Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
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51-52 (D.Conn.1996). Nonetheless, it ruled that plaintiff was required, but had
failed, to demonstrate that he detrimentally relied upon the Summary Plan
Description.
2
Though this court has discussed the reliance issue in a number of previous
decisions, see Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 909 (2d Cir.1990)
(reliance issue not appealed); Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1161
(2d Cir.1990) (reliance not found, but court "leave[s] to another day the
question of whether reliance upon a faulty plan document is a prerequisite to
ERISA recovery"), it has not been the subject of a definitive ruling. For the
reasons explained below, we find it unnecessary to reach the issue in this case
as well. Nor do we resolve defendant's argument, raised in its cross-appeal, that
the Committee's interpretation of the SPD, like that of the plan, should be
governed by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, see Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989),
and that the district court failed to apply that standard. We affirm because we
conclude that even under a de novo standard of review, the Committee's
reading of the SPD was the only reasonable and correct one.
Background
3(1)
4
Insisting that he had a present right to disability benefits under the UTC Plan,
plaintiff presented a claim to the Committee. On February 7, 1995, the
Committee considered and, for the same reason given previously to plaintiff,
unanimously denied his claim for disability benefits. Reviewing the UTC Plan
and SPD, the Committee concluded that "a Participant must be actively
employed at the time of his disability to be eligible for disability retirement
payments." Minutes of February 7, 1995, meeting of Benefit Claims Appeal
Committee. The Committee informed plaintiff of its determination by letter
dated March 8, 1995. Plaintiff continued to dispute the Committee's decision
and was informed by letter dated November 21, 1995, that it was final. On
December 1, 1995, plaintiff initiated the present action.
6(2)
7
The UTC Plan provides both retirement benefits and employee welfare
benefits, including health, disability and death benefits. See 1978 Plan, Articles
5-7. It is an "employee benefit plan," within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
1002(3) and is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Retirement
benefits are available to UTC Plan Participants at the "Normal Retirement
Date" (65) or after "Early Retirement" (a date prior to 65, but "after attaining
age 55 and completing at least ten years of Continuous Service"). 1978 Plan,
5.5. Alternatively, "[i]f, for any reason other than death or retirement, the
employment of a Participant ... is terminated after he has completed at least 10
years of Continuous Service and before he has attained age 55, he shall be
entitled to receive a Vested Retirement Annuity," commencing at age 65. Id. at
8.1. Thus, under the Plan, retirement benefits are not lost if the Participant is
terminated or leaves UTC for employment elsewhere, so long as ten years of
service were completed. See id. Accordingly, it is clear that, since plaintiff was
employed at UTC for over ten years, he was a Plan Participant and is currently
eligible to receive vested retirement benefits.
Disability benefits are also available under the UTC Plan to Participants who
have at least ten years of continuous service and receive disability benefits
under the Social Security Act. The disability date which triggers payment of
these benefits is defined under the UTC Plan as "the first day of the fifth month
... prior to the month for which a Participant first receives a disability benefit
under ... [the] Social Security Act." 1978 Plan, 6.1(b).
However, the UTC Plan is explicit that, unlike the case with retirement
benefits, disability benefits are not vested. To determine when a Participant is
entitled to non-vested benefits, one must examine those plan provisions that
define eligibility requirements.
10
Article Two of the UTC Plan sets out the definitions of key Plan terms. A UTC
Plan "Employee" is defined as "any employee of the Employer who is included
in a unit of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement between
employee representatives and the Employer, which agreement provides that the
employees in such unit shall participate in the Plan." 1978 Plan, 2.18. A UTC
Plan "Participant" is defined as "any Employee who has become a participant in
the Plan in accordance with Article Four." Id. at 2.27. Article Four describes
the manner in which Employees both become Plan Participants and cease to
possess such status. A UTC Plan Employee becomes a Participant under the
1978 Plan if he was a participant under the prior UTC Plan on December 31,
1977, or if he is over age 25 with one year of service or has completed five
years of service. See id. at 4.1.
11
12
13
Lastly, one other provision of the SPD should be mentioned. The SPD provides
that benefit claims that are denied may be appealed to the Benefit Claims
Appeal Committee, which has "the right to interpret the provisions of the plan,
[making] its decision[s] ... conclusive and binding." SPD, p. 14.
(3)
15
16
The district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff because it ruled
that he failed to show that he detrimentally relied on the SPD. See Moriarity v.
United Techs. Corp. Represented Employees Retirement Plan, 947 F.Supp. 43,
52-53 (D.Conn.1996).
17
First, however, the district court concluded that the SPD conflicted with the
Plan. The district court reasoned that, though the UTC Plan's definition of "
'Participant' clearly provides that an individual ceases to be a 'Participant' when
he or she ceases to be an employee," id. at 51, the SPD lacks any such
definition, and, therefore, fails to inform employees of the "circumstances
which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits."
