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3d 691
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, Gleeson, J.
John Boston, Legal Aid Society, Prisoners' Rights Project, New York,
N.Y. (Daniel L. Greenberg and Mary Lynne Werlwas, on the brief), for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
F. Franklin Amanat, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for Roslynn R. Mauskopf,
U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Deborah B.
Zwany, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CALABRESI and SACK, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY, District
Judge.1
CALABRESI, Circuit Judge.
Johnson appealed, and his suit was argued alongside several other cases
concerning the nature and scope of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.2 For
the following reasons, we vacate the district court's dismissal of Johnson's
complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
3
The MDC, where Johnson was incarcerated during the period relevant to this
appeal, is a facility operated by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). The BOP
provides prisoners a grievance procedure applicable to confinement-related
issues. The procedure is called the Administrative Remedy Program ("ARP"),
and consists of up to four steps, depending upon the circumstances. In some
cases, the inmate is required to seek informal resolution of his complaint. Then,
if the matter is not resolved, he must file an Administrative Remedy Request at
his facility within twenty days of the incident. If the inmate is not satisfied with
the facility's reply, he may file a Regional Appeal to the BOP's Regional
Director within twenty days of the warden's response. In some situations,
including those involving "sensitive subjects," appeals from disciplinary
proceedings, and other specified matters, the inmate may begin the process
with a Regional Appeal. In all cases, if the prisoner is not satisfied with the
Regional Director's resolution of the matter, he may appeal to the Central
Office, within thirty days. "At all stages of the ARP, prison staff must inform
the inmate in writing of the appropriate administrative procedure if the Request
or Appeal is not acceptable under the Administrative Remedy Program." See 28
C.F.R. 542 (1998).
B. Facts and Procedural History
Johnson's allegations are set forth in his original complaint, as well as his First
and Second Amended Complaints. We recount the facts as described in those
three pleadings.
1. Johnson's Claim against Testman
Johnson alleges that he was in the MDC barber shop with other inmates when
one of the barbers asked Johnson to demonstrate a type of haircut called the
"Fadeout." Defendant Corrections Officer ("CO") Testman saw Johnson using
the hair clippers, asked Johnson what he was doing with them, and after hearing
his reply, told the inmates that he was terminating barber shop services for the
day because of Johnson's use of the clippers. When inmate Elio Franco asked
why he couldn't get a haircut, Testman allegedly told him it was due to
Johnson's unauthorized use of the clippers, and that if Franco "ha[d] a problem
with not being able to get a haircut," he should "take it up with Johnson."
Franco said "yea, O.K.," and left the area. Shortly thereafter, as Johnson was
walking down a hallway, he was attacked by Franco, who plunged a tile cutter
into Johnson's neck and slashed his face and upper torso. Johnson claims the
attack caused him serious injuries to his face, neck, and upper torso, as well as
"emotional damage."
7
After the assault, Johnson received a disciplinary infraction for "fighting with
another person," and was placed in administrative detention in the Special
Housing Unit (SHU) while he awaited a hearing. At the hearing, Johnson
described the circumstances surrounding the attack, including Testman's
alleged comment to Franco. Nevertheless based on the incident report, his
own statement, and Franco's statement Johnson was found guilty of the
infraction, and was sentenced to an additional 21 days in the SHU, the loss of
30 days of "good conduct" time, and a year's loss of visiting and commissary
privileges.
his request. Johnson remained rear-cuffed for seven hours, and suffered severe
pain in his shoulder and back, for which he was treated by the on-duty
physician.
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he did not appeal to the Office of General Counsel; (3) whether James waived
the affirmative defense of exhaustion by failing to raise that defense in his
motion papers; and (4) whether the PLRA compels a rule of total exhaustion.4
II. Discussion
13
14
15
At a hearing before the district court, defense counsel stated, "[W]e are not
arguing exhaustion as to [Johnson's claim against James] for the following
reason, we do believe that the exhaustion requirement does apply even to that
handcuffing incident or at least that it may well apply; however, we have not
asserted it in our papers because we believe that there may well be a question of
fact as to whether the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with
regard to that claim.... [W]e chose not to press it at this juncture[,] reserving the
right to do so in the future if need be."5 Later in the proceedings, the judge said,
"you're not claiming exhaustion on James," and counsel replied, "I don't,
correct." The government now argues that because the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement did not apply to excessive force claims at the time of the hearing
on the defendants' motion to dismiss, they should not now be prevented from
invoking 1997e(a). This argument is unavailing.
