FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144621. May 9, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ISAGANI GUITTAP y

PENGSON (Acquitted), WILFREDO MORELOS y CRUZ
(Acquitted), CESAR OSABEL @ DANILO MURILLO @ DANNY @
SONNY VISAYA @ BENJIE CANETE, ARIEL DADOR y DE
CHAVEZ (Discharge), DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS,
LUISITO GUILLING @ LUISITO (Acquitted), and JOHN DOE @
PURCINO, accused.
DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 92-387, finding her and
accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P67,800.00 as actual damages.
[1]

On September 1, 1992, an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide

was filed against appellant Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y
Cruz, Cesar Osabel, Ariel Dador y De Chavez, Luisito Guilling and John Doe @
Purcino. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
[2]

That on or about the 17th day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with bladed weapons, by means
of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away certain personal items, to wit:
one (1) solid gold ring valued at P8,000.00
one (1) diamond ring valued at P40,000.00
one (1) necklace with pendant valued at P2,000.00
cash money in the amount of P4,500.00
one (1) samsonite bag valued at P650.00

one (1) .22 Cal. Squibbman with SN 64130 valued at P5,000.00

one (1) pair of sandal valued at P650.00
one (1) music mate (karaoke) valued at P5,000.00
one (1) jacket (adidas) valued at P1,000.00; and
one (1) pair of shoes valued at P1,000.00
with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo Jael
and Lionela Caringal, without the consent and against the will of the latter, to the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned offended parties in the aforestated sum
of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency, and, on the same occasion of such robbery, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with the same
bladed weapons, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab both of said
spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several
fatal wounds which directly caused the death of the aforenamed spouses.
[3]

Contrary to law.

[4]

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued. Accused Ariel Dador was discharged as a state witness while
accused Purcino remained at large.
On February 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena
Masinag GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
and they are sentenced toRECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties
provided by law. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Isagani Guittap, Wilfrido
Morelos and Luisito Guilling are hereby ACQUITTED.
The accused Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Romualdo Jael and Leonila Caringal Jael in the amount of
(P100,000.00) One Hundred Thousand Pesos plus actual damages of (P67,800.00)
Sixty Thousand and Eight Hundred Pesos, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.

[5]

During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15,
1992, Cesar Osabel asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant
Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they got there, Osabel and
Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their
way home, Osabel explained to Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob

the spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. He further told them that according to
Masinag, the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their
daughter lived with them in their house.
The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of
the Jael spouses to execute the plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador
stayed outside and positioned himself approximately 30 meters away from the
house. Moments later, he heard a woman shouting for help from inside the house. After
two hours, Osabel and Purcino came out, carrying with them one karaoke machine and
one rifle. Osabels hands were bloodied. He explained that he had to tie both the victims
hands with the power cord of a television set before he repeatedly stabbed them. He
killed the spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities.
Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the
garage of a bus line. However, when Dador returned with the tricycle, the two were no
longer there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and found him there with
Purcino. They were counting the money they got from the victims. They gave him
P300.00. Later, when Dador accompanied the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the
karaoke machine, he received another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in
Gulang-Gulang, Lucena City.
Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M.
Sante. During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting
complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and implicating appellant and
Osabel in said crime. The confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver
Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission
Office. Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and
appellants involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of
Atty. Alejandrino.
Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July
17, 1992, he noticed that the victims, who were known to be early risers, had not come
out of their house. He started calling them but there was no response. He instructed his
son to fetch the victims son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived, they all went
inside the house and found bloodstains on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor
opened the bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the victims.
Dr. Vicente F. Martinez performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the
victims and testified that since rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of the
victims, Romualdo Jael died between six to eight hours before the examination while
Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The cause of death of the victims
was massive shock secondary to massive hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds.
Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and
homicide. She testified that she knew the victims because their houses were about a
kilometer apart.She and Osabel were friends because he courted her, but they never
had a romantic relationship. She further claimed that the last time she saw Osabel was
six months prior to the incident. She did not know Dador and Guilling at the time of the
incident. According to her, it is not true that she harbored resentment against the victims

because they berated her son for stealing their daughters handbag. On the whole, she
denied any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.
From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former
appealed, based on the lone assigned error:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
CONSPIRING WITH HER CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL
PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAID CRIME.
The appeal is meritorious.
While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial
court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination, where there exist
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been ignored or
misconstrued, or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of facts, we
may disregard its findings.
[6]

