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G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988

ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad
S.
Viado, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own
behalf and in behalf of the other members of the "Consuelo Heights
Homeowners Association," petitioners-intervenors.
Orlando A. Rayos for petitioners-intervenors.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government
power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals
of the martial law regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by
the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning
as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of.
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6,
1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought
from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about
8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In
virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and
a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took
possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one
morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the
land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the
other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona
fide occupants thereof."
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial
law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree
invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier
purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into
several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land
bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands").

Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended.
Under these statutes:
1) a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did not wish to
lease) the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or
on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was
regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the and at the
interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor
of the government;
2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and
any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was
explicitly declared to 'be invalid as against the Government ... and ... in all respects
subordinate to its prior claim;"
3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money
and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands)
had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain
judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the "and by selling it in the
same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being
deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being
applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments due or to
become due; and
4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the
land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance," the certificate of title
over the land to issue and become effective in the manner provided by the Land
Registration Act. 1
Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding
complete payment of the price. It adjudged that

that Carmel had failed to

... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the

original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made
full payment of all installments of the purchase money and
interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including
those on which the dwellings of the members of said
Association 3 stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with
the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of
said association has never ceased to form part of the property of
the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land
and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the
Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab
initio as against the law and public policy.
Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all
those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the

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lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and
sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." 4

sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association,

Inc.

It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree
contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that
the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact
the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of
the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide
occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent
with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of
physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the
absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession
of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed
"occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing
the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in
favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on
due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land
Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the
Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and
restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from
the Assurance Fund.

But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr.
Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated
as they, in the following imperious manner:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081, dated September
21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do
hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts between
the government and the original purchasers, are hereby
cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent
transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, covering lots
979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230,
and 980-C-2 (LRC PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are
hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the
Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604,
62605, covering lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of
Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision
survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared invalid
and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that
said lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the
members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the
present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 32, as amended.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this
certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab
initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and
the property described herein is declared open for disposition and

Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the
petition, 7 he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the
petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial
or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause
to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation 8 they
had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price
by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social
justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the
pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left
homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they
had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses
were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons,
members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa
Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the
same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer
embodied in the Tuasons' petition.
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ
of certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike
the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or
ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ
of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions,
while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to
"proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions
judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality
directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He
made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what
the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute
a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and
authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. 11 He adjudged it to be an
established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent

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transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and
interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the
dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And
applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land
has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of
said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the
Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio
as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done
by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be
shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such
power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law 12 the judicial acts done by him were in the
circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were
completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible
scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law
regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the relevant facts
and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were
accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a
determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding
ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the
fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records
and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons
(and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and
afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing
evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly
violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of
the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a
power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition
exercised it unconstitutionally.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one
for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the
latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had
acted without jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the
Constitution or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of
the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such
relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically
sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief
being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the
parties' pleadings. 14

presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, 15 that official duty
being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of
the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the
payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this
presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these
proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became
"effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the
Land Registration Act." 16
It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price
of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act
1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the
Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest,
invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and
enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the
manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of
mortgages. 17 This it can do despite the lapse of a considerable period of time.
Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is
brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of
title by Carmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors
from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected. At any
rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in any manner affect
this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of
Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any
portion thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc." The decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the
application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth
a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in
callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of
private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from
persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as
explicitly guaranteed by law.
One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to intervene
substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit 18 and was
consequently given due course by the Court. They are therefore covered by this
judgment.
WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and
void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the
inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the
memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein
respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore
the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No
pronouncement as to costs.

There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was
actually issued to it by the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong

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A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE
ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second

paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of
the Constitution, and will not in any way amount
to an abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of
the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said
Committee as part of the primary functions of
an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the
Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C.
Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with
Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge
of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
(Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to
request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a
Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment
and to as assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the
Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that
Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions
of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed
abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is
believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal
justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar,
SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it
is provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice
shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly

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accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial
or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in
violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory
not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify
a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or
perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher
court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for
which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION
TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE
RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap
vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance
of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument.
There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL
DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY
SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the
absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to
his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING
COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to
this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of
his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether
said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavitcomplaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these
cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present
criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification
submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral
should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion
to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November
22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged
that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision
or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision
had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July
and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990,
or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an
extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case
despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged
arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the

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Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a
judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby

directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A.
Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted
to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the
independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavitcomplaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted
by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in
his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said

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G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is
political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains
that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House
of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.

CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments
among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas
ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four
members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party
to only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5,
1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal
from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to
prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointments. 4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from
the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under
the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of
the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing
as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting
of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's
assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is
that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as
Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul
the election of two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on
the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of
23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of
the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the
minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators

Consti 1
Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nineman composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The
petitioner came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that
Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the
Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the
majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three
members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia
that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could
resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice
in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the
manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court
held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the
present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of
votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not
clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance
with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute, and
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to
deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6
C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but
also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised
by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v.
Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the organization of the
Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the
choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less
persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who
caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also not an
insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing,
treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually
questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on
Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the
Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through Chief
Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection
was raised by five members of the Court. It is their view that
respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be
restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory
opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much
to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original
stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be
treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision
of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,

Consti 1
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation
that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being
barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation
of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must
act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner
and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their
respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a
proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by
the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent.
Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments
was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal
Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent
over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed
what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the
chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the
Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen
originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined
the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestration Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as
thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his
place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his
appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly
constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary
combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and
permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of
the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was
invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political
parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court
held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one
that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority,"
does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership

of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on

Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The framers of our
Constitution could not have intended to thus place a
constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the
mercy of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party
contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance
with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution.
He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it
might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin',"
like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him,
that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the
political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent.
The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which
no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the
reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect
that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis
of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of
Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with.
As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only
upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests
against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the
political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation
with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is
clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of
seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of
said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by
the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the
Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the
respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development
has supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to
repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he
claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the
questioned reorganization. As he insists:

10

Consti 1
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP itself, then the
proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and
ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly
registered political party, is not entitled to the
"rights and privileges granted by law to political
parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the right to be considered
in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House
of Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of representation in the
Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly
registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the
petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution
affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the
petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out
of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he
can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test
of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered
party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on
Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The
Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in
December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to
support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election
held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months
old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission
on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority
party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157
members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular
head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator
Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true
that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its
members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it
is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number
of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the
House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the
Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By
the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also
be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong
to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its
seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in
the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House
Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the
seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any
objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it
of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must
survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that
test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest
following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in
fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue
presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not
the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political
in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party
respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed
aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue
raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of
the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts
of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be
settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the
bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more
importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no
alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are
not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for
theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

11

Consti 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly
elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume
his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

12

Consti 1

[G.R. Nos. 116259-60. February 20, 1996]

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Third Division,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 118896-97. February 20, 1996]

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, petitioner
assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying petitioners
Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Informations; 1 (b) the order dated
May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and
(c) the order dated July 20, 1994 denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97 petitioner
seeks the annulment of the Resolution dated December 23, 19944 ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of
ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the
Solicitor General in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of
the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980
elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as
Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986.
Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections
where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local
elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was
petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the
Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial
Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2)
complaints both dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The
first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second
charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of
Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes A & A-I , respectively, Petition).

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend

Preliminary investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed
into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to
conduct preliminary investigation (Annex C, ibid).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia YapFernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself
from handling the preliminary investigation of the present case considering that
petitioner appears to be her co-principal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last
May 28, 1988 (Annex C-3, ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from
Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about
the present status of TBP No. 86-01 119 (Annex D, ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement
dated February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman referred the matter of continuing and
terminating the investigation of the present case to the newly deputized
Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(Annex D-1, ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27,
1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to another
Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and compadre of
petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was
formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial
Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex D-2, ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the
letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an
amendment be effected on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes E &
E-2, ibid.). No comment having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24,
1989, petitioner, on an even date, was again directed to comment thereon (Annex
E-1,ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex
E-3, ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I
Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex F-2, ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated
February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos
recommending the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2)
Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028.
The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second
for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes F & F-1, ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an Urgent Motion for
Quashal of Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts.
However, when the said motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioners
counsel was made to choose which of the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he

13

Consti 1
preferred to take up with respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner
filed an Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in the Aboveentitled Cases. After an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the prosecution and
petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed Resolution
on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex G, ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation, which was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second
assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex H-1 , ibid.).5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 116259-60, challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It was likewise prayed that respondent court be enjoined from
taking cognizance of and from proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner and
the trial and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before it.
Respondents thereafter filed their Comment to which a Reply was submitted by
petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by this
Court in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of
herein petitioner onOctober 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for
him by the court after he refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial of petitioners
motion to quash the informations, the prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before
respondent court a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite6 pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said motion on the ground that the
validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review before the
Supreme Court. He further contended therein that Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is unconstitutional in that it
constitutes an undue delegation of executive power and is arbitrary and
discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed
on October 14, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental Petition 7 questioning
the veracity of and seeking to restrain respondent court from acting on said motion
to suspend pendente lite, the hearing of which was scheduled on October 17, 1994.
However, before respondents could file their comment thereto as required by this
Court, petitioner, who initially sought the holding in abeyance of further action on
his supplemental petition until after respondent court shall have resolved the
motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to withdraw the same
purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main petition. Hence,
on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw
the supplemental petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as
submitted for resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28, 1994
an amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair

of the vessel in question; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors
of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with
the Province of Palawan.9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these coprincipals violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws which
thus rendered the informations null and void. It appears that the prosecution did not
oppose nor object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion
to include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order was filed by
petitioner on February 20, 1995 against the same respondents, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 118896-97, and which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin respondent court
from enforcing its resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering his
suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the Court resolved to consolidate this
second petition with G.R. Nos. 116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected therein,
the following pattern of contentious issues has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of
six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of his
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of law
pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the Tanodbayan are
different from the charges contained in the informations, another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which there is a denial
of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension
order in that: (1) he may not be suspended while the issue on the validity of the
informations filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court; and
(2) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the order of
suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue
delegation of the authority to suspend which is essentially an executive power.
Petitioner contends that the jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent
court in upholding the constitutionality of Section 13 are not applicable to the cases
at bar which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In addition,
petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject informations for having been filed
in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses by reason of the noninclusion therein, as co-principals, of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who approved the purchase of the vessel, as well as the board of directors of ERA

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Consti 1
Technology and Resource Corporation which entered into a contract with the
Province of Palawan.

(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor Salvador P.

Socrates, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the
following grounds:

I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60

1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason
of the unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid
down in the leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 10 In said case, all the
affidavits and counter-affidavits had already been filed with the Tanodbayan for final
disposition as of October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12, 1985, or three (3)
years thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held there that an
inordinate delay of three (3) years in the conduct and termination of the preliminary
investigation is violative of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process
and speedy disposition of his case, by reason of which the informations filed against
the accused therein were ordered dismissed. It must be emphasized, however, that
in the Tatad case, no explanation or ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution
therein as to the cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining
in Tatad, respondent court found that the six-year delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation was caused by petitioners own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in
these cases was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following
actuations of the accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with the Office of
the City Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in
abeyance on account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates, entitled Motion
to Suspend Preliminary Investigation. Suspension was prayed for until an
Ombudsman, as provided in Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then
Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation
correcting the complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the Office
of the Ombudsman a reply to complainants manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary investigation of
these cases was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then,
including the accused herein, were required to submit counter-affidavits;

(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within
which to oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the
motion after protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an Appearance and Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appropriate Pleading. Counsel prayed that respondents be
granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to comply with the order
of March 11, 1991;
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a motion to
quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the
prosecution to resolve the motion and there never was any intimation on the part of
the accused that the accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the
complaint against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the
prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the Informations in
these cases were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of
the prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss.11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of
respondent court, could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend the
preliminary investigation did not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary
investigation really started on February 18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued
subpoenas to the respondents; that the motion to dismiss/quash the complaints
was purposely for the early termination of the preliminary investigation; that the
filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be gleaned from the
affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the
time the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the factual
situation in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by herein
petitioner were not present in the latter case. Furthermore, the allegation that the
filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the
nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been
sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof. The