29 U.S.C. 1022(b). "Nowhere does the SPD set forth the circumstances under
which an employee who has completed 10 years of continuous service and has
been determined to be disabled by Social Security will nevertheless be
ineligible for disability benefits." Moriarity, 947 F.Supp. at 52. Consequently,
the district court concluded, the SPD is "inaccurate and inconsistent" with the
UTC Plan and "does not apprise employees of the circumstances in which they
may be denied benefits." Moriarity, 947 F.Supp. at 51. In light of this
conclusion, the district court reasoned that the UTC Plan had failed to fulfill its
obligation under ERISA "to provide accurate and comprehensible information
to employees." Id. at 52. Echoing a well-established proposition, the district
court then held that "when the SPD conflicts with the terms of the plan, the
SPD controls ... the determination of Plaintiff's rights under the Plan." Id. at 5152; see Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir.1990)(ERISA
"contemplates that the summary will be an employee's primary source of
information regarding employment benefits, and employees are entitled to rely
on descriptions ... in the summary. To allow the Plan to contain different terms
that supersede the terms of the Booklet [SPD] would defeat the purpose of
providing ... summaries.").1
18
19
Though the district court agreed with plaintiff in finding that the SPD
conflicted with the UTC Plan, and that the Committee's determination was
arbitrary and capricious, as indicated, it denied him recovery by holding that he
failed to show that he relied on the SPD's inconsistent language to his
detriment. See Moriarity, 947 F.Supp. at 52. Accordingly, the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the UTC Plan. This appeal by plaintiff
followed.
Discussion
20
Although, as the district court noted, the SPD here does not explicitly state that
disability benefits are not available to employees who become disabled after
they leave UTC, no other reading of the SPD is plausible. There is nothing in
the SPD's language, structure or printed layout that could reasonably lead a
participant to believe that benefits continue to be available to an employee for a
disability that develops after he or she leaves UTC. First, the SPD's discussion
of vested benefits specifically refers only to retirement benefits. It states that
"you are entitled--beginning at your normal retirement date--to income from the
plan." It is difficult to see how this language could be interpreted by a UTC
employee as referring to disability benefits, which are discussed in a completely
separate section of the SPD, entitled "Disability Pension." This section
immediately precedes the "Vested Rights" section on the same page in which
retirement benefits are discussed.
21
Second, as plaintiff reads the SPD, once he worked ten years for UTC, he
became entitled to benefits for any disability that arose after he quit UTC and
even if he went to work at a different company for the next twenty years. An
average plan participant reading this SPD could not credibly come away
believing that, if he left UTC and was subsequently found disabled, he was
entitled to a lifetime's worth of long-term disability benefits from UTC.
Although we are not required to do so, we would strain to avoid such a
preposterous result. We, therefore, conclude that even under a de novo review,
the Committee's interpretation of the SPD is the correct one and that it does not
permit plaintiff to receive benefits for a claim based on a disability that
developed years after his employment with UTC terminated.
Conclusion
22
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Defendant's cross-appeal is dismissed as moot.
TRAGER, District Judge, Concurring:
23
I join the Per Curiam opinion, but I think it important to note an issue not
adequately addressed by defendant's alternative argument that forms the basis
for the per curiam's affirmance.
24
25
In Firestone, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the appropriate standard
for reviewing a plan administrator's interpretation of a plan. The Court held that
a "denial of benefits ... is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S.Ct. 948. Subsequent cases in this Circuit
make clear that, in such a case, the appropriate standard of review is whether
the plan administrator's decision is "arbitrary and capricious." See Pagan v.
NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir.1995)(and cases cited therein).
In light of these holdings, and the provisions both in the UTC plan and SPD
granting the Committee authority to interpret "the Plan," the Committee argues
that its decision should be considered under a deferential standard of review,
The present case, however, does not turn on the Committee's interpretation of
the UTC Plan, but rather on its interpretation of the SPD. Under ERISA 1022,
employees are entitled to use and rely on an SPD, in lieu of the full plan, as
their main source of benefits information. The statute states that the SPD is to
be
27
written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and
shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.
28
29
On the other hand, an argument could be made that the trustees' interpretation
of the SPD ought to control. That is, if the rule were that an employee is
entitled to rely on his reasonable interpretation of the SPD, even if another
reasonable or perhaps more reasonable--and ipso facto non-arbitrary and
capricious--interpretation is posited by the plan administrator, the administrator
would be encouraged to close any potential loopholes or ambiguities in the
SPD. As a result, the SPD would become more complex, longer and inevitably
more difficult to understand, thereby undermining Congress's goal of having
SPD's that the average employee can comprehend.
30
In the present case, there is no need to resolve this issue because, assuming the
Committee's interpretation of the SPD is subject to a de novo review, the SPD
here cannot reasonably be interpreted as plaintiff contends.
The Honorable David G. Trager, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of New York, sitting by designation
See also Aiken v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th
Cir.1993) ("under controlling precedent in this Circuit, representations in a SPD
control over inconsistent provisions in an official plan document"); Hansen v.
Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir.1991) ("Like the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, this Court holds ... that if there is a conflict between the
summary plan description and the terms of the policy, the summary plan
description shall govern."); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851
F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir.1988) ("This Circuit has decided that statements in a
summary plan are binding and if such statements conflict with those in the plan
itself, the summary shall govern."); McKnight v. Southern Life & Health Ins.
Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir.1985) (defendant "asserts that if a conflict
arose between the plan and the summary, the plan should prevail. Such an
assertion defeats the purpose of the summary. It is of no effect to publish and
distribute a plan summary booklet designed to simplify and explain a
voluminous and complex document, and then proclaim that any inconsistencies
will be governed by the plan.")
Cases holding that in the event of a conflict between an SPD and a plan, the
former controls, implicitly rest on the idea that participants are entitled to rely
on the SPD, despite the terms of the plan. See Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co.,
940 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1991)("Any other rule would be, as Congress
recognized, grossly unfair to employees and would undermine ERISA's
requirement of an accurate and comprehensive summary.")