DE YSASI III V.

NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the
supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned
to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work
daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In
November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation
lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis
from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to
pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement,
payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client
to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond
merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to
exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they
may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to
the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement
of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

1. Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 (1974)

60 SCRA 234 Legal Ethics Lawyers Duty to the Courts Contemptuous Language
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and
he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus
the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del
Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges
intimating that he thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been
rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.

The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then
filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he
should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines
asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then
filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually
dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices.
Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA
decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del
Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been convinced that
human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against the
CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt,
the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case
dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not
with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

2. In re Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661 (1962)

5 SCRA 661 Legal Ethics Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional
pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the

widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It
does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without
regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession.
3. Oronce vs. CA, 298 SCRA 133 (1998)
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the property in litigation using
abusive methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was
pending in the CA & while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of its occupants & in contravention
of the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court,
are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says that they peacefully took over the property, such
peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in
force. Through his acts, he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

4. (1994)

5. Pajares vs. Abad Santos,30 SCRA 748 (1969)

Appellant Pajares was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall and appelle
Udharam Bazar & Co. was one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for
resale.
Consequently, the company sued Pajares for the recovery of a certain sum of money for the goods delivered to
her in good condition (the same having been sold), but did not make the full payment. Pajares, however, moved
for a bill of particulars, alleging that without which she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the
complaint. Such having been denied, appellant moved for a motion for reconsideration. The same was also
denied and clogged the court for seven years.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a faithful adherence (on the part of Pajares lawyer) to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court.

Held:
No, there was no faithful adhererence.
Clearly, there must be faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay
and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.
Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the
reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred
would have been more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appelle.

6. People vs. Rosqueta, 55 SCRA 486 (1974)

Rosqueta Jr and two others were convicted of a crime. They appeal their conviction until it reached the Supreme
Court. Their lawyer (counsel de parte), Atty. Gregorio Estacio, failed to file their Brief. And so the Supreme
Court ordered Atty. Estacio to show cause why he should not be disciplined for failure to file said Brief. Atty.
Estacio failed yet again to submit his explanation. The Supreme Court then suspended him from the practice of
law except for the purpose of filing the Brief in this particular case. Atty. Estacio then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration where he explained that he did actually prepare an explanation the same being left with
Rosqueta Sr (father of accused) for the latter to mail it. But then Rosqueta Sr.s house burned down together
with the explanation. He only came to know of this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Atty. Estacio also explained that his clients are withdrawing their appeal by reason of their failure to raise the
needed fund for the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Estacios suspension should continue.
HELD: No. His liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court noted that Atty. Estacio has been irresponsible,
has been negligent and inattentive to his duty to his clients. Atty. Estacio should be aware that even in those
cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from his clients or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case. He should be
aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and
unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are
duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable.

7. De Roy vs. CA, 157 SCRA 757 (1989)

157 SCRA 757 Legal Ethics Lawyers Duty Keep Abreast of Latest Jurisprudence

De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of Luis Bernal
thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De Roy appealed
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of the decision on
August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled
that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the Habaluyas
Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.
HELD: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

8. Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30 (1998)

9. Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 257 (1976)

70 SCRA 257 Legal Ethics Solicitor General May Recommend Dismissal of a Case in the Interest of Justice
In February 1968, Lorenzo Jose was caught possessing several firearms and explosives. He was prosecuted for
illegally possessing said firearms and explosives. During trial, he said that he is authorized to carry the
explosives but he cannot present (at that time) his permit hence he made a reservation to present his evidence at
a later time. The trial court acquitted him in the other cases but convicted him for illegal possession of hand
grenade.
He filed a notice of appeal but at the same time asked the trial court for a new trial so that he may be able to
present his new evidence. The trial court denied the request for new trial because Jose was able to perfect his
appeal.
The Court of Appeals likewise denied Joses request for a new trial as it ruled that there is no reversible error
committed by the trial court. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration and for new trial. The Solicitor General
opposed the MFR/New Trial as it stated that the evidence sought to be presented by Jose does not fall under
newly discovered evidence; that his permit to possess a hand grenade was supposed to be known to Jose at
the time of the trial and not discovered thereafter.

Undeterred, Jose submitted a reply where he finally indicated he is an undercover agent for the Philippine
Constabulary; that being such, he was authorized to carry firearms and explosives; that the reason why he did
not disclose the same immediately was because of his fear for reprisals considering that he resides in
Huklandia; he enclosed a letter from then Major General Fidel Ramos confirming this fact.
With the foregoing, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation where he recommended the granting of the new
trial even if the same violates the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD: Yes. This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal
of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The Solicitor General embodies the principle
that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure
the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. The recommendation by the Solicitor
General in this case acknowledges that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the
court of origin for a new trial.

10. People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967)

11. People vs. Madera, 57 SCRA 349 (1974)

57 SCRA 349 Legal Ethics Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If There is No Ground To
Sustain It
In April 1970, while Elino Bana was sleeping in his house, he was shot by Raymundo Madera. Behind Madera
were Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres. Elino Bana died before he could be brought to the hospital but he
made a dying statement wherein he positively identified Madera as his shooter. Two of Banas sons who were at
the house when the shooting happened identified Madera as the shooter as well as the two behind him. The trial
court convicted the three for murder. They appealed. Then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza recommended
the conviction of Madera but also recommended the acquittal of Marianito and Generoso.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct.
HELD: No, insofar as Marianito and Generoso is concerned Maderas guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. But Marianitos and Generosos guilt were not established. Their mere presence behind Madera when the
latter shot and killed Bana is not constitutive of their guilt without any showing that they shared the criminal
intent of Madera. It must be shown that they had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which
may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as
aid thereto whether physical or moral. This was absent in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court lauded the Solicitor General for recommending the acquittal of the two. The Supreme Court
also emphasized that the prosecutors finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused.
His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocates natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the

Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to
prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent.

12. Tan vs. Gallardo, 73 SCA 306 (1976)

13. People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120 (1978)
14. Misamin vs. San Juan, 72 SCRA 491 (1976)
15. PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan and Mendoza, G. R. No. 151809-12,April 12, 2005

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG
to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against
respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in
the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyting PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition
states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al.
before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of intervention that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that
the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising the Central
Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term matter and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality
of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and
bounds of the intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is
that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be
remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law. The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of
court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest
of
government.
Petition
assailing
the
Resolution
of
the
Sandiganbayan
is
denied.
Relevant
Dissenting
Opinion
of
Justice
Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance
his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official.
Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading

shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
service.