15

Consti 1
situation in Tatad was quite to the contrary since the accused therein successfully
proved that the charges were filed against him only after it became widely known
that he actually had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or
other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Such an
exigency apparently does not obtain in the case at bar. There is nothing in the
records from which it can be conclusively inferred, expressly or impliedly, that the
investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even coerced into filing
these criminal charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioners asseveration that the orders issued
by Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing
the informations for technical malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the
ground that the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
constitutes a violation of petitioners right to due process and speedy disposition of
his case which thereby ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have become
final and conclusive by reason of the prosecutions failure to file an appeal
therefrom. We have carefully scrutinized the orders adverted to and we find and so
hold that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution herein from proceeding
with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said Regional
Trial Court are different from the charges for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed
with the Sandiganbayan. The former is covered by a general law while the latter
involves a special law, with variant elements of the offenses being required, hence
double jeopardy cannot set in.Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that
the trial court in the malversation case hastily concluded that there was an
inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation
through the mere expedient of counting the number of years that had elapsed from
the institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing of the
informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual
considerations and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself
strictly to a mathematical reckoning of the time involved, instead of undertaking a
more substantive appreciation of the circumstances and particulars which could
have possibly caused the delay. On the contrary, herein respondent court has
convincingly shown that the preliminary investigation dragged on for several years
owing, ironically, to petitioners evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In the
cases now before us, it cannot be successfully and validly contended that
petitioners right to speedy trial has been violated.

We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in
the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. It is palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should
not be made to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal concern
should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can
easily be deduced from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse
in Tatad that the three-year delay was specifically considered vis--vis all the facts
and circumstances which obtained therein. Perforce, even on this ground alone, the
instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and
the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 12 In the
cases at bar, while there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who
brought about the situation of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations in that the same do not constitute an offense supposedly because (a)
in Criminal Case No. 18027, there is no statement that herein petitioner actually
intervened and participated, as a board member of ERA Technology and Resources
Corporation, in the latters contract with the Province of Palawan, which is allegedly
an element necessary to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
3019; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the information failed to show a causal
relation between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to the
provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal Case
No. 18027 for violation of Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the
ruling in the case of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan13 where it was held that what is
contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability
may attach. In the cited case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein
did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases
in question since he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already
been made, delivered and paid for by the municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the municipal
treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were
subsequently delivered by the supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer
again without the knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only participation of
the accused mayor in the transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the
disbursement vouchers for record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider
the act therein of the accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition under Section
3(h) of the law.

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Consti 1
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a
violation of Section 3(h) for intervening in his official capacity as Governor of
Palawan in reviewing and approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2,
1982 for payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources Corporation where he was
one of the incorporators and members of the board of directors. Such allegation
clearly indicates the nature and extent of petitioners participation in the questioned
transaction. Without petitioners approval, payment could not possibly have been
effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case No.
18028, for violation of Section 3(e), which would warrant the dismissal thereof.
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters
of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor
could be proved during the trial.14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the
information which would prove the causal relation between the act done by the
accused and the undue injury caused to the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to
petitioners contention, a reading of the information in Criminal Case No. 18028 will
readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged have been
sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges right at
the outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller
ventilation and examination. Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it
would be unwarranted to cut off the prosecutory process at this stage of the
proceedings and to dismiss the information. 15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses
charged in the complaints are different from those stated in the informations which
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, and that since there was no preliminary
investigation conducted with respect to the latter, such informations should be
declared null and void for lack of due process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the filing
of an information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both,
petitioner is accused of intervening in his official capacity as Provincial Governor in
the contracts for the installation and construction of waterwork projects, with the
ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a
member of the board of directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said
transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner was charged with a violation of
Section 3(e) as a result of the complaint filed against him and several others for a
violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In both instances, petitioner is charged with the
disbursement of public funds for the purchase of a motor launch which was grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of Palawan because
the same broke down only after its maiden voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are based
on substantially the same factual settings, except that the respective designations
are different. Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the
offense but its description in the complaint or information. 16 The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they

being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. It is not the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of
the information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in
the body of the information.17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances
are set forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an
offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a
misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the
information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in the charge
controls the erroneous designation of the offense and the accused stands indicted
for the offense charged in the statement of facts. The erroneous designation may
be disregarded as surplusage.18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law which is
involved in the present case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it
defines several modes of committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled
rule in the appreciation of indictments that where an offense may be committed in
any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is
alleged to have been committed in two or more of the modes specified, it is
sufficient to prove the offense committed through any one of them, provided that it
be such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a judgment of
conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense. 19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is
necessary to conduct a new one, affect the validity of the informations filed against
petitioner. It has been consistently held that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy. 20 It is not a ground for the
quashal of a complaint or information. The proper course of action that should be
taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such
information and to remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the
Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation, 21 if the accused actually
makes out a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold that
the informations filed against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the petitioners
preventive suspension, which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact that the validity of the
informations filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court. In
support thereof, he invokes the rule laid down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park

