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DIGESTS & DOCTRINES | CRIM 2 | 1R | ATTY.

PE 1
VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
COUNTERFEITING
PEOPLE v. KONG LEON
48 OG 664
BACKGROUND: The making of false coins of a foreign country is punishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coins from circulation therein.

MUTILATION OF COINS
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 247 (July 18, 1973)
PROHIBITING AND PENALIZING DEFACEMENT, MUTILATION, TEARING, BURNING OR DESTRUCTION OF
CENTRAL BANK NOTES AND COINS
WHEREAS, the Central Bank has the sole right and authority to issue currency within the territory of the Philippines
under its issue power, and pursuant to Section 54 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as the "Central Bank
Act," as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 72 dated November 29, 1972, the notes and coins issued by the
Central Bank shall be fully guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and shall be legal tender
in the Philippines for all debts, both public and private;
WHEREAS, Central Bank notes and coins are issued for circulation as medium of exchange and to utilize them for
other purposes does not speak well of the due respect and dignity befitting our currency; and
WHEREAS, defacing, mutilating, tearing, or partially burning or destroying our currency by any means renders it unfit
for circulation, thereby unduly shortening its lifetime, and such acts unfavorably reflect on the discipline of our people
and create a bad image for our country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, Proclamation No. 1104 dated January 17, 1973, and General Order No. 1
dated September 22, 1972, and in order to effect the desired changes and reforms in the social, economic and
political structure of our society, do hereby order and decree:
1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn or destroy, in any manner
whatsoever, currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank of the Philippines; and
2. That any person who shall violate this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos and/or by imprisonment of not more than five years.
All laws, orders and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.
This Decree is hereby made part of the law of the land and shall take effect immediately after the publication thereof
in a newspaper of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.

FORGERY
DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE
3 SCRA 650
BACKGROUND: Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs
contained" in which had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of such erasure and alteration, and with the
intent to use such notes of the Philippines, is punishable under Art. 168 in relation to Art. 166, subdivision (1) of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government where one of the
digits of the penultimate had been altered and changed from 9 so as to read 0 is punishable.
PEOPLE v. GALANO
54 OG 5897
Balut case and the Victory note payment
BACKGROUND: The forgery here committed comes under the first paragraph of Article 169 or the Code (By giving to
a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true
and genuine document). This provision does not only contemplate situations where a spurious, false or fake
document or instrument is given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also to situations involving
originally true and genuine documents which have been withdrawn or demonetized, or have outlived their usefulness.
The case under consideration could not come within the second paragraph of the aforesaid article (By erasing,
substituting , counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein) because
no figure, letter, word, or sign contained in Exhibit A has been erased, substituted, counterfeited or altered. The
forgery consists in the addition of a word in an effort to give to the present document the appearance of the true and
genuine certificate that it used to have before it was withdrawn or has outlived its usefulness.

FALSIFICATION

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People v. Romualdez
57 Phil 148
Case of Bar Exam where the scores of a certain Mabunay were changed
BACKGROUND: The contention that the papers which defendant ER altered were not public or official documents is
untenable because the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. The alterations made
in such papers, under the circumstances proven in this case, of the grades given to them by the correctors, constitute
the crime of falsification of public documents.
Beradio v. CA
103 SCRA 567
Unable to find digest online; to follow
Luague v. CA
112 SCRA 97
Unable to find digest online; to follow
CABIGAS v. PEOPLE
152 SCRA 18
FACTS: Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati branch. Assisting him
in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the Securities Receiving Clerk. On March 9, 1982, the Securities Section received
112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46M including 19 pieces of treasury bills of the 765th series.
On March 29, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of 6 treasury bills of the 765th series. Reynes crossed
out the last two digits 82 and the added after them the figure 76 on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the
19 treasury bills. When the Daily Report was prepared, the number of treasury bills stood at 1,539 pieces with a total
face value of P610, 095,000.00. On March 30, Cabigas prepared his own report wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of
treasury bills with a total amount of P607, 095,000.00. Cabigas placed a notation Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
dated March 9, 1982 as a legend of the asterisk which appears after the figure 1,533. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas
and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Daily Receipt and Daily
Report on Securities/Document. Both were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, Cabigas was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938, while Reynes was acquitted therein.
Issue: Whether or not Cabigas committed the crime of falsification.
Held: No. In falsification by an employee under Art. 171(4) by making untruthful statements in the narration of
facts,-the following elements must concur: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made
with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. Petitioner contends that the correction of the figure from 1,539 to
1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under custody is not falsification. By placing of an asterisk
sign and a notation was not effected to hide the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were lost. In fact, petitioner
reported the matter to his immediate supervisor and Branch Manager of the Securities Section. Petitioner argues that
the Daily Report is a form purely devised and adopted by him. This form was never required by Land Bank.
Therefore, petitioner was not under legal obligation to disclose in the Daily Report the correct number and value of
the securities. Petitioner was acquitted.
PEOPLE v. SENDAYDIEGO
81 SCRA 120
Facts: The prosecution claims that Licerio Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the
provincial auditor, used 6 forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum
of P57, 048.23. They were charged with malversation through falsification. The lower court acquitted Quirimit and
found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty malversation through falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego died. His
appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable.
Issue: Whether or not Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through
falsification.
Held: It appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the 6 vouchers the
signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineers office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that
the auditor had approved the vouchers. The treasurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments
of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of Carried Construction Co. On the other hand,
Samson denied that he received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurers office. These conflicting
versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved on the fact that Samson had hand-carried the vouchers
and followed up their processing in the offices of the provincial government the construction materials described in
the 6 vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales. The unavoidable conclusion
is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the
defraudation by means of the 6 vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically
authentic but which were intrinsically fake. The crimes committed in the case at bar are not complex. Separate crimes

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of falsification and malversation were committed. In the 6 vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the
malversation.
SIQUIAN v. PEOPLE
171 SCRA 223
Facts: Manuel Siquian, mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, appointed Jesusa Carreon as clerk. Accompanying her
appointment is the cetification of availability of funds issued by Siquian. Carreon began to work but from July to
December 1975 she was not paid. The Municipal Treasurer told her that there was no money yet. Carreon filed a
complaint. It appears that the Municipal Council failed to enact the annual budget thus, the annual budget for the
previous year was re-enacted. It also appears that there was no new item or position of clerk. The trial court found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document. The CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Siquian committed the crime of falsification.
Held: Yes. All of the requisites of Art. 171 (4) of the RPC had been fully met in the case at bar: (a) That the offender
makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. Siquian, a
public officer, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in
connection with the appointment of Carreon. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner
stated that funds were available for the position to which Carreon was appointed when he knew that the position itself
did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor. The petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of funds for the
position being filled up. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document.
PEOPLE v. VILLALON
171 SCRA 223
Facts: Complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother Severo Carrera are co-owners of a parcel of land located in
Binmaley, Pangasinan. Complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before a Notary Public Jaime B.
Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico De Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. De Guzman mortgaged
the parcel of land with the Peoples Bank and Trust Company using the special power of attorney, and was able to
obtain a loan. The mortgage account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed the mortgaged and the
land was sold to Serafica. The complainant discovered that their property was already registered in the name of
Serafica when the latter filed an action for ejectment. A criminal case for estafa thru falsification of a public document
was filed against private respondent. Private respondent claims that the crime has prescribed since more than 10
years had elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty for the more serious crime (falsification) shall be applied in its
maximum period (prision correccional which prescribes in 10 years). The prosecution countered that what was
intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion of the land and that the information was not filed out
of time. The Judge of the CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The Peoples motion
for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding judge Villalon.
Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private respondent has
suffice ground to exist in law and in fact
Yes. The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public document. The damage to another
is caused by the commission of estafa, hence the falsification of public document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa.
Whether the offense charged already prescribed
The document was registered in the Registry of Deed on Feb. 1964 and the information was filed only on March
1974. We reject petitioners claim that the 10 year period commenced when the complainant discovered the crime on
Jan. 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit. It is a well established rule that registration in a public registry is a notice to
the whole world.
ENEMECIO v. OMBUDSMAN
13 Jan 2004
Facts: Enemecio filed an administrative complaint and a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public
document. Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable words against
her and that Bernante shouted defamatory words against her. Enemecio further asserted that Bernante was on
forced leave. In truth Bernante was serving a 20 day prison term. He was able to receive his salary during his
incarceration. Enemecio contended that he was not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his falsified
leave applications. The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative and criminal complaint against Bernante finding no
probable cause. CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its decision.
Held: No. Under Art. 171 (4) of the RPC, the elements of falsification of public document thru an untruthful narration
of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false;

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and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.
Enemecio failed to point any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to
spend his leave of absence. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document absent any legal obligation to
disclose where he would spend his vacation leave.
BATULANON v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 139857, 15 Sep 2006
Facts: Polomolok Credit Cooperative Inc. (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager. During an
audit conducted in Dec. 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. Thereafter, 4
informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon. Medallo, the posting
clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon released 4 cash
vouchers. Medallo stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their cash vouchers and
made it appear that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein. Batulanon denied all the charges
against her. Batulanon argues that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a
third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are
accounts receivable by the cooperative. The trial court convicted Batulanon. CA affirmed with modification.
Issue: Whether or not Batulanon committed the crime of falsification of private document.
Held: Yes. The elements of falsification of private document under Art. 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in par. 7 Art. 171; (b) that the falsification was committed in
any private document; and (c) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage. In the case at bar, Batulanons act caused it to appear that persons
have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. By signing the name of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo in the cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained loan and received its
proceeds when in fact they did not. The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the cash
vouchers in the namen of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they were not PCCI members. In the case of Arroyo,
Batulanon was aware that she did not apply for a loan. The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private
documents and not commercial documents. A private document is defined as a deed or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a pubic notary or other person legally authorized, by which some disposition
or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. In another criminal case filed against Batulanon, the court convicted
her of the crime of estafa. Batulanon holds the money for the PCCI. Knowing that she was no longer qualified to
obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is disqualified to obtain a loan. Damaged was caused
to the PCCI because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members.
NIZURTADO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 107838, 7 Dec 1994
Facts: Accused, as Barangay Captain of Brghy. Panghulo, received a check for P10,000.00 from the Ministry of
Human Settlements for the barangay. However, before it can be encashed, the barangay must submit a resolution
approved by the Barangay Council identifying a livelihood project for the barangay. Subsequently, several council
meetings were held but the council was not able to agree on a project. Later, accused asked the barangay treasurer,
and later anouther councilman, to sign an unaccomplished resolution in mimeograph form stating that the project
would be barangay service center. Later, accused submitted the resolution to the Ministry which identified T-Shirt
Manufacturing as the project was held by the Barangay Council. In addition, the P10,000.00 which was received by
the accused was not invested to the identified project but instead distributed as loans to the accused and some other
councilmen. Accused was charged with the crime of malversation thru falsification of public document under Article
171, par. 2.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty as charged.
Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the malversation was committed since the accused used the fund for purposes other
than to which it was allocated. This crime was indeed committed thru falsification. In falsification under Article 171,
par. 2,. the document neeed not be an authentic official paper since its simulation, in fact, is the essence of
falsification. So, also, the signatures appearing thereon need not necessarily be forged.
GALEOS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174730-37, 9 Feb 2011
FACTS: Galeos and Ong were charged and found guiltyby the Sandiganbayan of falsification of public documents
under Article 171, Paragraph 415 of the RPC; Galeos with 4 counts and Ong with 8 counts. Ong was the Mayor of the
Municipality of Naga,Cebu. Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera for the
positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
The prosecution alleged that on several occasions, Galeos and Rivera (River laterdied so the charges were dropped
as to him) falsified their individual Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN).
On 4 occasions, Galeos either answered No or left blank the boxes pertaining to the question of whether he was
related within the 4th degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government. The SALNs were
filed by Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before Ong. It was later found out that Galeos and Ong were first
degree cousins, as their mothers were sisters. Galeos claimed that he was not being untruthful when he merely left
the box blank (unanswered), while Ong argued that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements
containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the
execution of the documents, and that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely administering the oath in a
document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness

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and/or veracity of the contents ofthe document. Both accused claimed that they had noknowledge that they were in
fact related and there was no intent on their part to make the untruthful statements.
ISSUE: Whether both accused were guilty of falsificationYES.
HELD: All the elements of falsification of public documentsby making untruthful statements have been established
bythe prosecution. The elements of falsification under Article 171, par. 4 are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a
publicdocument untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
It must also be proven that the public officer oremployee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document,the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official
position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of adocument; or
(2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. Likewise, in falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in
the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
The first element was proven. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship
may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion.When a government
employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies
as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears
to stress that theuntruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility for the position
but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on theappointing power.
The second element is likewise present. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the
disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Permanent employees employed by local government units are required
to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d)
personal data sheets as required by law. A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
The third element was also satisfied.
As to Ong As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification
recommending to the CSC approval to Galeos' appointment. Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on
nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn
affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Having executed thecertification despite his knowledge that he and Riverawere related to each other within the fourth
degree ofaffinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Riveras wife is the sister of Ongs
mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He
also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required
toissue such certification.
As to Galeos As to Galeos contention that leaving the boxes in blank cannot be considered as untruthful, the Court
held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds
material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position.
By withholding information on his relative/s in thegovernment service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of
falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in
the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS


PEOPLE v. DAVA
202 SCRA 62
FACTS: Michael Dava, a holder of a non-professional drivers license, bumped two pedestrians causing to the death
of one and physical injuries to the other. Due to this, hisdrivers license was confiscated, given to the fiscal of Pasig
City and used as evidence in the criminal case against him for homicide and serious physical injuries arising from
reckless imprudence. About 3 years after the incident, the brother of the deceased (and at the same time the father
of the one injured) saw Daza driving, knowing fully well that Daza did not have his drivers license. Roxas sought the
help of the Minister of Defense Enrile who indorsed the request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group (CHPG).Two officers of the CHPG saw the car of Dava parked and when he arrived, the officers confronted
him and asked for his license. They were shown a drivers license with official receipt issued by the Agency in
Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava said that his
officemate had secured it for him. It was discovered after subsequent investigation that the Drivers License is a fake
and a falsity because when compared with the Xerox copy of Davas license (the one confiscated), the signatures
and the dates of birth did not tally. Dava was charged with falsification of a public document. The prosecution witness,
Vinluan of the Angeles branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation, stated that although the form used of the license
was genuine (since the branch had some missing forms that theycould not account for), the signature of the issuing
official was fake. Also, he said that while the form was issued by the Angeles City agency, the license appeared on its
face to have been issued by the San Fernando, Pampanga Agency.
RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed RTCs decision.

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However, it was found out that said court did not have jurisdiction, thus the proceedings were annulled and a new trial
was begun with the Pampanga RTC. The Pampanga RTC also found Daza guilty, which was affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
Side issue: Daza alleges that the Pampanga RTC relied too much on the testimony of Vinluan which should not be
given credence since the proceedings in the case were annulled. This court held that yes, Vinluans testimony is
inadmissible as evidence, andmay as well be considered as non-existent.
ISSUE: Is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of Daza?
DECISION: Yes. Affirmed.
REASONING: The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in any transaction are the following:
1. The offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
It was Daza himself who requested his friend, Manalili, to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has
not at any time been issued a drivers license. His misrepresentation and the awareness of Manalili that Daza needed
a license in his job as a detailman, induced Manalili to deal with fixers in securing the drivers license. The fact that it
was Manalili and not Daza who dealt directly with the fixers cannot exculpate Daza since he is, beyond reasonable
doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of thecrime. Having already obtained a drivers license, Daza
knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Also, Daza cannot say that that he honestly
believed that Manalili would be able to secure a drivers license through legal means in only an hour. The patent
irregularity in securing the license was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and
prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. Even Manalili testified that he was surprised when the fixer
handed him the plastic jacket of the license a few hours after he had sought the fixers help.
2. The false document embraced in Art. 171 or in (1) or (2) of Art. 172
A drivers license is a public document within the purview of Arts. 171 and 172.The blank form of the license becomes
a public document the moment it is accomplished. Thus when the document was filled with Dazas personal data and
the signature of the registrar, although the same was simulated, it became a public document.
3. The person used such document
This is proven by the fact that when Daza was apprehended, the fake license was in his possession and it was
presented to the officer to show that he had a license. Also, since he is a detailman which entailed the use of a car, it
is possible that he used such license.
4. The use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage
The drivers license being a public document, the proof of this element has become immaterial. In the falsification of
public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth proclaimed therein.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE BANK NOTES


MARTINEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 194367, 15 June 2011
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied
petitioners appeal. The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The
petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery
but was refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers.
Consequently,the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the
accused. The defense of the accused was the defense of frame up. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the
counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that
the counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces
involved. As to the elements of thecrime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioners
possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the
counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.
Issue: Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note in this case
are present?
Resolution: Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal
possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or
certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of
credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or
falsified instruments. In thiscase, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to
buy soft drinks, was not presented incourt. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz
that petitioner asked the latter to buysoft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the
jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their
account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge. In this case, the non-presentation of the
informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act
which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis
dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have
before it evidence of an essential element of the crime.

USURPATION
PEOPLE v. CORTEZ
73 OG 10056
FACTS: On August 10, 1971, accused introduced himself to Elizabeth Reyes as aBIR agent while she was in her
store in Malate, Manila called the Mindoro House of Beef. The accused presented an ID in the name of S. Begunia
together with some BIR papers. Cortez told Reyes that he was authorized to examine the books and receipts of the
store. Thereafter, Reyes referred Cortez to her accountant Ms. Milagros Lontok. However, Cortez was asking for a
fee of P400 so that he would not inspect the books and receipts. He claims he was sent out to raise funds for the
Director of BIR.
On August 12, Reyes went to the BIR where she saw a picture of the real S. Begunia. She was promised that the real
S. Begunia will be presented a day after. On August 13 the real Soferacio Begunia with Jose Enriquez went to the
store of Reyes where they planned to catch Cortez.
In the morning of August 16 Cortez passed by the store in haste. The next day Cortez entered the store and inquired
about the money. Reyes handed an envelope containing P30 in marked bills, P20 in unmarked bills and a check for
P150. After handling the envelope, Reyes asked clearance but Cortez replied that he do not have the form. So Reyes
got a coupon bond with the letter head of her store and asked appellant to write the clearance on it. It was at this
juncture that Enriquez grabbed the hand of Cortez and arrested him.
Cortez refused to give any statement. His hands when examined showed that it contained fluorescent powder. Cortez
defense was that he was framed up. The lower court convicted him of the complex crime of robbery thru use and
falsification of public and/or official document and with usurpation of authority.
ISSUE: WON accused can be convicted of complex crime of robbery thru use and falsification of public and/or official
document and with usurpation of authority.
HELD: No. The accused is guilty only of the complex crime of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public
document by a private individual. Judgement modified.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that it is hardly disputable that accused committed acrime of falsification of
public document by a private individual as well as a crime of usurpation of authority. However, no robbery was
committed. In order that there is robbery, there should be either violence against or intimidation. In this case there
was no violence and no intimidation. There was no outside force or act capable of producing fear in the mind of
Reyes. When Reyes gave the money to Cortez she was already aware that the latter was a fraud and that he was
about to be arrested.
GIGANTONI v. PEOPLE
162 SCRA 158
FACTS: June 20, 1980 - Gigantoni was suspended from PC-CIS pending charges of gross misconduct against him in
the Sandiganbayan.. He received a letter informing him of such.
June 30, 1980 Gigantoni was terminated from office per judgment of the Sandiganbayan. Gigantoni was not
informed.
Sometime between 1980 and 1981 - Gigantoni became part of the Black Mountain Mining, Inc.
May 14, 1981 - as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)
allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials; he falsely represented himself to
the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL
records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3
1981; his real purpose was to verify some of the travels made by the employees of Black Mountain.
Officials of PAL charged him with usurpation of authority. Lower courts convicted him.
ISSUE: WON Gigantoni knowingly and falsely represented himself as a PC agent
HOLDINGS / RATIO: NO. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the
dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified
of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he"knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS
agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and

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never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed
thatpetitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been
regularly performed." It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense that he was already dismissed fromthe service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference
whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to
represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived
of. The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function
(second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177).
The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agencyof the Philippine Government." Petitioner
is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the
accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official
function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case
that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused
because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was
charged in the information,that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
REMEMBER: Suspension only affected his authority but not his status.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME


REPUBLIC ACT No. 6085
AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO REGULATING THE
USE OF ALIASES
Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different
from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized
for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act
within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames."
Section 2. Section Two of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and
the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias.
The judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other, than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry."
Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two, is hereby amended to read as
Follows:
"Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he was registered at birth in the
local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person who
obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public or private
transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without stating or affixing his real or original name
and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been authorized to use."
Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended by the insertion of the following
new section to be designated Section four to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act and subject to the provisions of section 1 hereof, all persons who
have used any name and/or names and alias or aliases different from those authorized in section one of this act and
duly recorded in the local civil registry, shall be prohibited to use such other name or names and/or alias or aliases."
Section 5. Section four of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
Section five, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of from one year to five years and a fine of
P5,000 to P10,000."
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and all Acts, rules or regulations of laws inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed.

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Approved: August 4, 1969.
LEGAMIA v. IAC
131 SCRA 478
BACKGROUND: A woman who has been living with a married man for almost 20 years, where the latter introduced
the woman to the public as his wife, assumed the role of being a wife and the family name of the man without any
sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind cannot be held liable of the crime Using Fictitious Name. The
absence of sinister purpose or personal material gain has removed the act from being a crime herein mentioned.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME


REPUBLIC ACT No. 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND
INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or any other
official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with
intent to defraud such foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in such pretended
character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person or from said foreign government or the
Government of the Philippines, or from any officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value,
shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in
addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attach, who shall act in the Republic of the
Philippines as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to, and registration with, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
aside from other penalties that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear any naval,
military, police, or other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or government with which
the Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so nearly resembling the same as to
be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon
conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines,
or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized
and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is
arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every
person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not
exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a
public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall the
said section apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an
ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in
the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City
of Manila, who shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have
resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the person
of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three
years, and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties that may
be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the country of the diplomatic or consular
representative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular
representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or similar penalties for like or similar offenses
herein contained.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: October 21, 1946

PERJURY
DIAZ v. PEOPLE
191 SCRA 86

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
BACKGROUND: A person who stated under oath in his application to take a police examination that he had never
been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed perjury. The elements
of the crime of the crime of perjury are: 1) the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter 2) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and
administer oath 3) accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood 4) that a sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
SAAVEDRA JR v. DOJ
G.R. No. 93178, 15 Sep 1993
FACTS: On 2 July 1987, the owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI for brevity), including private respondent Gregorio
M. Ramos, sold their shares of stock to petitioner Honorio Saavedra, Jr., for P1.2 million payable in installments. A
"Memorandum of Agreement," and a "Deed of Assignment" were executed to evidence the transaction. The former
document contained an automatic rescission clause in case any installment was not paid on its due date.
Payments were made in the total amount of P936,380.00, leaving a balance of P263,620.00 payable on 15
September 1987. On said date, however, petitioner withheld payment for the reason that the sellers failed to comply
with their warranties. Nevertheless, the balance was deposited in escrow subject to release once the warranties were
complied with.
On 5 November 1987, petitioner filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages 4 against private
respondent, alleging that he (petitioner) was the President and principal stockholder of the company. By way of
answer, respondent Ramos questioned petitioner's capacity to sue in behalf of PPI, claiming that petitioner ceased to
be its president when the sale of the PPI, shares of stock to him was automatically rescinded on 15 September 1987.
After executing a document entitled "Recission of Memorandum of Agreement," Ramos and his group filed a case 5
on 20 November 1987 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SRC) praying that the rescission be declared
valid and legal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the SEC but the same
was denied on 11 December 1987. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court which, on 21 March 1988, upheld the
jurisdiction of the SEC and ruled that under Sec. 5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC has "primary and exclusive"
jurisdiction over the twin issues of ownership and automatic rescission, they being intracorporate disputes. 6
Accordingly, proceedings in Civil Case No. 55247 were suspended.
On 7 December 1987, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 3257, private respondent filed a criminal case for
perjury against petitioner with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Pasig alleging that petitioner perjured himself when
he declared in the verification of the complaint in Civil Case No. 55247 that he was the President of PPI. 7 In his
answer-affidavit, petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission were still pending
and unresolved in the SEC, there was no basis to the charge that he asserted a falsehood by claiming to be the
President of the company especially when he was such per records extant with the SEC. 8
By Resolution dated 25 July 1988, the Provincial Prosecutor found a prima facie case for perjury against petitioner
and on 26 October 1988 filed the corresponding Information with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 74919. 9 The evidence supporting the charge was the Secretary's Certificate dated 5 December 1987
reflecting private respondent's election as President of PPI by the former owners thereof when they convened
following the automatic revocation of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and "Deed of Assignment."
Petitioner sought a review of the foregoing Resolution with public respondent DOJ but the latter subsequently came
up with the Resolution now under consideration, upholding the finding of probable cause for perjury, ruling as follows:
There is probable cause against you for prosecution as evidenced by the Secretary's Certificate dated December 5,
1987 extant on record. This evidence is a mute but eloquent witness affirming the claim of Ramos that he is the
rightful President of PPI. Indeed, the Secretary's Certificate alluded to readily shows that the original membership of
the Board was reconvened and reassembled, proving the fact that the presidency of PPI is lodged with Ramos.
Moreover, in view of the of the rescission of the memorandum of agreement, deed of assignment and contract of
lease, you lost your rights and interest over the shares of stock previously delivered to you by virtue of the subject
agreement. Consequently, you likewise lost your right to assume management over the corporation PPI. When you
thus stated in your complaint that you were President of PPI, such assertion constituted a lawful (sic)and deliberate
assertion of falsehood (emphasis supplied).
A Motion for Reconsideration having proved unsuccessful, petitioner took the instant recourse.
Issue: whether or not the charge for perjury against petitioner can prosper.
Held: Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to perjury. The assertion must be deliberate and
willful. As a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise required by the Rules of Court, and no rule requires
complaints for damages, as in the case before us, to be under oath. Since the complaint filed by petitioner against
private respondent is not required to be verified, another essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that
the sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be prosecuted on the
basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading which is not mandated by law to be verified. 18
Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolution of 25 July 1988 finding a prima facie case
for perjury against petitioner. A fortiori, the assailed DOJ Resolutions must be struck down as having been issued
without sufficient factual and legal bases. Correspondingly, the Information filed with the Pasig Trial Court pursuant
thereto must likewise be dismissed.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions dated 6 November 1989 and 7 March 1990 of
respondent Department of Justice sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor in finding probable cause for perjury against
petitioner are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Conformably herewith, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 67, or whichever branch of the same court Crim.
Case No. 74919 entitled "People v. Honorio Saavedra, Jr.," may be assigned, is directed to DISMISS the case. The
bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused, if any, is cancelled and released.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192565, 28 Feb 2012
Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case.
Issue: Whether or not the MeTC-Makati is the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held: The court denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in
criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:(a)Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.The
above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states: Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS


OUANO v. CA
188 SCRA 799
BACKGROUND: Once two persons have promised to share in a property subject to an issue as a consideration for
one to refrain from taking part in the public auction, and have attempted to cause and succeeded in causing another
bidder to stay away from an auction in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned, machination in
public auctions under Art 185 of the RPC has been committed. Causing another bidder to stay away from the auction
in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned is an act constituting the crime of machination in
public auctions.

CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS


CHAIN OF CUSTODY
PEOPLE v. CATENTAY
G.R. No. 183101, 6 July 2010
BACKGROUND: In this case, although the plastic sachets that the forensic chemist received were heat-sealed and
authenticated by the police officer with his personal markings, the forensic chemist broke the seal, opened the plastic
sachet, and took out some of the substances for chemical analysis. No evidence had been adduced to show that the
forensic chemist properly closed and resealed the plastic sachets with adhesive and placed his own markings on the
resealed plastic to preserve the integrity of their contents until they were brought to court. Nor was any stipulation
made to this effect. The plastic sachets apparently showed up at the pre-trial, not bearing the forensic chemists seal,
and was brought from the crime laboratory by someone who did not care to testify how he came to be in possession
of the same. The evidence did not establish the unbroken chain of custody.
PEOPLE v. KAMAD
G.R. No. 174198, 19 Jan 2010
FACTS: On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern Police District,
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, received information from an asset that a certain "Zaida" was selling shabu at Purok IV,
Silverio Compound, Paraaque City. At 10pm of October 16, 2002, SPO2 Sanchez, pseudo-buyer, gave marked
PHP 300 bills to accused-appellant for the purchase of shabu. Upon receipt of the item, Zaida Kamd and her
boyfriend, Leo were arrested.
ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the illegal
sale of 0.20 grams of shabu
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that in the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) corpus delicti presented as evidence.
Records show that the prosecution through SPO2 Sanchez, established the sale of the prohibited drug shabu by
accused-appellant but the RTC and the CA failed to notice the defects in the prosecution's case such as (1) lapse in

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
implementing Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the handling of the seized shabu and (2) failure of police to comply
with the chain of custody rule.
For violations of Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, no inventory and photographing of seized drugs was done at the place of
arrest as well as the presence of the accused as it was being done nor a representative of the media, the Dept. of
Justice, and any elected public official who will confirm that evidence seized were as they were found. Neither was it
established by the prosecution why such thing were not followed by presenting (1) justifiable cause and (2)
preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of seized evidence as required by the IRR of RA 9165, Sec. 21-A.
For non-compliance of the chain of custody rule, which requires the documentation and description of evidence as it
is being processed along the system was neither complied. The Court reverses and sets aside the decision of the CA
affirming the final judgment of RTC Branch 259 of Paraaque City for the illegal sale of shabu of acused-appellant.
Zaida Kamad is acquitted and ordered released from detention.
PEOPLE v. AGULAY
G.R. No. 181747, 26 Sep 2008
FACTS: On 24 August 2002, at around 6:30 in the evening, an informant arrived at Police Station 5 and reported to
the Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) that a certain Sing had been selling shabu at Brgy. Sta.
Lucia, in Novaliches, Quezon City. A police entrapment team was formed. PO2 Herrera was assigned as poseurbuyer and was given a P100.00 bill, which he marked RH, his initials. They stopped along J.P. Rizal St., Sta. Lucia,
Novaliches, Quezon City.PO2 Herrera and his informant stepped down from their vehicle and walked. The informant
pointed the target pusher to PO2 Herrera. They approached and after being introduced to Sing, PO2 Herrera bought
shabu using the marked P100.00 bill. Sing gave a small plastic sachet to PO2 Herrera who, thereafter, scratched his
head as a signal. The other police companions of PO2 Herrera, who were deployed nearby, then rushed to the crime
scene. PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and then frisked him. PO2 Herrera recovered two (2) plastic sachets from Sings
pocket. He also got the marked money from Sing. The specimens were submitted to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis and all of them tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. On 17
February 2006, the RTC found Narciso Agulay guilty of the offense charged, and meted out to him the penalty of Life
Imprisonment. Agulay sought an appeal with the Court of Appeals however the Court of Appeals denied Agulay's
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Agulay was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower court that Agulay was
arrested in flagrante delicto selling shabu. In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the
prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2)the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.Accused-appellant contends his arrest
was illegal, making the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accusedappellants claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation
does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest, in line with the provisions of Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode
of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and
legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
PEOPLE v. CAPUNO
G.R. No. 185715, 19 Jan 2011
FACTS: On or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal, Erlinda Capuno was caught
selling a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was found
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which substance produces a
physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound hereof providing similar physiological effects. Capuno
pleaded not guilty to the charge but the RTC decision found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.The
appellant appealed to the CA butit afrmed the RTC with the modication that the appellant be sentenced to life
imprisonment, and that the ne be increased to P500,000.00. The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that
the prosecution witnesses were not credible due to their conicting statements regarding the place of the buy-bust
operation, that the minor inconsistencies were not out of ulterior motive to further implicate the appellant. Lastly, the
CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established.
ISSUE: W/N Capuno is guilty of the crime charged against her
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court acquits Capuno of the charge against her due to reasonable doubt on her guilt. In a
prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown
by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of
the seized drug, evidence must denitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
fails.The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
R.A. No. 916 but this was not followed by the buy-bust operation.
ON CHAIN OF CUSTODY: Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the conscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002, denes chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/conscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufcient to support a nding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the shabu
presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.The rst crucial link in the chain of custody
starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint afdavits, it is clear that
the police did not mark the conscated sachet upon conscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
thecustodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimen will use the markings as reference. The second link is the turnover from the police to the police station
where the police officers failed to identify the person to whose custody the item was given.

SEC 26 ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY


PEOPLE v. ADAM
13 Oct 2011
FACTS: On February 17, 1999, at 2:30 p.m., a condential informant arrived in the ofce of the Regional Intelligence
and Investigation Division, Region 12, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. He reported to Inspector
Danilo Bugay, and told the latter about his agreement with a drug pusher, Mangi Adam, for the purchase of
200 grams of shabu for P200,000.00 at 7:30 p.m. at the 7-Eleven Store located at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna.
The condential informant also reported that he had agreed to pay P200,000.00 to Adam upon delivery of the
prohibited drug. Inspector Bugay decided to conduct a buy- bust operation and proceeded to form a team. PO3 Rey
Lucido was designated to act as poseur-buyer, while SPO3 Honorio Sanchez and SPO1 Danilo Satuito were to act
as back-up men. PO3 Lucido was tasked to buy 200 grams of shabu for P2,000.00 consisting of two genuine
P1,000.00 bills and boodle money tied together by a rubber band and placed in an envelope. The operation was a
success as it led to the arrest of Adam, who was then brought to Camp Vicente Lim. The sachets that were seized
from Adam were found to be positive for shabu. The RTC found Adam guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Php 5,000,000.
ISSUE: W/N Adam was found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court dismisses the case as the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
a sale of 200 grams of shabu took place between the appellant as the seller and PO3 Lucido as the poseurbuyer for P2,000.00 Article 1, paragraph 2(o) of Republic Act No. 6425 denes the sale of illicit drugs as the act of
giving a dangerous drug, whether for money or any material consideration. The Court enumerated the elements
necessary to prosecute illegal sale of drugs. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in Court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The Court finds that there was
no way for the accused to know that what was inside the envelope given him contained money but the Court does
find the accused guilty of attempted sale of shabu as defined in Sec. 24(b), Article IV of RA 6425. As stated in the
facts, the accused attempted to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime but
this was halted when the officer identified himself as a police officer and placed the accused under arrest.

COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA


PEOPLE v. BERDADERO
G.R. No. 179710, 29 June 2010
FACTS: The Investigation Section of the Batangas City Police Station received a report from an informant that the
appellant was selling shabu. PO3 Danilo F. Balmes (PO3 Balmes) and PO2 Edwalberto M. Villas (PO2 Villas)
organized a buy-bust operation and designated the informant as the poseur- buyer. The two police ofcers and the
informant went to the target area and parked the van they were using in front of appellants house. After alighting
from the vehicle, the informant talked to the appellant. A few minutes later, the appellant went inside his house.
When he returned, he handed to the informant two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in exchange
for the marked money. The informant then gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale was consummated. The police
ofcers who were observing the transaction from inside the van apprehended the appellant and recovered the
marked money from him. They apprised the appellant of his constitutional rights before taking him to the barangay
hall to record the entrapment operation and the evidence seized from the appellant in the blotter. The informant
turned over the plastic sachetsto PO3 Balmes. They then proceeded to the police station.
Upon their arrival,
the buy-bust operation and the items conscated from the appellant were recorded in the police blotter. The desk
ofcer, PO1 Arnold delos Reyes (PO1 Delos Reyes), prepared the complaint sheet while PO3 Balmes placed
markings on the plastic sachets. The rst sachet was marked DFB-1 with the date 3-25-03, while the second sachet
was marked DFB-2 with the same date. The sachets were then submitted for laboratory examination, which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The victim claimed that he was framed and he denied that the

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
illicit drugs were confiscated from him. RTC ruled for the conviction of the accused, sentencing him to life
imprisonment and a fine of Php 500,000. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: W/N there was an illegal sale of shabu
HELD: YES. The Court is satisfied that the prosecution is able to prove the existence of all the elements of illegal sale
of shabu.
The elements necessary to establish a case for illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.
The prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. The
appellant was positively identied by police ofcers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu
presented in the case. PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas testied that their condential informant acted as the buyer of the
shabu from the appellant.It was likewise established that the sale actually occurred and that two sachets of shabu
were sold for the price of P500.00. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation was duly adduced in
evidence. The shabu sold by the appellant was also positively and categorically identied during trial.
PEOPLE v. ROA
G.R. No. 186134, 6 May 2010
FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of 5 September 2003, the Quezon City Police District (QCPD) received
information from an asset that a certain Joel Roawas peddling shabu somewhere along Senatorial Road in
Barangay Batasan Hills. Acting on this information, QCPD Chief Superintendent Raymund Esquival immediately
formed a team of police ofcers to conduct a buy-bust operation with the objective of apprehending the suspected
pusher in agrante delicto. The team arrived at the target area around 12:30 in the morning of 6 September 2003.
The asset and PO2 Galacgac proceeded towards the house of the appellant, while the other members of the buybust team positioned themselves in strategic places. The asset went inside the house, and, after about a minute,
came out with the appellant. The asset then introduced PO2 Galacgac to the appellant as a user who wants to buy
shabu. The appellant readily agreed. The appellant handed PO2 Galacgac onesmall plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance. In turn, PO2 Galacgac handed the previously marked P100.00 bill to the appellant as
payment.PO2 Galacgac scratched his head, which served as the signal to the other members of the buy-bust team
that the transaction was completed. In an instant, the other members of the buy-bust team closed in and
apprehended the appellant. Upon being frisked by SPO1 Limin, two more small plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance were recovered from the appellants right front pocket.The appellant was then brought to the
police station. The sachets were marked by the police officers who then requested for a confirmatory examination
The sachets tested positive for shabu and as a consequence, two separate criminal actions were filed against
Berdadero. The RTC found Berdadero guilty in the two complaints and the CA also affirmed the decisions of the
RTC. Berdadero denies that he was caught in flagrante delicto, that he was just a victim of a frame up and in support
of his denial, points out that the QCPD never coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
about conducting any buy-bust operation, violating in the process Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165. Neither did
the QCPD conduct any surveillance prior to the execution of the purported buy-bust. These circumstances, the
appellant believes, discount the existence of a genuine buy-bust operation and lend credibility that he was just
framed.
ISSUE: W/N the lack of coordination with PDEA makes the buy-bust operation irregular
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court rules that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165
requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain close coordination with
the PDEA on all drug related matters, the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEAs participation a condition
sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in agrante arrest sanctioned by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere noncoordination with the PDEA.Failing to show any ill motive and improper performance of duty on the part of the police
ofcers who caused his apprehension, the appellants defenses of denial and frame-up must necessarily fail.
PEOPLE v. FIGUEROA
G.R. No. 186141, 11 Apr 2012
Version of the Prosecution
In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut, Chief of the Special
Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force and informed him of the drug pushing
activities of a certain Baby, later identified as accused-appellant FIGUEROA. YABUT instructed other inspectors to
conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.
On June 23, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met with accused-appellant
FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA to accused-appellant
FIGUEROA as the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample be of good quality.
FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3
CALLORA through the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu.

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The following day, the Special Operation Unit 1 requested the PNP Crime Laboratory to dust with ultra-violet powder
the two (2) pieces ofP500.00 bills with serial numbers FG403794 and MY883243 to be used in the planned buy-bust
operation against accused-appellant FIGUEROA.
A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3 CALLORA, was then formed to
conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money was
prepared. The genuine two (2) pieces of P500.00 bills were placed on top of boodle money to make them appear as
P10,000.00.
At about 4:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, PO3 CALLORA arrived in the vicinity of 7-Eleven on board a car driven by
PS/INSP. GARCIA and met with the informant. PO3 CALLORA and the informant waited for accused-appellant
FIGUEROA, who after a few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433. Seeing the two,
accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant
FIGUEROA rolled down the window of her car and asked where the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA
asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant FIGUEROA opened a Chowking plastic bag and showed a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust
money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped
away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road. The other occupants of the car were Susan Samson y
Figueroa, sister-in-law of the accused, Margie Sampayan y Garbo, Fe Salceda y Resma and Christian Salceda y
Resma. PO3 CALLORA immediately boarded the car and joined the chase.
FIGUEROAs vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the intersection of C-5 road. At that time,
PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota Revo and threw the
Chowking plastic bag to the pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor. PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it
up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance inside. PO3 CALLORA
and PO2 PINILI introduced themselves as police officers. FIGUEROA was informed of her violation and was apprised
of her constitutional rights. The items recovered from the crime scene were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where they were tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met and transacted with PO3 CALLORA regarding the sale of shabu.
She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered under the floor matting of the car
she was driving as well as the plastic sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic bag found on the pavement of
Kalayaan Avenue corner C-5 road.
She alleged that between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, she was driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433
on her way to the house of her elder brother at Eco Center, Barangay Calsada, Taguig City to get their mothers
allowance. Their mother stays with her at her residence. With her as passengers were Susan Samson y Figueroa,
Fe Salceda y Resma, and the latters nine[-]year[-]old son, Christian Salceda y Resma, and Margie Sampayan y
Garbo, FIGUEROAs laundrywoman. They stayed at her brothers house for about twenty (20) minutes.
When she was about to proceed after the traffic light turned green at the junction of Kalayaan Avenue, a navy blue
car blocked her path. P/SUPT YABUT alighted from said car and was shouting that he was a police officer while
approaching accused-appellant FIGUEROA. He ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to roll down her car window.
Accused then asked, Bakit po mister? P/SUPT YABUT reiterated that he was a police officer and ordered accusedappellant FIGUEROA to get down from her car as they would be searching the same. FIGUEROA and her
companions were made to stay at the sidewalk for about thirty (30) minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and
were told not to do anything while the search was going on. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, Aantayin muna natin sila.
For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk until other persons referred to by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at
the scene.
RTC: Criminal Case No. 04-2432 ACQUITTED, LACK OF EVIDENCE
Criminal Case No. 04-2433 GUILTY; violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment
CA DISMISSED.
HELD:
Lack of Prior Coordination with the PDEA
In both the Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals and accused-appellants Supplemental Brief before this Court,
the main defense proffered by accused-appellant was the alleged violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165,
requiring that the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintain close coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters.
Accused-appellants contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not
invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Thus,
in People v. Berdadero, the Court noted that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing
the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the
PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court consequently held that this silence [cannot] be interpreted
as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to
such an arrest inadmissible. Petition DENIED

THE OBJECTIVE TEST


PEOPLE v. ONG
G.R. No. 175940, 6 Feb 2008

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
Review of CA decision which affirmed the Judgment[3] of the RTC convicting appellant Anson Ong alias Allan Co of
illegal sale and possession of shabu.
Criminal Case No. 97-0017, appellant was accused of illegal sale of shabu, thus: That on or about the 21st day of
[April] 1997, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver 989.05 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug.
Criminal Case No. 97-0018, appellant was charged with illegal possession of shabu allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1997, Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Anson Ongalias Allan Co, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 988.85 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug without the corresponding license. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A
joint trial of the two cases ensued.
The operative facts are narrated by prosecution witnesses who comprised members of the buy-bust team. Sometime
in April 1997, Col. Zoila Lachica (Lachica) was tipped off by a female walk-in informant that a group, led by a Chinese
national, was engaged in drug trafficking in Pasay City. Upon verification of said information, a meeting took place
between Lachica and the informant where the latter was able to arrange a drug deal with appellant in the vicinity of
Heritage Hotel.[6] Lachica then instructed Investigator Oscar Coballes (Coballes) to prepare the boodle money
consisting of four P500.00 bills and five P100.00 bills placed on top of nine (9) bundles of paper cut to the size of the
peso bills. These bills were then submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for ultraviolet powder dusting.[7] Before
lunchtime on 21 April 1997, Lachica organized a team and planned the conduct of a buy-bust operation. The twelveman team was composed of Lachica, Coballes, Police Supt. Edgar Danao (Danao), P/Inspector Rolando Montes
(Montes), PO3 Manuelito Lagradilla (Lagradilla), SPO2 Wilfredo Saballa (Saballa), SPO3 Pardo, SPO2 Pedro Tan,
the confidential informant, and other civilian agents. Danao acted as the team leader with Montes assisting him.
Saballa was designated as the poseur-buyer and the other members of the team were tasked to secure the area.[8]
After lunch, the group proceeded to the parking lot of San Juan de Dios Hospital onboard four (4) vehicles, including
a motorcycle driven by Lagradilla. At about 3:00 p.m., they reached the parking lot where Danao conducted the final
briefing and then deployed his men strategically between the premises of Heritage Hotel and Copacabana Hotel.[9]
At 4:00 pm, Saballa and the informant went to Heritage Hotel while the other team members strategically posted
themselves within the hotel premises.[10]
Fifteen minutes later, Saballa and the informant left Heritage Hotel and proceeded to the adjacent Copacabana Hotel
where he waited at the main entrance of the lobby. Suddenly, a black Honda Civic car with Plate No. ULN 766 arrived
and parked along the driveway near the front entrance.[11] The informant approached the car while Saballa was left
behind holding the black bag containing the boodle money.[12] Upon signal by the informant, Saballa came up to the
right front door. Saballa showed the contents of the bag to the driver of the car, who was later identified as appellant.
He then handed the bag to him.[13] Instantaneously, a man approached the car, took the boodle money from
appellant and ran away.[14] Coballes ran towards the drivers side and poked his gun at appellant. Appellant tried
moving the car but Coballes stood in front and blocked it. Appellant was then ordered to open the door. Coballes saw
a red bag containing white crystalline substance inside the car and took it into custody. [15] Meanwhile, Lagradilla
chased the man who took the boodle money around the parking area of Copacabana Hotel.[16] While on the run,
Lagradilla saw the man throw the money inside a passing whiteToyota car driven by a certain Chito Cua (Cua).
Instead of pursuing the man, Lagradilla blocked the white Toyota car and arrested Cua.[17]
RTC: ONG POK PIW a.k.a. ANSON ONG a.k.a. ALLAN CO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) offenses
for Violations of Section 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act [No.] 6425. Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
hereby declared confiscated in favor of the government.
CA: UPHELD. Appellate court strongly relied on the testimonies of the police officers and dismissed the imputed
inconsistencies in their statements as being minor.
HELD: For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity
of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before
the court of the corpus delicti.[26]
In determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operation, the objective
test, as laid down in People v. Doria,[28] is utilized. It has been held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,
the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery
of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[29]
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation.
The details of the meeting with the informant, the alleged source of the information on the sale of illegal drugs, appear
hazy.
While the presentation of the boodle money, as a general rule, is not indispensable in the prosecution of a drug case,
the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the non-presentation of the buy-bust
money raise reasonable doubts on the occurrence of a buy-bust operation.[56] It is indeed suspicious that vital

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
pieces of evidence, such as the boodle money and the drivers license were lost while in the custody of Coballes who
unfortunately passed away during trial. Certainly, the failure to present vital pieces of these evidence cast doubt on
the veracity of the buy-bust operation. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Anson Ong a.k.a. Allan Co
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from prison is ordered unless he is being
held for some other valid or lawful cause.
PEOPLE v. VICTORIO PAGKALINAWAN
G.R. No. 184805
Prosecutions Version of Facts
On July 20, 2004, at around 11:00 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal DrugsSpecial Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City Police and reported the illegal activities of a certain
Berto, a resident of Captain Ciano St., Ibayo, Tipaz, Taguig City.
The leader of the group, Police Senior Inspector Romeo Paat, immediately formed a buy-bust team with PO1
Memoracion as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the group as back-up. The informant introduced PO1 Memoracion to
Berto as a taxi driver who wanted to buy shabu. Berto immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from PO1
Memoracion and showed three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu in his palm, and asked the poseur-buyer to pick
one. Once PO1 Memoracion took hold of the shabu, he took off his cap, which was the pre-arranged signal for the
rest of the team to close in and arrest Berto. Berto suddenly became suspicious of PO3 Vicua, who was coming up
to them, so he attempted to flee the scene. PO1 Memoracion was able to stop him and ordered him to empty his
pockets. The other two (2) sachets of shabu were recovered from him and the appropriate markings were made on
them. Berto was identified later on as appellant Pagkalinawan.
After the police investigator made the request for laboratory examination of the confiscated transparent plastic
sachets of suspected shabu, PO1 Memoracion brought these to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
Appellant recounted that, on July 20, 2004, he was watching television inside their house. His granddaughter Paula
San Pedro and sister-in-law May Pagkalinawan were with him in the house at the time. Suddenly, armed men
barged into the house and introduced themselves as policemen. One of them pointed a gun at him and asked where
he was keeping the shabu. He denied having what the policemen were looking after. Despite his denial, the
policemen still searched his house. When they could not find any prohibited drugs there, the policemen brought him
to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Taguig City Police Station. At the police station, he was told by the policemen to
amicably settle the case with them. But because he did not heed their order, cases for violation of RA 9165 were
filed against him by the policemen.
May Pagkalinawan testified that she went to the house of her sister-in-law Zenaida for about ten minutes, but when
she returned home, she saw policemen apprehending appellant. She asked the policemen where they were bringing
appellant and they told her to follow them at the police station in the Taguig City Hall. She also averred that the
policemen did not present any document giving them authority to search their house and arrest appellant. She
further claimed that the police officers did not apprise appellant of his constitutional rights during and after the arrest.
Paula San Pedro, who claimed to be appellants granddaughter, also corroborated the stories of both May
Pagkalinawan and appellant.
RTC RULING: GUILTY BOTH COUNTS.
CA: AFFIRMED. Dismissed the allegation of instigation, saying that what happened was actually an entrapment.
HELD: One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[12]
In order to determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, this Court has consistently applied the objective test. In
People v. Doria,[13] this Court stressed that in applying the objective test, the details of the purported transaction
during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. It further emphasized that the manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense.[14]
Evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment, not instigation, to capture appellant in the act of
selling a dangerous drug. It was the confidential informant who made initial contact with appellant when he
introduced PO1 Memoracion as a buyer for shabu. Appellant immediately took the PhP 500 buy-bust money from
PO1 Memoracion and showed him three pieces of sachet containing shabu and asked him to pick one. Once PO1
Memoracion got the shabu, he gave the pre-arranged signal and appellant was arrested. The facts categorically
show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers conduct was within the acceptable
standards for the fair and honorable administration of justice.
Moreover, contrary to appellants argument that the acts of the informant and the poseur-buyer in pretending that they
were in need of shabu instigated or induced him to violate the Anti-Drugs Law, a police officers act of soliciting drugs
from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a decoy solicitation, is not prohibited by law and
does not render the buy-bust operation invalid.

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It bears stressing that what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In other words, the
essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.[17] All these elements
were satisfactorily proved by the prosecution in the instant case.

MANDATORY DRUG TESTING


PIMENTEL v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161658, 3 Nov 2008
ISSUE: WN Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 is constitutional.
Insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses, among other personalities.
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161658
Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
Pimentel filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. Seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution. Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says
that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
HELD: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 unconstitutional. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal drug
clean, obviously as a pre condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
G.R. No. 157870
Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g]
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on
the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative
power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.
HELD: The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The primary
legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random
testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal
drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation.
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. The

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intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well being of the
citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal
drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
G.R. No. 158633
Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g]
Laserna Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
HELD: Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
Entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 = UNCONSTITUTIONAL;


Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 = CONSTITUTIONAL
Sec. 36(f) = UNCONSTITUTIONAL
All concerned agencies are permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g)

NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE PROBATION LAW FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS & PUSHERS


PADUA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 168546, 23 July 2008
Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not
guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of first time offenders as per Section 70[10] of Rep.
Act No. 9165. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Subsequently, he applied for probation [alleging that he is
a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under P.D. No. 968], but was
denied. Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that
under Section 24[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law.
RTC: No probation privilege due to Sec. 24
HELD: Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege of probation.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,
regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.
CA correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and
harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and
magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11and 15. The
law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as
predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law
on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.
Suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for
petitioners benefit.
Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 - once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence.

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Section 40 - once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order
execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years.
PADUA already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344

NEGATIVE ALLEGATION
Su Zhi Shan v. People
Unable to find digest online; To follow

LIMITED APPLICATION OF THE RPC ON RA 9165


PEOPLE v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 176735, 26 June 2008
Facts: On March 2003, two informations were filed against Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc for violating the provisions
of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Peoples version of the facts shows that the
Pasig City police conducted a buy-bust operation. The appellants opposed and claimed that there was no buy-bust
operation to speak of and that prior to their arrests, they were strangers to each other. The trial court rendered a
decision convicting the appellants for violating RA 9165. CA affirmed the decision. The CA ruled that the buy-bust
operation was legitimate and regular. The testimonies of the appellants and their witnesses contained irreconcilable
inconsistencies. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting them considering that the prosecution failed
to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests without warrant were not legally effected.
Issue: Whether or not the trial and the appellate court erred in their decision.
Held: No. For the successful prosecution of the offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Sec. 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must be proven: (a) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti. In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established. The
prosecution witnesses consistently testified that a buy-bust operation indeed took place, and the shabu subject of the
sale was presented and duly identified in open court. The poseur-buyer positively identified appellants as the persons
who sold the sachet containing shabu. It was also shown that Catoc knowingly carried with him shabu without legal
authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. As we have already declared the legality of the
buy-bust operation, it follows that the subsequent arrests were likewise legally effected. Any search resulting from the
lawful warrantless arrests was also valid because the appellants committed a crime in flagrante delicto. The trial court
also correctly held that there is conspiracy. The act of Santos in receiving the marked money from PO3 Luna and
handing the same to Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet of shabu to Santos to give to the policeman, revealed that
there is a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of conspiracy between the appellants.
PEOPLE v. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 170234, 8 Feb 2007
FACTS: In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, was
charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for allegedly having sold one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco.
During trial, the prosecution testified that the accused was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by the team of
PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig and SPO2 Zipagan through the information given by a
confidential informant, who went with the said team during the operation. Accused, however, refuted said claims,
saying that: 1) there was no buy-bust operation and that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) allegedly sold
by him to the poseur buyer was planted evidence; and 2) the trumped-up charge is a way of getting even with him
because he, together with his wife, had filed a case before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for grave
misconduct against several policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1 Christopher Semana and five John Does) assigned at
the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their house on 5 February
2002.
In support of his first argument, accused claimed that the non-conduct of a surveillance and the absence of any
agreement as regards the money to be used in buying the shabu and as regards the signal to inform the back-up
policemen that the transaction has been consummated shows that there is so much doubt as to the existence of a
buy-bust operation.
After trial, the lower court decided convicting the accused. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Are the non-conduct of surveillance and the absence of any agreement as regards the money to be used in
buying the shabu and as regards the signal to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has been
consummated essential to establish the existence of a buy-bust operation?
HELD: No. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the

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discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much
less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during
the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted
without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person who
is peddling the dangerous drugs.
The fact that the team leader and the other members of the team did not discuss or talk about the marked money
does not necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation. As explained by SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2
Damasco was the designated poseur buyer it was the latter's discretion as to how to prepare the marked money. It is
not required that all the members of the buy-bust team know how the marked money is to be produced and marked
inasmuch as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this Court sees it, the other members of
the team left the matter of the marked money to one person the poseur buyer because it was he who was to
deal directly with the drug pusher.
As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The employment of a
pre-arranged signal, or the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was,
indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. A buy-bust operation
is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In the case under consideration, all
these elements have been established.
------

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS


GAMBLING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1602
PRESCRIBING STIFFER PENALTIES ON ILLEGAL GAMBLING
WHEREAS, Philippine Gambling Laws such as Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code (Forms of Gambling and
Betting), R.A. 3063 (Horse racing Bookies), P.D. 449 (Cockfighting), P.D. 483 (Game Fixing), P.D. 510 (Slot
Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 of the Ministry of Justice, P.D. 1306 (Jai-Alai Bookies) and other City
and Municipal Ordinances or gambling all over the country prescribe penalties which are inadequate to discourage or
stamp out this pernicious activities;
WHEREAS, there is now a need to increase their penalties to make them more effective in combating this social
menace which dissipate the energy and resources of our people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree:
Section 1. Penalties. The following penalties are hereby imposed:
(a)
The penalty of prison correccional in its medium period of a fine ranging from one thousand to six thousand
pesos, and in case of recidivism, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period or a fine ranging from five
thousand to ten thousand pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person other than those referred to in the succeeding sub-sections who in any manner, shall directly or
indirectly take part in any illegal or unauthorized activities or games of cockfighting, jueteng, jai alai or horse racing to
include bookie operations and game fixing, numbers, bingo and other forms of lotteries; cara y cruz, pompiang and
the like; 7-11 and any game using dice; black jack, lucky nine, poker and its derivatives, monte, baccarat, cuajao,
pangguingue and other card games; paik que, high and low, mahjong, domino and other games using plastic tiles
and the likes; slot machines, roulette, pinball and other mechanical contraptions and devices; dog racing, boat racing,
car racing and other forms of races, basketball, boxing, volleyball, bowling, pingpong and other forms of individual or
team contests to include game fixing, point shaving and other machinations; banking or percentage game, or any
other game scheme, whether upon chance or skill, wherein wagers consisting of money, articles of value or
representative of value are at stake or made;
2. Any person who shall knowingly permit any form of gambling referred to in the preceding subparagraph to be
carried on in inhabited or uninhabited place or in any building, vessel or other means of transportation owned or
controlled by him. If the place where gambling is carried on has a reputation of a gambling place or that prohibited
gambling is frequently carried on therein, or the place is a public or government building or barangay hall, the
malfactor shall be punished by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of six thousand pesos.
(b)
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine of six thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon the maintainer or conductor of the above gambling schemes.
(c)
The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period with temporary absolute disqualification or a fine of six
thousand pesos shall be imposed if the maintainer, conductor or banker of said gambling schemes is a government

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official, or where such government official is the player, promoter, referee, umpire, judge or coach in case of game
fixing, point shaving and machination.
(d)
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period or a fine ranging from four hundred to two thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall, knowingly and without lawful purpose in any hour of any day,
possess any lottery list, paper or other matter containing letters, figures, signs or symbols pertaining to or in any
manner used in the games of jueteng, jai-alai or horse racing bookies, and similar games of lotteries and numbers
which have taken place or about to take place.
(e)
The penalty of temporary absolute disqualifications shall be imposed upon any barangay official who, with
knowledge of the existence of a gambling house or place in his jurisdiction fails to abate the same or take action in
connection therewith.
(f)
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine ranging from five hundred pesos to two
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any security officer, security guard, watchman, private or house detective of
hotels, villages, buildings, enclosures and the like which have the reputation of a gambling place or where gambling
activities are being held.
Section 2. Informer's reward. Any person who shall disclose information that will lead to the arrest and final conviction
of the malfactor shall be rewarded twenty percent of the cash money or articles of value confiscated or forfeited in
favor of the government.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. Provisions of Art. 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No.
3063, Presidential Decrees Numbered 483, 449, 510 and 1306, letters of instructions, laws, executive orders, rules
and regulations, city and municipal ordinances which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed.
Section 4. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication at least once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 9287 (APRIL 2, 2004)
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAMES, AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1602, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. It
is likewise the policy of the State that the promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Hence, the State hereby condemns the existence of illegal gambling activities such as illegal numbers games as this
has become an influential factor in an individual's disregard for the value of dignified work, perseverance and thrift
since instant monetary gains from it are being equated to success, thereby becoming a widespread social menace
and a source of corruption.
Towards this end, the State shall therefore adopt more stringent measures to stop and eradicate the existence of
illegal numbers games in any part of the country.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Illegal Numbers Game. - Any form illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or combinations thereof as factors
in giving out jackpots.
b) Jueteng. - An illegal numbers game that involves the combination of thirty-seven (37) numbers against thirty-seven
(37) numbers from number one (1) to thirty seven (37) or the combination of thirty-eight (38) numbers in some areas,
serving as a form of local lottery where bets are placed and accepted per combination, and its variants.
c) Masiao. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the results of the last game of
Jai Alai or the Special Llave portion or any result thereof based on any fictitious Jai Alai game consisting of ten (10)
players pitted against one another, and its variants.
d) Last Two. - An illegal numbers game where the winning combination is derived from the last two (2) numbers of
the first prize of the winning Sweepstakes ticket which comes out during the weekly draw of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and its variants.
e) Bettor ("Mananaya", "Tayador" or variants thereof). - Any person who places bets for himself/herself or in behalf of
another person, or any person, other than the personnel or staff of any illegal numbers game operation.
f) Personnel or Staff of Illegal Numbers Game Operation. - Any person, who acts in the interest of the maintainer,
manager or operator, such as, but not limited to, an accountant, cashier, checker, guard, runner, table manager,
usher, watcher, or any other personnel performing such similar functions in a building structure, vessel, vehicle, or
any other place where an illegal numbers game is operated or conducted.

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g) Collector or Agent ("Cabo", "Cobrador", "Coriador" or variants thereof). - Any person who collects, solicits or
produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling
paraphernalia.
h) Coordinator, Controller or Supervisor ("Encargado" or variants thereof). - Any person who exercises control and
supervision over the collector or agent.
i) Maintainer, Manager or Operator. - Any person who maintains, manages or operates any illegal number game in a
specific area from whom the coordinator, controller or supervisor, and collector or agent take orders.
j) Financiers or Capitalist. - Any person who finances the operations of any illegal numbers game.
k) Protector or Coddler. - Any person who lends or provides protection, or receives benefits in any manner in the
operation of any illegal numbers game.
Sec. 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer the following
penalties:
a) The penalty of imprisonment from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as a bettor;
b) The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such person acts as a
personnel or staff of an illegal numbers game operation;
The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to any person who allows his vehicle, house, building or land to be used
in the operation of the illegal numbers games.
c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such person acts as a
collector or agent;
d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if such person acts as a
coordinator, controller or supervisor;
e) The penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen (14) years, if such person
acts as a maintainer, manager or operator; and
f) The penalty of imprisonment from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years, if such person acts as
a financier or capitalist;
g) The penalty of imprisonment from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, if such person acts as
protector or coddler.
Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia or Materials. - The possession of any gambling paraphernalia and
other materials used in the illegal numbers game operation shall be deemed prima facie evidence of any offense
covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Liability of Government Employees and/or Public Officials. - a) If the collector, agent, coordinator, controller,
supervisor, maintainer, manager, operator, financier or capitalist of any illegal numbers game is a government
employee and/or public official, whether elected or appointed shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) to Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute disqualification from public office.
In addition to the penalty provided in the immediately preceding section, the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any local government official who, having knowledge of the
existence of the operation of any illegal numbers game in his/her jurisdiction, fails to abate or to take action, or
tolerates the same in connection therewith.
b) In the case of failure to apprehend perpetrators of any illegal numbers game, any law enforcer shall suffer an
administrative penalty of suspension or dismissal, as the case may be, to be imposed by the appropriate authority.
Sec. 6. Liability of Parents/Guardians. - The penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year or fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon any parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or ascendancy over
a minor, ward or incapacitated person, and not otherwise falling under any of the foregoing subsections, who induces
or causes such minor, ward or incapacitated person to commit any of the offenses punishable in this Act. Upon
conviction, the parent, guardian or person exercising moral authority or ascendancy over the minor, ward or
incapacitated person shall be deprived of his/her authority over such person in addition to the penalty imposed.
Sec. 7. Recidivism. - The penalty next higher in degree as provided for under Section 3 hereof shall be imposed upon
a recidivist who commits any of the offenses punishable in this Act.
Sec. 8. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any person who serves as a witness for the government or provides evidence in
a criminal case involving any violation of this Act, or who voluntarily or by virtue of a subpoena testificandum or duces
tecum, produces, identifies, or gives testimony shall be immune from any criminal prosecution, subject to the
compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1732, otherwise known as Decree Providing Immunity from
Criminal Prosecution to Government Witnesses and the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

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Sec. 9. Prosecution, Judgment and Forfeiture of Property. - Any person may be charged with or convicted of the
offenses covered by this Act without prejudice to the prosecution of any act or acts penalized under the Revised
Penal Code or existing laws.
During the pendency of the case, no property or income used or derived therefrom which may be confiscated and
forfeited shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be
admitted for the release of the same.
The trial prosecutors shall avail of provisional remedies provided for under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Upon conviction, all proceeds, gambling paraphernalia and other instruments of the crime including any real or
personal property used in any illegal numbers game operation shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
All assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him/her in his/her name or in the name of another
person found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to be proceeds
of the offense and shall likewise be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
Sec. 10. Witness Protection. - Any person who provides material information, whether testimonial or documentary,
necessary for the investigation or prosecution of individuals committing any of the offenses under Sections 3, 4, 5 and
6 herein shall be placed under the Witness Protection Program pursuant to Republic Act. No. 6981.
Sec. 11. Informer's Reward. - Any person who, having knowledge or information of any offense committed under this
Act and who shall disclose the same which may lead to the arrest and final conviction of the offender, may be
rewarded a certain percentage of the cash money or articles of value confiscated or forfeited in favor of the
government, which shall be determined through a policy guideline promulgated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
coordination with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).
The DILG, the NAPOLCOM and the DOJ shall provide for a system of rewards and incentives for law enforcement
officers and for local government official for the effective implementation of this Act.
Sec. 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act, the DILG, DOJ,
NAPOLCOM, and other concerned government agencies shall jointly promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations, as may be necessary to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 13. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any section or provision of this Act, or any portion thereof, or the
application of such section, provision or portion thereof to any person, group or circumstance is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of this Act shall not be affected by such declaration and shall remain in
force and effect.
Sec. 14. Amendatory Clause. - The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1602, in so far as they are
inconsistent herewith, are hereby expressly amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 15. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Sec. 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.

IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS


PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 960 (JULY 14, 1976)
AMENDING ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, it is the obligation of the State to safeguard the morality of society, particularly the youth, against the
eroding influence of immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows;
WHEREAS, in order to arrest the proliferation of such doctrines, publications, exhibitions and shows, it is necessary
to amend the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land, the following:
Section 1. Amendment of Article 201, Revised Penal Code. Article 201 of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and
fifteen, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, is hereby amended to read as follows;
"Art. 201.
Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of
prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine,
shall be imposed upon:
"1.

Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

"2.
The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form, the editors publishing such
literature, and the owners/operators of the book store or other establishments selling the same;

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"3.
Those who in theaters, fairs cinematographs or any other place, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, including the following:
"(a) Films which tend to incite subversion, insurrection or rebellion against the State;
"(b) Films which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their Government and/or duly constituted
authorities;
"(c) Films which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
"(d) Films which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography;
"(e) Films which offend any race or religion;
"(f) Films which tend to abet traffic in the use of prohibited drugs;
"(g) Films contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees, edicts,
and any or all films which in the judgment of the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures or other agency established by
the Government to oversee such motion pictures are objectionable on some other legal or moral grounds.
"4.
Those who shall sell, give away of exhibit prints, engravings, sculptures or literature which are offensive to
morals."
Section 2. Confiscation of articles. The literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings, or other materials and
articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed.
Section 3. Jurisdiction. Violations of Section 1 hereof shall be subject to trial by the military tribunals and the
offenders shall be subject to arrest and detention pursuant to existing laws, decrees, orders and instructions
promulgated pursuant to Proclamations No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973.
Section 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:
1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section 1 hereof, the penalty
shall be imposed in the maximum period and in addition, the accessory penalties provided for in the Revised Penal
Code, as amended shall likewise be imposed.
2. The license or permit of the theater, cinematograph or other place or establishment where the violation has been
committed shall be canceled temporarily or permanently, depending upon the gravity of the violation as determined
by the proper military tribunal.
Section 5. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication by the Department of
Information in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila this 14th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 969 (JULY 24, 1976)
AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 960 WHICH AMENDED ARTICLE 201 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution,
do hereby decree and order:
Section 1. Sections 1 and 2 paragraph 1 of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 960 are hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 1. Amendment of Article 201, Revised Penal Code. Article 201 of Act Numbered Thirty-Eight hundred and
fifteen, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, is amended to read as follows:
"Art. 201.
Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:
"1.

Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

"2. a.
The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
"b.
Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or
condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any
race religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

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"3.
Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive
to morals.
"Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures,
painting, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following
rules:
"a.

Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed.

"b.
Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in acquittal, the obscene/immoral
literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation referred
to in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture
proceedings conducted as the Chief of Constabulary.
"c.
The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after
his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision
of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable.
"Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows:
"1.
In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section 1 hereof, the
penalty as provided herein shall be imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be imposed."
Section 2. To be inserted between Sections 4 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 960 is Section 4-A to read as follows:
"Sec. 4-A.
The Chief of Constabulary shall, with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this decree."
Section 3. This decree shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication by the Department of Public Information
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 24th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.
PEOPLE v. KOTTINGER
45 PHIL 352
FACTS: On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110
Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J.
Kottinger, the manager of the company.The information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the
store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. To this
information, the defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an offense and were not contrary to law; but trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly
excepted thereto. Following the presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense, judgment was
rendered finding the defendant guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can
be seen in the regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.
HELD: NO. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of
persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all
the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card
pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines.The prosecution produced no evidence proving the
postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact.
The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, decency,
or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in
determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another
test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
The Philippine statute (Philippine Libel Law) does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings,
papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common used
and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the
pictures themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a
picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case.
FERNANDO v. CA
G.R. No. 159751, 6 Dec 2006

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FACTS: On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search
Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando
and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler, IOU
magazine, and VHS tapes.
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to
the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and
confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to present evidence. The RTC acquitted
Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos.
The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on certiorari and assailed the CA decision.
They assigned the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at the time of the raid.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they were selling pornographic
materials. Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene
materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials.
Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.
The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held liable
under Article 201, and petitioner Fernandos ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the
Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited materials and liable under the Information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the accused's conviction
HELD: NO. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the
regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a)
the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave
away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
People v. Kottinger-.obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to
determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall.
Also, that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. The disclaimer was whether a
picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is
to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.
Go Pin- If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be
viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures
here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the
supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or
minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their
exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the
privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and
galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and
taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position
to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.
Padan- An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In
it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense
to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence
specially on the youth of the land.
Katigbak- the Court measures obscenity in terms of the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole rather
than in isolated passages.
Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court recognized that Kottinger failed to
afford a conclusive definition of obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions than
answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to
art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or that if they find
inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene. Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too
much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and two-cents worths among judges as to
what is obscene or what is art.
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy jurisprudence is on
obscenity and how jurisprudence actually failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of
human civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences,

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and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. It seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of
obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in
determining what is patently offensive. No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive hard core sexual conduct. Ie offensive
descriptions of sex acts.
What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to
case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this Court,
unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials? We emphasize that mere
possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article
201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The
offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The mayors permit shows that
Fernando was the owner of the store.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene
materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search,
identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was served.
NOGALES ET AL v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 191080, 21 Nov 2011
Facts: On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry Meez(SI Meez) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him and his fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to search
the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and
take into custody the items/articles/objects enumerated in his application. That he has been informed, verily believes
and personally verified that JUN NICOLAS, LOREN NUESTRA, FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES, MELINDA P.
NOGALES, PRISCILA B. CABRERA and/or occupants PHIL-PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES CORP. located
at Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila have in their
possession/control and are concealed in the above-mentioned premises various material[s] used in the creation and
selling of pornographic internet website, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Computer Sets
Television Sets,
Internet Servers,
Fax Machines,
Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials ,
Web Cameras,
Telephone Sets,
Photocopying Machines,
List of clients, and
Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.

On the same date of the hearing, the application was granted and the corresponding Search Warrant,[5] issued.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Return Seized Properties.[7] In the said motion, petitioners cited the following grounds:
On December 26, 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed August 6, 2008 Order of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the removal and
destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials.
Held: Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject law. The CA was
lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs and softwares, which were initially ordered
to be retained by the NBI, should be released in their favor with only the hard disk removed from the CPUs and
destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be violative of Article 201 of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should
also be forfeited and destroyed in the manner allowed by law. The law is clear. Only licensed softwares that can be
used for legitimate purposes should be returned to petitioners.
To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.

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Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks and the
softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the purpose of minimizing if not totally
eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those engaged in any way in the proliferation of pornography
or obscenity in this country. The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property
rights must be balanced with the welfare of the public in general. The hard disk drives containing the pornographic
materials and the softwares used in any way in violation of Article 201 of the RPC.

TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208 (MAY 26, 2003)
AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND
SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees the respect of individual rights. In pursuit of this policy, the State shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures and development of programs that will promote human dignity, protect the people from any
threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for involuntary migration
and servitude of persons, not only to support trafficked persons but more importantly, to ensure their recovery,
rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society.
It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men as enshrined in
the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families. United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children and all other relevant and universally accepted human rights instruments
and other international conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be
considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.
(b) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully
take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery refer to the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral
ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
(e) Sex Tourism refers to a program organized by travel and tourism-related establishments and individuals which
consists of tourism packages or activities, utilizing and offering escort and sexual services as enticement for tourists.
This includes sexual services and practices offered during rest and recreation periods for members of the military.
(f) Sexual Exploitation refers to participation by a person in prostitution or the production of pornographic materials
as a result of being subjected to a threat, deception, coercion, abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt bondage,
fraud or through abuse of a victims vulnerability.
(g) Debt Bondage refers to the pledging by the debtor of his/her personal services or labor or those of a person
under his/her control as security or payment for a debt, when the length and nature of services is not clearly defined
or when the value of the services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt.
(h) Pornography refers to any representation, through publication, exhibition, cinematography, indecent shows,
information technology, or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or
any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual purposes.
(i) Council shall mean the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act.

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Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the
following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration, any person or, as provided
for under Republic Act No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring,
buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading
them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or activities for the purpose of
utilizing and offering persons for prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person, by means of threat or use of force, fraud, deceit, violence,
coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person; and
(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or abroad.
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. The following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking in
persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons;
(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued, tampered or fake counseling certificates, registration stickers
and certificates of any government agency which issues these certificates and stickers as proof of compliance with
government regulatory and pre-departure requirements for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute, or cause the advertisement, publication, printing, broadcasting
or distribution by any means, including the use of information technology and the internet, of any brochure, flyer, or
any propaganda material that promotes trafficking in persons;
(d) To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of facilitating the acquisition of clearances and
necessary exit documents from government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-departure registration and
services for departing persons for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at international and local airports,
territorial boundaries and seaports who are in possession of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel documents for
the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport, travel documents, or personal documents or belongings of
trafficked persons in furtherance of trafficking or to prevent them from leaving the country or seeking redress from the
government or appropriate agencies; and
(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or otherwise, or make use of, the labor or services of a person held to a
condition of involuntary servitude, forced labor, or slavery.
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
(b) When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995 and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;

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(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane,
suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS).
Section 6. Confidentiality. At any stage of the investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense under this Act, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as parties to the case,
shall recognize the right to privacy of the trafficked person and the accused. Towards this end, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors and judges to whom the complaint has been referred may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair
and impartial proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for the best interest of the parties, order a closeddoor investigation, prosecution or trial. The name and personal circumstances of the trafficked person or of the
accused, or any other information tending to establish their identities and such circumstances or information shall not
be disclosed to the public.
In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind closed-doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and
reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio, producer and
director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person utilizing tri-media facilities or information technology to
cause publicity of any case of trafficking in persons.
Section 8. Prosecution of Cases. Any person who has personal knowledge of the commission of any offense under
this Act, the trafficked person, the parents, spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian may file a complaint for
trafficking.
Section 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from violation of this Act shall be filed where the offense was committed,
or where any of its elements occurred, or where the trafficked person actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion
of other courts.
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses
enumerated in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than
Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
(d) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(e) If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association, club, establishment or any juridical person, the penalty
shall be imposed upon the owner, president, partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who participated in the
commission of the crime or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its commission;
(f) The registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and license to operate of the erring agency,
corporation, association, religious group, tour or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of entertainment
shall be cancelled and revoked permanently. The owner, president, partner or manager thereof shall not be allowed
to operate similar establishments in a different name;
(g) If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported after serving his sentence and be barred
permanently from entering the country;
(h) Any employee or official of government agencies who shall issue or approve the issuance of travel exit
clearances, passports, registration certificates, counseling certificates, marriage license, and other similar documents
to persons, whether juridical or natural, recruitment agencies, establishments or other individuals or groups, who fail
to observe the prescribed procedures and the requirement as provided for by laws, rules and regulations, shall be
held administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The concerned government official or
employee shall, upon conviction, be dismissed from the service and be barred permanently to hold public office.
His/her retirement and other benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and

(i) Conviction by final judgment of the adopter for any offense under this Act shall result in the immediate rescission of
the decree of adoption.
Section 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. Any person who buys or engages the services of trafficked persons for
prostitution shall be penalized as follows:
(a) First offense six (6) months of community service as may be determined by the court and a fine of Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00); and

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(b) Second and subsequent offenses imprisonment of one (1) year and a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00).
Section 12. Prescriptive Period. Trafficking cases under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided,
however, That trafficking cases committed by a syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section 6 shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years.
The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day on which the trafficked person is delivered or released
from the conditions of bondage and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused.
Section 13. Exemption from Filing Fees. - When the trafficked person institutes a separate civil action for the recovery
of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt from the payment of filing fees.
Section 14. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds and Instruments Derived from Trafficking in Persons. In
addition to the penalty imposed for the violation of this Act, the court shall order the confiscation and forfeiture, in
favor of the government, of all the proceeds and properties derived from the commission of the crime, unless they are
the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards for damages shall be
taken from the personal and separate properties of the offender; Provided, further, That if such properties are
insufficient, the balance shall be taken from the confiscated and forfeited properties.
When the proceeds, properties and instruments of the offense have been destroyed, diminished in value or otherwise
rendered worthless by any act or omission, directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been concealed, removed,
converted or transferred to prevent the same from being found or to avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall
be ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the proceeds, property or instruments of the offense.
Section 15. Trust Fund. All fines imposed under this Act and the proceeds and properties forfeited and confiscated
pursuant to Section 14 hereof shall accrue to a Trust Fund to be administered and managed by the Council to be
used exclusively for programs that will prevent acts of trafficking and protect, rehabilitate, reintegrate trafficked
persons into the mainstream of society. Such programs shall include, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Provision for mandatory services set forth in Section 23 of this Act;
(b) Sponsorship of a national research program on trafficking and establishment of a data collection system for
monitoring and evaluation purposes;
(c) Provision of necessary technical and material support services to appropriate government agencies and nongovernment organizations (NGOs);
(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars to provide venue for consensus building amongst the public, the
academe, government, NGOs and international organizations; and
(e) Promotion of information and education campaign on trafficking.
Section 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in Persons. The government shall establish and implement
preventive, protective and rehabilitative programs for trafficked persons. For this purpose, the following agencies are
hereby mandated to implement the following programs;
(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) shall make available its resources and facilities overseas for trafficked
persons regardless of their manner of entry to the receiving country, and explore means to further enhance its
assistance in eliminating trafficking activities through closer networking with government agencies in the country and
overseas, particularly in the formulation of policies and implementation of relevant programs.
The DFA shall take necessary measures for the efficient implementation of the Machine Readable Passports to
protect the integrity of Philippine passports, visas and other travel documents to reduce the incidence of trafficking
through the use of fraudulent identification documents.
It shall establish and implement a pre-marriage, on-site and pre-departure counseling program on intermarriages.
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall implement rehabilitative and protective programs
for trafficked persons. It shall provide counseling and temporary shelter to trafficked persons and develop a system
for accreditation among NGOs for purposes of establishing centers and programs for intervention in various levels of
the community.
(c) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall ensure the strict implementation and compliance with the
rules and guidelines relative to the employment of persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise monitor, document
and report cases of trafficking in persons involving employers and labor recruiters.
(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) shall ensure the prosecution of persons accused of trafficking and designate and
train special prosecutors who shall handle and prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a mechanism for
free legal assistance for trafficked persons, in coordination with the DSWD, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and other NGOs and volunteer groups.

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(e) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall actively participate and coordinate in the
formulation and monitoring of policies addressing the issue of trafficking in persons in coordination with relevant
government agencies. It shall likewise advocate for the inclusion of the issue of trafficking in persons in both its local
and international advocacy for womens issues.
(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) shall strictly administer and enforce immigration and alien administration laws. It shall
adopt measures for the apprehension of suspected traffickers both at the place of arrival and departure and shall
ensure compliance by the Filipino fiancs/fiances and spouses of foreign nationals with the guidance and
counseling requirement as provided for in this Act.
(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) shall be the primary law enforcement agency to undertake surveillance,
investigation and arrest of individuals or persons suspected to be engaged in trafficking. It shall closely coordinate
with various law enforcement agencies to secure concerted efforts for effective investigation and apprehension of
suspected traffickers. It shall also establish a system to receive complaints and calls to assist trafficked persons and
conduct rescue operations.
(h) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall implement an effective pre-employment
orientation seminars and pre-departure counseling programs to applicants for overseas employment. It shall likewise
formulate a system of providing free legal assistance to trafficked persons.
(i) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall institute a systematic information and prevention
campaign and likewise maintain a databank for the effective monitoring, documentation and prosecution of cases on
trafficking in persons.
(j) Local government units (LGUs) shall monitor and document cases of trafficking in persons in their areas of
jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of licenses of establishments which violate the provisions of this Act and ensure
effective prosecution of such cases. They shall also undertake an information campaign against trafficking in persons
through the establishment of the Migrants Advisory and Information Network (MAIN) desks in municipalities or
provinces in coordination with DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA), Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO),
NGOs and other concerned agencies. They shall encourage and support community based initiatives which address
the trafficking in persons.
In implementing this Act, the agencies concerned may seek and enlist the assistance of NGOs, peoples
organizations (Pos), civic organizations and other volunteer groups.
Section 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. - Trafficked persons shall be recognized as victims of the act or
acts of trafficking and as such shall not be penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of trafficking enumerated in
this Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this regard, the consent of a
trafficked person to the intended exploitation set forth in this Act shall be irrelevant.
Section 18. Preferential Entitlement Under the Witness Protection Program. Any provision of Republic Act No. 6981
to the contrary notwithstanding, any trafficked person shall be entitled to the witness protection program provided
therein.
Section 19. Trafficked Persons Who are Foreign Nationals. Subject to the guidelines issued by the Council,
trafficked persons in the Philippines who are nationals of a foreign country shall also be entitled to appropriate
protection, assistance and services available to trafficked persons under this Act: Provided, That they shall be
permitted continued presence in the Philippines for a length of time prescribed by the Council as necessary to effect
the prosecution of offenders.
Section 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking, to be composed of the Secretary of the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the following as members:
(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;
(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment;
(c) Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration;
(d) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;
(e) Director-General, Philippine National Police;
(f) Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women; and
(g) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who shall be composed of one (1) representative each from among the
sectors representing women, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and children, with a proven record of involvement in
the prevention and suppression of trafficking in persons. These representatives shall be nominated by the
government agency representatives of the Council, for appointment by the President for a term of three (3) years.
The members of the Council may designate their permanent representatives who shall have a rank not lower than an
assistant secretary or its equivalent to meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council
in accordance with existing budget and accounting, rules and regulations.
Section 21. Functions of the Council. The Council shall have the following powers and functions:

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
(a) Formulate a comprehensive and integrated program to prevent and suppress the trafficking in persons;
(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of this Act;
(c) Monitor and oversee the strict implementation of this Act;
(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the various member agencies to effectively address the issues and
problems attendant to trafficking in persons;
(e) Coordinate the conduct of massive information dissemination and campaign on the existence of the law and the
various issues and problems attendant to trafficking through the LGUs, concerned agencies, and NGOs;
(f) Direct other agencies to immediately respond to the problems brought to their attention and report to the Council
on action taken;
(g) Assist in filing of cases against individuals, agencies, institutions or establishments that violate the provisions of
this Act;
(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of trafficked persons in cooperation with DOLE, DSWD, Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), LGUs and NGOs;
(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government or from NGOs and other
civic organizations such assistance as may be needed to effectively implement this Act;
(j) Complement the shared government information system for migration established under Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 with data on cases of trafficking in
persons, and ensure that the proper agencies conduct a continuing research and study on the patterns and scheme
of trafficking in persons which shall form the basis for policy formulation and program direction;
(k) Develop the mechanism to ensure the timely, coordinated, and effective response to cases of trafficking in
persons;
(l) Recommend measures to enhance cooperative efforts and mutual assistance among foreign countries through
bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements to prevent and suppress international trafficking in persons;
(m) Coordinate with the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI), and other NGOs in monitoring the promotion of advertisement of trafficking in the internet;
(n) Adopt measures and policies to protect the rights and needs of trafficked persons who are foreign nationals in the
Philippines;
(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and providing the necessary intervention or assistance to trafficked
persons; and
(p) Exercise all the powers and perform such other functions necessary to attain the purposes and objectives of this
Act.
Section 22. Secretariat to the Council. The Department of Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the
Council.
Section 23. Mandatory Services to Trafficked Persons. To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the
mainstream of society, concerned government agencies shall make available the following services to trafficked
persons:
(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free legal services which shall include information about the victims rights and the procedure for filing complaints,
claiming compensation and such other legal remedies available to them, in a language understood by the trafficked
person;
(d) Medical or psychological services;
(e) Livelihood and skills training; and
(f) Educational assistance to a trafficked child.
Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration of the trafficked persons shall be adopted and carried out.
Section 24. Other Services for Trafficked Persons. (a) Legal Assistance. Trafficked persons shall be considered under the category Overseas Filipino in Distress and
may avail of the legal assistance created by Republic Act No. 8042, subject to the guidelines as provided by law.

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(b) Overseas Filipino Resource Centers. The services available to overseas Filipinos as provided for by Republic
Act No. 8042 shall also be extended to trafficked persons regardless of their immigration status in the host country.
(c) The Country Team Approach. The country team approach under Executive Order No. 74 of 1993, shall be the
operational scheme under which Philippine embassies abroad shall provide protection to trafficked persons insofar as
the promotion of their welfare, dignity and fundamental rights are concerned.
Section 25. Repatriation of Trafficked Persons. - The DFA, in coordination with DOLE and other appropriate
agencies, shall have the primary responsibility for the repatriation of trafficked persons, regardless of whether they
are documented or undocumented.
If, however, the repatriation of the trafficked persons shall expose the victims to greater risks, the DFA shall make
representation with the host government for the extension of appropriate residency permits and protection, as may be
legally permissible in the host country.
Section 26. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with DFA, shall endeavor to include offenses of trafficking in
persons among extraditable offenses.
Section 27. Reporting Requirements. The Council shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to Congress
an annual report of the policies, programs and activities relative to the implementation of this Act.
Section 28. Funding. - The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall immediately include in their
programs and issue such rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act, the funding of which shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 29. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Council shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 30. Non-restriction of Freedom of Speech and of Association, Religion and the Right to Travel. - Nothing in
this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of speech and of association, religion and the right to travel
for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section 31. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.
Section 32. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That this
Act shall not in any way amend or repeal the provision of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
Section 33. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS


PUBLIC OFFICER
LAUREL v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 145368, 12 Apr 2002
Facts: Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission,
a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed
as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged
anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this
petition for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp
is a private corporation.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer
Held: Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an
office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said
office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it
is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was
characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not
receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no
part of the office.

BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
MANIPON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
143 SCRA 267
Facts: Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch
IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to
ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay LongogTabek and
the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch
[Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez but did not inform the labor arbiter of the
garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told
Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn. However, on December 27, 1979, Manipon told Dominguez that
he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year. Dominguez interpreted this to mean
that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration.
Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to
entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Manipon was charged with direct bribery under the
Revised Penal Code.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense theory that
there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
Held: Yes. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following
elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present,
offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4)
that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. 14 The promise of a public officer to
perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or implied.
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-142879. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the
same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had
already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the
corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn
immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's
office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not
informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC
concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express
terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez
to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
DACUMAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
143 SCRA 267
To follow; Kanino ito?
LAUREL v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 145368, 12 Apr 2002
To follow; New digest on bribery and corruption of public officials

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION


ALMEDA v. PEREZ
5 SCRA 970
To follow Capa
CABAL v. KAPUNAN
6 SCRA 1059
Facts: Petitioner Cabal, then-Chief of staff of the AFP; faced an administrative case against him after a complaint,
member of the Philippine army, charged the former of violation R.A. 1379. The Committee in-charge of hearing the
case required petitioner to take the stand and testify. However, the petitioner desisted since it would violate his right
against self-incrimination. Thru the fiscal, a charge of contempt was files against the petitioner. The petitioner assails
the charge in this case.
HELD/RATIO: The petitioner cannot be forced to testify since it would violate his right to self-incrimination. The
administrative case seeks to punish the accused by forfeiting the items should he be adjudged guilty. As such, the
nature of the case is criminal. In a criminal case, the accused cannot be forced to testify.

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REPUBLIC v. CA
172 SCRA 296
Facts: Spouses Berdon were charged of unexplained wealth under R.A. 1379. Husband Berdon, an assistant civil
engineer of the DPWH, and wife, a pharmacist, acquired parcels of land and constructed a house. The amount is
said to be disproportionate to their income. The RTC dismissed the case. Likewise, CA found nothing to reverse.
Hence, the Republic made this appeal.
HELD/RATIO: The courts are not bound by the statement of assets and liabilities in determining whether a wealth is
unexplained under the language of R.A. 1739. it was satisfactorily explained how the spouses acquired the money for
the purchase of parcels of land and the construction of a house. The money cam from loans and donations.
MORFE v. MUTUC
22 SCRA 424
FACTS: Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees
from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state
policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." Nor was it the first statute of its
kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the postwar era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully
acquired by any public officer or employee. One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
of 1960is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar:.."
ISSUE: WoN the provision is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy
HELD: No.
RATIO: The intention of the Act and its provision is to minimize the opportunities for corruption to prosper in
government and to maintain a transparency that will allow the people to be vigilant regarding the leaders that they
choose. This requirement of periodical submission of statements of assets and liabilities seem to have a rational fit
with the objectives of the statute and since it is well within the power of the government to impose such a
requirement, then the statute and its provision is valid.
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure
of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship
such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection
of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family
expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional
intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
The provision is not violative of the rule against self-incrimination because if the law which makes a person operating
a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or property, stop and give his name, residence,
and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer is invalid, because such information, although in itself
no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which
involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. This is untenable.
The provision cannot be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to
remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as
laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law."
JARAVATA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
172 SCRA 296
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 873
**Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
**The crime was committed allegedly on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25,1979, in the Municipality
of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines.
**Jaravata was the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High School. Using his influence as
a public official and taking advantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with

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deliberate intent did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments
from other classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELABAUTISTA, and
FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00,P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary
differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the release of the salary differentials of the six
classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS
**Jaravata was charged before the Sandiganbayan where he found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE (1)
YEAR, is minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, as maximum, and to further suffer perpetual special disqualification from
public office and to pay the costs.
**No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing that the money given to the accused was already refunded by
him. The petition raises factual and legal issues but for obvious reasons Our decision shall deal with the legal issue
only.
The Sandiganbayan states in its decision the following:
A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense showsthat there is no dispute that
[complainants] Ramos, Lloren, Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones
Barangay High School with accused as their assistant principal and [Conrado Baltazar as the administrator; that on
January 5, 1979, accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary differentials
for 1978 and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers
in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses; that
accused incurred expenses in the total amount of P220.00 and there being six classroom teachers, he divided said
amount by six or at the rate of P36.00 each; that the classroom teachers actually received their salary differentials
and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts
but as Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to him by Lopez, Dacayanan,
Dulay and Bautista, and accused complied (Pp. 7-8.)
The decision also recites that "the evidence is overwhelming to show that accused received more than the rightful
contribution of P36.00 from four classroom teachers, namely: Lopez, Dulay, Dacayanan and Bautista. Lopez
categorically declared that he gave the accused P100.00 (TSN, p. 5, August 21, 1980 hearing) after he received his
salary differential or an excess of P64.00. So with Dulay, that he gave P70.00 to the accused (TSN, p. 16, supra) or
an excess of P34.00; Dacayanan, that he gave to the accused P118.00 (TSN, p. 26, supra) or an excess of P82.00,
and Bautista, that he gave to the accused P50.00 (TSN, p. 38, supra) or an excess of P14.00. In short, the total
amount received by the accused in excess of the share of the classroom teachers in the reimbursement of his
expenses is P194.00. "(P. 9.)
ISSUE: Whether or not, under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the provisionSection 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019
HELD: No.
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the following:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage,or benefit, for himself or for any
other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
**There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even normal from the government."
**It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants
was in the concept of a gift or benefit.
**The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of
Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for
1978 of the complainants. It should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment
accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the
part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses.
**The Court opined that Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by
law in a contract or transaction.
**There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of
the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a
supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be
said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary
differentials.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the
petitioner is set aside. Costs de oficio.
TRIESTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
145 SCRA 508
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Trieste, Sr. was charged with 12 violations of Sec. 3, par. H of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019) by the Sandiganbayan. Trieste as Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of Numancia,
Aklan, Trieste had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and his approval is required in the
disbursements of municipal funds. It was alleged that as mayor, he awarded the purchase, supply and delivery of
construction materials by his municipality to Tri-gen Agro-Industrial Corporation, of which he is the president,
incorporator, director and major stockholder. He authorized the payment to said corporation by affixing his signature
to certain vouchers.
ISSUES: 1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering
purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the
former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the
knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? NO
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official
capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law? NO
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the
Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was
undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? NO to both
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation long before the questioned transactions? YES
HELD: Held in favor of acquittal.
RATIO:
1-2. Petitioners signature is not the kind of intervention contemplated by Sec 3(h). There should be active
intervention to the transaction to which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order for liability to attach. The
transaction in this case was an emergency contract (there was no bidding held hence no room for petitioner to
intervene in Trigens favor. There is no evidence that he used his influence or his authority in having the transactions
given to Trigen particularly since he signed the vouchers only after payment.
3. Trigen also did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction. Trigen has been dealing with the municipal govt
even before the petitioner assumed mayorship. Also, personal canvasses conducted found that Trigens offer was the
lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the community.4. Petitioner has already divested himself of his
interest in Trigen by selling his shares to his sister before assuming office, and there is no requirement to report to the
SEC.
RA 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
(h)Director or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any
law from having any interest.
DISPOSITION: The decision and resolution of Sandiganbayan is reversed and petitioner is acquitted of offenses
charged against him.
MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
151 SCRA 399
FACTS: Mejorada was the right-of-way agent of the Office of the Highway District Engineer tasked to facilitate
negotiations regarding the compensation to be received by property owners affected by highway constructions or
improvements. The widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road affected the house and lot of 8 property
owners and were thus approached by Mejorada to work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots.
Hemade them sign a blank Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties and
Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct Improvements. In the said documents, he made it appear that
the values of the properties and improvements therein were higher than their actual values. After processing their
claims, he accompanied the property owners to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to claim their PNB checks.
He also went with them to the PNB to encash these and then led them to his car where he divested all of them of the
amounts paid leaving only P1,000 per person except to one to which he left P5,000. He told the property owners that

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the payments made to them were to be shared to other persons as well. The claimants were helpless at that point
because according to them, Mejorada was accompanied by armed individuals.
The Fiscal filed 8 informations stating these facts accusing him of violating RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty and sentenced him to 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment.
ISSUE: WON the elements of the crime were present
HELD: Yes. Mejorada quotes Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 arguing that it cannot be applied to him because it only mentions
that: This provision shall apply to offices and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The Court said that before the enumeration in Section 3, the
reference toany public officer was unqualified. The last sentence in paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which under the ordinary concept of public
officers, may not come within the term. (FIRST ELEMENT)
Mejorada also alleges that his actions have not caused any injury or damage to the Government because the
payments were made on the basis of the document made by the Highway District Engineer to which the petitioner
had no hand in preparing. The Court said that the inflation of the true claims of the property owners caused damage
to the Government in the form of added expense in the compensation released from its budget. It cannot be said that
he had no participation in the preparation of the document because as right-of-way agent, it was his job to accomplish
these documents during or after negotiations with property owners. (SECOND ELEMENT)
Finally, Mejorada claims that the acts complained of must be done in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for him to be liable.
According to him, his acts would merely constitute robbery as he was no longer in the discharge of his duties when
he performed the acts. The court ruled that his actions were all part of the scheme he concocted and that he couldnt
have done all those if he was not using his position as right-of way agent.
SEGOVIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 124067, 27 Mar 1998
SUMMARY: Segovia, et al were designated as members of the Contracts Committee of NPC for the Mindanao Grid
Projects. A bidding was held. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D,
and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively. Joint Venture was disqualified but instead of awarding the
project to Urban it was also disqualified and a failure of bidding was declared. Subsequently, the project was
cancelled. Urban charged Segovia, et al with violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After a preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case thus a case was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution placing Segovia, et al, under preventive suspension of 90 days. Segovia, et al
questioned it claiming that preventive suspension is not mandatory but is subject to the sound discretion of the court.
Also, their suspension is no longer necessary because the project was already cancelled, they are no longer involved
in the awarding of bids, and that all documents necessary for the investigation were already submitted. SC declared
that preventive suspension is mandatory and that it is also intended to prevent the accused from committing further
acts of malfeasance while in office.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing
conducted for that purpose. (Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, and Luciano, et al vs. Mariano)
FACTS: NPC Board designated petitioners Segovia, Santiago, Pangilinan (all 3 are executive officials), Pastoral and
Vales (the 2 already resigned) to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPCs Mindanao Grid LDC &
SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project. The Contracts Committee thus constituted
conducted the prequalification and bidding procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were
the Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively.
The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC reviewed all the bids submitted and recommended approval
of the results. The contracts Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified after
verification from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that group, as well as the second lowest bidder
(Urban) had been downgraded, thereby rending both ineligible as bidders. Later on, NPC Board declared a failure of
bidding direct a re-bidding. The recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for reasons not
appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was eventually cancelled.
Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
the Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors of NPC, and the Chairman and Members of the Contracts
Committee. Urban alleged that before the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts Committee,
without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding
and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC was already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture but
because Urban protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former; however, intead of awarding the contract
for the project to Urban as the second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of bidding
and ultimately cancelled the project. These acts, it is claimed, constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsmans Office, the Graft Investigation Officer submitted
a Resolution recommending, among others, that petitioners Segovia, et al be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 of having in one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. The ombudsman approved this recommendation. An information
was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia, et al.

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Petioners Segovia, et al sought and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no benefit thereby.
The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The accused were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty; and a
pre-trial was held. Earlier, a Motion to Suspend the accused pendent lite was filed invoking Section 13 of RA 3019
alleging that the information/s is/are valid. Petitioners Segovia, et al opposed the motion. They theorized that the
explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. They claimed that the
admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in no unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; the 3 remaining
were occupying positions not related to prequalification of contractors, biddings or awards as they were only ad hoc
members of the Contracts Committee, and their suspension might cause delay of vital projects of the NPC; and that
under the circumstances obtaining, they were in no position to tamper with any evidence. Also, all relevant
documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or the Sandiganbayan.
In short, It is petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section rest in the sound discretion of the
Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory language of the statute, and that that discretion was gravely
abused by the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed their suspension
Petitioners opposition was overruled. Sandiganbayan] handed down its Resolution suspending them for a period of
ninety (90) days. The Sandiganbayan held that the suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a
proper preliminary investigation had been conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with
any of the crimes specified in the law; and stressed that its authority and power to suspend the accused had been
repeatedly upheld in several precedents. It subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition of the preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public
officers who stand accused before it, pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)?
RULING: It is mandatory. The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of
the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. (Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, and Luciano,
et al vs. Mariano)
RATIO: There is no grave abuse of discretion. In ordering the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan did but
adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a mass of jurispudence emanating from this Court,
sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the
theory of discretionary suspension should still be advocated to this late date, despite the mass of jurisprudence
relevant to the issue, it little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial
pronouncements of the Highest court of the land.
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public
officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan: Preventive suspension was not penal in character but merely a preventive measure before
final judgement. The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his
prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office; Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan: Preventive suspension is not violative of the
Constitution as the person suspended remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his
culpability must still be established.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the
court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of
court functions -- including preventive suspension -- should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court
that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that
acknowledgment.
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicated upon a valid information under Act, whether
they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or noncareer service. The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office in relation to which he is charged.
It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. Imposition of
suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A precondition therefor is the existence of a valid
information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to
determine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any
part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The accused should be given adequate oppurtunity to challege the
validity or regularity of the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation; that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
But once a proper determination of the validity of the Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of
the court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension of the accused official. The court has no discretion to
hold in abeyance the suspension on the pretext that the order denying the latters motion to quash is pending review
before the appellate courts.

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However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of time; it would
be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal
protection of the laws. The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the
maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with PD 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. LGC limit it to 60 days and not more than 90 days a year for the same grounds
known at the date of first suspension
Petitioners Segovia, et al urge the Court to consider their case an exception because of the peculiar circumstances
thereof. They assert that the evils sought to be avoided by seperating a public official from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated -- e.g., to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of ** (his) office,
such as through intimidation of witnesses, or the tampering with documentary evidence -- will not occur in the
present situation. They conclude that their preventive suspension at this point would actually be purposeless, as
there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of their office. Their
arguments have been raised and rejected in earlier cases. Another reason for preventive suspension is to prevent
the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. Also, temporary delay of other vital projects
of NPC as alleged is not sufficient basis for the non-application of the mandatory preventive suspension.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan resolution
ordering the preventive suspension of Segovia, et al is VALID.
AMBIL JR v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 175457, 6 July 2011
FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman against herein petitioners Ambil and Apelado, then
governor of Eastern Samar and Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar ,respectively, for allegedly ordering and
causing the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim in violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the allegations in the Information reasoning however that
Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his
detention at the provincial jail. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found them guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners?
HELD: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as
regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the
HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when
none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction
be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr.,
over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public
officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.
SANTIAGO v. GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. 109266, 2 Dec 1993
Facts: On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential
candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that
"(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The
petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set
for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992,
petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that
petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment.
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would
her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried
to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the holddeparture order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of
the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure
permission to leave the country.
The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and
DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from
enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations
and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.
Issue: (a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code?

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
Held: The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it
should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult
as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered
following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original
information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed
and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal
Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the
disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
LUSPO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188487, 14 Feb 2011
DOCTRINE(S): Criminal Law; AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act; Two ways for a public official to violate Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions; Essential Elements of the Offense.In Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan, 441 SCRA 377 (2004), we explained that there are two ways for a public official to violate this
provision in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In that case, we
enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the govern ment, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Same; Same; Second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, which are
manifest partiality, Evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; Definitions of such Modalities.The
second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, which are manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Manifest partiality and evident bad faith connote that the crime
is committed by dolo, while gross inexcusable negligence indicates its commission through culpa. In the recent Albert
v. Sandiganbayan, 580 SCRA 279 (2009), we reiterated the definitions of such modalities, viz.: There is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another. Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or selfinterest or ill will or
for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Same; Same; Generally; Factual findings of the antigaft Court are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, Exceptions.
Generally, factual findings of the antigraft court are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record.
Same; Same; Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence; It is a manifest deliberate intent
on the part of an accused to do wrong or to cause damage.To repeat, bad faith does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. It is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of an accused to do wrong or to cause damage.
There is nothing on record to show that Luspo was spurred by any corrupt motive or that he received any material
benefit when he signed the ASAs.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Splitting; Meaning of Splitting in Its Literal Sense; Within the sphere of
government procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries and payments.As
defined in COA Circular No. 7641 dated July 30, 1976, splitting, in its literal sense, means dividing or breaking up into
separate parts or portions, or an act resulting in fissure, rupture, or breach. Within the sphere of government
procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries, and payments. One form of splitting
is the breaking up of payments which consist in making two or more payments for one or more items involving one
purchase order. Splitting is intended to do away with and circumvent control measure, such as the reviewing authority
of a superior official. In this case, the ASA of P10,000,000.00 was split by Duran and Montano into 100 checks of
P100,000.00 each to elude the reviewing authority of Director Sistoza.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
DE JESUS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 182539-40, 21 Feb 2011
To follow Rent
SORIANO JR v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-65952, 31 July 1984
To follow Rent

PLUNDER
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, 21 Nov 2001
To follow; Kanino po ito?
SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148468, 28 Jan 2003
FACTS: Consolidated cases. This case is an offshoot of Estrada v. Sandiganbayanas the Serapio is one of the
accused charged with plunder together with the former president and Jose Jinggoy Estrada. It is a consolidation of
three cases filed by petitioner with the Supreme Court against the Sandiganbayan and other respondents.
Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students. Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of P200M from Ilocos Sur Gov. Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later deposited it
in the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank. However, in the latter part of 2000, Chavit accused
President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and
recipient. The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the
Sandiganbayan.
The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to
quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas corpus.
Serapio states that the information charges more than one offense, namely, briber, malversation of public funds or
property, and violations of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
ISSUE: WN information filed is invalid for multiplicity of crimes charged.
HELD: NO. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the
crime of plunder. Petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate
acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not
crimes separate and independent of the crime of plunder. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity.
When the Anti-Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Section 1, paragraph (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under
Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the
public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1). Verily, had the legislature intended
a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," that this term is sufficiently defined in Section 4, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (d), and Section
2. A 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6)
of Section 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Section 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal that is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal.
* The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase combination or series of overt or criminal acts. The
determining factor of R.A. No. 7080, as can be gleaned from the Record of the Senate, is the plurality of the overt
acts or criminal acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed
wealth equals or exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if he performs
only a single criminal act.

MALVERSATION
LABATAGOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
183 SCRA 415

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
FACTS: Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao StateUniversity. She filed a leave
of absence and did not discharge her duties for thesaid period. When COA conducted the examination, the petitioner
did not haveany cash in her possession, so she was asked to produce all her records, booksof collection, copies of
official receipts and remittance advices and her monthlyreports of collections. Petitioner incurred shortages.
The accused Labatagos wascharged and convicted of malversation of public funds after she failed to explainthe
shortages of the amount she remitted to the bank. It was found out that therewere discrepancies in the remittances.
ISSUE: WN Labagtos is guilty of the crime of Malversation.
HELD: YES. Conviction upheld.Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement of collections anddeposits
prepared by the audit team of Francisco Rivera on the understandingthat her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied
by the figures clearly reflected onthe said documents. Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecutions rebuttal
witness,confirmed that the accused filed application for maternity leave in March 1978 butcontinued reporting for work
during that month and that she (Guanzon) was theone assigned to collect the fees in her stead. When the accused
was physicallyabsent from office, she also turned over her collections to the accused in thelatters house with the
duplicate copies of the receipts she issued which theaccused signed after satisfying herself that the amounts turned
over tallied withthe receipts. All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan
Marohombsar and Auditor Casan supported as they are by merepieces of paper, despite the admission by Director
Osop of having signed someof them were not valid disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in thechits
were really secured by the persons who signed them, the responsibility toaccount for them still rests in the accused
accountable officer.Regarding her defense that she was made to believe that she incurredonly a small amount as
shortage, the evidence shows that she signed documentsshowing that it was a large amount. Moreover, her claim
that she was onmaternity leave is belied by a witness who testified that she still continuedworking even after filing a
maternity leave
RATIO: Malversation consists not only of misappropriation or conversion of public funds or property to ones personal
use but also by knowingly allowingothers to make use of or misappropriate the same.
* Public funds can only be disbursed with proper authorization.Generally, it is the head of the department. It is usually
a different person other than the custodian.
ESTEPA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
182 SCRA 269
FACTS: Leonardo Estepa was a senior paymaster of the cash division of the city treasurers office of the city
of Manila. He and 9 other paymasters and supervising paymaster Cesar Marcelo went to the CentralBank to get
P7,640,000 which is the amount of cash advances requested by the 10 paymasters. The cash was placed inside 2
duffel bags and transported to the CTO. The cash distribution was made in Atty. Kempis room, head of cash division,
where the door wasclosed and guarded to stop people from entering. With Atty. Kempis and the 10 paymasters,
Marcelo opend the duffel bags and again counted thesum of P7,640,000 (bills of 100s, 50s, 20s, 10s, and coins) and
was placed in a table. Each paymaster was given the sum they requested for in different denominations. Estepa was
given the amount of P850,000. After all 10 paymasters got their money, Marcelo asked if everything was fine, no
complaints were heard, even from Estepa. All of them left the room. Upon receiving the money, Estepa placed them
on the sofa and transported the smaller denominations first to the table, leaving the bigger denomination on the sofa
since he could not carry all at once. People were already entering the office of Atty. Kempis. He brought the bigger
denominations to his cage first then the smaller ones. After counting the money in his cage, he discovered that
P50,000 was missing and reported it to Marcelo. Marcelo summoned the 10 paymasters and asked if they got the
correct amount. All of them got the correct amount except for Estepa.
Issue: WN Estepa is guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds.
Held: YES. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer
hadreceived the public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore wasmade and
he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An accountable public officer may beconvicted for
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has notbeen able to explain
satisfactorily the absence of the public funds involved. There is prima facie evidence of malversation where the
accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with whichhe is chargeable upon demand by
duly authorized officer.
Estepa carelessly and negligently allowed an unknown person to steal or misappropriate the amount of P50,000 and
he had failed to exercise his duty as a public officer accountable for public funds received byhim. His actions
amounted to negligence as it provided two opportunities for a mysterious, unseen thirdperson to pick up the missing
bundle of money amounting to P50,000:
1. From the sofa inside the room of Atty. Kempis where he had left the bundles of large denomination bills,without
asking anyone to keep an eye on them while he left the room; or
2. From petitioner's cage outside Atty. Kempis' room where he left the bundles of large denomination bills, again
without anyone being left in charge thereof, while he went back to the desk (also outside Atty. Kempis'room) to
retrieve the bundles of small denomination bills he had previously deposited on top of said deskwithout, once more,
getting someone to watch those bundles
ILOGON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
218 SCRA 766

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
FACTS: Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978
to January, 1986. He performed the tasks of accepting payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as
there was no cashier employed during this period. He was adept at this work because, before his designation as
Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a duly appointed cashier. On September 19, 1983, Commission on
Audit Auditors Robin S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner
covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination showed that the petitioner
incurred a shortage in his accounts amounting to P118,871.29, later reduced to P118,003.10. Petitioner argued that
he never misappropriated the amount of P 118,003.10 for his own personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash
advances to his co-employees.
ISSUE: WN accused is guilty of malversation.
HELD: YES. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made. There is
even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and
petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same.
The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of P118,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds
malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's
criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance.
In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P1
18,003.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same.
He would invoke what he calls "humanitarian reasons" as the justification for the said shortage. But, he knows that his
granting of "chits" and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and
regulations. Such practice is also prohibited by Memorandum Circular No. 570, dated June 29, 1968, of the General
Auditing Office. "giving "vales" is proscribed under PD 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines, specifically Section 69 thereof, which provides that postmasters are only allowed to use their
collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank whenever
their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted".
AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
268 SCRA 747
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services
were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks
were left at the formers premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional
Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and a delinquenttaxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by
accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain
possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property
since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcons failure
to comply with the provisions of the warrant did notrelieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public
funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1
day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.
Ruling: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606
provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime
within its jurisdiction. After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and
his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent
Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner
did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore,
when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged
as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the
proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack
of jurisdiction.
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public
officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously
may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by
competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National
Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a
privateindividual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
TORRES v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 175074, 31 Aug 2011
Facts: That on or about the 27th day of April 1994, or sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Virac,
Catanduanes, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Principal of Viga Rural Development High School, Viga, Catanduanes, and as such by reason
of his office and duties is responsible and accountable for public funds entrusted to and received by him, to wit: PNB
Checks (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32; C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for P58,940.33, all dated
April 26, 1994 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR
PESOS and FIFTY-FOUR CENSTAVOS (P196,654.54), Philippine Currency, representing salaries, salary
differentials, additional compensation allowance and Personal Emergency Relief Allowance from January to March
1994 of the employees of the said school, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to
his office, encashed said checks with the Philippine National Bank, Virac, Catanduanes Branch and once in
possession of the money, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence,
misapply, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of
money, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
Issue: whether he is deemed to be an accountable officer.
Ruling: Yes. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who
has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the
public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the
accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held
guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property, or
passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense,
it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and
whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty
therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may
still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 178626; 13 June 2012
Facts: On September 5, 1996, the Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) for the Province
of Zambales issued PAO Office No. 96-09 directing an Audit Team composed of State Auditor 1 Virginia D.
Bulalacao, State Auditor 1 Teresita Cayabyab and Auditing Examiner II Lourdes Castillo, to conduct an examination
of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio,
Zambales.
After the audit, the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of Ms. Cecilia U.
Legrama dated October 1, 1996. The report contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability was short of
P289,022.75 and that there was an unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount ofP863,878.00,
thereby showing a total shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. Included in the shortage is the amount of
P709,462.80, representing the total amount of various sales invoices, chits, vales, and disbursement vouchers,which
were disallowed in the audit for lack of supporting documents. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was
able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00. Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the
Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales at the time the audit was conducted, were charged in an Informationdated
December 15, 1998 with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
Issue: whether she succeeded to overthrow the prima facie evidence of misappropriation
Ruling: No. Under Article 217, a presumption was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which said officer is accountable
should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When these
circumstances are present, a presumption of law arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as
decreed by Article 217. To be sure, this presumption is disputable and rebuttable by evidence showing that the public
officer had fully accounted for the alleged cash shortage.
In the case at bar, after the government auditors discovered the shortage and informed petitioner of the same,
petitioner failed to properly explain or justify the shortage that was subject to her accountability. Petitioner denied that
she put the amount involved to personal use and presented various sales invoice, chits, vale forms, and
disbursement voucher to prove her claim.Petitioner even went further by testifying that the total amount of

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P681,000.00 appearing in a disbursement voucher were cash advances given to the mayor during the height of the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption. However, the date when the eruption occurred was way before the period subject of the audit.
Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it is undisputed that petitioner was the
municipal treasurer at the time material to this case.Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being the
municipal treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper management of the local governments funds. Third, the
parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the subject amount as public fundsand
that petitioner is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she has
put such missing funds to her personal use. Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary
for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the
said funds upon demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners failure
to present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut the prima facie presumption of
malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction. #HOFFMAN

INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS


RODILLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
161 SCRA 347
Facts: accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned with the
jail section thereof. On March 27, 1980, when he reported for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor
Victoriano, officer-in-charge in assigning police officers to escort prisoners, to escort ZenaidaSacris deadline Andres,
a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of the Court of First Instance to face trial for an alleged
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the policewoman officer who was supposed to escort the said
detainee was then sick. He and the detainee proceeded to the court building and arrived thereat between 8:30 and
9:00 o'clock in the morning. while waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat. Orlando Andres, who
happened to be in the court and a relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida, approached the
accused and requested the latter if he could permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented and
Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her husband. After a short while, the presiding judge deferred the decision
against her because of a new Presidential Decree revising some provisions regarding violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to allow them to have lunch as
they were already very hungry. He consented to the request and they proceeded to the canteen located at the
mezzanine floor of the court building. He took a seat beside Zenaida and Pat. Andres while the relatives of said
detainee were seated at a separate table. While eating, the husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his
wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and
a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second floor of the building. Zenaida and her lady
companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the
door thereof. Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she was
going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go
out of the comfort room.
After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the accused became suspicious and
entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the
window of said comfort room was not provided with window grills. He tried to peep out of the window by stepping on
the flush tank which is just about 3 feet from the window and noticed that outside of the window there was a concrete
eave extending down to the ground floor of the building which he presumed that Zenaida might have used as a
passage in escaping. He immediately went out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres
but they were not able to see her. Pat. Andres advised him to go to Zenaida's house as she might be there, which
home is located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Pat. Andres having told him that the husband of the escapee is
from Rizal, Nueva Ecija, the accused borrowed the car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to said town. Upon arrival
thereat, they contacted the relatives of Zenaida and asked for information as to her whereabouts, but they answered
in the negative. They went back to Caloocan City and went again directly to Bagong Barrio to the house of Zenaida,
arriving thereat at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. While at the residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano arrived and
the accused related to him about the escape of Zenaida. He formally reported the matter of his superior officer at the
City Jail Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared further that as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture
by his superiors regarding the manner of delivering prisoners. However, he admitted that he did not inspect first the
comfort room before he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were many females going in and out of said comfort
room, and that he did not promptly report the escape earlier because they were then pressed for time to intercept
Zenaida at the highway.
Issue: WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS DEFINITE LAXITY AMOUNTING TO
DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION.
Ruling: Yes. It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his authority
when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human
considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch and to go to the comfort room to relieve
herself.
As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was
clearly a violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when he was
supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each other at the
request of a co-officer.

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It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of
any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence
amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her
companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary
prudence.
The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an opportunity for the prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out
an earlier plan by which she could escape. The plan was in fact carried out with the help of the lady who
accompanied his prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of the most familiar and common place
methods of escape. It is inconceivable that a police officer should fall for this trick. The arrangement with a lady friend
should have aroused the petitioner's suspicion because the only pretext given by the petitioner was that she was
going to answer the call of nature. It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone especially by
someone who was not urgently in need of a toilet if the purpose was merely to relieve herself. Despite this, the
petitioner allowed the two to enter the comfort room without first establishing for himself that there was no window or
door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the
excuse that the prisoner was having her monthly period and that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he
patiently waited for more than ten minutes for the companion to return. This was patent negligence and incredible
naivette on the part of the police officer.
Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it was only 11:30 a.m., it would not have been inhuman
for the petitioner to deny the prisoner's request to first take lunch. Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared
the toilet of female occupants and checked all possible exists first and if he did not allow the lady companion to go
with Zenaida Andres to the comfort room. These human considerations, however, are immaterial because the fact
remains that as a police officer, he should have exercised utmost diligence in the performance of his duty.
The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability. That he was not trained in escorting women prisoners is
likewise unacceptable as there are no hard and fast rules of conduct under all conceivable situations for police
officers acting as guards. However, they are expected to use prudence, diligence, and common sense. That Judge
Pardo did not immediately pronounce judgment so the petitioner could have immediately brought Zenaida back to jail
is inconsequential. In the first place, the escape would not have materialized had he immediately escorted her back to
jail after the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside the comfort room because it would create a
commotion, he being a male, is a lame excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the ladies for permission so he
could check the comfort room first to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. The fact that the building is made of
concrete and the outside windows covered with grills should not make a police officer complacent especially because
well-planned escapes are not uncommon. Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so that two (2) guards are
usually assigned to a prisoner.
There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of the petitioner to recapture the escapee. Instead of
promptly reporting the matter so that an alarm could immediately be sent out to all police agencies and expert
procedures followed, he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in Caloocan and failing in this, proceeded
to Nueva Ecija. It was only later in the evening that he formally reported the matter to his superior. This even gave the
escapee greater opportunity to make good her escape because the chances of her being recaptured became much
less. Such action requires concerted police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner should have been or was
probably aware of. #HOFFMAN
------

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS


PARRICIDE
PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN
116 SCRA 739

PEOPLE v. TOMOTORGO
136 SCRA 238

DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES


PEOPLE v. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735

MURDER & HOMICIDE


PEOPLE v. BUENSUCESO
132 SCRA 143

PEOPLE v. CABALHIN
231 SCRA 486

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
PEOPLE v. FERRER
250 SCRA 58

PEOPLE v. RIBAJADO
142 SCRA 637

UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE v. SALUFRANIA
159 SCRA 401

HAZING

RAPE
PEOPLE v. MANGALINO
182 SCRA 329

PEOPLE v. ATENTO
196 SCRA 357

PEOPLE v. CAMPUHAN
329 SCRA 270

PEOPLE v. GALLO
315 SCRA 461

PEOPLE v. BERANA
311 SCRA 664

PEOPLE v. SABADLAB
G.R. No. 175924, 14 March 2012

PEOPLE v. VILLAFLORES
G.R. No. 184926, 11 Apr 2012

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN


ANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010

CHILD ABUSE
OLIVAREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
182 SCRA 329

NAVARETTE v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147913, 31 January 2007

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
PEOPLE v. MATIAS
G.R. No. 186469, 13 June 2012

PEOPLE v. LASCANO
G.R. No. 192180, 21 Mar 2012

PEOPLE v. CHINGH
G.R. No. 178323, 16 March 2011

BONGALON v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169533, 20 Mar 2013

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY


KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE v. TOMIO
202 SCRA 77

PEOPLE v. MERCADO
131 SCRA 501

PEOPLE v. DEL SOCORRO


182 SCRA 359
FACTS: Leticia Sandiad de Del Socorro was charged for wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapping one CLAIRE
SANCHEZ, a minor below seven (7) years old, for the purpose of permanently separating said child from EVELYN
SANCHEZ y TEJERO and ANTONIO SANCHEZ, parents of the said child and thereafter sold to one DRA.
APOLONIA VILLAMAYOR, in the amount of P700.00. On 11 February 1984, Claire Sanchez was taken from outside
her home in Mandaluyong by Del Socorro. The child was brought to a certain Dr. Apolonia Villamayor in Angono
Rizal who gave P700 as donation upon the behest of accused who said she wanted the lady physician to take care
of the child, whom she referred to as her daughter, because her husband had died just two (2) months ago and she
could not afford to feed her brood. Accused denied that she kidnapped the child, saying that she saw her in the street
crying and as the child did not seem to know where she lived, Socorro took pity and brought her along when she went
to Angono where she entrusted the child to Dr. Villamayor.
ISSUE: WN accused committed kidnapping
HELD: YES. The claim of the defendant-appellant that the child, Claire Sanchez, went voluntarily with her, cannot be
given credence. Evidence of kidnapping: Evelyn Sanchez, the mother of the child, Claire, declared that when she
asked her daughter upon their reunion if she went voluntarily with the defendant-appellant, the child answered that
she did not; defendant-appellant herself testified that when she picked up the child in Mandaluyong, her only thought
was to bring the child to Dr. Villamayor; If she really pitied the child whom she described as crying on the sidewalk,
why, it can be asked, did she not bring her to the nearest police station in Mandaluyong? xx; why did she think only of
Dr. Villamayor who, according to her, she did not even know personally, but only in name?

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To cut down on the illicit traffic of children, we urge the prosecution of persons to whom children are sold or given
away for a valuable consideration. Oftentimes, it is only the abductor or kidnapper who is prosecuted. Yet, the person
to whom the kidnapped child is given and who may have wittingly or unwittingly given the motivation for the
abduction, goes scot-free, even as the intention of this person is to keep and raise the child as his own. By keeping
the child, under these circumstances, is he not guilty of serious illegal detention?
PEOPLE v. LIM
190 SCRA 706
FACTS: July 1, 1986, Masbate, accused conspired and mutually helped each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Aida and Avelyn Villanueva, both minors; separating them from their parental care;
Aida Villanueva was detained for about 20 days in the house of Carmen Lim alias "Mameng" while Avelyn Villanueva
was detained and brought to Cebu City by accuseds sister, thereby depriving Aida and Avelyn of their personal
liberties. Accused stated however that she took in the girls when she saw them in the street and told her that their
father had driven them away from home. She fed and clothed both; Aida stayed with her while she proposed to the
former that Avelyn would accompany her sister to Cebu. Aida agreed on the condition that she and Avelyn could
meet every week.
ISSUE: WN kidnapping was committed.
HELD: NO. There is no kidnapping when the fact of detention, which is an essential element of the crime charged,
was not clearly established.There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's
residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was
not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. The appellant's residence has a store fronting the street where many customers presumably come
and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically
restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
Justified by: no motive whatsoever for the appellant to kidnap the two children; The appellant is a woman of sufficient
means; Had she wanted to hire an additional maid, she could certainly afford to hire another one without going to the
extent of committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. [People vs. Lim, 190 SCRA 706(1990)]; There was no need
to kidnap a minor and force her to work against her will.
PEOPLE v. RAMOS
297 SCRA 618
FACTS: On 13 July 1994, an American pastor named Malcolm Bradshaw was driving his car along EDSA. At the bus
stop between Corinthian Gardens cor. White Plains Avenue, he saw Alicia Abanilla struggling to break away from the
arms of accused-appellant. The woman hailed other vehicles for help but to no avail. Bradshaw stopped his car and
blew his horn repeatedly to attract the womans attention. She grabbed the opportunity and ran towards Bradshaws
car and hopped in at the back seat. Unfortunately, Ramos caught up with her and squeezed himself into the same
car.
From EDSA Bradshaw turned right towards White Plains Avenue where he was flagged down by a traffic policeman.
As Bradshaw slowed down Ramos pulled out his gun and ordered to go straight ahead. Ramos and Alicia were
dropped off in Proj. 4. Before they left the vehicle, Alicia asked Bradshaw to inform her family of the situation.
Ransom money was delivered to Ramos later in the day. In attempting to escape the vehicle they were in, Alicia
jumped out but her blouse was caught. Ramos stopped the car and shot her twice causing her death.
RTC: convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimeskidnapping for ransom and murderinstead of the complex
crime charged in the Information. It held that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of
killing her so as to make the offense a complex crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an
afterthought, making accused-appellant liable for two (2) separate offenses.
ISSUE: WN kidnapping was committed.
HELD: YES. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with an
indubitable proof of intent on the part of the malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended partys liberty. The
term actual deprivation of liberty consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of detaining a person
or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. xx Actual restraint of the victims liberty was evident from the moment
she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work at Meralco and taken instead against her will to
Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted by her abductor who, armed with a .22 caliber
compelled her to go with him. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion.It is enough that, as in the instant case, she was in any manner
deprived of her liberty, unable to moveand get outas she pleased.
PEOPLE v. SABARDAN
G.R. No. 132135, 21 May 2004
FACTS: That about and during the period beginning the 15th day of September 1991, to the 30th day of September
1991, in Binangonan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by force and intimidation, detain and keep lock one Richelle Banluta, a girl
twelve (12) years of age in his rented apartment at No. 5 Linaluz St, from September 15 to September 30, 1991, or a
period of fifteen (15) days, under restraint and against the will of said Richelle Banluta, and said accused during said
period of detention did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge of the complainant

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Richelle Banluta while she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug which he administered
to her, against her will and consent.
Defendant alleges he never saw Richelle during the period of September 15, 1991 to September 30, 1991, nor did he
invite her to stay in his apartment.20 He further asserted that he had nothing to do with the offense charged and that
Richelle was merely trying to exact money from him.
ISSUE: WN rape was committed.
HELD: Criminal Law; Rape; The situs criminis is not an essential element in rape.The verisimilitude and probative
weight of the testimony of Richelle, that the appellant detained her against her will and raped her in his apartment,
were not debilitated by her mistake in declaring that the apartment of the appellant was at Linaluz Street, when, in
fact, it was at No. 11-C Luz Street. It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential element in rape.
The gravamen of the felony is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant under any of the
circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Richelles mistake was only minor and collateral to
the gravamen of the crime charged. She consistently testified that the appellant detained and raped her in his
apartment, only about thirty meters away from their house. The appellant admitted that he resided in the said
apartment, and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors. It has been held that inconsistencies and
discrepancies in the testimony, referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime, do not diminish
the witnesses credibility.
Serious Illegal Detention with Rape; Where the original and primordial intention of the accused in keeping the
complainant in his apartment was to rape her and to deprive her of her liberty, he is guilty only of rape and not of the
complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape.In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial
intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty.
Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the
complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code.
Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua.
EXTRA: A test to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to a victim is not an
indispensable element in the prosecution for rape. In rape cases, carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may
be proven not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence. It is well-settled that healed lacerations do
not necessarily negate rape. Well-settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence
and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape
victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral injuries entitling them to such award.
PEOPLE v. BALUYA
G.R. No. 181822, 13 Apr 2011
FACTS: August 31, 2003, in Manila, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
take, detain and carry away GLODIL CASTILLON, nine (9) years old, son of Gloria Castillon, while the latter was
playing outside of their residence along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, by poking a knife on his back, twisting his hands
and forcibly bringing him to Novaliches, thus detaining and depriving him of his liberty under restraint and against his
will and consent.
ISSUE: WN kidnapping and serious illegal detention was committed.
HELD: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; The deprivation means not only the imprisonment of a person, but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.The deprivation required by
Article 267 of the RPC means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of
confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child, it also includes the
intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. In other words, the essence of kidnapping
is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.
Same; Same; Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the
offender forcibly restrained the victim.Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more
irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from
which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still
amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of
the abductor.
EXTRA: Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimonies of prosecution witnesses.Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater
weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an
inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.
PEOPLE v. ASTORGA
G.R. No. 110097, 22 Dec 1997

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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ROBBERY
Napolis vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-28865. February 28, 1972, 43 SCRA 301
FACTS: Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the CA affirming that of the CFI Bataan: guilty of robbery
in band, to suffer imprisonment of from 10 yrs. 1 day, prision mayor (min.) to 17 years, 4months and 1day, reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis. Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel,
Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sammy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso,
Domingo Flores, Alias Eko, and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the intent to
gain and armed with a Grease Gun, 3 caliber .45 pistols and 2 revolvers, entered the dwelling of the spouses Ignacio
and Casimira Peaflor by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack,
assault and hit Ignacio with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him to fall on the ground and rendering him
unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same accused approached Casimira, threatened
her at gun point and demanded money; that the same accused while inside the said house searched and ransacked
the place and take and carry away the following cash money and articles belonging to said spouses.
HELD: Characterization of crime of robbery with force upon things where robber lays his hands upon a person.The
doctrine laid down in previous cases whereby in case of robbery inside an inhabited house, the thief, in addition, lays
his hands upon any person without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty decreedunder paragraph (15)
thereofis much lighter defies logic and reason and is now expressly abandoned. It is more plausible to believe that
Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an
inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code, When the elements of both
provisions are present, the crime is a complex one, calling for the impositionas provided in Art. 48 of the Codeof
the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery
committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided
in Article 299 (a). In addition, however, to performing said acts, accused also used violence against Ignacio and
intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294(5), which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in
its max period to prision mayor in its med. period, which is lighter than that prescribed in Article 299, although,
factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by Art. 299.
The proposition that robbery with violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery
committed by force upon things, but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom
in the cases above citedreduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or
intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only
where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under
the conditions set forth in Art. 299.
Doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos and applied in U.S. v. Manansala, U.S. v. Turla, People v. Baluyot,
Manahan v. People, and People v. Sebastian is hereby abandoned
People vs. Biruar
July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 513
FACTS: While Gorgonio and Fausta Mosende were preparing to go to retire for the night, several men arrived and
called to them from outside the house. Thinking they were relatives, the couple invited the men to enter. Romualdo
Raboy and Edgardo Seeres, armed with .45 caliber pistols came up and took the shotgun owned by the couple and
some money. They then proceeded to the house of George Kalitas, about 25 meters away, from where gunshots
were heard. Later, a blaze started which spread rapidly and completely burned down said house. All the inmates of
the house of George Kalitas, a 70-year old paraplegic, were fast asleep when the firing started and were awakened
by the gunfire. Several family members including George Kalitas were hit during the firing. Accused Saturnino
Galliano poured the can of kerosene on the walls of the kitchen of the house and ignited it with some dried fronds.
The accused gained entry into the house by breaking open the main door with an axe, forcibly opened a truck and
took 40K owned by the Kalitas couple. The inmates of the house left the house and brought the wounded to the
hospital but George Kalitas died en route. The main house, bodega, including their contents, and a truck parked in
between the buildings, all valued at P34,545.00, were completely destroyed in the fire.
The CFI of Davao found accused Abraham Lim, Angel Dy, Ceferino Caturan, Edgardo Seeres, Romualdo Raboy,
and Saturnino Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries.
HELD: Use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance that applies solely to crime of robbery in
band under Art. 295.The use of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989 (Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries).
Penalty for robbery in band with use of unlicensed firearm is the maximum of penalty prescribed by law.Art. 295 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that if the robbery mentioned in pars. 3, 4 and 5 is committed by a band, the
offenders shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties; and Article 296 also states that when any
of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon the
malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided for by law. Hence, the penalty to be

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imposed upon the defendants should be the maximum of the maximum period of the penalty, even without the
concurrence of any other aggravating circumstance.

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE


People v. Mangulabnan
No. L-8919, September 28, 1956, 99 Phil. 992
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana's mother, Monica del
Mundo, were awoken by gunshots in their house. Vicente crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pio that persons
were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling. Someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back
of the house and suddenly entered the dining room. He then removed 3 board pieces in the wall and entered the
living room. Cipriana recognized him, armed with a hunting knife, as Agustin Mangulabnan. Accused removed the
iron bar from the door leading to the balcony allowing 2 persons to enter. Agustin snatched from Cipriana her
necklace and money. 1 of the 2 unidentified men took from the person of Monica del Mundo P200 in cash and a gold
necklace. But not contented, the same individual asked that she give her diamond ring which the latter could not
produce, and for this reason, he struck her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. The second unidentified
individual put his companion aside and climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards, appellant and his
two unidentified companion left the place. Vicente Pacson was later found lying face down, already dead.
HELD: Crime of robbery with homicide when may exist.In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery
with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery and it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration.
People v. Calixtro
No. L-32794, July 15, 1983, 123 SCRA 369
FACTS: A jeep with seven men on board stopped in front of the Rural Bank of San Luis. The men who stood in front
of the bank were Alberto Katigbak, Petronilo Mercado and Apolinario Martinez, while Pio Cuevas, then Chief of Police
entered wearing a PC uniform and was armed with a carbine. Juanito Calixtro and Juan Mercado followed, both in
civilian attire and were armed with short firearms. As Cuevas entered, he told the security guard of the bank, Julian
Agojo, that the Lieutenant, at the same time pointing to Calixtro, was going to apply for a loan. Agojo then instructed
them to proceed to the manager of the bank. Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro, immediately grabbed the
service carbine of Agojo and the 2 grappled over it. Gunshots ensued when Katigbak, Martinez and Marcado fired
towards the direction of the bank while Calixtro and Mercado were shooting at Agojo. Cuevas was hit and ran
towards the jeepney, followed by the others. A car chase ensued but ultimately all the members were caught.
Cuevas, suffering from his wounds, had time to give an ante-mortem statement but died in the hospital. Alberto
Obrador also died during the car chase.
HELD: Members of a group of robbers can be held criminally liable for robbery in band with homicide where in
course of robbery they shot and killed one of their own group.Did the appellants commit robbery in band with
homicide considering that Cuevas was one of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger?
The answer is Yes because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so. In the light of the foregoing, the trial
court correctly held that the appellants committed robbery in band with homicide aggravated by craft and the use of a
motor vehicle which is punishable by death.
People v. Pecato
No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14
FACTS: Automatic review of decision of CFI Surigao del Norte finding the accused Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda
guilty of the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons as defined and penalized under Article
294, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death by electrocution.
While Felix Larong, about 70 years old, and his family, consisting of his wife Luciana, about 85 years of age, and his
31-year old unmarried daughter, Uldarica Larong, were preparing to sleep, several men called from outside their
house. The men politely requested that they be allowed to enter the house. Felix then opened the door and four men,
each carrying a gun, entered. The intruders then ordered the occupants to lie face down from the floor and demanded
money from Felix, who said he had none to give. The men then asked if he recognized them and when Felix
answered in the affirmative, Arturo Pecato shot him while he way lying face down on the floor. They then turned to
Uldarica Larong and demanded money from her but when she refused, she was manhandled and hit with gun butt on
different parts of her body. She later gave them P350. The men left and fearing they would come back, Uldarica and
Luciana hid in the bushes outside the house. The men returned after some time but finding the house empty, did not
stay long. Upon reporting the robbery and killing, the police asked the victims who perpetrated the crime. The two
women positively identified and pointed to Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victoriano Leyros, and Ereneo Peruda.
HELD: Robbery with homicide under Art 294 (1) of RPC; Actual Participation in the Homicide is not necessary unless
it clearly appeared that the accused endeavored to prevent the homicide.The crime committed by the accused is
Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was
shot to death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide resulted during or because of,
the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed; it is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime that has to be taken into consideration. Further, whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime

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are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take
part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. In this instance, the
evidence on record is bereft of any showing that any of the accused tried to prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What
is shown instead is that they merely stood watching and did nothing when one of their companions shot the victim.
Additionally, the term homicide in robbery with homicide should be understood as a generic term and includes
murder.
Treachery; Trial courts ruling that there was treachery since the victim was shot to death while lying face down on the
floor, without any warning and not able to defend himself at all is correct.
Same; Same; Dwelling is aggravating since the authors could have committed the crime without need of violating
domicile of the victim.
Alibi; Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as the
perpetrators when there was no physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.
People v. Tapales
No. L-35281, September 10, 1979, 93 SCRA 134
FACTS: October 28, 1971, at nighttime purposely sought to better accomplish their ends, Jessie Tapales and Pedro
Coranez, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by boarding the taxi being then
occupied by Eugenio Calaykay and Diana Ang while said vehicle stopped at Jones Bridge, Manila and pointing a
balisong knife at Diana and a gun at Eugenio, took, stole, and carried away against their will and consent, a mens
wrist watch and one (1) brown wallet with cash money of undetermined amount belonging to said Eugenio Calaykay;
and Mexican money worth P2.00 and a Parker pen valued at P10.00 belonging to said Diana Ang. By reason of and
on the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eugenio, by
then and there shooting him twice with the gun and stabbing him with the balisong knife on the chest, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct cause of his death thereafter. By reason of and on the
occasion also of the said robbery, the said accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by threatening to stab and kill the
said Diana Ang with said balisong knife and firearm, which they were holding then at the time, succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her, one after the other against her will and consent.
HELD: Robbery with homicide; Where the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape, the legal definition of the
crime is robbery with homicide, with rape considered as an aggravating circumstance.This Court has consistently
held that the legal definition of the crime committed herein is Robbery with Homicide, with Rape being considered an
aggravating circumstance. It is the uniform jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that where the crime charged is
robbery with homicide and rape, the legal definition of the crime is robbery with homicide punishable under paragraph
1, Article 294 of the Penal Code; and the rape committed on the occasion of that the crime is considered an
aggravating circumstance.
Despite appreciable interval of time between the commission of the robbery and the killing, and the commission of the
rape, it was by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery that the homicide and rape were committed.While there
may have been an appreciable interval of time between the robbery and the killing, on the one hand, and the rape, on
the other, there can be no question but that there was a direct relation, an intimate connection between them such
that it can be stated, without fear of contradiction, that it was by reason or on occasion of the Robbery that Homicide
and Rape were committed.
Aggravating circumstances; Nighttime; Nighttime becomes aggravating only when it is specially sought by the
offender and facilitated the commission of the crime.It is evident that they purposely sought nighttime and took
advantage of it to facilitate the commission of the offense and to avoid discovery. In fact, when the victim Eugenio
Calaykay shouted hold-up, hold-up, no one responded to his call because of the lateness of the night. When he
forced himself out of the taxi and fell on Del Pan Bridge, no one saw or noticed it. Again, because of the wee hours of
the morning, appellants were able to cruise around leisurely from Manila to Quezon City looking for a vacant lot. In
the meantime, both appellants, taking advantage of the darkness of night inside the taxicab, were able, with impunity,
to take liberties with the person of Diana Ang.
People v. Quinones
G.R. No. 80042, March 28, 1990, 183 SCRA 747
FACTS: On June 30, 1986, the bodies of Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana were found in a
wooded area Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and
bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about
7pm of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway by Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo
Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., who had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The
three were taken to the nearby woods where they were killed.6 According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was
at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with pendant worth
P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22 caliber handgun. All this, together with the other articles
belonging to the victims, were taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was
recovered without the stereo and the spare tire.
HELD: Robbery with homicide; Conspiracy; A conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be
proven through series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of the common unlawful purpose.It is clear
from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and

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decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven through the series of acts
done by each of the accused in pursuance of the common unlawful purpose.
Special complex crime; There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code; The
number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty under Art. 294 of the said Code.The Court
finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly
sentenced by the trial court. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that
three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons
killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code.
Penalty; The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is Reclusion Perpetua to be imposed only once even if
multiple killings accompanied the robbery.The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion
perpetua, to be imposed only once even if multiple killings accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by
the trial court of the attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code provides that when the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied without regard to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
People v. Salvilla
G.R. No. 86163, April 26, 1990, 184 SCRA 671
FACTS: On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by Bienvenido Salvilla, Reynaldo Canasares, Ronaldo Canasares,
and Simplicio Canasares at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days
before. The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. Accused entered the establishment and
there Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie, the latter being
a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. The victims then handed accused
P20,000 and begged that they be released but they were instead held hostage in the office. Later, the police and
military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard and tried negotiated with accused but the latter
refused to surrender or to release the hostages. Ultimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the
police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the
girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares.
HELD: Robbery; From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity
to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused
had no opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the
moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the
unlawful taking is complete.
The crime of serious illegal detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by appellant and his coaccused to facilitate and carry out their evil design to stage a robbery.Under Article 48, a complex crime arises
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The term necessary means does not connote
indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase necessary means merely
signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the
crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused
to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.

ROBBERY WITH RAPE


People v. Patola
No. L-41265, February 27, 1986, 141 SCRA 401
FACTS: On the evening of September 7, 1973 in the store of Roman Coado, Mila Amoguis and Elena Odal,
salesgirls, were piling up the goods as it was closing time. Feliciano Patola, Eunillo Sangayon, and two unidentified
persons were still in the store drinking. Unexpectedly, Sangayon closed the door of the store. Patola, with a gun in his
hand, approached Mila and told her not to shout if she did not want to die. Patola and Sangayon herded Mila, Elena,
the Coado couple and their son William to an adjoining room and told them to lie down on the floor face down and
were hogtied. Their mouths were stuffed with pieces of cloth. Patola, Sangayon and their two companions ransacked
the store and took away P1,700 in cash, appliances, a wrist watch and other things. Then, Sangayon raped Elena.
After Sangayon was through, his companion in turn abused Elena. Mila was untied by Patola and brought to another
room where he raped her. Patola and Sangayon were arrested six days after the commission of the robbery and were
identified by Mila, Elena and Zosima Coado.
HELD: Robbery with rape with the use of a deadly weapon, a complex crime; Credibility of witnesses; Findings of the
trial court on the credibility of the witnesses, entitled to great weight.As this is a case involving credibility of the
witnesses, the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight. Even if Dalogdogs testimony is disregarded
because he was not present during the robbery, the testimonies of the offended parties are adequate to prove the
special complex crime charged.
Penalty for robbery with qualified rape, under Art. 294 [2] or 335, Penal Code, when applicable.There used to be a
controversy as to whether robbery with qualified rape should be penalized under article 294[2] or under article 335
which imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. That controversy was set at rest in People vs. Cabural and
People vs. Porcare where it was held that robbery with qualified rape should be punished under article 294[2]. It
should be stressed that in this case the accused were not charged with qualified rape alone, a crime against chastity,
but with robbery with rape, a crime against property. The trial court applied in this case article 335. It regarded article

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294[2] as having been amended by article 335. That is why it imposed the death penalty. If article 294[2], before it
was amended, is to be applied, the penalty is only reclusion perpetua.
People v Dinola
G.R. No. ??
Facts: Emeterio Dinola, armed with a deadly weapon and by means of force and intimidation, willfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with Marilyn Caldosa, and that on the occasion, Dinola, by the use of force and with intent to
gain, willfully and feloniously take and carry away the wrist watch of Marilyn Caldosa. The trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime of robbery with rape.
Issue: W/N the accused is guilty of the crime of robbery with rape.
Held: The Court has already ruled that rape may be committed even if no force was used, intimidation being
sufficient. Intimidation includes the moral kind such as fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife. The Court has
likewise held that the admission of the victim that her hands were on her sides while the accused was on top of her
does not mean that she consented to the act. The complainant in this case, is a seventeen (17) year old lass while
the accused is a thirty four (34) year old laborer. Considering, the size, age and strength of the accused, coupled by
his use of a bolo to threaten the complainant, the Court rules that the complainant's failure to resist the accused does
not detract from the fact that the latter employed intimidation in order to have sexual intercourse with the latter. The
law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim. However, it
does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered the house of the complainant, he already
had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused,
the latter lit a candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly took it
from her. Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even accidental. If the intention
of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery
with rape is committed. However, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape also
committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct
offenses. The Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment of the court a quo by finding the accused guilty of two
independent crimes of rape and robbery.
People v Moreno
G.R. No. ??
Facts: On or about the 8thday of January 1999, in Makati City, Philippines, the accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, unlawfully divested MaritesTacadena of one (1) gold ring, black bag containing one (1)ATM card, one (1)
white Burger Machine T-shirt, 30 copies of Burger Machine coupons, one (1) pocket book, a bible, toothbrush,
toothpaste and cash money in the amount of P200.00, to the latters damage and prejudice and the on the occasion
of the said robbery and by using force and intimidation, accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will and consent. After evaluating the evidence offered by the
parties, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution, convicted ROGELIO of robbery with
rape and appreciated against him the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. It disregarded ROGELIOs defenses of
denial and alibi in view of his positive identification by MARITES as her assailant. The Trial Court finds accused
Rogelio Moreno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the special complex crime of robbery with rape
under Articles 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Applying Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and absent any
mitigating circumstance, the Court imposes the penalty of death upon said accused. Accused is ordered to pay the
complainant P200,000.00 as and for moral damages plusP1,000.00 representing the value of the personal properties
taken but not recovered. Hence, this automatic review.
Issues: The accused claims that the trial court committed the following errors: I. In finding that the guilt of the
accused-appellant for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. II. In appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity in the commission of the crime charged.
Held: The SC is convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that ROGELIO succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
MARITESwith the use of force and intimidation. In any event, force or intimidation itself is sufficient justification for a
womans failure to offer resistance. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists advances
because of fear for her life and personal safety. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove
resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.However, ROGELIOs conviction of robbery with rape cannot be sustained.
The special complex crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, employs the clause "when the robbery shall have been accompanied with rape."
In other words, to be liable for such crime, the offender must have the intent to take the personal property of another
under circumstances that makes the taking one of robbery and such intent must precede the rape. If the original plan
was to commit rape, but the accused after committing the rape also committed robbery when the opportunity
presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as a separate and distinct crime. Significantly, the constitutive element
of violence or intimidation against persons in robbery was not present at the time of the snatching of the shoulder bag
of MARITES.Accused-appellant may thus be held liable for simple theft only, in addition to the crime of rape.
However, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For nocturnity
to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was purposely
sought for by the offender. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, no

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sufficient evidence was offered to prove that ROGELIO deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his
criminal design. In fact, the victim testified that there were streetlights and lights from the ABC Commercial Complex.
People v Balacanao
G.R. No. ??
Facts: Fifteen armed men stormed the house of spouses Calata in Cagayan. EstelitaCalata executed a sworn
statement charging Balacanao, Batuelo, Gangan, Salvador, Soriano, and 5 John Does of robbery with rape. The trial
court found them guilty of robbery with rape.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in its decision.
Held: No. Robbery with rape is a special complex crime punished under Art. 294 (2) of the RPC. The accusedappellants assault the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Estelitas confusion should not militate against her
given number of malefactors and the ordeal she went through. In robbery with rape, the rule is the same as the rule in
robbery with homicide. Instead of convicting only the sexual offenders of robbery with rape, their co-conspirators will
also be made liable to the same offense, even if they did not actually rape any of the victims.

ROBBERY IN BAND
People v Apduhan
G.R. No. ??
Facts: Respondent along with five other persons entered the house of spouses Miano, shooting Geronimo Miano and
Norberto Aton, that killed both and took the money amounting P 322.00 belonging to Geronimo Miano. Respondent
pleaded not guilty initially and later after advice from counsel Tirol, pleaded guilty.
Issue: Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the only aspect of the case
properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed
by the court a quo.
Held: Art. 295 provides that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 294 are committed by a
band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods.Consequently, Art. 295 is inapplicable to
robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesions graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or
blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery in Art. 264(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be
punishable under Art. 295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the RPC. Hence, with
the present wording of Art. 295 there is no crime as robbery with homicide in band. If robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1),
but the element of band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, the
accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of guilty. Apduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge
of the significance and consequences of his act. Judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when
as accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. For
failure to secure the required number of votes, the penalty of death cannot be imposed.

ROBBERY BY THE USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS


People v Jaranilla
G.R. No. ??
Facts: The case is an appeal of the defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo, anf Franco Brillantes from the decision
of the CFI of Ilo-Ilo which convicted the accused of robbery and homicide, and sentenced each of them to reclusion
perpetua and ordered the accused to pay solidarily the sum of P6, 000.00 to the heirs of RamonitoJabatan and the
sume of P500.00 to Valentin Baylon as the value of the 5 fighting cocks. It should also be noted that the accused,
Jaranilla, has escaped from the provincial jail and no record shows that he has been apprehended.
Issue: W/N defendants Suyo and Brillantes are liable as co-principal in the crime of homicide.
Held: The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide because the act was made during the spur of the
moment and the treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender. In addition,
only persons who perpetrated the killing is responsible for such action. Furthermore, mere presence in the crime
scene does not necessarily make a person co-principal thereof. Hence, only the accused Jaranilla who perpetrated
the killing is responsible and liable for robbery and homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of
theft. Therefore, the decision of the lower court is reversed and sentenced the accused, Suyo and Brillantes, as coprincipals in the crime of theft. No promulgation as to the accused Jaranilla that being stated that the accused has
escaped from the provincial jail.

CARNAPPING
People v De la Cruz
G.R. No. ??
Facts: On Dec. 5, 1984, a Ford Telstar automobile was carnapped, and that Anthony Banzon, the registered owner of
said car, was shot and killed. The trial court found the accused Danilo de la Cruz, Romeo Salvador, and
DantesBeloso guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide, penalized under Sec. 14 of RA 6539.

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Issue: W/N the trial court is correct.
Held: Yes. The crime committed is carnapping with homicide, with carnapping defined as the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in
the commission of the carnapping obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration certificate and other
pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus facilitate its sale to a third party, in keeping with the modus
operandi of the perpetrators.
Izon v People
G.R. No. ??
Facts: On Sept. 8, 1977, the accused Jimmy Milla and Pedro Divino, conspiring, confederating together and by
means of violence and intimidation stabbed Reynaldo Togorio, and the accused Amado Izon who helped in mauling
him thereby inflicting upon Togorio physical injuries. Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to
the penalty provided in RA 6539 known as Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Contending that the court erred in imposing
the penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed in the RPC for simple robbery
with violence, because the information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway,
so as to make it a motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and therefore failed to inform them that
they were being charged under the cited statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against the petitioners.
Issue: Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972.
Held: Yes. From the definition cited by the government which petitioners admit as authoritative, highways are always
public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to
make the vehicle a motor vehicle within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets
with or without the required license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not
to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and
the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they
have just been bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anticarnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the RPC. It would readily be noted that any vehicle
which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of
motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be kind of motor vehicle as defined
in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.

THROUGH FALSE PRETENSES, FRAUDULENT ACTS OR MEANS


CELINO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77569
FACTS: On March 17, 1978, Zosimo and Ricardo Celino together with two (2) other companions went to Jose Tan
Kapoes house and informed Kapoe that there was a hidden treasure under his lot located in the poblacion of
Calauan, Laguna. Zosimo and Ricardo Celino told him that a certain dwarf entering the body of Zosimo is giving
instructions to the latter as to the digging operation and that he will be given millions of pesos. Kapoe believed Celino
because their fathers were close friends and so he allowed them to dig a hole in his ricemill. Celino and Zosimo told
Kapoe that they discovered a jar full of gold but they did not permit Kapoe to see it. Instead, they told Kapoe to give
them P10,000 and the cash was placed in an envelope.
After leaving the jar and the envelope inside the little room located under the house of Kapoe, the two left and told
Kapoe that they will come back, awaiting the dwarfs instructions. After some time, the brothers then received another
envelope filled with cash and this continued up until Kapoe got suspicious. Kapoe then opened the jar and found that
it only contained newspapers, comics, rocks and soil. Kapoe then demanded that the money he gave be given back
to him through his driver and Zosimo said he will return the money.
ISSUE: Whether or not Celino is guilty of estafa under Art. 315, No. 2 (a) of the RPC
HELD: YES. The Court affirmed the CAs decision.
RATIO: Under the abovestated facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that that there was proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the act committed by the petitioner constitutes the crime of estafa defined and
punished under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by: xxx 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses of fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits. (Emphasis supplied).
ABEJUELA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 80130
FACTS: Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and other
agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or May 1978,
Abejuela was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. Balo

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offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding business, claiming that he was expecting a large sum of
money out of the insurance policy of his late father.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook.. He wanted to deposit the
checks purporting to be proceeds from his fathers insurance policy into Abejuela's account with Banco Filipino. At
first, Abejuela was reluctant, advising his friend to open a bank account with the same bank or open a new account
with another bank. Through the explanations of Balo, Abejuela conceded and let Balo take hold of his passbook.
Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook continued for quite some time.
During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of
P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96.
In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from August 9, 1978. But feeling
apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook, Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by
borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business profits. Abejuela also closed
his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of his deposit.
The bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between the interest reconciliation balance
and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof
reconciliation. He also notice that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four large
deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits slips
thereof could not be located.
After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest bookkeeper were convinced that
the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela
savings account ledger. They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the fictitious deposits
after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by the bank accountant.
The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the accusations, but later admitted
having posted the false deposits. Abejuela was also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by
Balo in accomplishing his fraudulent scheme. On December 5,1978, an information was filed against Glicerio Balo,
Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was committed by Abejuela
HELD: NO. The Court acquitted Abejuela.
RATIO: After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the evidence on
record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo.
From Balo's own admissions, it was he who deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and
parties and cajoled him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have questioned
Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance proceeds of his later father. When Balo
showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into
believing that Balo indeed had money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate the
encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were close friends and "compadres",
Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is understandable.
The most that could be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that petitioner
Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be
convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which
assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended to be committed.
KOH TIECK HENG v. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 48535-36
FACTS: Koh Tieck Heng, alias Tomas P. Flores opened Savings Account No. 26580, with the Security Bank and
Trust Company, Escolta St., Manila, with an initial deposit of P500.00, made on 21 Feb. 1973, for which he was given
a pass book in his name of Tomas P. Flores. He made a second deposit of P400.00 then a withdrawal of P500.00
then a deposit of P775.00, and then a withdrawal of P1,000.00.
On 13 March (sic, August) accused went to SBTC and filled up or accomplished and signed a deposit slip for a
deposit of P18,060.00 in check. With the deposit slip, he submitted to Urbana Ramos de Ferrer, his passbook and a
Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973 for P18,060.00, appearing to have
been signed and issued by `F. Dycaico', who was then maintaining with the Philippine Bank of Communications a
checking account No. 13360. This check was signed and indorsed by the accused.
On 16 August 1973, the accused withdrew from this Savings Account No. 26580, the sum of P10,000.00 upon
submission to Margarita Tiongson of a withdrawal slip accomplished and signed by him. Upon receipt of the amount
withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the back of the withdrawal slip. On the next day, 17 August 1973,
the accused withdrew another amount of P5,500.00 upon defendant's submission to Teller No. 3 of a withdrawal slip
and the pass book. The withdrawal was posted in the pass book as shown by Exhibit C-3. Upon receipt of the sum
withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the back of the withdrawal slip.

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On 18 August 1973, the accused went again to the SBTC to deposit another Philippine Bank of Communications
Check No. U-186414, dated 11 August 1973 for P18,060.00 which appears to be signed by 'F. Dycaico' against
Checking Account No. 13360. Accused, filled up and accomplished a deposit slip for P18,060.00. After accomplishing
the deposit slip, accused submitted the check, the pass book (and the deposit slip to Candida Abella Villanueva. The
deposit of P18,060.00 was thus posted at the pass book.
Sometime in that month of August 1973, Florencio Dycaico, who maintains the Checking Account No. 13360 with the
Philippine Bank of Communications saw his Statement of Account and came upon an amount of P18,060.00 debited
against his account. He complained to the PBC that he never issued a check for that much. With this information PBC
informed SBTC that the check was a spurious check. So, SBTC officials instructed their bank tellers to watch for
Tomas P. Flores.
The accused appeared in the SBTC premises on 22 August 1973. He filled up, accomplished and signed a
withdrawal slip for P15,500.00, and after that he submitted his passbook with the withdrawal slip to Maria Victoria
Soriano. Forewarned to watch for the accused Tomas P. Flores, she asked the accused to sign his name in and he
did sign it as requested. He signed his name of Koh Tieck Heng. After that, Teller No. 7 brought the slip and the
passbook of Tomas P. Flores. Teller No. 7 returned to her cage and then called up for Tomas P. Flores. The accused
went to Teller No. 7. Teller No. 7 asked the accused to sign his name at the back. After he signed the check, the NBI
agent Espartero swooped down on the accused and apprehended him.
Accused was charged of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents and another information was filed against
the accused for attempted estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of the crimes charged against him
HELD: YES. The Court affirmed the decision in toto.
RATIO: The two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and
competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established. Deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury. The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and having benefited from the
subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable
conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified said Exhibits "A" and "H". Ineluctably, the use of the spurious
checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof
thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of the crime
of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own
spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. Since
only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court correctly convicted
appellant of attempted estafa.
PEOPLE v. ONG
G.R. No. 93849
FACTS: Accused Dick Ong was one of the depositors of the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company in its Aurea
Annex Branch at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. He opened his savings account on December 6, 1978, under the
Bank's Saving Account No. 6-1981, with an initial deposit of P22.14 in cash and P10,000.00 in (a) check.
On the same date, December 6, 1978, without his check undergoing the usual and reglamentary clearance, which
normally takes about five working days, Dick Ong was allowed to withdraw from his savings account with the Bank
the sum of P5,000.00. The corresponding withdrawal slip was signed and approved by Lino Morfe, then the Branch
Manager, and accused Lucila Talabis, the Branch Cashier.
That initial transaction was followed by other similar transactions where Dick Ong, upon depositing checks in his
savings account with the Bank, was allowed to withdraw against those uncleared checks and uncollected deposits.
The withdrawals were authorized and approved by accused Ricardo Villaran and Lucila Talabis, sometimes jointly,
sometimes by either of them alone, and at other times by one of them together with another official of the Bank. But
all of those uncleared checks deposited by Dick Ong prior to January 3, 1979 and against which he was allowed to
withdraw were subsequently honored and paid by the drawee banks.
Ong then issued and deposited into his savings account four checks and before these checks were cleared, his
withdrawal against the amount of these checks were approved by Talabis. The next day, he issued and deposited
seven checks into his savings account and like the previous day, his withdrawal against the amount of these checks
were allowed and approved without being cleared first. When the bank presented the checks to the respective
drawee banks, all of the checks were dishonored for for lack or insufficiency of funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong was guilty of the crime charged against him.
HELD: NO. The Court acquitted Ong
RATIO: The following are the elements of this kind of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee thereof. Based thereon, the trial court concluded that the guilt of the accused-appellant has
"been duly established by the required quantum of evidence adduced by the People against (him)". We shall confine

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Our discussion only on the first element because there is no argument that the second and third elements are present
in this case. For an orderly discussion of this element, We will divide it into two parts: first, "postdating or issuance of
a check," and second, "in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued."
Inasmuch as the first part of the first element of Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is concerned
with the act of "postdating or issuance of a check," the accused-appellant raises the defense that he was neither the
issuer nor drawer of the subject checks, but only an indorser thereof. Thus, his liability, if any, should be governed by
the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, particularly Section 66 thereof, supra. Also, he could not have had
any knowledge as to the sufficiency of the drawers' funds in their respective banks. The Office of the Solicitor General
contend's that the trial court found as a fact that the accused-appellant issued the subject checks.
Regarding the second part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused-appellant alleges that when he deposited the subject checks in his savings account, it was clearly not in
payment of an obligation to the Bank. The Office of the Solicitor General misses this point of the accused-appenant.
This single argument of the accused-appellant spells tilting the scale to his advantage. In several cases, We were
categorical that bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn
interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated loans and are to be covered
by the law on loans. Current and savings deposits are loans to a bank because it can use the same.

