack cruise missiles.
COOPERATING NOW
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China commit to deepen their cooperation on nuclear
security and to work together to make the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by
President Obama next year a success. The two sides plan to hold an annual
bilateral dialogue on nuclear security, with the first meeting of the dialogue to be
held prior to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.
http://cogitasia.com/nuclear-weapons-and-u-s-china-relations-a-way-forward/
Because the current nuclear dynamics are broadly stabilizing and should be
sustained, the Working Group recommends a robust but realistically tailored
program of engagement and dialogue on nuclear issues that reinforce Chinas
nuclear restraint and advance U.S. interests in stability, dialogue, transparency, and
progress toward arms control. In concert with efforts to improve dialogue, the
United States should adopt three policy initiatives.
First, the United States should plan, procure, and posture its forces and base its own
policy on the assumption that an attempted U.S. disarming first strike, combined
with U.S. missile defenses, could not reliably deny a Chinese nuclear retaliatory
strike on the United States. This recommendation is based on a hard-nosed
judgment that the United States cannot realistically hope to deny Chinas secondstrike capability and a failed attempt to build capabilities to do so would be costly
and counterproductive. Members of the Working Group differ, however, on whether
the United States should explicitly and publicly acknowledge a state of mutual
vulnerability with China. Some believe that such a step would have positive
stabilizing benefits on Chinas nuclear policy, while others fear that public and
formal acknowledgment will achieve little more than raising questions from nervous
allies.
Second, the United States should specifically and publicly tie the development and
deployment of its national missile defenses oriented to East Asia to North Korea,
making it clear that it will continue to adjust the size and scope of its capabilities in
accordance with the development of the North Korean ICBM threat. To minimize
Chinas reactions to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, the United States
should seek to quell Chinas concerns as much as possible by making its program as
transparent as prudence and security allow and by making it clear that the United
States has no intention of using BMD to negate Chinas long-range nuclear deterrent
capability. The Working Group notes, however, that Chinas significant shorter-range
conventional missile capability, especially those ballistic and cruise missiles that
threaten U.S. military forces in the region, are a legitimate and necessary target for
the development of U.S. theater missile defenses.
Third, the United States should strive to maintain, and in important respects
strengthen, its extended deterrent structure in the Pacific. Especially important will
be the translation of admirable rhetoric about a restoration of U.S. attention to the
Asia-Pacific region and promising first steps in the evolution of the U.S. regional
force structure into sustained and concrete investments of resources, time, and
energy. In the military realm, this means making significant investments in the kinds
of capabilities that can maintain U.S. military advantages in the region, particularly
conventional capabilities designed to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
operations. The United States should also ensure that it can provide a credible
extended nuclear deterrent by investing in a fleet of next-generation strategic
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a new heavy bomber capable of carrying
nuclear ordnance, and a new nuclear cruise missile.
http://cogitasia.com/nuclear-weapons-and-u-s-china-relations-a-way-forward/
The relationship between the United States and China will be of tremendous
geopolitical consequence for the 21st century. Even though conflict mercifully
seems unlikely at this point, it cannot be ruled out and might become increasingly
likely if we are unwise or unlucky. With both sides possessing and appearing set to
retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously
dangerous and quite possibly devastating. Finding ways to minimize the possibility
of war and the use of nuclear weapons is therefore a primary responsibility of
political leaderships on both sides of the Pacific.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227
In fact, American BMD against North Koreas small arsenal is necessary to increase
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea, but it is not capable of
preempting the Chinese arsenal. One reason is that the effectiveness of BMD
systems is debatable even for the advanced U.S. interceptors, whose extensive
testing has not provided conclusive about how they would operate in real conflict
environments. Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College
has characterized BMDs as expensive and incomplete in their coverage. American
BMD systems can only intercept a small number of nuclear warheads (the ratio is
five interceptors for one warhead), while both the United States and China possess
large strategic and conventional missile arsenals, which can be used
interchangeably in a conflict scenario to penetrate missile defenses. The Chinese
Second Artillery Forces modernization has rendered it a massive source of
firepower that American BMD systems could never hope to counter. Adding decoys
and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles, it becomes
obvious that on a cost-exchange ratio, BMD forces are not only ineffective, but also
a much more expensivenot to mention technically unreliableoption than landbased ballistic missiles, whose technology is extensively tested, reliable and
relatively cheap. That said, building and deploying a large number of interceptors is
not only strategically suboptimal, but also financially challenging, given both
countries budgetary constraints.
testing failures, U.S. political and military circles appear to be deeply invested in
their further development.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227?
page=2
If the trend described above continues unchanged, then both countries will find
themselves irrevocably trapped in a spiral of qualitative arms competition, which
will inevitably cast an even darker shadow over the relationship. Nevertheless, the
prospect of an arms control deal appears to be remote for now, for several reasons.
First, there is deep mistrust over each others future intentions. China deciphers U.S.
policies in the region as laying the foundation for a containment strategy, while
Washington regards Beijing as a revisionist state that will attempt to change the
regional status quo when the opportunity arises. Second, even if the United States
considered concessions for an arms control agreement, its regional allies, especially
Japan, would not welcome such an option. Uncertainties over intentions and allies
objections make any deal a dauntingalbeit not impossibletask.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-armsrace-15227?page=3
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama administration proposed
strategic stability dialogues with China, but progress has been limitedmainly due
to Chinas reluctance to join. North Koreas recent nuclear test puts greater pressure
on the two countries nuclear relations, but can also work as a catalyst to resume
official discussions on nuclear issues. Calling anew for high-level nuclear discussions
might be a good way to go. If China remains adamant in its objection to get involved
in high-level strategic dialogues, it not only risks a deterioration of its relations with
South Koreawhich it so painstakingly and successfully has been building since
Park Geun-hye assumed officebut it will also miss the opportunity to gain better
insights and understanding into the systems, raise its concerns in a formal setting
and prove that it is not using the issue to divide the allies. The United States will
need to consider Chinese concerns over the number of interceptors. This will pave
the way for a mutually agreeable figure that will allow Washington to reassure its
allies, especially through enhancing stability on the Korean peninsula. Also, if the
United States is serious about its pledges to China that its BMDs do not target
Beijing, then proceeding to talks over potential arms controls will be tangible proof
of its claims, especially if Chinese concerns and choices start significantly altering
the strategic environment.
NOW IS KEY
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-brink-us-china-nuclear-arms-race-15227?
page=3
Track II diplomacy dialogues have paved the way for official conversations. Hence, it
is time for both China and the United States to come to the negotiating table, save
themselves from expensive technologies whose feasibility and effectiveness in real
conflict environments is highly questionable and prevent a further deterioration of
their strategic relationship. It will take time, effort and skills, so the sooner the talks
start, the better.
Trilateral CPs
EXPAND TO INCLUDE OTHERS
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Trilateral security dialogues involving China and the United States could also help to
broaden economic opportunity and address security tensions. Trilateral frameworks
involving critical regional partnerssuch as a Japan-China-U.S. dialogue and an
India-China-U.S. dialogueare worth considering. A Japan-China-U.S. dialogue on
energy and climate change, for example, could prove fruitful for all three nations. In
the aftermath of the Japanese nuclear disaster, Japan is facing new challenges to
meet its energy and climate needs, and that could open new opportunities for
trilateral cooperation on issues such as clean energy deployment, nuclear safety,
and natural gas trading. Any such trilateral discussions would have to be very
carefully managed and well-prepared but could create new networks for
understanding and stability.
Transparency
TRANSPARENCY KEY
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Second, both nations need to find ways to be more transparent about their policies
and intentions toward the other. China, for example, could be more forthcoming
about its military doctrines and plans, something the region will want as Chinas
military capacity grows. America could find ways to be more transparent on policy
toward inward foreign direct investment, for example. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, process serves an important national
security role, but there are opportunities for increasing the transparency and
predictability of that process. President Obamas SelectUSA initiative, which offers a
single contact for foreign entities seeking to invest in the United States, is a helpful
step. In our view, China has more work to do here, since the United States has a
more open political process. Closed decision making does not reassure other nations
or contribute to bilateral and multilateral understanding about intentions. One way
to improve bilateral transparency is to expand and deepen the bilateral institutions
that create a predictable and transparent framework for interactions between both
nations and also create platform for resolving disputes. The U.S.- China Bilateral
Investment Treaty currently under negotiation is one example of this type of
framework. The Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiation process shows how hard this
is to accomplish when countries have different values and political systems, but the
United States and China should be trying to create such mechanisms where both
can.
State/Local CP
CAN BE DONE
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At CAP, we would also like to see more regional agreements, such as the recent
climate agreement signed80 between California and Chinese province of
Guangdong, which was based primarily on shared local needs rather than nationallevel political guidance. We could foresee similar agreements on energy issues
being of particular interest to local governments in both nations, such as green-job
training, clean energy investment incentives, energy-efficiency incentives, building
more resilient infrastructure to protect local communities from sea-level rise, or
hydraulic-fracturing safety. Forums where mayors and governors could meet would
facilitate this type of cooperation. Overall, the United States and China need to
reach a next phase of the relationship whereby cooperation becomes even more
routine.
Disease
SHOULD WORK TOGETHER ON DISEASE PREVENTION CHINA
KEY
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China
%2021.pdf
The U.S. and China, within the framework of UN reform, should launch a joint
initiative, in partnership with other member states, on the reform of a single UN
institution as a test case for how the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system
as a whole could be lifted. There are a number of candidate institutions for reform.
But given recent crises in the management of globally communicable diseases, and
the security implications for all states in preventing and handling such crises
effectively, the WHO presents an obvious case for conjoint effort. China has
extensive experience in the field, with its medical corps having worked across the
developing world for over half a century. The excellence of U.S. medical research
and treatment facilities in dealing with globally communicable diseases is well
recognized. The opportunity for immediate collaboration in more effectively dealing
with this major global public good is clear.
Central Asia
NO COOPERATION NOW
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
China and the United States appear to share similar priorities in Central Asia, such
as promoting economic growth and connectivity and preventing the spread of
extremism and terrorism. Yet Beijing and Washington pursue these goals in very
different ways, which could make meaningful cooperation in the region challenging.
In particular, while the United States seeks to encourage democratization and
discourage corruption in government and business, China supports the regions
authoritarian governments and is more tolerant of the regions widespread
corruption.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
Taiwan
US-TAIWAN RELATIONS STRONG NOW
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
U.S.-Taiwan relations in 2015 remained strong, despite the lack of substantive
progress on bilateral trade and investment negotiations and the absence of major
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 2011. In 2014, annual bilateral trade reached a
record high, increasing by 6 percent to $67.4 billion, while Taiwan became the
tenth-largest trading partner of the United States, passing both India and Saudi
Arabia. U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military contacts also increased in 2014. That year,
over 3,000 DOD personnel conducted visits to Taiwan, a 50 percent increase over
visits in 2013. Seven years of cross-Strait rapprochement have been beneficial to
the United States by reducing cross-Strait tensions and allowing U.S. policymakers
to address other priorities in the U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships.
Nonetheless, Chinas military exercises and military modernization are still largely
directed toward its mission to eventually reunify Taiwan with the Mainland. Taiwans
focus on indigenous weapons platforms and asymmetric capabilities, along with its
expanded defense engagement with the United States, has served to improve its
ability to inflict costs on China should it decide to use force against Taiwan, but the
cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in Beijings favor. With Taipeis
stagnating defense budget and capabilities and Chinas improving antiaccess/area
denial capabilities threatening to keep U.S. forces farther from Chinas shores,
Beijing has increasing advantages in a Taiwan contingency, raising the cost for the
United States to take action in a crisis or conflict.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Executive
%20Summary%20and%20Recommendations.pdf
The United States and Taiwan share a close relationship based on common
democratic values, strong commercial ties, and a U.S. commitment to aid in
Taiwans defense. U.S.-Taiwan trade is at a record high, underlying Taiwans
increasing importance as a close economic partner. Furthermore, the United States
continues to support Taiwans defense through increasing military-to-military
contact and other discreet defense cooperation.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/09/23/obama_taiwan_deter_china_1114
55.html
During Xis visit, the president can unilaterally announce a landmark decision that
won't require either the concurrence of the U.S. Congress (which would support him
on this issue in any event) or reciprocal action by the government of China. On his
own, Obama could declare publicly that the United States will defend Taiwan against
aggression or coercion from China.
For the first time since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter unilaterally terminated
the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, Beijing would know with certainty that any
use of force against Taiwan would mean conflict with the United States. Since
China's leaders are not suicidal, such a presidential declaration would prevent
potentially disastrous Chinese miscalculation. This is the same kind of deterrence
President Dwight Eisenhower achieved when he entered into the 1954 treaty with
the Republic of China.
Moreover, as noted, Taiwan's fate is no longer just about Taiwan. America has five
treaty allies and a range of friends and partners in the region who look to the United
States to ensure East Asia's security in the face of an increasingly powerful and
assertive China. If U.S. resolve is seen to be faltering regarding Taiwan, with its
special historical ties and shared democratic values, the entire region could be
rendered defenseless against Chinese economic and military pressure. Then
Communist China will have achieved without a war what Imperial Japan tried to do
through war - its own Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
General Impacts
LAUNDRY LIST (WAR, RELATIONS)
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-waramerica
What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to
deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring
superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time.
If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere
in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putins neo-imperialist Russia and
the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison.
Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without AmericanChinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the
next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a
partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.
Thucydides Trap
NOT INEV
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/11/24/uschina_relations_thucydides_t
rap_108717.html
The good news is that the Thucydides trap isnt inevitable: rising powers arent doomed to
clash with established ones. Economic interdependence and nuclear weapons lessen the
prospects of war. And military manoeuvring in the South China Sea is still about signalling, not
conflict. But the bad news is that some form of clash seems increasingly likely. The US cant
move to offshore balancing without spooking its own allies; but Chinas idea of the US as an
outsider implies just such a shrinking role for the US in Asia. Troubled waters lie ahead.
aspirations noted above, China today is falling far short of the mark, raising serious
questions about the future of its relationship with the United States.
Peacekeeping
WORKING TOGETHER NOW
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
In recognition of the critical role UN and regional peacekeepers serve in maintaining
international peace and security, the United States and China affirm to further increase their
robust commitments to international peacekeeping efforts. The Chinese side appreciates the
U.S. sides holding of the Leaders Summit on Peacekeeping, and welcomes the new
contributions to be announced by the United States to support peace operations. The United
States welcomes the new contributions to be announced by China to support UN peacekeeping
efforts. The United States and China recognize the need to deepen the partnership between
the African Union and the United Nations on peace operations. Both sides look forward to an
enhanced discussion with the African Union and other partners to further explore proposals to
this end. Both sides decided to continue discussions to deepen cooperation on capacity
building for troop- and police-contributing countries.
Animals
COOPERATING ON WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING NOW
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China, recognizing the importance and urgency of combating
wildlife trafficking, commit to take positive measures to address this global
challenge. The United States and China commit to enact nearly complete bans on
ivory import and export, including significant and timely restrictions on the import of
ivory as hunting trophies, and to take significant and timely steps to halt the
domestic commercial trade of ivory. The two sides decided to further cooperate in
joint training, technical exchanges, information sharing, and public education on
combating wildlife trafficking, and enhance international law enforcement
cooperation in this field. The United States and China decided to cooperate with
other nations in a comprehensive effort to combat wildlife trafficking.
Poverty
WORKING TOGETHER ON POVERTY NOW
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
The United States and China are committed to advance sustainable and inclusive
international development as laid out in the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, through expanded cooperation to end poverty and hunger and the
promotion of inclusive economic growth, and protection of the environment. The
two sides intend to communicate and cooperate in implementing the Agenda and to
help other countries achieve common development goals.
Terrorism
WORKING TOGETHER ON COUNTER-TERRORISM NOW
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xijinpings-state-visit-united-states
President Obama and President Xi decided to continue expanding law enforcement and anticorruption cooperation, including by enhancing coordination and cooperation on criminal
investigations, repatriation of fugitives, and asset recovery issues. The United States and China
welcomed recent progress on repatriating Chinese fugitives and illegal immigrants through
charter flights and look forward to continuing this cooperation. The United States welcomes
Chinas commitment to consider joining the OECD Working Group on Bribery as a participant in
the near future. As a new aspect of the Joint Liaison Group's role as the primary mechanism for
law enforcement cooperation, both sides committed to discuss the mutual recognition and
enforcement of forfeiture judgments. The two sides condemn all forms of terrorism and
committed to expand exchange of information to counter the transnational flow of foreign
terrorist fighters. The United States and China held a Counter-Improvised Explosive Devises
(IEDs) Workshop on September 14 in Washington, DC, decided on principles for furthering
efforts to counter the threat posed by IEDs, and committed to hold a follow-on workshop in
China.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialogue-counterterrorism-orcounter-productive
This week, China and the United States convened another counterterrorism dialogue
in Beijing. On the surface, their expressed intentions are positive: joining forces to
counter terrorism, partly by encouraging peace and economic development.
Yet its hard to see the dialogue giving adequate attention to human rights
violations committed under the guise of counterterrorism.
All governments have an obligation to provide public order and prevent crime. But
as China increasingly treats peaceful dissent as a threat to national security,
its insistence that many such incidents rise to the level of terrorism is cause for
concern. And through this dialogue the US risks giving its imprimatur to Chinas
approach.
Since the bilateral counterterrorism dialogue was suddenly resurrected in July 2014,
Chinas already-problematic approach to terrorism has hardened significantly. This
has included reverting to Mao-era tactics of public sentencing rallies, using state
media to label individuals as terrorists before any semblance of a judicial process,
and sentencing to life in prison prominent Uighur economist and peaceful
critic Ilham Tohti on charges of separatism. By the end of 2014, Chinese courts
had convicted more than 700 people on charges of terrorism or separatismin
opaque proceedingsthe Criminal Procedure Law denies terrorism suspects basic
defense protections, including access to family members and lawyers, and allows
suspects to be held for months in undisclosed locations.
