Arab-Zionist Entente 1913-1914

Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-1914
Author(s): Neville Mandel

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Apr., 1965), pp. 238-267
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-19141

Neville Mandel
(1)
At the beginning of April 1913, Salim Najjar, a Syrian Arab
journalist, wrote from Cairo to Sami Hochberg, editor of Le JeunleTurc in Constantinople. Salim Najjar was a member of the Arab
nationalist "Decentralisation Party"; and Sami Hochberg was a Jew
who was closely associated with members of the Zionist Executive,
since his newspaper, Le Jeune-Turc, was subsidised by Zionist funds.
Najjar had worked on the staff of this paper and thus knew Hochberg well. In his letter he told Hochberg:
"Votre interet vous oblige de montrer d'accord avec nous la main

dans la main dans la politique de decentralisation. Autrement
vous tournerez les chretiens et les musulmans de Syrie contre vos
coreligionnaires. Je vous dis cela en ami et en ami sincere.

Repetez-le au Dr. Jacobson. Le passage du comite [de la decen-
tralisation] au pouvoir est trop court et vous serez oblige 'a la fin
de travailler avec nous. Ne faut-il pas commencer des maintenant?
... Etudiez la situation et tracez votre ligne de conduite. C'est le
moment de prevoir les evenements. Si vous decidez sincerement
pour une entente entre nous, indiquez-moi ici (Caire) le repre-
sentant autorise des Sionistes pour nous mettre en contact avec
lui."2
The opening sentence in this extract referred to Hochberg's connec-
tion with the Zionist Movement and "Dr. Jacobson", to whom

Najjar requested the contents of his letter be repeated, was the
principal Zionist representative in Constantinople as well as being

a member of the Zionist Executive ("Smaller Actions Committee").
238
Najjar's letter to Hochberg was no less than an invitation to the

Zionist Movement to make an entente with the Decentralisation
Party.
(2)
By 1913, educated Arabs in Palestine and surrounding territories
were familiar with the aims of the Zionist Movement and were
fully aware of the implications of these aims. Over the past thirty
years the Jewish population of Palestine had greatly increased. At
the beginning of the 1880's, there had been approximately 23,000

Jews in Palestine; they lived, with few exceptions, in the four "Holy
Cities" of Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safed. During the three
decades after the first major pogroms in Russia-i.e. from 1882 to
1913-more than 100,000 Jews entered Palestine. Of these, over half

departed again after a short while because of difficult local con-
ditions and measures taken by the Ottoman authorities who, disapproving strongly of the influx from the outset, had imposed
restrictions on Jews reaching Palestine designed to prevent them
from settling there. The net increase by immigration was therefore

in the region of 50,000 which, when combined with natural growth,
brought Palestine's Jewish population up to some 85,000 souls in
1913, representing about 12% of the total population in the country.
Many of the immigrants who settled in Palestine during these years
were devout Jews who still came to join the old, pious communities
as before. But rather more than half of those who remained were
determined young men, belonging to the Zionist Movement or to
its forerunner, the "Lovers of Zion" Movement. As Jewish nationa-
lists, they were dedicated to rebuilding what they considered to be

their nation's patrimony, the land of Palestine.3 In 1913 they perhaps numbered 35,000; about 12,000 of them lived on over forty
agricultural settlements which had been established throughout the

country, whilst the remainder were not confined to the four "Holy
Cities" but were also to be found in fair numbers in Jaffa and Haifa.
The Arabs of Palestine could not be blind to their activities; those
who had contact with the newcomers reacted immediately and in
most cases negatively.' Over the years, suspicion of and antipathy

for the Jewish settlers had grown among the fellaheen who only
gradually reconciled themselves to the presence of the Jewish settlements in their midst. In the towns Arab tradesmen and artisans were
apprehensive and resentful of the competition created by the influx
of Jews. On a more sophisticated level, educated Arabs could not
239
be deaf to the endless statements made by Zionist leaders abroad

concerning Jewish ambitions in Palestine. These were frequently
reproduced in the Arabic press and by 1913, despite official Zionist
declarations to the contrary, Arab leaders in Palestine and elsewhere

were convinced that the sole object of the Zionist Movement was to
establish a Jewish state which, centred in Palestine, might even
extend as far as Iraq. These leaders voiced their fears in the Ottoman Parliament, while editors of newspapers in Palestine as well as
in Beirut, Damascus and Cairo worked out and broadcast-often
with considerable vehemence-Arab objections to Jewish activities
in Palestine. In the midst of this antagonism towards the Jewish
settlers in Palestine it can reasonably be asked how the Decentralisation Party could ever contemplate an entente with the Zionists at
all.
In 1913, Arabs who were active members of nationalist societies

were in no way typical of the Arab masses and, what is more
relevant, probably little typical of most Arab leaders and notables

as well. Ernest Dawn, in his article on "The Rise of Arabism in
Syria", estimates that al-Fatat, al-'Ahd and the Decentralisation
Party had, between them, only 126 known members by October

1914 and that even this number may be too large by 30.5 Of Dawn's
126 active nationalists, only 22 were definitely Palestinians; if the 30
"doubtfuls" are disallowed, then out of the reduced figure of 96,
just 12 were Palestinians. This is significant, because it means that
the vast majority of all active Arab nationalists at this time had had
little or no direct contact with Zionist settlers in Palestine. It may
be conjectured that in spring 1913 members of the Decentralisation

Party comprised, at the most, one third of Dawn's 126 nationalists
in October 1914; it was from this tiny, untypical but important,
group that the suggestion of an entente with the Zionists emerged.
It is known that before World War I representatives of various

Arab Nationalist societies made a number of approaches in different
directions in search of allies or support for their cause. Shukri
Effendi al-'Asali, a member of al-Qahtaniyya, accompanied by Dr.

Ayyub Effendi Thabit, made approaches to Egyptian nationalists in
1911 6 Druse and Muslims from the Lebanon and Damascus solicited the British Consul-General in Beirut for his country's support
in their "struggle against the Turks" in the winter of 1912, while
at the same time Syrian Muslims visited Lord Kitchener, the High
Commissioner in Egypt, "petitioning Great Britain to annex Syria to
Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration".7 The Arab

240
contacts with the Zionists which began the following spring must
also be viewed within the context of the nationalists' search for allies
against the Turks.
The Zionists had always argued that Jewish immigration into

Palestine could only benefit the local population in particular and
the Ottoman Empire in general, since the Jews would provide the
manpower, capital and techniques necessary for the advancement of
Palestine. Herzl and other Zionist leaders after him had claimed that
they commanded immense funds and that they had influence in the
most important of European newspapers. There is considerable
evidence to show that the Arabs accepted these Zionist claims:
indeed, most politically aware Arabs regarded Zionism as a threat
precisely because they feared its imagined power, while the Decen-
tralisation Party, on the other hand, entertained the idea of allying

itself with that power and thus exploiting it to its own advantage.
Rashid Rida, the most respected Muslim thinker of the time, was
a founder-member of the Decentralisation Party. It was he, perhaps,
who did most to prepare the ground for a liaison with the Zionists
by providing an intellectual, Islamic, rationale for it. In September
191 1, Rida published an article in al-Manar which reflected his conviction that it was necessary to strengthen Dar al-Islam to meet the
challenge of a technically superior Europe.8 In the course of this
article, Rida defined the nature of the "Zionist danger", as he saw it.
He argued that the Syrians required large agricultural, industrial and

commercial projects to develop their land ("bilad"). To this end, the
Syrians were not only greatly in need of European finance, but they
also had to come in contact with and work alongside Europeans in
order to learn all kinds of technical skills from them. Rida referred
the Syrians to the example of Egypt which had progressed markedly
through European investment. He then applied a syllogistic form
of argument to his thesis: his major premise was as stated-Syria
needed development for which capital was required; his minor pre-
mise was that Jews controlled European finance. These premises

yield the conclusion that the Syrians must be prepared to accept aid
from Jews. Rida held that the alternative-to reject this aid and to
do without development-meant poverty and ruin. The "Zionist
danger" was, he believed, confined to one thing: namely, the
Zionists' "taking possession of the Holy Land". Everyone, within
whose power it was to make the Ottoman Government prevent this,
was duty-bound to do so as vigorously as possible. The danger in
employing foreign capital, Jewish or otherwise, was two-fold: first,
241
the local population and the Government could be drowned in
debts; and, second, foreigners could gain a hold on the country
("bilad") by acquiring most or much of its land ("ard"). But, if the

Zionist danger and the dangers inherent in foreign capital could be
overcome, Rida saw no objection to calling on Jewish capital. And,
given his theory that, in addition to European capital, the Syrians
required to work alongside Europeans in order to learn from them,

it was not too long a step for Rida to reconcile himself to the
Zionists' presence in Palestine-on condition, of course, that they
could be prevented from taking over the country. Rida worked out
this corollary to his original argument over the next eighteen months
and, by his own admission, came to the conclusion in spring 1913
that it was necessary for the Arabs to make a compact with the
Zionists.9
(3)
In February 1913, an anti-Zionist polemic was being conducted
in al-Ahram, the large Cairo daily. An anonymous writer alleged
that the Committee of Union and Progress (the "CUP") had, since
coming to power in the Ottoman Empire, continually relied on
support from Freemasons and Zionists, because it was in need of
the Jews' money.'0 This was a groundless charge which had been
levelled against the CUP by many of its opponents since the summer
of 1909."1 In this case, the charge was answered in al-Muqattam by

an Egyptian Jew, Robert Ghazi, under the pseudonym of "Tantawi".
On February 19th, the anonymous writer of the first article in alAhram rejected Ghazi's rejoinder and claimed, falsely, that the CUP
and the Zionists were in league; equally false were his claims that
in the new Cabinet which had been formed after Enver Bey's coup
d'e'tat of January 23rd there were two ministers who served the
Zionists' interests, that the Jews controlled the finances, economy
and agriculture of the Empire and that all commercial concessions
and loans were made to or by Jews, through Jews, and to the advantage of Jews. The Zionists, he wrote, had gained concessions from
the Government and had gone ahead with their schemes "without
the consent of the Syrians in particular and the Arabs in general".
Accordingly, "[Arab] hatred of the Zionists takes birth from today;
[it is a] hatred which will fight with all means against the interests of
Zionism to annul its achievements and to destroy its hopes for the
future". The writer counselled the Zionists to try to secure the
Arabs' assent for their activities and "to take into account the
242
friendship of one's neighbour [i.e. the Arabs] which is preferable to

that of the distant stranger [i.e. the Turks]".'2 The editor of alAhram, Da'ud Barakat, was a member of the Decentralisation
Party; he added a postscript to this article in which he declared:
"It is certain that the Syrians do not find it at all inconvenient to

have their Jewish brethren as neighbours and to live among them;
but what is reprehensible is that an agreement has been made
about their land without their knowledge or consent. It is absolutely necessary that an entente be made between the Zionists
and Arabs, because this war of words can only do evil. The
Zionists are necessary for the country: the money which they
will bring, their knowledge and intelligence, and the industriousness which characterises them will contribute without doubt to
the regeneration of the country.""
On February 21st, Robert Ghazi answered this article directly in
al-Ahram with the retort that all the hostility between the Zionists
and the Arabs emanated from the latter; he therefore counselled the
writer to secure the friendship of the Arabs for the Jews. Four days
later, Haqqi Bey al-'Azm, the Secretary of the Decentralisation
Party, joined in the polemic. He denied that all Syrians were
opposed to the Zionists; the Syrians knew that their land required
capital and energy for its advancement and that the Jews were best
suited for this object. The opposition to the Jewish settlers on the
part of Syrian and Palestinian Arabs was the result of two causes:
first, most of the Jewish immigrants retained their foreign nationality after settling in Palestine or merely posed as Ottoman subjects;
and, second, the immigrants and many native Ottoman Jews had
supported the CUP and its ruinous policies. The Arabs, wrote Haqqi
Bey, were prepared to open their country to the Jews on condition
that (i) they adopted the Arabic language; (ii) they were not economically exclusive; (iii) they became true Ottoman subjects; (iv) they
eschewed politics; and (v) they took into account the Arab nation
"which today or tomorrow is bound to rise again"-otherwise, "a

page of Arab history will be sullied by the deeds they will per-
petrate against the Jews".'4 Then, about one month later, Salim
Najjar sent Sami Hochberg the letter quoted at the beginning of this
paper, officially inviting the Zionists to make an entente with the
Decentralisation Party. And shortly thereafter an Egyptian Zionist
reported from Cairo that Da'ud Barakat had furnished him with
the names of delegates who would attend the "First Arab Congress"
(to be held in Paris that summer), since it was probable that some
243
of them would try to have discussions with Zionists in Paris with a

view to making an entente."
(4)
Hochberg did as Najjar had requested and repeated the contents
of his letter to Dr. Jacobson, who relayed Najjar's proposal to the
Zionist head office in Berlin with the suggestion that Hochberg be

dispatched forthwith to Cairo and perhaps to Beirut as well. Jacobson recommended Hochberg for a number of reasons: since he held
no official position in the Zionist Movement, any initial contacts
which he might make could not be regarded as "too official"; as the

editor of an important daily in Constantinople, he was well-con-
nected with Ottoman politicians of all shades of opinion and therefore had easy access to all groups; he had lived in Palestine for a
long time and knew the Arabs and their language well.'6 This suggestion was accepted without delay by the Zionist head office. As a
result, Hochberg arrived in Cairo at the end of April; from there he
travelled to Beirut, where he met members of the "Reform Com-
mittee"; and then, his task completed, he returned to Constantinople

in the middle of May.
In his report on his mission Hochberg stated that he met twenty
members of Decentralisation Party and the Beirut Reform Com-
mittee.' He mentioned only four of them by name: of the Decentralisation Party, Rafiq Bey al-'Azm (President) and Salim Najjar; of
the Beirut Reform Committee, Ahmad Effendi Mukhtar Bayhum
Bey (who arrived in Cairo at the same timne as Hochberg) and, in

Beirut, Rizq Allah Effendi Arqash. Later evidence shows that in
Cairo Hochberg also met Iskandar Bey 'Ammun and Haqqi Bey al'Azm (respectively Vice-President and Secretary of the Decentralisa-
tion Party) and, in Beirut, Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah (editor of
al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani). Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed

that in Cairo Hochberg talked to Da'ud Barakat-as the first public
advocate of an Arab-Zionist entente-and to Khalil Effendi
Zayniyyah (a member of the Beirut Reform Committee who came

to Cairo with Ahmad Bayhum). Thus a possible total of nine out of
the twenty Arabs whom Hochberg met can be identified, leaving
elev-en unknown.
Regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine Hochberg reported
that there was "anxiety or at least uncertainty".'8 But since no official

position had been adopted as yet by either the Decentralisation Party
244
or the Beirut Reform Committee, Hochberg found that everyone

whom he talked to still adhered to his own personal views. Four dis-
cernible attitudes could be recognised. To Hochberg's surprise those

most favourably inclined towards Jewish immigration were Arab
Christians, who explained that they were a minority group in Syria
and, in addition to the economic arguments in favour of Jewish
immigration, they welcomed the influx of Jews because it would help
to counterbalance the superior numbers of Muslims in the area. Indeed, according to Hochberg, some of them went so far as to say:
"Nous voudrions meme que les israelites formassent en Palestine

la majorite et reussissent a y former une autonomie israelite pro-
prement dite qui tiendrait en deux cette masse compacte musuI-
mane qui peuple les vastes contrees contigues telle que la Mesopatamie, la Syrie, l'Egypte, le Hedjaz et le Yemen. "19
The second and third attitudes were those of Muslims-some of

whom were willing to accept Jewish immigration without reserva-
tion, while others would only agree to it on certain conditions. The

latter wished, for example, to fix the number of immigrants annually,
to limit the extent of land that Arab peasants were entitled to sell
to the immigrants so that the peasant could never be wholly dispossessed, and to impose immigration legislation similar to that in
America whereby every immigrant was required to bring with him
a certain sum of money so that he would not become a burden on
the country. Of the twenty nationalists whom Hochberg met, only

two-both Muslims-declared themselves opposed to Jewish immigration. Their position was the converse of that of the Christians
who welcomed the Jewish immigrants enthusiastically; these two
Muslims were opposed just because the Jews represented a European

element which would break the compact Arab mass whose force derived from the very unity of its language and customs. Some of those
who favoured Jewish immigration entertained doubts of another
kind, for they felt that discussions with the Zionists ought not take
place before the Arab movement had consolidated itself, lest the
movement's leaders should play into the hands of their enemies,
especially the CUP, who might accuse them (as they had previously
accused the CUP) of "selling the country to the Jews".
Hochberg gained the impression that a majority within both Arab
nationalist groups in Cairo and Beirut wished to make an entente
with the Zionists. He indicated to them that the Zionists would pro-
bably be unwilling to enter into such an arrangement unless the

Arabs integrated Zionist demands into their programme, since it was
245
-natural and logical" that the Zionists would not be eager "to con-
tribute to the formation of a force which could turn itself against
them". In any event it was recognised that no entente could be made

until the First Arab Congress was held in June, since any agreement
would require a special meeting of all Arab nationalist groups in
Syria and Palestine which could only be convened after this Congress. In the meantime, however, the following entente verbale was
made between the Decentralislation Party and Hochberg:
"1) Le Comite du Caire etant en principe favorable 'a l'immigration juive en Syrie et en Palestine et a une entente avec les
sionistes se fera un devoir de travailler pour un rapprochement du
monde arabe avec le monde israelite et de dissiper par sa propa-
gande orale et par la voie de la presse arabe tous les prejuges qui
avaient jusqu'ici cours dans le monde arabe au sujet de l'immigration juive et qui empechaient le rapprochement arabo-israelite.
"2) En echange 'Le Jeune Turc' se fera un devoir d'appuyer la

cause du mouvement arabe tant qu'elle demeurera compatible
avec l'unite et l'integrite de l'Empire. 'Le Jeune Turc' fera tout

son possible pour que les journaux europeens (surtout allemands)
avec lesquels il est en relations en fassent de meme."20
Hochberg reported that both parties regarded this entente verbale as
an "exchange of services" to prepare the ground and, especially, to

attune Arab public opinion for an accord complet in the future.
Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, the President of the Decentralisaltion Party,

prepared a special statement for the press, in which he declared that
"we appreciate too well the precious combination which Jewish
capital, manpower and intelligence can bring us for the rapid
development of our provinces to commit the error of refusing

them". Immigration legislation would, he thought, be necessary,
but not along the lines of the "exceptional measures" which had
been prescribed under Abdulhamid and which-in theory, at leastwere still in force. Salim Najjar, for his part, undertook to write a
series of articles on the subject of an Arab-Zionist entente which
would appear in the Arabic press under the signatures of various
members of the Decentralisation Party.
As has been mentioned, Ahmad Bayhum, a prominent member of
the Beirut Committee, had come to Cairo at the same time as Hochberg. He took part in the discussions there and then directed Hochberg to Beirut where the entente verbale between himself and the
Decentralisation Party was accepted by the Reform Committee as
well. Rizq Allah Effendi Arqash, a member of that Committee,
246
also prepared a statement for the press in which he, like Rafiq Bey
al-'Azm, stressed the advantages to be gained from the Jews' capital,
culture and technical abilities.2"
In May and June the parties to the entente verbale took the first
steps to implement it. The Decentralisation Party had passed a
resolution on April 30th (while Hochberg was in Cairo), assuring
Ottoman Jews of equal rights in a decentralised administration.
Nissim Malul, a Jewish member of the Decentralisation Party who
was al-Muqattam's correspondent in Jaffa, incorporated this resolution and the statements prepared by both Rafiq Bey al-'Azm and
Rizq Allah Effendi Arqash into four long articles about Arab
demands which he published in ha-Herut (the newspaper of Arabic-
speaking Jews in Palestine)."2 After returning to Constantinople,

Hochberg published a series of leading articles in Le Jeune-Turc
entitled "Les reformes dans les provinces arabes"."3 Like Malul, he
too incorporated the statements by Rafiq Bey and Rizq Allah

Effendi into his articles. He also printed a further statement made b
Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah in Beirut guaranteeing the rights of
Ottoman Jews according to the Reform Committee's programme.
The Arab nationalists began to do as they had promised as well. In
June, ha-Herut noted that the statements prepared in Cairo and
Beirut had been published in al-Sha'b (Cairo?) and al-Islah (which

had begun to appear in Beirut in May under the editorship of
Ahmad Tabbarah).Y' And in July, the Zionist Office in Jaffa, which
read the Arabic press closely, reported that the tone of articles in
this press on the Zionist issue had recently become noticeably more
moderate.25
(5)
The First Arab Congress was held in Paris in June 1913. It was
attended officially by twenty-four delegates and unofficially by a
larger number who remained in the background. One of these latter
was Sami Hochberg who arrived in Paris some ten days before the
Congress opened. On the agenda was an item called "Immigration

from and to Syria". Hochberg discovered that almost all the delegates were opposed to the Turkish immigrants whom the Central
Government wished to introduce into the Arab provinces, while on

the question of Jewish immigrants the delegates variously retained
the four attitudes he had encountered in Cairo and Beirut.2" Iskandar
Bey 'Ammun, the Vice-President of the Decentralisation Party,
247
spoke with 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, the Chairman of the Congress, about Jewish immigration into Palestine and won his support
for it. Before the Congress began, al-Zahrawi assured Hochberg that
in his opinion Jewish immigration was not only desirable but necessary as well.27
Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah was to make the major speech on the
immigration issue. Hochberg reported that at first Tabbarah had

shown himself "a little hostile", but he "has now changed his
opinion". In any event, wrote Hochberg, the Zionists had nothing to
fear because the commission at which Tabbarah's speech was to be

prepared would eliminate anything that could be considered un-
favourable to Jewish immigration.28 In the plenary session on

June 21st, Tabbarah discreetly avoided all direct mention of Jewish
immigration, preferring instead to adopt a somewhat ambiguous
position. People, he said, were divided into two schools of thought

as regards the immigration to Syria. One group was apprehensive
about this immigration, fearing its possible effects on the local population; the other group did not share these fears but, on the contrary,
held that the immigration was a gain to Syria. As for himself,
Tabbarah felt that there could be no harm in the immigration-"if

it has a special form of organisation ["nizam khass"]".29
A resolution was proposed in favour of such immigration as was

capable of benefiting Syria economically. In the discussion which
followed Khayr Allah Effendi Khayr Allah, a delegate representing

the Arabs in Paris, spoke against Turkish immigration and said that
only an immigration of people of means could be useful to the Arab
provinces. At this, Ahmad Bayhum exclaimed "Jewish immigration: yes; but Turkish immigration: no!".30 There were some mur-
murs from the Arab students who had assisted in organising the
Congress, but none spoke out against this remark. All the speakers,
however, concurred with Khayr Allah Effendi in opposing Turkish

immigration. Since the executive of the Congress wished to avoid
any pronouncements liable to anger the Ottoman Government, alZahrawi, as Chairman, thought it wisest to close the discussion at
this point and thus the resolution, which might have been amended
to deplore Turkish immigration, was dropped.3'
Two days after the Congress, 'Abd al-Karim Effendi al-Khalil,
leader of the Arab nationalist group in Constantinople, came to
Paris with the draft of an agreement made between himself, on behalf of the Arabs, and Talat Bey, on behalf of the Government.
Representatives of the Government were expected in Paris within
248
two or three days to discuss this agreement in detail and Hochberg

was sure that it would be accepted. Al-Zahrawi and 'Abd al-Karim
Effendi informed Hochberg that they were of the opinion that an
official entente should also be made with the Zionists.32 A day later,
on June 26th, al-Zahrawi told Hochberg that he and his colleagues

believed that Jewish immigration should be encouraged on two con-
ditions: (i) the immigrants become Ottoman subjects and (ii) Arab
peasants were not displaced from land sold to Jews.33 However,
"adversaries" of Jewish immigration had conducted a campaign
against Zionism.34 The nationalists in Paris wished either "to win
over these adversaries by persuasion or to impose their views in the

matter". Attempts at suasion could be initiated immediately through
the Arabic press but nothing could be imposed until the nationalist
leaders enjoyed genuine authority in the Arab world; this would not
be theirs before the Ottoman Government began to fulfil the Arabs'
demands thanks to their efforts. They preferred at this stage to make

a secret entente with Hochberg, since they believed that it would be
injudicious for Zionist leaders to come to Paris to conclude an
official entente, which would quickly become public-knowledge and

so might prejudice both the Arab and Zionist causes. Hochberg
therefore wrote to Dr. Jacobson who was then in Berlin asking for
instructions and for a minimum programme of Zionist demands to

serve as a basis for the proposed secret entente.3"
Whilst awaiting a reply, Hochber, obtained a statement from
Al-Zahrawi in the form of an interview for Le Jeune-Turc. Al-
Zahrawi associated himself with the published statements made by

Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, Rizq Allah Effendi Arqash and Shaykh Ahmad
Tabbarah concerning Jewish immigration. He then declared:
"Au cours de ce congres j'ai lance une nouvelle formule qui a

eu beaucoup de succes, parce qu'elle s'accordait parfaitement avec
la mentalite et l'etat d'esprit des congressistes, a savoir:
'Les Juifs du monde entier ne sont que des emigres syriens, a

l'instar des emigres syriens chretiens qui se trouvent en Amerique,
a Paris et ailleurs. Comme ceux-ci, ceux-la aussi ont la nostalgie

de leur pays natal.'
"Nous sommes meme siurs que nos freres israelites du monde

entier sauront nous preter leur concours tant pour faire triompher
notre cause commune que pour le relevement materiel et moral de
notre pays commun."36

249
This statement appeared in Le Jeune-Turc (which had temporarily changed its name to L'Union) on July 16th.
Dr. Jacobson, considering it inappropriate for Hochberg, who

held no official brief for the Zionist Movement, to make a secret
entente with the Arab nationalists, hastened to Paris himself, where
he conferred with Hochberg on June 28th. Thereupon he reported
to the Zionist Executive that an entente with the Arabs would probably not be discussed; instead, he hoped merely to obtain declarations from the most important Arab leaders present in Paris which
could be used by the Zionist office in Constantinople to influence the
Ottoman Government to relax the restrictions on Jewish settlement

and land purchases in Palestine.3" He also mentioned that he was to
meet al-Zahrawi and Ahmad Bayhum on June 30th or July 1st; and
although no account of this meeting has been found, it is clear in the
light of later events that Jacobson did not succeed in obtaining the
declarations he desired. The draft agreement between the Govern-
ment and the Arabs which 'Abd al-Karim Effendi al-Khalil had
brought from Constantinople had been accepted in principle and, it
would appear, the Arabs in Paris were now unwilling to commit
themselves to more than had already been said to Hochberg.
(6)
Parallel to this liaison with Arab nationalist leaders, the Zionist
office in Constantinople, directed by Dr. Jacobson, was in contact

with the Ottoman Government. In the summer of 1912 the CUP
Cabinet had been forced to resign by the so-called "Saviour Officers"

and had been replaced by a ministry sympathetic to the opposition
party, the "Liberal Union". The first Balkan War, which broke out
that autumn, went disastrously for the Ottoman Empire, with the
result that the new Government (although avowedly anti-Zionist and
supported by many Arabs) was willing, in desperation, to solicit the

Zionists' help in the hope of gaining Jewish financial support for the
Empire's bankrupt Treasury. Secret negotiations were thus begun
in the midst of which Enver Bey led his coup d'etat of January 1913.
The CUP were restored to office, but the negotiations with the
Zionists were not broken off. In February, Talat Bey, also hoping to
gain access to Jewish capital, put to Dr. Jacobson a proposal to
create an "alliance islamo-juive" at precisely the same moment as

Da'ud Barakat wrote in al-Ahram that an Arab-Zionist entente was
250
"absolutely imperative".38 Dr. Jacobson realised how naive this proposal was and even how dangerous it might be, if taken literally.
Nevertheless, he immediately travelled to Berlin and Paris to seek
funds for the Ottoman Government.39 In March, however, he indicated on behalf of the Zionists that as long as their entry and land
purchase in Palestine were restricted, Jewish financial support for
the Empire could not possibly be forthcoming.40

In September, after the agreement between the Ottoman Govern-
ment and the Arabs had been publicly celebrated, the Grand Vezir
confidentially let it be known that the Cabinet would like to demonstrate its sympathies for the Jews, but dared not do so for fear of
Arab opinion. The Jews, he said, "must before all else make an
entente with the Arabs; [and] we [the Government] shall do the rest"
-by which he meant that the restrictions in Palestine would be
abolished.4' Although the Zionists had not yet made any formal
entente with the Arabs, the Ottoman Government began in autumn
1913 cautiously to relax these restrictions, hoping thereby to loosen

Jewish "purse-strings" in Europe.
(7)
Meanwhile, the Zionist Office in Constantinople tried to keep
alive its contacts with Arabs in the capital; but the latter, having
received from the Government the promises they desired, no longer
seemed to feel that an entente with the Zionists was so necessary. In

any event, al-Zahrawi had told Hochberg in Paris that an ArabZionist entente must wait until the nationalists' authority was con-
solidated through the Government's implementation of the Arabs'

demands.
Hochberg and Jacobson met al-Zahrawi in Constantinople twice
that winter and, although he was amicable enough, their conversations went no further than what Jacobson called "entente
pleasantries" ("Entente-Liebenswurdigkeiten").4I In October and
November, the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Sulayman alBustani, promised to write to friends in Beirut and Damascus about
an Arab-Zionist entente, although he did not show himself very
favourable to the idea." Asher Saphir, a young Palestinian Jew who
was persona grata with Arab nationalists in Constantinople, tried to
maintain their interest in an entente. He found that they did not
"care a rap" about the "common Semitic spirit" which had been
mentioned in connection with Arab-Jewish unity. They wanted
251
"specifically European things: money, organisation, machines"."

Saphir and other Zionists also contributed articles to the Arabic
press urging an Arab-Zionist entente. One such article appeared in
al-Muqattam in the middle of November. It was reproduced in
al-lslah by Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah, who appended his comments
to it. It will be recalled that Tabbarah was reported by Hochberg to

have been "a little hostile" to Jewish immigration when he arrived in
Paris before the First Arab Congress, but then had "changed his
opinion". Now, at the end of November, he expressed his doubts
openly. The Zionist writing in al-Muqattam had argued that all the
differences between Arabs and Jews in Palestine arose from Arab
misunderstanding of Zionist aims; Tabbarah denied this, contending

that there was good reason to fear Jewish immigration both politically and economically. The Zionists talked of how much they
cherished the Ottoman Empire, but, he claimed, the actions of
thousands of Jewish immigrants in Palestine belied these affirmations. If they first became Ottoman subjects and gave guarantees
that the fellaheen would not be dispossessed, then, and only then,
could an Arab-Zionist entente be reached.45
It would appear from the above that after August 1913 Arab
nationalists in Constantinople and Beirut lost their interest in an
Arab-Zionist entente. However, in Cairo, where the idea had been
put forward in the first instance, the position was rather different. At
the end of September Da'ud Barakat reminded an Egyptian Zionist
that in principle an entente already existed between the Decentralisa-
tion Party and the Zionists and he now requested that the Zionists
delegate a representative to work out this entente in greater detail

with Rafiq Bey al-'Azm.6 At the beginning of January 1914 another
Zionist in Cairo reported that he had been approached by Rashid
Rida and, on a second occasion, by Rafiq Bey al-'Azm and Haqqi
Bey al-'Azm; they had addressed themselves to him on behalf of the

Decentralisation Party and had expressed a desire to be put in
close contact with the Zionist Executive "with the object of laying
the foundations of an entente and of mutual collaboration for the

realisation of the reciprocal aims of both organisations".47 But the
Jews to whom these leaders of the Decentralisation Party turned
were in no way empowered to act for the Zionist Movement and so
could do nothing more than report the approaches back to the

Zionist head office in Berlin.
In the article by Ernest Dawn which has been cited above a distinction is drawn between the Decentralisation Party, al-Fatat and
252
al-'A hd on the one hand and the other Arab nationalist groups on
the other. Dawn regards members of the Decentralisation Party,
al-Fatat and al-'A hd as nationalists in a true sense as they sought
Arab independence from the Ottoman Empire; the other groups,
such as the Beirut Reform Committee, did not desire full independence but, as their names implied, strove only for administrative reform within the Empire.48 The validity of this distinction is supported by the pattern of relations between Arab nationalist groups
and Zionists in the latter half of 1913. When the Ottoman Government acceded to Arab demands in the summer of that year, the
more moderate of the Arab nationalist groups looked forward to the
implementation of the desired reforms and lost interest in an entente

with the Zionists; whereas, in Cairo, the more radical of the nationa-
lists, dissatisfied with the promises the Arabs had received, continued to contemplate full independence and for this end, Jewish
backing (through the Zionist Movement) was sought.
(8)
At the beginning of April 1914, Nahum Sokolow, a member of the
Zionist Executive, came to Jaffa, charged inter alia with the task of
examining Arab-Zionist relations. On April 10th, al-Muqattam
published an interview which Nissim Malul, its Jaffa correspondent,

had with Sokolow on his arrival. Sokolow suggested that the Arabs
should regard the Jews, not as foreigners, but as fellow-Semites
"returning home"-as he put it-equipped with European skills

which would be of immense value to the local population. He made
the point that if Jewish immigration into Palestine was hindered,

then the land would remain waste and would be of no utility to
anyone; whereas, if Jewish settlement went ahead, all would benefit.

He therefore emphasised the need for an Arab-Jewish understand-
inn: with this in view he stated that the language, culture and literature of the Arabs would be taught in Jewish schools; the Jews would
start a campaign against disease, especially trachoma among Arab
children; social services, such as hostels for the poor of all religions,
would be initiated; and branches of the Anglo-Palestine Company
(the Zionist Movement's bank) would be opened in most towns in
Palestine to offer the local population long-term credit at low

rates.49 Four days later, Rafiq Bey al-'Azm answered Sokolow, also
in al-Muqattam. Sokolow's words were "very, very nice". But the
Jews did not act by them: they did not mix at all with the local
253
population, to whom they were an economic threat and-as the

vanguard of a Great Power invasion-a political danger as well. The
Arabs, Rafiq Bey declared, still wanted an entente with the Zionists;
but curing physical wounds (as Sokolow suggested) would not heal
wounds of the heart, and simply to teach Arabic equally with Hebrew was not enough. The Zionists must pave the way to integration
by becoming Ottoman subjects, by opening their schools to Arab
children and by co-operating economically with the local population;
the Zionists had to act-not just talk.50
These two articles were not, of course, the only ones about
Zionism to appear in the Egyptian press at this time. On April 11th,

exactly one year after inviting the Zionists to make an entente with
the Decentralisation Party, Salim Najjar contributed a bitterly anti-
Zionist article to al-Ahram, criticising the Zionists for not fulfilling
the terms of the agreement which had been made with Hochberg.5
Within a fortnight, al-Muqattam published two articles by Nissim
Malul in response to Najjar's attack.52 One week later, on April 29th,
Haqqi Bey al-'Azm sent an irate letter to Nissim Malul who was
also, as mentioned above, a member of the Decentralisation Party.
Haqqi Bey explained that recently he had not had time to write to
Malul (presumably about an Arab-Zionist entente) because he had
been pre-occupied with the 'Aziz 'Ali Bey al-Masri "affair". He indicated his annoyance at the renewed Arab-Zionist polemic in the
columns of al-A hram and al-Muqattam; however, he was more
angry at what Sokolow had said in his interview with Malul, which
he understood to mean that the Zionists would "return" to Palestine,
whether the Arabs liked it or not. He also took exception to the fact
that Sokolow had advocated the use of Hebrew by the Jewish immigrants: this, wrote Haqqi Bey, meant "death" to Arabic. Nonetheless, he repeated that the Arabs were still willing to make an entente
with the Jews, provided that the immigrants became true Ottoman
subjects and that the Arabic language did not suffer.53
But the exchanges in the Cairo press did not stop. Others, including Dr. Shibli Shumayyil, (the early Arab socialist), also began to
take part. On May 27th, al-Muqattam published the first instalment

of a two-part article entitled "A Zionist Leader [in Constantinople]
answers the arguments of Rafiq Bey al-'Azm and demonstrates that

the Jews and Arabs must reach an understanding". The "Zionist
leader"-probably Dr. Jacobson-denied that the Zionists relied on
the Ottoman Government at the expense of the Arabs, as Rafiq Bey
254
had claimed; he accepted Rafiq Bey's demand for mutual co-operation and urged an Arab-Zionist agreement."4
On the same day, Nissim Malul sailed from Jaffa to Cairo where
he met Haqqi Bey and other Decentralisationists on May 28th.

