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HABEAS CORPUS
Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851
Facts: Caunca filed a petition for habeas corpus in behalf of his cousin Flores who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as
a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed
by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
Issue: Whether or not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
who has not yet paid the advance payment it made?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice
or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of
justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861)
Facts: The petitioner, a citizen of Baltimore, was arrested by a military officer acting on the
authority of his commanding officer. The petitioner was accused of treason against the
United States. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, while on Circuit Court duty, issued a
writ of habeas corpus directing the commanding officer to deliver the prisoner, and this
was refused on the grounds that the officer was authorized by the President to suspend the
writ.
ISSUE: Can the President suspend the writ of habeas corpus?
HELD: No. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to be set free on the grounds that
(1) the President, under the Constitution cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. This can be done under the Constitution only by Congress, since the provision
appears in the Article of the Constitution dealing with Congress, and in a list of limitations
on Congress. (2) A military officer cannot arrest a person not subject to the rules and
articles of war, except in the aid of civil authority when the individual has committed an
offense against the United States. In such a case the military officer must deliver the
prisoner immediately to civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.
In re Yamashita (1946)

FACTS: After World War II, Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried before a U.S.
military tribunal in Manilla for war crimes committed by troops under his command. U.S.
claimed that D failed to discharge his duty as a commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, allowing them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against the U.S. and allies and was in violation of laws of war.
ISSUE: Whether the commander may be charged with personal responsibility for the failure
to take such measures when violations result?
HELD: There is an affirmative duty to take such measures as were in his power and
appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and civilians. Purpose of the
law is to protect civilians and prisoners of war from brutality.
Magno v. CA, 212 SCRA 229
Facts: The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit. As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks,
two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund. Magno was charged of
violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue: Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in
question.
Held: No. To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw
as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay
an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.
Ordonez v Director of Prisons (1994)
Facts: The DOJ informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released and that Paquinto
and Cabangunay were still detained. The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court.
At the hearing, he stressed that their continued detention despite the
nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.
Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
Held: Yes. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity
of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person
is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts
the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance

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of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely
affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member
of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and
debased for liberty is total and indivisible.

RIGHT TO SELF INCRIMINATION

ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of

counsel.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the
petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was
pregnant to prove the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to
such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation
of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, May 26, 1969

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of
Medical Examiners. Petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on
the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants
violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Held: The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions,
but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against
himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a
medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence:
"The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of
his own free genuine will."
People v. Tranca, Aug. 17, 1994
Facts: Tranca was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as
amended. Tranca pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. The defense contends that the
rights of Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an
ultraviolet ray examination.
Issue: Whether the subjection of Trancas body to ultraviolet powder violates Trancas right
against self-incrimination.
Held: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a
prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's body to

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.

RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219; 55 L. Ed. 191
Facts: Plaintiff contracted The Riverside Co. to be farm hand from Dec. 30, 1907 to Dec. 30,
1908 for the sum of $12.00 per month. Bailey ceased the work without just cause after
working through January and three or four days of February and refused to refund the
money.
Issue: Whether a statute of punishing a person, as conviction for crime, who fails or refuses
to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, is constitutional?
HELD: The Thirteenth Amendment absolutely declares that slavery and involuntary
servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States, which includes peonage, the
voluntary or involuntary service or labor in liquidation of any debt or obligation. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime,
however, it does not mean to punish a person as a crime if he does not perform the service
or pay the debt.

US v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245

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FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the
Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of
Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render
service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.

Ratio: Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power
to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This
power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a
clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

ISSUE: W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving
citizens of their rights therein guaranteed

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte

Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No.
1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and
justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

CRUEL AND INHUMANE PUNISHMENT

People vs Dacuycuy (1989)
Facts: Private respondents, public school officials from Leyte were charged for violating
Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers).The petition was
transferred where the respondent Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and
constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts.
Issue: Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts
were the legislative department of the government.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (1999)

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed
the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a TRO on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered
HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of
the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life.

People v. Esparas (1996)

People v. Echegaray, G.R. 117472, Feb. 7, 1997
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accusedappellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After
arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She
was found guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This is the
issue.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparass death sentence
despite her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a decision
imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts.
There, the Court said, mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of

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death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is wholly without force or
effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a
commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been
reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled
under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is
founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the end that its

justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.
It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions.