Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
NAVARRO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37,
Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under
the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 that seeks to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 16, 2001 and
Resolution3 dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These
CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 2000 4 and March 7, 2001 5 orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro
City, denying petitioner Roger V. Navarros (Navarro) motion to
dismiss.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two
complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint) 6 and
98-598 (second complaint),7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum
of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen
Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two
(2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession.
The first complaint stated:
1. That plaintiff KAREN T. GO is a Filipino, of legal age, married to
GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and doing
business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES, an entity
duly registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, which has its business address at Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City; that defendant ROGER NAVARRO is a
Filipino, of legal age, a resident of 62 Dolores Street, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro City, where he may be served with summons and
other processes of the Honorable Court; that defendant "JOHN DOE"
whose real name and address are at present unknown to plaintiff is
hereby joined as party defendant as he may be the person in whose
possession and custody the personal property subject matter of this
suit may be found if the same is not in the possession of defendant
ROGER NAVARRO;
2. That KARGO ENTERPRISES is in the business of, among others,
buying and selling motor vehicles, including hauling trucks and other
heavy equipment;
3. That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER
NAVARRO, it is hereby stated that on August 8, 1997, the said
defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain motor vehicle which is
more particularly described as follows
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-51680
Motor No. 6D15-338735
Plate No. GHK-378
as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO
PURCHASE entered into by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES,
then represented by its Manager, the aforementioned GLENN O.
GO, and defendant ROGER NAVARRO xxx; that in accordance with
the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO
PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff
six (6) post-dated checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE & 33/100 PESOS
(P66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment of the agreed
rentals; that when the fifth and sixth checks, i.e. PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS
NOS. 017112 and 017113, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and
February 8, 1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the
same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the
common reason that the current deposit account against which the
said checks were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the
amounts thereof; that the total amount of the two (2) checks, i.e. the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66) therefore represents the
principal liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the
basis of the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH
RIGHT TO PURCHASE; that demands, written and oral, were made
of defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX &
66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor vehicle
as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO
PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are, in vain to the
great damage and injury of herein plaintiff; xxx
4. That the aforedescribed motor vehicle has not been the subject of
any tax assessment and/or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an
execution or an attachment as against herein plaintiff;
xxx
8. That plaintiff hereby respectfully applies for an order of the
Honorable Court for the immediate delivery of the above-described
motor vehicle from defendants unto plaintiff pending the final
determination of this case on the merits and, for that purpose, there
is attached hereto an affidavit duly executed and bond double the
value of the personal property subject matter hereof to answer for
damages and costs which defendants may suffer in the event that
the order for replevin prayed for may be found out to having not been
properly issued.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as
the first complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to
Purchase involved is dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle
leased is described as follows:
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-510528
Motor No. 6D14-423403
The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three postdated checks, each for the amount of P100,000.00, to Karen Go in
payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was
dishonored when presented for payment.8
On October 12, 19989 and October 14, 1998,10 the RTC issued writs
of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two
vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that
the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was
not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase
(collectively, the lease agreements) the actionable documents on
which the complaints were based.
On Navarros motion, both cases were duly consolidated on
December 13, 1999.
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground
that the complaints did not state a cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated
May 26, 2000,11 the RTC issued another order dated July 26, 2000
setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that
Glenn Gos leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held
that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the
action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should
have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on
claiming that by issuing this order, the trial court violated Rule 10 of
the Rules.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him,
Navarro maintains that the complaints were premature because no
prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the
lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued
based on flawed complaints, the vehicles were illegally seized from
his possession and should be returned to him immediately.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro
to state that she has no real interest in the subject of the complaint,
even if the lease agreements were signed only by her husband,
Glenn Go; she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go
signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo
Enterprises. Moreover, Karen Go maintains that Navarros insistence
that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Gos paraphernal property is without
basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property
acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property.
Finally, Karen Go insists that her complaints sufficiently established a
cause of action against Navarro. Thus, when the RTC ordered her to
include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with
the rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure
the complaints lack of cause of action.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e.,
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 15
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the
registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still
insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case.
According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo
Enterprises name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical
personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were
Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as coplaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of action for the
caused the substitution.3 The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax
Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and issue a new
one in the name of Juanitos heirs.