17

Consti 1
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 22 that even if no temporary restraining order
was issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained from
taking any action while the petition for certiorari was pending with the Supreme
Court. Petitioner insists that this is what respondent court should have done. Under
this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review of the order issued by
the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994, denying his amended and
consolidated motion to quash the information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion
to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of
law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. 23 In other words, it cannot be the
subject of appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. 24Although
the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse
of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not attendant in the present
case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the
suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has
been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This presuspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused
and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of
the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs
its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al.27 we have set out the
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under

the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that
upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper
notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why
he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory
provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an
order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no
longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or suspension
should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the
contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of
the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the Act upon determination
of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act
or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that the hearing
be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension
envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the
quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the
suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the
same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that
upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes
mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the
matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not
within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review
before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension
hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against
him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds
provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the
court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and
buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official

18

Consti 1
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused
elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate
enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is
subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against
him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending
a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest
will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. 29

Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions authorizing the purchase and
repair of the motor launch should likewise have been included as principals by
inducement or indispensable cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly
merely implementing their resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the
informations are null and void, the suspension order which is based thereon should
necessarily also be declared null and void. We find no merit in petitioners
arguments.

To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of

Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion
nor duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that
unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit
further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether
the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 30

First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated
in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal
actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved. The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an
offense. This does not mean, however, that they shall have no discretion at all; their
discretion lies in determining whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable
belief that a person has committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all
persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information, which
conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are
not required to be included.32

Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the instant
case do not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations
against petitioner were tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same.
Likewise, the informations show that the allegations contained therein meet the
essential elements of the offense as defined by the substantive law. The record is
also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of the informations under any
of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 31Finally, a
cursory reading of the order dated February 9, 1994 issued by respondent court will
show that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his motion to quash.
Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him
on which the order of suspension was based, are null and void in view of the noninclusion of his co-principals which thus constitutes a violation of petitioners right to
due process and equal protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent court
of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027,
the board of directors of ERA Technology Corporation should have been included as
principals by indispensable cooperation because without them he could not possibly
have committed the offense.

This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to
include the other public officials who appear to be responsible for the offense
charged as co-accused in the information filed against the accused does not in any
way vitiate the validity of the information under the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the
crime charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for
which a motion to quash the information against the accused may be filed, most
especially in the case at bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is
probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from the fact that there is no
allegation of conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such an infirmity would
neither have the effect of extinguishing or mitigating petitioners liability if he is
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No one would contend that if for
lack of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the prosecuting
officer fails to include the names of one or more persons in an information filed by
him, who were in fact guilty participants in the commission of the crime charged
therein, such persons will be relieved of criminal liability; or that those accused who
have been charged with the offense, brought to trial, and found guilty will be
permitted to escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of the
trial, or after the trial, that there were other guilty participants in the crime. 34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a ground
for the quashal of the informations, the motion to quash must still be denied for
having been filed only after petitioner had been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that (t)he failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the

19

Consti 1
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash,
except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. The failure to include a
co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an
information or to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the
evidence clearly warrants such action, the offended party has the following
remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may file an action for
mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a
new complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a new
examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute administrative
charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of
the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may
institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioners strategy that from the
inception of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman and during the conduct
of the preliminary investigation, until the filing of the informations before the
Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his amended and consolidated motion to
quash, herein petitioner has not been heard to complain about the alleged noninclusion of the other supposed offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for
petitioner to invoke and exploit this particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information, from
the facts and evidence of record, we do not deem it necessary to include the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members of
the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation as co-accused in the informations
filed against herein petitioner. Insofar as the board members of said corporation are
concerned, they may be prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No.
3019 which provides that (i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce
or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
thereof. In the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027, petitioner stands
charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not contain any allegation to the
effect that the board members knowingly induced or caused herein petitioner to
commit the offense defined therein, which is an essential element of the crime in
Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot be included as coprincipals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot
likewise be included in the information for violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal
Case No. 18028, for the simple reason that it is not the validity of their resolution
which is in issue here. While it is true that said sanggunian passed a resolution
authorizing the allocation of funds for the purchase of a motor launch, and that
petitioner merely acted on the strength thereof, it is not the fact of such
authorization which is the subject of the charges against petitioner but rather the
manner by which that resolution was implemented by the latter. There is nothing in
the averments in the information from which it could be inferentially deduced that

