PVTA v.

CIR
65 SCRA 416
FACTS:
On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed a petition to seek relief for their
alleged overtime services in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Respondent court sustained the claims of private respondents hence the petition of
certiorari and plea for reversal from PVTA. Petitioner contends that they are
exercising governmental functions thus they are exempt from the Eight-Hour Labor
Law and respondent court have no jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE:
Is the PVTA discharging governmental functions and not proprietary functions thus
exempting it from Commonwealth Act. No. 444?
HELD:
There is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor
formerly reserved for private enterprise. Just because the petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary function, it does not follow that the labor
controversy is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent court. The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of the
functions of the government (constituent and ministrant), unrealistic, not to say,
obsolete. The contention that the Eight-Hour Labor Law did not apply to the
petitioner, moreover, lacked merit on the grounds of the casualness in the way such
argument was advanced in the petition.

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of
the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in
her favor and allow herself to be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be
binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the
terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the
best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care
towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who
is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press
their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different
if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother
asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role
of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916
Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer
Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The
Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as
relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but
$80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which
was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the
$80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this
order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the
Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of
the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a
recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and
their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a
reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.
HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people
thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public
interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro
people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no
other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court
ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in
gold or coin in Philippine peso.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS.

PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
G.R. No. L-409
January 30, 1947ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,vs.ERIBERTO
MISA, respondent.
FACTS:A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a
Filipino citizenwho adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupationcannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by the Article 114 of theRevised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in thePhilippines and consequently the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were thensuspended; and that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon
theproclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE
GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE.
HELD: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is
the unendingallegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states.
Generally, a person who owespermanent allegiance to a state is called a
national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupiedby the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) orsevered by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereignde jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the
legitimategovernment. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that
"Sovereignty resides in thepeople and all government authority emanates from
them.")
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control
andgovernment of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant. Thepolitical laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government andcitizens, are suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign
people. (Art. 114. Treason. Anyperson who, owing allegiance to (the United
States or) the Government of the PhilippineIslands, not being a foreigner, levies war
against them or adheres to their enemies, givingthem aid or comfort within the
Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusiontemporal to death and
shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)
DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the
Philippines weresuspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted
principles of the international lawadopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as
part of law of the nation.The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily
be bound to the sole authority ofthe invading power whose interest and
requirements are naturally in conflict with those ofdisplaced government, if it is
legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce fromthe inhabitants
such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for
themaintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration of the
country.

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained

valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing
the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may
be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror.
Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid,
then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government
and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese
military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of
the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the
phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being
continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of
the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon
them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 PHIL 285

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of
the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the
contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and
which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does
not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the
time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence
rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of
a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

ALCANTARA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 PHIL 749
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto
mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that
said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military
occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?
HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which
petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by
the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as
new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition for
writ of habeas corpus is denied.

RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF

75 PHIL 875

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of
war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February
27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla
outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for
prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not
subject to military law at the time of offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d).
The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been
recognized by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the
Constitution which provides that National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are
agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition
thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses
in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence,
the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force
and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of
the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor
its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty
over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision
of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of
the SPC to be political in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a general principle of the public

law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer
in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was
acquitted.
MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77
FACTS:
On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias
Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with acts unbecoming of a
judge when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of
litigation on which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also
members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares
and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner,
respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14
(1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:
Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees like justices and
judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not
found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by
the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.