[7]

[8]

Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were
insufficient to establish with moral certainty her participation in the
conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to rob
the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when Osabel told him on their
way home. Thus, Dador had no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually
made and of appellants participation thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated
her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in
open court when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of
violence.
On direct examination, Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on
July 15, 1992, to wit:
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Q. And do you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that transpired
among you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that transpired
among you on July 15, 1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?
A. The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.
Q. How did that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of Sps. Jael?
A. It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel Murillo and
Decena Masinag, sir.
Q. And why were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena Masinag who
planned the robbery?

A. Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far from us
and they were inside the room, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. On that night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk with
Decena Masinag together with your companions Danilo Murillo and Purcino?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk to you?
ATTY. FLORES:
Already answered, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness, may answer.
WITNESS:
None, sir. (emphasis ours)[9]

We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal
knowledge but from what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near
appellant and that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her house on
July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellants
participation in the conspiracy.
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his
own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
defined as evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard
from others. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what
someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we
held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is
without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is
the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

Osabels
extrajudicial
confession
is
likewise
inadmissible
against
appellant. The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence
against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
[14]

[15]

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing,

does not apply in this case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a coaccused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be

independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the
case at bar, apart from Osabels extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of
appellants alleged participation in the conspiracy was presented by the
prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not
sufficiently established.
Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is
used as a corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his coaccused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other
circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the
guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt. As earlier stated, there is no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may
corroborate.
[16]

In People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by

reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the conspiracy.
[17]

In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with
and concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she
had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy,
mere knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship.
[18]

[19]

Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any
element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the
mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
[20]

[21]

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellants innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. She is ORDERED RELEASED
unless there are other lawful causes for her continued detention. The Director of Prisons

is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time
when appellant is released pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Judge Abelio M. Marte.

[2]

Also known as Danilo Murillo, Danny, Sonny Visaya, Benjie Canete.

[3]

Spelled elsewhere in the records as Leonila.

[4]

Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[5]

Rollo, p. 57.

[6]

People v. Franco, 336 Phil. 206, 213 [1997].

[7]

People v. Abayon, G.R. No. 142874, 31 July 2002.

[8]

People v. Bertulfo, G.R. No. 143790, 7 May 2002.

[9]

TSN, November 23, 1993, pp. 17-22.

[10]

People v. Manhuyod, G.R. No. 124676, 20 May 1998, 290 SCRA 257, 270.

[11]

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 124514, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 208, 215.

[12]

G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002.

[13]

People v. Ubongen, G.R. No. 126024, 20 April 2001.

[14]

Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 25.

[15]

People v. Raquel, 333 Phil. 72, 80 [1996].

[16]

People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 138022, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 637, 649, citing People v. Aquino,
369 Phil. 701, 725 [1999].

[17]

347 Phil. 410, 430 [1997].

[18]

People v. Campos, G.R. No. 111535, 19 July 2001, 361 SCRA 339, 349.

[19]

People v. Listerio, G.R. No. 122099, 5 July 2000, 335 SCRA 40, 59.

[20]

People v. Leao, G.R. No. 138886, 9 October 2001, 366 SCRA 774, 788.

[21]

People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, 24 September 2002.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versus-

G.R. No. 187536

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson
BRION,
BERSAMIN,*
PEREZ, and
SERENO, JJ.

