MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE

SERVICE, INC.
- versus PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW
YORK/MCGEE & CO., INC
G.R. No. 162467
May 8, 2009
Tinga, J.:
FACTS:

Del Monte Philippines, Inc. contracted

petitioner Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service,
Inc., a stevedoring company, to load and stow a
shipment of 146,288 cartons of fresh green Philippine
bananas and 15,202 cartons of fresh pineapples
belonging to Del Monte Fresh Produce International,
Inc. into the cargo hold of the vessel M/V Mistrau. The
vessel was docked at the port of Davao City and the
goods were to be transported by it to the port of
Inchon, Korea in favor of consignee Taegu Industries,
Inc. Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under
an "open cargo policy" with private respondent
Phoenix Assurance Company of New York , a non-life
insurance company, and private respondent McGee &
Co. Inc. (McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of
Phoenix.
The vessel set sail from the port of Davao City and
arrived at the port of Inchon, Korea. It was then
discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was
in bad condition. The Marine Cargo Damage Surveyor
of Incok Loss and Average Adjuster of Korea, through
its representative Byeong Yong Ahn (Byeong),
surveyed the extent of the damage of the shipment. In
a survey report, it was stated that 16,069 cartons of the
banana shipment and 2,185 cartons of the pineapple
shipment were so damaged that they no longer had
commercial value.
Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes
aboard the M/V Mistrau. The vessel set sail from the
port of Davao City and arrived at the port of Inchon,
Korea. It was then discovered upon discharge that
some of the cargo was in bad condition.
Del Monte Produce filed a claim under the open cargo
policy for the damages to its shipment. McGees
Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the
claim and recommended that payment in the amount
of $210,266.43 be made. Phoenix and McGee instituted
an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal

After trial, the RTC held that the only participation of

Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board
the M/V Mistrau under the direction and supervision
of the ships officers, who would not have accepted
the cargoes on board the vessel and signed the
foremans report unless they were properly arranged
and tightly secured to withstand voyage across the
open seas. Accordingly, Mindanao Terminal cannot be
held liable for whatever happened to the cargoes after
it had loaded and stowed them. Moreover, citing the
survey report, it was found by the RTC that the
cargoes were damaged on account of a typhoon which
M/V Mistrau had encountered during the voyage. It
was further held that Phoenix and McGee had no
cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because
the latter, whose services were contracted by Del
Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte
Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte
Produce. The RTC dismissed the complaint and
awarded the counterclaim of Mindanao Terminal in
the amount of P83,945.80 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Phoenix and McGee have a
cause of action and whether Mindanao Terminal is
liable for not having exercised extraordinary diligence
in the transport and storage of the cargo.
RULING:
No, in the present case, Mindanao Terminal,
as a stevedore, was only charged with the loading and
stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the ships
cargo hold; it was never the custodian of the shipment
of Del Monte Produce. A stevedore is not a common
carrier for it does not transport goods or passengers; it
is not akin to a warehouseman for it does not store
goods for profit.
**Phoenix and McGee appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision The
same court ordered Mindanao Terminal to pay Phoenix and
McGee "the total amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and
attorneys fees of 20% of the claim." It sustained Phoenixs
and McGees argument that the damage in the cargoes was
the result of improper stowage by Mindanao Terminal.
** Mindanao Terminal filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 February 2004
resolution. Hence, the present petition for review.

AIR FRANCE,
- versus RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-21438
September 28, 1966
Sanchez, J.:
FACTS:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air
France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. Rafael
Carrascoso was one of the 48 Filipino pilgrims who
left Manila for Lourdes. However, at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that
his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous
in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
seat to the white man".
ISSUE:

Whether or not damages may be recovered

on the basis of the expulsion
HELD:
Yes, the contract of air carriage generates a
relation attended with public duty. Passengers should
be
protected and insured a pleasant trip. Thus, the
wrongful expulsion is a violation of public duty by
the air carrier- a quasi delict. Damages are proper.
**
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket
holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an
airline. What security then can a passenger have? The
foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First,
That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the BangkokTeheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached

when petitioner failed to furnish first class

transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from
the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The
contract was averred to establish the relation between
the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongful expulsion.
** Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. 44

ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS

- versus JEROME JOVANNE MORALES,
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis
Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year student at the
Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up BS Computer
Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head
which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper
Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned
and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired
from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store
for repair. With Alfred Pacis at the time of the
shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason
Herbolario. They were sales agents of the defendant,
and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun
store.