In January 2015, Beijing released a draft counterterrorism law that expands state
powers with no commensurate accountability or defense for the accused. In July,
Chinese authorities pressured Thailand into forcibly expelling more than 100 ethnic
minority individuals from immigration detention despite the fact that credible
allegations of criminal conduct against them was produced; Chinese state media
broadcast images of these people hooded and handcuffed, and referred to them as
terrorists shortly after their flight had landed.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialoguecounterterrorism-or-counter-productive
What then is the utility of the China-US dialogue? But there seems to be little reason
for the US to proceed until China takes some meaningful steps, including providing
information about prosecutions, radically rewriting the draft counterterrorism law,
ensuring terrorism suspects have lawyers of their own choosing, allowing free media
access to regions where terrorist attacks have taken place, and ceasing its hunt
for refugees. Holding formal dialogues while Chinese counterterrorism laws and
practices are heading in the wrong direction is simply counter-productive.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/china-reverse-downward-rights-spiral-0
President Xi Jinping has vowed to eradicate corruption, maintain economic growth,
and promote the rule of law in China, said Sophie Richardson, China director. But
Xis China Dream has been a nightmare for rights advocates as they face Orwellian
laws, indefinite detention, and torture, with little hope for redress. Their dire plight is
only made worse by the worlds inaction.
human rights norms deteriorated with the US-led operation in Afghanistan in order to fight against global terrorism
and with the invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain. Additionally, the treatment of prisoners by the US officials in
Guantanamo Bay, Bagram in Afghanistan and Abu Ghraib was perceived as aggressive, paternalistic, neoimperialist and a combination of all those by the rest of the international community (Burnell 2010, 2). Importantly,
the EU and especially the US are faced with an important credibility problem at the moment concerning their efforts
towards international human rights protection and democracy promotion in the rest of the world. Credibility refers
to the fact that democratization is hardly ever the only foreign policy goal of those governments who provide
democracy assistance (Burnell 2010). As Bermeo explains, even though the US has spent hundreds of millions of
dollars on democracy and good governance in Egypt, its military aid, which is much more higher than the ones for
democratization, increases the scepticism towards the priority of the US in Egypt (Bermeo 2009). Democracy
promotion can therefore only succeed if it is embedded within the overall set of foreign policies of the promoting
country and if the promoting country itself adheres to the rules, norms and values it claims to want to become more
widespread (Burnell 2010). Similarly, concerning international human rights protection, the US fails to
accede to the ICC with others including China , India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and
this discourages these states and also the others from engaging in
activities that promote human rights
it is not expected from the US to be a global leader of human rights protection and democracy promotion
internationally.
moment
The anti-terrorism law clearly addresses the concern. According to the law, "terrorist
activities shall be punished in accordance with the law and human rights shall be
respected and safeguarded to protect citizens' lawful rights, interests and freedom."
It means the process of carrying out the law will be regulated, and violations of
people's legal rights will be prevented, which is an important principle of the newly
adopted law.
The law strikes a balance between strengthening of counter-terrorism measures and
the respect and protection of human rights.
For one thing, quite a few clauses in the law have specified that legal rights of
citizens and organizations must be respected and protected.
For another, given the definition of "terrorism" in the new law - proposition or
activity that "infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government
organs and international organizations," effectively preventing and cracking down
on terrorism itself amounts to safeguarding human rights.
China scoff at the United States, and its hypocrisy. One expects China or even
Russia to have one of the highest incarceration rates in the world, and they are
nowhere near the rate of the United States.
The United States Prison Population is at 2, 193,798 compare to China whos
population is at 1,548,498 and Russias prison population is at 874,161. Its
embarrassing that countries like China and Russia have a lower rate of incarceration
compared to the United States who advocate human rights and democracy yes
thats hypocrisy.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/the-u-s-just-botched-yet-another-chance-topress-for-human-rights-in-china/
On top of this, the United States committed to enhance counterterrorism
cooperation with China. Such an agreement gives credibility where it is manifestly
not due, given Chinas proposed counterterrorism law, which is nothing more than a
legal veneer for human rights abuses.
Although China does suffer a number of deadly and apparently politically motivated
attacks directed against the general population, the Chinese government long has
manipulated the threat of terrorism to justify its crackdown on the 10 million ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province. U.S. officials will no doubt insist that it is better to have
discussions that create opportunities to raise precisely those concerns. But clearly
whatever concerns the United States raised at last years counterterrorism dialogue
were brushed aside in the drafting of this law. The United States should set far
higher standards for China to meet before engaging in any sort of cooperation on
this issue.
Tibet
CHINA BAD TO TIBET
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
The 6th Tibet Work Forum meeting in late August, held to determine central
government policy for the region for years to come, emphasized the imperatives of
security and stability, but authorities failed to address systematic ethnic and
religious discrimination and restrictions, or the profound socioeconomic changes
brought by massive re-housing and resettlement campaigns in which Tibetans were
compelled to participate.
Central government authorities continue to deploy officials in villages and
monasteries and have expanded surveillance mechanisms to the grassroots level, a
development which appears to have contributed to more frequent arrests of local
community leaders, environmental activists, villagers involved in social and cultural
activities, and writers and singers whose works are considered sensitive.
In July, Tenzin Delek Rinpocheone of Tibets highest-profile political prisoners
died in detention. In violation of the relevant regulations, authorities refused to
release his body or investigate the circumstances of his death. Also in July, Lobsang
Yeshe, a village head imprisoned for his role in a local anti-mining protest in May
2014, died in prison following reports that he had been mistreated. Another high
profile prisoner, a young Lhasa NGO worker Tenzin Choedrak, died in December, two
days after he was abruptly released early from detention.
Protests, particularly against mining and land acquisition, continue despite threats
from local authorities. Security forces beat and arrested peaceful protestors in
Chamdo in April and in Gannan in June. Following mass protests against mining in a
supposedly protected part of Qinghai in 2014, mining operations were reportedly
closed down, although the reasons for this remain unclear. After public outcry over
corruption in the school exam system, authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region
and Qinghai introduced tighter regulations and prosecuted offenders.
Seven more Tibetans self-immolated in 2015, bringing the total since 2009 to 143.
Xinjiang
CHINA BAD FOR XINJIANG
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
Xinjiang, home to 10 million Uighurs, continues to be the site of pervasive
discrimination, repression, and restrictions on fundamental human rights.
Opposition to central and local policies has been expressed in peaceful protests, but
also through violent incidents such as bombings, though details about both protests
and violence are often scant as authorities keep an especially tight hold over
information in Xinjiang.
Chinese authorities in 2015 continued the counterterrorism campaign they launched
in Xinjiang in mid-2014, deploying more security forces to the region, and
implementing new laws and regulations that further criminalize dissent and restrict
religious practice for the regions Muslim ethnic Uighur population. Since mid-2014,
authorities have detained, arrested, or killed increasing numbers of Uighurs alleged
by police to have been involved in illegal or terrorist activities, but the authorities
claims are impossible to verify independently. In June, a group of people attacked a
police traffic checkpoint in Kashgar with small bombs and knives. Between 18 and
28 people reportedly died, including 15 suspects killed by police as well as several
bystanders.
Xinjiang authorities promulgated comprehensive yet vaguely worded new religious
affairs regulations in January. Those prohibit extremist attire and ban activities
that damage the physical and mental health of citizens. In recent years, authorities
have used similar official and unofficial directives to discourage or even ban civil
servants, teachers, and students from fasting during Ramadan. In March, a Hotan
court convicted 25 Uighurs of endangering state security for their participation in
illegal religious studiesin this case, private religious classes.
Hong Kong
CHINA BAD TO HONG KONG
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
Although Hong Kong is guaranteed autonomy in all matters other than foreign
affairs and defense, and enjoys an independent judiciary and other civil liberties,
Beijing appears to be encroaching on the rights to political participation, expression,
and assembly there.
In June, Hong Kongs legislature rejected a Beijing-backed proposed electoral reform
package for the regions chief executive. The proposal, which would expand the
franchise but allow a Beijing-dominated nominating committee to screen out
candidates it did not like, was opposed by many Hong Kong residents and in 2014
had sparked the months-long Umbrella Movement protests.
About 1,000 people were arrested in connection with the Umbrella Movement,
though most were released without being prosecuted. Authorities have charged
student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung, among others, with unlawful assembly, and
inciting others to take part in an unlawful assembly, despite those laws
incompatibility with international freedom of assembly standards. The Independent
Police Complaints Council said it had received 159 complaints from demonstrators
alleging police assault and abuse that it deemed required investigation, but the
only police who had been arrested at time of writing were police caught on film
beating pro-democracy protester Ken Tsang.
Concerns about freedom of expression in Hong Kong persist, especially for media
seen as critical of Beijing. In January, an attacker threw a Molotov cocktail outside
the residence of pro-democracy media owner Jimmy Lai. No one was injured, but no
one was arrested. In August, two assailants of former Mingpao editor Kevin Lau
Chun-to were sentenced; one admitted that they had been paid to stab Lau to
teach him a lesson.
In July, Reverend Philip Woo Siu-hok was summoned to Shenzhen by religious affairs
authorities to warn him against preaching to mainlanders who come to Hong Kong.
International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW KEY TO RELATIONSHIP AND ALL IMPACTS
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/21/national-security-advisorsusan-e-rices-prepared-remarks-us-china
Many of our concerns stem from a common root. Steps that erode the international system or
that slowly eat away at a rules-based order and universal rights or that give one nation an
unfair advantage are detrimental to all. This is true whether we are talking about maritime
concerns or cyberspace or human rights. China cannot expect to wield influence selectively
or lead only when its convenient, opting in or out of international norms at will. Everyone has
to play by the same rules, regardless of size or power, because thats the way everyone can
compete and be treated equally.
Africa
US POSITION ON AFRICA HURTS RELATIONS AND CREDIBIILTY
http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-U.S.-China-SummitDecoding-a-Tower-of-Babel.pdf
It is in the context of this evolving, confused American policy that we encounter U.S.
presidential
(and presidential candidate) statements and actions that increase friction with Beijin
g and reduce
U.S. credibility. The opening months of 2015 saw the Obama administration seeming
ly trying to
derail Chinas attempt to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with
substantial
Western and other participation, only to have 57 nations, many of them Washington
s allies, sign on
with Beijing in April. We find Obama trying to sell the already fully defensible TPP tra
de agreement
by saying, Thats why we have to make sure the United States and not countries l
ike China is
the one writing this centurys rules for the worlds economy. Similarly, we have the
U.S. president
giving an interview to the BBC just before traveling to Africa noting that Chinese lea
ders are not
accountable to their constituencies, [and] have been able to funnel an awful lot of m
oney into
Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that are being extracted from Africa.
You cant use Beijing as an allpurpose punching bag and expect cooperation.
Arctic
US IS CHAIRPERSON OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL BEST WINDOW
TO ACT
http://chinaus-icas.org/node/78
The United States agenda as chairman of the Arctic Council starting this year is reported to focus
on addressing climate change, improving energy access to remote Arctic regions as well as
environmental protection. The emphasis on climate change and environmental protection,
beyond geopolitical competition and sovereign rights claims, makes a global consensus on Arctic
governance possible, and increases the potential for cooperation between the five Arctic states
(or eight polar states) and non-Arctic players including international organizations and individual
states, e.g. China.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chinas_undeclared_arctic_foreign_pol
icy.pdf
The United States will find some, though not all, aspects of Chinas Arctic policy
match its own interests both in the Arctic region and globally. Partnering with China
in the Arctic where possible, and developing in-depth knowledge of Chinas Arctic
interests and objectives, will strengthen U.S. ability to give meaning to the concept
of the United States and China developing a new type of great power relationship.
http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-usand-china
Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the U.S. and
China:
First, since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change, Arctic climate change
research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries. We
are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue, so
inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and
glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions. Working together on
WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is
another fruitful course ahead.
Second, focus joint discussions on Arctic marine safety and strategies to protect the
Arctic marine environment. Implementation and future enforcement of the
mandatory IMO Polar Code for ships operating in polar waters (to come into force
Jan. 1, 2017) is a topic of national interest to both maritime states. Bilateral
cooperation could also include identifying the range of marine conservation
measures, such as marine protected areas, and studying how these measures might
mesh with future commercial voyages in the Arctic Ocean.
Third, maritime law enforcement, specifically related to fisheries, in northern waters
is of practical and operational concern. The two coast guards have agreements in
place and have worked together in the Pacific; extending this enforcement
collaboration builds trust and resilience when marine operations become more
complex. An agreement signed in Oslo in July by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) barring their fishing fleets from
the central Arctic Ocean will surely require the engagement of non-Arctic states who
have deep-water fleets such as China. Engaging China early in Arctic fisheries
discussions on a bilateral basis with the U.S., or among the Arctic five, can be an
effective strategy to minimize future disagreements.
Fourth, the wide gap in Arctic marine infrastructure identified in the Arctic Councils
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009) demands critical attention by the major
maritime states. China-U.S. cooperation on infrastructure can identify potential
public-private partnerships, discuss strategies for much-needed Arctic observing
systems, and study port and maritime communications requirements. The U.S. can
also foster Chinas engagement within the Arctic Council on matters related to
Arctic search and rescue, and Arctic oil spill preparedness and response, as it is
plausible Chinese-flagged commercial ships will sail in Arctic waters.
Fifth, joint Arctic marine research is an arena with much promise. Joint
oceanographic research between the U.S. and China would attain global attention
and herald an era of close collaboration in Arctic Ocean research highly relevant to
global climate change. Joint icebreaking research ship operations in Arctic icecovered waters could provide unique and lasting cooperative experiences for the
Chinese and American operating agencies, as well as key links between our
research funding organizations.
China and the U.S. have an obligation and opportunity to work together on a range
of cooperative issues to maintain the Arctics future as a peaceful, safe and secure
region, as that new frontier opens. Both nations must be proactive in Arctic matters
within their already existing dialogue and in international organizations including
the Arctic Council.
First Strike
China developing second strike now
http://cogitasia.com/nuclear-weapons-and-u-s-china-relations-a-way-forward/
Why submarines are a game changer. Ballistic missile submarines can act as first- or
second-strike weapons. Because submarines are hard to detect, they can be used to launch a
first strike with little or no warning. As a second-strike weapon, they are more likely than
land-based missiles to survive an enemy first strike and be able to retaliate. But regardless
of whether they are intended to fulfill a first- or second-strike role, ballistic missile
submarines deployed on deep-water deterrence patrols are not compatible with Chinas
current nuclear posture and will contravene the very foundations of Chinas No First Use
pledge: The storage of warheads will be decentralized; warheads will be mated with missiles;
missiles will be on a higher level of alert than other components of the nuclear arsenal; and
targeting data will be stored onboard the submarines.
However, submarine-launched ballistic missiles are arguably the most efficient way of
deploying nuclear weapons for any country that wants a credible deterrent. All of the legally
recognized nuclear powers except China possess and deploy nuclear-armed submarines, and
other nuclear states are increasingly looking to submarines to provide the foundations of
their nuclear deterrent. Even the United States has argued that its submarine forces are so
effective that they alone could counter the Russian nuclear threat. China is looking to
field five Type 094 submarines in the very near future, each armed with a dozen missiles
and deployed in a similar fashion to the United Kingdoms Continuous At Sea Deterrence
program, which always has at least one submarine on patrol. Arms control expert Jeffrey
Lewis calculates that each Chinese sub is able to conduct patrols lasting approximately 60
days, or about 300 days total for all five submarines, which provides near-continuous at-sea
deterrence (the time required to refit each submarine after its patrol may hinder year-round
coverage). This would ensure a high survivability rate of nuclear weapons (even while taking
account of claims that the Type 094 is not the quietest submarine) and a force comparable
with other states recognized survivable forces.
The military application of nuclear weapons. This leads to the most important result
of Chinas nuclear submarine deployment: Not only will it be able to deter a first
strike, but it will also prevent a conventional conflict from escalating into a nuclear
exchange. This is crucial for China, which wants to be able to use its conventional
forces and dual-use weapons without running the risk of receiving a nuclear strike in
retaliation. This brings thousands of conventionally armed ballistic missiles into
play, giving China greater anti-access/area denial capabilities and greater coercive
power in resolving sovereignty issues that plague international relations in the
Pacific region.
GMO
CHINA TOO STRICT ON AGRICULTURE GMO IMPORTS HURTS US
ECON AND CHINESE HUSBANDRY MARKET
https://newhouse.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/newhouse-leads-letterurging-fair-trade-china-us-alfalfa-exporters
https://newhouse.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/newhouse-leads-letterurging-fair-trade-china-us-alfalfa-exporters
Since China opened its market to U.S. alfalfa hay in 2006, rising exports of this
commodity have been a great trade success story. American exporters are projected to
sell 1.2 million tons of high-quality alfalfa into the Chinese market in 2015, and as
Chinas demand for milk and dairy products grows, its need for the highest-quality feed
will grow as well. It is crucial that American farmers and exporters are able to continue
exporting into this market, and ensuring this should be a top priority of the U.S. Trade
Representative and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Unfortunately, recent
developments have imperiled the ability of U.S. exporters to meet Chinese demand for
alfalfa, potentially putting hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of U.S. jobs at
risk. We urge you to prevail upon China to accept reasonable world-class import policies
for U.S. alfalfa a top priority in ongoing negotiations with China.
Since 2001, China has prohibited imports of Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) crops,
although it has waived this prohibition in certain circumstances. Of concern is the fact
that, beginning in 2014, China has applied destination testing of alfalfa for GMO traits.
Now, not only are exporters required to sample, test, and ship alfalfa that is 100% nonGMO, but on the receiving end destination tests may still detect a Low Level Presence
(LLP) of GMO traits that may not have originated at the farm. This change to destination
testing happened without sufficient warning and threatens to shut out an unreasonably
high percentage of the U.S. alfalfa crop, which has recently expanded to meet Chinese
market demand.
Most of our other trading partners, even those who also prohibit GMO alfalfa (which has
been approved by the FDA), accept that in many cases, a miniscule amount of GMO
traits are unavoidable for much of the crop. U.S. exporters are cognizant and
responsive to the requirements of our trading partners, and make every effort to grow
conventional crops without any GMO traits for export. However, certain environmental
factors (runoff, bee pollination, etc.) sometimes make this impossible. Trading partners
such as the European Union accept that a LLP of the products DNA showing GMO traits
is considered a technical zero. China previously did as well, but recent testing
changes have resulted in U.S. alfalfa with a technical zero percentage of GMO traits
being rejected at a very great expense to U.S. exporters.
At a time when China is investing billions in its own GMO research, we are concerned
that this heightened testing is an attempt to shut American producers out of a key
export market. We urge you to make the retention of this market apriority for the
Administration in bilateral negotiations with China, including the Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade, as well as other trade-related negotiations. Unfortunately, this
approach by the Chinese could ultimately impact many other U.S. crops. We look
forward to working with you to ensure that American farmers and exporters are able to
compete on a level playing field.
3 SOLVENCY STEPS
http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/download/2015%2520Viewpoint.pdf
To improve market access in the Agricultural Industry, AmCham Shanghai
recommends that: 1) The U.S. Government continues to press China to lift bans on
American agricultural products including beef and rice, and approve more strands of
GMOs for import. 2) The U.S. Government increases cooperation and coordination
with relevant Chinese government agencies on food safety and food import policies.
Better coordination between technical agencies such as the USDA and the Chinese
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)
can alleviate misunderstandings and help American companies to improve their
position in this rapidly expanding market. 3) The U.S. Government encourages
China to engage more with American agricultural companies and seek industry
input on draft laws and regulations. American agricultural companies have
extensive experience and knowledge on food safety issues. We applaud the Chinese
government for its efforts to solicit industry opinions on relevant laws and
regulations in 2014 and encourage the government to continue to find ways to
engage with industry on these issues.
http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/cloned-in-china-beijing-aims-for-biotechdominance/
China has the potential to become a major biotechnology exporter; however,
international GMO regulations often stand in the way, failing to distinguish between
different product creation methods.