MICHAEL
BOKINGO
alias Promulgated:
MICHAEL
BOKINGCO
andREYNANTE COL,
August 10, 2011
Accused-Appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the Amended Decision[1] dated 14 November 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael
Bokingco[2] (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua.
On 31 July 2000, an Information[3] was filed against appellants charging
them of the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting
and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby
inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which
caused his death.[4]

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not

guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.[5]

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house
along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop,
which formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment
units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is
Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasions
brother-in-law, while the other row was still under construction at the time of his
death.Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13
construction workers employed by Pasion.[6]
The prosecutions evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February
2000, Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came
from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back door. [7] A few minutes
later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to
check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on
the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door
and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was
hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck and managed to push him
away.Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a coworker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was
found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment
No. 3 and saw Pasions body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio
were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was
treated for his injuries.[8]
Elsa testified that she was in the masters bedroom on the second floor of the
house when she heard banging sounds and her husbands moans. She immediately
got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her
way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards
her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was
wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas.[9] Col then instructed her
to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know
the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards
the back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached
the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: tara,
patay na siya.[10] Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa
proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor,
bathed in his own blood.[11]

PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4
in Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he
received a phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp.
Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He
noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw
hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the
kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the
nearby
construction
site. The
police
went
to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in
one of the beds while Vitalicio was still loitering around the emergency room. He
approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the incident. [12] He
prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.[13]
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted
down notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco
admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing
several days before because they got fed up with Pasion.[14]
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra),
contained the following findings:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds

Body in rigor mortis
Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to
the right of the root of the nose.
Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 x 6 cm.
Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the
nipple line, 0.8cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and
puncturing the manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both
extremities round.
2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the
anterior median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the
anterior median line 4 on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both
extremities round.
Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 cm length.

Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length
involving all layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping
wound.
Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 cm to the right of injury (18) 1
cm below, wound involving the whole scalp.
Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm
length.
Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part
of the left temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region
with brain tissue out of the gaping wound.
Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear
extensions, with gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped
with linear extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration
and expulsion.
Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
Brain tissue damage.[15]

Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull
proved fatal.[16]
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in
Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened
by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did
not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco
replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him
in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both
struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right
after the incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.
[17]
During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings
towards Pasion.[18]
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by
Pasion. He however resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from
his salary.He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought

to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as
the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well.
[19]

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment [20] finding

appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias
MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse
of confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.Each accused is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five
thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six
hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) as attorneys fees, Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.[21]

In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the trial court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of
Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as
conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating
circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.[22]

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] and called the appellate

courts attention on the omission to rule on Bokingcos fate when it rendered the
challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside
from Bokingcos admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant

case.Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used

as evidence against his alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to
the findings of the lower courts that the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the commission
of the crime.[24]
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the
criminal liability of Bokingco in its dispositive portion of its Amended Decision,
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants
MICHAEL
BOKINGCO
and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable
doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable
penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the
accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the
said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs
of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.[25]

Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this
Court required the parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from
notice thereof if they so desire. [26] Appellants manifested that they are no longer
filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their arguments in the Appellants
Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.[27] The appellee likewise manifested
that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. [28] The instant case was
thus submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Amended Decision, two issues were
raised: 1) whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to
convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.

There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco

made two (2) separate and dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial
confession taken during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he
and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court
that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the
head. On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for
murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They
question the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime considering that
no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by
Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the
case. They belittle Bokingcos extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the
killing. The attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence was likewise assailed by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not
purposely sought but it was merely co-incidental that the crime took place at that
time. Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to
aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they were living
in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because
they worked in the construction of the victims apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established
that Pasion was defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no
opportunity for him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco.
The OSG agrees as well with the trial courts findings that evident premeditation,
nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime
to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was
commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.[29] Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the
attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on
the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.[30]

Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. [31] But the admitted
manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding
of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination;
and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [32] It
is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much
time had elapsed before it was carried out. [33] In the instant case, no proof was
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in
court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. [34] Despite
the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the
prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his
and Cols plan to kill Pasion.[35] Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without
the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

In People v. Sunga,[36] we held that the right to counsel applies in certain

pretrial proceedings that can be deemed critical stages in the criminal process. The
preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by
the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. [37] In
said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later
acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary

investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did
have a counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights,
he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was
held inadmissible.[38] In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his
confession was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that
evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that
Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in this case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for
Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of
Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco
for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied
in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which
ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years
and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty
shall be within the range of prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum
to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision
mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in its
medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum is appropriate under the circumstances.[39] The award of exemplary
damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.

Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to

hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, Col asserts that Bokingcos uncounselled testimony that appellants planned
to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other
evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsas statements
during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to
open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard from
BokingcoTara, patay na siya, are not adequate to support the finding of conspiracy.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Cols conviction of murder by
conspiracy by mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the
victims wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and attacked her with
a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col when he
was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants
acts are indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses
had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the
factual findings of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination.[40] However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial
courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the
outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the
assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.[41] The second exception
obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be
proved.Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,

during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the
acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest.[42] Unity of purpose and unity in the execution
of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.[43]
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as
the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.[44]
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants
fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of
Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas
house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date
when you were in your masters bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where
we reside.
xxxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning
on that day when you were in your masters bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of
the kitchen was directly leading to the back door or back portion of the
building where the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this masters bedroom located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not
able to go out of the kitchen because I was blocked.

Q: You were blocked by whom?

A: By Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was
situated near the back door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the
front portion of our residence.
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp
object under my chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under
her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two
steps away from him. (Around 3 meters)
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was
hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was mahapdi (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a
sharp weapon under your chin?

A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp
object under my chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I
was wounded under my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object.[45]
xxxx
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open
did Reynante Col do about it?

the

vault

of

the

pawnshop,

A: He did not say anything.

Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.[46]

what

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired
with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Cols actuations can be equated to
attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against
appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.[47]
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been
killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in
concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there
were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to
escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco
had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not
coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up
anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the
latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and
is considered as hearsay against them.[48] An exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such
act or declaration.[49] In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to
the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.[50] As we have previously discussed, we did not find
any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence
against Col.

Bokingcos judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted

that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6)
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Per Special Order No. 1053.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice) and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-25.
[2]
In this Decision, we refer to appellant Michael Bokingo by his alias Michael Bokingco.
[3]
Another Information was filed before the first level court of Angeles City for Attempted Homicide. Records, Vol.
I, p. 92.
[4]
Id. at 1.
[5]
Id. at 103.
[6]
CA rollo, p. 137.
[7]
TSN, 23 October 2001, p. 7.
[8]
TSN, 26 July 2001, pp. 4-13.
[9]
TSN, 22 January 2002, pp. 3-5.
[10]
Id.
[11]
TSN, 28 February 2002, pp. 3-5.
[12]
TSN, 15 February 2001, pp. 5-18.
[13]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.
[14]
TSN, 3 December 2002, p. 13.
[15]
Records, Vol. II, p. 413.
[16]
TSN, 30 January 2001, p. 15.
[17]
TSN, 16 July 2003, pp. 3-7.
[18]
TSN, 2 September 2003, p. 2.
[19]
TSN, 4 November 2003, pp. 3-7.
[20]
Presided by Judge Ma. Angelica T. Paras-Quiambao. CA rollo, pp. 7-30.
[21]
Id. at 29-30.
[22]
Id. at 154.
[23]
Id. at 161-166.
[24]
Id. at 164-165.
[25]
Id. at 195-196.
[26]
Rollo, p. 45.
[27]
Id. at 46.
[28]
Id. at 53.
[29]
People v. Tabuelog, G.R. No. 178059, 22 January 2008, 542 SCRA 301, 320 citing People v. Concepcion, G.R.
No. 169060, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 660, 670-671.
[30]
TSN, 26 July 2001, pp. 4-13.
[31]
Records, p. 103.
[32]
People v. Delpino, G.R. No. 171453, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 515, 529 citing People v. Tigle, 460 Phil. 368,
382-383 (2004) citing further People v. Baldogo, 444 Phil. 35, 59-60 (2003).