BOUNCING CHECKS
LUIS S. WONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press. Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. After printing the
calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to
collect the payments. Petitioner, however, had a history of unremitted collections. Hence, petitioners customers were
required to issue post-dated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00, intended to guarantee the
calendar orders of customers who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused
to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioners
unremitted collections.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to replace
them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks
with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned forthe reason "account closed."
Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5) banking days. Petitioner was charged with three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and was found guilty by the trial court, to which the CA affirmed.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not LPI deposited the checks within a reasonable time; (2) WON the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.
HELD: (1) Yes. Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or 157days
after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds underSection 2 of B.P.
Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected tokeep his bank account active and
funded beyond the ninety-day period. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after
more than six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the
date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As
found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that
he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the
checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment
within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. (2) There are 2 ways
of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (a) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the
time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (b) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein, or credit with, said bank to cover the full amount
of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of 90 days.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the 1st situation, pertinent to the present case, are: (a) The making, drawing &
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (b) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (c) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
As to the 1st element, the RTC & CA have both ruled that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and
not as guarantee. What B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

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As to the 2nd element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the 2nd element prima facie exists when
the 1st & 3rd elements of the offense are present. Thus, the makers knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds.
An essential element of the offense is knowledge on the part of the maker/drawer of the check of the insufficiency of
his funds in, or credit with, the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind
difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the
check is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank when presented within 90
days from the date of the check. The statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within 5 banking days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker/drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank
or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Nowhere in the said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days.
Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds under the following conditions: (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of
the check & failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof.
That the check must be deposited within 90 days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his
duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Sec. 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will
be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a
check becomes stale after more than 6 months (180 days).
Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be
considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still
be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the RTC, private respondent did not deposit the checks
because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was
constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but
failed to make arrangements for full payment within 5 banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence
that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance
of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence, the respondent court is not in error for affirming his
conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.

OTHER DECEITS
VILLAFLOR v. CA
192 SCRA 680(no case digest available)
Appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentationwhen, knowing that the car was then owned by theNorthern
Motors, Inc., still told the complainant that the car was actually owned by him for purposes of and at the time he
obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad faith when he obtained the said loan under
such deliberate pretenses.
JOSE VELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
CORTES, J. / JULY 16, 1990
FACTS: For defrauding the Government in the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty- TwoThousand Two Hundred Seven
Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60) through the illegal and unauthorized issuance of fake Letters of Advice of
Allotments and Cash Disbursement Ceilings and the tampering and falsifications of General Vouchers and supporting
documents, the following officials and employees of the Ministry of Public Highways Central Office, Regional Office
No. VII and the Siquijor Highway Engineering District, together with contractors Clodualdo Gomilla, Juliana de los
Angeles and Manuel Mascardo, were charged with forty-six (46) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents:
(1) Rolando Mangubat, Angelina Escano, Chief Regional Accountant and Regional Finance Officer,
respectively, of the 7th Highway Regional Office in Cebu City; Wilfredo Monte, Zosimo S. Dinsay, Cresencia
L. Tan, Isaac T. Mananquil, Trinidad T.
Manloloyo, Aurelio M. de la Pena Eugenio S. Machan, Ediltrudes Kilat Jose R. Veloso, Regino Junawan
Arsenio Pakilit Juan Sumagang, Francisco Ganhinhin and Urbano Arcamo, the Civil Engineer, Senior Civil
Engineer, Accountant I, Highway District Engineer II, Assistant Highway District Engineer, Administrative
Officer, Property Custodian, Auditing
Aide Auditor, Auditing Examiner, Senior Civil Engineer, Crewman and Auditing Aide respectively, of the
Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED) in Crim. Cases Nos. 20732095, and
(2) Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, Basilisa Galwan Budget Officer, Matilde Jabalde,Supervising
Accounting Clerk, Josefina Luna, Accountant II, Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, of the Department of Public
Works and Highways, Region VII, Cebu City;Leonila del Rosario, Chief, Finance and Management Service,
Engracia Escobar,
Chief Accountant, Abelardo Cardona, Asst. Chief Accountant and Leonardo Tordecilla,Supervising
Accountant, of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Central Office,Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos.
3323-3345

Petitioner, together with accused Mangubat, Mananquil, Monte, Machan Tan,Ganhinhin, Manloloyo, de la Pe Insay,
Kilat Jumawan, Pakilit Arcamo,Sumagang and Gomilla were found guilty as co-principals and sentenced in eachof
twenty-three cases to suffer imprisonment of from four (4) years, two (2)months and one (1) day of prision

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correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of One Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos(P1,500.00) in each case and to indemnify the government in amounts varyingfrom case to case.
Petitioner does not dispute the finding that there were anomalies in the Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED)
Neither does he dispute the existence of aconspiracy between the suppliers and certain government officials
andemployees. What he vehemently denies is the Sandiganbayan's finding that hewas a conspirator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Veloso should be convicted as co-principal/ comspirator in the saidcriminal cases
HELD: YES. Veloso is a co-principal in the crimes.
RATIO: The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner's liability, as District Auditor,emanated from his irregular
and improper processing, pre-audit and approvalof all the general vouchers and checks in question, based
on irregular or fakesupporting papers. The graft court found that he also signed and passed inaudit the
vouchers and checks knowing that these were illegally funded andimproperly charged to "Fund 81-400" (the
prior year's obligations), andengaged in "splitting," so that he would be the one to pass the vouchers inaudit
when such should have been forwarded to the Commission on Audit(COA) Regional Auditor for action or
review
The Sandiganbayan described the details of the "splitting" resorted to as follows: ..based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that the accused district officials resorted to "splitting" of RSEs,POs (Purchase Orders) and GVs in order to
avoid review or approval by higher authorities. Under COACircular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, in relation to COA
Circular No. 16-16A, dated February 10,1976, of which the Court takes judicial notice, it is provided that "Resident
Auditors of bureaus, officesand agencies of the National Government in Metropolitan Manila, as well as other
Auditors 3 for District/City Highway, Public Works/School, State Colleges and Universities, Military Areas and
Zonesoutside Metropolitan Manila, are authorized to countersign checks and warrants in amounts notexceeding
P50,000.00 in each case. Consequently, all GVs in amounts exceeding P50,000.00 musthave to be processed, preaudited and approved by the Regional Auditor of the COA, instead of (SHED)resident auditor Jose Veloso, one of
the accused herein.Thus, in the very wording of COA Circular No. 76-41, "to avoid action, review or approval by
higher authorities", the district officials herein resorted to the splitting of the RSEs, POs and the GVs involved inthe
fake LAA dated October 6, 1977 in the amount of P200,000.00. Said LAA evolved into three (3)separate transactions
involving the amounts of P48,480.00, P48,480.00 and P48,189.60 as evidenced bythree GVs dated December 21,
December 21 and December 23, 1977, respectively. Otherwise, if suchtransactions were to be reviewed and preaudited by the Regional (COA) Auditor, who might be averse to joining the conspiracy, then the GVs and supporting
papers may be found to be the result of (1) inexistentprograms of work, (2) illegal funding, (3) irregular or non-existent
bidding, (4) fictitious deliveries andinspection, and other anomalies. Consequently, the Court considers such
"splitting" as an integral and/or essential element or link in the conspiracy to defraud the Government inasmuch as
such practices was(sic) consciously and deliberately resorted to in order to hide the massive and
stupefyingmisappropriations being undertaken by the accused herein. [Decision, pp. 75-76;Rollo, pp. 105106;underscoring in the original...
But petitioner vigorously argues his innocence, alleging his non- participation inthe conspiracy and his good faith in
attaching his signature to the documentsinvolved. He contends that it has not been shown that he falsified any of
thedocuments which the Sandiganbayan found to be falsifications.
Thus, while he admits that he signed the general vouchers, he claims that his actof doing so was merely ministerial
considering that all the supporting papers anddocuments were submitted and attached to the vouchers. He continues
that hecould not question the veracity of the prepared Letters of Advice of Allotments(LAA) and Sub-Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) since thesedocuments, with the program of work accompanying them and other
inspectionreports, gave him the go-signal to pass them in audit.
Thus, he claims that the vouchers would have been cleared even without hissignature as they were supported by the
required documents andcertifications.This argument cannot be given much weight.
Clearly, given his acts and omissions in auditing the documents, whichrelated not only to one but to several
transactions, petitioner's participationin the conspiracy to defraud the Government has been established
beyondreasonable doubt. It is well-settled that there need not be direct evidence of the existence and details
of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individualoffender, the existence of a conspiracy and a conspirator's
participationmay be established through circumstantial evidence
Petitioner, as resident auditor of the SHED was tasked with ensuring theregularity of all transactions that are
subject to his review. In these cases,he had before him, for his signature, vouchers that were patently
irregular, supported by similarly irregularly issued documents, which he should nothave passed in audit.
Instead of refusing to affix his signature andreporting the irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty
bound to do, heturned a blind eye and signed the documents, completing the process thatled to the
consummation of the crime.
He can not rely on the excuse that his subordinates have already initialed thedocuments for his signature because his
function, as their superior, is to check on their work and to ensure that they do it correctly. Otherwise, if his
signaturewas a superfluity, petitioner would be serving no useful purpose in occupying his position of resident auditor.
The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved and the magnitude of theamount involved also prevent a
reasonable mind from accepting the proposition thatpetitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of
his functions Hepassed in audit twenty-four (24) general vouchers which resulted in the issuance of twenty-three (23)
checks amounting to Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand TwoHundred Seven Pesos and Sixty Centavos

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(P982,207.60).Moreover,the irregularities were not of the kind that could have gone unnoticed by the trained eyes of
an auditor.
Finally, it may be that petitioner has already been administratively penalized for hismalfeasance, as in fact he was
suspended for one (1) year without pay but such willnot bar his conviction under the general penal laws.
Administrative liability isseparate and distinct from penal liability.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED.

SWINDLING BY SYNDICATE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1689 (April 6, 1980)
INCREASING THE PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF SWINDLING OR ESTAFA
WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of swindling and other forms of frauds in rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon (s)", and farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public;
WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds contributed by stockholders or members of such rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative
system, contravenes the public interest, and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said crimes be checked, or at least minimized, by imposing capital
punishment on certain forms of swindling and other frauds involving rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)",
farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa)
is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful
or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association,
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 6th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
CATIIS VS. CA (no case digest available)
G.R. No. ??

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSE DUJUA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004
Facts: Ramon Dujua, his mother Rose, his aunt, Editha Singh, and his uncle, Guillermo Samson were charged with
illegal recruitment in large scale. Only Ramon was arrested. Four testified against Ramon Dujua. All of them were
promised work abroad upon payment of fees but they were not actually deployed. Ramon pleaded not guilty and
denied the allegations that he was a recruiter.
Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment in large scale was committed by Ramon Dujua, et al.
Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) The accused engages in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of
the Labor Code; 2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers either
locally or overseas; and 3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons individually or as a
group.
All three elements were established beyond reasonable doubt.
First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily proved that Dujua promised them employment and
assured them of placement overseas. All of them identified Dujua as the person who recruited them for employment
abroad. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the three complainants, Dujuas mere denials cannot
prevail. As long as the prosecution is able to establishthrough credible testimonial evidence that Dujua has engaged
in illegal recruitment , a conviction for the offense can very well be justified.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
Second, Dujua did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or
authority.
Third, it has been alleged and proven that Dujua undertook the recruitment of more than three persons.
People vs. Chowdury
G.R. No. 129577-80 February 15, 2000
Facts: Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegalrecruitment in large scale by recruiting Estrella B. Calleja,
Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows that accused appellant interviewed
private complainant in 1994 at Craftrades office. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating
under temporary authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that he
was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit
overseas workers. The complainants also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the
license of Craftrade was already expired.
For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty
was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed theinstructions given by his
superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the
agency's Managing Director.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime
charged.
Held: No, an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. In this
case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active participation in the commission
of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover, accused-appellant was not aware of Craftrade's failure to register his
name with the POEA and the prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged inrecruitment despite this
knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere
employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legalrequirements for its operation. The accused-appellant
carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in
turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his
actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirementsfor
deployment but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and intentionally participated in the
commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his task and unaware of illegality of recruitment.

MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
CABALLES v. DAR
G.R. No. ??
PARTIES: YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.HEHERSON ALVAREZ and
BIENVENIDO ABAJON
FACTS: 1975, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of Andrea Millenes land. Millenes received
P2/month as rental and she also allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, whereby they share the produce
50-50.
1979, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes bought the property from Millenes. The spouses asked Abajon to vacate the
property. Abajon refused to leave and instead offered to pay them rental, but the new owners refused. Yolanda then
executed an affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from
the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill-intent, cut down the banana plants on the
property worth about P50.
ISSUE: WON Abajon is guilty of malicious mischief. NO.
RATIONALE: Malicious Mischief any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage
not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief
Elements: Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another
Damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction
Damage was caused maliciously by the offender

Abajon cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized
occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof.
Whatever Abajon planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus an
essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is damage deliberately caused to the property of another
is absent because Abajon merely cut down his own plantings.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
JUDGMENT: Criminal case dismissed.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1728
AMENDING PARAGRAPH 4 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 DATED OCTOBER 2, 1972
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 9, dated October 2, 1972, was adopted and promulgated for the purpose of
providing an effective deterrent to the use of illegal firearms, explosives, and other deadly weapons, as means for the
commission and/or furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, and widespread public
disorder, which problems and conditions gravely imperiled the existence and survival of the State.
WHEREAS, in view of the recent bombings, arsons, and other acts of terrorism and lawlessness committed or being
carried out by the radicals and other criminal elements in Metro Manila and in other parts of the country, resulting in
the loss of human lives, serious injuries to innocent civilians, sizable damage to property, and the waste and
destruction of valuable resources, there is an urgent necessity to amend Presidential Decree No. 9, to better serve its
purpose and insure the complete success of the continuing efforts of the government aimed at solving the problems
of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawlessness, and public disorder, on the one hand, and the restoration of
normalcy in the country, on the other;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows:
Section 1. Paragraph 4 of Presidential Decree No. 9, dated October 2, 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for
the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in
addition to the penalty provided for the particular offense/s committed or intended to be committed: Provided,
however, that, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any person who, with the use of deadly weapons
enumerated in the preceding paragraph 2, including hand grenades, rifle grenades, and other type of explosives,
commits any of the crimes against persons or property as defined in the Revised Penal Code, resulting in the death
of the victims of such crimes, shall suffer the mandatory penalty of death.
"The conspiracy of proposal, as these terms are defined in Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to
maliciously damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property by means of explosives,
incendiary devices, or any similar agency or means of destruction as those enumerated in the preceding paragraph 2,
shall be punished, respectively, by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years and a fine of not more than ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), and by imprisonment of more than five (5) years and a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY


ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
People v. Famularcano
43 OG 1721 (hard copy available at law lib (Ate Jackie)

CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS


SIMULATION OF BIRTHS
People v. Sangalang
74 OG 5977 (hard copy available at law lib (Ate Jackie)

BIGAMY
People v. Aragon
100 Phil 1033

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004

CRIMES AGAINST HONOR


LIBEL
Vasquez v. CA
G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and
some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza

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regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with
Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at
the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of the news article
appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, pulished were supposed allegations by Vasquez that
(1) nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa; (2) ang
mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal
officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa
mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latters
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions
for criminal libel.
Held: The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in criminal prosecutions for
libel. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good
motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal
Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel was used as a form of harassment: Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the
charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report,
namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the
petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.
GMA NETWORK, INC. and REY VIDAL v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, et al.
G.R. No. 146848, 17 October 2006, Garcia, J. (Second Division)
FACTS: The enumeration under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not an exclusive list of conditionally
privileged communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press has expanded the
privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. Although every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. The privilege destroys the
presumption.
In February 1988, a certain Abello and over 200 other unsuccessful examinees in the August 1987 physicians
licensure examinations, filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila to compel the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test
papers. They alleged that mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test
questions vitiated the results of the examinations. Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc.,
covered the filing of the said petition. After securing a copy of the petition, he drafted and narrated the news report for
the ten oclock evening news edition of GMAs Channel 7 Headline News.
Jesus G. Bustos, et al., former chairman and members of the Board of Medicine of the PRC which conducted the
examinations, filed a damage suit against Vidal and GMA Network, claiming,inter alia, that the latter, in reckless
disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMAs Channel 7 of
an unrelated and old footage showing physicians wearing black armbands. According to them, Vidal and GMA
Network made use of the said footage to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with
the complaining unsuccessful examinees, when the same actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors
and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital
management. The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages, holding that the news report was privileged, being
but a narration of the allegation is contained in and the circumstances attending the filing of the Petition for
Mandamus. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which, while regarding the text of the news report as a
qualifiedly privileged communication, nevertheless held that the insertion of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket film
footage, without the words file video was evidence of malice.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the televised news report on the filing of the Petition for Mandamus is libelous; (2)
Whether or not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of the PGH in their 1982
demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages
HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The news report is qualifiedly privileged communication, being a fair and true
reportwithout any comment or remarks. Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged
matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The mala or bona fides of the author is of no
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action.

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In qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory
utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. To this kind belongs private
communications and fair and true report without any comment or remarks falling under and described as
exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC). The enumeration under this provision is not an exclusive
list of conditionally privileged communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press
has expanded theprivilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. The news telecast in question is
a qualifiedly privileged matter, the same being only a narration of the contents of the Petition for Mandamus, devoid
of any comment or remark. What Vidal and GMA Network did was simply to inform the public of the said petition filed
against the then Board of Medicine. It was clearly within Vidals job to keep the public abreast of recent developments
in government institutions, which he was assigned to cover. The insertion of the 1982 video footage is not malicious.
Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the identifying character-generated words file videoappeared to
have been superimposed on screen, purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public.
At any rate, the absence of the said accompanying words would not change the legal situation insofar as the
privileged nature of the news report is concerned. The video footage, standing without accompanying soundsor
voices, was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. Even assuming arguendo that the film
footage contained demeaning features, the showing thereof was actually accompanied or simultaneously voiced over
by the narration of the news report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. There was nothing in the news
report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond what was reported.
The subject news report was clearly a fair and true report. Thus, Vidal and GMA Network are entitled to the protection
and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Art. 354, par. 2 of the RPC, and can not be held liable for
damages. Their failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain and telecast the side of the former Board
ofMedicine, is not an indicia of malice. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the
presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. The privilege destroys the presumption.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007
FACTS: An Information for Libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against private respondents Baskinas and
Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the complainant.
Private respondents moved to quash the Information and the warrants of arrest which was denied by the RTC.
Private respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which was granted holding that the fact that the
Information against private respondents states that the libelous matter was "caused to be published in Smart File, a
magazine of general circulation in Manila." CA held that the Information failed to allege where the written defamation
was "printed and first published," an allegation sine qua non "if the circumstances as to where the libel was printed
and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the publication." The Information, it was noted, did not indicate
that the libelous articles were printed or first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the
publication of the articles.
The CA further observed that even during the preliminary investigation, private respondents had already interposed
that Smart File was actually printed and first published in the City of Makati, and that the address of the publisher
Animal Farms Publication as indicated in the editorial page of the publication itself was a post office box with the
Makati Central Post Office.
ISSUE: Does the subject information sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the Manila trial courts to hear the libel charge, in
consonance with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD: NO. The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official
or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may
also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of
the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer
holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he
held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in
Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where
the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national
dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean
that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.
Petitioner does submit that there is no need to employ the clause "printed and first published" in indicating where the
crime of libel was committed, as the term "publish" is "generic and within the general context of the term 'print' in so
far as the latter term is utilized to refer to the physical act of producing the publication." Where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in
general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where
Smart File is in general circulation.
If this disquisition impresses an unduly formalistic reading of the Information at hand, it should be reiterated that the
flaws in the Information strike at the very heart of the jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction of a
court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Article
360 states, in as unequivocal a manner as possible, that the criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed with the
court of the province or city "where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense." If the Information for libel does not establish
with particularity any of these two venue requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal
case.

SLANDER
REYES v PEOPLE (27 SCRA 686) March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
((IN A NUTSHELL))The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In the instant case, it should be viewed as
part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
(FULL TEXT provided)
VICTORIO V CA
173 SCRA 645, May 3, 1989 G.R. Nos. L-32836-37
((IN A NUTSHELL)) Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, kayabang, tunaw na utak,
swapang, and "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation.
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libellous per se.
(FULL TEXT provided)
People v. Judge Orcullo 111 SCRA 609
G.R. No. L-57103 January 30, 1982
(FULL TEXT provided)
Villanueva v. People
G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

SLANDER BY DEED
People v. Motita
59 OG 3020 (hard copy available at law lib (Ate Jackie)

INCRIMINATING AN INNOCENT PERSON


People v Alagao
G.R. No. ??
Facts: On Feb. 28, 1961, Martin Alagao, et al. being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and
confederating together, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one MarcialApoloniothe
commission of the crime of bribery through unlawful arrest. The defendants moved to quash the information against
them: there would be either be only the singular crimes of incriminatory machinations or unlawful arrest, or perhaps
two crimes, incriminatory machinations and unlawful arrest. The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash, contending
that a perusal of the information will readily conclude that it is a complex crime in the sense that unlawful arrest was
used as a means for incriminatory machination. The CFI of Manila sustained the motion to quash.
Issue: Whether the information filed in the court below alleges the complex crime of incriminatory machinations
through unlawful arrest.
Held: Yes. For a criminal complaint or information to charge the commission of a complex crime, the allegations
contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined by law. It is sufficient that the
information contains allegations which show that one offense was a necessary means to commit the other. We,
therefore, held that the information in question in the present case contains allegations properly charging the
commission of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and the court a quo committed
error when it ordered its dismissal.

WIRETAPPING
Gaanan v. IAC
G.R. No. ??
The case: This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA 4200 or Anti-wiretapping Act
Facts: In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

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VILLABLAGON-TAMONDONG-INOCENCIO-CAPA-ARPIA-HOFFMAN-PEALOSA-UNABIA
That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions, which the
latter answered in affirmative. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money,
he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted insisted that complainant himself should receive
the money. And when he received the money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00
for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant then charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for
listening to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs
The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and Laconico was private in nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner
overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and
Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Issue: WON extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties
using a telephone line.
Held: No.
Ruling: Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities
orrepresentatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or
tointimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or othersof
similar nature.We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or other devices
enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone
line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties
being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the
case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, [145 SCRA 112 (1986)], a case which dealt with the issue of
telephone wiretapping, the Supreme Court held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing
a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those device(s) or arrangement(s) enumerated therein, following the principle that penal statutes
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Gaanan v IAC
G.R. No. ??
An extension phone is not one of those prohibited under RA 4200. There must be either a physical interruption
through the wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record
the spoken words. The extension phone was not installed for such purpose.