LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS (3S)

I. Quitclaim
1. Philippine Carpet MFG vs Taguamon
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC ) is a corporation registered
in the Philippines engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and
rugs Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioners
retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs. The alleged reason of PCMC for such action was
because of less demand in the market of their products due to the un-competitiveness of their price
On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and Comanda received a uniformly
worded Memorandum of dismissal stating that they are going to be retrenched because of the slump
in market demand. As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective
March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump
in demand. PCMC, however, claimed that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.
Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Mr. Patricio Lim and Mr. David
Lim.
Respondents contend that PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and
subsequent to their termination. They also insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and
signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case. PCMC on the other hand,
contend that retrenchment was a necessary management prerogative. Petitioners PCMC also
stressed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as they allowed almost three years to pass
making the principle of Laches applicable. Considering that respondents accepted their separation
pay and voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle
of estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation from the service. Finally, as to
Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not dismissed from employment, but in
fact they voluntarily retired from employment to take advantage of the companys program
Issue:
WON deeds of release and quitclaim can bar employees from demanding benefits to which
they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal.
Ruling:
No. As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal
because the employees consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor
upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers
minded to evade legal responsibilities. The circumstances show that petitioners misrepresentation
led its employees, specifically respondents herein, to believe that the company was suffering losses
which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs, and

eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim. The amounts already
received by respondents as consideration for signing the releases and quitclaims, however, should
be deducted from their respective monetary awards.
II. Application of Res judicator
2. Hijo Resources Corp vs Mijares
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES
G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Epifanio P. Mejares, Remegio C. Baluran, Jr., Dante Saycon, and
Cecilio Cucharo (respondents) were among the complainants, represented by
their labor union named "Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit, Djevon, at Raquilla
Farms sa Hijo Resources Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the
NLRC an illegal dismissal case against petitioner Hijo Resources Corporation
(HRC). Complainants (respondents) alleged that petitioner HRC, formerly known
as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), is the owner of agricultural lands. In 2000,
HPI was renamed as HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application for the
conversion of its agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved. In
2001, complainants were absorbed by HRC, but they were working under the
contractor-growers: Buenaventura Tano (Bit Farm); Djerame Pausa (Djevon
Farm); and Ramon Q. Laurente (Raquilla Farm).
On 1 July 2007, complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC, which was
later registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 24
August 2007, NAMABDJERA-HRC filed a petition for certification election before
the DOLE. When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three
contractor-growers filed with the DOLE a notice of cessation of business
operations. In September 2007, complainants were terminated from their
employment on the ground of cessation of business operations by the
contractor-growers of HRC.
On 19 September 2007, complainants, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed
a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions with
prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC.
On 19 November 2007, DOLE Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa issued an Order,
dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for certification election on the ground
that there was no employer-employee relationship between complainants and
HRC. Complainants did not appeal the Order of Med-Arbiter but pursued the
illegal dismissal case they filed.
On 4 January 2008, HRC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The motion to dismiss was anchored on the following arguments: (1)
Lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res judicata; and (2) The Order of the
Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were not employees of HRC, which
complainants did not appeal, had become final and executory.

On 5 February 2008, Labor Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to dismiss and
held that res judicata does not apply. ((The Labor Arbiter ruled that the decision
of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature of that
proceedings does not foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the
existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between them.
Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter that no employment relationship exists
between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his
own independent finding on the same issue. The non-litigious nature of the
proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does not prevent the Labor Arbiter from
hearing and deciding the case.))
HRC filed with the NLRC a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary
restraining order, seeking to nullify the Orders of Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
granted the petition.
((The NLRC held that the Med-Arbiter Order dismissing the certification election
case on the ground of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC
and complainants (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC) constitutes res judicata
under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, and thus, warrants the
dismissal of the case. The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter exercises quasijudicial power and the Med-Arbiter's decisions and orders have, upon their
finality, the force and effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata.))
The CA reversed the NLRCs Resolution. ((Under Article 217 of the Labor Code,
the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal
cases. Although the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are also described as
non-litigious, the Court of Appeals noted that the Labor Arbiter is given wide
latitude in ascertaining the existence of employment relationship. Hence, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification election case
does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship between HRC and the complainants.))
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the
ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employeremployee relationship between the parties in the certification election case.
HELD: No. As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts in this case are very
similar to those in the Sandoval case, which also involved the issue of whether
the ruling in a certification election case on the existence or non-existence of
an employer-employee relationship operates as res judicata in the illegal
dismissal case filed before the NLRC. In Sandoval, the DOLE Undersecretary
reversed the finding of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case and ruled
that there was no employer-employee relationship between the members of
the petitioner union and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI), since the former were
employees of the subcontractors. Subsequently, several illegal dismissal cases
were filed by some members of the petitioner union against SSI. Both the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties, citing the resolution of the DOLE Undersecretary in the
certification election case. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC ruling and

held that the members of the petitioner union were employees of SSI. On
appeal, this Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and ruled that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in relying on the pronouncement of the DOLE
Undersecretary that there was no employer-employee relationship between the
parties. The Court cited the ruling in the Manila Golf11 case that the decision in
a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does not
foreclose all further disputes between the parties as to the existence or nonexistence of an employer-employee relationship between them. This case is
different from the Chris Garments case cited by the NLRC where the Court held
that the matter of employer-employee relationship has been resolved with
finality by the DOLE Secretary, whose factual findings were not appealed by the
losing party. As mentioned earlier, the Med-Arbiter's order in this case
dismissing the petition for certification election on the basis of non-existence of
employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of the
respondent union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a
petition for certification election is to determine which organization will
represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.12The
respondent union, without its member-employees, was thus stripped of its
personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the certification election
case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but
to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss
the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the
pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there
was no employer-employee relationship between the parties, which the
respondent union could not even appeal to the DOLE Secretary because of the
dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to denying due process to the
complainants in the illegal dismissal case. This, we cannot allow.

3. SSC vs Rizal Poultry and Livestock

GR 167050, June 1 2011

RE: Application of Res Judicata involving Employer-Employee Relationship

Doctrines:
1. Jurisprudence does not dictate absolute identity but only substantial identity of
parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest
between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case.
2. Res judicata by "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require an identity in the cause
of action. An identity of issues would suffice.

Petitioner: Social Security Commission

Respondents: Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., BSD Agro Industrial
Development Corporation and Benjamin San Diego (owner of BSD Agro)

Facts:
Alberto Angeles filed a petition before the Social Security Commission to compel
respondents Rizal Poultry or BSD Agro to remit all his paid contributions to the SSS.
Respondents countered with a Motion to Dismiss, citing the NLRC ruling regarding
the absence of employer-employee relationship between Angeles and respondents.
Angeles had earlier filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against BS Agro and San Diego.
The Labor Arbiter initially ruled in favor of Angeles, but the NLRC reversed the decision
and held that no employer-employee relationship existed based on the finding that the
duties performed by Angeles, such as carpentry, plumbing, painting and electrical works,
were not independent and integral steps in the essential operations of the company, which
is engaged in the poultry business.
At any rate, the SSC denied respondents motion to dismiss, ruling that the
decisions of the NLRC and other tribunals on the issue of existence of employeremployee relationship between parties are not binding on the Commission. At most, such
finding has only a persuasive effect and does not constitute res judicata as a ground for
dismissal of an action pending before it.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which granted
such petition and ruled that the existence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship is a common issue between the cases before the SSC and the NLRC, and
that the case therefore falls squarely under the principle of res judicata.
Hence, this petition. SSC contends res judicata does not apply because:
(1) There is no identity in the cause of action since the labor dispute and the SSC claim do
not proceed from the same cause of action in that the action before SSC is for nonremittance of SSS contributions while the NLRC case was for illegal dismissal; and
because
(2) The element of identity of parties is likewise unavailing since another employer, Rizal
Poultry, was added as respondent in the case lodged before the SSC. There is no showing
that BSD Agro and Rizal Poultry refer to the same juridical entity.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC finding no employer-employee

relationship, constitutes res judicata.

Ruling: Yes.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).14

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Verily, the principle
of res judicata in the mode of "conclusiveness of judgment" applies in this case.
As to the identity of parties, the Court held that there was substantial compliance.
The parties in SSC and NLRC cases are not strictly identical. Rizal Poultry was impleaded
as additional respondent in the SSC case. Jurisprudence however does not dictate
absolute identity but only substantial identity. There is substantial identity of parties
when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party
in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. Although
Rizal Poultry is not a party in the NLRC case, there are numerous indications that all the
while, Rizal Poultry was also an employer of Angeles together with BSD Agro and San
Diego. Most significantly, the three respondents, BSD Agro, Rizal Poultry and San Diego,
litigated as one entity before the SSC. They were represented by one counsel and they
submitted their pleadings as such one entity. Certainly, and at the very least, a community
of interest exists among them.
As to the identity of causes of action, res judicata by "conclusiveness of judgment,"
as previously discussed, does not require an identity in the cause of action. An identity of
issues would suffice. The mandatory coverage under the Social Security Act is premised
on the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as evident in Section 9(a) of the
Social Security Act of 1997. Thus, there is an identity of issue of existence or absence of
employer-employee relationship.
In the instant case, therefore, res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies. The judgment in the NLRC case pertaining to a finding of an absence
of employer-employee relationship between Angeles and respondents is conclusive on the
SSC case.

III. Burden of proof

4. Bitoy Javier vs Fly Ace
*From the internet
FACTS:
Javier an employee of Fly Ace performing various work for the latter filed a complaint
before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits.
He alleged that he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7:00 oclock in the
morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that during his employment, he was not issued an
identification card and pay slips by the company; that he reported for work but he was no
longer allowed to enter the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of
Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong), his superior; that after several minutes of begging to the guard to
allow him to enter, he saw Ong whom he approached and asked why he was being barred
from entering the premises; that Ong replied by saying, Tanungin mo anak mo;that he

discovered that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn after the two met at a fiesta
celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong and convince him to spare
her father from trouble but he refused to accede; that thereafter, Javier was terminated
from his employment without notice; and that he was neither given the opportunity to refute
the cause/s of his dismissal from work.
For its part p, Fly Ace denied the existence of employer-employee relationship between
them and Javier as the latter was only called roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month
whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint ruling that respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in
trucking business but in the importation and sales of groceries. Since there is a regular
hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to Respondents claim that complainant
was contracted on pakiao basis.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the decisin of the LA. It was of the view that a pakyaw-basis
arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship. Payment
by result x x x is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the
relation. It is a mere method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the
existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC further averred
that it did not follow that a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because
the work he was doing was not directly related to the employers trade or business or the
work may be considered as extra helper as in this case; and that the relationship of an
employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail whatever
the parties may call it. Finding Javier to be a regular employee, the NLRC ruled that he
was entitled to a security of tenure. For failing to present proof of a valid cause for his
termination, Fly Ace was found to be liable for illegal dismissal of Javier who was likewise
entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. However, on appeal, CA
reversed the ruling of NLRC
The CA ruled thatJaviers failure to present salary vouchers, payslips, or other pieces of
evidence to bolster his contention, pointed to the inescapable conclusion that he was not
an employee of Fly Ace. Further, it found that Javiers work was not necessary and
desirable to the business or trade of the company, as it was only when there were
scheduled deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would
contract the services of Javier as an extra helper. Lastly, the CA declared that the facts
alleged by Javier did not pass the control test.
He contracted work outside the company premises; he was not required to observe
definite hours of work; he was not required to report daily; and he was free to accept other
work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his contracted service to the company, the
same being co-terminous with the trip only. Since no substantial evidence was presented
to establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal dismissal could not
prosper. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between Javier and
Fly Ace, thereby holding the latter guilty of illegal dismissal.
HELD: The CA's decision was sustained.
LABOR LAW

As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of employment with Fly
Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Labor officials are
enjoined to use reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively with little
regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they provided a license
to completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum of proof required, however,
must still be satisfied. Hence, when confronted with conflicting versions on factual matters,
it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on
the basis of evidence received, subject only to the requirement that their decision must be
supported by substantial evidence.Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by substantial
evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he claims illegal
dismissal.
In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. Whoever claims entitlement
to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x. Sadly, Javier
failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
By way of evidence on this point, all that Javier presented were his self-serving statements
purportedly showing his activities as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier failed to pass
the substantiality requirement to support his claim. Hence, the Court sees no reason to
depart from the findings of the CA.
While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he was
made to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery
items for delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to fortify his claim. The lone
affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening Javiers
cause.
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled
tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the
most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to
control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and
methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
DENIED.

IV. Presentation before the Labor Arbiter

5. Raza vs Daikoku Electronics
ALBERTO J. RAZA, Petitioner, v. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS
no.188464 july 2015
Facts:

The

facts

of

the

case

gr

follow.

Petitioner Alberto J. Raza (Raza) was hired as a driver by respondent Daikoku

Electronics Phils., Inc. (Daikoku) on January 11, 1999. Eventually, he was
assigned to drive for the other respondent, the company president Mamoru
Ono (Ono). Raza claims that his working days and hours depended on Ono's
schedule and needs, so it was not unusual for him to be ordered to work from
very early in the morning up to past midnight of any day, including
Sundays.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the evening of July 21, 2003, Raza dropped Ono off at the latter's residence
called the Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City. But Raza, instead of
parking the company vehicle at the condominium building's parking area,
drove the vehicle to his home and parked it there overnight. The next morning,
as Raza was about to fetch Ono, the latter confronted him and asked why the
vehicle was not at the condominium parking lot. Raza replied with a lie, telling
Ono that he parked the car at the condominium building but in the wrong slot.
Three (3) days later, on July 24, 2003, Raza was served a company Notice of
Violation of the Code of Conduct for Dishonesty. On July 25, 2003, Raza
submitted his written explanation wherein he admitted bringing the car to his
home without permission and lying about it to Ono. 4 He apologized for these
infractions but he also indicated that he was previously told by Ono that he
could use the car if he needed to.
The Committee then recommended the suspension of Raza for twelve (12)
days without pay for the offenses of parking the company vehicle at home
without authority and for lying about it. 7 However, disregarding such
recommendation, the company's General Affairs Manager Gerardo Gaytano
sent a letter dated August 7, 2003 terminating Raza's services for dishonesty. 8
Respondents explain that the harsher punishment was imposed because at the
meeting of the board of directors, Ono denied permitting Raza to use the
company car and even presented a report from the Pacific Plaza Security Office
stating that from May 1, 2003 to July 20, 2003, Raza did not park the company
car at the said building for a total of thirty-one (31) instances, all without
authority
nor
permission.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, Raza filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for damages and
attorney's fees. LA ruled in favor of Raza. The Labor Arbiter found that the
allegations of Raza's infractions, such as his repeated use of the
company vehicle without permission, are unsubstantiated by
evidence.12 She ruled that although the company alleges that there
were thirty-one (31) prior incidents of Raza taking the company
vehicle, allegedly reported by the condominium security guard, Raza
was not confronted with the same in the notice of violation and
neither was it presented during the deliberations by the investigating
committee. And even if such report was admitted, the Labor Arbiter
still sustained Raza's explanation that he was permitted to do so by
Ono and that there were times when Raza would work until 1:30 in the
morning and was told to report back to work at 7:00 in the morning of
the same day, or with just a few hours of rest in between.
Disagreeing with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, respondents filed an appeal
to
the
NLRC.

In a Resolution14 dated August 31, 2005, the NLRC dismissed the appeal due to
respondents' failure to include a certificate of non-forum shopping and lack of
proper verification. It held that Raza was not illegally dismissed since the
infractions he committed were a just cause for dismissal.
Raza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which at first was dismissed but
later on was granted after filing a recon. And on the dewcision of this court, the
petition filed by raza was also dismissed by the CA.
ISSUE: w/n THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE IMPOSITION OF A GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTY ON
THE ALLEGED INFRACTION COMMITTED BY PETITIONER ?
Ruling:
This Court disagrees with the Labor Arbiter's finding that the
infractions were too light and do not merit the supreme sanction of
dismissal. The arbiter's finding is grounded on her incorrect disregard
of the security guards' report on the thirty-one (31) alleged prior
incidents, which she claimed was not included in the notice of
violation and was not presented during the hearing by the
investigating committee. The Labor Arbiter also held that even if the
incidents [were] considered, such are excused by Razas long and
unusual working hours. Suffice it to state during the investigation,
Raza himself admitted such incidents as, during his appearance
before the investigating committee, he himself alleged and
acknowledged that on several occasions, Mr. Mamoru Ono authorized
(him) to take the vehicle home, which has the effect of admitting
that he, indeed, has previously taken the car home. 69 Then, the
company's letter of termination dated August 7, 2003 included as one
of the grounds therefor Raza's allegedly recurring act of taking the
subject vehicle without authority, 70 which Raza had the chance to
refute via a letter-motion for reconsideration 71 dated August 19, 2003.
In any case, the presentation of the security guards' report for the
first time with the Labor Arbiter through the respondents' Position
Paper is neither too late nor improper. For one thing, the NLRC is not
restricted by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be
liberal in the application of its rules in hearing and deciding labor
cases.
Under Section 2, Rule I of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and
reiterated verbatim in the same provision of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,
it
is
provided
that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to
carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, under Section 10, Rule VII of both the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure
and the 2011 NLRC Rules it is also identically stated that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 10. Technical rules not binding. The rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the
Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure,
all
in
the
interest
of
due
process.
In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be represented by
legal counsel but it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding
Commissioner or Commissioner to exercise complete control of the proceedings
at
all
stages.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
And far more importantly, it is precisely at the stage of the filing of the position
paper that the parties are required to submit supporting documents and
affidavits to bolster their causes of action or defenses, as the case may be. 72
Hence, it was just proper and the most opportune time that the said report was
presented at that stage and at the level of the Labor Arbiter.
note: just in case na matanong. Nadiscuss ito sa case. This Court has
previously upheld as legal the dismissal of employees for using the employer's
vehicle for their own private purposes without prior permission or authority. In
Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao,76 the Court held that a rule
prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purposes
without authority from management is a reasonable one. Thus, an employee
who used the company vehicle twice in pursuing his own personal interests, on
company time and deviating from his authorized route, all without permission,
was held to have been validly dismissed, for, as the Court held, to condone the
employee's conduct will erode the discipline that an employer should uniformly
apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and regulations by its
other employees.77 In another case, Family Planning Organization of the
Philippines v. NLRC,78 the Court also affirmed the dismissal of an employee who
used the company vehicle twice without permission and for personal reasons,
noting that employees must yield obedience to the rule against unauthorized
use of company vehicles because this is proper and necessary for the conduct
of the employer's business or concern.79ChanRoblesVirtualaw

V. Effect of Verification
6. Reyes vs Glaucoma Research Foundation
PETITIONER Jesus G. Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents
Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., Eye Referral Center and Manuel B. Agulto with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed his
complaint for his failure to establish that the elements of employer-employee relationship
existed between him and respondents. The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA decision.
It declared petitioner as respondents employee and found him illegally dismissed from the
service.

The Court of Appeals (CA) annulled and set aside the judgment of the NLRC and
reinstated the decision of the LA. Petitioner elevated his case to the Supreme Court. He
contended that respondents petition for certiorari filed with the CA should have been
dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified because the jurat portion of the
verification states only the community tax certificate number of the affiant as evidence of
her identity. He argued that under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, as amended by the
Supreme Court Resolution, A.M. No. 02-8-13, dated Feb. 19, 2008, a community tax
certificate is not among those considered as competent evidence of identity. Does this
contention find merit?
Ruling: No.
This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not required in cases
where the affiant is personally known to the notary public.
Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 356, this
Court held that:
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their
valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a jurat under Section
6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A jurat refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation
before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
Also, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides as follows:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions
a
xxx
b
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document
1
is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
2
is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Moreover, Rule II, Section 6 of the same Rules states that:
SEC 6. Jurat. - Jurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
a
appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
b
is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
c
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
d
takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.

In legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a choice

of one among two or more things. The word signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another thing in an enumeration.
Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to the notary public, the latter
need not require the former to show evidence of identity as required under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, as amended.
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the attorney-in-fact of
respondents who executed the verification and certificate against forum shopping, which
was attached to respondents petition filed with the CA, is personally known to the notary
public before whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the
notary public hold office at respondents place of business and the latter is also the legal
counsel of respondents (Peralta, J., SC 3rd Div., Jesus G. Reyes vs. Glaucoma Research
Foundation, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015).

VI. Evidence Presented for the first time on appeal

7. Moresco II vs Cagalawan
Facts:
Moresco Appointed Cagalawan as Head for a line crew then he was transferred to another
area but only as a crew member. PETITIONER Cooperative (MORESCO II) failed to file a
position paper before the labor arbiter. In its appeal against an adverse decision of the
labor arbiter, it invoked the liberal application of the rules and prayed for the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) to admit its evidence on appeal. The evidence consisted of
a letter dated May 8, 2002 addressed to its General Manager Amado Ke-e, from the area
manager of its Gingoog City sub-office, requesting for two additional disconnection
linesmen in order to attain its collection quota. The evidence was presented to justify the
transfer of respondent Virgilio Cagalawan to its Gingoog sub-office.
Issue:
Whether or not labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving
evidence submitted on appeal?
Held:
Yes.Labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving evidence
submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them.
However, any delay in the submission of evidence should be adequately explained and
should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven. In the present case,
MORESCO II did not cite why it had failed to file its position paper or present its cause
before the labor arbiter despite sufficient notice and time given to do so. Only after an
adverse decision was rendered did it present its defense and rebut the evidence of
Cagalawan, by alleging that his transfer was made in response to the letter-request of the
area manager of the Gingoog sub-office asking for additional personnel to meet its

collection quota which lends credence to Cagalawans theory that it may have just been
fabricated for the purpose of appeal. Nevertheless, Cagalawan, for his part, faithfully
complied with the transfer order but with the reservation to contest its validity precisely
because he was not adequately informed of its real basis . Hence, Cagalawan was
constructively dismissed.
Domdom vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On February and May 1994, four (4) separate informations were filed at the
Sandiganbayanagainst certain officials of the Philippine National Police due to the
discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP Commands. The petitioner was
included as an accused on account of his approval of the Advice Allotment in the amount
of P5M and P15M respectively which amounts to a violation of the Anti-Graft Law under
Sec 3 of RA 019.
On May 17, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued 2 orders, the first was ordering the
prosecution to demonstrate probable complicity in the transaction described in the
information and the second order was deffering action on the motion for consolidation
considering the uncertainty of the Court in proceeding the case at this time and
considering that only one of the 15 accused filed a motion for consolidation.
A Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 26,
1997 and included petitioner as they were recommended for further prosecution by the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges that respondents Desierto, Villa and Tamayo acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion for consolidation, claiming that since all of the pertinent
cases have been remanded by the Sandiganbayan to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation, "jurisdiction has revested" in the
latter and "it is grave abuse of discretion to refuse to perform the duty of consolidating
these cases.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan should be enjoined from proceeding with the
hearing and other incidents of Criminal Case No. 20574 against the petitioner during the
pendency of the petition.
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court held that the contentions of the petitioner are untenable. The Court
explained : Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either
through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following
instances:
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;(2) When
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;(4) When the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority;(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

(7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;(8) Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution;(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by lust for vengeance;(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
Corollary to the rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense
charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or
substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may
proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.
However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans
action when there is an abuse of discretion, by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, we proceed to determine whether the respondents Ombudsman Desierto and
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Such arbitrariness or despotism does not obtain here.

8. Leopard Security and Investigation vs Sabang

GR No. 186344 February 20,2013
Facts
Ondong, along with private respondents Quitoy, Sabang and Morales,
were hired as security guards by petitioner LSIA and were assigned to different
branches in Union Bank at Cebu City. On April 1,2005, Union Bank served a
notice to LSIA terminating the parties' service contract effective on April
30,2005. On April, 29,2005, Morales, a representative of LSIA, informed
respondents of the termination of its contract with Union Bank and ordered
respondents to go to Union Bank for the turnover of their service firearms. On 3
May 2005, respondents and Ondong filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unpaid 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay (SILP), moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees against LSIA, its President,
Jose Poe III, Union Bank, its Regional Service and Operations Officer,
Catherine Cheung, Herbert Hojas, Protectors Services, Inc. (PSI) and Capt.
Gerardo Jaro. Cheung, Hojas, were dropped from the case upon motion of the
respondents while Jaro and PSI were later on excluded from the case in view of
Ondong's execution of a quitclaim. On May 10, while the case was docketed
before the Regional Arbitration Branch VII of NLRC, LSIA sent a notice requiring

respondents to report for work to its Mandaluyong City office but the latter
failed to appear.

LA Ruling: The LA rendered a Decision finding LSIA liable for illegal dismissal. In
informing respondents of the termination of their services only on April 30
despite Union Bank's advice of the termination of its security service contract
on April 1, the LA ruled that the report to work order on May 10 did not show a
sincere intention on the part of LSIA to provide respondents with other
assignments. Aside from backwages, LSIA was also ordered to pay the
respondents' claim for separation pay on the ground that reinstatement was no
longer feasible under the circumstances.
NLRC Ruling: The NLRC modified the Decision of the LA. Applying the principle
that security agencies like LSIA are allowed to put security guards on
temporary off-detail or "floating status" for a period not exceeding six months,
the NLRC discounted the factual and legal bases for the illegal dismissal
determined by the Labor Arbiter as well as the backwages awarded in favor of
respondents. The NLRC also upheld the Labor Arbiters award of separation pay
on the theory that reinstatement was no longer viable. The awards of
proportionate 13th month pay and SILP for which Union Bank and LSIA were
held solidarily liable were likewise sustained for failure of the latter to
discharge the burden of proving payment of said labor standard benefits.
Belatedly submitting documents to prove its payment of SILP, LSIA filed a
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision which was, however,
denied for lack of merit in the NLRCs 23 July 2007 Resolution.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
faulting the NLRC for awarding separation pay absent a finding of illegal
dismissal. LSIA also faulted the NLRC for ignoring the evidence it
submitted alongside its motion for reconsideration to prove the
payment of respondents SILP for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 (eto
yung issue na related sa syllabus ni atty. jimeno)

CA Ruling: The CA affirm the NLRC, denying LSIA's petition. The CA also applied
the principle that respondents could not be considered illegally dismissed
before the lapse of 6 months from their being placed on "floating status" by
LSIA. Award of separation pay, proportionate 13th month pay and SILP were
also proper because of the strained relations between LSIA and respondents.
Issue

1. Whether or not separation pay may be awarded despite despite lack of

showing of illegal dismissal
2. Whether or not the NLRC is correct in not receiving evidence of LSIA to prove
payment of SILP
Held
1. No. Applying Article 286 of the Labor Code of the Philippines by analogy, this
Court has repeatedly recognized that security guards may be temporarily
sidelined by their security agency as their assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the latter with third parties. Temporary "off-detail" or
"floating status" is the period of time when security guards are in between
assignments or when they are made to wait after being relieved from a
previous post until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when, as
here, the security agency clients decide not to renew their contracts with the
agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing
contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster. For as long as such
temporary inactivity does not continue for a period exceeding six months, it
has been ruled that placing an employee on temporary "off-detail" or "floating
status"
is
not
equivalent
to
dismissal.
In the case at bench, respondents were informed on 29 April 2005 that they
were going to be relieved from duty as a consequence of the 30 April 2005
expiration of the security service contract between Union Bank and LSIA. While
respondents lost no time in immediately filing their complaint on 3 May 2005,
the record equally shows that they were directed by LSIA to report for work at
its Mandaluyong City office on 10 May 2005 or a mere ten days from the time
the former were effectively sidelined. Considering that a security guard is only
considered illegally dismissed from service when he is sidelined from duty for a
period exceeding six months, we find that the CA correctly upheld the NLRC
ruling that respondents were not illegally dismissed by LSIA. Parenthetically,
said ruling is binding on respondents who did not appeal either the decision
rendered by the NLRC or the CA in line with the entrenched procedural rule in
this jurisdiction that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as
are
designed
to
have
the
judgment
modified.
Having correctly ruled out illegal dismissal of respondents, the CA reversibly
erred, however, when it sustained the NLRC award of separation pay on the
ground that the parties relationship had already been strained. For one, liability
for the payment of separation pay is a legal consequence of illegal dismissal
where reinstatement is no longer viable or feasible. In cases of illegal dismissal,
the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in lieu of
reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best
interest
of
the
parties.

As a relief granted in lieu of reinstatement, however, it consequently goes

without saying that an award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding
that there was no illegal dismissal. Standing alone, the doctrine of strained
relations will not justify an award of separation pay, a relief granted in
instances where the common denominator is the fact that the employee was
dismissed by the employer.
Absent illegal dismissal on the part of LSIA and abandonment of employment
on the part of respondents, we find that the latter reinstatement without
backwages is, instead, in order. In addition to respondent alternative prayer
therefor in their position paper, reinstatement is justified by LSIA directive for
them to report for work at its Mandaluyong City office as early of 10 May 2005.

2. No. As for the error ascribed the CA for failing to correct the NLRC
disregard of the evidence showing LSIA payment of respondents SILP,
suffice it to say that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving
evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases. Considering that labor
officials are, in fact, encouraged to use all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little resort to
technicalities of law or procedure, LSIA correctly faults the CA for
likewise brushing aside the evidence of SILP payments it submitted
during the appeal stage before the NLRC.
The record shows that respondents were uniformly awarded SILP at the rate
of P666.00 for the period May 3 to December 31, 2002, P1,000.00 for the
period January 1 to December 31, 2003, P1,040.00 for the period January 1 to
December 31, 2004 and P347.36 for the period January 1 to May 3, 2005 or a
total of P3,053.36 each.44 The Bank Advice Slips and On Demand Statement of
Account45 submitted by LSIA before the NLRC shows uniform payments of SILP
to respondents in the sum of P1,025 for the year 2004 which should, therefore,
be deducted from the award of said benefit in favor of respondent. Although
LSIA also submitted a Bank Advice Slip showing a supposed P1,065.00 payment
of SILP for the year 2005 in favor of respondent Sabang only, the absence of an
On Demand Statement of Account for said amount impels Us to disallow the
further deduction thereof from the SILP award.
VII. Rule on the filing of pleading not done personally
9. ALBERTO J. RAZA, , v. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. AND MAMORU
ONO

Gr No. 188464 | July 29, 2016

FACTS
Alberto J. Raza (Raza) was hired as a driver by respondent Daikoku Electronics
Phils., Inc. (Daikoku) and was assigned to drive for the company president, Mamoru
Ono.

Raza claims that his working days and hours depended on Ono's schedule and
needs, so it was not unusual for him to be ordered to work from very early in the
morning up to past midnight of any day, including Sundays.

One evening, Raza dropped Ono off at his residence in Pacific Plaza Condominium
in Makati City. But Raza, instead of parking the company vehicle at the
condominium building's parking area, drove the vehicle to his home and parked it
there overnight.

The next morning, as Raza was about to fetch Ono, the latter confronted him and
asked why the vehicle was not at the condominium parking lot.
o Raza replied with a lie, telling Ono that he parked the car at the condominium
building but in the wrong slot.

3 days later, Raza was served a company Notice of Violation of the Code of
Conduct for Dishonesty.

Raza submitted his written explanation wherein he admitted bringing the car to his
home without permission and lying about it to Ono. He apologized for these
infractions but he also indicated that he was previously told by Ono that he could
use the car if he needed to.

The company's Investigation Committee conducted a hearing wherein Raza again

admitted bringing the car home and lying about it to Ono, but Raza reiterated that
there were previous occasions when Ono authorized him to bring the vehicle home
o The Committee then recommended the suspension of Raza for 12 days
without pay but the company's General Affairs Manager Gerardo Gaytano
terminated Raza's services for dishonesty
o Reasons for harsher punishment:
a) Ono denied permitting Raza to use the vehicle during their board meeting;
and
b) Ono presented a report from the Pacific Plaza Security Office stating that
the act was done 31 times, without permission.

Thus, Raza filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for damages and
attorney's
fees.

LA decision: in favor of Raza.

o the allegations of Raza's repeated use of the company vehicle without

permission, are unsubstantiated by evidence.
o She ruled that although the company alleges that there were 31 prior
incidents, Raza was not confronted with the same in the notice of violation
and neither was it presented during the deliberations by the investigating
committee.
o And even if such report was admitted, the Labor Arbiter still sustained Raza's
explanation that he was permitted to do so by Ono.

NLRC: dismissed the appeal of Daikoku for failing to include a certificate of nonforum shopping and lack of proper verification.

Daikoku filed Motion for Reconsideration and Raza opposed the same, saying that
such was filed out of time

NLRC, however, reinstated the appeal of Daikoku ruling that the application of
technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to meet the demands of substantial
justice. In the same resolution, the NLRC ruled in favor of Daikoku.
o It held that Raza was not illegally dismissed since the infractions he
committed were a just cause for dismissal. Such infractions include the taking
of the company vehicle without authority, which the NLRC described as a
recurring act, and the uttering of falsehood towards company president
Ono, which it believed was a show of disrespect and brought dishonor to the
latter.Raza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the NLRC's
resolutions, but the petition was initially dismissed by the appellate court in
its Order24 dated November 6, 2006 for its failure to meet procedural
requirements, such as the inclusion of pleadings and documents relevant to
the petition, as well as the inclusion of the actual addresses of the
respondents.

CA decision:
o The CA rejected Raza's allegation that Daikokus motion for reconsideration
of the NLRC's August 31, 2005 Resolution was filed late with the NLRC,
stating that Raza failed to substantiate such allegation with evidence.
o Then, it found that Raza's dishonesty, consisting of parking the vehicle at his
home overnight and lying about it to Ono, is deserving of the sanction of
dismissal.

ISSUE: W/n Daikokus Motion for Consideration was submitted on time with the NLRC.
CONTENTIONS
RAZA
o The motion for reconsideration filed by Daikoku with the NLRC after the
tribunal initially dismissed their appeal was filed out of time.
o that the deadline for filing the said motion was October 21, 2005, but there
was allegedly a certification from the postmaster that the latter's office was
without any clear record of mailing, or even a record of mailing or dispatch.

o Raza admits, however, that the envelopes sent to the NLRC and his counsel
all indicate through stamps and handwritten markings that the mailing date
was October 21, 2005.
HELD: (Yes)
There is nothing out of the ordinary nor irregular in the mailing of the motion of
respondents as would put in doubt the timeliness of its filing.
The mailing of the motion was done on the deadline for the filing and service of
such, which was October 21, 2005, as indicated by the post office on the envelopes
as well as in the registry receipts sent to the NLRC.
o Thus, the motion is considered filed on that date and the filing was on time.
o Raza does not dispute but even admits the fact that the envelopes and
registry receipts bear that date.
The rule is that whenever the filing of a motion or pleading is not done
personally, the date of mailing (by registered mail), as indicated by the post
office on the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the date of
filing.
o The fact that the post office indicated October 21, 2005 on the envelope and
receipts as the mailing date, entitles Daikoku to the presumption that the
motion was indeed mailed on said date.

The postmaster's belated certification that there is no clear record of mailing or

dispatch or that dispatch or delivery was done on a later date does not contradict
the fact of mailing done on October 21, 2005.

In Razas own Second Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt, the post offices
copies of Registry were dated Nov. 2, 2005 as date of dispatch
o Receipt Number 1421 (which corresponds to the mailing done to Razas
counsel (Atty. Gesmundo) of his copy of the motion)
o Receipt Number 1422 (which corresponds to the mailing of the NLRCs copy)
The date, November 2, 2005, does not negate the fact of mailing done
on October 21, 2005.
That the mail was delivered or dispatched by the postal service on a
later date that it was deposited or mailed by the sender is only
logical.

As to the alleged absence of a clear record of mailing, the same only refers to the
offices own record, but the stamps and marks of October 21, 2005 on the
envelopes are also a record and are reliable evidence of mailing done on that date.
o Between the belated certification of the postmaster and the marking or
stamping done by the post office at the time of mailing, the latter is preferred
as evidence for having been done closer to the transaction in question,
especially in this case when the postmaster's certification does not even
clearly allege nor prove any irregularity or mistake made in such marking or
stamping.
10. Smart Communications vs Solidum

VIII. Contempt powers of NLRC

11. Federico Robosa vs NLRC
GR No. 176085
Ponente: Brion, J.:
FACTS:
CTMI Employees Union, led by the petitioners Frederico Robosa et al, filed a
petition for certification of election at CTMI to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the company. It failed to garner the votes required. Later on, respondent issued a
memorandum demobilizing its sales territories and abolishing its system of truck-sales
representatives while simultaneously informing the sales group of a new system (Salon
Business Groups). Petitioner union asked for the withdrawal of respondents directives but
the latter ignored it. Instead it issued a notice of termination of employment of sales drivers
due to the abolition of their position.Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practices against CTMI, it also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO. During the compulsory arbitration proceedings, the union was
prompted to file it to the NLRC which then issued a TRO. It was upgraded to a writ of
preliminary injunction when the respondent refused to comply. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC who then directed Labor Arbiter Cryostat
Tamayo to hear motion for the contempt as urged by the union.
The NLRC heard the contempt charge but issued its dismissal. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but subsequently sought relief from the CA. However, the CA opined that
the dismissal is not subject to review by an appellate court. Hence, this petition raising the
issues.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the NLRC has contempt powers
2. Whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable;
3. Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt
charge against the respondents.
HELD:

1. Under 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC may hold any offending party in contempt,
directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The Labor
Code, however, required the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt
in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only
when there is no law granting them contempt power. Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the
labor arbiter of the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending
party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not
improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the
NLRC.
2. The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents
amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal. This ruling is
grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.
The case cited Mison Jr. Vs Subido where Justice Reyes stressed the contempt
proceeding far from being a civil action is of a criminal nature and of summary character in
which the court exercises but limited jurisdiction. It was then explicitly held: Hence, as in
criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an
exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court.
3. No. The assailed NLRC ruling did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It rightly
avoided probing into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are
issues involving the merits of the case which are by law within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. The NLRC can inquire into them the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. The NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the
merits of the case shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter, an act of a court or
tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when it was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

IX. Probative value of unsubscribed affidavits

12. Cabalen Mgt. vs Quiambao

518 SCRA 342 March 14, 2007
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
FACTS: Prior to their dismissal, respondents Quiambao, Palermo, Rochelle B. De
Leon and Jocelyn B. Deang were working as dining supervisor, cashier,
receptionist, and kitchen supervisor, respectively, while other were waiters at
the companys Cabalen restaurant, Quad, Glorietta branch. On September 4,
2001, respondents received a memorandum placing each one of them on
preventive suspension for 30 days without pay and ordering them to explain
within 48 hours reported violations of the companys Code of Conduct.
In compliance with the memorandum, respondents filed their written
explanations, denying or refuting the charges against them. Consequently,
respondents, with the exception of Quiambao and Palermo, were served with
notices of dismissal after petitioners adjudged them guilty of the charges.
The dismissal of respondents was based on the statements of two witnesses,
Henry dela Vega Balen (Balen) and Roderick Malana (Malana), their coemployees, that they had connived with one another in pocketing tips which
were intended for the group, serving food or drinks without receipts or with
tampered ones, and committing like forms of stealing, resulting in losses or
damages to the company.
Respondents thus filed three separate cases against herein petitioners, the
company and Adriano Jr. Corporation, together with the Cabalen restaurant at
the Glorietta, for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension, with claims for 13th
month pay, sick and vacation leaves, monthly allowances, weekly tip, monthly
signed chit, unpaid salaries, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and regularization.
The decision of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
was in favor of Cabalen. Quiambao, et al. elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals and the CA ruled otherwise. Cabalen sought to set aside the
decision of the CA which reversed the earlier rulings provided for by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC. They also questioned the Resolution given by CA which
denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
The assailed CA decision held that except for respondents Vizier Inocencio and
Vincent Edward Mapa whose petitions were dismissed pursuant to Section 5,
Rule of the Rules of the Rules of Court and Section 4 (a) of the Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, herein Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed from
their employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, hence,
Cabalens Motion for Reconsideration became subject of this Resolution.
ISSUE:Whether or not Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed
HELD: It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving
a valid dismissal of an employee, for which two requisites must concur: (a) the

dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in the Labor Code; and (b)
the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity
to be heard and
to defend himself.
To establish a just or authorized cause for dismissal, substantial evidence or
"such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion" is required. Further required is that an
employee sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before
the termination of his employment. The first notice must appraise him of the
particular acts or omissions upon which his dismissal is grounded; the second,
to inform him of the employers decision to terminate his employment. While
the failure of the employer to comply with these notice requirements does not
make the dismissal illegal as long as a just or authorized cause has been
proved, it renders the employer liable for payment of damages because of the
violation of the workers right to statutory due process.
In the instant case, only photocopies of the statements of Balen and Malana
form part of the records despite Cabalens reliance thereon to prove
respondents purported transgressions.
In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto
Supply, Inc. v. NLRC held that the unsigned photocopies of daily time records
(DTRs), which were presented by the therein employer to show that its
employee was neglectful of his duties, were of "doubtful or dubious probative
value."
Cabalen, et al. did not even heed their own procedures on disciplinary actions.
The only facts extant in the records are that respondents were issued abovesaid Corrective Action Report (CARE) Forms asking them to explain their alleged
infractions within 48 hours; and they subsequently received notices of
dismissal after they submitted their written explanations. There is, however,
nothing to show that before their dismissal, Quimbao, et al. were informed of
their immediate supervisors decision to terminate their services, or that they
were thereafter invited to an administrative investigation before the HRD
manager or officer who is tasked to conduct the investigation in the presence
of the employees immediate supervisor/s and the witnesses, if necessary, as
provided under Section IV of the companys Code of Conduct.No record of any
administrative investigation proceeding, which under the companys rules was
to be "minuted," had also been presented. Hence, only Cabalens allegation
that the statements of the witnesses were taken as part of the administrative
investigation is before this Court. Allegations without proof do not deserve
consideration.
Finally, on the dismissal of Quiambao allegedly on the ground of business
losses, it was incumbent upon Cabelen, et al. to prove it by substantial
evidence. It did not, however. In fact, Quiambao presented documents to
disprove the validity of his retrenchment on that ground. For petitioners failure
to discharge its burden then, this Court is constrained to hold that Quiambaos
dismissal was not valid.

X. Compliance with period to appeal mandatory

13. Manaya vs Alabang Country Club
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that he was initially hired by respondent as
maintainance helper receiving a salary of P198.00. He was later designated as
company electrician and continued his work for the employer when the latter
through its engineering and maintenance dept manager, Engr. Ronnie Dela
Cruz, informed him that his services we no longer required by the company.
Petitioner alleged that he was forcibly and illegally dismissed w/o cause and
w/o due process which prompt him to file a complaint before the LA claiming
that he had not committed any infraction of the company policies and that he
was not paid his service incentive leave (SIL), holiday pay and 13 th month pay.
He further alleged that with his more or less 9 years of service with respondent,
he had become a regular employee. He demanded his reinstatement w/o loss
of seniority rights with full backwages and all monetary benefits due him.
Respondent denied that petitioner was its employee. He averred that the
latter was employed y First Staffing Network Corp with w/c respondent had an
existing Memorandum of Agreement. Thus, by virtue of the legitimate job
contracting, petitioner as an employee of FSNC, came to work with respondent,
first as maintenance helper and subsequently as an electrician. Respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint insisting that petitioner had no cause
of action against it.
LA held that Petitioner Manaya is indeed a regular employee of Alabang
Cuntry Club and his dismissal having been effected without just and valid cause
and w/o the observance of due process is hereby declared illegal. LA ordered
Manayas resinstatement and other benefits appurtenant with full backwages.
Alabang Country appealed with the NLRC but the latter dismissed the
same for failure to perfect an appeal within the statutory period. Respondent
filed a Motion for Recon which the NLRC denied. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before that CA and the latter granted the petition and ordered NLRC
to give due course Alabangs appeal to LAs decision. Manaya filed a MR which
was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR

WHEN IT ORDERED THE NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF
RESPONDENT ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INCORPORATED EVEN IF THE SAID
APPEAL WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS
FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL

HELD:
Of relevance is Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC

Section 1. PERIODS OF APPEAL. Decisions, resolutions or

orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof; and in case of decisions,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code,
within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. If the 10 th or 5th
day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday,
the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day
following such Saturday, Sunday or holiday.
No motion or request for extension of the period within which
to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of
the rules on the application of the reglementary periods of appeal. Clearly,
emphasized in these cases is that the policy of liberal interpretation is qualified
by the requirement that there must be exceptional circumstances to allow the
relaxation of the rules.
Absent exceptional circumstances, we adhere to the rule that certain
procedural precepts must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for
perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally
entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail oneself of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules,
particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of
judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final
and executory. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.
In the case at bar, we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for
the following reasons:
Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made which
rendered the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as final and executory.

Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in

interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations,
the

workingmans

welfare

should

be

the

primordial

and

paramount

consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to

the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the
Labor Code that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case as it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. As
so rightfully enunciated, the liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from
the mandate that the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the
settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the
survival of an employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food,
shelter, clothing, medicine and education; it also wears down the meager
resources of the workers to the point that, not infrequently, they either give up
or compromise for less than what is due them. Without doubt, to allow the
appeal of the respondent as what the Court of Appeals had done and remand
the case to the NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the
petitioner.
Thirdly, respondent has not shown sufficient justification to reverse the
findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.

XI. Effect of late service of the copy of appeal

14. Manila Mining Corp vs Amor

XII. Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping

15. Basan vs Coca Cola Bottlers

G.R. Nos. 174365-66

February 4, 2015

ROMEO BASAN, DANILO DIZON, JAIME L. TUMABIAO, JR., ROBERTO DELA RAMA,
JR., RICKY S. NICOLAS, CRISPULO D. DONOR, GALO FALGUERA, and NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,Petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, alleging that respondent dismissed them
without just cause and prior written notice required by law.
Respondent corporation, counters that they were merely hired as temporary route helpers
in anticipation of high volume of work and that they knew that their assignment was only
temporary in duration.
Labor Arbiter found that since they were performing activities necessary and desirable to
the usual business of petitioner for more than the period for regularization, petitioners are
considered as regular employees. Ordered reinstatement
NLRC affirmed.
CA reversed stating that respondents repeated hiring for various periods (ranging from
more than six months for private respondent Basan to eight years in the case of private
respondent Dizon) would not automatically categorize them as REGULAR EMPLOYEES.
For the topic of Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping: respondent contends
that the petition should be denied due course for its verification and certification of nonforum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N FAILURE OF ALL PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATION OF NONFORUM SHOPPING SHOULD BE GROUNDS TO DISMISS THE CASE
HELD: Supreme Court ruled no. On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general
rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all
the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case,
appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural
requirement.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 16
Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement.17
Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner Basan does not necessarily
result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial justice to overlook
petitioners procedural lapses.18 Indeed, the application of technical rules of procedure may
be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice. 19

XIII. Need for motion fro reconsideration

16. Metro Transit vs Piglas
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (MTO) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation which entered into a Management and Operations
Agreement (MOA) with the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) for the operation
of the Light Rail Transit (LRT) Baclaran-Monumento Line.
For purposes of collective bargaining agreement (CBA), petitioner MTO's rank
and file employees formed the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Metro,
Inc.-National Federation of Labor (PIGLAS).
Meanwhile, its managerial and supervisory employees created their own union
bearing the name Supervisory Employees Association of Metro (SEAM).
Petitioners MTO and PIGLAS entered into a CBA covering the period of 13
February 1995 to 13 February 2000. SEAM similarly negotiated with petitioner
MTO under a separate CBA. Allegedly disgruntled with PIGLAS, some rank and
file employees formed another union under the umbrella of the Philippine
Transport Group Workers Organization-Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
(PTGWO-TUCP), which negotiated with management for certification as the new
bargaining agent. The aforesaid intra-union dispute was settled through a
certification election which PIGLAS won.
Thereafter, PIGLAS renegotiated the CBA demanding higher benefits.
AHCTEa
On 25 July 2000, due to a bargaining deadlock, PIGLAS filed a Notice of Strike
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On the same
date, PIGLAS staged a strike. Consequently, Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma,
then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), issued an
Order of Assumption of Jurisdiction/Return to Work, 3 dated 25 July 2000,
directing the striking employees to immediately return to work, and petitioner
MTO to take them back under the same terms and conditions of employment
prevailing prior to the strike.
The striking PIGLAS members refused to accede to the Return to Work Order.
LRTA issued a Resolution, terminating its employees, including herein
respondents.
Resultantly, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter Complaints 4 against
petitioners and the LRTA for the following: (1) illegal dismissal; (2) unfair labor
practice for union busting; (3) moral and exemplary damages; and (4)
attorney's fees.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondents.

Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). NLRC
dismissed petitioners' appeal for non-perfection since it failed to post
the required bond.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted NLRC
Resolution, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the same.aHECST
On 24 August 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the
Petition. It ruled:
The petitioners have filed this petition for certiorari against the
resolution of the NLRC dated May 19, 2006 dismissing the appeal
for non-perfection. They have not, however, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the ruling prior to filing the petition.
This renders the petition fatally defective.
Hence, petitioners come to this Court, challenging the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of its Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the claims of the petitioner for failure
to file a petition for reconsideration and to post a bond.
RULING:
For Reconsideration:
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. 11 Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. 12 The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or
administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend
the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. 13
We have held that the "plain", "speedy", and "adequate remedy" referred to in
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 14 is a motion for reconsideration of
the questioned Order or Resolution. As we consistently held in numerous cases,
a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort
to the courts can be had.
In the case at bar, petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.
The motion for reconsideration would have aptly furnished a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. As a rule, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error
imputed to it. 16 The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners' failure to
file a motion for reconsideration against the assailed Resolution of the NLRC

rendered its petition for certiorari before the appellate court as fatally
defective.
For bond:
In cases involving a monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is unconditionally required by Article
223 22 of the Labor Code to post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the
amount of the monetary award adjudged. 23 It should be stressed that the
intention of lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that
an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond. 24 The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers
intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
exclusive
means
by
which
an
employer's
appeal
may
be
perfected. 25 Moreover, it bears stressing that the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, 26 and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.

17. Andrew James Mcburnie vs Ganzon

MCBURNIE, Petitioner, v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON,
INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an Australian national,
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against Eulalio
Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc., and E. Ganzon, Inc., (respondents). McBurnie claimed that
on May 11, 1999, he signed a 5-year employment agreement with the company EGI as an
Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management of the company hotels and
resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime in
November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him to go back to Australia
while recuperating from his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by respondent
Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended project would no
longer push through.
The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and
establish a company for the management of the hotels. They did not intend to create an
employer-employee relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that was
being invoked by McBurnie was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an
alien work permit in the Philippines, and that McBurnie had not obtained a work permit. On

September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as having been illegally
dismissed from employment. The respondents filed their Memorandum of Appeal and
Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. They
claimed that an award of more than P60 Million Pesos to a single foreigner who had no
work permit and who left the country for good one month after the purported
commencement of his employment was a patent nullity. On March 31, 2005, the NLRC
denied the motion to reduce bond explaining that in cases involving monetary award, an
employer seeking to appeal the LA decision to the Commission is unconditionally required
by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond equivalent to the monetary award.
ISSUE: Whether or not McBurnie was illegally dismissed?
Held: No. There was no Er-Ee relationship. The crucial issue in this case concerns the
sufficiency of the appeal bond that was posted by the respondents. The present rule on the
matter is Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was substantially
the same provision in effect at the time of the respondents appeal to the NLRC, and which
reads: No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and
upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. The
filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding
paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
While the CA, in this case, allowed an appeal bond in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 and then ordered the case remand to the NLRC, this Court Decision dated
September 18, 2009 provides otherwise, as it reads in part: While the bond may be
reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion
to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion
to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.The
qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash
bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash
or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.If the NLRC does
eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the
correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer
within the 10-day period.
To begin with, the Court rectifies its prior pronouncement the unqualified statement that
even an appellant who seeks a reduction of an appeal bond before the NLRC is expected
to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the judgment award within the 10day reglementary period to perfect the appeal.

XIV. Rule on amount of appeal bond not absolute

18. Sarah Lee Phil. vs Macatlang
Sara Lee Phils., Inc. v. Macatlang
G.R. No. 180147, 180148, 180149, 180150, 180319 & 180685
June 4, 2014

Facts:
Petitioners - Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. (SLPI), Aris Philippines, Inc. (Aris),
Sara Lee Corporation (SLC), Atty. Cesar Cruz (Cruz), and Fashion Accessories
Philippines, Inc. (FAPI), respectively and shall be collectively referred to as the
"Corporations."
This case are 6 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari pertaining
to the P3.45 Billion appeal bond which, as mandated by Article 233 of the Labor
Code, is equivalent to the monetary award adjudged by the labor arbiter in the
cases.
Aris filed a Notice of Permanent Closure with the DOLE stating that it will
permanently cease its operations. All employees of Aris were duly informed.
Aris Workers Union staged a strike for violation of duty to bargain collectively,
union busting and illegal closure. After conciliation, Aris undertook to pay its
employees, the settlement amount of P419 Million and an additional P15 Million
Benevolent Fund to the Union.
FAPI was incorporated. When said incorporation came to the knowledge
of the affected employees, they all filed 63 separate complaints against Aris for
illegal dismissal. Essentially, the complainants insisted that FAPI was organized
by the management of Aris to continue the same business of Aris, thereby
intending to defeat their right to security of tenure. The
Labor
Arbiter
rendered judgment finding the dismissal of 5,984 complainants as illegal and
awarding them separation pay and other monetary benefits amounting to
P3.45 Billion.
The Corporations filed their Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce
Appeal Bond and to Admit Reduced Amount with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). They asked the NLRC to reduce the appeal bond to P1
Million each on the grounds that it is impossible for any insurance company to
cover such huge amount and that, in requiring them to post in full the appeal
bond would be tantamount to denying them their right to appeal. Aris claimed

that it was already dissolved and undergoing liquidation.

FAPI, for its part,
claimed that its total assets would not be enough to answer for even a small
portion of the award. The Corporations posted a total of P4.5 Million.
Macatlang, et al., opposed the motion by asserting that failure to comply
with the bond requirement is a jurisdictional defect since an appeal may only
be perfected upon posting of a cash bond equivalent to the monetary award as
provided by Article 223 of the Labor Code.
NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond. The NLRC issued an
Order directing the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond,
bringing the total posted bond to P9 Million.
Macatlang, et al., filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They
charged the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
appeal of petitioners despite the gross insufficiency of the cash bond. They
declared that the appeal bond must be equivalent to the amount of the award.
The Court of Appeals proceeded to reverse and set aside the NLRC
Resolution and deemed it reasonable under the circumstances of the case to
order the posting of an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion. The Corporations
assail the Court of Appeals in directing the posting of an additional appeal bond
of P1 Billion. They contend that the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that
Macatlang, et al., had already received their separation pay of P419 Million and
P15 Million Benevolent Fund.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal bond may be reduced

Held:
Appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence,
parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or
rules allowing it.
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained
only on any of the following grounds:

a. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on

the part of the Labor Arbiter;
b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud
or coercion, including graft and corruption;
c. If made purely on questions of law; and
d. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The requisites for perfection of appeal as embodied in Article 223, as amended,

are:
1) payment of appeal fees;
2) filing of the memorandum of appeal; and
3) payment of the required cash or surety bond.
These requisites must be satisfied within 10 days from receipt of the
decision or order appealed from. It is presumed that an appeal bond is only
necessary in cases where the labor arbiter's decision or order contains a
monetary award. Conversely, when the labor arbiter does not state the
judgment award, posting of bond may be excused.
The NLRC may dispense of the posting of the bond when the judgment award
is:
(1) not stated or
(2) based on a patently erroneous computation.
By explicit provision of law, an appeal is perfected only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond. The posting of the appeal bond within the period
provided by law is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional. The requirement
that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is
apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they
will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an

appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just
and lawful claims.
The Court did relax the rule respecting the bond requirement to perfect appeal
in cases where:
(1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules,
(2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds
to reduce the bond,
(3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would
serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or
(4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or
good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period

The old NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

. . .The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the
Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. (As amended by Nov. 5,
1993)
Thus, appellants are given the option to file a motion to reduce the
amount of bond only in meritorious cases. Clearly therefore, the Rules only
allow the filing of a motion to reduce bond on two (2) conditions:
(1) that there is meritorious ground and
(2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted
Compliance with the two conditions stops the running of the period to
perfect an appeal provided that they are complied within the 10-day
reglementary period.
In the case at bar, the motion to reduce bond filed by the Corporations
was resolved by the NLRC in the affirmative when it found that there are
meritorious grounds in reducing the bond such as the huge amount of
the award and impossibility of proceeding against the Corporations'
properties which correspond to a lower valuation. Also, the NLRC took
into consideration the fact of partial payment of P419 Million. The NLRC found
the P4.5 Million bond posted by the Corporations as insufficient, hence ordering
them to post an additional P4.5 Million. Thus, P9 Million was held as the amount
of the bond as reduced. Notably, the computation of the judgment award in this
case includes damages.

Under the applicable rules, damages and attorney's fees are excluded
from the computation of the monetary award to determine the amount of the
appeal bond. We shall refer to these exclusions as "discretionaries," as
distinguished from the "mandatories" or those amounts fixed in the decision to
which the employee is entitled upon application of the law on wages. These
mandatories include awards for backwages, holiday pay, overtime pay,
separation pay and 13th month pay.
The SC sustained the Court of Appeals in so far as it increases the
amount of the required appeal bond. But the SC reduced the amount of the
appeal bond to P725 Million. The amount of P725 Million is approximately 25%
of the basis above calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional obligation
of the state to afford protection to labor which, specific to this case, is
assurance that in case of affirmance of the award, recovery is not negated; and
on the other end of the spectrum, the opportunity of the employer to appeal.

XV. Sufficiency of Appeal Bond

19. Toyota Alabang vs Edwin Games
DOCTRINE:
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only
in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an action
must comply with the requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as regards the
period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper appeal before the
NLRC; and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals from final and
executory decisions of the Labor Arbiter.
FACTS:
Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its vehicle lubricants.
Subsequently, it charged him with qualified theft before the trial court. Two years
thereafter, Games led a Complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of bene, and
damages against petitioner. The latter, through counsel, failed to file its Position Paper on
the date set.
The LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay Games P535,553.07 for his
separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees resulting from
his illegal dismissal. Petitioner no longer led a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the
LA's ruling became final and executory.

The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner sought to quash. It prayed that the
proceedings be reopened, explaining that it had failed to present evidence because of its
counsel's negligence in ling the appropriate pleadings. The LA denied the claims of
petitioner. Aggrieved, the latter appealed before the NLRC. The appeal of petitioner was
denied due course because it had failed to show proof of its security deposit for the appeal
bond under Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure. On the merits, the
NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution of a final judgment. For the NLRC, petitioner's failure to appeal the LA
Decision already made the ruling final and executory.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, but the action was
dismissed.
Firstly, the CA ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
appeal, given that petitioner had failed to comply faithfully with the bond requirement.
Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final judgment is no longer appealable.
Thirdly, the CA found that petitioner's own negligence had caused it to lose its right to
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in refusing to reopen the proceedings
below.

HELD:
This Court maintains that the CA correctly refused to reopen the proceedings below. The
reopening of a case is an extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make a complete
farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Hence,
there must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be granted.
In this case, petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. As found by the appellate
court, petitioner was present during the mandatory conference hearing in which the latter
was informed by the LA of the need to file a Position Paper. However, petitioner not only
reneged on the submission of its Position Paper, but even failed to move for the filing of
the pleading at any point before the LA resolved the case on 5 February 2008. Moreover,
petitioner had failed to exhibit diligence when it did not attend the hearing, or any of the
proceedings thereafter, despite its manifestation that it no longer had any legal
representative. Given the instances of negligence by petitioner itself, the Court finds that
the CA justly refused to reopen the case in the former's favor.

Based on the foregoing, the task at hand involves a determination of whether or not the CA
gravely erred in finding that the NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction in refusing to grant
petitioner's entreaty to reopen the case. In other words, as long as the exercise of
discretion below is based on well-founded factual and legal bases, no abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be imputed, and we are then justified to
deny due course both to the Rule 45 petition and the concomitant Motion for
Reconsideration.
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond,
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
Evidently, the above rules do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds of
rulings of the LA. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA
involves a monetary award, an employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the posting
of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying terms, so long as the decision of the LA
involves a monetary award, as in this case, that ruling can only be appealed after the
employer posts a bond. ETHIDa
The NLRC has given a well-founded reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's appeal,
namely, no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only
in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an action
must comply with the requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as regards the
period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper appeal before the
NLRC; and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals from final and
executory decisions of the Labor Arbiter.
More importantly, this Court cannot give special treatment to petitioner. In our past cases,
this Court already held that the failure of the counsel to file the required position papers
before the LA is not a ground to declare that petitioner had been deprived of due process;
and is not a cause to conclude that the proceedings a quo had been null and void. We
have consistently held that the requirements of due process are satised when the parties
are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all
the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be
conducted or was necessary. Here, petitioner, despite being given several chances to pass
its position paper, did not at all comply. Worse, petitioner also had other instances of

negligence. Consequently, this Court cannot redo the whole proceedings of the Labor
Arbiter who had already afforded due process to the former.

20. Smart Communications vs Solidum

G.R. 197763
December 7, 2015
Facts:
An employment contract was entered into by Smart Communications
(Smart) and Jose Solidum (Solidum), hiring the latter as the Department
Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations.
As a Department Head, he is tasked to approve project proposals coming
from his market assistants and product managers. Once approved, a
finance officer will assign a reference number to the project with a stated
budget allocation.
The approved project details and the total amount of the project will then
be included in a cost estimate (CE), submitted to the company, routed for
approval, and returned for implementation.
Solidum received a NOTICE TO EXPLAIN from the company charging him
with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence. It was shown
that he was charged with:
1. Violating company policies by misrepresenting and using his
position and influence to plot to defraud Smart,
2. Conceptualizing fictitious marketing events,
3. Appointing fictitious advertising agencies, and submitting fictitious
documents.
Solidum was placed on preventive suspension without pay for a period of
30 days.
Solidum denied the charges and sent letters to Smart, requesting copies
of pertinent documents so he can explain and present his own evidence.
He changed his mind and declared that he will no longer entertain
memorandums. Smart gave the documents he requested but Solidum
refused.
Due to his refusal, Smart extended his preventive suspension for 10 days.
A notice of termination was served.
Issue: Whether or not the termination of Solidum was proper.
Held:
Labor Arbiter
Ruled in favor of Solidum.

That the extended period of suspension without pay was illegal and that
Solidum was unjustly dismissed without observing procedural due
process and was ordered to be reinstated and to be awarded backwages
and monetary claims.
Ruling of LA was based on the ground that breach of trust and
confidence is restricted to managerial employees Which no evidence
was presented that Solidum, was a Manager other than his titular
designation as department head.

NLRC
Reversed LAs decision.
It argued that the LA erred in declaring Solidums dismissal illegal without
just cause on the basis that he is not a managerial employee.
Solidum is a managerial employee because he holds a position of trust
and has breach such trust, and that he was accorded procedural due
process.
CA
Solidum Appealed
The CA rendered the decision in favor of the NLRC with the modification
that Solidum be paid his salaries and benefits with accrued during the
period of his extended preventive suspension.
SMART COMMUNICATION vs. SOLIDUM
G.R. 197836
December 7, 2015

The rulings of trial court in criminal cases generally do not bind the labor
tribunals
In Amadeo Fishing Corporation vs Nierra, the court rules that an acquittal in
criminal prosecution does not have the effect of extinguishing liability for
dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence
Solidums reliance on the rulings of the trial courts is misplaced. His acquittal
before such courts cannot bind the labor tribunal.
Wherefore, the petition of Solidum is denied. The Court of Appeals decision is
affirmed with MODIFICATION that the award of salaried and benefits that
accrued during the period of extended preventive suspension is DELETED.

XVI. Effect of NLRCs failure to rule

21. Bedoya vs Ace Promotion and Mktg Corp.
***Italicized words: you may opt not to read it
BEDUYA et al. vs. ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195513
June 22, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation (APMC), with respondent
Glen Hernandez as its President, is a contractor engaged in the deployment of
workers to various companies to promote the latters products through
promotional and merchandising services. In pursuance of its business, APMC
entered into a Promotional Contract7 with Delfi Marketing, Inc.8 (Delfi) whereby
the former undertook to conduct promotional activities for the latters
confectionery products. For this purpose, APMC employed workers, including
petitioners Marlon Beduya, Rosario Dumas, Alex Leonoza, Alvin Abuyot, Dindo
Ursabia, Bernie Bosona, Romeo Onanad, Armando Liporada, Frankfer Odulio,
Marcelo Mata, Alex Colocado, Jojo Pacatang, Randy Genodia and Isabino B.
Alarma, Jr. (petitioners), as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail
outlets and supermarkets under fixed-term employment contracts. The last
contracts of employment9 that petitioners signed were until January 30, 2007.
In a letter10 dated December 27, 2006, Delfi notified APMC that their
Promotional Contract will expire effective January 31, 2007. On January 29,
2007, APMC informed petitioners, among other workers, that their last day of
work would be on January 30, 2007.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
Before the Labor Arbiter, three separate complaints11 for illegal dismissal
and money claims against respondents were filed by petitioners and by other
employees (complainants) whose employment was terminated allegedly by
reason of the expiration of APMCs contract with Delfi. The said complaints
were consolidated.
In their Position Paper,12 complainants alleged among others that they
are regular employees of APMC and the expiration of the Promotional Contract
between APMC and Delfi does not automatically result in their dismissal.
Respondents claimed that since complainants were hired as
merchandisers for Delfi, their employment automatically ended when APMCs
Promotional Contract with Delfi expired.
In a Decision13 dated April 24, 2008, the Labor Arbiter, after finding no
credible evidence to prove that they were employed on a contractual basis,
declared complainants to have been illegally dismissed. Thus, he ordered
complainants reinstatement or payment of separation pay, payment of
backwages, unpaid wages, ECOLA, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of
Bond15 with the NLRC. They maintained that complainants were contractual
employees. As such, their contracts of employment were terminated upon the
expiration of APMCs Promotional Contract with Delfi. Anent their motion for
reduction of appeal bond, respondents contended that the awards granted to
complainants amounting to 6,269,856.89 should be decreased ((considering
that:
(1) eight complainants did not sign the position paper submitted to the Labor
Arbiter and therefore, the monetary awards given in their favor should be
excluded in the computation of the total award; (2) nine complainants already
withdrew their complaints as shown by their Affidavits of Desistance;16 (3)
assuming that separation pay was correctly awarded, the computation thereof
should start from year 2003 when complainants started working for Goya and
not from year 1997 as computed by the Labor Arbiter; and (4) the backwages
should be computed only up to January 31, 2007 or up to the expiration of the
Promotional Contract with Delfi and not until July 31, 2008.))
Respondents attached a supersedeas bond17 in the amount of
437,210.00 along with their appeal. In their Opposition with Motion to Dismiss
Appeal,18 complainants prayed for the dismissal of respondents appeal based
on insufficiency of the bond posted. This thus resulted in the non-perfection of
the appeal, and consequently, the Labor Arbiters Decision had become final
and executory.
Without acting on respondents motion for reduction of bond and the
complainants opposition thereto, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters
Decision and dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Some of the complainants, including petitioners, filed a Petition for
Certiorari23 with the CA. They insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in granting respondents appeal despite the latters failure to perfect
the same since the appeal bond filed was grossly insufficient and inadequate.
Consequently, the Labor Arbiters Decision had already become final and
executory.
On November 30, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision24 dismissing the
petition. Thus, petitioners, from among all the complainants, are now before
this Court through the present Petition.
ISSUE: Whether it is procedurally correct to pass judgment on a case when
there is still a pending motion to be resolved.
HELD:
With respect to the NLRCs failure to initially act upon respondents motion to
reduce bond and petitioners opposition thereto with motion to dismiss, suffice
it to say that the same did not divest the NLRC of its authority to resolve the

appeal on its substantive matters. After all, the NLRC is not bound by technical
rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in
deciding labor cases.39 Further, the NLRC is mandated to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process.

XVII. Sufficiency of a current dated check as appeal bond

22. GBMLT Manpower Services vs Malian
GR 189262, June 6 2015
RE: Sufficiency of a Current-Dated Check as Appeal Bond
Doctrine: The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his
appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they
will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal.
It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade,
their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims. Nevertheless, the Court
has had occasion to rule that the appeal bond requirement for judgments involving
monetary awards may be relaxed in meritorious cases, as in instances when a liberal
interpretation would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.
The same liberality can be applied to this case in particular, in which it is clear that
respondent's allegations of illegal dismissal and money claims are unfounded.

Petitioner: GMBLT Manpower Services, Inc. (recruitment agency)

Respondent: Ma. Victoria H. Malinao (CPA Lawyer who applied for a job as teacher
abroad, in Ethiopia)

Facts:
Respondent signed a Contract of Employment for Foreign Academic Personnel
covering a period of two academic years with a salary of 900 USD. She departed for
Ethiopia on December 12, 2005. She was assigned to teach Cooperative Accounting at
the Alemaya University, but she unilaterally decided to discontinue teaching the course
allegedly because auditing, not accounting, was her specialization. She spent the rest of
the semester without teaching a load.
In another circumstance, respondent was replaced by another instructor in Auditing
II, due to a students' petition. The latter was again left idle. Dean Workneh Kassa of the
Faculty of Business and Economics wrote to VP Alamirew, indicating that the qualification
of respondent had been highly debated as the faculty had never approved the recruitment
of expatriate staff who were bachelor's degree holders, and that it was the second time

that the Department of Accounting had to replace respondent in her course assignment,
because "she has never handled any course effectively."
On 6 April 2006, Vice President Alamirew issued the notice of Termination to
respondent, effective three months from the date of the letter. The notice alluded to the two
instances when the Department of Accounting had to replace respondent in her course
assignments.
While waiting for the three-month period to expire, respondent was offered a post at
the Internal Audit Department by Alemaya University President Belay Kassa (President
Kassa). She accepted the job, but later changed her mind and rejected the offered post.
She narrated how she felt insulted by her peers in the workplace. Respondent was
repatriated on 27 June 2006. She later signed a Quitclaim and Release dated July 2006 in
favor of petitioner in the amount of 900 USD.
On 18 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint before the labor arbiter against
petitioner as local agency and Alemaya University as foreign principal. She sought full
payment of the unexpired portion of the two-year contract, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. In a Decision dated 29 March 2007, the labor arbiter found respondent
to have been unduly repatriated in breach of the employment contract. Petitioner and
Alemaya University were ordered to pay her in solidum the amounts of USD 4,500 as
unrealized income - from which the amount paid to her under the Quitclaim and Release
had already been deducted - Php 30,000 as moral damages, Php 20,000 as exemplary
damages, plus costs.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the NLRC. In her Motion to Dismiss Appeal,
respondent indicated that petitioner had received a copy of the Decision of the labor arbiter
on 13 April 2007, giving it a period until 23 April 2007 within which to perfect its appeal.
According to respondent, the check issued by petitioner for the appeal bond was
presented for payment only on the last day of the period for appeal from the
Decision of the labor arbiter. Given that checks have the effect of payment only
when they have been encashed - which takes three banking days from the time they
are presented for payment - the appeal bond was actually posted beyond the
reglementary period for appeal. That being the case, the appeal was not perfected,
and the labor arbiter's ruling attained finality. Hence, according to respondent,
petitioner's appeal was not perfected, and the labor arbiter's ruling had attained
finality. The NLRC dismissed respondents complaint because her claims had been the
subject of a valid release, waiver and quitclaim.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reinstated the decision of the
labor arbiter. As regards the appeal bond before the NLRC, the CA ruled that since
petitioner's check payment was encashed only after the reglementary period within
which to appeal, the appeal was considered to have been filed out of time.
According to the CA, the rules provide that only a cash or surety bond may be
considered as appeal bond, and noncompliance with the rule was fatal to
petitioner's cause.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners appeal was perfected on time.

Ruling: Yes.
The posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal from a decision of the labor
arbiter is required under Article 228 of the Labor Code, which provides:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In several pronouncements, the Court has adopted a particular understanding of the
word "only" in the phrase "an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond." It has regarded the phrase as the legislative's
unequivocal declaration that the posting of a cash or surety bond is the exclusive means
by which an employer's appeal from a labor arbiter's decision may be perfected. In Viron
Garments Manufacturing v. NLRC, the Court stated the ratio for the requirement:
It is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the
case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon
the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to
discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even
evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful
claims.
Proceeding from this rationale, the intention of the requirement is fulfilled when the
employer is able to deposit with the NLRC an amount that is equivalent to the monetary
award adjudged by the labor arbiter in the employee's favor, and that shall subsist until the
final resolution of the appeal.
In this case, there is no question that the NLRC accepted the appeal bond posted
by petitioner through a current-dated check, as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 0701550
dated 20 April 2007. That check was deposited to the bank account of the NLRC on 23
April 2007 without incident. Furthermore, respondent has never disputed the sufficiency of
the bond posted or petitioner's manifestation before us that "up to the present, the cash
bond posted x x x is still in effect and remains in the coffers of the x x x NLRC and is
susceptible to execution in the unfortunate event that this Petition fails."
Nevertheless, the Court has had occasion to rule that the appeal bond requirement
for judgments involving monetary awards may be relaxed in meritorious cases, as in
instances when a liberal interpretation would serve the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits. In this kind of undertaking, the Court is justified in giving
employers the amplest opportunity to pursue their cause while ensuring that employees
will receive the money judgment should the case be ultimately decided in their favor. The
same liberality can be applied to this case in particular, in which it is clear that
respondent's allegations of illegal dismissal and money claims are unfounded based on
the following:
(1) Respondent never denied the grounds cited in the notice of termination.
(2) It cannot be denied that when respondent accepted the post offered at the
Internal Audit Department, the parties had decided to revert to the status quo ante of
harmonious employment relationship and to do away with the previous termination of her

employment. As correctly found by the NLRC, the logical conclusion is that the parties had
agreed to let her employment continue in the university under the Contract of Employment,
albeit in a different capacity. When respondent later decided that she did not want the new
job for personal reasons, she exercised her right to terminate the Contract of Employment.
Ultimately, it was she who terminated the Contract of Employment, and she cannot now
claim that she was illegally dismissed.
(3) Respondent admits that she had a full understanding of the terms and
conditions of the Quitclaim and Release and voluntarily signed it. Besides, the entitlement
to the salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract obtains only for
illegally dismissed employees. In view of the finding that respondent was not illegally
dismissed, she is not entitled to such salaries.
(4) "Dire necessity of cash is an acceptable ground to nullify quitclaims only if the
consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, which
circumstance is not obtaining in this case. As aptly observed by the NLRC, respondent is a
learned professional and a teacher no less. Anyone would be hard put to trick her into
agreeing to something like signing a waiver. In this case, no proof was presented to show
that petitioner had defrauded or deceived her into signing the document.

XVIII. Period to file Petition for Certiorari

23. Le Soleil International Logistics vs Sanchez
FACTS :
On 16 September 2011, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari filed by petitioners for failing to perfect their petition for certiorari
within the 60-day reglementary period provided under the Revised Rules of
Court. The assailed CA resolution reads in toto:
Filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant
petition for certiorari seeks the nullification and setting aside of the April 25,
2011 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR Case
No. 01-00038-11 which modified the September 6, 2010 Decision in turn
rendered by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 04-04439-10, and the June
14, 2011 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition outright on the following grounds:
First, the petition was filed three (3) days late on September 5, 2011.
Under Section 4, Rule 65 Revised Rules of the Civil Procedure, as amended by
AM No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from notice of the judgment or order denying their motion for reconsideration.
Having received a copy of June 4, 2011 Resolution denying the motion for

reconsideration of the assailed April 25, 2011 Decision on July 24, 2011,
petitioners had up to September 2, 2011 only to file the petition for certiorari.
Second, the petition contains no statement of the specific material dates
showing when petitioners received a copy of the assailed April 25, 2011
Decision of the court a quo when a motion for reconsideration was filed,
contrary
to
Section
3,
Rule
46
of
the
1997
Rules.
Third, the petition does not state the date of issue of petitioners' counsel's
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as
required
under
Bar
Matter
No.
1922,
dated
June
3,
2008.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED.4
Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, petitioners timely interposed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was also denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution5 dated 17 November 2011.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners instant Petition for Review on Certiorari shall be
granted?
RULING:
THE COURT DENIED THE PETITION. The general rule is that a timely appeal
is the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits.
This is true even if one of the errors to be assigned on appeal is the lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the judgment over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power by said court is in excess of its jurisdiction, or
the making of its findings of fact or of law set out in the decision is attended by
grave abuse of discretion. In other words, the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is mandatory because the failure to perfect the appeal
within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the
judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction
to review the judgment.
The pertinent rules on the perfection of a petition for certiorari is set forth
under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, under Section 4.
Under the foregoing rules, petition for certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be assailed.8 The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a
speedy disposition of their case. 9 Rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of
claiming substantial merit.10 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive
rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
24. Visayan Electric Company Employees Union vs Visayan Electric Company

XIX. Motion for Extension of time

25. Laguna Metts Corp vs CA
26. Domdom vs Sandiganbayan
GR Nos. 182382-83 February 24,2010

Facts
Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit (COA)
assigned at the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), requested the
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
transactions-bases of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom (petitioner) for
miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of PCIC, the receipts
covering which were alleged to be tampered.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found
probable cause to charge petitioner with nine counts of estafa through
falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting receipts for
his claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses, after verification with
the establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the
appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan
The Informations were separately raffled and lodged among the five
divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motions for Consolidation to
consolidate the cases with the Third Division, the Division having the lowest
docket number. The First, Second and Fifth Division granted the motion while
the Third and the Fourth Division denied the motion. The Sandiganbayan Third
Division disallowed the consolidation it holding mainly that the evidence in the
cases sought to be consolidated differed from that to be presented in the one
which bore the lowest docket number.
Petitioner thus seeks relief from the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Certiorari, with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan
from further proceeding with the cases against him during the pendency of this
petition. Petitioner argues that, among other things, all the cases against him
arose from substantially identical series of transactions involving alleged
overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.

Respondent People of the Philippines (People), in its Comment, counters

that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration which is a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari; that the petition was filed out
of time since a motion for extension to file such kind of a petition is no longer
allowed; that consolidation is a matter of judicial discretion; and that the
proceedings in the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan may proceed
independently as the Informations charged separate crimes committed on
separate occasions.
Issue
Whether or not the motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is
no longer allowed.
Held
No, a motion for extension of time to file petition is still allowed. The
respondent People argued that a motion for extension of time to file a petition
for certiorari is no longer allowed because the deletion of the provision " No
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days." in Section 4 of
Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit
motions for extension. The SC however ruled otherwise.
That no mention is made in the amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a
motion for extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the
filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the
deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such a
prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Courts sound
discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within
the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.
In the present case, it would be more in keeping with law and equity if all
the cases filed against petitioner were consolidated with that having the lowest
docket number pending with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The only
notable differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction,
the entity transacted with and amount involved. The charge and core element
are the same estafa through falsification of documents based on alleged
overstatements of claims for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.
Notably, the main witness is also the same Hilconeda P. Abril.

27. Republic vs St. Vincent de Paul College

GR No. 192908 | August 22, 2012

FACTS
Two cases were filed by the Republic, which seeks to expropriate certain properties
registered in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges (St. Vincent) for the
construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP)
The Republic also alleges that the subject land originated from a free patent title
and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation (Section 112
of Commonwealth Act No. 141)
On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the
issuance of an order of expropriation, which was granted by the trial court.
o Ground: that the Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 sq.m portion of
the property and there is no need for just compensation since the property
originated from a free patent.
St. Vincents filed motion for reconsideration (MR) of the order granting
expropriation, which was denied by the trial court. They did not appeal the denial of
the MR.
After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Clarification of the Order granting the expropriation without just
compensation
o St Vincents: it does not oppose the ruling regarding the determination of
public purpose and the Republics right to expropriate the subject land, it,
however, claims that it is entitled to just compensation.
Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order by entering the subject
portion of St. Vincents property. St. Vincents demanded, in a demand letter, that
they vacate and remove their equipment.
Due to St. Vincents refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an
urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the
lower court.
The lower court, however, modified its original Order (granting the expropriation
without just compensation) and now required the Republic to immediately pay St.
Vincent the amount of the value of the property.
o The Republic moved for reconsideration but, it was denied by the lower court
for lack of factual and legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15)
days within which to file its petition.
o The CA granted the motion and the Republic was given a non-extensible
period of 15 days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for
certiorari.
o The Republic alleges in their petition for certiorari, that the orders were given
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
(kelan nila finile? Bakit out of time??)
The CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the Republic to show cause
why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time
o Republic: pleaded the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of
substantial justice.
o St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition: said explanation is merely pro
forma due to the Republics failure to justify its explanation.

CAs ruling: dismissing the Republics petition for certiorari on the ground that the
petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed.

CONTENTIONS:
The Republic
o relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon
the strength of the substantial merits of its petition.
o The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for
extensions are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion.
St. Vincent
o present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance nor state any
justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of
procedure for filing the motion of extension
o And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the general rule
on pro forma motions/pleadings must apply.
ISSUE: w/n CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the Republics petition for
certiorari for being filed out of time
HELD:
The Court notes that the CA Resolution, which initially granted the Republics
motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed
was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal.
o The CA resolution stated, among others: "Provided that this Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed
for
o Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are
allowed by the rules.
o On this score alone, the CA should have admitted the petition filed by the
Republic sincethey merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009
granting the extension prayed for.
Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on
the ground that the same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
o the CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty
(60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible.
o The Republic, however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file
a petition.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, it is necessary to discuss the relationship
between its rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the
application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for

compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a
corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional

trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that:
o If the Court intended to retain the authority to grant extensions under Section
4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been
preserved.
o The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-712-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any
extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
o The rationale for the amendments is to prevent the use (or abuse) of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends
of justice.
o As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:
o That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65
of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous for formulation, does not
make the filing of such pleading (motion for extension) absolutely prohibited.
If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been
reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted." Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed,

subject to the Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be
allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events,
given its merits.
In Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the
other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period
subject to the Courts sound discretion.
Labao v. Flores subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict
application of the rule:
o (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
o (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure;
o (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default;
o (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
o (5) the merits of the case;
o (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules;
o (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory
o (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby
o (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants fault;
o (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
o (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play
o (12) importance of the issues involved; and
o (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.
In this case, the Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing
the procedural rules would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public
interest.
Thus, to protect strong public interest, it is appropriate and justifiable to relax the
amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the
reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition.
o Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious
circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to litigate the issues on
the merits.
o Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the
15-day extension it asked for.
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in
Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari
must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed.
o Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound
discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to
Domdom case.
Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republics petition: first, due to its
own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution

dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest involved, i.e.,
expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue
prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.

XX. Surety bond not necessary on certiorari

28. Jonathan Sang-an vs Equator Knights
JONATHAN I. SANG-AN, vs. EQUATOR KNIGHTS DETECTIVE AND SECURITY
AGENCY, INC
FACTS:
Jonathan was the Assistant Operation Manager of respondent Equator Knights Detective and
Security Agency, Inc. which was tasked, among others, with the duty of assisting in the operations
of the security services. He was also in charge of safekeeping Equators firearms. On April 2001,
Equator discovered that two firearms were missing from its inventory. The investigation revealed
that it was Jonathan who might have been responsible for the loss. On April 24, 2001, Jonathan was
temporarily suspended from work pending further investigation. On May 8, 2001, while Jonathan
was under suspension, a security guard from Equator was apprehended by policemen for violating
the Commission on Elections gun ban rule. The security guard stated in his affidavit that the
unlicensed firearm had been issued to him by Jonathan. On May 24, 2001, Jonathan filed with the
NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement. He alleged that he had been
denied due process when he was dismissed. Equator, on the other hand, argued that Jonathans
dismissal was for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The LA dismissed the complaint
holding that no illegal dismissal took place as Jonathans services were terminated pursuant to a just
cause. The LA found that Jonathan was dismissed due to the two infractions he committed: (1) the
loss of Equators firearms under Jonathans watch, and (2) issuance of an unlicensed firearm to
Equators security guard. Jonathan appealed to the NLRC, contending that no charge had been laid
against him; there was no hearing or investigation of any kind; and he was not given any chance or
opportunity to defend himself. The NLRC sustained the findings of the LA. However, it held that
Equators letter informing him of his temporary suspension until further notice did not satisfy the
requirements of due process for a valid dismissal. Thus, the NLRC modified the LAs decision and
ordered Equator to pay Jonathan backwages from April 24, 2001 until the date of the NLRCs
decision. Equator moved for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting the filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.The CA reinstated the
LAs decision dismissing Jonathans complaint. Jonathan filed a motion for reconsideration which
the CA denied. Hence, this petition. Jonathan contends that when Equator filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as required by
Article 223 of the Labor Code. Without complying with this condition, the petition for certiorari
should have been dismissed outright. Also, Jonathan contends that the CAs findings of fact are
contrary to the findings of fact by the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the posting of a cash or surety bond is required for the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA?

HELD:
The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code
only applies to appeals from the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does not apply to special civil
actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, nowhere under
Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.A petition for certiorari is an
original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings that resulted in the judgment or
order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal prior to an appeal from the judgment or to a final
judgment where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law or by
the rules.

XXI. Definition of Grave Abuse of Labor Arbiter

29. Dacles vs Millenium
G.R. No. 209822 8 July, 2015
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Doctrine: Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and
whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave,"
discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In
labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia,
its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence, "or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that he was hired by respondents Millenium Erectors Corp., engaged in
construction business, as a mason in 1998. On June 7, 2010, while he was working on a
project in Malakas St. QC, he was advised by respondent's officer, to move to another
project in Robinson's Cubao, QC. However, upon arrival at the site, he was instructed to
return to his former job site and, thereafter, was given a run-around for the 2 succeeding
days. When he requested to be given a post or assigned to a new project, he was told by
the paymaster not to report for work anymore, prompting him to file the illegal dismissal

complaint, with claims for SIL, OT, HP, 13th month pay, rest day, Premium pay, and salary
differentials.
Respondents denied having illegally dismissed petitioner, claiming that he was a mere
project employee whose contract expired upon the completion of his masonry work
assignment in RCB-Malakas Project and NECC Project. Respondents further denied
having employed petitioner since 1998 because it was only organized and started
business operations in February 2000
The LA Ruling: LA dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint, finding that petitioner is a
project employee given that the employment contracts between MEC and petitioner show
that the latter, although repeatedly rehired, was engaged in particular projects and for
specific periods. The LA likewise denied petitioner's money claims for lack of evidentiary
support. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed;
The NLRC Ruling: NLRC reversed the LA ruling declared that petitioner was a regular
employee. Accordingly, the NLRC ruled that petitioner was a regular employee since he
was originally employed in 1998 without a fixed period to perform tasks that were
necessary and desirable to MEC's business, and which status cannot be altered by a
subsequent contract stating otherwise.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA.
The CA Ruling: CA annulled and set aside the NLRC' s ruling and reinstated the LA' s
ruling. The CA upheld the LA' s finding that petitioner is a project employee who was first
hired as a mason for the NECC Project from and second, for the RCB-Malakas Project
from until its completion. It further gave emphasis on the fact that petitioner's termination
was duly reported by respondents to the DOLE.
Issue:

whether or not the CA committed reversible error in holding that the NLRC gravely abused
its discretion in declaring that petitioner was a regular employee, and not a project
employee.
Held: No. CA correctly granted respondents' certiorari petition before it, since the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner was a regular employee of MEC when
the latter had established by substantial evidence that petitioner was merely a project
employee. On the other hand, there is no evidence on record to substantiate petitioner's
claim that he was employed as early as 1998.
First, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
the discretion conferred upon it.
In this case, records reveal that petitioner was adequately informed of his employment
status (as project employee) at the time of his engagement for the NECC and RCBMalakas Projects. This is clearly substantiated by the latter's employment contracts duly
signed by him, explicitly stating that: (a) he was hired as a project employee; and
(b) his employment was for the indicated starting dates therein "and will end on
completion/phase of work of project." To the Court's mind, said contracts sufficiently
apprised petitioner that his security of tenure with MEC would only last as long as the
specific project or a phase thereof to which he was assigned was subsisting. Hence, when

the project or phase was completed, he was validly terminated from employment, his
engagement being co-terminus only with such project or phase.
All told, since respondents have duly proven by substantial evidence that petitioner,
although rehired, was engaged for specific projects, the duration and scope of which were
specified at the times he was engaged, and that he was apprised of his status as a project
employee at the onset, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner was
a regular employee. Therefore, the affirmance of the CA's ruling is in order.

XXII. Grounds where SC may resolve issue of facts

30. Dominador Malabunga, Jr. vs. Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation
G.R. No. 198515 June 15, 2015
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Respondent Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation is a duly registered
domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products.
It hired petitioner Dominador Malabunga, Jr. as one of its machinists.
On July 9, 2004, an inventory of respondents tools and items at the company
warehouse was made, and it was found that one aluminum level was issued to
respondents Fabrication Unit, and another to petitioner. The latter returned an
aluminum level to the warehouse.
Thereafter, respondent served a written Notice upon petitioner, charging the
latter with theft of the aluminum level issued to its Fabrication Unit and
requiring him to submit a written explanation. Respondent claimed that
petitioner stole the aluminum level issued to the Fabrication Unit and returned
the same to cover up the loss of the one issued to him.
Consequently, respondent issued its Decision suspending petitioner for a period
of 30 days and requiring him to return the value of the lost aluminum level. The
decision stated that petitioner was charged with theft of the Fabrication Units
aluminum level that petitioners written explanation was insufficient to subvert
the circumstantial evidence which points to him as the perpetrator of the theft;
that petitioner is guilty of serious misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor
Code and Patakaran Bilang 26 of the company rules and regulations relative
to theft of company property or employee/visitor belongings; and that on
account of petitioners years of service and the small amount involved, the
company decided to impose the penalty of suspension and not dismissal.
Hence, petitioner through the company union (CAPASCO) filed a Motion for
Review seeking a reconsideration of the above Decision but to no avail.
Petitioner then filed a Complaint for illegal suspension before the NLRC but was

dismissed. Upon appeal the decision was set aside prompting the respondent
to move for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of theft and must be accorded a
suspension
HELD: No. In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve, as
this Court is not a trier of facts. However, in exceptional cases, this Court may
be urged to resolve factual issues: [1] where there is insufficient or
insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court
below; or [2] when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or
incomplete facts submitted by the parties[;] or, [3] where the [Labor Arbiter]
and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. 42 When there is a divergence
between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA, there is a need
to refer to the record.
Faced with the limitations in respondents system, this Court cannot sustain its
view that petitioner is guilty of theft of company property. It could simply be
that due to the ineffective system within the warehouse and its inefficient
personnel, there was a mix-up of records; worse, it could be that tools and
items within the warehouse were misplaced or lost due to its irresponsible
personnel. If any, respondent is alone responsible; it cannot conveniently put
the blame on its employees in order to make up for or cover its losses caused
by its own disorganized system and inept personnel.
From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on record as to
the factual basis of the charges against petitioner. These doubts shall be
resolved in (his) favor in line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford
protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor. The consistent rule is
that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

XXIII. Validity of Compromise Agreement

31. Eurotech Hair Systems vs Go

32. J-Phil Marine, Inc. vs NLRC

*From the internet
G.R. No. 175366; August 11, 2008
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
Warlito E. Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying
overseas, filed on March 4, 2002 before the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma complaint against petitioners manning

agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its then president Jesus Candava, and its
foreign principal Norman Shipping Services for unpaid money claims, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent's total claim against petitioners was P864,343.30 plus
P117,557.60 representing interest and P195,928.66 representing attorney's
fees
By Decision of August 29, 2003, Labor Arbiter Fe Superiaso-Cellan dismissed
respondent's complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision of September 27, 2004, reversed the Labor
Arbiter's decision.
During the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, respondent,
against the advice of his counsel, entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners. He thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release subscribed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement
without the assistance of a counsel is proper
HELD:
Yes, the act of Dumalaog in entering into a compromise agreement without a
lawyer is proper.
The Supreme Court held that the relation of attorney and client is in many
respects one of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation.
The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts
within the scope of his authority. The circumstances of this case indicate that
respondent's counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning
the compromise agreement.
Dumalaog has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that
if such compromise is entered into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of
the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his
counsel of his fees.

33. Radio Mindanao Network vs Ybarola

G.R. No. 198662

September 12, 2012

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. and ERIC S. CANOY, Petitioners,

vs.
DOMINGO Z. YBAROLA, JR. and ALFONSO E. RIVERA, JR., Respondents.
FACTS: Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were account
managers of RMN
The
respondents
services
were
terminated
as
a
result
of
RMNs
reorganization/restructuring; they were given their separation pay P 631,250.00 for
Ybarola, and P 481,250.00 for Rivera. Three months later, they executed release/quitclaim
affidavits.
Dissatisfied with their separation pay, the respondents filed RMN for illegal dismissal with
several money claims, against RMN and its President, Eric S. Canoy. They indicated that
their monthly salary rates were P 60,000.00 for Ybarola and P 40,000.00 for Rivera.
Respondents argued that the release/quitclaim they signed should not bar recovery of the
full benefits due them; because they signed due to dire necessity.
The petitioners argued that the amounts the respondents received represented a fair and
reasonable settlement of their claims, and that they executed the quitclaims freely and
voluntarily.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint, but ordered the payment of
additional separation pay to the respondents P 490,066.00 for Ybarola and P 429,517.55
for Rivera.5
The separation pay was adjusted by reason of respondents Certificates of Compensation
Payment/Tax Withheld showing that Ybarola and Rivera were receiving an annual salary
of P 482,477.61 and P697,303.00, respectively.
The NLRC overturned the LAs decision, and upheld the validity of the respondents
quitclaim affidavits as they failed to show that they were forced to execute the documents.
From the NLRC, the respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The C.A. overruled the NLRCs decision.
1.) because the separation pay was deficient by at least P400,000.00 for each of
them, and
2.) it was their inability to support their families that drove them to sign the quitclaim.
It took them three months to sign said quitclaim.
Petitioners seek reconsideration in the SC regarding the vailidity of the quitclaim. They
argue the Courts ruling in Talam, since in this case, both respondents were not unlettered
employees but intelligent, well-educated ones who knew what they were signing, and that
respondents submitted no proof that they were in dire circumstances when they executed
the release/quitclaim document.
ISSUE: W/N THE QUITCLAIM WAS VALID
HELD: No, the quitclaim signed was not valid. Talams situation differed from Ybarola and
Rivera in this case.
In Talam vs NLRC Talam received. valuable consideration for his less than two years of
service with the company; he was not shortchanged and no essential unfairness took
place. In this case, as the CA noted, the separation pay the respondents each received
was deficient by at least P 400,000.00; thus, they were given only half of the amount they

were legally entitled to. To be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be a
reasonable one, given especially the respondents length of service 25 years for Ybarola
and 19 years for Rivera. The CA was correct when it opined that the respondents were in
dire straits when they executed the release/quitclaim affidavits. Without jobs and with
families to support, they dallied in executing the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually
forced to sign given their circumstances.