Traditional GMOs add DNA to products, whereas gene-editing removes or shuts off
certain genes. Despite this difference, (especially given public discomfort with the
idea of added DNA) regulations in major markets such as the U.S lack finesse.
Currently, whether cloned Tibetan mastiffs or gene-edited micro-pigs, such products
cannot be exported to the United States a major drawback for Chinese companies
trying to access the U.S market, itself one of the largest consumers of GMO
products.
Prof. Max Rothschild from Iowa State University explains the dilemma by stating that
the FDA should be grappling with this major difference [added vs. removed DNA]
as to how it will affect regulatory policy and whether gene-edited organisms should
be regulated in the same way as more traditional GMOs.
In recognition of the industrys growing role in bilateral trade, biotech issues are
increasingly coming to the fore in China-U.S talks. On November 23rd, the 26th U.SChina Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade was held. As a result of said
meeting. China has made pledges to move quickly on outstanding approval
procedures for existing biotech products.
Pressure from both Chinese and American biotech companies has seen Beijing and
Washington initiate the Strategic Agricultural Innovation Dialogue (SAID) to promote
GMO trade, and simplify biotech approval. This adds to last years agreement for
the U.S and China to station food inspector staff in each others countries.
Chinas barriers to imports of some U.S. genetically modified crops are disrupting
seed companies' plans for new product launches and keeping at least one variety
out of the U.S. market altogether.
Two of the world's biggest seed makers, Syngenta AG and Dow AgroSciences, are
responding with tightly controlled U.S. launches of new GMO seeds, telling farmers
where they can plant new corn and soybean varieties and how can the use them.
Bayer CropScience told Reuters it has decided to keep a new soybean variety on
hold until it receives Chinese import approval.
Beijing is taking longer than in the past to approve new GMO crops, and Chinese
ports in November 2013 began rejecting U.S. imports saying they were tainted with
a GMO Syngenta corn variety, called Agrisure Viptera, approved in the United
States, but not in China.
The developments constrain launches of new GMO seeds by raising concerns that
harvests of unapproved varieties could be accidentally shipped to the world's
fastest-growing corn market and denied entry there. It also casts doubt over the
future of companies' heavy investments in research of crop technology.
The stakes are high. Grain traders Cargill Inc [CARG.UL] and Archer Daniels Midland
Co, along with dozens of farmers, sued Syngenta for damages after Beijing rejected
Viptera shipments, saying the seed maker misrepresented how long it would take to
win Chinese approval.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gmo-china-insight-idUSKCN0J90DU20141125
Controlled launches, however, are at best a temporary fix because they are costly,
complicated and risk accidental contamination of other export grains, said Jim
Sutter, chief executive of the U.S. Soybean Export Council.
"The long-term solution is to work with our partners in China and build confidence in
the process in the way we want it to work," he said. "Easier said than done."
In China, which has one-fifth of the worlds population but just seven per cent of the
worlds arable land, food security is a national obsession. Pesticides and enhanced
fertilizers no longer improve crop yields as markedly as they once did, and staple
crops, such as rice, may not grow as reliably in the temperature extremes brought
on by climate change. As a result, the government has begun to invest heavily in
research on genetically modified crops. Last fall, the Communist Partys Literature
Research Office published the text of a speech that President Xi Jinping had given
before the Central Rural Work Conference, an agricultural-policy body, calling on
domestic scientists to boldly research and innovate, [and] dominate the high points
of G.M.O. techniques. The most recent Five Year Plan names biotechnology,
including enhanced agriculture, as one of seven Strategic Emerging Industries.
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/can-the-chinese-government-get-itspeople-to-like-g-m-o-s
The mixed messages over G.M.O.s reveal profound divisions within Chinas
government, as well as an uncharacteristic sensitivity to public opinion. Much of the
research has been funded through the Ministry of Science and Technology, with a
mandate to elevate Chinas scientific prowess to world-class status. But the licenses
for testing and final commercial approval are granted by a joint-ministerial
conference made up of representatives from twelve agencies; it is convened by the
Ministry of Agriculture, which is subject to State Council influence and the
imperative of maintaining social stabilitythat is, avoiding public unrest. Put
simply, the problem mostly lies in the rising resistance of the public to G.M.O.s,
which has made the political leadership hesitant to go ahead with
Infrastructure
CHINA ALREADY INVESTS IN US RAIL
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2015/09/unlikely-saviour
But in one important area, that obsession seems to be working to Americas benefit.
Last week brought news of a big Chinese investment in what could become the first
high-speed rail line in America. Construction on a 230-mile line between Los
Angeles and Las Vegas will begin as early as next autumn, announced a Chinese
Communist Party official. China Railway International USA, a consortium led by
Chinas national railroad, will provide an initial capital investment of $100m for the
line, which will first run from Las Vegas to the town of Victorville, about 80 miles
from Los Angeles, and which officials hope will later connect to the citys downtown.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2015/09/unlikely-saviour
High-speed rail has many advocates in America. But the country that once thrived
on its transcontinental railways has fallen hopelessly behind Europe and Asia
following years of disinvestment and closures. The trouble is that the government
has demonstrated a stubborn unwillingness to bring the network into the 21stor
even mid-20thcentury. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama
proclaimed: Within 25 years, our goal is to give 80% of Americans access to highspeed rail. But Republican governors of three states slated for big rail projects
cancelled those plans and returned the money to the federal government. Jeff
Denham, the chairman of the House of Representatives subcommittee in charge of
railroads said last year: High-speed rail can be a good idea; I just think it should be
left up to the private sector. Even states that stand to benefit most from such
investment seem ambivalent. Kevin McCarthy, the House Majority Leader, who
represents perpetually congested California, told the Wall Street Journal: "I will do all
that I can to ensure not one dollar of federal funding goes to boondoggles like
California's high-speed rail."
rail line will be a big money spinner for China Railway International USA.
Transportation isnt supposed to make money, says Mr Kunz. Instead, China is
taking a strategic step to boost its own industry. After investing in more miles of
new high-speed rail than any other country in the world, it has developed the
engineering know-how to build tracks and trainswhich it now hopes to export to
overseas markets. The United States is one of more than 20 countries where China
aims to build a market for its rail industry.
The United States offers an unparalleled investment opportunity for China. Only the
US can absorb such a large amount of capital: the US presents a massive
opportunity for infrastructure spending. Neglected for years, US bridges totter,
roads crack, and airports face wide scale delays due to the lack of capacity.
Sanyal pointed out that the Mumbai Airport is much more modern than New Yorks
LaGuardia; such neglected infrastructure presents a great investment opportunity.
This suggests that whilst infrastructure investing in China faces diminishing returns,
infrastructure in the US provides potentially higher profts for Chinese investors. For
the US, this will create a massive defcit and for China a surplus. However, if not
squandered and executed effectively, the infrastructure spending in the US should
pay for itself and beneft both countries in the long term.
The infrastructure contrast between China and the United States is stark and
growing ever more so. Although the US invested as much as 4 percent of its annual
GDP in infrastructure during the 1950s and 1960s, that number is down to just 2.4
percent today. The result of the disinvestment is troubling and can be seen
everywhere in the country.
American airports and harbors, for instance, are overburdened with far more traffic
than they can accommodate, and more than 4,000 dams are at risk of failure.
Roadways are congested and deteriorating, resulting in accidents and traffic jams
that force commuters to spend more than 4 billion hours each year driving to and
from work.
In addition, bridges have decayed to such a point that repairing them would cost
approximately $140 billion. Worse yet, the country's aging infrastructure poses a
direct threat to human health and the quality of life.
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, more than 1.2 trillion gallons
of untreated sewage leak into US waterways each year from antiquated sewer
systems, some of which use components that are 200 years old.
For all of these reasons, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has awarded
a grade of D+ to the United States, based on the condition and performance of its
infrastructure. In its report, the ASCE identified a "pressing need for modernization"
and noted the "significant backlog of overdue maintenance" across various
infrastructure systems. The ASCE calculates that correcting these problems will
require the US to invest roughly $3.6 trillion by 2020 in critical upgrades and
repairs.
transportation programs over the short term, Congress has not passed a long-term
transportation bill in 10 years.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/201509/26/content_22004970.htm
Since the 1960s, however, American investment in large-scale public works has
fallen dramatically. Meanwhile, China, India, and other countries have been forging
boldly ahead with serious investment in transit systems, airports and numerous
other projects. There is a strong correlation between a nation's economic growth
and its investment in infrastructure, as the Chinese government fully recognizes.
Given this fact, and Americans' deep frustration with the state of their own
country's infrastructure, it's time for Congress to open the public purse and once
again make a long-term commitment to modernizing the nation. Otherwise, the
United States will simply rest on the laurels of yesterday's public-works
achievements while China and other up-and-coming nations quietly pass it by.
Can emerging markets take advantage of this cheap capital? In recent months,
there has been a chorus arguing that the global economy needs a sharp increase in
investment, particularly in infrastructure. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry
Summers published a Financial Times column titled Why public investment really is
a free lunch while IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde argued that an
investment boost is needed by the world economy to overcome a new mediocre.
http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-capital-is-on-the-move-1421896110
In others words, a sustained revival in global economic growth boils down to a
revival of infrastructure investment in the US. The country has the necessary scale
to absorb Chinas surplus and the poor state of its infrastructure provides many
avenues for fruitful deployment of capital. The irony is that the IMFs new mantra
ultimately leads us back to large global imbalances. Far from decrying this as a
http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1618300/chinese-capital-exportsmay-be-boon-us-infrastructure
Now remember, when you have a glut of capital, a few things reliably happen. Asset
prices rise because capital seeks a return, interest rates stay low, for the same
reason, and you have a tendency for bubbles to develop. That means that even if
Western central banks were able to raise interest rates, flows of capital from China
might keep rates low and give rise to bubbles anyway.
costs less inflation, are below 1 per cent in the US and much of the industrialised
world over horizons of up to 30 years. So infrastructure investment actually makes it
possible to reduce burdens on future generations.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/
For its part, China castigates the U.S. for its irresponsible fiscal trajectory, its
political opposition to Chinese investment in American companies and
infrastructure, and its export-control laws, especially those restricting the export of
technologies with potential military applications.
We believe its time to turn the typical exchange of economic critiques on its head.
The two countries have largely been engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, each
blaming the other for its own failings, exerting pressure on the other to accede to its
demands, and too often waiting for the other to act first. In fact, it is in each
countrys self-interest to meaningfully address the criticisms made by the other.
The greatest American threat to Chinas economic future is the possibility that
Americas economic success could come to an end; the greatest economic danger
China poses to the U.S. is the chance that Chinas economy fails to grow. By
contrast, if each country gets its own house in order and thus succeeds
economically, that should diminish economic insecurity, which generates friction,
and increase confidence about the future, which fosters a constructive relationship.
As former U.S. Treasury secretaries with long experience working with China, we
believe each country should undertake significant reforms. Seriously considering
each others criticisms is a good way to begin.
the united states has enormous long-term strengths, including a dynamic and
entrepreneurial culture, a strong rule of law, flexible labor and capital markets, vast
natural resources, and relatively favorable age demographics. But China is right to
say that improving Americas long-term fiscal outlook is a prerequisite to
sustainable growth. Well-structured fiscal reforms could contribute to growth and
job creation now while reducing the burden of debt in the future. Some argue that
the government could create jobs and increase demand in the short term through
public investment in infrastructure or other sectors, while simultaneously taking
steps to improve the countrys long-term fiscal trajectory. Others argue that the
nation could create more well-paying jobs by reforming its tax code for individuals
and corporations, reducing the distortions that undermine economic
competitiveness while raising necessary revenue.
Chinese investors could help the United States speed growth now without worsening
its long-term debt problem. The U.S. has vast infrastructure needs and a paucity of
public capital. But byzantine regulatory and policy barriers too often discourage
private investment in major projects. A more streamlined and welcoming
environment for domestic and foreign investment in infrastructure projects would
create jobs and boost competitiveness.
STATES CP
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/
Much of the effort to attract Chinese investmentwhether in infrastructure or
manufacturing or agribusinessneeds to come from outside Washington. States
and cities have a choice: they can continue to be passive recipients of occasional
Chinese investment, or they can design more-systematic approaches to seeking
Chinese capital, and the jobs and competitive advantages that accompany it. In
Ohio, Michigan, and California, for example, proactive governors are attracting
Chinese investment and creating high-quality jobs in sectors like auto parts and
clean energy.
At a minimum, more than $8 trillion in new investment will likely be needed in U.S.
transportation, energy, and wastewater and drinking water infrastructure from 2013
through 2030otaling some $455 billion per year.
According to data from the American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation,
Chinese outward investment reached $85 billion in 2013, a dramatic increase from a
mere $10 billion in 2005. The U.S. has been the No.1 destination, luring more than
$14 billion of investment last year alone.
http://rhg.com/reports/assessing-the-opportunity-for-chinese-participation-in-usinfrastructure
There is significant opportunity for foreign investors to participate in US
infrastructure build-out. Given Chinas external portfolio and the growing
capabilities of Chinese firms in infrastructure-related activities, it will be a
particularly interesting opportunity for Chinese investors and suppliers. The most
straightforward way for Chinese firms to participate in US infrastructure build-out is
via financial investment providing capital either via debt or equity investments.
Such investments would help China in its goal to diversify its global portfolio in
terms of both geographies and asset classes. Currently, Chinese institutional
investors and firms have large and growing capital pools, but their balance sheets
show a high degree of home biasthat is, almost all of their investments are in
the domestic economy. Greater uncertainty about domestic growth in China has
increased awareness of the risks of maintaining domestically concentrated
portfolios and the benefits of global diversification. At the same time, the returns for
low-risk investments have fallen precipitously across the globe in light of
quantitative easing and a flight to safe haven assets since the financial crisis (Figure
2).
For Chinese investors, financial investments in infrastructure projects in advanced
economies offer relatively safe returns and a longer-term investment horizon.
Investments in capital-intensive infrastructure projects also have the advantage of
allowing for the passive investment of large amounts of money without the need for
constant managerial supervision. This provides a particularly attractive opportunity
for cash-rich Chinese funds that are looking to go out and invest abroad. Chinese
money managers and sovereign investors are known to already have significant
equity and debt holdings in mature markets, but because there are no disclosure
requirements for smaller stakes, it is impossible to provide an accurate snapshot of
current exposure to infrastructure-related positions. However, bigger stakes usually
are disclosed, and these have increased substantially in recent years. For example,
in 2012, the China Investment Corporation (CIC), one of Chinas sovereign wealth
funds, purchased an 8.68% stake in British water utility Thames Water and a 10%
stake in Heathrow Airport Holdings, the firm that owns Londons Heathrow Airport,
for $726 million.
The US infrastructure sector also offers opportunities for Chinese firms as providers
of infrastructure goods and services. Owing to the past 30 years of Chinas
infrastructure boom, many Chinese firms now have significant economies of scale
which, when combined with low labor costs, enable them to offer construction
materials at globally competitive prices. Chinas infrastructure boom and
educational priorities also have grown the size, capabilities, and experience of the
countrys engineering corps. Chinese firms have thus become increasingly
competitive in the market for such infrastructure-related services such as civil
engineering, construction services, contract management services, and operations
and maintenance or life-cycle management services.
For Chinese providers of goods and services, certain commercial and operational
challenges also diminish the prospects of participation in US projects. First, as a
result of several high-profile cases of defective Chinese products in recent years, US
buyers have exhibited growing concerns over the safety and quality of Chinesesourced products. For infrastructure in particular, it is critical that parts and
components are safe, of high-quality, and durable. Second, although Chinese
construction service providers have operated successfully in developing economies,
lack of experience operating within foreign and often complex regulatory
environments in developed economies and managing labor relations are primary
commercial impediments.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
Our study found that Chinese participation in U.S. infrastructure would enable the
United States to leverage Chinese capital, industrial capacity, and infrastructure
experiences, while allowing China to help support and capitalize on the coming
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
The United States is poised to undertake the most significant expansion and
modernization of its infrastructure since the 1950s.1 Unlike previous infrastructure
booms, this new period is taking place in the context of significant pressure on
federal, state, and local budgets, suggesting that substantial private capital will be
necessary to finance the new infrastructure investments. This expansion is also
taking place in a dramatically changed global economy that boasts new players in
global trade and investment. The most important of these new players is China. As
the United States second-largest goods trading partnerand with a large and
growing pool of available capitalChina is well positioned to participate in and
benefit from U.S. infrastructure expansion and modernization.
generate and may serve as helpful partners in navigating the political and
regulatory challenges surrounding foreign investment.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
In addition to U.S. laws and regulations, Chinese firms and their U.S. counterparts
must plan for any legal and regulatory requirements governing outbound
investment from China: Chinese Outbound Investment Approvals Process. Chinese
parties must first gain approval from their home regulators before they invest or
move funds overseas. Under current law, direct investments typically require
separate approvals from the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange, and relevant industry regulators. For financial investments, Chinese
investors need to have a specific government mandate for overseas investment or
to obtain a quota under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors Program
(QFII). State Conditions on Outbound Investment. It also is not uncommon for
stateowned investors or banks to condition investments or loans on other stateowned firms obtaining service or supply contracts, which can add additional
complexity to the potential transaction.
PLAN SOLVES
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
As a summary point, we put forth the following suggestions for Chinese partiesas
well as their U.S. counterpartscontemplating participation in U.S. infrastructure.
We direct these points to potential transactions that will involve direct investment,
but many of them apply in equal force to potential providers of infrastructure goods
term projects, and near-term budget shortfalls, which affect states abilities to
address current infrastructure needs.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
The ability of states to self-finance public infrastructure projects may remain
constrained in the medium term even if state revenues return to pre-recession
levels. State budgets are likely to favor the restoration of services cut during and
since the recession over infrastructure investment. Available funds will be affected
by structural changes in the economy, such as the growing number of Medicaid
beneficiaries.23 And asset renewal needs, if left unaddressed, may continue to
grow, further diverting funds from greenfield projects
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
In addition to opportunities for Chinese companies, high-net-worth individuals may
also invest in U.S. infrastructure through the United States EB-5 program, which
provides foreign investors with U.S. residence permits in exchange for investments
of more than $1 million (or $500,000 for certain targeted employment areas) that
create 10 or more U.S. jobs. The funds may be channeled through special
government-licensed regional centers, such as the Inland Empire Center in
California, which focuses on solar energy infrastructure projects.84 Beyond
acquiring stakes in existing companies and assets, Chinese firms have recently
begun to enter the U.S. infrastructure market through greenfield investments. One
example is a joint venture between Chinas ENN group and Utah-based CH4 Energy
Corporation, which is building a nationwide network of natural gas fueling stations
(known as blu LNG fueling stations) for trucks along U.S. highways. CH4 benefits
from ENNs experience in operating more than 200 such gas stations in China. In the
United States, two stations are already operational, four more are under
construction and the consortium plans to build an additional fifty stations
throughout the United States this year.85 ENNs expertise and industrial capacity
are crucial assets to CH4 as it and its leading competitor in the emerging U.S.
natural gas transportation market, Clean Energy Fuels Corp., seek to accelerate
infrastructure build-out to make commercial use viable in the long term.86
million for the project.96 The possibility of Chinese participation as vendor has also
led some Chinese manufacturers to set up factories on U.S. soil in order to localize
production. For example, TPCO Enterprise, Inc., a subsidiary of Tianjin Pipe Group, a
Chinese supplier of seamless steel pipes, has a factory in Houston, Texas, where it
produces pipes for the American market.97 By bringing production to America, firms
can (1) establish distribution networks or more closely monitor third-party
distributors; (2) provide improved post-sales support; and (3) in some cases, reduce
the impact of tariffs on their products.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
At the same time, the provision of services in developed economies poses many
challenges to Chinese firms, thus limiting the potential opportunities in the United
States. Although Chinese construction service providers have operated successfully
in developing economies, lack of experience operating within foreign and often
complex regulatory environments in developed economies is a primary commercial
impediment. A leading example of large-scale failure brought on by lack of
operational expertise is China Overseas Engineering Groups (Covecs) unsuccessful
attempt to build a highway in Poland in 2009.
