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HABEAS CORPUS
Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851
Facts: Caunca filed a petition for habeas corpus in behalf of his cousin Flores who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as
a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed
by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
Issue: Whether or not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
who has not yet paid the advance payment it made?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice
or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of
justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861)
Facts: The petitioner, a citizen of Baltimore, was arrested by a military officer acting on the
authority of his commanding officer. The petitioner was accused of treason against the
United States. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, while on Circuit Court duty, issued a
writ of habeas corpus directing the commanding officer to deliver the prisoner, and this
was refused on the grounds that the officer was authorized by the President to suspend the
writ.
ISSUE: Can the President suspend the writ of habeas corpus?
HELD: No. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to be set free on the grounds that
(1) the President, under the Constitution cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This can be done under the Constitution only by Congress, since the provision
appears in the Article of the Constitution dealing with Congress, and in a list of limitations
on Congress. (2) A military officer cannot arrest a person not subject to the rules and
articles of war, except in the aid of civil authority when the individual has committed an
offense against the United States. In such a case the military officer must deliver the
prisoner immediately to civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.
In re Yamashita (1946)
FACTS: After World War II, Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried before a U.S.
military tribunal in Manilla for war crimes committed by troops under his command. U.S.
claimed that D failed to discharge his duty as a commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, allowing them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against the U.S. and allies and was in violation of laws of war.
ISSUE: Whether the commander may be charged with personal responsibility for the failure
to take such measures when violations result?
HELD: There is an affirmative duty to take such measures as were in his power and
appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and civilians. Purpose of the
law is to protect civilians and prisoners of war from brutality.
Magno v. CA, 212 SCRA 229
Facts: The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit. As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks,
two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund. Magno was charged of
violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue: Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in
question.
Held: No. To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw
as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay
an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.
Ordonez v Director of Prisons (1994)
Facts: The DOJ informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released and that Paquinto
and Cabangunay were still detained. The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court.
At the hearing, he stressed that their continued detention despite the
nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.
Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
Held: Yes. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity
of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person
is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts
the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance
of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely
affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member
of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and
debased for liberty is total and indivisible.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.
FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the
Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of
Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render
service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.
Ratio: Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power
to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This
power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a
clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
ISSUE: W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving
citizens of their rights therein guaranteed
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No.
1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and
justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After
arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She
was found guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This is the
issue.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass death sentence
despite her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision
imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts.
There, the Court said, mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of
death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is wholly without force or
effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a
commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been
reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled
under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the end that its
justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.
It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions.