Proctor & Gamble Japan (C)

Compete with them in their own backyard, for you will eventually have to
compete with them at home . . . We need to be in business with Japan, and we
cannot afford to be anything but successful there.
E.L. Artzt,
Winter, 1987
Artzt faced two critical decisions in February, 1985: 1) whether to stay in Japan, and, 2) if P&G
stayed, who would lead the operation. Common sense and a -75% operating margin told Artzt to sell
P&G Japan or pare back the operations and join the ranks of well respected packaged goods companies
such as General Foods, General Mills, and Colgate who had failed in Japan. However, his international
strategy dictated a reaffirmation of commitment to Japan. He considered Japan a leading edge country
in the consumer goods industry. His conviction was so strong and the problem so severe that he
considered running P&G Japan himself.
In March 1985, Ed Artzt convinced the P&G board to stay in Japan and appointed Durk Jager to
tackle the Japanese business as general manager. Jager thus assumed one of P&Gs toughest general
manager assignments in recent memory. The crisis required Artzt to report to the P&G board monthly
and hold face-to-face meetings with Jager quarterly. Jager had the support and confidence of P&G
president and CEO John Smale and his line management, but he had to win over the demoralized
employees of P&G Japan and the Japanese consumer.
Ichidai Hiyaku: 1985-1988
Japan is the second largest free market in the world, the most
technologically advanced and the most competitive. Its also P&Gs door to the
rest of the Asian market. We must compete successfully here if we are to compete
with the Japanese worldwide.
D.I. Jager,
Winter, 1987
Jagers first move was the develop a senior management team. Reaffirming his support for the
managers of R&D, finance, manufacturing, and buying, he made changes elsewhere. In marketing, he
promoted Kerry Clark to advertising manager, his former position. In sales, he appointed Fred Caswell.
And in personnel, he promoted Ryozo Shin-i to personnel manager and made him a direct report.
Jager posed a challenge to this new team: Pull together and save it or were out of business.
As one manager recalled, he then went on to set awesome goals. As advertising manager, Jager
demonstrated strong leadership and had created a risk-taking environment that allowed people to fall
flat on your face, once. The marketing group thus knew and trusted him based on its three years
experience with him. But the rest of the organization, predominantly Japanese, thought of Jager as
Crazy Man Durk, for his management style went counter to most Japanese management practices.
Faced with issues whose roots could be found in the very foundation of the organization, Jager
struggled with how to think conceptually about the degree of change required. This period of survival
and the changes required to be successful had to be shared and understood by the entire organization.
As Personnel Manager Shin-i stated, the company needed top-to-bottom, inside-out employee
commitment.
Jager and his team developed a plan called Ichidai Hiyaku, which literally meant The Great
Flying Leap. This name embodied the plans spirit and risk for both the expatriates and the Japanese.
In business terms, it was designed to translate into a shared vision, teamwork, and success in the
marketplace. Starting in 1985, the three-year plan was built to develop a profitable base business while
planning for future growth. The objectives were:

Year I -

Increase volume dramatically, without causing further operating losses.

Year II -

Continue to build the current brands and get new ones into the market.

Year III -

Achieve an operating break-even position while developing a sound volume

base for expanding test brands.

Although the plan was potentially far-reaching, a significant portion of the groundwork had been
laid before Jagers appointment as general manager, primarily in the areas of senior manager
recruitment, R&D, and changes in the manufacturing group. Organizationally, an overhauled recruiting
effort was initiated and a top flight group of senior, international managers imported. In R&D, a new
Pampers was a ready for launch and a number of new brands ready for test market. In manufacturing,
new diaper lines had been ordered for the Akashi paper plant.
However, the internal health of the organization had not changed in response to these initiatives.
A recently transferred international manager recalled that in the spring of 1985 people were pretty
demoralized, there wasnt a sense of happiness . . . we had almost accepted failure . . . we had stopped
designing superior products . . . Pampers was a major blind test loser and Cheer a break-even parity.
One Japanese manager summarized the attitudes of the employees as defensive, reactive, and
bureaucratic.
To break the spiral of failure, Jager offered himself and the Ichidai Hiyaku plan for the Japanese
to rally around. Artzt had cleared the deck for Jager, giving him total support, a free hand on
operational and strategy changes, near carte blanche on investment funds, and a direct reporting
relationship to him.
Jager first shocked both the employees and Japanese business community by publicly
discussing P&Gs losses and poor product performance. This disclosure caused significant consternation
among the Japanese employees because not only had P&G never shared such information before, but it
confirmed their worst fears, P&G would leave Japan. Jager believe, however, he was only clearing the
air of speculation and laying a new, firm foundation upon which to build Ichidai Hiyaku. He felt that the
plan would give employees a clear direction for their energies and provide functional managers with the
credibility and license to effect major change within their own departments.
Business Operations
Jager and his team moved quickly. They concluded that fundamental mistakes were made upon
entry into Japan, errors that had been both compounded and camouflaged by early success through
1980. As part of Ichidai Hiyaku, the following five steps were identified as necessary to succeed in the
business operations.
1. Understand Consumers Japanese consumer demands differed radically from those of the
United States. One senior P&G executive cited as a prime example the Cheer launch with the United
States advertising campaign for All Temperature Cheer. The message: Here is one detergent that gets
clothes clean in all three washing temperatures normally used in American laundry, hot, warm, cold.
Cheers success in Japan was initially attributed to such advertising and aggressive pricing.
When the feature pricing in 1979, however, so did the business. Upon closer examination, the threetemperature washing concept was not relevant to Japanese laundry habits. Women typically washed
clothes in tap water and occasionally the recycled family bath water in the winter; doing the wash in the
three different temperatures did not apply to them.
2. Tailor Products to Japan. Closely aligned with understanding the consumer was the need for
tailoring products in Japan, instead of simply adapting imported products. Furthermore, even if a U.S.
product initially met the needs of the consumer, it became outdated quickly.

The launch of Pampers was a classic example. Having created the Japanese disposable diaper
market in 1978, P&G found itself with a share drop from its 1981 high of 90% to its 1985 low of 6%, with
the entrance of only two competitors. The competition produced a better fitting and absorbing diaper at a
premium price, and Pampers became quickly and hopelessly outmoded. In three years, the demands of
the Japanese consumer had outstripped the 20-year development history of disposable diapers in the
United States.
3. Exploit Consumer Understanding. Knowledge of the consumer had to be blended with the
tailored product to create a brand franchise. Advertising had to convince the consumer of the product
benefits.
4. Sell Your Company Image The company logo was to be linked to the brand through packaging
and advertising so that the brand would benefit from P&Gs image. A common practice in Japan was to
sell the consumer on both the company and the brand.
5. Penetrate the Japanese Distribution System. Regardless of all other efforts, if the product did
not get to retail shelves, it could not be sold. When P&G lost its feature price momentum on Cheer, it
recognized the problem of not having wholesale leverage. With 3,000 wholesalers having non-exclusive
distribution rights to P&G brands, the company represented only 1% to 2% of their business.
Incorporating these five steps into the Japanese organization primarily affected R&D, marketing, sales,
and manufacturing.
Research and Development
R&D Manager Chris Holmes held a central belief regarding the Japanese consumer: She shows
us more and more what is good, first. He believed that European and United States, trends were
helpful, but the worldwide center of innovation should be the Japanese consumer and competition.
Based on this assumption, Holmes began the process of building an R&D team in Japan.
Ultimately, in his view, the team would conduct local product development for the Japanese company,
become the technical support center for P&G in Asia, and develop a P&G worldwide technology group.
This was a tough challenge for an R&D organization with only 60 people when compared with Kaos
2,000 in Japan. However, Holmes, ace-in-the-hole was the unreserved support he received from the
R&D group in Cincinnati. Holmes was able to rely on this group to provide a wide range of help, from
basic technology research to manufacturing process testing.
The remaining issue was whether the P&G Japan R&D group could maintain the pace of
innovation to lead Kao and Uni-Charm. It appeared as if each competitor took turns leapfrogging one
another in product upgrades, rendering the latest generation diaper obsolete within six months. In fact,
during one 36-month period, P&G retooled its plants and upgraded its diaper product four times.
Eventually, however, the R&D groups in Osaka and Cincinnati jointly created the worlds thinnest and
more absorbent diaper, a significant winner over both Uni-Charms Moony and Kaos Merries brands.
Marketing
P&G Japans marketing responsibilities were understanding the consumer, working with R&D to
tailor the products, and understanding the best method of exploiting the first two efforts.
In consumer understanding, new ways of approaching research were sought to grasp the
qualitative picture the statistics-oriented research in the 1970s had missed. Techniques such as filming
the consumer at home while she used diapers revealed the subtle differences between Japanese and
American habits and practices. In working closely with R&D, the two groups could gain better alignment
on new product development objectives, ideas, and approaches to tailor the products for Japan.
The biggest challenge lay in determining what advertising would work. It was all the more
difficult because the senior management team was predominantly Western and the Japanese marketing

staff had a limited experience base. The advertising manager, Kerry Clark, undertook the task of
analyzing successful Japanese advertising.
Clark and his team examined competitors growth brands and determined that a number of
unique cultural and communication patterns had a big impact on advertising execution in Japan. For
example, the indirectness of communication and the importance of harmony in Japanese culture led to a
virtual absence of side-by-side comparisons in advertising. The tone of advertising was always friendly
and never aggressive. Commercials often used background music and popular, well-known celebrities;
and, more important, they explicitly identified the manufacturer. However, this did not stop advertisers
from making powerful commercials that featured the performance of their own products.
To adapt to this new learning effectively, the amount of commercial development, production,
and testing in Japan was increased substantially. Much of this was disposable production, used solely
to probe consumer reactions and to build the base of learning.
Coincident with this overhaul in advertising practices was a reassessment of P&G Japans
advertising agencies. Without the leverage of large media expenditures like those in the United States,
P&G Japans business was concentrated among three advertising agencies: Dentsu (100% Japaneseowned), Grey/Daiko (50/50 joint venture), and Leo Burnett-Kyodo (100% United States owned). These
agencies were managed aggressively, and new business was assigned to the best performers. By 1986,
the efforts of P&G Japans agencies, combined with new approaches to consumer and research analysis,
resulted in award-winning commercials.
Sales and Distribution
The complexity of Japans multi-tiered distribution system meant that the sales person played a
highly strategic role. Because goods moved from the factory through both primary and secondary
wholesalers before reaching retailers shelves, manufacturers depended heavily on the wholesaler to
distribute their product. Unlike the United States system, the wholesalers, not the retailers, received
most of the P&G sales calls.
The first challenge facing P&G Japan was the conflict between the links in the distribution chain,
manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, commented National Accounts Sales Manager Takashi Yoshino. We
had to find a system in which each link complements the others. P&G called this way of thinking the
distribution triangle, in which the maker, wholesaler, and retailer were placed at the corners and the
consumer in the center. It assumes that once we all agree we have the same ultimate objective, the
consumer, we can focus our efforts together much better.
After intense study with the help of a major consulting firm, Jager cut the number of secondary
wholesalers from 2.500 to 1,000 and concentrated the business in the hands of 50 core wholesalers,
down from 500. In so doing, each wholesaler received exclusive distribution rights to P&G products by
either geography or trade channel. Jager also moved quickly to avoid speculation defections. This and
the wholesaler arrangement were unheard of in Japan. In one sweep, P&G Japans leverage with its
core wholesalers was increased ten-fold. The plan worked; no selected wholesaler turned P&G Japan
down to be a core partner.
Manufacturing
Arriving in December 1979 to run manufacturing and start the work on the Akashi Greenfield
diaper plant, Pete Wickemeyer quickly recognized that there were fundamental operational and labor
problems leading to a highly uncompetitive cost position for P&G Japan. After much initial resistance on
both sides, Wickemeyer and one of his plant managers, Minoru Shimada, developed a working
partnership. Although extremely rare, their mutual trust allowed Wickemeyer and Shimada to 1) resolve
a labor dispute preventing the opening of the Akashi plant, and 2) radically reorganize the plant
management structure and systems.
The results had been impressive: plant productivity skyrocketed and costs plummeted. This

newly competitive cost structure laid a foundation upon which Pampers could relaunch in late 1984. The
relationship between Wickemeyer and Shimada illustrated what could be achieved with change.
In 1985, Shimada faced two challenges: 1) how to achieve results like those of the Akashi plant
in P&Gs other facilities, and 2) how to maintain the Akashi plants rate of progress while fighting a diaper
war requiring total production line refits every nine months.
To meet the first challenge, Shimada moved quickly to restructure P&Gs other plants, reducing
plant management staff from 36 to 9 managers on average per plant.
Regarding rapid line changes, Shimada eliminated the 12-month lead time for the U.S. custommade diaper production lines by sourcing locally. (This was the first time P&G sourced outside the U.S.)
P&Gs Japanese competitors also sourced from this supplier, which led to some competitive signaling on
the timing and type of P&Gs product changes. However, Shimada believe the shorter lead times of a
locally sourced line plus the fact that P&G did extensive in-house customizing offset any loss in
confidentiality.
Organizational Issues
The biggest changes Ichidai Hiyaku called for were in organizational policy.
Compensation/Promotion System: Through to 1983, P&G Japan used traditional Japanese
personnel and administrative practices: an age- and seniority-based promotion and compensation
system, under which senior Japanese almost automatically were promoted even if a more capable
younger person was available. Managers should reach a certain age level since early promotion could
damage outside company relations and the effectiveness of both the individual and the organization. In
compensation, there was little difference between outstanding performers and marginal ones. Age, years
of service, and cost of living were the main determinants.
In Japan, such a system, designed to treat all employees equally, was considered essential for
harmony and developing a healthy organization. But a hierarchy based on age made it all but impossible
for a junior person to challenge a senior managers ideas or decisions. The power of knowledge and
analysis, central to P&Gs thoroughness, was rendered virtually useless as a way for junior managers to
advocate ideas, and by 1984, the best young people were leaving out of frustration. Further, those who
remained were rapidly losing their motivation to perform well.
Personnel Manager Shin-i initiated a move to a merit-based promotion and compensation
system. The key criteria for promotion was changed to performance, contribution to the business, and
future potential. By 1987, 80% of an annual salary increase was allotted on the basis of merit and the
remainder on cost of living.
Over and above the system changes, a series of early retirement programs were implemented,
removing 35 managers during the 1983-1987 period who did not fit P&Gs future plants. A larger number
left voluntarily.
Recruiting: Through to 1983, no coordinated, active recruiting effort existed because each
department reviewed candidates independently. Two kinds of candidates were hired: locally educated
Japanese who spoke English, and Japanese with U.S. MBA degrees. The former typically had focused
so much effort on the English language that other skills such as mathematics were lacking. In contrast,
the U.S.-educated Japanese possessed the necessary skills but rapidly became frustrated with an
American company using a seniority-based compensation/promotion system and left.
Because P&G was a strict promotion-from-within company, successful university recruiting was a
survival issue. Shin-i once again moved to change personnel practices, selecting the top eight schools
in Japan for recruiting and marketing P&G to targeted students. He sold P&G as a unique employer
based on four points: 1) it tolerated no sex discrimination; 2) it gave large responsibility to managers at
an early age; 3) it had a performance-based compensation and promotion system; and 4) it had no

English-speaking requirement (the company would send the student to an English language immersion
program).
Shin-i also pioneered the use of on-campus marketing seminars conducted by a team of P&G
managers. In effect, P&G lowered all the obvious barriers to entering a United States company for the
Japanese. In 1984, five students were hired from the top 10 schools.
Public Relations: In mid-1985, P&G Japan also initiated its first corporate image campaign to
develop the business and improve its ability to recruit students. The rationale for the plan was based on
three pieces of evidence:
$

Research indicated that between 15% and 20% of all Japanese consumers trued or purchased a
product based on the company name.

Japanese consumers were strongly influenced in their product performance perceptions by a

company name or image or both.

Japanese students seeking employment tended to select a company based on its reputation.

For example, in an identified product test, the Kao identified entry won over the P&G entry even though
the same product was used in the test; only the manufacturers name had been changed.
Having students rank companies was another measure of corporate image: In 1984, P&G ranked
593rd, and Kao ranked 111th. This finding was reinforced by corporate identity research conducted in mid1985, indicating that only 48% of Japanese consumers knew the Proctor & Gamble name compared to
100% for both Kao and Lion.
Based on these results, P&G Japan pursued a public relations program designed to: 1) achieve
wider recognition of the company name and trademark; 2) establish a strong connection between its
brands and the company name; and 3) make the major segments of society important to P&G Japan,
consumers, the trade, future employees, and the business community, familiar with the companys
principles.
P&G Japan increased its Japanese market profile by using a corporate signature shot at the
end of all television commercials and by placing the company logo on the front panel of all packaging
and on all public material, from banners and business cards to brochures and press releases. P&G also
moved to open up communications with the press, business community, and trade:
$

It gave press and financial community receptions to announce major events such as new product
launches.

It held open houses for major plant openings (the first times anyone outside of P&G, including
suppliers, were allowed into a P&G diaper plant),

It instituted regular press conferences.

In May 1986, P&G listed its stock on the Tokyo Stock Exchange to demonstrate to employees and
consumers its commitment to stay in Japan.
Other public relations tactics included: 1) establishing and advertising the first toll-free consumer
telephone system in Japan; 2) introducing the P&G Tsushin magazine (i.e., Communicating P&G) to
provide monthly updates on the companys activities to the press; and 3) publishing the P&G
Tradebeams magazines to provide P&Gs wholesalers and retailers with articles on its product launches,
personnel changes and other events.
Ichidai Hiyaku Results

During the three-year Ichidai Hiyaku plan, P&G Japan sales increased from $132 million in 1985
to $556 million by 1988, while achieving a break-even position on the established brand business.
Fueling this growth was the launch and re-launch of more than a dozen brands. Japan cherry-picked
successful ideas from P&G worldwide while also leading the company in disposable diapers and laundry
detergent upgrades. In fact, Japan led the company to the thin Pampers Ultra diaper, a $500 million
worldwide capital investment for P&G.
In diapers, the performance demands of the Japanese consumer clearly outpaced those of the
European and American consumer as Kao and Uni-Charm fought P&G for technological leadership. By
mid-1985, substantial competitor product upgrades were arriving at the rate of one every six months, a
period quickly dubbed the Diapers Wars. In response, P & G made a concerted effort to lead the race
by placing its best worldwide technology in the Japanese marketplace first rather than in the United
States, as had been accepted policy. This change enabled P&G Japan to maintain a product
performance edge, albeit slim, throughout the wars. In fact, by late 1989, P&G Japan reclaimed the
market leader position with a 23% share on Pampers. Although still below P&Gs 1980 market share,
consumer usage had grown from 10% to 54% in nine years.
In detergents, a similarly tough struggle was being fought. In spring 1987, Kao threw the
detergent market into disarray with the launch of a new product aptly named Attack. Within six months,
Attack became the number-two detergent, with a 17% share, and was projecting to take the leadership
from Lions Top brand. Kao had introduced a fivefold concentrate detergent with market, Kao risked its
own 42% company market share (six brands), but this move made Kao the undisputed leader by 1988,
with a 54% company market share.
This move of course affected Cheer. Although repositioned in 1984, Cheer never really
recovered from the elimination of its feature price promotions in the late 1970s; by 1988, it had stabilized
at a 4.8% share. Recognizing Cheers fate and the change of the market, P&G Japan moved quickly to
launch a new brand called Ariel in fall 1988. Like Pampers in 1985, Ariel incorporated P&Gs best
worldwide detergent technology in a concentrated form. By late 1989, Ariel captured an estimated 8%
share. Despite this action, P&Gs Japans detergent business was still a distant number three behind Kao
and Lion.
What Kao was doing in detergents, P&G Japan was doing in other markets. After two year of
extensive research and refinement, in late 1986, P&G Japan launched Whisper into the Japanese
feminine hygiene product market, considered one of the toughest to penetrate. Whisper (called Always
in the United States) achieved a market leadership 25% share within three years of launch while
charging a 20% price premium.
By 1988, P&G Japans business was growing. In November of that year, even Kao Chairman
Kazaburo Sagawa complimented the company in the magazine Business Tokyo:
P&G has learned how to make products the Japanese consumer likes. . . Were very
impressed with their ability to get products right for Japan now. We welcome this kind of
competition, it helps us improve our products as well. 1
Notwithstanding words of praise from outside sources, Ichidai hiyaku had been a hard-fought
battle for survival and change. As one P&G manager said, People didnt just go for the program itself
but for the person who led it, Durk. As Artzt later summed up the events, P&G had made typical
Western entry mistakes, but resolved them with atypical solutions.
Gradually, the cultural rift between the expatriates and Japanese nationals faded. The house
cleaning of old-thinking managers had helped. By 1988, only one-third of the managers held the same
job they had at the beginning of Ichidai Hiyaku. The Japanese skepticism of the international managers
ability to work in a team declined, and the expatriates questioning of the local employees talents
waned.
1David Kilburn, AThe Righteous Road To Riches,@ Business Tokyo, November, 1988.