It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later

brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on
top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun.
The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the
head.
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision in favour Spouses Alfredo P. Pacis and
Cleopatra D. Pacis. Respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals. In its Decision dated 11 May 2005, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision
and absolved respondent from civil liability under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 August
2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jerome Jovanne Morales Is
guilty of negligence and lack of due care as he failed
to observe the diligence of a good father of a family.
HELD:
Yes, as a gun store owner indeed, a higher
degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous
weapons or substances. Such person in possession or
control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life
or business which involve little or no risk, a business
dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise
of a higher degree of care.
Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep
a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable
risk of harm or injury to others. He has the duty to
ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed
for ready-access defensive use. With more reason,
guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may
cause an accidental discharge such as what happened
in this case.
He were clearly negligent when he accepted
the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the
first place, the defective gun should have been stored

in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for

repair, respondent should have made sure that it was
not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded,
respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it
was not shown in this case whether respondent had a
License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition
or enhance or upgrade firearms.
________________________________________________
_________________________________________
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE,
- versus
SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO,
G.R. No. 160889
April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in
Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado
Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician
of respondent Nora S. Go, who was admitted at the
said hospital on April 19, 1992. At 1:30 a.m. of April
20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby
boy. However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered
profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts
of the placenta which were not completely expelled
from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Dr.
Milagros L. Cantre performed various medical
procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Noras
blood pressure.
While massaging Noras uterus for it to
contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to
warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious
until she recovered. While in the recovery room, her
husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a
fresh gaping wound two and a half (2 ) by three and
a half (3 ) inches in the inner portion of her left arm,
close to the armpit.5 He asked the nurses what caused
the injury. He was informed it was a burn. Forthwith,
on April 22, 1992, John David filed a request for
investigation.
On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the
National Bureau of Investigation for a physical
examination, The medico-legal officer later testified
that Noras injury appeared to be a burn and that a
droplight when placed near the skin for about 10
minutes could cause such burn He dismissed the

likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood

pressure cuff as the scar was not around the arm, but
just on one side of the arm. The costs of the skin
grafting and the scar revision were shouldered by the
hospital.
Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be the same
Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain in her left
arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her
wounded arm. Her movements now are also
restricted. Her children cannot play with the left side
of her body as they might accidentally bump the
injured arm, which aches at the slightest touch. Thus,
on June 21, 1993, respondent spouses filed a
complaint for damages against Dr. Cantre, Dr. Abad,
and the hospital.
In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment was
rendered in favor of Sps. John and Nora GO. Dr.
Cantre, Dr. Abad, and the hospital all appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the trial court decision, the motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Dr. Cantre is responsible for

the injury sustained by Nora S. Go.
HELD:

Yes, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by

its very nature and considering her condition, could
only be caused by something external to her and
outside her control as she was unconscious while in
hypovolemic shock.
Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by
the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both
instruments are deemed within the exclusive control
of the physician in charge under the "captain of the
ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in
charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his
assistants during the time when those assistants are
under the surgeons control.
** In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an
injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the instrument
causing the injury, provided that the following
requisites concur:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily

does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants;
and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct
which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC.,
- versus NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA,
G.R. No. 126297
January 31, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children
MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR.,
EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and
RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA,
- versus JUAN FUENTES,
G.R. No. 126467
January 31, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
MIGUEL AMPIL,
- versus NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA,
G.R. No. 127590
January 31, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the
Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a
series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil,
petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be
suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the
medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed
an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found
that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread
on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain
portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of
Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to
perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision. However, the
operation appeared to be flawed, because in the

corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11,

1984, the attending nurses entered the remarks:
"sponge count lacking 2 "announced to surgeon
search done but to no avail continue for closure."
Natividad Agana was discharged on April
24, 1984 and payed hospital bills amounting to 60,000
Php.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted
both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her
that the pain was the natural consequence of the
surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she
consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes
which were not removed during the operation.
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her
husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four months of consultations and
laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was
free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the
Philippines.

pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and

malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative complaint for gross negligence and
malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The
PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with
respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the
United States. On February 16, 1986, pending the
outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was
duly substituted by her above-named children. On
March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor
of the Aganas.
Issues:
G.R. No. 126297 Whether or not of
Professional ServicesInc. is solidarily for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil.
G.R. No. 126467 Whether or not Dr.
Fuentes is guilty of negligence or medical
malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, that the pieces of gauze are prima
facie proofs that the operating surgeons have
been negligent.

On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the

Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks
thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed
about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her
that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the
pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek
treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While
confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a
foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A rectovaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs
which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the
damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent
another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband
filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a
complaint for damages against the Professional
Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes . They alleged
that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two

G.R. No. 127590 Whether or not Dr. Ampil

is liable for negligence and malpractice sans
evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze
in Natividads vagina.
HELD:
G.R. No. 126297 YES, the owners and managers of
an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.

Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control

over their attending and visiting consultant staff.
While consultants are not, technically employees ,
the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages.
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with
the apparent authority which he knowingly permits
the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out
to the public as possessing.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the
Medical City Hospital the names and specializations
of the physicians associated or accredited by it,
including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. "it is
now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the
public directory leading the public to believe that it
vouched for their skill and competence." By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created
the impression that they were its agents, authorized to
perform medical or surgical services for its patients.
As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of
them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief
that such were being rendered by the hospital or its
employees, agents, or servants.

G.R. No. 126467 NO, the requisites for the

applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the occurrence of an injury;
(2) the thing which caused the injury was under the
control and management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care;
and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of
the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the
"control and management of the thing which caused
the injury."
We find the element of "control and management of
the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting.
Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead
surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He

requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to

perform hysterectomy when Dr. Ampil found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left
ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and
thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr.
Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything
to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the
operating room.
Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He
was about to finish the procedure when the attending
nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were
missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the
misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then
directed that the incision be closed. During this entire
period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating
room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other
words, he was the "Captain of the Ship."

G.R. No. 127590 YES, he is liable despite pointing to

other probable causes, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes
who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy; (2)
the attending nurses failure to properly count the
gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical
intervention of the American doctors who examined
Natividad in the United States of America.
The removal of all sponges used is part of a
surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon
fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his patients
body that should be removed as part of the operation,
he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and
creates a new condition which imposes upon him the
legal duty of calling the new condition to his patients
attention, and endeavoring with the means he has at
hand to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to
ensue therefrom.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the
missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled
her that the pain she was experiencing was the
ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been
more candid, Natividad could have taken the
immediate and appropriate medical remedy to

remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what

was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has
ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his
patient.

ISSUE:

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more

appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully
pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he did something
that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the
patient.

HELD:

February 2, 2010 RESOLUTION of

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIVIDAD
and ENRIQUE AGANA,
G.R. No. 126297
January 31, 2007
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children
MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR.,
EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and
RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA,
vs.
JUAN FUENTES,
G.R. No. 126467
January 31, 2007
And
MIGUEL AMPIL,
vs.
NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA,
G.R. No. 127590
January 31, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:

Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) filed a

second motion for reconsideration urging referral
thereof to the Court en banc and seeking modification
of the decision dated January 31, 2007 and resolution
dated February 11, 2008 which affirmed its vicarious
and direct liability for damages to respondents
Enrique Agana and the heirs of Natividad Agana
(Aganas). Manila Medical Services, Inc. (MMSI),
Asian Hospital, Inc. (AHI), and Private Hospital
Association of the Philippines (PHAP) all sought to
intervene in these cases invoking the common
ground that, unless modified, the assailed decision
and resolution will jeopardize the financial viability of
private hospitals and jack up the cost of health care.

Whether or not Professional Services Inc. has

been erred to be held liable for the Negligence of Dr.
Miguel Ampil.

YES, after gathering its thoughts on the

issues, this Court holds that PSI is liable to the
Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior
for lack of evidence of an employment relationship
with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible
agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac
vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its
failure to perform its duties as a hospital.
While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot
practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors,
surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of
its business of facilitating medical and surgical
treatment.
**Where an employment relationship exists, the
hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article
2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the
principle of respondeat superior. Even when no
employment relationship exists but it is shown that
the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is
its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable
under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and
Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of
apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its
relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be
held directly liable to the patient for its own
negligence or failure to follow established standard of
conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.
**Under the "control test", an employment
relationship exists between a physician and a hospital
if the hospital controls both the means and the details
of the process by which the physician is to accomplish
his task.
As priorly stated, private respondents
maintained specific work-schedules, as determined by
petitioner through its medical director, which
consisted of 24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours
each week and which were strictly to be observed
under pain of administrative sanctions.
**That petitioner exercised control over respondents
gains light from the undisputed fact that in the
emergency room, the operating room, or any
department or ward for that matter, respondents'
work is monitored through its nursing supervisors,

charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or

consent of petitioner or its medical director, no
operations can be undertaken in those areas. For
control test to apply, it is not essential for the
employer to actually supervise the performance of
duties of the employee, it being enough that it has
the right to wield the power.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS,
- versus C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:

On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8

March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City, a
vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis
Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210 (owned by
C.O.L. Realty Corporation and driven by Aquilino
Larin) and a Ford Expedition bearing Plate Number
LSR 917 (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by
Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, one
Estela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver,
Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a
speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah
Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of
Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Espedition
violently rammed against the cars right rear door and
fender.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.
demanded from respondent reimbursement for the
expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the
hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of
P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting
(C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based
on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.
Ramos
denied liability for damages insisting that it was the
negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which
was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos
asserted the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete
barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection. The MeTC rendered the