On March 6, 1998 the Taronas filed a motion to declare petitioner
Tallorin in default for failing to answer their complaint within the
allowed time.4 But, before the RTC could act on the motion, Tallorin
filed a belated answer, alleging among others that she held a copy of
the supposedly missing affidavit of Juanito who was merely an
agricultural tenant of the land covered by Tax Declaration 463. He
surrendered and waived in that affidavit his occupation and tenancy
rights to Tallorin and the others in consideration of P29,240.00.
Tallorin also put up the affirmative defenses of non-compliance with
the requirement of conciliation proceedings and prescription.
On March 12, 1998 the RTC set Tallorins affirmative defenses for
hearing5 but the Taronas sought reconsideration, pointing out that the
trial court should have instead declared Tallorin in default based on
their earlier motion.6 On June 2, 1998 the RTC denied the Taronas
motion for reconsideration7 for the reasons that it received Tallorins
answer before it could issue a default order and that the Taronas
failed to show proof that Tallorin was notified of the motion three days
before the scheduled hearing. Although the presiding judge inhibited
himself from the case on motion of the Taronas, the new judge to
whom the case was re-raffled stood by his predecessors previous
orders.
By a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA),8 however, the Taronas succeeded in getting the latter court to
annul the RTCs March 12 and June 2, 1998 orders. 9 The CA ruled
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting Tallorins late
answer in the absence of a motion to admit it. Even if petitioner
Tallorin had already filed her late answer, said the CA, the RTC
should have heard the Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default.
Upon remand of the case, the RTC heard the Taronas motion to
declare Tallorin in default,10 granted the same, and directed the
Taronas to present evidence ex parte.11
On January 30, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment, a) annulling the
tax declaration in the names of Tallorin, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de
Valdez, and Dolores Valdez; b) reinstating the tax declaration in the
name of Juanito; and c) ordering the issuance in its place of a new
tax declaration in the names of Juanitos heirs. The trial court also
ruled that Juanitos affidavit authorizing the transfer of the tax
question.
The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.16
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights,
so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. 17 Joining
indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a
requirement of due process. Without their presence, the judgment of
the court cannot attain real finality.
Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the
absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the
responsibility for impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the
plaintiff.18
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the
names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in its place, the
reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanitos
name. Further, the Taronas sought to strike down as void the affidavit
in which Juanito renounced his tenancy right in favor of the same
three persons. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the
Taronas wanted would necessarily affect the rights of such persons
to the property covered by the tax declaration.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the
persons in whose names they are issued. Their cancellation
adversely affects the rights and interests of such persons over the
properties that the documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax
declaration is a primary evidence, if not the source, of the right to
claim title of ownership over real property, a right enforceable against
another person. The Court held in Uriarte v. People 19 that, although
not conclusive, a tax declaration is a telling evidence of the
declarants possession which could ripen into ownership.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 20 the Court said that no one
in his right mind would pay taxes for a property that he did not have
in his possession. This honest sense of obligation proves that the
holder claims title over the property against the State and other
persons, putting them on notice that he would eventually seek the
B.
CRISOLOGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court challenging the May 6, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN, which affirmed the
September 27, 2010,2 October 7, 20103 and November 9, 20104
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br.
14), in Civil Case No. 33,551-2010, an action for Cancellation of
Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. The Registry
of Deeds for the City of Davao. Sheriff Robert Medialdea. John &
Jane Does. and all persons acting under their directions.
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum
of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various properties
including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and
292600 (subject properties), which were attached by various
creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies
were annotated on the back of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses
Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases before RTC,
Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case Nos.
26,810-98 and 26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al.
Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was the
successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another
collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8),
docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a
compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998, between the
parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer
the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter
subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in
turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of JEWM,
both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice
of lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed
against So Keng Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and
pursuant to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the case before RTC-Br. 14
became final and executory because Spouses Crisologos did not
perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering the issues in the CA
petition moot and academic.
In their Reply,13 Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that any cancellation of annotation
of certificates of title must be carried out by giving notice to all
parties-in-interest. This they forward despite their recognition of the
mootness of their assertion over the subject properties, to wit:
Again, we respect JAICs position that "the claims of subsequent
attaching creditors (including petitioners) have been rendered moot
and academic, and hence the entries in favor of said creditors have
no more legal basis and therefore must be cancelled." But we
likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by at least being notified
and heard.14
The Ruling of the Court
The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that
RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to
recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for
cancellation of lien.
In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the
back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable
include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529,15 to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure,
alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon
and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by
order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper
cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the
ground that the registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate,
have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon
the certificates have arisen or been created; or that an omission or
error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon, or
on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable
ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after
Omelio failed to cause the service of proper summons upon the John
and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Even when Sps.
Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be recognized as the John
and Jane Does, Judge Omelio refused to acknowledge their
appearance and ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos'
pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating Justice recommended
admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo
as indispensable parties in that case.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying
the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the latters right to due
process. Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio has issued
an order which fails to notify or summon the indispensable parties,
we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law, with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer
penalty in the future.
xxx
WHEREFORE, We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY of four
counts of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law for the
following acts: (a) refusing to recognize Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo
and Nannette B. Crisologo as indispensable parties; in violation of
the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we impose upon Judge
George E. Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00), with a warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.20
The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses
Crisologos pleas to be recognized as indispensable parties. In the
words of the Court, "Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to
recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring
them to file a motion to intervene, considering that a simple perusal
of the certificates of title would show Sps. Crisologos adverse rights
because their liens are annotated at the back of the titles." 21
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes
a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel
Belen,22 the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the trial
judges "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or
procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment.
It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 17, 2008
and February 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02120-MIN.
The assailed CA judgment nullified the December 4, 2001 Decision 3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, in Spl.
Proc. No. 782-01, while the questioned CA Resolution denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior
Superintendent. On July 30, 2001, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 39 of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the
"Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," the
Chief of Directorial Staff of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
issued General Order No. 1168, enumerating the names of
commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on
various dates in the month of January 2002 by virtue of their
attainment of the compulsory retirement age of 56. Among the
names included in the said Order was that of petitioner, who was
supposed to retire on January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP
Records Management Division indicate that he was born on January
11, 1946.
On September 3, 2001, petitioner filed an application for late
registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar's Office of
Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore
under oath that he was born on January 11, 1956. The application
was, subsequently, approved.
On October 15, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City,
Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public Service
Records Regarding the Birth Date. Pertinent portions of his
allegations are as follows:
xxxx
1. That herein petitioner is 45 years old, married, Filipino citizen,
PNP (Police Superintendent) by occupation and resident of Camp
Bagong Amai, Pakpak, Marawi City. x x x;
2. That on January 11, 1956, herein petitioner was born in Mulondo,
Lanao del Sur, x x x, copy of his live birth certificate is attached and
marked as Annex "A", for ready reference;
3. That when petitioner herein joined with (sic) the government
service, particularly the local police force and later on the Integrated
National Police, he honestly entered his birth date as January 11,
1946, while in his (sic) Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS, in short) and National Police Commission, he erroneously
entered his birth date as January 11, 1946, which entry are honestly
based on estimation, as Muslim (sic) in the south do not register their
marriages and births before;
4. That herein petitioner has correctly entered his true and correct
birth date, January 11, 1956, in his Service Record at the National
Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Directorate for Personnel
and Records Management, Camp Crame, Quezon City, copy of
which is attached and marked as Annex "B", x x x;
5. That herein petitioner is submitting Joint Affidavit of two (2)
disinterested person (sic) x x x;
6. That this petition is not intended to defraud anybody but to
establish the true and correct birth date of herein petitioner.
x x x x4
The petition was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 782-01.
On December 4, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner
DIMAPINTO BABAI MACAWADIB, to wit:
1. Ordering the Chief, Records Management, PNP NHQ, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, to make a correction upon the birth date of
herein petitioner to January 11, 1956;
2. Ordering the Director, Personnel and Records Management
Service, NAPOLCOM, Makati City, to make correction upon the birth
date of herein petitioner from January 11, 1946 to January 11, 1956;
and
3. Ordering the Chief, Records of the Civil Service Commission,
Manila and all other offices concern (sic), to make the necessary
correction in the Public Records of herein petitioner to January 11,
1956.
SO ORDERED.5
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Entry of Final Judgment 6 indicating
therein that its December 4, 2001 Decision in Spl. Proc. No. 782-01
has become final and executory on March 13, 2002.
On January 8, 2008, herein respondent filed a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to
) First Name
: NORMA
Middle Name
: SY
Last Name
: LUGSANAY
b As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
) : FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither
prejudice the government nor any third party. It also held that the
names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the
same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog
City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma
Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition
to avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The
CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable
parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case
for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local
Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. 17 As to
whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the
CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were
not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly
state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. 18
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed
by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding
is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may
also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth
certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname
and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the
name which she has been known for since childhood, including her
legal documents such as passport and school and professional
records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and
citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however,