16
First, defense counsel's statement at the district court hearing belies the notion
that the government declined to rely on 1997e(a) because of a belief that it
was inapplicable to Johnson's claim against James. In fact, the government's
statement at the hearing specifically referred not to doubts about the legal
viability of the non-exhaustion defense, but rather to "a question of fact" as to
whether the plaintiff had exhausted his remedies with respect to the claim
against James. Hence, it is clear that the government did not wish to rely on any
argument that could not be decided in its favor as a matter of law. Further, and
18
In Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 2004 WL 1842652, we today concluded that
New York Department of Correctional Services ("NY DOCS") regulations
governing grievance procedures were unclear. We held that, in the particular
circumstances of that case, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have raised his
complaints through the disciplinary appeals process rather than by filing a
separate grievance. In Hemphill v. New York Dep't of Corr. Servs., 380 F.3d
680, 2004 WL 1842658, also decided today, we remanded the case to the
district court so that it might consider, inter alia, whether the allegedly
confusing nature of N.Y. DOCS regulations justified the plaintiff's failure to
file a grievance in the manner that DOCS officials now prescribe. Here,
Johnson contends that because under BOP regulations the appellate process for
disciplinary rulings and for grievances is one and the same, he reasonably
believed that raising his complaints during his disciplinary appeal sufficed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies.
19
determine how best to deal with this argument, we must ask whether Johnson's
submissions in the disciplinary process were sufficient, in a substantive sense,
to exhaust his remedies under 1997e(a).
20
21
22
Here, the plaintiff's initial answer in his disciplinary proceeding did not mention
Testman or his remark to Franco. In Johnson's regional appeal, however, in the
course of arguing that the altercation with Franco was not Johnson's fault,
Johnson described Testman's statement to Franco that "if you have a problem
with it take it up with Johnson." Johnson's Central Office appeal included a
similar description. But prison officials' responses to Johnson's appeals do not
indicate that the officials considered Johnson's disciplinary appeal to be a
complaint about Testman's conduct. And the defendants argue that Johnson's
passing references to Testman's remark afforded prison authorities no way of
knowing that Johnson believed Testman was culpable for inciting Franco's
assault. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that his submissions clearly
described Testman's conduct, and that prison officials had all the information
necessary to launch an investigation into whether Testman had provoked
Franco to attack the plaintiff.
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The defendants contend that both Testman and James are entitled to qualified
immunity from Johnson's suit against them. For substantially the reasons stated
orally by the district court in its denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds,6 we agree that qualified immunity is not
appropriate at this time.
III. Conclusion
26
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes:
1
The Honorable William H. Pauley III, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation
These cases wereGiano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 680, 2004 WL 1842652; Hemphill
v. State of New York, 380 F.3d 670, 2004 WL 1842658; Abney v. New York
Dep't of Corr. Servs., 380 F.3d 649, 2004 WL 1842647; and Ortiz v. McBride,
While, as noted above, Johnson had originally sued various other defendants
and had also brought state law claims, all these suits and claims were
withdrawn by him
We have held today, inOrtiz v. McBride, 2004 WL 1842644, that a rule of total
exhaustion is not required by the PLRA, and that exhausted claims may be
allowed to proceed while unexhausted claims are dismissed.
It is not clear what the government meant by the last clause of this sentence.
Perhaps it sought to win on the merits, but if and only if it lost on the
merits, to be able to argue for a dismissal without prejudice on non-exhaustion
grounds. But this it could not do. In any event, once the government chose not
to argue exhaustion to the district court at the summary judgment stage, it
forfeited the right to raise the issue before this court on appeal