Haqqi Bey informed Malul that, when Malul did not reply, as requested, to his letter of the previous month, the Decentralisationists
in Cairo had felt let down-so let down, in fact, that Rafiq Bey had,
that very day, prepared a circular describing their disillusionment
with the Zionists which they intended to send to all their branches.
Malul protested against this, explaining that he had not replied
because Nahum Sokolow, the member of the Zionist Executive

whom he required to consult, was making a tour of Palestine and
was still absent from Jaffa. Instead of sending out the circular as
proposed, Malul suggested that representatives of the Zionists and
the Decentralisation Party should meet to discuss an entente. Haqqi

Bey was prepared to accept this alternative course and sent Malul
in search of Rafiq Bey.55
On the following day, al-Muqattam printed the second part of the

Zionist leader's reply to Rafiq Bey, in which it was also suggested a
meeting of Arab and Zionist representatives should be held to dis-
cuss an agreement.56 In the same issue, an article appeared by Rafiq

Bey himself, headed-significantly-"The Zionist question and how
to remove their danger". Other Arabs had already elaborated

schemes to defeat the Zionists and these schemes, in some instances,
had not stopped short of violence. Rafiq Bey's programme, however,
was quite different for it was concerned solely with the protection of
the fellaheen (by land reform, protective legislation, agricultural
companies and loans) and, what was more worthy of note, it was
cast in a form which did not preclude an agreement with the
Zionists.57 Malul took credit for persuading Rafiq Bey to submit

another article to al-Muqattam which appeared on May 30th to the
effect that he had now read the reply of the Zionist leader in
Constantinople who had answered his earlier criticism of Sokolow
and that he agreed with this Zionist on the need for a meeting
between representatives of both the Arabs and the Zionists. The
Decentralisation Party was prepared to convene this meeting in
Cairo. He was going to occupy himself with this proposal and stop
writing about Zionism for the time being.5" On June 1st, at Malul's
request, al-Mi qattam announced that it was closing its columns to
articles on Zionism until this meeting had taken place; al-Ahram,

also at Malul's prompting, followed suit.59
255
(9)
By spring 1914 popular feeling in Palestine had taken an ugly

turn against the Zionists. Certain newspaper editors had been dis-
pleased that the Arab Congress in Paris had not taken a firm stand
against the Zionists. In July 1913, Falastin (in Jaffa) rebuked Shaykh
Ahmad Tabbarah for his "one-sided" handling of the immigration
question at the Congress, "for he did not mention what dangers were
connected with the immigration of the Zionists into the country
["bilad"] and what problems for the future are being brought by the
Government's toleration of them at the present-[problems] which
an immigration of people from Rumelia would not create under any

circumstances".60 In August, al-Karmal (in Haifa) proposed that a
congress be held in Nablus to discuss ways and means of combating
the "Zionist peril".6' In the autumn, this paper protested violently

against the moves towards an Arab-Zionist entente which it had
heard were afoot.62 That winter three Jewish settlers in the north of
Palestine were murdered. The Arabs had not failed to notice that the
Central Government had relaxed its restrictions against the Jews in
Palestine (hoping, as explained above, to gain access to Jewish

capital in Europe). Since 1901 all Jews entering the country had
been issued with a temporary permis de sejour which limited their
stay to three months; in September 1913 this procedure was
abolished. Moreover, the obstacles which Jews had formerly met

when purchasing land were quietly reduced; the lengthy formalities
which had had to be gone through when foreign Jews previously

sought Ottoman nationality were done away with; and a Zionist
society was permitted to open in Constantinople. In March 1914,
Rashid Rida wrote in al-Manar that:
"It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs-the local population-[to do] one of two things. Either they must make an
agreement ["ittifaq"] with the leaders of the Zionists to settle th
differences between the interests of both parties . .. or [they m

gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first
forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed
gangs which will oppose [the Zionists] by force. Some [Arabs]
say this is the first thing to be done, because cauterisation is the
only way-and cauterisation is the ultimate remedy, as it is
said."6"
The last words in this paragraph were an allusion to the Arabic

proverb "Akhir al-tibb al-kayy", as well as being an unmistakeable
reference to the hardening of Arab anti-Zionist feeling in and
256
around Palestine. In April, ha-Herut noted that Arabic press attacks
on the Zionists had never been so violent.64 In that month, parlia-
mentary elections were held, and anti-Zionism played an important

part in the campaign of many candidates in Palestine. Raghib alNashashibi, who was elected a CUP deputy for Jerusalem, declared
that "the Ottoman Government must adopt the methods of

Rumania" in dealing with the Jewish immigrants.65 Anti-Zionist
societies were reported to have been founded by young Arabs in
Jerusalem,66 Haifa,67 Nablus,68 Beirut,69 Constantinople70 and in
al-Azhar, Cairo.7' And again, articles began to appear rejecting the

possibility of any Arab-Zionist entente, this time written by Muhammad Mahmasani, a young lawyer in Beirut who as a student in Paris
had helped in organising the First Arab Congress.7'
(10)
In Palestine there were signs that responsible Arab notables were
disturbed by the popular mood. One such notable was Nasif Bey alKhalidi, a native of Jerusalem, who in 1914 was Chief Engineer in
Beirut. He was friendly with Haim Kalvarisky, who worked for the
Jewish Colonization Association as administrator of Rosh Pinna, a

Jewish settlement near Safed. In May, Kalvarisky introduced Nasif
Bey to Nahum Sokolow who was engaged in the tour of Palestine
which Malul had mentioned as his reason for not replying to Haqqi
al-'Azm's letter of April 29th. In his turn, Nasif Bey introduced

Sokolow to Arab leaders in Beirut and Damascus, including
Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and

Georges Bey Fakhuri. Sokolow found them responsive to the idea
of an Arab-Zionist confrontation and so a meeting was projected
for some time in June or July.73 No exact time or place was fixed. At
the end of May Sokolow returned to Jaffa. He instructed the Zionist
office there to prepare a list of delegates for this meeting, which he
explained would be preliminary to subsequent ones. At this stage,

Arab and Zionist representatives had only to become acquainted; no
commitments or engagements were envisaged.74 Sokolow then

returned to Beirut, where he again saw Nasif Bey al-Khalidi, who
told him that the meeting would take a long time to organise, as he
wished to win over a number of prominent Palestinian notables; he
also requested Sokolow to arrange for Zionist leaders from Europe

to be present at the meeting when it was held.75 Nasif Bey then set
257
out on his "diplomatic" mission to Jerusalem and Jaffa, while

Sokolow sailed for Constantinople.
In Constantinople, Zionist contacts with Arabs there had lapsed

since January, partly because the Arabs had shown little inclination
to discuss an entente and partly because Dr. Jacobson was absent
from the city. Jacobson returned towards the end of April and in
the next weeks various conversations took place with Ahmad Bayhum, Najib Bey Shuqayr (editor of Peyam) Shukri Bey al-Husayni (a
Jerusalem notable, long resident in Constantinople) and Arab

deputies from both the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem and the Vilayet
of Beirut. In discussion, it became clear that these Arab leaders
entertained real fears of the Zionists for the future.76 Jacobson sug
gested that if the Arabs aspired to eventual autonomy, it would be
folly for them to alienate the Jews; he also pointed out that Palestine
represented only a small part of the Arab lands and if the Arabs
opposed Jewish immigration in the country, then the whole Arab

world, far beyond the borders of Palestine itself, would be deprived
of the benefits which could be obtained from this immigration.