Externally, P&Gs efforts were working on both campuses and in the publics mind. By 1988,
Durk Jager was promoted to group vice president, Asia/Pacific and Japan. But before leaving, Jager and
his team laid the foundation for the next three-year plan, Choten Tohatsu, which meant reach for the
summit. Ron Pearce took over from Jager in Japan, and he faced a very different set of issues.
According to Pearce, Choten Tohtatsu was designed to:
change the thrust of our thinking and actions from survival to leadership. . . Choten
Tohtatsu challenges us to drive several of our brands to strong market leadership and to
firmly establish P&G as a top consumer goods marketer in Japan. This would also bring
P&G Japan into a leadership position with P&G International in terms of volume and
profit contribution.
P&G Japan had both strong momentum and product flow in the summer of 1988, but by fall,
there was concern about whether a sense of urgency had been lost with the passing of the survival
crisis. Pearce identified three fundamental issues facing the P&G Japan organization: 1) business
growth; 2) organization and infrastructure growth; and, 3) cultural integration.
In terms of growth, priorities had to be set on where to focus Japans resources B to develop the
current core business further or to enter new categories to broaden the business base. Constraining this
choice was a real limit on the capacity of P&G Japans current organization and infrastructure. With two
high volume categories at present, detergents and disposable paper products, P&G Japan was only
capable of handling the development of a third major category. The recent acquisition of RichardsonVicks provided a fledgling base upon which to start a beauty care category, shampoos, skin lotions, etc.
However, to ensure long-term growth, a fourth business was probably required. The issue of real limits
on the current infrastructure remained. Since P&G was a strict promotion-from-within company, a 36- to
48- month time-frame was needed to develop new marketing, R&D and sales managers.
The most intangible yet pervasive issue facing Pearce was the cultural integration of the
Japanese into an American management system. Although the new merit-based promotion and
compensation system helped to ensure the right people were in the right place, it did not accommodate
the differences in operating styles between Japanese and American/European managers. The more
reserved and conflict-avoiding operating styles of the Japanese did not optimize their contribution in the
P&G organization. In contrast, their European counterparts were quite used to strongly advocating their
ideas and directly challenging their counterparts. The differences between the two types of managers
traced back to such fundamental matters as society and educational systems.
Competitive Threat
Complicating the growth constraint was an expected increase in competitor market reaction to
new initiatives. For instance, when P&G Japan launched Rejoy, a two in one shampoo/conditioner
brand, in July 1988, Kao and Lion both had copycat products in full distribution within four months. In
contrast, the United States equivalent product, Pert, had been on the U.S. retail shelves for four years
and still had no competitor.
Kao represented the biggest threat to P&G. During the 1980s, the company effected wholesale
change with three significant moves: 1) the company restructured; 2) it diversified its business base; and,
3) it expanded internationally. In restructuring, Kao started a program originally called Total Cost
Reduction (TCR) in 1987; but by 1989 TCR had evolved to stand for Total Creative Revolution. 2 The
final version of TCR involved a rationalization of staffing in both the manufacturing and administration
areas of the company. These people were replaced by productivity-enhancing investments such as
Kaos new $1.2 billion automated warehouse distribution network allowing next-day delivery to retail
costumers. This restructuring freed up people and resource for Kao to diversify its business into products
such as computer floppy disks. By 1989, over 9% of corporate sales were in disks.
2Kao Annual Reports. 1987 through 1989.

In May 1988, Kao brought the United States-based Andrew Jergens Company. Jergens was also
headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio and specialized in skin care products. It was believed Jergens had
been bought to establish a beachead in the United States market for Kaos highly successful Biore skin
care and Sofina cosmetics lines. By 1989, the major source of Kaos sales was still Asia, but now it had
operations across the world.
Future Considerations
As Jager assumed his new post as group vice president, Asia/Pacific and Japan, he faced a
number of questions: 1) What role should Japan play in developing the Far East business? 2) How could
economies of scale, scope, and learning be realized in geographically dispersed countries, each
requiring domestic manufacturing? 3) What should his market entry strategy be for new markets as
diverse as Australia, Korea, and Pakistan based on the Japanese experience? And 4) Was there a
bigger role that Japan could play worldwide for P&G, and was it ready to do so?