Decision dated 1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos)

from liability.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable for

the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo.
HELD:
YES, What is clear to Us is that Aquilino
recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through
it. Without doubt, his negligence is established by the
fact that he violated a traffic regulation.
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for
Rodels contributory negligence in driving the Ford
Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.
We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of
Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the
part of Ramos. For the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his employee, an
employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that in the selection
and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises
the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Ramos driver was texting with his cellphone while
running at a high speed and that the latter did not
slow down albeit he knew that Katipunan Avenue
was then undergoing repairs and that the road was
barricaded with barriers. As the employer of Rodel,
Ramos is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former.
** This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code:
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. Accordingly, there ought to be
no question on (C.O.L. Realtys) negligence which
resulted in the vehicular mishap.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC.,
- versus JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC.
and CRESILITO M. LIMBAGA,
[G.R. No. 161803, February 04, 2008]
REYES, R.T., J.:
FACTS:
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio
Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a
Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading,

Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay

Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They
were delivering commercial while a Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a
parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. as the trailer suffered a
tire blowout the night before. The driver Cresilito
Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a
substantial portion of the national highway, on the
lane of the passenger bus. The prime mover was not
equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates, the early warning device as substitute,
Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the
front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn
incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga
likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the trailer.
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover ,
the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto
the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two
bright and glaring headlights and the approaching
passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved
to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit
the front of the stationary prime mover. The
passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz
and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The
Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of
the incident.
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van
owner filed a complaint for damages against prime
mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan City.
The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as
defendant in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PrimeMover is liable for the
damages suffered by the Nissan Van
HELD:
YES, Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
managing and running its business. The evidence on
record shows that it failed to provide its prime mover
and trailer with the required early warning devices
with reflectors and it did not keep proper
maintenance and condition of the prime mover and
the trailer. The circumstances show that the trailer
were provided with wornout tires and with only one
(1) piece of spare tire.

We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent

in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of
the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial portion of the national road on the lane of
the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed
parking of the prime mover on the national road
posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was
incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to
prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.
We find that private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice
driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a
truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly
specialized driving skills. The employer clearly failed
to properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime
mover.
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime
mover on the national highway. Liberty Forest, Inc.
was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and
in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper
condition.
** Facts of the case reveal that when Ortiz, the driver
of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the
space on the road it needed, the latter vehicle scraped
its rear right side on the protruded bulldozer blade
and the impact threw the bus directly on the path of
the oncoming truck. This made plaintiffsappellants/appellees conclude that the Joana Paula
bus occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of
the truck, to swerve to its left and ram the front of the
parked trailer.
** To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered
by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
plaintiff.
**The two (2) flat tires suffered by the trailer and these
two (2) tires were attached to one of the two (2) Ibeams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which
axle is very near but behind the other axle and with
the location , it would have the other beam suffer the
flat tires as it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D8 bulldozer.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and
ARMANDO U. CARBONEL,
- versus -

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

LEONARDO DIONISIO
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
FELICIANO, J:
FACTS:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. Leonardo Dionisio was on his way
home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he
saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters
away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. was parked on the right hand side
of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic.
in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear.
The dump truck was parked askew, Dionisio
claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving
his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix,
in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (which
rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against
Phoenix and Carbonel) basically claiming that the
legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Phoenix was liable for the

mishap that ensued.
HELD:

YES, Dionisio was negligent the night of the

accident. He was hurrying home that night and
driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he
extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection
of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and
thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.chanrobles
virtual law library
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance
and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal
and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful - or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's
negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear.
Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The truck driver's negligence was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's
car would in any probability not have occurred had
the dump truck not been parked askew without any
warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable
risk of injury for anyone driving. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts

** There are four factual issues that need to be looked

into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio
had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful
night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or
speeding just before the collision with the dump
truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off

his car's headlights before contact with the dump

truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d)
whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident.
**"last clear chance" doctrine The historical function
of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate
the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule
that of contributory negligence. The common law rule
of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at
all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant.

spun around and landed on the opposite lane. At the

time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a
Traffic Violation Receipt, his drivers license had been
confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving.

It permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who

had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Whether or not Del Rosario is liable for the

lifetime paralysis of Stephen Huang and if Mercury
Drug is solidarily liable for the same.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and

ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO
- versus SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN
HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG,
G.R. No. 172122 June 22, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS:

Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered

owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with
plate number PRE 641. It has in its employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Richard and Carmen
Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang
and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with
plate number PTT 775. These two vehicles figured in a
road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30
p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound,
coming from the general direction of Alabang going
to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost lane
while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when
the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed
into the front right side of the car. The collision
hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost,

The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total

wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and
lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent
Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest
down and requires continuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment.
ISSUE:

HELD:
YES, Del Rosarios negligence as the direct
and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Stephen Huang. Del Rosario failed to do
what a reasonable and prudent man would have done
under the circumstances, and it is highly improbable
that the car swerved since it would not have leaped
across the other lane if that would have occurred.
We now come to the liability of petitioner
Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario. In the case
of petitioner Del Rosario, however he took the
driving tests and psychological examination when he
applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not
when he applied for the position of Truck Man.
Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, perceptual speed, visual attention,
depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and
steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and
police clearances were also presented. Lastly,
petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving
seminars . In effect, the only seminar he attended
before the accident which occurred in 1996 was held
twelve years ago in 1984.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to
show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact,
on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was
driving without a license.
**He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior,

but nothing was done about it. He was not

suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action
whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario.
We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner
Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of
proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del
Rosario.
** It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does
not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the
time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been
out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without
any alternate.

JOSEPH SALUDAGA,
- versus FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C.
DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU,
[G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008]
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
FACTS:

Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law

student of respondent Far Eastern University when he
was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on August 18,
1996. He was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes
Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound
he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the
police station where he explained that the shooting
was accidental. He was eventually released
considering that no formal complaint was filed
against him. Salduga thereafter filed a complaint for
damages against respondents on the ground that they
breached their obligation to provide students with a
safe and secure environment and an atmosphere
conducive to learning.
Far Eastern University and Edilberto De
Jesus(as president) in turn, filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by
respondent FEU to provide security services within
its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy's
President,) to indemnify them. On the other hand,
Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint
against AFP General Insurance.
On November 10, 2004, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner,

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which

rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the school is liable for breach of
contract
2. Whether or not Far Eastern University is liable
HELD:
1. YES, It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of
its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding
right of relief. In the instant case, we find that, when
petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the
security guard who was hired to maintain peace and
secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing
that respondents failed to comply with its obligation
to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students.

2. YES, the defense of Caso Fortuito cannot be

sustained. After a thorough review of the records, we
find that respondents failed to discharge the burden
of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their
students. They failed to prove that they ensured that
the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. also failed to show that they undertook
steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards
assigned to them actually possess the qualifications
required in the Security Service Agreement.
Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure
must fail. In order for force majeure to be considered,
respondents must show that no negligence or
misconduct was committed that may have occasioned
the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the
possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in
producing damage and injury to another.
AMADO PICART,
- versus FRANK SMITH, JR.,
[G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918]
STREET, J.:

FACTS:

On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan

Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank
Smith, jr. approached from the opposite direction in
an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he
saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and
after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man
on horseback before him was not observing the rule of
the road.
Being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or
the rapidity of the approach, Picart pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left.
He says that the reason he did this was that
he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length
of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the Smith guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing the Smith assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. The pony
had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had
made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet,
the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When Smith had gotten quite
near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting
the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with
its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frank Smith is liable for
negligence causing the injuries to Amado Picart.
HELD:
YES, a prudent man, placed in the position
of the defendant, would in our opinion, have

recognized that the course which he was pursuing

was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course.
It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
** The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
**The "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence
cannot be invoked where the negligence of the
plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant.
Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of
collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid
injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a
recovery.
when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not
avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that
position becomes the condition and not the proximate
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery.
GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE,
GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. AGAD, FELIX LIM and
PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE,
- versus INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA
ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO, Minors ROYCE
STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE,
JACQUELINE BRIGITTE JOCELINE CORAZON,
JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed
CALIBO, represented by their mother, CECILIA A.
VDA. DE CALIBO,
[G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979
Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Roranes and Patos were
on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated
Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached from the South Lizada Bridge going

towards the direction of Davao City. At about that

time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI
sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias
bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said
bridge.
At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge,
the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence
of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and
Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was
unhurt. On November 27, 1979, the instant case for
damages was filed by the surviving spouse and
children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents
of Tagbilaran City against Paul Zacarias(the driver)
and Felix S. Agad, George Lim and Felix Lim who are
the co-owners of the Glan People's Lumber and
Hardware which owns of the cargo truck.
For failure to file its answer to the third party
complaint, third party defendant, which insured the
cargo truck involved, was declared in default.

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH

MCKEE[parents of Jose Koh], petitioners,
- versus INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME
TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-68103, July 16, 1992]
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

ISSUE:

**[When the northbound car was about (10) meters

away from the southern approach of the bridge, two
(2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the
road and into the lane of the car. The boys were
moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the
lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights
of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted
to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.]
**On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
court. On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a
decision against the accused Ruben Galang .
**Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals. On 4 October
1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision
affirming the conviction of Galang.
**motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the respondent Court was filed with this
Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A
motion for its reconsideration was denied with
finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983.
**On 29 November 1983, the Intermediate Appellate
Court reversed and set aside the decision.

Whether or not the driver of Glan was

negligent in veering the truck thus holding Glan
peoples lumber liable for the injuries.
HELD:
NO, driver of the jeep had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, while still at that
distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping
in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck,
either of which he had sufficient time to do while
running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour.
In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect, the truck to swerve and
leave him a clear path.
**Paulino Zacarias was well within his own lane and
had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way
**Calibo had been drinking shortly before the accident
his negligence that was the proximate cause of the
accident.

FACTS:
In the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, a head-oncollision took place between an International cargo
truck, Loadstar (owned by JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO) and driven by Ruben
Galang and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh.
The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries
to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose Koh was negligent in

swerving to the lane of the truck which may have
contributed to the collision of the vehicles.
HELD:
NO, any reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and
could very well slow down, move to the side of the
road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO
SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO,
- versus COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZBENITEZ, as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
[ G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992]
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:

On 30 August 1985, a stabbing incident

caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the
time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third
year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established
that his assailants were not members of the school's
academic community but were elements from outside
the school.
ISSUE:

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the

untimely demise of Carlitos Bautista due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.
HELD:
YES, For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with.
** the school may still avoid liability by proving that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined
to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time
and place.
** Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied.
** Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit
or "built-in" obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a
constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.

SALDUGA **take from 1st part

FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL.,

- versus PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
[G.R. No. L-22415, March 30, 1966]
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS:

Then Senator Fernando Lopez made

reservations for first class accommodations from
Tokyo to San Francisco on May 24, 1960 with PANAM through Your Travel Guide agency specifically
by Delfin Faustino for his wife Maria his son-in-law
and his daughter Milagros which the head office
confirmed reservations on March, 31 1960.
As soon as they arrived in Tokyo Senator
Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine
Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding
their first class accommodations for that evening's
flight. For the given reason that the first class seats
therein were all booked up, however, PAN-AM's
Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PANAM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party
in that trip as first class passengers.
Due to pressing engagements awaiting
Senator Lopez and his wife, in the United States
**[he had to attend a business conference in San
Francisco the next day and she had to undergo a
medical check-up in Mayo Clinic, Rochester,
Minnesota, on May 28, 1960 and needed three days
rest before that in San Francisco]
They were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from
Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers. Senator
Lopez however made it clear, that they did so "under
protest" and without prejudice to further action
against the airline.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Pan American Airlines is

liable for breach of contract and is thus amenable for
damages caused.
HELD:
YES, through its agents Pan American
Airlines cancelled the First class reservations by
mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally
withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact
of said cancellation, letting them go on believing that
their first class reservations stood valid and
confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing
first class tickets in the conviction that they had
confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they

had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed

itself into the position of having to breach its a
foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no
last-minute cancellation by other passengers before
flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation
of defendant may indeed have been prompted by
nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in
holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers
in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek
the services of other airlines that may have been able
to afford them first class accommodations. All the
time, in legal contemplation such conduct already
amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a
breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill-will
**The first class reservations of Senator Lopez and
party were made on March 29, 1960 however, Mariano
Herranz [PAN-AM's reservations employee]
mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had been
reserved, including those of Senator Lopez and party.
April 1960 Herranz discovered his mistake,
upon seeing the reservation card newly prepared by
his co-employee Pedro Asensi for Sen. Lopez and
partyIt was then that Herranz sent another telex wire
to the San Francisco head office, stating his error and
asking for the reinstatement of the four (4) first class
seats reserved for Senator Lopez and party ). San
Francisco head office replied on April 22, 1960 that
Senator Lopez and party are waitlisted and that said
office is unable to reinstate them. Since the flight
involved was still more than a month away and
confident that reinstatement would be made, Herranz
forgot the matter and told no one about it.
Subsequently, on April 27, 1960, Armando Davila,
PAN-AM's reservations employee working in the
same Escolta office as Herranz, phoned PAN-AM's
ticket sellers at its other office in the Manila Hotel,
and confirmed the reservations of Senator Lopez and
party.

** Jalbuena bought a first class ticket from PAN-AM

on April 13, 1960; he confirmed it on April 15, 1960 as
to the Tokyo-Hongkong flight of April 20, 1960; PANAM similarly confirmed it on April 20, 1960. At the
airport he and another Oriental Mr. Tung were
asked to step aside while other passengers - including
"white" passengers boarded PAN-AM's plane. Then
PAN-AM officials told them that one of them had to
stay behind. Since Mr. Tung was going all the way to

London, Jalbuena was chosen to be left behind. PANAM's officials could only explain by saying there was
"some mistake". Jalbuena thereafter wrote PAN-AM to
protest the incident

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ

and ANICIA PAYAM,
- versus THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN,
[G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005]
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
McLoughlin, an Australian businessmanphilanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during
his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met
Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him
around, introducing him to important people,
accompanying him in visiting impoverished street
children and assisting him in buying gifts for the
children and in distributing the same to charitable
institutions for poor children. Tan convinced
McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to
Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez
were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel
while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for
the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care
of McLoughlins booking at the Tropicana where he
started staying during his trips to the Philippines
from December 1984 to September 1987.
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from
Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a
safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety
deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in
previous trips. On 12 December 1987, before leaving
for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his
safety deposit box with his key and with the key of
the management and took therefrom the envelope
containing Five Thousand US Dollars, the envelope
containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars and his
passports and his credit cards.
When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the
envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only
Three Thousand US Dollars were enclosed.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of

Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia.
When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the
envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars was short of
Five Thousand US Dollars. He also noticed that the
jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in
the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana
was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4
April 1988, he asked Lainez if some money and/or
jewelry which he had lost were found and returned to
her or to the management. However, Lainez told him
that no one in the hotel found such things and none
were turned over to the management. He again
registered at Tropicana and rented a safety deposit
box.
The same incident happened, when McLoughlin
discovered the loss, he immediately confronted
Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the
safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. Tan
admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and
was able to open the safety deposit box with the
assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also
told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to
McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.
ISSUE:

Whether or not YHT corporation is liable for

the malfeasance which caused injury to McLoughlin.
HELD:

YES, Payam and Lainez, who were

employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master
key of the management when the loss took place. In
fact, they even admitted that they assisted Tan on
three separate occasions in opening McLoughlins
safety deposit box.
Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside
from the registered guest had access to the safety
deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify
McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to
discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to
him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible
for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of
the negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the
occurrence of this incident considering that Payam
admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three

times in opening the safety deposit box of

McLoughlin while he was still asleep.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who,
in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of
negligence, are liable for damages. Art Article 2180
states that owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
**The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of
Safety Deposit Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted
with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for
resolution in this petition. Notably the same is null
and void. Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free
himself from responsibility by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by
the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper
and the guest whereby the responsibility of the
former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be void.

the Base slowed down before reaching the crossing,

that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop
completely. The train coming from the direction of
San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it
was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident. The
jeep Ralph Corliss was driving collided with the
locomotive of Manila Railroad Company, close to
midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957, at the
railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in
front of the Clark Air Force Base.
At the time crossing bars have not been put
down and there was no guard at the gate-house, and
that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not
qualified to do so at the time of the accident.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is

liable for the damages caused in the mishap.
HELD:

NO, Ralph Corliss was so sufficiently warned

in advance of the oncoming train that it was
incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident
and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle
before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.
He was knowledgeable and familiar with the location
and nature of the rail tracks that it cannot be imputed
to Manila Railroad despite the lack of warnings
Corliss must have been more cautious.
** Considering the purposes and the general methods
adopted for the management of railroads and railroad
trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching
a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing
and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing
cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen
and do everything that a reasonably prudent man
would do before he attempts to cross the track.

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS,
- versus THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
[G.R. No. L-21291, March 28, 1969]
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:

Ralph W. Corliss, was an air police of the

Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident,
he was driving the fatal jeep was then returning in
said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base. That
at the time of the accident, the jeep coming towards

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and

AURELIA TAMARGO,
- versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON
L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC,
respondents.
[ G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992]
FELICIANO, J.:

LIBI

FACTS:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then

a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
by Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against spouses Victor and
Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom
he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Adelberto Bundoc's
voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo gave rise
to liability on quasi-delict against him. as Article 2176
of the Civil Code provides.
HELD:
YES, provided that the civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a
minor child who lives with them according to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.

SOFIA M. GUILLANG,
- versus RODOLFO BEDANIA
and RODOLFO DE
SILVA,
[G.R. No. 162987, May 21, 2009]
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the
afternoon, Genaro M. Guillang was driving his brand
new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan along Emilio
Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite. Rodolfo A. Bedania
was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck towards
Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent
Rodolfo de Silva. Along the highway and the road
leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania
negotiated a U-turn. When the truck entered the
opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the
right portion of the truck. The truck dragged
Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car
were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical
Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because
of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to the
Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3
November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he
sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck
while the truck sustained minor damage. On 24 April

1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the

heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages
based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania
and de Silva.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Bedania was grossly

negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by
making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due
regard to traffic rules and the safety of other
motorists.
HELD:
YES, there is a presumption that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. In this case, the trial court found that the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report showed that the
truck committed a traffic violation by executing a Uturn without signal lights. . The trial court added that
Bedania violated another traffic rule when he
abandoned the victims after the collision. Bedania
was grossly negligent in his driving and held him
liable for damages.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life
of Antero and his companions. The cause of the
collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for
if the
U-turn was executed with the proper
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not
have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck
without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that
risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of
events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the
death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION,
INC.,PETITIONER,
- versus SPOUSES REYNALDO AND MARIA LUISA
TANJANGCO, AND SPOUSES FRANK AND
TERESITA CUASO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008]
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:

Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own

Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by
petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. ). On
the other hand, Frank and Teresita Cuaso own Lot 65
which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots.