[33]

People v. Grabino, G.R. No. 189981, 9 March 2011; People v. Agudez, G.R. No. 138386-87, 20 May 2004, 428
SCRA 692, 709 citing People v. Jarlos, G.R. No. 140897, 19 February 2003, 397 SCRA 735, 743744.
[34]
TSN, 16 July 2003, p. 5.
[35]
TSN, 2 September 2003, p. 10-11.
[36]
447 Phil. 776 (2003).
[37]
Id. at 807.
[38]
Id. at 790-791.
[39]
Revita v. People, G.R. No. 177564, 31 October 2008, 570 SCRA 356, 372.
[40]
People v. Olimba, G.R. No. 185008, 22 September 2010.
[41]
People v. Bi-ay, G.R. No. 192187, 13 December 2010 citing People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 188601, 29 June 2010,
622 SCRA 524, 537-538.
[42]
People v. Relos, Sr., G.R. No. 189326, 24 November 2010 citing People v. Delos Santos, 399 Phil. 405, 417
(2000); People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 105992, 1 February 1995, 241 SCRA 28, 34; People v. Agpawan, 393
Phil. 434, 438 (2000).
[43]
People v. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, 22 April 1994, 231 SCRA 693, 698 citing Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-57519, 13 September 1988, 165 SCRA 316, 323.
[44]
Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, 23 February 2009, 580 SCRA 54, citing Sim v. People, G.R. No. 159280, 18
May 2004, 428 SCRA 459, 465-466.
[45]
TSN, 22 January 2002, pp. 3-5.
[46]
TSN, 28 February 2002, p. 3.
[47]
Records, Vol. I, p. 92.
[48]
People v. Vda. de Ramos, 451 Phil. 214, 224-225 (2003).
[49]
People v. Morial, 415 Phil. 310, 335-336 (2001).
[50]
Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, 19 January 2010, 610 SCRA 316, 332 citing People v. Tena, G.R. No.
100909, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 43, 48-49 citing further Montoya v. Baun, 44 O.G. 4382 as cited in
Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p. 349.

G.R. No. 158236

Today is Friday, July 15, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
September 1, 2004

LIGAYA V. SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962 granting the petition for
certiorari filed by Domingo I. Orda, Jr. and nullifying the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 258 dated July
5, 2002 and July 23, 2002 in People v. Ligaya V. Santos, et al., for murder, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0921 and 01-0425.
The Antecedents

On January 17, 2001, Dale B. Orda, a college student and son of respondent, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Domingo Orda, Jr.,
was shot by a male person on a motorcycle at the corner of Ayala Boulevard and San Marcelino Street, Manila. Dale was then
seated at the passengers seat at the back of their car, while his father was at the wheel. Fortunately, Dale survived the shooting. 3

At about 6:20 p.m. on April 2, 2001, another son of the respondent, Francis Orda, a twenty-year-old senior engineering student of the
Mapua Institute of Technology, was shot to death at Saudi Arabia Street corner Sierra Leone Street, Better Living Subdivision,
Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. Gina Azarcon, a helper at the Bakers Brew Coffee Shop at the corner of Saudi Arabia and
Somalia Streets, Barangay Don Bosco, gave a sworn statement to the police investigators on April 1, 2001, declaring that three male
persons perpetrated the crime, two of whom shot the victim inside his car.4

On April 7, 2001, Azarcon gave a supplemental affidavit pointing to and identifying Rolly Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano as two of the
assailants.5 An Information was filed in the RTC of Paraaque City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on April 18, 2001,
charging Rolly Tonion alias "Komang" and Jhunrey Soriano with murder for the killing of Francis Orda. 6

The accused filed a petition for bail. The prosecution presented Gina Azarcon as its witness in opposition to the petition.