According to Zionist reports, the Arabs were not unimpressed by
this line of argument.77 Jacobson realised that the Arabs whom he

met were associated with different Arab societies which were not
necessarily in agreement with one another. Ahmad Bayhum had
been a member of the now defunct Beirut Reform Committee; Najib

Bey Shuqayr was a Decentralisationist; Shukri Bey al-Husayni was
connected with the Arab group in Constantinople; and the CUP
deputies to Ottoman Parliament were probably not active in any

nationalist society at all. Nonetheless, Jacobson was able to summarise their general demands as follows: they desired the Zionists (i)
to assist Arab education, by supplying savoir faire and funds; (ii)

to give assurances that the fellaheen would not be deprived of all
their land or proletarianised by the Jewish settlers; and (iii) to find

large capital sums to finance extensive public-works projects for the
development of the Arab provinces.78
Sokolow had been preceded in his journey to Constantinople by
the Vali of Beirut, Sami Bekir Bey, who also made contact with
Jacobson and his colleagues. He informed them that he, too,

favoured an Arab-Zionist meeting, although he did not set much
store by the Arab movement since, in his opinion, its leaders could
all be bought over for cash and, anyhow, they were what he termed
"Leaders without an army".79 When Sokolow arrived in Constantinople at the beginning of June, Sami Bekir Bey went further than
258
Nasif Bey al-Khalidi by insisting that the participation of European
Zionist leaders in the proposed meeting was imperative."0 While in

Constantinople, Sokolow received no communications from Haim
Kalvarisky or any of the Arabs whom he had met in Beirut and

Damascus. On the other hand, Najib Bey Shuqayr informed him
that the Decentralisation Party now wished to meet the Zionists in

Cairo (as a result of Nissim Malul's recent visit). Bearing in mind
Nasif Bey al-Khalidi's statement that the meeting would take a long
time to arrange, Sokolow came to the conclusion it would have to be
put off until the autumn when the various interested parties would
be in a position to assemble the appropriate delegates.8
(1 1)
But, in Palestine, things moved on apace. On June 19th, the
Zionist office in Jaffa invited ten delegates to attend an Arab-Zionist

meeting to be held on July 1st at Brummana, near Beirut.82 A week
or so later, Nasif Bey passed through Jaffa but was reluctant to dis-
close the names of the Arabs who would attend the meeting as his
list was not yet complete; he did indicate, however, that the editors
of Falastin and al-Karmal might be invited to be present. Since these

men had been campaigning for several years against Zionist activities
in Palestine, the Zionist office in Jaffa wrote to Kalvarisky, telling
him that their participation in the meeting was undesirable as it

would only lead to an acrimonious discussion. The Zionists therefore
requested to be informed of the Arab delegates' names in advance of
the meeting.83 On July 1st, Nasif Bey informed Kalvarisky that he

did not believe the meeting could be held before July 15th but, as
everything was now fixed on the Arab side, Kalvarisky should come
immediately to Beirut to make the final arrangements.84 Thereupon
Dr. Jacob Thon of the Zionist office in Jaffa set out to join Kal-
varisky at Rosh Pinna and accompany him to Beirut. Meanwhile

Kalvarisky's involvement in these political matters had come to the
attention of his employers, the Jewish Colonization Association,
who, for reasons of their own, could not approve of Kalvarisky's
activities.85 They therefore ordered him to disassociate himself from

the meeting and, in consequence, Dr. Thon was obliged to make his
way to Beirut alone.88
The Vali of Beirut had returned from Constantinople at the

beginning of July. Nasif Bey saw him on the 14th of the month and
was instructed not to do anything without informing the Vali first.87

On that or the next day Nasif Bey saw the Vali again in the company
259
of two Jewish land-agents (representing the Zionists and the Jewish
Colonization Association) who had come to discuss land purchases
in the Valley of Jezreel. The subject of the Arab-Zionist meeting

was raised, whereupon the Vali declared that it was unnecessary; he
did not know in whose names Nasif Bey and his colleagues were
authorised to speak; the Central Government had ordered him to
protect the Jews; he undertook to act as advocate for the Jews; the
Arabic press (which propagandised against the Zionists) was venal
and was not to be taken seriously.88
A day or so later Dr. Thon arrived in Beirut. Despite the Vali's

volte-face, it appears that Nasif Bey and Dr. Thon did not im-
mediately jettison the idea of an Arab-Zionist meeting. Nasif Bey

furnished Dr. Thon with the names of the Arab delegates and a
suggested agenda. Dr. Thon then took his leave of Nasif Bey who
cautioned him that:
"Governments are transient and fluctuate; the people are the constant factor, and one must come to an agreement with the
people."89
Dr. Thon passed through Haifa on his way back to Jaffa. Meetings
were held in both these towns, on July 20th and 30th respectively, to
consider the situation. The Zionists who took part in these meetings
all thought it wisest to find some way of postponing the meeting
with the Arabs for the time being, but to do so in such a way as not
to sever all contact with them. The Zionists were loth to negotiate
with the Arabs whom Nasif Bey had nominated: of the ten dele-
gates, only three could be supposed to be genuinely in favour of an

Arab-Zionist entente (Ahmad Bayhum, Rizq Allah Effendi Arqash
and Nasif Bey himself); against this, three of those named were
newspaper editors or proprietors who were violently opposed to the
Zionists (Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, of al-Qabas (formerly al-Muqta-
bas); Yusuf al-'Isa, of Falastini; and 'Abd Allah Mukhlis, of alKarmal); and two others were also known to be ill-disposed to the
Zionists ('Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar and Jamil al-Husayni);

moreover, there was not a single Palestinian notable of any real
standing on the list.90 Nasif Bey had proposed the following agenda:
"1. [The Zionists] should explain, as far as possible by producing
documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism and
of the colonization of Palestine connected therewith.
"2. Thereafter the Arabs will formulate their demands, acceptance of which would determine whether the [Zionist] Move-
ment could be considered harmful to the Arabs or not."91

260
The Zionists feared that this agenda, as it stood, was liable to worsen, rather than better, their relations with the Arabs. And more-
over, the opposition of both the Vali of Beirut and of the Jewish
Colonization Association had to be taken into account as well. For
these reasons, therefore, it was decided to send a small delegation,
consisting of Kalvarisky and two or three others, to confer with
Nasif Bey during the first week of August in order to find an acceptable way of postponing the meeting.92
In the event, something far removed from Palestine, the Arabs
and the Zionists put an end to all thoughts of a meeting which might
have explored the possibility of an Arab-Zionist entente: World
War I broke out in Europe on August 5th, 1914.
(12)
There are many interesting aspects to this whole episode. The
keys to much of it are to be found perhaps in the answers to a
number of questions which relate to the latter phases of ArabZionist contacts in 1914.
Why were Arabs in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Constantinople

responsive to Zionist approaches after April 1914? The answer pro-
bably lies in the fact that the Ottoman Government had failed to
fulfil the agreement which it made with the Arabs in the summer of
1913 and thus, by the following April, Arab nationalist leaders in
centres beyond Cairo had also come to agree with the Decentralisation Party that it was now time to achieve Arab independence from
the Ottoman Empire once and for all. And in this endeavour Jewish
support seemed attractive to all Arab groups, just as it had to the
Decentralisation Party since spring 1913 when Salim Najjar first
wrote to Sami Hochberg.
Why did the Vali of Beirut perform a volte-face on his return from
Constantinople by announcing in mid-July that he was opposed to

an Arab-Zionist meeting? His statement that he was acting on instructions from the Central Government can be believed. In
September 1913 the Government had just concluded its agreement

with the Arabs, and it reckoned that if the Arabs could settle their
differences with the Zionists through some form of entente, then
Jewish financial aid for the Empire would be assured. For this
reason, the Government had encouraged the Zionists to seek an
entente with the Arabs at that time. However, by summer 1914 Arab
opposition to the Government had reached unprecedented heights

261
and there was cause to fear the growing Arab movement, especially
if the outbreak of general war in Europe was imminent. Hence the
Government had no wish for the Arabs to ally themselves with the
Zionists and the capital imagined to be at the latters' commandcapital which it wanted desperately for itself.
Where did the Zionists stand in these exchanges? They were faced
with two separate problems, both of which were not easily solved.
From the beginning of 1913 both the Ottoman Government-or,

more accurately, the CUP-and the Arab nationalists had begun to
court their favour and they did not know which "suitor" to choose.
To have allied themselves with the CUP in spring 1913 would have
alienated the Arabs; when, in the autumn of that year, the Grand
Vezir suggested they turn their attentions to the Arabs, the latterwithin the Empire, at least-were no longer interested; and when, in
the early summer of 1914, the Arabs seemed to incline again towards an entente with the Zionists, the Government was opposed
to the match. By 1913 the Zionists were fully aware of the need to
come to an agreement with the Arabs, but they confronted a
dilemma of a special kind, for they did not know on what possible
basis this agreement could be reached. Certainly, from the Zionists'
point of view, there was very little room to compromise on precisely
the points which the Arabs wished to be re-assured: immigration,
land purchase and the place of the Hebrew language. To be sought
after by two worthy "suitors" and not to be able to decide between

them was for the Zionists problem enough; but to know full well that
these "suitors' " main interest was in the money which they imagined
the Zionists to possess made the latters' position impossible, for in
reality-despite the myth which Herzl and others had built up-the
Zionist Movement had no sums of any magnitude at its command.
In 1911 Rashid Rida had expressed the belief that the Jews controlled the finances of Europe; this belief was widespread through-
out the Ottoman Empire but it was, of course, unfounded. Baron
Edmond de Rothschild had supported the early Jewish settlements

in Palestine and had continued to interest himself in them even after
he entrusted their administration to Baron Maurice de Hirsch's
Jewish Colonization Association in 1899. "The Baron" had never
been won over to the Zionist cause, but his interest in Palestine
through the Jewish Colonization Association made him the Zionists'
one possible Maecenas. Therefore, the Jewish Colonization Association's opposition to the proposed Arab-Zionist meeting at Brummana had indeed to be taken into account by the Zionists. In May
262
1914, Dr. Jacobson wrote after listing the general demands of the
Arabs in Constantinople:
"Voila la situation! Comment sortir de la sans se casser le cou,comment vaincre ces difficultes sans argent, sans beaucoup-
beaucoup d'argent? Je me creuse la tete et ne trouve pas de

reponse."93
He had written in similar vein over a year before when Talat Bey
proposed his "alliance islamo-juive".94 In both cases the Zionists
found no alternative but to procrastinate.
How sincere were the responses to Sokolow's approaches in Beirut
and Damascus in May 1914? Nasif Bey al-Khalidi's desire to bring
the Arabs and Zionists together appears to have been ingenuous.
But he pointed to a stumbling-block when he told Sokolow at the

beginning of June 1914 that the meeting would take a long time to
arrange since he wished to persuade prominent Palestinians to participate. Already in April 1913, Albert Antebi had noted that popular
feeling was such in Jerusalem that no responsible Arab notable
wished to compromise his political position by openly favouring the

