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1 NON IMPRISON. FOR DEBT & DOUBLE JEOP.

NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT


Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of BP 22. They moved seasonably to quash
the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on nonimprisonment due to debt
Held: The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
People v. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726
Facts: Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to
quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as
B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which
was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling that
B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned
Order quashing the Information. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Wether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22
Held: A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank.
Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as
evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing
obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a
deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum
prohibitum.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
People v. Quijada, July 24, 1996
Facts: Trinidad sold the land to respondent Mondejar. In 1980, the heirs of Trinidad, herein
petitioners, filed a complaint for forcible entry against the respondent. In 1987. In the
meantime, respondent Mondejar conveyed portions of the land to the other respondents.
On July 5, 1988, petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession
and ownership of the land.
Issue: Whether the sale between Trinidad and Regalado is valid considering the capacity of
the vendor to execute the contract in view of the conditional deed of donation
Held: The donor may have an inchoate interest in the donated property during the time
that ownership of the land has not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest may be the
subject of contracts including a contract of sale. In this case, however, what the donor sold
was the land itself which she no longer owns. It would have been different if the donorseller sold her interests over the property under the deed of donation which is subject to
the possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-fulfillment of the resolutory
condition.
People v. Pineda, Feb. 11, 1993
FACTS: Defendant was accused of the crime of damage to property with multiple physical
injuries, thru reckless imprudence.
ISSUE: WON the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence can be
complexed with damage to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence.
HELD: The information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight physical
injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to property and serious and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information
that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus
causing upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less serious
physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to damage to
property.
PEOPLE V RELOVA (1987)

2 NON IMPRISON. FOR DEBT & DOUBLE JEOP.

Facts: The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty. On 2 February 1976,he filed a
motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had
already prescribed. Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed
another information against Manuel Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or not Manuel Opulencia can be tried for violation of the RPC after acquittal
from the violation of an ordinance due to prescription which were based from the same act
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the accused was placed in double jeopardy, hence,
could not be tried in the criminal case. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, accused Manuel Opulencia
freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the
installation and use of unauthorized electrical connections or devices.
Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319
Facts. Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. They ordered a second trial at
which the jury sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant was granted certiorari to
have the second conviction overturned.
Issue. Does the entire Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States affirms the first degree murder
conviction and the accompanying death sentence. Two requirements need to be met for a
state to appropriately choose to not include the prohibition on double jeopardy, or any
other piece of the 5th Amendment, in its law. They do not have to incorporate such a right
if it is not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, and if its abolishment would
not violate a principal of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the American
people as to be ranked fundamental. Here, the Supreme Court saw the states allowing a
second trial on the same facts as not violating fundamental principles of liberty and justice
because it was only done to make sure that there was a trial without legal error.
Cuison v. CA, April 15, 1998
FACTS: Private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of sum of
money representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court
dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the CA. CA ordered
petitioner to pay Valiant with the sum plus interest, AF and costs.

ISSUE: WON Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the
latter liable for the disputed transaction
HELD: YES. As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who clothes
another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest
belief that he is what he appears to be. It is intended to protect the rights of innocent
persons. In such a situation, both the principal and the agent may be considered as joint
tortfeasors whose liability is joint and solidary.

Manantan v. CA, 350 SCRA 387


Facts: The Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that
the appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. On its decision, the Court of
Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents. In finding petitioner civil liability, the
court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of
intoxication.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused also extinguished his civil liability.
HELD: NO. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of as a felony. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which will
be instituted must be based on ground other than the delict complained of. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In the case at
bar, the accuseds acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases if the accused acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
defendant is civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act.

3 NON IMPRISON. FOR DEBT & DOUBLE JEOP.