the members of the sanggunianparticipated, directly or indirectly, in the purchase

of the vessel, and which fact could be the basis for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground that
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is unconstitutional
for being an undue delegation of executive power to the Sandiganbayan. He
postulates that the power of suspension, which is an incident of the power of
removal, is basically administrative and executive in nature. He further submits that
the power of removal vested in the court under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019
is an incident of conviction, that is, it can only be exercised after a conviction has
been handed down. Hence, according to petitioner, since the power to suspend is
merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be exercised as an
incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13 authorizes the court to
exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot
be considered as an exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of
the courts power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that Section 13 is arbitrary
and discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in that it does not require a
proceeding to determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the fact
that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the courts power of suspension
under Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised and adjudicated in the case
of Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, et al., 35 the pronouncements wherein we quote
in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who should
exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension where a criminal case has already been filed in court - still is with the Provincial
Governor, relying on Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is
that, following the ruling in Sarcos vs. Castillo x x x, because the main respondents
are elective municipal officials, that power of suspension must be held to repose in
the Provincial Board, under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic
Act 5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, solely the court in which the criminal case has been filed shall wield the power
of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
grants with specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an
official charged with a violation thereof. It would seem to us though that
suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate and distinct from
suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate reading of Section 13 yields two
methods of investigation, one separate from the other: one criminal before the
courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import of the last

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sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices case shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Our interpretation but
preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry between the first part of Section
13 and the last part thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - which here include
suspension - should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any public official
committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of the law, amongst others, to perpetual disqualification from public office.
Here, the Makati elective officials heretofore named have been charged with and
found guilty of a violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and were sentenced by the court below, amongst others to be perpetually
disqualified to hold office. Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails (t)he deprivation of the public
offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election. No stretch of the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual
absolute disqualification - which, in effect, is encompassed in the punishment set
forth in Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act - covers that of
removal from the office which each of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of
judicial legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for
this is that suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is
without doubt that Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public
officers pending court proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is
not violative of the separation of powers. For, our Constitution being silent, we are
not to say that from Congress is withheld the power to decide the mode or
procedure of suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme, convinces us
the more that the power of suspension should be lodged with the court. While the
law may not be a model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section 13
requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that there be a
valid information. Validity of information, of course, is determined by the Court of
First Instance where the criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial
function. Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who knows the
facts upon which suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque,
supra, at page 469: We are certain that no authority or good reason can be found in
support of a proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing
criminal charges for the sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of
justice. Independent of the other branches of the Government, the courts can well
take care of their own administration of the law.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should not
be artificially construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to suspend - a
prime tool designed by Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from
frustrating the purity and certainty of the administration of justice. Surely, we
should not be pedantically exacting in reading its provisions. We should rather say
that if the courts power of suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be
withheld or narrowed by construction, Congress should have spelled it out in no
uncertain terms x x x.
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an
encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the
process that a line should be drawn between administrative proceedings and
criminal actions in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating further on the
possible danger which may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a
criminal action under Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than
the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger
should the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court.
Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is
one other factor, and that is, the rights of the person accused. The court could very
well serve as a lever to balance in one equation the public interests involved and
the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the danger that partisan politics
may creep in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored especially if
the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public local
elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused.
Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the suspending authority
will display reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is thus that the
statute should catch up with the realities of political life. There is indeed the
dispiriting lesson that in a clash between political considerations and conscience it
is the latter that quite often gets dented. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one
who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute
fairness must have been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless
refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of
First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official
indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their logical
parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time, ironically in
fairness to petitioner himself, that the same be now calcined in the judicial crucible
into their ultimate configuration.

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and
118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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Sanidad vs. Comelec

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Definition of Political Question
Facts: In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991 calling
for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays)
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous
PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendumplebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of
PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16,
1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition
to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD
1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As
a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners
have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite
is a step towards normalization.

HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable
one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly
associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested
act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is
confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides
how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the legislature, can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time.
Read another version of this digest here (Amendment to the Constitution)

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

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