Zionists.95 This observation was confirmed by the difficulty which
Nasif Bey met in compiling a list of Arab delegates for the proposed
meeting at Brummana and even more vividly by the total absence of

prominent Palestinians from the list which was eventually drawn
up. The names of the Arabs who were prepared to meet the Zionists
at Brummana and the agenda they proposed suggest that on the
Arab side the object of the meeting had changed from that first
conceived by Nasif Bey and Sokolow. Why were five anti-Zionists

willing to meet the very people whom they were convinced were a
serious threat to the Arabs in Palestine and why did they ask the
Zionists to bring documentary evidence to explain their aims?
There is reason to suspect that they were looking for a "show-down"

with the Zionists. In 1911, Najib Nassar, the editor of al-Karmal,
had endeavoured to demonstrate from Jewish sources that the
Zionists desired to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine, whence they would gravitate out towards Syria and Iraq; to
prove this he had published a booklet entitled al-Sihyuniyya"Zionism: its History, Aims and Importance", which was little
more than a slanted translation of Richard Gottheil's article on
Zionism in The Jewish Encyclopaedia. Since that date the Arabic

press had followed closely all Zionist pronouncements and publications and had found it a relatively easy matter to incriminate the
Zionist Movement of separatism, despite its official policy of seeking

263
no more than a "homeland" (Heimstatte) in Palestine, within and

not separate from the Ottoman Empire. That representatives of the
three newspapers which had taken the lead in this literary campaign
against the Zionists should demand of the latter to provide docu-
mentary evidence to explain their aims prompts the suggestion that

the object of the Arabs who actually agreed to come to Brummana
was more devious than that of Nasif Bey, the initiator of the meeting.
In the course of 1913 and 1914, Zionists came in contact with

representatives of many Arab groups; but of all these groups, the
Decentralisation Party-from which the proposal of an Arab-
Zionist entente emerged-appears to have been most desirous of
such an entente. At the end of May 1914 Rafiq Bey al-'Azm ex-
pressed his willingess to meet Zionist leaders in Cairo to discuss an

entente. Assuming that Zionist leaders had come to Cairo after the
plans to meet at Brummana had collapsed and assuming that somehow, before the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I, a formal
Arab-Zionist entente had been worked out, would this entente have
changed subsequent relations between Arabs and Zionists? Even

disregarding the McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declar-
ation, there can be little doubt that it would not. By 1914 popular
feeling in Palestine was too hostile to the Zionists to have allowed
such an entente to stand. The motives of the Arab nationalists who
sought the entente were tactical and contingent on specific political

aims which in part were realised by World War I. And even the
Decentralisation Party itself was divided after April 1914 on
whether an entente with the Zionists was the best course. Salim
Najjar had begun to attack the Zionists in al-Ahram; in Beirut,
Muhammad Mahmasani had proclaimed that any entente with the

Zionists was impossible; and on June 20th Haqqi Bey al-'Azm
wrote to Mahmasani saying:
"[Rafiq Bey] sends you an official reply . . . on the subject of Mr.
[Sokolow] and concerning the meeting which he has proposed. My

opinion differs from that [of Rafiq Bey], because I am convinced
that the meeting has no purpose at all; and if I am not opposing it,
it is because I do not see that there is any harm in it. This meeting
will achieve nothing in view of Mr. [Sokolow's] aim. Understand,
dear brother, that these people are marching towards their object
at a rapid pace, thanks to the help of the Government and the
indifference of the local population. I am sure that if we do noth-
ing to affect the status quo, [the Zionists] will attain their object in
264
a few years in [Palestine], where they will found [a Jewish State];

then they will gravitate towards Syria, next towards Iraq and thus
they will have fulfilled their political programme.
". .. But, by employing means of threats and persecutions-
and it is this last method which we must employ-by prodding the

Arab population into destroying their farms and setting fire to
their colonies, by forming gangs to execute these projects, then
perhaps [the Zionists in Palestine] will emigrate to save their
lives."96
This paper is based heavily on material found in the Central Zionist
Archive, Jerusalem, referred to as "CZA" in subsequent notes.

CZA Z3/45 (10.4.1913), V. Jacobson (Constantinople) to R. Lichtheim
(Berlin).
""Palestine" at this time lay wholly within the Ottoman Empire. On the
west bank of the river Jordan it was comprised of the Mutasarriflik of
Jerusalenm in the south and part of the Vilayet of Beirut in the north. Its
total population in 1913 was approximately 700,000.
For an analysis of Turkish and Arab responses to the Jewish immigrants
between 1882 and 1914 and for a fuller discussion of the background to
this paper, see my contribution to St. Antony's Papers, vol. 17 (Oxford,

1965). The episode described in the present article is also touched on
briefly in that paper.
; C. Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria", The Middle East Journal,
vol. xvi (1962), pp. 148-9.
6 A. Lutfi al-Sayyid, Qissat hayati (Cairo, n.d.), p. 137.

G. P. Gooch & H. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of
the War: 1898-1914 (London, 1938), X, ii, 824-5.
Al-Manar, vol. xiv (1911), pp. 713-17.
CZA L2/94/I, extract from letter, dated 6/7.6.1914, by Nissim Malul

(Cairo) to Zionist Office (Jaffa).
10 CZA Z3/752 (21.2.1913), S. Hasamsony (Cairo) to Zionist head office

(Berlin).
Cf. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern? Turzkey, (London, 1961), pp.
207-8, n. 4.
12 From a French translation of this article prepared by the writer of the
letter cited in the penultimate note.

1) Loc. cit.
From a Hebrew translation of this article prepared by the Zionist office
in Jaffa-CZA Z3/115.
15 CZA Z3/752 (25.4.1913), S. Hasamsony (Cairo) to Zionist head off

(Berlin).
6 CZA Z3 /45 (10.4.1913), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to R. Lichtheim (Berlin).

17 CZA Z3/114 (17.5.1913), S. Hochberg (Consple.)
' Loc. cit.

19 Loc. cit.
20 Loc. cit.
21 Loc. cit.
22 Ha-Herut, v, 196 (18.5.1913); ibid. 197 (9.5.1913); ibid. 205 (28.5.1913); &
ibid. 212 (5.6.1913).
21 Le Jeune-Turc, v, 145 (27.5.1913); ibid. 147 (29.5.1913); ibid. 150 (1.6.1913

& ibid., 154 (5.6.1913).
265
24 Ha-Herut, v, 216 (10.6.1913); & ibid. 219 (15.6.1913).

25 CZA Z3 /115 (25.7.1913), Arabic press report.
26 CZA Z3/114 (10.6.1913), S. Hochberg (Paris) to V. Jacobson (Berlin).
27 CZA Z3/114 (16.6.1913), same to same.
28 Loc. cit.
29Al-Mu'tamar al-'arabi al-awwval (Cairo, 1913), pp. 92-3.

31 Loc. cit.
32 CZA Z3 / 114 (25.6.1913), same to same.
33 CZA Z3/114 (26.6.1913), same to same.
34 Hochberg did not make it clear whether the "adversaries" whom alZahrawi had in mind were present in Paris or if they had been active else-
where; the context suggests the latter alternative, although it could equally
embrace both.

36CZA Z3/114 (27.6.1913), same to same.
37 CZA Z3/114 (29.6.1913), V. Jacobson (Paris) to Zionist Executive (Berlin).
38 CZA Z3/45 (28.2.1913), V. Jacobson (Paris) to H. Franck (Paris).
39 Loc. cit.
40 CZA Z3/45 (27.3.1913), V. Jacobson (Berlin) to Ahmed Agayev (Consple.).
41 CZA Z3/47 (25.9.1913), V. Jacobson (Berlin) to R. Lichtheim (Consple.).