REGULATIONS, MAN
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
Given the landscape of the Chinese economy and the strong history of Chinese
companies being at least partly owned by the government, the issue of state control
and whether an entity is acting on the basis of commercial concerns or on behalf of
government interests may result in increased regulatory or political scrutiny of
Chinese participation in infrastructure projects. From the perspective of U.S.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
Apart from CFIUS and other regulatory approvals, the U.S. Congress can take an
active interest in foreign participation in U.S. infrastructure and be an important
institution for parties to consider and engage in the context of specific transactions.
This is particularly true for transactions that present national security issues.
Congress is likely to continue to be a more important institutional consideration for
investments from China than it will be for investments from virtually any other
country. Indeed, in 2000, Congress created a bipartisan committee, the United
StatesChina Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), specifically to
monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of
the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China. The USCC regularly holds hearings and publishes
research papers on specific subjects pertinent to U.S.China relations, and it is
required to submit to Congress an annual report that includes recommendations for
legislative and administrative action. Over the past decade, the experience of a
number of Chinese companieswhich can be defined broadly to encompass Hong
Kongbased companies as well has proven the direct impact Congress can have
on individual transactions involving Chinese investors. For example, congressional
opposition ultimately killed China National Offshore Oil Corporations (CNOOC) bid
for Unocal in 2005, and there was substantial political opposition to the proposed
investment by Huawei Technologies (Huawei) in 3Com in 2007, which ultimately was
rejected by CFIUS.
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/files/020877_Chi
naInfrastructure_Final_Revised.pdf
Because transport infrastructure in the United States is largely a local matter,
Chinese participants, and particularly investors, should be prepared to address local
political concerns. By one estimate, more than 80% of U.S. voters oppose the use of
foreign capital in domestic infrastructure projects.123 Thus, while investments in
roadways and related infrastructure have the benefit of being less likely to raise
national security concerns than, for example, investments in airports or seaports,
they may still face adverse public opinion. Despite possible political obstacles, the
need for new capital to modernize the U.S. roadways offers considerable
opportunities for investors.
projects themselves but also in navigating the political and regulatory challenges
surrounding the projects.
http://www.cfr.org/infrastructure/encouraging-us-infrastructure-investment/p27771
Congress has done little to address this growing crisis. Ideally, it would pass
comprehensive bills to guide strategic, long-term investments. The surface
transportation bill, known as the highway bill, is a notable example of such
comprehensive legislation. It is the largest source of federal infrastructure spending,
allocating hundreds of billions of dollars over several years for highways, rapid
transit, and rail. But the most recent six-year highway bill expired in 2009, and
Congress has been unable to agree on a new multiyear bill since then. The Senate
passed a new bill in March 2012 that provides only two years of funding and efforts
in the House to pass a longer-term bill have nearly collapsed. The continuing
impasse forced Congress to pass its ninth temporary extension of the old law at the
end of March 2012, this time for ninety days. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood
announced in February that he does not expect a bill to pass before the 2012
election, a view many experts share.
focused on low-cost federal loans to supplement state financing and private capital.
The bill is not supported by House Republican leaders, however, and is unlikely to
pass this year. There are also important transportation reforms in both pending
highway bills where Republicans and Democrats are on common ground: expanding
the popular Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loan
program, streamlining the Department of Transportation bureaucracy to speed
approval of new projects, and eliminating congressional earmarksa huge step
toward smarter project selection based on merit rather than political interests. But if
the highway bill does not pass, none of these reforms will happen.
http://www.cfr.org/infrastructure/encouraging-us-infrastructure-investment/p27771
Cut red tape for new projects. On March 22, 2012, President Obama issued a new
executive order to "improve performance of federal permitting and review of
infrastructure projects." But the order is short on substance and long on studies and
steering committees. A bolder step would be eliminating duplicative reviews by
merging them into single-track proceedings wherever possible. The approval
process for natural gas pipelines is a model; an interagency agreement established
a "one-stop" review conducted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) with input from other government agencies. President Obama could order
similar streamlining without congressional approval and without waiting months for
a steering committee plan.
cost-effective manner, other states should follow suit and seek out Chinese
construction companies such as Sinomach for bids.
The CGIT data show that, in terms of Chinese firms, a disconnect exists between the
access to American investment and construction markets. The American
infrastructure market affords an untapped opportunity, which Chinese companies
are more than capable, and likely willing, to fill. How much infrastructure work the
US needs is a matter of debate. That it is worthwhile to reduce barriers to entry into
the US infrastructure market, an area where Chinese firms are able to contribute,
should not be.
ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS
http://qz.com/138761/america-needs-8-trillion-worth-in-infrastructure-over-the-nexttwo-decades-and-china-could-help/
The idea of Chinese control over critical US infrastructure like power and water
plants or airports is enough to get a number of US officials up in arms. Lawmakers
have already said American companies should not to do business with Chinese firms
Huawei and ZTE for fear of enabling Chinese government influence over domestic
telecom equipment. And its not only the US that is sensitive. Over $200 billion in
potentialmergers or acquisitions around the world have fallen through because of
political or regulatory opposition to Chinese investment, according to the US think
tank, the Heritage Foundation.
http://qz.com/138761/america-needs-8-trillion-worth-in-infrastructure-over-the-nexttwo-decades-and-china-could-help/
Thats a missed opportunity, the US Chamber report says. Chinese investment in
the US last year reached a record $6.5 billion, but even that is only a fraction of the
Peoples Republics total overseas foreign direct investment, or OFDI. Chinas OFDI
is low compared to the size of its economy, but at $77 billion last year, it is still the
worlds sixth largest overseas investor. The US needs capital for expanding energy
supplies, but also for drinking or waste water treatment equipment, highways, and
bridges. Annual expenses should be about $455 billion, and that doesnt even cover
operation and maintenance or upgrades.
What makes China a good candidate is that it is already investing in infrastructure
in foreign countries, including the US, and in some cases in quite sensitive sectors.
In the UK, Chinese investors can own majoritystakes in future nuclear plants. The
countrys sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, (CIC) also owns
9% of the company that controls the UKs largest water and sewage company. In the
US, CICowns a minority stake in EIG Global Energy Partners, an asset manager that
invests in energy and resources-related infrastructure. Thats on top of its 17%
stake in the American power company AES. The state-owned oil giant Sinopec also
announced earlier this year it is buying half of one of Chesapeake Energys oil and
gas fields in Oklahoma and Kansas.
US INFRASTRUCTURE SUCKS
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-the-us-modernise-itsinfrastructure/
It seems self-evident that a developed economy requires adequate, ongoing
investment in public goods. But the state of infrastructure in the US suggests that
many decision-makers do not share this view. A 2013 report by the American
Society of Civil Engineers gave the US a pathetic overall grade of D+ for its
infrastructure. The report cited numerous state-specific shortcomings, including
Michigans 88 high-hazard dams and 1,298 structurally deficient bridges and the
$44.5 billion needed to upgrade drinking-water systems in California.
PRIVATE FUNDING CP
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-the-us-modernise-itsinfrastructure/
Americas desperate need for modern infrastructure has come, in some ways, at a
fortuitous moment. At a time when the economic recovery remains fragile, a
publicly financed infrastructure program could meaningfully transform the prospects
of US workers, providing new employment opportunities for low and un-skilled labor.
Meanwhile, scaling up infrastructure spending could provide an often-overlooked
opportunity for long-term institutional investors. Pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds in the US manage combined assets totaling roughly
$30 trillion, and they have been struggling to find investments that match their
long-term obligations. Persistently low interest rates have been particularly
challenging for pension funds, which face rising liabilities (calculated on a
discounted basis).
A large-scale program to reboot Americas crumbling infrastructure would go a long
way toward addressing this gap between assets and liabilities, providing pension
funds with investments with long time horizons (and thus guaranteeing the incomes
of tomorrows retirees) while leveraging private capital for the public good. In fact,
US pension funds are already investing in infrastructure, but they are doing so in
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-the-us-modernise-itsinfrastructure/
One way to avoid this bottleneck would be for US President Barack Obama to
establish a bipartisan Infrastructure Commission tasked with finding solutions to the
problem. This would operate much like the bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, established in 2010 to address Americas fiscal
challenges, or the military-base-closing commissions of the 1980s and 1990s. By
splitting the responsibility between the countrys two main parties, the commission
would free its members from the pressures of day-to-day politics and allow them to
concentrate on the health of the economy. Congress would then hold an up-or-down
vote on the commissions recommendations.
INFRASTRUCTURE KEY
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-the-us-modernise-itsinfrastructure/
Infrastructure has long been acknowledged as fundamental to a countrys economic
prospects. In neglecting the necessary investments, the US has put itself on a
precarious path, one that could lead to stagnation and decline, which would be
difficult to reverse.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/12/10/chinese-investmentin-the-u-s-will-grow-in-2016/#38be65a31a8a
Even though the U.S. is a favorite nation, investments here have been significantly
lower than in the rest of the world: Chinas $90 billion invested in the worlds largest
economy is less than 10% of its total outward investment of $1.1 trillion since 2005.
This underweight position results partly from Chinas earlier investment strategy
and partly from to the political climate in the U.S.
Until recently, three quarters of Chinese foreign investment was in energy, natural
resources, and related transportation infrastructure. Those kinds of investments can
be made elsewhere in the world at less cost and political risk than in the U.S., where
natural resources are seen as vital to the national interest. The federal Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States traditionally takes a dim view of Chinese
SOEs buying up strategic national resources and screens out investorsSOEs in
particularit feels do not meet the national security test.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/xi-jinping-chinese-investment213185
This raises an important question: Is more investment by Chinese companies, who
are primarily guided by non-market economic principles and often receive support
from the state, really in our interest? What will their sourcing patterns be? Will a
company that makes steel pipe and tube use domestically produced raw materials
and suppliers or will they seek to employ the workers in their home market? As
Smithfield Foods may no longer be subject to same profit pressures as other
producers, have other companies had to engage in cost-cutting measures to
compete against it? If so, what has been the impact of those cuts on pig farmers,
feed grain producers and other suppliers?
So China isnt interested in taking capacity offline and putting its people out of
work.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/xi-jinping-chinese-investment213185
From the BIT to economic espionage to overcapacity Chinas playing by a different
set of rules. By now, we should have learned that further trade deals and
investment treaties will only lead to more outsourcing of production and loss of jobs.
Chinas playing to win and so should the United States. When China understands
that the U.S. will stand up when they dont open up their markets and that we will
respond forcefully to rule breaking and upsetting international norms, we may be
able to manage our differences. Until then we should stop hoping that China wants
to be more like us.
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-releases-report-chineseinvestment-us-infrastructure
Two-way infrastructure investment has emerged as one of the most promising
opportunities to spur economic growth and job creation in both the United States
and China, U.S. Chamber President and CEO Thomas J. Donohue said. This type of
investment would benefit both of our countries, strengthening our relationship and
enhancing global stability and prosperity.
The report shows that the pressing need for resources to modernize U.S.
infrastructure is creating new opportunities for Chinese investors to act as providers
of capital, goods, and services in areas such as civil engineering, architecture,
construction, and contract and life-cycle management. At a minimum, more than $8
trillion in new investment will likely be needed in U.S. transportation, energy, and
wastewater and drinking water infrastructure from 2013 through 2030totaling
some $455 billion per year. However, making the most of these opportunities will
require careful navigation of the legal, regulatory, and political landscape in the
United States.
US INFRASTRUCTURE SUCKS
https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/infrastructure-week-kicks-the-hard-facts
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden noted the United States is 28th in the world. Thats
28th in the world in infrastructure.
AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka called the hold-up in progress pure politics,
adding, This is becoming [a] self-inflicted crisis and its not a pretend collapse a
bridge collapse is a real crisis.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assess
ing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/
The Chinese economy has reached an inflection point. It is not yet clear whether the
Chinese Communist Party can successfully traverse these changing circumstances
and maintain its hold on power. The growth model that pulled more than 400 million
Chinese citizens out of poverty over the past three decades is running out of steam.
Chinese wages are rising and eliminating Chinas prior price advantages in global
export markets. Fixed infrastructure investments are producing diminishing returns.
Chinese citizens no longer accept the pollution costs associated with heavy
industry, and even if they did, the global market cannot continue to absorb more
Chinese steel and cement at double-digit annual growth rates. In order to keep the
economy growing and maintain ruling legitimacy, Chinese leaders must downshift
from the old growth model and foster new industries based on technological
innovation, domestic consumption, and services.
Around US$400bn dollars-worth of oil and gas projects have been deferred or
cancelled (a process that actually started before the decline in oil prices began),
with, for example, the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras, announcing in June
2015 that it was cutting its 2020 production target from 4.2m b/d to 2.8m b/d. The
shale oil industry in the US, although primarily responsible for the recent collapse in
oil prices, is also concomitantly vulnerable, given the surge in US oil independents'
debts in recent years. History also provides repeated warnings of the long-term
impact of oil price slumps: the surge in oil prices to close to US$150/barrel in 2008,
for example, can be traced back to the investment freeze across the industry in the
wake of the oil price collapse in 1998. Meanwhile, contrary to historical precedent,
the oil market is still not fully taking into account geopolitical risks to supplies,
ranging from war in the Middle East to political ructions in Venezuela.
Conclusion
The risk of an oil price shock in 2016-20 is low currently. However, the volatile
geopolitical environment in the Middle East and eastern Europe, and the longer-term
impact of a curtailing of investment in the sector, provide upside risk.
Conclusion
If China's economy slows by more than we currently expect, it will further feed the
ongoing global commodity price slump (especially in oil and, in particular, metals),
with a hugely detrimental impact on those Latin American, Middle Eastern and SubSaharan African states that had benefited from the earlier Chinese-driven boom in
commodity prices. In addition, given the growing dependence of Western
manufacturers and retailers on demand in China and other emerging markets, a
prolonged deceleration in growth there would have a severe knock-on effect across
the EU and the US - far more than would have been the case in earlier decades.
Glaciology/Fem K
NEED A MULTIDIMENSIONAL FEM LENS FOR GLACIOLOGY
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A critical but overlooked aspect of the human dimensions of glaciers and global
change research is the relationship between gender and glaciers. While there has
been relatively little research on gender and global environmental change in
general (Moosa and Tuana, 2014; Arora-Jonsson, 2011), there is even less from a
feminist perspective that focuses on gender (understood here not as a male/female
binary, but as a range of personal and social possibilities) and also on power,
justice, inequality, and knowledge production in the context of ice, glacier change,
and glaciology (exceptions are Bloom et al., 2008; Williams and Golovnev,
2015; Hevly, 1996; Hulbe et al., 2010; Cruikshank, 2005). Feminist theories and
critical epistemologies especially feminist political ecology and feminist
postcolonial science studies open up new perspectives and analyses of the history
of glaciological knowledge. Researchers in feminist political ecology and feminist
geography (e.g. Sultana, 2014; Mollett and Faria, 2013; Elmhirst, 2011; Coddington,
2015) have also called for studies to move beyond gender, to include analyses of
power, justice, and knowledge production as well as to unsettle and challenge
dominant assumptions that are often embedded in Eurocentric knowledges (Harris,
2015: xx). Given the prominent place of glaciers both within the social imaginary of
climate change and in global environmental change research, a feminist approach
has important present-day relevance for understanding the dynamic relationship
between people and ice what Nsser and Baghel (2015) refer to as the cryoscape.
Through a review and synthesis of a multi-disciplinary and wide-ranging literature
on human-ice relations, this paper proposes a feminist glaciology framework to
analyze human-glacier dynamics, glacier narratives and discourse, and claims to
credibility and authority of glaciological knowledge through the lens of feminist
studies. As a point of departure, we use glaciology in an encompassing sense that
exceeds the immediate scientific meanings of the label, much as feminist critiques
of geography, for example, have expanded what it is that geography might mean
vis--vis geographic knowledge (Domosh, 1991; Rose, 1993). As such, feminist
glaciology has four aspects: (1)knowledge producers, to decipher how gender
affects the individuals producing glacier-related knowledges; (2) gendered science
and knowledge, to address how glacier science, perceptions, and claims to
credibility are gendered; (3) systems of scientific domination, to analyze how power,
domination, colonialism, and control undergirded by and coincident with
masculinist ideologies have shaped glacier-related sciences and knowledges over
time; and (4) alternative representations, to illustrate diverse methods and ways
beyond the natural sciences and including what we refer to as folk glaciologies to
portray glaciers and integrate counter-narratives into broader conceptions of the
cryosphere. These four components of feminist glaciology not only help to critically
uncover the under-examined history of glaciological knowledge and glacier-related
sciences prominent in todays climate change discussions. The framework also has
important implications for understanding vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience
all central themes in global environmental change research and decision-making
that have lacked such robust analysis of epistemologies and knowledge production
(Conway et al., 2014; Castree et al., 2014).
Most existing glaciological research and hence discourse and discussions about
cryospheric change stems from information produced by men, about men, with
manly characteristics, and within masculinist discourses. These characteristics
apply to scientific disciplines beyond glaciology; there is an explicit need to uncover
the role of women in the history of science and technology, while also exposing
processes for excluding women from science and technology (Phillips and Phillips,
2010; Domosh, 1991; Rose, 1993). Harding (2009) explains that the absence of
women in science critically shapes the selection of scientific problems, hypotheses
to be tested, what constituted relevant data to be collected, how it was collected
and interpreted, the dissemination and consequences of the results of research, and
who was credited with the scientific and technological work (Harding, 2009: 408).