Before the Cuasos constructed their house on

Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic
Engineer Democrito De Dios conducted all the
previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos.
Before, during and after the construction of the said
house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the
approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the
Cuasos constructed their house employing the
services of C.B. Paraz Construction Co., Inc. build
their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos'
Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached
between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded
that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the
latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to
file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.
** The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its
failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their
house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby,
exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted
Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and
building plans without verifying their accuracy and in
making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity
and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had
Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty,
they would not have been involved in a boundary
dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined
that Corinthian should also be held answerable for
any damages that they might incur as a result of such
construction.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Corinthian Gardens

Association is liable for negligence, in approving the
building plan and whether or not it acted in good
faith in doing so.
HELD:

YES, Corinthian cannot and should not be

allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming
that its approval of the Cuasos' building plans was
only limited to a so-called "table inspection and not
actual site measurement. Corinthian's failure to
prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter
wall into Tanjangcos' property - despite the inspection
conducted - constitutes negligence and, at the very
least, contributed to the injury suffered by the

Tanjangcos.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND AURMELA

GANZON,
- versus RAUL DE LEON,
[G.R. No. 165622, October 17, 2008]
REYES, R.T., J.:
FACTS:

On October 17, 1999, Raul T. De Leon noticed

that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty
reading. On the same evening, he met a friend for
dinner at the Foohyui Restaurant. The same friend
happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and had
just arrived from abroad De Leon consulted Dr. Milla
about his irritated left eye. Dr. Milla prescribed the
drugs "Cortisporin Opthalmic" and "Ceftin" to relieve
his eye problems. Before heading to work the
following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving,
Paranaque branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation
to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his
prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a
pharmacist assistant. Subsequently, he paid for and
took the medicine handed over by Ganzon.
Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent
felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected
eye with water, but the pain did not subside, only
then did he discover that he was given the wrong
medicine, "Cortisporin Otic Solution. De Leon
returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his
left eye still red and teary. When he confronted
Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the
prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and
instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully
read the prescription. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug,
through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about
the day's incident which did not merit any response.
Instead, two sales persons went to his office and
informed him that their supervisor was busy with
other matters. Having been denied his simple desire
for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a
complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercury Drug is liable for
the injuries suffered by Raul De Leon.
HELD:
YES, The proximate cause of the ill fate of De
Leon was defendant Aurmela Ganzon's negligent
exercise of said discretion. She gave a prescription
drug to a customer who did not have the proper form
of prescription, she did not take a good look at said
prescription, she merely presumed because it was the
only one available in the market and she further
presumed that by merely putting the drug by the
counter wherein plaintiff looked at it, paid and took
the drug without any objection meant he understood
what he was buying. Mercury Drug and Ganzon can
not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active
players in the field of dispensing medicines to the
public, the highest degree of care and diligence is
expected of them.
In cases where an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there has been negligence on
the part of the employer, either in the selection or
supervision of one's employees. Mercury Drug and
Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high
standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy
professionals. They were grossly negligent in
dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye
drops to De Leon. Worse, they have once again
attempted to shift the blame to their victim by
underscoring his own failure to read the label.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION,

- versus SEBASTIAN M. BAKING,
[G.R. No. 156037, May 28, 2007]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking,
went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical checkup. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG,
blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis,
Dr. Sy found that respondents blood sugar and
triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then
gave respondent two medical prescriptions
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for
his triglyceride.
Sebastian Baking went to the Alabang branch
of Mercury Drug and presented his prescription for

Diamicron, which the pharmacist misread as

Dormicum. Baking was given a potent sleeping tablet,
instead of medicines to stabilize his blood sugar.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong
medicine, took one pill of Dormicum on three
consecutive days. On the third day of taking the
wrong medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular
accident as he fell asleep while driving.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mercury Drug is liable for

negligence in providing/selling drugs to Sebastian
Baking.
HELD:
YES, Considering that a fatal mistake could
be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the
said employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified
whether the medicine she gave respondent was
indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care
required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspond
with the superior knowledge of the business which
the law demands.
** In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there has been negligence on the part of
the employer, either in the selection or supervision of
one's employees.