34. Radio Mindanao Network vs Amurao III

BERSAMIN, J p:
FACTS:
On February 16, 1989, petitioner Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) hired
respondent Michael Maximo R. Amurao III (Michael) as a radio broadcaster for
its DWKC-FM station and production manager for its metropolitan radio
operations at a monthly salary of P28,400.00.
Years later, RMN decided to reformat and restructure the programming of its
DWKC-FM station to meet the demands of the broadcasting industry. On April
25, 2002, the president of RMN met with Michael and other personnel of the
station to inform them of the management's decision, advising them that the
reformatting and restructuring of the station's programs would necessarily
affect their employment; but assuring that they would be paid their retirement
pay and other benefits.
To formalize the discussions had in their meeting, RMN furnished Michael and
other personnel separate letters dated May 14, 2002.
However, Michael and the other personnel refused to sign in receipt when the
letters were served on them. Not long after, however, they accepted the offer
of RMN and executed affidavits (Affidavits of Release/Quitclaim) relinquishing
all their claims against the employer.
On October 14, 2002, or 5 months after receiving his benefits and his execution
of the quitclaim, Michael filed a complaint against RMN for illegal dismissal with
money claims in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Decision of the Labor Arbiter
On November 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 6 declaring the
dismissal of Michael as illegal on the ground that the reformatting and
restructuring of RMN's radio programming did not fall under any of the just or
authorized causes specified under Article 282, Article 283 and Article 284 of
the Labor Code that would make the termination of his employment valid; and
holding the quitclaim Michael signed as void because it was not voluntarily
executed.

Ruling of the NLRC

NLRC held that the quitclaim was null and void for not being voluntarily
executed; modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter in that the amount already
received by Michael was to be deducted from the monetary benefits awarded
to him; and deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
On August 31, 2004, however, the CA denied due course to the petition and
dismissed it for lack of merit. 13
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Release/Quitclaim executed by Michael
was valid and binding.
RULING:
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy. A quitclaim is
invalid or contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In instances of invalid
quitclaims, the law steps in to annul the questionable waiver. Indeed, there are
legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and reasonable settlements of
laborers' claims that should be respected by the Court as the law between the
parties. Where the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a full
understanding of its terms as well as its consequences, and the consideration
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. 20 A waiver is essentially contractual.
In our view, the requisites for the validity of Michael's quitclaim were satisfied.
We explain.
Firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly
understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition. Being a
radio broadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly responsible
position in the company. It would be implausible to hold, therefore, that he
could be easily duped into simply signing away his rights. Besides, the
language and content of the quitclaim were clear and uncomplicated such that
he could not claim that he did not understand what he was signing.
Secondly, the settlement pay of P311,922.00 was credible and reasonable
considering that Michael did not even assail such amount as unconscionably
low, or even state that he was entitled to a higher amount.
Thirdly, that he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release
of the settlement pay 21 did not prove that its execution was coerced. Having

agreed to part with a substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect
its interest and obtain its release from all obligations once it paid Michael his
settlement pay, which it did in this case.
And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide
for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his children did not
immediately indicate that he had been forced to sign the same. 22 Dire
necessity should not necessarily be an acceptable ground for annulling the
quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been forced to
execute it. Nor was it even proven that the consideration for the quitclaim was
unconscionably low, and that he had been tricked into accepting the
consideration.
With the quitclaim having been freely and voluntarily signed, RMN was released
and absolved from any liability in favor of Michael.

35. PERT/CPM Manpower vs Vinuya

FACTS: Respondents were contracted by the agency for deployment to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer in Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. The contract was for 2 years, approved
by POEA, providing 9 working hours a day, a salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food
allowance, free and suitable housing, free transportation, free laundry, free medical and
dental services. However, in Dubai, Modern Metals gave them appointment letters with
terms different from those they signed in the Philippines increasing their employment
terms, reducing salaries, allowances, and benefits. The working conditions were also not
as promised. They complained to their agency but to no avail. Due to unbearable living and
working condition, they resigned from their job and indicated personal/family problems as
their reasons. (except for Era who mentioned real reason). On March 15, 2008,
respondents file a complaint for illegal dismissal against PERT CPM. They agency alleged
that they were not illegally dismissed because they resigned voluntarily. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint finding that they voluntarily resigned. Respondents appealed to
NLRC which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter. NLRC pointed out that signing of
different contract in Dubai is illegal. NLRC ordered the payment of agency to pay the
salary, placement fee, and exemplary damages to respondents. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC, but modified their judgment adjusting the
awards, particularly their salaries, in light of court s ruling in Serrano striking down the
clause in Sec 10, par 5, RA 8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the applicability of Serrano ruling.
This was denied. CA upheld NLRCs decision.
ISSUE: W/N RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010, restoring the subject clause
in Sec 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively

HELD: No. Amendment introduced by RA 10022 cant be given retroactive application

because it will result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of Serrano ruling.We thus cannot accept the agency s insistence that the
respondents voluntarily resigned since they personally prepared their resignation letters in
their own handwriting.

36. Jaime Gapayao vs Fulo

G.R. No. 193493
June 13, 2013
Facts:
Jaime Fulo (deceased) died of electrocution while doing repairs at the
residence and business establishment of petitioner. Petitioner extended some
financial assistance to private respondent. The respondent executed an
Affidavit of Desistance stating that she was not holding the petitioners liable for
the death of her late husband, Jaime Fulo, and was thereby waiving her right
and desisting from filing any criminal or civil action against petitioner.
The Compromise Agreement provides:
The undersigned employer, hereby agrees to pay the sum
of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) to the surviving spouse
of JAIME POLO, an employee who died of an accident, as a
complete and full payment for all claims due the victim. . .
The private respondent filed a claim for social security benefits with the
SSS. However, it was discovered that the deceased was not a registered
member of the SSS. The SSS conducted a field investigation to clarify his status
of employment and found that the deceased was an employee of the
petitioners. Consequently, the SSS demanded that petitioner remit the social
security contributions of the deceased. When petitioner denied that the
deceased was his employee, the SSS required private respondent to present
documentary and testimonial evidence to refute petitioner's allegations.
Petitioner disclaimed any liability on the premise that the deceased was
not the former's employee, but was rather an independent contractor whose
tasks were not subject to petitioner's control and supervision. Assuming that
the deceased was petitioner's employee, he was still not entitled to be paid his
SSS premiums for the intervening period when he was not at work, as he was
an "intermittent worker who [was] only summoned every now and then as the

need [arose]." Hence, petitioner insisted that he was under no obligation to

report the former's demise to the SSS for social security coverage.
The SSC rendered a Resolution finding that Jaime Fulo, the late husband
of petitioner, was employed by petitioner Jaime Gapayao.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there was Employer-employee relationship between the
deceased and petitioner
2. Whether or not there was valid Compromise Agreement

Held:
1. YES
Three types of employees: Regular, Project, Casual
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees.
Seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular
seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time. The nature
of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season,
they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or
when their services may be needed. They are in regular employment
because of the nature of their job, and not because of the length of time
they have worked.
A reading of the records reveals that the deceased was indeed a farm
worker who was in the regular employ of petitioner. From year to year,
starting January 1983 up until his death, the deceased had been working on
petitioner's land by harvesting abaca and coconut, processing copra, and
clearing weeds. His employment was continuous in the sense that it was
done for more than one harvesting season. Moreover, no amount of
reasoning could detract from the fact that these tasks were necessary or
desirable in the usual business of petitioner.
The most telling indicia of this relationship is the Compromise Agreement
executed by petitioner and private respondent.

2. YES, the Compromise Agreement is valid

It is a valid agreement as long as the consideration is reasonable and the

employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he or
she was entering into.
All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered
into is personal and specific individual consent. Once executed by the workers
or employees and their employers to settle their differences, and done in good
faith, a Compromise Agreement is deemed valid and binding among the
parties. Petitioner entered into the agreement with full knowledge that he was
described as the employer of the deceased. This knowledge cannot simply be
denied by a statement that petitioner was merely forced or threatened into
such an agreement. His belated attempt to circumvent the agreement should
not be given any consideration or weight by this Court.

37. Emmanuel Agustin vs Alejandro Cruz Herrera

FACTS:
Respondent Herrera is the President of Podden, the company in which petitioners are
employed. Petitioners alleged that they were illegally dismissed by Respondent, thus, they
enagged the services of petitioner lawyer, Atty. Agustin, upon the verbal agreement that he
will be paid on a contingency basis at the rate if 10 % of the final monetary award.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioners. No appeal was posed by
respondent on such judgement, hence, a motion for execution was filed by petitioners.
However, respondent moved to deny the motion and invoked that he and the employeespetitioners already executed a compromise agreement and settled their dispute. Agustin
opposed.
In resolving the conflict, LA reversed its previous decision and dismissed the case. On
appeal to the NLRC, the latter reversed the LAs decision. Then, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and dismissed
the complaint. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision to dismiss the case on the ground of the
compromise agreement which is with no knowledge of Agustin

HELD:
The Court held no.
The court stressed that Atty. Agustin should be reminded that his professional relation with
his clients is one of agency, hence, the acts of an agent are deemed acts of the principal
only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
But under the present case, Atty. Agustin was clearly to have been acting beyond the
scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement between his clients and
Herrera.
The court also emphasized that it is a settled rule that parties may enter into a compromise
agreement without the intervention of a lawyer. Hence, although without knowledge of
Agustin, the compromise agreement was valid.

XXIV. Remedies of Third Party Complaint

38. Yupangco Cotton Mills vs CA
[G.R. No. 126322. January 16, 2002]
FACTS:
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
From the records before us and by petitioners own allegations and admission, it
has taken the following actions in connection with its claim that a
sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission erroneously and
unlawfully levied upon certain properties which it claims as its own.
1. It filed a notice of third-party claim with the Labor Arbiter on May 4,
1995.
2. It filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on July 4, 1995, which was dismissed on August 30,
1995, by the Labor Arbiter.
3. It filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75628 on
October 6, 1995. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on October
11, 1995 for lack of merit.
4. It appealed to the NLRC the order of the Labor Arbiter dated August
13, 1995 which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit on December 8,
1995.

5. It filed an original petition for mandatory injunction with the NLRC on

November 16, 1995. This was docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-IC.
0000602-95. This case is still pending with that Commission.
6. It filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Manila which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-76395. The dismissal of this case by public
respondent triggered the filing of the instant petition.
In all of the foregoing actions, petitioner raised a common issue, which is
that it is the owner of the properties located in the compound and buildings of
Artex Development Corporation, which were erroneously levied upon by the
sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the decision rendered by the said
Commission in a labor case docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-02960-90.
On March 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
dismissing the petition on the ground of forum shopping and that petitioners
remedy was to seek relief from this Court.
On April 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. Petitioner argued that the filing of a complaint
for accion reinvindicatoria with the Regional Trial Court was proper because it is
a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose properties were subjected to
a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it
was not a party) by Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court and
by the doctrines laid down in Sy v. Discaya, Santos v. Bayhon, and Manliguez v.
Court of Appeals.
In addition, petitioner argued that the reliefs sought and the issues
involved in the complaint for recovery of property and damages filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by respondent judge, were entirely
distinct and separate from the reliefs sought and the issues involved in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Besides, petitioner pointed
out that neither the NLRC nor the Labor Arbiter is empowered to adjudicate
matters involving ownership of properties.
On August 27, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was guilty of forum
shopping, and
(2) WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners
accion reinvindicatoria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court.
HELD:
1. On the first issue raised, we rule that there was no forum shopping.

There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were questioned, two

distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought.
In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of
action and reliefs sought.
The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of
execution on the property of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex and
Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue petitioner
raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution issued by the
labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner, not a party to
the labor case.
On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial
court was to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction.
Hence, the causes of action in these cases were different.
The rule is that for forum-shopping to exist both actions must involve the
same transactions, the same circumstances. The actions must also raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
we ruled that:
Forum-shopping or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possible)
opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
would make a favorable disposition.
(2)
On the second issue, a third party whose property has been levied upon
by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with
several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail
himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the
third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event
he failed in the remedy first availed of.
Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative
remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the
denial to the NLRC.
Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper
action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally

seized by the sheriff. This finds support in Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39,
Revised Rules of Court.
In Sy v. Discaya, we ruled that:
The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to
vindicate his claim of ownership over the properties seized is reserved by
Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, x x x:
xxxxxxxxx
As held in the case of Ong v. Tating, et. al., construing the aforecited rule,
a third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the
obligation of a judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court
which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and
after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released
from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What
said court do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of
whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his
duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken
hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does
not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any
character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary
to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to
restore the property to the claimants possession if warranted by the evidence.
However, if the claimants proof do not persuade the court of the validity of his
title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.
Independent of the above-stated recourse, a third-party claimant may
also avail of the remedy known as terceria, provided in Section 17 (now 16),
Rule 39, by serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and a
copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. The officer shall not be bound to keep
the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not
greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for damages may be
brought against the sheriff within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
filing of the bond.
The aforesaid remedies are nevertheless without prejudice to any proper
action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable to vindicate his claim to
the property. Such a proper action is, obviously, entirely distinct from that
explicitly prescribed in Section 17 of Rule 39, which is an action for damages
brought by a third-party claimant against the officer within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of
the property subject of the terceria.
Quite obviously, too, this proper action would have for its object the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention
thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff
and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the

supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor

himself. Such proper action, as above pointed out, is and should be an entirely
separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if
instituted by a stranger to the latter suit.
The remedies above mentioned are cumulative and may be
resorted to by a third-party claimant independent of or separately
from and without need of availing of the others. If a third-party claimant
opted to file a proper action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must
institute an action, distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is
being enforced, with the court of competent jurisdiction even before or without
need of filing a claim in the court which issued the writ, the latter not being a
condition sine qua non for the former. In such proper action, the validity and
sufficiency of the title of the third-party claimant will be resolved and a writ of
preliminary injunction against the sheriff may be issued. (Emphasis and
underscoring ours)
In light of the above, the filing of a third party claim with the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent
action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And,
the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum
shopping.