Feminist glaciology is rooted in, and combines, both feminist science studies and
postcolonial science studies to meaningfully shift present-day glacier and ice
sciences. While feminist science studies focuses explicitly on gender and the place
(or absence) of women in science, it can neglect specific analyses of the social
relations of colonialism and imperialism, emphasizing instead Western women
without sustained attention to indigenous, non-Western, and local knowledge
systems that are the centerpiece of postcolonial science studies (Harding,
2009; Phillips and Phillips, 2010;Schnabel, 2014). The postcolonial perspective is
crucial for understanding glaciological knowledges because the science of
glaciology has historically participated in the imperialist, colonial, and capitalist
projects associated with polar exploration, mountain colonization, resource
extraction, and Cold War and other geopolitical endeavors.
More recently, glaciology has also been central to earth systems science that often
relies on remote sensing from satellite imagery to suggest broader claims of
objectivity but is actually akin to the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere
(Haraway, 1988: 581; also see Shapin, 1998). Questions about epistemology in
climate science, ice coring, and glaciology are only beginning to be asked,
especially focusing on Cold War polar glaciology (Martin-Nielsen,
2012, 2013; Elzinga, 2009; Korsmo, 2010; Naylor et al., 2008; Turchetti et al.,
2008; Macdougall, 2004; Finnegan, 2004; Heymann et al., 2010; Bowen,
2005; Hulme, 2010). Of these studies probing the discipline of glaciology, only a tiny
subset analyze gender (exceptions include Bloom, 1993; Bloom et al., 2008; Hulbe
et al., 2010; Hevly, 1996) or approach human-glacier interactions from the
perspective of feminist postcolonial science studies or feminist political ecology
(exceptions include Williams and Golovnev, 2015; Cruikshank, 2005). Fewer still
recognize indigenous knowledges, local perspectives, or alternative narratives of
glaciers, even though large populations of non-Western and indigenous peoples
inhabit mountain and cold regions near glaciers and possess important knowledge
about cryoscapes (Carey et al., 2015; Nsser and Baghel, 2014; Drew, 2012).
Since the origins of the field of glaciology in the 19th century, the discipline has
been dominated by men and masculinity. Glaciology, polar exploration, and
mountaineering profoundly interconnected pursuits have also been
characterized by masculinist discourses that privileged manly exertion, heroism,
and conquest (Chisholm, 2008;Schrepfer, 2005; Bloom, 1993; Brown, 2002). In polar
sciences and Antarctica in particular, women were marginalized and absent until at
least the mid-20th century (Pyne, 1986; Fogg, 1992), while a white, masculinist
narrative emerged instead (Bloom, 1993; Bloom et al., 2008; Lewander, 2009).
Women, if mentioned at all, were often cast as mens curiosities or companions, as
wives or helpers (Hulbe et al., 2010). Their appearance was almost always
incidental to the aims of men and the male ship captains, expedition leaders, and
government officials. As just one example, Louise Sguin sailed secretly on Captain
Yves Joseph de Kerguelens 1773 voyage to the Antarctic region (Lewander, 2009:
92). She made scientific observations and discoveries but, at first, hid from public
visibility. Subsequent publicity about her presence tarnished Kerguelens reputation
and contributions, thereby demonstrating not only how womens roles and activities
have been eclipsed but also how discovery and exploration were supposed to be
mens terrain. National exploration, scientific practices, and patriarchy all resulted in
the exclusion of women and the restriction of glaciological (and other) knowledge.
or do the things that men do, such as earning a PhD in a university where men hold
the majority of leadership and faculty positions, or publishing in peer-reviewed
journals often managed by men. It also ignores the preponderance of sexual
harassment and sexual assault by field scientists in other disciplines, especially at
early career stages. Clancy et al. (2014) sampled 666 researchers in other science
fields to find that 64 percent of women reported they had experienced sexual
harassment, while more than 20 percent revealed they had experienced sexual
assault. Women were 3.5 times more likely to experience harassment than men,
indicating its gendered nature. While the Clancy et al. (2014) study is not about
glaciology field work or the experiences of female glaciologists per se, it illuminates
trends in these other fieldwork-focused disciplines to suggest that analyzing only
the numbers of participating women in glaciology may obscure many other aspects
of gender discrimination in glaciology.
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Local, non-Western, and indigenous societies are often no more egalitarian than
scientific disciplines such as glaciology, and thus they, too, experience differential
representation in the production of environmental knowledges (Cochrane,
2014). Klein et al. (2014) report in their study of Tibetan herders understandings
and observations of climate change, for example, that bias and inequality exist in
those communities in Nagchu Prefecture. It was not possible to achieve gender
balance in their interviews, for instance, because women repeatedly refused to be
interviewed, citing their own lack of knowledge and illustrating how dominant
perceptions of glaciology can emerge, which may in some cases suppress
alternative knowledges. Women often do possess different knowledge about glaciers
due to many issues, such as: spending more time than men attending to livestock
near Andean glaciers (Dunbar and Medina Marcos, 2012); managing agriculture,
terracing, and irrigation that includes the distribution of glacier runoff in highland
Peruvian communities (Bolin, 2009); being responsible for mobility, storage, and
shelter amidst changes to snowfall and other cryospheric changes on the Tibetan
Plateau (Yeh et al., 2014); expressing water supplies in the Ganges River through
spiritual frameworks that contradict hydrologic models (Drew, 2012); and
responding to diminishing water supplies in Tajikistan mountains with more efficient
water use practices, as opposed to mens reactions to emigrate from their
communities (Christmann and Aw-Hassan, 2015). Nevertheless, it is critical to avoid
objectifying womens vulnerability, clinging to a sharp male-female binary, or
portraying women as passive victims. After all, climate change can lead to the
breakdown of stereotypical gender roles and even gender renegotiation (Godden,
2013). Moreover, the romanticization of womens environmental sensibilities or the
over-classification of women as poverty-stricken and marginalized in local
communities can render them passive; such representations often privilege
The history of glaciology is not simply about the ubiquity of men and the absence
and/or erasure of women. It is also about how scientific practices and results are
gendered. Many natural science fields have historically been defined by, and their
credibility built upon, manly attributes such as heroic (often nationalistic)
exploration and triumphs over hostile, wild, and remote landscapes (Terrall, 1998).
Feminist science studies began critiquing the gendered dimensions of
environmental knowledge several decades ago (Merchant, 1980; Plumwood,
1993; Haraway, 1988). These scholars and others since (e.g. Buck et al., 2014) have
argued that the Baconian view of knowledge engendered a strong tendency in the
environmental sciences to classify, measure, map, and, ideally, dominate and
control nonhuman nature as if it were a knowable and predictable machine, rather
than dynamic, chaotic, unpredictable, and coupled natural-human systems. Such
feminist critiques apply today to glaciology, climate sciences, and global
environmental change research more broadly. Terry (2009: 6), for example, argues
that climate discourse is still a stereotypically masculine one, of new
technologies, large-scale economic instruments, and complex computer modeling,
which for glaciers can render them static, essentialized, and passive (also
see Moosa and Tuana, 2014).
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Fleming (2010) finds a similar story of domination in the climate sciences, in which
20th-century scientists and engineers used cloud seeding and other geoengineering
strategies to manipulate weather, steer storms, and make rain. Technoscientific
control is a dominant trope in climate change discourse and knowledge, and it is by
nature highly gendered (Israel and Sachs, 2013). Much geographical fieldwork
involves this masculinist reflexivity generating supposed objectivity through
distance from and disinterest in the subject (Coddington, 2015; Sundberg, 2003).
These conclusions transcend gendered dimensions of knowledge by acknowledging
broader trends in Western sciences that have sought to place science at a god-like
vantage from nowhere, ignoring both situated knowledges and the geography of
science (Haraway, 1988; Shapin, 1998; Livingstone, 2003).
recognizes that those without the inclination or the ability to climb glaciers can
find other positions in glaciology, such as computer modeling, the articles subheadline (Climb any mountain: Glaciology is an outdoors game) certainly does not
celebrate these indoor desk jobs. Nor does such a depiction consider class barriers
for entry into the field, such as the high costs of acquiring and maintaining
necessary alpine skills. Alternative knowledges and practices are marginalized in
this sustained masculinist atmosphere, restricting scientific questions asked,
practitioners involved, methods employed, sites studied, and results achieved.
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Feminist glaciology builds on feminist postcolonial science studies and feminist
political ecology to understand how gender, power, and inequality are embedded in
systems of scientific domination (Schiebinger, 2014). Such power structures
maintain glaciology as a discipline concentrated in the wealthy developed world,
often termed the Global North, with generally weak institutional representation from
the developing world or indigenous communities. This pattern exists for global
climate simulations in general, which are conducted by European and North
American scientists with little to no representation from Central and South America,
Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia (Edwards, 2011). The feminist lens is crucial
for effective analysis of what might look on the surface like postcolonial or
hegemonic structures of development. But global power imbalances and gender
inequality co-constitute each other and the natural sciences and glaciology in
particular. Current climate change discussions, for example, perpetuate power
discrepancies through what Israel and Sachs (2013: 345) refer to as the centrality
of mathematical and technological sciencestructured by masculinist ideologies of
domination and mastery, thus determining who can or cannot participate in climate
science and policy-making. Such institutional, cultural, and scientific practices also
affect glaciological knowledge. While there are, on paper, few recognized
glaciologists from the Global South (for exceptions see Carey, 2010), such
recognition is predicated upon a specific type of knowledge production that is
restricted to a group of scientists who often cannot be divorced from larger
processes of colonialism, imperialism, patriarchy, and capitalist resource extraction.
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Questions of who produces glaciological knowledge, and how such knowledge is
used or shared, take on real implications when considered through feminist
postcolonial science studies and feminist political ecology lenses. Specifically, the
feminist approach opens up marginalized knowledge and exposes how larger
structures of domination have worked historically to suppress certain voices. It
reveals how people across the planet have been living with glaciers for centuries
and have produced wide ranges of glaciological knowledge folk glaciology that is
rarely recognized within the scientific discipline of modern glaciology. We use the
term folk glaciology to refer to significant glacier-oriented knowledges produced at
different times and places by diverse peoples, cultures, and social groups.
The US had a similarly militarized relationship with the Arctic (Farish, 2013; MartinNielsen, 2012, 2013). In 1949, US Air Force Lt. Col. Emil Beaudry convinced his
superiors that, as Greenland was likely to be the avenue of approach for untold
destruction, [and] unless guarded could well spell doom for the United States as a
nation, whichever country was able to completely master [Greenland] would
possess a new weapon that could not be countered or molested (quoted in MartinNielsen, 2012: 6971). Mastering and defending Greenland, however, required
mastering its ice sheet, and new glaciological knowledge was only possible with the
resources available to the US military. In 1949 Henri Bader, the chief scientist for the
US governments Snow, Ice and Permafrost Research Establishment (SIPRE),
complained that, while there was general knowledge of the location and easilydiscernible characteristics of glaciers, more complex and sophisticated knowledge
of their physical processes was poor (Bader, 1949: 1309). The substantial growth of
glaciology in subsequent decades relied, to an important degree, on these military
demands. This militarization of the polar regions and the intellectual and
institutional growth of glaciology were part of broader US geopolitical visions and
strategies during the Cold War, which were pursued by a particular group of men as
policy-makers who were products of specific elite masculinities (Dean, 2003),
operating in the context of anxieties about American masculinities (Cuordileone,
2005), and with particular discourses of masculinity and male bodies, especially in
distant places like the Arctic (Farish, 2010).
the polar regions, manifesting the centrality of power, conquest, and national
security in the history of glaciological knowledge.
national variation and the diversity of perspectives, including those of women and
other marginalized peoples (Israel and Sachs, 2013). Feminist political ecologists
have thus sought to use innovative research methods such as storytelling,
narrative, literature, and the visual arts to go beyond gender to find new voices
discussing and representing global environmental change (Harris, 2015; Mollett and
Faria, 2013; Coddington, 2015: 215). Feminist glaciology promotes alternative
glacier representations (which include folk glaciologies) and calls for
transdisciplinary knowledge integration and methodology, which is crucial for
putting glacier knowledges into their human contexts (Hewitt, 2014a).
OBJECTIVITY IS A LINK
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Ice is not just ice. The dominant way Western societies understand it through the
science of glaciology is not a neutral representation of nature. The feminist
glaciology framework draws attention to those who dominate and frame the
production of glaciological knowledge, the gendered discourses of science and
knowledge, and the ways in which colonial, military, and geopolitical domination coconstitute glaciological knowledge. Even in a globalized age where the place of
women and indigenous people has improved markedly in some parts of the world,
masculinist discourses continue to dominate, in subtle and determinative ways.
Feminist glaciology advocates for a shift of preoccupations in research, policy, and
public perceptions from the physical and seemingly natural, to a broader
consideration of cryoscapes, the human, and the insights and potentials of
alternative ice narratives and folk glaciologies.
The call for a feminist glaciology is not limited to ice and glaciers, but is a larger
intervention into global environmental change (and especially climate change)
research and policy. As international negotiations remain stalled and governmental
commitments to change and reform are fitful and seemingly ineffectual, those
studying environmental change and aware of its significant effects and dangerous
potentials continue to search for ways of stemming the tides of change as well as
forming just and equitable global structures for addressing it. The feminist
glaciology framework articulates with these larger quests in at least two ways. First,
it repeats the demands for increased presence of humanities and social science
perspectives in global environmental change research, policy, and broader public
discourse. Many humanities and social science disciplines and sub-disciplines have
given significant attention to these issues, but there remain boundaries between
these analyses and those considered central to the environmental change question.
The natural sciences that drive and undergird environmental change policy are
often asked by decision-makers and the media to speak for society or frame
research and policy questions for humanity. But the natural sciences are not
equipped to understand the complexities and potentialities of human societies, or to
recognize the ways in which science and knowledge have historically been linked to
imperial and hegemonic capitalist agendas. Feminist glaciology participates in this
broader movement by suggesting richer conceptions of human-environment
relations, and highlighting the disempowering and forestalling qualities of an
unexamined and totalizing science.
Second, we reiterate the need not only to appreciate the differential impacts of
environmental change on different groups of people men and women, rich and
poor, North and South but to understand how the science that guides attempted
solutions may in fact perpetuate differences because they are, essentially, built on
and draw their epistemic power from differentiation and marginalization. Struggles
over authority and legitimacy play out in many obvious ways in climate change
negotiations. Struggles also happen in less obvious ways, such as in the
environmental change research underpinning climate politics. Analysts and
practitioners must recognize the ways in which more-than-scientific, non-Western,
non-masculinist modes of knowledge, thinking, and action are marginalized. The
response to simplistic ice is just ice discourse is not merely to foreground or single
out women and their experiences that would simply perpetuate binaries and
boundaries and ignore deeper foundations. Rather, it is a larger integration of
human approaches and sensibilities with the existing dominant physical sciences.
Politics
TUMP ELECTION BAD MODERATE RISK HIGH IMPACT
https://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gr&articleid=2876
Moderate probability, High impact; Risk intensity = 12
March 17th 2016Introduction
The businessman and political novice, Donald Trump, has built a strong lead in the
Republican party primary, and looks the firm favourite to be the party's candidate in
the US presidential election in November.
Analysis
Thus far Mr Trump has given very few details of his policies - and these tend to be
prone to constant revision - but a few themes have become apparent. First, he has
been exceptionally hostile towards free trade, including notably NAFTA, and has
repeatedly labelled China as a "currency manipulator". He has also taken an
exceptionally right-wing stance on the Middle East and jihadi terrorism, including,
among other things, advocating the killing of families of terrorists and launching a
land incursion into Syria to wipe out IS (and acquire its oil). In the event of a Trump
victory, his hostile attitude to free trade, and alienation of Mexico and China in
particular, could escalate rapidly into a trade war - and at the least scupper the
Trans-Pacific Partnership between the US and 11 other American and Asian states
signed in February 2016. His militaristic tendencies towards the Middle East (and
ban on all Muslim travel to the US) would be a potent recruitment tool for jihadi
groups, increasing their threat both within the region and beyond.
Conclusion
Although we do not expect Mr Trump to defeat his most likely Democratic
contender, Hillary Clinton, there are risks to this forecast, especially in the event of
a terrorist attack on US soil or a sudden economic downturn. It is worth noting that
the innate hostility within the Republican hierarchy towards Mr Trump, combined
with the inevitable virulent Democratic opposition, will see many of his more radical
policies blocked in Congress - albeit such internal bickering will also undermine the
coherence of domestic and foreign policymaking.
Recently, negative images of China have come to dwarf the positive representation
of China as a strategic partner. The dominant discourse has been one of stoking fear
about the rise of China, particularly in the economic sphere, with Chinas growth
commonly being framed as a causeor, at the very least, a correlateof American
decline. There has been precious little attempt to build a domestic coalition in
favour of Chinas rise: economic and political groups with a stake in facilitating
Chinese economic growth are unorganized, lacking a coherent voice in US politics,
while those poised to make political hay out of so-called China bashing86do so
PROTECTIONISM POPULAR
http://reason.com/archives/2016/03/25/china-trade-didnt-kill-americas-working
American politics aren't exactly immune to bouts of protectionism. A Bloomberg poll
has found that two-thirds of Americans, Republicans and Democrats, are four-square
behind ita sentiment that Bernie Sanders is exploiting on the left and Donald
Trump on the right.
But although free trade has always been a tough sell to the general public,
American economists across the political spectrum have long held firm that
globalization and trade liberalization are, on balance, a boon for the country. But
now this consensus may be fraying, with The New York Times' agent provocateur
Paul Krugman recently declaring that such thinking is "fundamentally dishonest"
elitist bunkum.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/isolationism-making-comeback-13764
On the right, would-be Republican nominees seem to revel in making xenophobic
remarks, especially China-bashing (even arguing that the U.S. should go out of its
way to undermine the most important bilateral relationship in the world), and see
no problem with standing apart from the international community over the Iran
deal. Although Rand Paul is perhaps the only vocal proponent of a
more slender foreign policy, it is telling that even his purportedly hawkish
Republican colleagues have failed to stoplet alone reversethe huge cuts to the
military that have been imposed by sequestration.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/isolationism-making-comeback-13764
So far, however, Americas post-Cold War presidentsBush, Clinton, Bush and
Obama to a manhave been fortunate enough to govern during times when at
least a bare majority of the political elite have been in favor of broad
internationalism when it has counted most. Even if isolationism has triumphed on
occasion, the macro-level bias towards internationalism in U.S. foreign policy is not
dead yet. But the internationalist consensus is certainly weakening and there is
now a real risk that the United States is approaching a tipping point after which the
domestic balance will be in favor of isolationist tendencies.
China Legitimization
LEGITIMACY ON BRINK AND GETTING WORSE ECON
SLOWDOWN
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/09/29/122283/assess
ing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/
The Chinese economy has reached an inflection point. It is not yet clear whether the
Chinese Communist Party can successfully traverse these changing circumstances
and maintain its hold on power. The growth model that pulled more than 400 million
Chinese citizens out of poverty over the past three decades is running out of steam.
Chinese wages are rising and eliminating Chinas prior price advantages in global
export markets. Fixed infrastructure investments are producing diminishing returns.