42 CZA Z3/48 (11.1.1914), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to Zionist Executive
(Berlin).
43 CZA Z3/47 (3.10.1913), same to same; CZA Z3/47 (16.11.1913), I. Neufach

(Consple.) to same.
44 CZA Z3 /47 (20.11.1913), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to same.
45 CZA Z3/116 (28.12.1913), J. Thon (Jaffa) to same, enclosing Arabic press

report.
46 CZA Z3/753 (1.10.1913), S. Hasamsony (Cairo) to Zionist head office

(Berlin).
47 CZA Z3/753 (10.1.1914), J. Caleff (Cairo) to President, Zionist Executive

(Berlin).
48 Dawn, "Rise of Arabism", pp. 147-8.

49 From Hebrew translation of this article prepared by Malul-CZA
A 18/14/6.
50 From Hebrew translation of this article in ha-Herut, vi, 159 (26.4.1914).

51 CZA Z3/ 115 (7.5.1914), J. Thon (Jaffa) to Zionist head office (Berlin), enclosing Arabic press report.
52 CZA A 18/14/6.
53 CZA Z3/116, Hebrew and German translations of letter dated 29.4.1914,
from Haqqi Bey al-'Azm (Heliopolis) to Nissim Malul (Jaffa).

54 CZA Z3 / 116, Arabic press report (n.d.).
55 CZA A 18/14/6 (29.5.1914), N. Malul (Cairo) to N. Sokolow & A. Ruppin

(Jaffa).
56 CZA Z3 / 116, Arabic press report (n.d.).

57 CZA L2/94/I, Arabic press report (n.d.).
51 Loc. cit.
59Loc. cit.; c.f. ibid. (31.5.1914), N. Malul (Cairo) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa).
60 Falastin, iii, 49 (9.7.1913).
61 Falastin, iii, 58 (9.8.1913).

62 CZA, Z3/116 (5.11.1913), J. Thon (Jaffa) to Zionist Executive (Berlin),
enclosing Arabic press report giving details of al-Karmal (10.10.1913); &
ibid. (17.11.1913), same to same, giving details of al-Karmal (4.11.1913).

63 Al-Manar, vol. xvii (1914), p. 320.
266
64 Ha-Herut, vi, 155 (21.4.1914).
65 From an interview with the editor of al-Iqdam (Cairo), translated into

Hebrew in ha-Herut, vi, 143 (30.3.1914).
66 CZA L 18/245/5 (9.4.1914), I. Levy (Jerusalem) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa).

67 Ha-Herut, vi, 207 (22.6.1914).
68 CZA Z3/116, Arabic press report (n.d.), giving details of article which
appeared on 2.4.1914 in Fatat al-'Arab (Beirut).
69 Ha-Herut, vi, 192 (4.6.1914).
70 Palestine Jewish Colonization Association Archive (Haifa), 39/168
(21.5.1914), A. Antebi (Jerusalem) to A. Bril (Jaffa). (Subsequent references

to material located in this archive are prefixed "PICA".)
CZA Z3/116, Arabic press report (n.d.), giving details of article which
appeared on 5.5.1914 in Fatat al-'Arab (Beirut).
72 Loc. cit. giving details of articles which appeared on 27.4.1914 and
4.6.1914 in Fatat al-'Arab.
73 CZA L2/34/II (3.6.1914), [A. Ruppin], (Jaffa) to V. Jacobson (Consple.).

74 Loc. cit. & CZA Z3/399 (23.5.1914), N. Sokolow (Damascus) to Y.
Tschlenow (address unknown); cf. ibid. (5.7.1914), same (London) to same.
75 Loc. cit.
*6 CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to Zionist Executive

(Berlin).
7 Loc cit; & cf. earlier CZA Z3/48 (28.4.1914), same to Zionist head office
(Berlin).
78 CZA L2/34/I1 (3.5.1914), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa).

9 CZA Z3/49 (28.5.1914), R. Lichtheim (Consple.) to Zionist Executive
(Berlin).
80 CZA Z3/399 (5.7.1914), N. Sokolow (London) to Y. Tschlenow (address
unknown).
81 Loc. cit.
62
83
84
85
Invitations, signed by A. Ruppin, in CZA L2/516.

PICA 79/3 19 (30.6.1914), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to H. Kalvarisky (Rosh Pinna).
PICA 79/319 (1.7.1914), Nazif Bey el-Khalidi [sic], (Beirut) to same.
PICA 82/322 (13.7.1914), H. Kalvarisky (Rosh Pinna) to J. Rosenheck
(Haifa).
86Loc. cit. & cf. PICA 82/322 (13.7.1914), same to Nazif Bey el-Khalidi
(Beirut).
87 PICA 79/319 (14.7.1914), Nazif Bey el-Khalidi (Beirut) to H. Kalvarisk

(Rosh Pinna).
88 CZA Z3/1457 (23.7.1914), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to Zionist Executive (Berlin).

89 CZA L2/44 (30.7.1914), minutes of meeting of ha-Wa'ad ha-Temidi [Zionist "Standing Committee"], (Jaffa).
90 CZA Z3/ 1457 (23.7.1914), A. Ruppin (Jaffa) to Zionist Executive (Berlin).

91 Loc. cit.
92 Loc. cit. & CZA L2/44 (30.7.1914), minutes of meeting of ha-Wa'ad haTemidi (Jaffa).
93 CZA L2/34/II (3.5.1914), V. Jacobson (Consple.) to A. Ruppin (Jaffa).

94 CZA Z3/45 (4.2.1913), same to J. Kann (Hague).
95 CZA L2/44 (19.4.1913), A. Antebi (Jerusalem) to J. Thon (Jaffa). Antebi
was a native of Damascus who had worked for the Alliance Israe'lite
Universelle and the Jewish Colonization Association in Jerusalem for many
years; he was an intimate of the leading families in the city and probably
was better informed than any other Jew of local political currents.
96 From the French translation of this letter as published by Jemal Pasha in
Le Journal de Beyrouth, iii, 413 (1.9.1915).
267

Arab-Zionist Entente 1913-1914

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Arab-Zionist Entente 1913-1914

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Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-1914

Author(s): Neville Mandel

Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-19141

"Votre interet vous oblige de montrer d'accord avec nous la main

coreligionnaires. Je vous dis cela en ami et en ami sincere.

sentant autorise des Sionistes pour nous mettre en contact avec

tion with the Zionist Movement and "Dr. Jacobson", to whom

principal Zionist representative in Constantinople as well as being

Najjar's letter to Hochberg was no less than an invitation to the

the beginning of the 1880's, there had been approximately 23,000

1913-more than 100,000 Jews entered Palestine. Of these, over half

from settling there. The net increase by immigration was therefore

lists, they were dedicated to rebuilding what they considered to be

agricultural settlements which had been established throughout the

most cases negatively.' Over the years, suspicion of and antipathy

be deaf to the endless statements made by Zionist leaders abroad

declarations to the contrary, Arab leaders in Palestine and elsewhere

In 1913, Arabs who were active members of nationalist societies

relevant, probably little typical of most Arab leaders and notables

Party had, between them, only 126 known members by October

be conjectured that in spring 1913 members of the Decentralisation

It is known that before World War I representatives of various

Effendi al-'Asali, a member of al-Qahtaniyya, accompanied by Dr.

Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration".7 The Arab

The Zionists had always argued that Jewish immigration into

tralisation Party, on the other hand, entertained the idea of allying

He argued that the Syrians required large agricultural, industrial and

mise was that Jews controlled European finance. These premises

the local population and the Government could be drowned in

debts; and, second, foreigners could gain a hold on the country

("bilad") by acquiring most or much of its land ("ard"). But, if the

required to work alongside Europeans in order to learn from them,

in al-Ahram, the large Cairo daily. An anonymous writer alleged

of 1909."1 In this case, the charge was answered in al-Muqattam by

friendship of one's neighbour [i.e. the Arabs] which is preferable to

"It is certain that the Syrians do not find it at all inconvenient to

"which today or tomorrow is bound to rise again"-otherwise, "a

of them would try to have discussions with Zionists in Paris with a

Zionist head office in Berlin with the suggestion that Hochberg be

which he might make could not be regarded as "too official"; as the

travelled to Beirut, where he met members of the "Reform Com-

mittee"; and then, his task completed, he returned to Constantinople

In his report on his mission Hochberg stated that he met twenty

members of Decentralisation Party and the Beirut Reform Com-

Bey (who arrived in Cairo at the same timne as Hochberg) and, in

tion Party) and, in Beirut, Shaykh Ahmad Tabbarah (editor of

al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani). Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed

advocate of an Arab-Zionist entente-and to Khalil Effendi

Zayniyyah (a member of the Beirut Reform Committee who came

that there was "anxiety or at least uncertainty".'8 But since no official

or the Beirut Reform Committee, Hochberg found that everyone

cernible attitudes could be recognised. To Hochberg's surprise those

"Nous voudrions meme que les israelites formassent en Palestine

prement dite qui tiendrait en deux cette masse compacte musuI-

The second and third attitudes were those of Muslims-some of

tion, while others would only agree to it on certain conditions. The

a certain sum of money so that he would not become a burden on

the country. Of the twenty nationalists whom Hochberg met, only

who welcomed the Jewish immigrants enthusiastically; these two

Muslims were opposed just because the Jews represented a European

bably be unwilling to enter into such an arrangement unless the

tribute to the formation of a force which could turn itself against

them". In any event it was recognised that no entente could be made