Chinese citizens no longer accept the pollution costs associated with heavy
industry, and even if they did, the global market cannot continue to absorb more
Chinese steel and cement at double-digit annual growth rates. In order to keep the
economy growing and maintain ruling legitimacy, Chinese leaders must downshift
from the old growth model and foster new industries based on technological
innovation, domestic consumption, and services.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
Three pillars supported this system. The first was a delicate balance of political
power at the top, commonly known as collective leadership, designed to prevent
the emergence of another Mao-like leader who could impose his will on the party.
Under this system, key policy decisions were made through a process of consensusbuilding and compromise, ensuring the protection of the interests of the senior
leaders and their factions. The second pillar was absolute personal security for top
leaders. One of the key lessons from the debacles of the Maoist era was that elite
unity is impossible without such security, because only untouchable rulers have the
capacity and credibility to negotiate with each other, strike deals, and resolve intraregime conflict. The third pillar was a system of sharing the spoils of economic
growth among the elites, mainly through large and sophisticated patronage
networks. To be sure, this system has caused pervasive corruption, but it also has
provided incentives for its elites to toil for the regime.
Today, less than three years after Xi ascended to the top, this system has been
shredded. The equivalent of a multipolar world at the top of the CPC regime is
now a unipolar system; the collective leadership has yielded to strongman rule
and a decision-making process dominated by Xi. Absolute personal security for the
top leaders, defined as sitting or retired members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, has also been shattered with the fall of Zhou Yongkang, a former
member of the committee and internal security chief who drew a life sentence in
2015 after his conviction on corruption charges. The anti-corruption drive and its
accompanying austerity measures have also put an end, at least temporarily, to the
practice of sharing spoils among elites, engendering their bitterness and reportedly
prompting them to engage in work stoppages as protest. While it is doubtful that
Xis war on corruption will actually root out corruption, it has succeeded in
destroying the post-Tiananmen incentive structure inside the regime.
On its own, the transformation of collective leadership into strongman rule may
not necessarily unravel Chinese Leninism. However, the clear initial outcome of this
transformation so far is the evaporation of elite unity, the glue that has held
together the post-Tiananmen system. Even though there are no overt signs of
challenge to Xis power within the CPC today, it is a safe bet that his rivals are
biding their time, waiting for the right moment to strike back.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
Manipulating nationalism and muscle-flexing may deliver short-term political
benefits, but only at the cost of the CPCs long-term security. One of the wisest
strategic choices made by Deng Xiaoping was to develop friendly ties with the U.S.led West to accelerate Chinas modernization program. In the post-Deng era, Xis
two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, also learned a key lesson from the
collapse of the Soviet Union: a strategic conflict with the United States would imperil
the very survival of the CPC. The costs of a new arms race would be unbearable,
and outright hostility in Sino-U.S. relations would destroy the bilateral economic
relationship.
It is unclear whether the CPC leadership understands the risks of its new and stillevolving survival strategy. If its members are convinced that only this strategy could
save CPC rule, now threatened by the collapse of the key pillars of the postTiananmen model, they are likely to continue on the present course. Ironically, such
a course, if the above analysis is right, is more certain to accelerate the CPCs
demise than to prevent it.
AUTHORITARIANISM BAD
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-partyrule-in-china/
If the CPC believes that escalating repression and nationalism will enable it to
maintain power during a period of elite disarray, deteriorating economic
performance, and heightened social tensions, it must consider the enormous risks
and costs of this new survival strategy. Besides taking China backwards, this
strategy is unsustainable and dangerous. Repression may work for a while, but
autocracies overly dependent on it must be prepared to escalate the use of violence
continuously and apply ever-more draconian measures to deter opposition forces.
Repression can also be bad for business, as rulers are forced to curtail information
flows and economic freedom to ensure regime security. (Indeed, Western firms are
already complaining about the inconveniences caused by the Great Firewall.)
Raising the level of repression when the economy is sinking into stagnation will
strain the CPCs resources because repression requires the maintenance of an
expensive network of informants, secret police, censors, and paramilitary forces.
Repression also incurs huge moral costs and could ignite a divisive debate inside
the regime. Lets put the question starkly: Is China really ready to become another
North Korea?
Topicality stuf
ENGAGEMENT INCLUDES SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/engagement-what-does-it-mean-for-publicdiplomacy/
When presenting statistics about social media activities undertaken by the State
Departments Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, Ambassador
Alberto Fernandez described the number of engagements the CSCCs digital
outreach team had made that year as in the thousands. Explaining what an
engagement is, Fernandez stated that engagements consist of written text posted
to online forums, Facebook, or the comments sections of media Web sites. So does
each post the CSCC makes in a forum count as an engagement? Does each post
on Facebook count as an engagement? If so, this appears to set a low bar for what
is considered engagement.
Rhino Ranch Af
Plan: The United States Federal Government should make a substantial amount of
its federal land available for lease to the Peoples Republic of China with the
condition that the land be used to sustainably raise and ranch rhinos to be used in
Chinese traditional medicine
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/articles/heres-what-might-happen-localecosystems-if-all-rhinos-disappear-180949896/?no-ist
Some large animals influence their surroundings more than others. Elephants are
known as ecosystem engineers for their tendency to push over trees and stomp
shrubby areas in the savannah into submission. This keeps forests at bay, which
otherwise would overtake open grasslands. Wolves, on the other hand, are apex
predators. They keep other species like deer in check, preventing herbivore
populations from getting out of hand and eating all the plants into oblivion. Both
elephants and wolves are keystone species, or ones that have a relatively large
impact on their environment in relation to their actual population numbers.
African rhinos, it turns out, also seem to be a keystone species. According to a
recent study published by Scandinavian and South African researchers in the Journal
of Ecology, rhinos maintain the diverse African grasslands on which countless other
species depend.
http://www.businessinsider.com/rhino-extinction-could-be-catastrophic-2014-10
Aside from providing food for numerous species, grasslands, like the savannas,
serve an important global role, as well. They act as natural "carbon sinks"
essentially storage lockers for carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a cause of global
warming. Because of industrialization, Africa's carbon emissions will likely increase
substantially throughout the 21st century.
The savannas, where rhino live, are an important ecosystem, and it seems that
conservation of the species is essential to preserving them.
more than its weight in gold. Basic supply and demand tells us that the fewer rhinos
there are, the higher the price will go until theyre poached into extinction.
https://animalblawg.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/can-farming-rhinos-save-thespecies/
Kevin Charles Redmon poses an interesting thought: can farming the horns of
African rhinoceroses save the species? The horns of the rhinos are used throughout
the world, from dagger handles to medicine. Though the animals are endangered,
and protected underCITES, there is a lucrative black market business in poaching,
especially when the horns fetch $65,000 a kilo; demand for horn is inelastic and
growing, so a trade ban (which restricts supply) only drives up prices, making the
illicit good more valuableand giving poachers greater incentive to slaughter the
animal. Poachers arent overly concerned with the long-term extinction risks of
their prey. The focus is on the immediate value. Because the activity is illegal,
timing is of the essence, and its apparently easier to kill and harvest the rhinos
versus tranquilizing and waiting for them to go down. What if, Redmon wonders, we
were to harvest the horns (they re-grow over time) by placing rhinos in captivity,
guarding them well, and introducing a sustainable horn supply that doesnt kill the
rhinos?
Its not an easy question on either side. On one hand, it is hardly unheard of to take
a segment of an endangered species out of the wild to raise its numbers before
reintroducing a revitalized, or at least stable, population. In the United States we
have done this with the California Condor, the Bison, and the Grey Wolf, just to
name a few charismatic megafuana. On the other hand, this wouldnt be a strictly
preservation move. The rhinos would be farmed for their horns. While what Redmon
suggests is a long way from anything like a CAFO, its a step that likely makes many
activists and conservationists wary. CITES would also have to legalize this method of
horn harvesting, giving legitimacy to further animal exploitation. Rhinos would be
just another animal that exists at our whim and for our uses.
As hard as it may be to stomach, a main issue is that current enforcement of the
laws against poaching are not enough to discourage people from the business (even
thought World Wildlife Fund is taking a page from the Obama playbook of terrorism
deterrence). Supply and demand, as often is the case, are at the core. The focus has
(and remains) on limiting the demand. It would seem that there are at least 65,000
reasons why that approach is not as effective as it could be. If we cant control
demand, cant we try to control the supply? Dont both ends need to be addressed?
For those who seek to eliminate CAFOs, it isnt enough to promote vegetarian/vegan
habits. In the meantime, the supply must also be influenced, which is why you see
campaigns to end gestation crates and battery cages. Maybe legalized production
of rhino horns would help assuage the demand so that poaching would not be as
profitable, and would therefore be worth a more humane form for exploitation, even
if it isnt a utopian one. Maybe it would backfire and instead increase the worldwide
demand. Either way, we are running out of time to make a decision.
and
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the
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cobi.12412/epdf
from 2014 to 2023. Rhinoceros population dynamics were then modeled under 8
differentpolicy scenarios that could be implemented to control poaching. We also
estimated the economic costs andbenefits of each scenario under enhanced
enforcement only and a legal trade in rhinoceros horn and used adecision support
framework to rank the scenarios with the objective of maintaining the rhinoceros
populationabove its current size while generating profit for local stakeholders. The
southern white rhinoceros populationwas predicted to go extinct in the wild <20
years under present management. The optimal scenario to maintainthe rhinoceros
population above its current size was to provide a medium increase in antipoaching
effort andto increase the monetary fine on conviction. Without legalizing the trade,
implementing such a scenario wouldrequire covering costs equal to approximately
$147,000,000/year. With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, theconservation
enterprise could potentially make a profit of $717,000,000/year. We believe the 35year-old banon rhinoceros horn products should not be lifted unless the money
generated from trade is reinvested inimproved protection of the rhinoceros
population. Because current protection efforts seem to be failing, it istime to
evaluate, discuss, and test alternatives to the present policy.
Between
and
2007,
1990
15
southern
(Ceratotherium
white
simum)
simum
a
n
d
b
a
c2013.
k
(illegally
Diceros
rhinoceroses
average
were
on
killed
every
year
in
South
Since
2007
Africa.
illegal
killing
for
their
horn
has
>950
escalated
to
in
individuals/year
We
conducted
analysis
economic
to
whether
determine
a
legal
trade
white
in
rhinoceros
southern
horn
could
protection.
rhinoceros
linear
Generalized
models
examine
were
used
the
to
drivers
socioeconomic
of
on
data
collected
2013,
1990
and
project
number
the
of
total
likely
to
from
2014
Rhinoceros
2023.
dynamics
were
then
modeled
8
different
that
could
be
implemented
control
to
poaching.
also
estimated
We
economic
and
under
enforcement
enhanced
only
and
a
legal
used
awith
horn
framework
to
rank
scenarios
the
the
maintaining
objective
the
of
while
generating
local
profit
stakeholders.
southern
go
extinct
in
the
wild
under
<20
present
years
The
management.
optimal
scenario
maintain
population
above
size
was
its
to
current
provide
medium
increase
effort
antipoaching
and
monetary
fine
onl
Without
conviction.
legalizing
trade,
the
such
implementing
a
scenario
would
costs
approximately
equal
to
ar.
$147,000,000/ye
With
legal
horn,
enterprise
potentially
could
make
$717,000,000/ye
profit
of
We
35-year-old
believe
ban
should
products
not
be
lifted
money
unless
generated
is
from
reinvested
of
the
Because
population.
current
protection
seem
to
be
efforts
failing,
it
is
discuss,
alternatives
and
to
test
policy.
present
CREATING MARKET IS THE ONLY WAY TO STOP EXTINCTION
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cobi.12412/epdf
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/can-you-wage-a-war-onpoaching/375760/
All of which raises the question: If the problem is primarily one of economic
incentives from a foreign market, why are African leaders in Washington seeking
military-grade weaponry as a solution?
Part of the answer stems from the way in which the challenge is being framed in the
United States. The Obama administration, which announced a presidential taskforce
on wildlife trafficking last summer, has often echoed the language of the War on
Terror in its public statements on the subject, asserting in the most recent White
House fact sheet that wildlife trafficking undermines security across nations. Born
Free USA, an American conservation group, has reported that U.S.-designated
terrorist groups such as Somalias al-Shabab and Ugandas Lords Resistance Army
reap profits from the illegal wildlife trade. Johan Bergenas, a researcher at the
Stimson Center, a D.C.-based think tank, has been a particularly vocal advocate for
combating a new threat in the terrorist hotbed of Africa. He urges conservation
groups to combat poaching, using new and inexpensive technologies to detect and
deter terrorist activities and traffickers, adding, Drones, satellite imagery, tracking
devices and other high-tech tools could transform the fight to save elephants and
rhinos, cheaply and effectively starving terrorists of the easy money they gain from
wildlife crimes.
One possible solution, which was not discussed at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, is
legalization. In 2013, South Africas Environmental Minister Edna
Molewa suggested that the country could reduce black-market demand for poaching
by producing legally harvested rhino horns. Others, including investment
analyst Michael Eustace and sustainability economist Michael 't' Sas-Rolfes, have
also championed the approach. The plan would involve the non-lethal removal of
rhino horns, which rhinos have the capacity to regrow. Eustace has estimated that
roughly 1,200 horns per year could be sustainably obtained from live rhinos, while
400 additional horns could be collected from rhinos who die of natural causes. The
collective output from these "harvests" would be enough to squash the illegal
market.
commodity in Asia for thousands of years, for both ornamental and medicinal
purposes, mostly in elite circles. An essential part of the horns current value is its
scarcity. As a medicine, it is and has always been used to treat a wide range of
conditions related to inflammation and toxicity in the body. In some circles it is
considered the ultimate medicine to treat serious (and not so serious) cases i.e. it
is the Rolls Royce of traditional Chinese medicine. Evidence suggests that demand
is rising in both Vietnam and parts of China along with increased affluence (not just
for cancer treatment, but for all sorts of medicinal and ornamental uses, but with
the underlying prestige factor). The poaching crisis was sparked when we
responded to that increasing demand in exactly the wrong way: by restricting the
supply. Basic economics tells us that if you reduce the supply in the face of
increasing demand, market prices will rise. If prices rise, so do the potential rewards
for poachers and illegal traders.
http://www.perc.org/blog/qa-michael-t-sas-rolfes-why-legal-rhino-horn-trade-willsave-rhinos
Many anti-poaching campaigns are aiming to reduce Asian demand for rhino horn
through awareness and education. Can reeducation work?
A: I am skeptical that this approach can deliver results fast enough to bring
poaching down to sustainable levels in the short and even medium term. We are
dealing with a product market based on very deeply held cultural values and beliefs.
Those advocating demand reduction are unable to tell us how quickly this can work
and most importantly how much it will cost to be effective and who is going to
pay for it.
reducing the price of horn) and most critically having such effective security on
the ground that the rhinos are almost impossible to get to.
http://www.perc.org/blog/qa-michael-t-sas-rolfes-why-legal-rhino-horn-trade-willsave-rhinos
Q: Even if trade is legalised and farming rhinos becomes a reality, is it possible that
some consumers may still seek out horns sourced from wild (poached) rhinos
rather than their farmed counterparts (the same way wild-caught salmon is
preferred over the farmed variety)?
A: I consider this less likely with rhinos as we are not talking about artificial and
intensive feed-lot farming, but rather ranching periodically removing the horn from
free-ranging rhinos (that is by far the most cost-effective way to produce horn).
Conscious meat consumers avoid grain-fed feed-lot beef but are happy to eat grassfed free range beef, even if the cattle in question are not truly wild. I would not
expect rhinos to be much different. If you offer consumers the choice between
genuine certified legal free-range rhino horn and illegal horn of unknown origin that
may be a fake, I suspect few consumers would pay a premium for the latter. If
anything, most would probably be willing to pay far less.
only one right one. There is still a lot of work to be done on this and everyone needs
to be involved, from government agencies to private agents and NGOs.
Still, Biggs argues, horn farming wont necessarily replace poaching unless certain
conditions are met. The black market will only collapse when legal horns are
cheaper and easier to obtain than ill-gotten ones and penalties for operating outside
the central selling organization are severe. DNA signatures and radio chips will
help trace licit horns, and exporters will be subject to regular audits. At the same
time, buyers must demand cruelty- and conflict-free wares (think of efforts to
demonize blood diamonds).
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/south-africa-asks-would-legalizingtrade-in-rhino-horn-save-the-species
The legalization proposalwhich has been called a desperate gamble by Julian
Rademeyer, author of Killing for Profit, the definitive book on the illegal rhino horn
tradebegan gathering momentum several years ago, championed by a small
group of rhino farmers. In South Africa, where wildlife can be owned, its not
uncommon for peoplelargely white and wealthy landownersto turn big tracts of
acreage into private game reserves to attract safari tourists. A smaller number of
people run private ranches to breed and raise non-endangered animals like buffalo
or antelope. And some are raising rhinos as well. Not only can rhinos adapt to
ranching, but their horns (made of keratin, like fingernails) grow back after being cut
off, meaning they can be harvested.
As poaching has soared, so has the animals value, and some of these rhino farmers
saw an opportunity to help preserve wildlife as well as start a lucrative business.
Trade supporters see horn harvesting as akin to milking cows or shearing wool from
sheep. Farmers breed and raise the rhinos, storing the horns in hopes that
legalization will be passed so they can sell their haul for a healthy profit, even after
covering their substantial farming and security costs. The animals themselves are
also for sale, usually to game reserves or zoos, but that doesnt yield as much
revenue as the horns would.
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/south-africa-asks-would-legalizingtrade-in-rhino-horn-save-the-species
Security is far and away Humes biggest expense, and he insists that legalized horn
is the only way to cover his costs. If you are anti-legal trade, then you are the
enemy of my rhinobecause that is the biggest reason why my rhinos will go
extinct, he said. Without us being able to sell the horns, this project will fail. The
costs are insurmountable.
Youve got to kill it to get the scales. With rhino, you dont have to do that. And I
dont want to keep them in pens. I dont want to run a zooI would rather have a
rhino running around with a horn on. But if some have to be farmed to save the rest,
well, then Ill go with that. The current slaughter is just totally morally
unacceptable.
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/south-africa-asks-would-legalizingtrade-in-rhino-horn-save-the-species
Rhino breederswith their stockpiles of harvested hornsstand to make tens of
millions of dollars if trade is legalized. Hume owns four tons of horn, which he
estimated would earn him about $40 million at current prices. (After filling up the
local banks with his stock, he now keeps them with an international security firm.)
The majority of that money would go into protecting the rhinos, he said, and the
rest into breeding.
Hume has bred more than 500 rhinos to date, including 131 in 2014. His goal is to
produce 200 calves a year, at which point he could start selling the animals. His
ultimate ambition is to buy more farmland and increase the scale of his operation,
so that in the next 20 or 30 yearsIf they ever get rid of the scourge of
poachinghe could release his rhinos back into the wild.
We drove back to the main house, where more members of Humes anti-poaching
unit sat silently in the shade, awaiting their polygraph. Rhinos today are worth
more dead than alive, Hume said, adding that if trade were legalized, the animals
would have more allies than ever. Nobody would ever kill a rhino if he was getting
money from the horn. A smile spread across his face, and he cupped his hands
together as if holding an imaginary prize: It produces like a henand who the hell
would kill the hen that lays the golden egg?
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/south-africa-asks-would-legalizingtrade-in-rhino-horn-save-the-species
More importantly, legalization would spark an increase in demand. As Andrew
Wetzler, director of the Land and Wildlife program at the Natural Resources Defense
Council, told me, Given the experience the world has had with the one-off sales of
ivory, we ought to be extraordinarily cautious when it comes to rhino horn
legalization. The only argument in favor of it is that it will bring down the price and
therefore reduce the incentive to poach. And I dont think theres any reason to
think thats true.
According to Wetzler, there are two main reasons why legalization wont work. First,
if trade were allowed, it would become much easier to buy and sell illegal rhino
horn, with criminals fraudulently applying legitimate certificates to contrabands,
making it difficult to distinguish one from the other. Second, the demand for horn is
so highand could potentially get much higher in China and Vietnam if made legal
that they cant be produced fast enough to affect the price.
If you cant drive the price down, then all youre doing is generating a new market.
And as long as the price is extraordinarily high, theres every incentive to poach,
Wetzler said. So rather than alleviate the problems, its very likely that legalization
will just make it worse."
Adam Welz, who represents South Africa for WildAid, a non-profit that fights illegal
wildlife trading, agrees: The second you legalize it, youre sending a very powerful
message. Youre endorsing this productand youre immediately going to get a lot
more people interested in buying it.
Welz puts no stock in the idea that rhino horn revenue could pay for sufficient
security, pointing out that protecting some rhinos in a prison camp situation, with
giant electric fences and machine gun posts in every corner, isnt enough. Youre
never going to protect them in an ecologically functional way, he said. Youre
always going to find somebody willing to risk his life to shoot a rhino because hes
going to get paid five or 10 times his annual salary for two days work.
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/rhino-horn-south-africalegalized/
History backs them up on this point. Similar one-off sales of ivory to Japan in 1999
and China in 2008 have been linked to the resultant increased demand for ivory in
Asia, which has driven elephant poaching across Africa to crisis proportions in the
past decade. At the time, proponents of those sales said flooding the market with
stockpiled ivory would lower prices and therefore eliminate the incentive to poach
more elephants. The opposite happened and prices soared. South Africa now argues
that putting more than 18,000 kilograms of rhino horn up for sale would glut the
market, lower prices and save more rhinos. This is an argument we have heard
before.
Meanwhile, any legal rhino horn market only supports the misconception that this
keratinous body part has medicinal qualities. In China and especially Vietnam rhino
horn powder is sold as a cancer cure and an after-party drug to remove hangovers.
Rhino horns have no such abilities. Why support the misplaced economic value of
something that has no practical function for humans, and why support the utterly
false belief that rhino horn could cure desperately sick people of their cancer?
As WildAid Executive Director Peter Knights wrote on the organization's blog,
"Legitimizing and promoting demand for rhino horn would inevitably create a far
larger consumer base and once this genie is out we could never re-cork the bottle if
the experiment went wrong.
LEGALIZING SUCKS
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/rhino-horn-south-africalegalized/
Legalizing rhino horn, however, does not appear to be the answer. Instead, the
international community needs to target the consumer demand for rhino horn and
end it. Rhino horns are useless to every human but they are essential for rhinos,
which use them to defend themselves and root up food. Eliminating the market for
rhino horns is the only way we're going to ensure the long-term survival of these
threatened species.
CHINA IS KEY
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-22-00-sa-pushes-for-legal-trade-in-rhino-horn
Vietnam, which Traffic, the wildlife trade monitoring network, has described as the
"nexus" of a "rapacious" demand for rhino horn, continues to deny its centrality to
the problem, despite evidence to the contrary. Last week, Do Quang Tung, the
acting head of Vietnam's wildlife trade authority, dismissed as "bullshit" suggestions
that Vietnam was the primary destination and consumer country for rhino horn.
Instead, he pointed to China, saying it was responsible for "99% of the horn that
goes through Vietnam".
RHINO HORN NOT USED FOR TCM ITS A STATUS SYMBOL FOR
ELITES
http://africageographic.com/blog/an-open-letter-to-point-out-flaws-in-legalising-therhino-horn-trade/
We agree that rhinoceros are being poached for their horns; composed mostly of
keratin, the same protein in our hair and fingernails. In the past, western society
believed, erroneously as it turns out, that demand for horn was ostensibly driven by
the sexual desires of Asian men. During the same period Yemeni demand for
dagger-handles made of rhino horn, considered a symbolic rite of passage, also
contributed to global demand. Until very recently it was thought that demand for
horn was primarily driven by Eastern medicinal requirements. Rhino horn is said to
cool the blood and break a fever. Notwithstanding, Traditional Chinese Medicine
(TCM ) does, in fact, advocate an alternative. Modern demand-theory challenges the
notion that TCM demands are causal in the main. Its now believed that rhino horn is
symbolic of status for the elite. The cure for cancer theory emanating out of
Vietnam has also, largely, been discounted.
To clarify then, rhino horn is not an aphrodisiac. Yemeni demand for dagger-handles
has all but disappeared, and even though rhino horn has been used in TCM in the
past, todays practitioners prescribe alternatives. Most agree that rhino horn does
not cure cancer. Modern theory holds that it is considered symbolic of status. Whats
clear is that demand for rhino horn is tangible.
http://africageographic.com/blog/an-open-letter-to-point-out-flaws-in-legalising-therhino-horn-trade/
This is where you come in. You say to lift the CITES ban on rhinoceros trade.
Legitimise the demand at the end-user. Eliminate the illegal supply chain. Establish
a Central Selling Organisation mandated to control supply of approved product
through legal channels and to approved distributors only who in turn supply the
end-user markets. De-horn rhinoceros safely and without any negative effect on the
donor-animal and collapse prices by volume of supply. Funds raised from the legal
sales would contribute to current conservation in any one of a number of ways,
either by bolstering fortress conservation (security) or for the purchase of land etc.
Your point is well made but, dare I say it, flawed.
Allow me to clarify as best as I can. For ease of reference, the points will be
annotated.
1. Nobody detracts from the success of your herd. I certainly dont. Even so, as the
owner of South Africas largest privately owned herd you stand to benefit more than
most from a resumption of trade. Its a conflict of interest, which I cant, in good
conscience, ignore. Whilst the authorities deliberate, perhaps you would consider
recusing yourself from the discussion and withdrawing from the media?
2. Its true that rhino horn can be harvested as and when the animal regenerates its
horn and over the course of its life. Its also true that the animal doesnt have to be
killed to do so. Notwithstanding, unless SANPARKS and/or Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
intend to dehorn their herd in the field, which youll agree is an unlikely occurrence,
the only benefit to either would be the sale of surplus animals to private owners. To
participate equitably these rhino would need to be sold at prices at, or in excess of,
the current price of horn. A single animal yields approximately 4-6kg of horn? At
current prices of US$30,000-US$50,000 per kilogram that equates to approximately
ZAR1,500,000 to ZAR2,500,000 per animal or circa 10 times the current price of the
live animal.
3. On my point 2. above, you might be inclined to point out that an increase in
supply should, by definition, drop the price of the product to more reasonable
levels. Thats true if demand stays constant but its an assumption best left in the
bin where it belongs. There is no irrefutable evidence that demand wont increase,
perhaps dramatically so, if ever trade was legalised. A possible/probable shift
outwards of the demand curve would leave prices unchanged at best, or resume its
upward spiral as new users enter the market.
4. The global regulatory environment is constantly in flux. Its safe to expect some
significant change within my own industry. The CSO concept as a stand-alone entity
will soon be obsolete. A fairly common criticism of the CSO structure is its bias
towards some form of complicity either in open forum or disguised by internal
policies. In truth most operate as cartels, controlling both price and supply.
Manipulation is simply endemic in such a structure. The same cartel-like complicity
will manifest in the demand markets. Selling to selected distributors has the same
causal effect.
5. It does not follow that illegal syndicates will become redundant when trade is
legalised. On the contrary, the scope to launder illegally harvested product
through official channels becomes entrenched, particularly in a corrupt environment
and or when large sums of money are involved. At the same time your cost of
harvesting horn or your production costs are significantly higher, I suspect, than the
price of a bullet plus one or two thousand dollars for the trigger-men.
6. You have said that illegal trade will be eradicated in a legal trade environment. I
dont see why. The infrastructural environment under the auspices of legal trade
would, in all likelihood be no different from the current. The illegal networks are well
established. Fortunately some commendable work has been done by the authorities
to break down these structures, but they still exist and will continue to exist until
they dont and certainly for reasons other than resumption in trade.
7. The most blatant flaws in your argument Ive left to last and they detract from the
rest of your argument. Cattle farming has little to do with conservation. Farming
lions for the legal trade is, by anybodys definition, not conservation. The same
applies to the farming of chickens or pigs or sheep or in this case rhinoceros.
Farming rhinoceros to shave their horns is as far removed from conservation as is
farming crocodiles for their belly skins. Yes, theyre not domesticated, but theyre
hardly free-roaming wild animals either. Your herd is supplementary-fed and
controlled in relatively small paddocks. Mauricedale is obviously a well-run farming
operation.
8. Now, if you were to publicly distinguish your herd from the free-roaming herd and
openly commoditise your rhinoceros then your herd becomes a product; like eggs or
bacon. Yes, its still an illegal commodity but your exhortations in the public domain
to reopen trade would be inscrutable. Intentions are made clearer, are based on
sound business principles and are more readily understood in the public eye.
However, masking intent by including conservation benefits and the projectintegration of the local community in the same dialogue is misleading; although
unintended perhaps.
9. In passing I am confident that the authorities in control of the valuable stockpile
of rhinoceros horn will remain steadfast in their application thus avoiding any
potential conflicts of interest. These same officials hold the elective right to lobby
CITES for renewal of trade.
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2015/proceed/papers/P1015.pdf
Conventional wisdom holds that demand reduction strategies would be effective in
reducing supply, where demand is downward sloping. Our study shows that, that
even if the demand curve is negative and inelastic as hypothesised by Biggs et al
(2012), conventional demand reduction strategies that influence the price of rhino
horn to the market may not be successful in curbing supply. Our model indicates
Last week the number of South African rhinos poached for their horn since January
surpassed the 2013 total of 1,004. At the time of publishing the number was 1,030.
With this news more weight will be put behind the arguments in favour of legalising
trade in rhino horn, a strategy that some claim will reduce demand by flooding the
market with stockpiled and farmed horn. It is a solution the government appears
intent on implementing despite potentially disastrous results and lack of evidence
that the enormous financial benefits to the rhino owners who are campaigning for
legalisation will filter down into anti-poaching efforts where they are needed most
our under-funded national parks. In this account of the situation, conservationist
Dex Kotze reveals how global conservation authorities appear to be opening
avenues for trade while South Africa cannot even meet 1% of the potential demand
for rhino-horn.
court officials to make inconvenient evidence disappear, and fees for good lawyers
and hitmen. It provides an incentive more powerful than the fear of death to the
squads of triggermen who regularly enter rhino reserves despite the presence of
armed rangers, police and military units.
Hundreds have died in shootouts with authorities across the country in recent years,
but they still come. The proceeds from a single horn can be literally life-changing in
the poor rural communities where many poachers live, where jobs are scarce and
nearby parks are hostile no-go zones, not assets that communities can benefit from
and be proud of. This means we will never shoot our way out of the poaching
nightmare. As spending on armed protection of rhinos has increased, so have South
Africas poaching rates, now the highest recorded since records began. Massive
outlays on harsh security measures by individual reserves can sometimes reduce
rhino deaths locally, but the total rhino body count for the country rises at an ever
greater pace.
http://magazine.africageographic.com/weekly/issue-22/rhino-horn-trade-southafrica-china-selling-out/
South Africas poor record of governance and corruption at the highest level under
President Zuma is a major obstacle for legalised trade to work. Stockpiles of rhino
horn worth millions have already been stolen from government offices where safe
custody, security alarms and electric fences were blatantly absent.
The government and pro-trade lobbys concept of a transparent central selling
organisation (CSO) regulating rhino horn trade is a pipe dream that could never
work. Motivations using comparisons to the CSO of the global diamond industry are
navely ironic. Illicit diamond trading continues throughout the world, blood
diamonds still enter the market, and criminal syndicates in South Africa are
targeting jewellery stores on a weekly basis indicating a healthy black market for
diamonds. If the imposition of controls by the massively-resourced diamond industry
has not curbed illegal activity, why would anybody think that this system would
work with regard to rhino horn?
In addition CITES has proved to be totally ineffectual in controlling illegal trade in
wildlife, despite ongoing efforts and the imposition of controls, again calling into
question the efficacy of the proposed model.
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-14-bold-plan-to-fly-sa-rhinos-to-texas
Several challenges
But the plan must overcome several challenges before it can move forward: it must
get approval from the United States department of agriculture to import the
animals; it must find enough ranchers in Texas who want to take the rhinos; and it
must raise the funds to move the creatures, at an estimated cost of at least $50 000
a rhinoceros.
Home to 80% of the planets rhinoceros population, South Africa is in the midst of a
poaching epidemic. The animals horns fetch a high price $65 000 for just under
1kg in markets such as China and Vietnam, where rhino horn is an ingredient in
traditional medicines. Illegal rhino killings increased by 20% in 2014, with 1?215
rhinos dead.
Conservation groups, representatives of the government and individual supporters
such as landowners in both regions are just beginning to formulate the Texas
relocation plan. Game farmers own roughly 5 000 of South Africas estimated
20 000 white and black rhinos, and have good reason to co-operate with a scheme
that might preserve the population.
Strauss, May 2015, Michael J., Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International
Law, Strauss is professor at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, Paris
teaching international relations and law. A specialist in territorial lease agreements,
his numerous published works include The Leasing of Guantanamo Bay.
Yet considering this activity to be part of normal state practice is something that is
not often done. The leasing of territory has been largely an ad hoc process in which
states have addressed a range of specific situations for which the conventional
application of sovereignty was less advantageous or convenient. Although individual
cases have occurred on every populated continent, they have differed widely in
origin, purpose, implementation and even terminology, and there has never been
any clear template. Consequently, leasing has gone largely unexplored as part of
the comportment of states, as an element of diplomacy or as a contributor to the
development of international law.
That is not to say that leases are ignored, as numerous scholars have studied
individual cases Hong Kong and Guantanamo Bay have been probed from many
different angles in recent decades, to give just to prominent examples. But material
about the broader phenomenon remains sparse, and some of what exists is more
than a century old. This means that most leases of territory have been made by
states with little detailed knowledge of, or regard for, the broader context in which
they happen. Even when a state has engaged in some form of systematic leasing,
as the United States has done with foreign military bases and Russia has done with
strategic sites in former Soviet states, it has necessarily occurred in this vacuum.
Strauss, May 2015, Michael J., Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International
Law, Strauss is professor at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, Paris
teaching international relations and law. A specialist in territorial lease agreements,
his numerous published works include The Leasing of Guantanamo Bay.
Many states routinely import large quantities of agricultural products, but their
dependence on international markets was brought into question when global prices
of food commodities surged higher in 2007-2008 with unprecedented severity, and
importing states sought alternate ways to obtain stable flows of a foreign farm
products with less price risk. One result was a movement to secure long-term rights
on farmland abroad, and this rapidly developed into a large-scale international
scramble to purchase or lease sometimes vast areas of foreign land. The trend,
often derided as a land grab, nonetheless attracted the eager participation of
many states where the land is located, particularly developing countries, because it
offered a new source of investment income and held the promise of strengthening
their agricultural sectors.
as might occur during a drought when water must be allocated; in a 2008 treaty
between Libya and Mali by which Mali leased 100,000 hectares of farmland for 50
years to a company created by both states for purposes of growing crops for Libya,
Mali was obliged to permit the Societe Malibya agricole to use the quatity of water
necessary, without restriction, for the project during the period from June to
December of each year.
LEASE stuf
Hezbollah Advantage
www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Strauss_Michael_Territorial_Leasing_Bounda
ry_Conflicts_Disputes_Borders_Guantanamo_Bay.html
There are six known cases in which territorial leases have been used
successfully to resolve boundary disputes, and no known cases in which a lease concluded for
that purpose failed to achieve its goal. But each time, the lease involved a very small area and information
about it was poorly disseminated, so none of these leases ever
became a model that other states copied. The result was that the
wheel kept being reinvented while territorial leasing has been widely
used for economic and military purposes, it was considered an
original idea each time it was used for resolving a sovereignty
dispute. This indicates that a degree of diplomatic creativity was
necessary, and creativity is the exception rather than the rule.
Herbert I. London, 10, President Emeritus of Hudson Institute, The Coming Crisis
in the Middle East, June 23, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=publication_details&id=7101&pubType=HI_Opeds
The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum . War clouds are
on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive
action to commence is a trigger. Turkeys provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a
humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of
Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria
bets are of in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni tent must
stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could
incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an
victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more
dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim
and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign.
Strauss 2009, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Interview with Leonhardt
van Efferink,
www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Strauss_Michael_Territorial_Leasing_Bounda
ry_Conflicts_Disputes_Borders_Guantanamo_Bay.html
Boundaries are normally fixed when states are created, but states
and their populations and economies continue to evolve after that
point and so do their perceived territorial needs. Territorial leasing is a mechanism by
which states sometimes address these evolving interests without
resorting to formal boundary changes. A lease essentially reallocates sovereign-like rights in a way
that can be less dramatic or definitive than a cession of territory by one state to the other. If a lease can satisfy the interests of
both states, it can sometimes be an alternative to war it can transform a conflict
from being about sovereignty into being about specific rights and
obligations associated with sovereignty, and this opens up new
options for resolving the issue. A lease normally requires administration, and if this involves both states it
can become a confidence-building activity that can, if all goes well,
enhance bilateral relations more broadly.
Strauss 2009, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Papers and Proceedings of
the Nineteeth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban
Economy, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/strauss
.pdf
Territorial leases gained favor among states by broadening their
diplomatic options. They are alternatives to transfers of territorial
title when these may seem too disproportionate or definitive, and
they can provisionally resolve territorial issues for which permanent
agreements prove too difficult. But leases can also lead to unintended consequences, such as sovereignty
over a leased territory eventually passing from the lessor state to the lessee state; cases in which this occurred once led scholars to refer
to leases as disguised cessions.
Has worked every time in the past, even the problems it creates are easily resolved
Strauss & Gal-Or, 2008, Michael J and Noemi, Lecturer in Geopolitics-Doctoral
Program at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, & Director at Institute
for Transborder Studies and Professor of Department of Political Science at Kwantlen
University College in Surrey B.C, Touro International Law Review Volume 11,
International Leases as a Legal Insturment of Conflict Resolution: The Shab'a Farms
as a Prototype for the Resolution of Territorial Conflicts,
www.tourolaw.edu/ILR/uploads/articles/STRAUSS_FINAL_FULL_TEXT.pdf
The leases concluded by France and Spain, Bangladesh and India, and
Israel and Jordan all resulted in stable situations of sovereignty and
territorial control in the frontier locations where these questions had
been disputed. They established clearer and more precise boundaries that were respected by the
states and also by local populations in proximity to the territories
involved, and they brought to an end the periodic violence that had
occurred in some of these areas. All three of the leases generated new
problems, but these were either resolved or considerably less acute
than the initial problems of territorial sovereignty that were being addressed. Moreover, the
problems that arose were associated with the individual
circumstances of each lease, such as the economic impact of a specific clause or a third partys reaction to the
arrangement, rather than being inherent in the lease itself as a legal
instrument.
Modeling stuf
UNIQUENESS
[in 1ac]
LINKS
LEASING GETS MODELED POST CASE (GITMO IS ONE OF AND
THE MAIN EXAMPLE DISCUSSED ABOVE THIS SECTION)
Strauss 2010, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Viability of Territorial
Leases in Resolving International Sovereignty Disputes, p 283, Published by
L'Harmattan, October 27,
This raises the question of whether limits to using territorial leases in resolving such disputes can be identified. Until now, too few
examples have existed to know, and it remains a subject for further research. Nonetheless, the cases presented
here all fall within the limits of what can succeed, and collectively they can act as
a preliminary model for resolving other territorial conflicts with similar
characteristics. Future application of the leasing concept in the context of settling territorial
disputes between states may indicate more clearly where the limits are, and allow a more refined model
to be developed. In the meantime, the examples studied here provide evidence that the phenomenon of
territorial leasing as a means of conflict resolution may be identifiable
as an international regime a role that would ofer greater visibility to
this practice and bring it more fully into the range of recognized
options that states have available for settling issues pertaining to
territorial control.
RUSSIA-UKRAINE MODULE
Sets precedent for Ukraine Russia dispute coming in 2017
Strauss 2009, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Interview with Leonhardt
van Efferink,
www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Strauss_Michael_Territorial_Leasing_Bounda
ry_Conflicts_Disputes_Borders_Guantanamo_Bay.html
There is also the danger that the lessee state may not leave, and if
its a strong state the lessor may not be able to kick it out.
Guantanamo Bay is an example of this, too. Cuba has called on the
United States to go home ever since the Cuban revolution in 1959, but the United States
has argued that the lease is a valid agreement that allows it to
remain there. A problem of this nature is currently brewing between
Ukraine and Russia over the port that Russia leases for its Black Sea
Fleet of naval ships at Sevastopol. Ukraine says it wont renew the
lease when it expires in 2017, but Russia seems intent on staying , at least
until it has an alternative port ready at some later point.
SHABA MODULE
Inherency/Uniqueness
Shaba farms are the lynchpin in the Levant another war inevitable without
resolution
Strauss & Gal-Or, 2008, Michael J and Noemi, Lecturer in Geopolitics-Doctoral
Program at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, & Director at Institute
for Transborder Studies and Professor of Department of Political Science at Kwantlen
University College in Surrey B.C, Touro International Law Review Volume 11,
International Leases as a Legal Insturment of Conflict Resolution: The Shab'a Farms
as a Prototype for the Resolution of Territorial Conflicts,
www.tourolaw.edu/ILR/uploads/articles/STRAUSS_FINAL_FULL_TEXT.pdf
On July 12, 2006,
Leasing Harms/Impacts
General
NO RESOLUTION ON SHEBA MEANS MASSIVE UPHEAVALS IN
THE LEVANT
Electric Lebanon 2009, September 11, Shebaa Farms "real issue" is water,
electronicintifada.net/content/shebaa-farms-real-issue-water/8438
continued Israeli occupation of
the Shebaa Farms will remain a key trigger to renewed conflict
between the two countries.
There will not be enough water for our generation or the next , said Comair.
We will see social, economic, political and military conflicts and in
that order within the next 20 years.
But in the absence of hydro-diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon, the
prevailed
along the Blue Line and the parties worked closely with UNIFIL to strengthen liaison and coordination arrangements.
However, a few incidents occurred which had the potential to spark a
serious escalation.
Water Wars
SHABA RESOLUTION IS KEY TO PREVENT WATER WARS IN THE
LEVANT
Electric Lebanon 2009, September 11, Shebaa Farms "real issue" is water,
electronicintifada.net/content/shebaa-farms-real-issue-water/8438
The absence of hydro-diplomacy reflects conflict in the region . In 1965, Syria
and Lebanon began the construction of channels to divert the Banias and Hasbani, preventing the rivers flowing into Israel. Israel
attacked the diversion works, the first in a series of moves that led to a regional war two years later.
In 2002, when the Lebanese constructed a pipeline on the River Wazzani intended to
supply households in southern Lebanon with water, Israeli
And it is not just the direct overland flow that the Shebaa provides
Israel. According to the Lebanese Water Ministrys Comair, 30 to 40 percent of the River Dans
water flows into it through underground supplies originating in the
Shebaa. Israel is worried that if Lebanon gains control of the Shebaa,
it can then control the flow to the Dan river, said Comair.
Far more important, and far easier to answer, is the question: Is there any connection between fresh water and conflict, including violent
conflict? And the answer has to be an unambiguous yes. History going back 5,000 years is rife with examples where water has been a
goal of violence, a target or tool of conflict, or a source of disputes and political strife. Our Water Conflict Chronology, at
worldwater.org, lists hundreds of these examples. And if there is a strong connection between water and conflicts, two new questions
come up: Are the risks of these conflicts growing, and how can we reduce them? I think the answer to the first is, yes, the risks of waterrelated conflicts appears to be growing.
Michael E. Campana is the director of the Institute for Water and Watersheds and a
professor of geosciences at Oregon State University. He maintains the blog
WaterWired.
The aforementioned events afford some measure of optimism, but will the past predict the future? We face an uncertain and potentially
calamitous future. World population is approaching 7 billion people. Climate change and its effect on water resources loom ominously.
Watershed boundaries may change. Water supplies may increase in some areas and decrease in others. And since water does more than
quench thirstit grows food, maintains ecosystems and fisheries, dilutes waste, provides recreation, facilitates navigation and trade, and
generates powerI can foresee situations where nations, or even states, cities, or provinces, wage war over water and the services it
provides.
and water insecurity, in the majority of cases, water and food insecurity are rarely about competition
over resources but rather reect the politics of allocation and inequality. In this respect, war and
conicts aggravate these insecurities not just on the short term but also on the long term. At the global
level, food security has considerably improved and provides the means to address these insecurities.
Trade can certainly be seen as a way to address access for countries that are under severe stress in
terms of food and water and provides logical grounds for questioning the various water and food wars
scenarios. Although global trade and technological innovation are key drivers in providing stable and
resilient global systems, the most destabilizing global water-related threat is increasing food prices and
hunger. Overall, decision-makers should show greater concern for the human beings who make their
living in agriculture, so that those at risk of livelihood and food-security failures, especially under
anticipated scenarios of climate change, will be less deprived. Current debates linked to global food
security and climate fail to address the political dimension of resource scarcity which is primarily
linked to the politics of inequality, gender and power.
tensions and conflicts, diplomatic efforts to reduce the risks of conflict must now include an environmental
component. Furthermore, military preparedness should include an improved understanding and analysis of the threats associated with
water.
HEZBOLLAH - GENERAL
SOLVING SHABA SOLVES HIZBALLAH
Spyer 2009, Jonathan, Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global
Research in International Affairs Center, June 1, Israel and Lebanon: Problematic
Proximity, www.gloria-center.org/2009/06/spyer-2009-06-01/
Nevertheless, the
and Syria would lead to an all-out regional conflict. "They should understand that a
war on Iran and Syria will not remain in Iran and Syrian territory, but
it will engulf the whole region and there is no escaping this reality ,
Nasrallah said during a televised speech honoring "Martyrs' Day."
White 2013, defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military
and security affairs of the Levant and Iran. He is widely sought out as a
commentator on military issues involving Syria, Israel, Hizballah, the Gaza conflict,
and Iran May 29, Hezbollah's declaration of war in syria: military implications, The
Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollahsdeclaration-of-war-in-syria-military-implications
On May 25, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah ma de
what amounts to a
declaration of war against the Syrian revolution. He committed his group to
defeating the rebellion and preserving the regime of Bashar al-Assad, declaring
that "Syria is the resistance's main supporter, and the resistance cannot stand still and let takfiris [extremist Sunnis] break its
backbone." No one can fault him for lack of clarity; this was not a speech cloaked in ambiguity. Assuming he follows through on his
commitment to protect Assad's regime, both the speech and Hezbollah actions already
White 2013, defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military
and security affairs of the Levant and Iran. He is widely sought out as a
commentator on military issues involving Syria, Israel, Hizballah, the Gaza conflict,
and Iran May 29, Hezbollah's declaration of war in syria: military implications, The
Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollahsdeclaration-of-war-in-syria-military-implications
Hezbollah's commitment in particular will change the equation on whatever battlefields the group fights,
giving the regime renewed ofensive and defensive capabilities and
greater resources. It will also boost morale among the regime's forces
and supporters, encouraging Assad to stay the course and crush the rebellion. As a result, the regime will be even
less likely to negotiate a true transition of power, deflating the hopes
of those pressing for a diplomatic solution. A regime that has shown
no inclination to negotiate while losing the war will hardly be moved
to compromise if it believes its prospects have improved . Hezbollah's
bold action stands in sharp contrast to the feeble response from supporters of the Syrian opposition. Without a significant upgrading of
rebel capabilities -- either from their own resources, outside assistance, or both -- Nasrallah's declaration could
Hezbollah
troops would probably enter the fray on the side of the Assad government,
and their paymasters in Tehran might also intervene more directly .
This would escalate and expand the conflict. The Sunni majority Syrian rebels would face a
Shiite-backed (Hezbollah, Iran) Assad regime, intensifying a regional Shiite-Sunni divide already tearing apart Lebanon and Iraq.
This conflict would sunder the entire region and further devastate
Syria. With US involvement growing and escalation likely , pressure would build for
stronger action. A no-fly zone? Drone strikes against Syrian tanks and artillery? Boots on the ground? The US might find
itself dragged into another even more dangerous Middle East war .
Rather than pursuing uncertain and dangerous military solutions, the
US should use its influence to continue to press for a diplomatic
settlement. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov announced recently in Moscow the
convening of a conference in Geneva to end the fighting and begin negotiations for a transitional government. UN-Arab League envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi welcomed last weeks communiqu as the first hopeful news concerning that unhappy country in a very long time."
1996-98. Middle East crisis: World briefing: Bringing Iran and Syria in from the
cold, 7-27, The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, p. Nexis]
A black day in the Middle East produced one hopeful glimmer : Kofi Annan's insistence,
backed by hosts Italy and other Rome conference participants, that lasting peace in Lebanon would
require the "constructive engagement" of all regional countries including Syria and
Iran. "Looking at the broader picture it is clear we need a new push for comprehensive peace," the UN secretarygeneral said. "Without this, we are only buying time until the next explosion ." Mr
Annan's words sound like a statement of the obvious. And Syria and Iran have repeatedly stated that no Lebanon
deal can stick without them. But for its own geo-strategic reasons, the US continues to cold-shoulder the two
countries it blames for arming and aiding the Lebanese Shia militia. There have been half-hearted contacts with
Syria through the US embassy in Damascus. But with Tehran, a founder member of Mr Bush's "axis of evil", nothing
Yet good reasons for seeking direct Iranian and Syrian engagement grow by the
day as the US and Israel dig themselves into ever deeper trouble. Yesterday's Roman circus
at all.
again underlined international divisions over how to end the fighting and how subsequently to police the Israel-
And it is the safe haven for Ba'athist insurgents in Iraq." Nadim Shehadi, a Middle East expert at Chatham House,
call it capitulation light, but capitulation all the same. It would be the end of the American regional agenda," he
said. And Syria would never entirely pull the plug on Hizbullah. Nor would it break with Iran. "The idea that it would
Cutting a
deal with Damascus to break the deadlock might be more attractive to Washington
than accepting a ceasefire that would be portrayed as a victory for Hizbullah, Mr
Shehadi said. And it was better than the other choice, which was "direct confrontation
with Iran and Syria that could lead to a world war". The biggest danger, he said,
was that Mr Bush might suffer "an Oedipus moment" and, determined to avoid his
father's supposed mistake in leaving Saddam Hussein in power after the 1991 Gulf war, would attack
do so is naive. The only reason Syria is not under attack now is because of its alliance with Iran."
Iran before the country went nuclear. Given that background engaging Iran, as urged by Mr Annan,
looks like an even harder sell. Iran's price for collaboration would include compromise over its suspect nuclear
programme - a likely deal-breaker for the US. And even then, Iran would not abandon Hizbullah. Former president
Muhammad Khatami recently hailed the group as "a shining sun that illuminates and warms the hearts of all
Muslims and supporters of freedom in the world". And he is a moderate.
oil prices of this magnitude could be expected to push the United States
economy into recession .
With the November mid-term Congressional elections in the United States approaching rapidly, those
countries opposing Israel's military actions may soon act to cut oil exports and effect political change in the United States,
global recession
touching of a
in 2007.
Islam Yasin Qasem, holds a Master Degree in International Affairs from Columbia
University in NYC, 7 [7-9, The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o
.htm]
Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests,
superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military
power to ensure secure access
to oil resources,
US Fed News Service, 13 (US Fed News Service, Fast accurate verbatim
transcripts for political events in Washington Including US State News, 6-1-13,
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON IRAN, THE
IRGC, AND HEZBOLLAH'S INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE,
ProQuest//ACK)
US. Department of State issued the following press release: MODERATOR: Hey, good morning, everyone,
and thanks for joining us. And let me just go ahead and introduce our speakers real quick and we'll get it
over to them. We have - first of all, this call is on background. We have [Senior Administration Official One],
who'll be Senior Administration Official One. And our second speaker is [Senior Administration Official Two],
who will be Senior Administration Official Two. So I'm going to turn it right over to Senior Administration
Official One for some opening remarks and then Two for some brief comments as well. So go ahead, Senior
Administration Official One. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you very much and thanks for
everyone to be - for being on the call today. As many of you will have seen, yesterday we released at the
State Department the annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012. And one of
the most noteworthy conclusions when we put that report together was a marketing resurgence
of terrorist activity by Iran and Hezbollah. The tempo of operational
activity was something we haven't seen since the 1990s, with attacks
plotted in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa in 2012 alone . We believe this
is an alarming trend. It's borne out by the facts and it merits closer inspection as we evaluate the landscape
Iranian leadership share a similar world view and strategic vision and are seeking to exploit the current
alarming, but there's also an encouraging trend at work and one I think that's received fairly - relatively little
attention in our view, and that's the increasingly firm response among governments around the world to
these actions. We're seeing prosecutions of Hezbollah operatives in multiple jurisdictions around the world,
ongoing investigations, and discussions about proscribing the group as a terrorist organization. Now just to
recap a couple of the
Burgas that killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen and injured 32 others. In March of this year, a
court in Cyprus found a Hezbollah operative guilty of charges stemming from surveillance activities carried
out in 2012 against Israeli tourists. Thailand is currently prosecuting a Hezbollah member for his role in
helping plan a possible terrorist attack in that country. We understand that trial will begin in mid-June. The
Qods Force is suspected of directing terrorist attacks in Georgia, India, Thailand, and Kenya in 2012. You will
Arbabsiar was sentenced yesterday to 25 years in prison for his involvement in that plot. We see no signs of
been involved in the conflict and, of course, is making no - no longer making any effort to
disguise or downplay the extent of its commitment to kill or die on behalf of the Assad
regime. A large number of Hezbollah fighters are now operating in
Syria, even though the Lebanese Government has sought to
disassociate Lebanon from the Syrian crisis in the best interest of the Lebanese
people. The group is openly undermining that policy and working closely with Iran to provide a range of
support to the Assad regime, including fighters, weaponry, and training a large pro-regime militia. We judge
Iran and Hezbollah have enlisted Alawite, Iraqi, Shia militant and
terrorist groups to participate in counter-opposition operations in Syria. All of this support is helping
that
the regime brutally crack down on the opposition, kill civilians, and is contributing to regional instability,
Solvency
LEASING SOLVES FOR ALL PARTIES AND FITS THE HISTORICAL
MODEL WILL SAY YES
Strauss & Gal-Or, 2008, Michael J and Noemi, Lecturer in Geopolitics-Doctoral
Program at Centre dEtudes Diplomatiques et Stratgiques, & Director at Institute
for Transborder Studies and Professor of Department of Political Science at Kwantlen
University College in Surrey B.C, Touro International Law Review Volume 11,
International Leases as a Legal Insturment of Conflict Resolution: The Shab'a Farms
as a Prototype for the Resolution of Territorial Conflicts,
www.tourolaw.edu/ILR/uploads/articles/STRAUSS_FINAL_FULL_TEXT.pdf
Our proposal suggests embarking on a completely different route. In
PALESTINE MODULE
Palestine could use the leasing model
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WQTyWaFzD4TI12ay_dQkF8Pp_cjRzdRpKPVqRebIF7c/edit
Abrasive:
1. As the sovereign, Cuba can request that the Cuban flag be flown at the Base. 2. As the sovereign, Cuba could lease other territory to
other countries, for any purpose. 3. As the sovereign, Cuba could invoke eminent domain against the Naval Station.
Cooperative:
4. Cuba could ask the US to reaffirm the Teller Amendment. 5. Cuba could ofer to renegotiate a
Treaty of Relations 6. Cuba could offer to renegotiate the Lease on a mutually agreeable basis.
This actually could be an important model for the settlement of the
issue of Palestine.
dispute is therefore critical; while this would be the case for any type
of settlement attempt, it is possible that resolving a conflict through
leasing may be viable at an earlier moment of calm rather than resolving it through a
more traditional and definitive determination of sovereignty and rights.
Strauss 2009, Michael, PHD from international relations and diplomacy at Centre
d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Strategiques & lecturer there, Interview with Leonhardt
van Efferink,
www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Strauss_Michael_Territorial_Leasing_Bounda
ry_Conflicts_Disputes_Borders_Guantanamo_Bay.html
Territorial leasing can have disadvantages for the lessor state if the
transfer of rights is so comprehensive that the lessee state is
tempted to claim sovereignty over the territory after a period of
controlling it. Sovereignty over leased territories has occasionally been transferred this way, causing some scholars a century
ago to refer to territorial leases as "disguised cessions." Yet this is far from the rule, since leased
territories have also been returned to the lessor states upon
termination of the leases modern examples being Hong Kong , which
reverted back to China, and the Panama Canal, which reverted back to Panama.