On June 7, 2001, Ernesto M. Regala and his son, Dennis C. Regala, a barangay tanod of Barangay 659, Arroceros, Ermita, Manila,
executed separate affidavits before the Assistant City Prosecutor of Paraaque City. Ernesto narrated that at about 10:00 p.m. on
April 1, 2001, he sent his son, Dennis, to deliver collections from the public toilet at Arroceros to Barangay Chairman Ligaya Santos.
When Dennis had not yet arrived by 11:00 p.m., he decided to fetch his son. While they were in Santos office, Dennis and Ernesto
heard Santos saying, "Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda." They saw Santos give a
gun to Rolly Tonion, who was then with Edna Cortez, a certain Nognog, Ronnie Ybaez, and another male companion. Dennis then
gave Ernestos collection amounting to P400 to Santos. At 11:00 p.m. on April 2, 2001, Cortez told Ernesto that the son of the
assistant city prosecutor was ambushed at the Better Living Subdivision, and that the latter was fortunate because the bullet
ntended for him hit his son instead.7 For his part, Dennis alleged that at 9:00 a.m. on April 3, 2001, Tonion asked him to return the
gun to Santos for him, but that he refused to do so. On April 15, 2001, Santos asked him to monitor the activities of the respondent
and his son at the store owned by the latter, located at the LRT Station at Arroceros.

The respondent executed an affidavit-complaint dated June 7, 2001 and filed the same in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque City, charging Santos, Cortez and Ybaez with murder for the death of his son Francis. 8The case was docketed as I.S.
No. 01-F-2052.

In her counter-affidavit, Santos denied the charge and claimed that the affidavits executed by Ernesto and Dennis were all lies. She
averred that she was in their house in Cavite City on April 1, 2001 and returned to Manila only in the early morning of April 2, 2001.
Her alibi was corroborated by the affidavits of Anthony Alejado, Marianito Fuentes, Normita Samonte, and Lilian Lemery. She also
denied Dennis claims that she asked him to monitor the activities of the respondent and his son on April 15, 2001. She alleged that
the respondent filed the charge and other baseless charges against her to enable him to gain control over Plaza Lawton where his
store was located.

Cortez also denied the charge. She claimed in her affidavit that Santos was not in her office on April 1, 2001, it being a Sunday. She

alleged that the affidavits of Dennis and Ernesto were lies.

On July 31, 2001, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Santos and Cortez for murder. 9 An
Information for murder was, thereafter, filed on August 29, 2001 against Santos and Cortez, docketed as Criminal Case No. 010921.10

On August 30, 2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit implicating Barangay Kagawad Christopher Castillo, his brother Girlie Castillo,
and Robert Bunda for the killing of Francis. On the same day, the respondent executed an affidavit-complaint charging them for the
same crime.11 On September 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order requiring the prosecutor to submit additional evidence against
Cortez.12 Sabino M. Frias, thereafter, executed an affidavit on September 18, 2001, implicating Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers,
Bunda, and Pedro Jimenez, the driver of Santos, in the killing of Francis. 13

Meanwhile, Santos, Cortez, and Ybaez filed a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in I.S. No. 01-F-2052 in the
Department of Justice (DOJ).14 On their motion, the trial court suspended the proceedings against Santos and Cortez and the
ssuance of warrants for their arrest. However, on September 12, 2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit recanting her statement
against the Castillo brothers and Bunda.15

In the meantime, during the hearing on October 23, 2001, the prosecution terminated the presentation of its testimonial evidence in
Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on the accused Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail and offered its documentary evidence. The accused
presented Azarcon as their first witness to prove their innocence of the crime charged.

On November 12, 2001, the public prosecutor issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 01-H-3410 finding probable cause for murder against
the Castillo brothers and Bunda. On November 28, 2001, the public prosecutor filed a motion to amend information and to admit
amended information against them as additional accused.16 The accused, thereafter, filed a petition for review of the resolution of the
public prosecutor before the DOJ on January 7, 2002.17 They also filed a motion to suspend proceedings and the issuance of
warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0425 and 01-0921 and a motion to admit newly discovered evidence, namely,
Azarcons affidavit of recantation.18 The public prosecutor opposed the motion and filed a motion to admit second amended
nformation with Pedro Jimenez as additional accused.19 On February 5, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion of
the accused Castillo brothers and Bunda and ordering the issuance of warrants for the arrest of Santos and Cortez. 20 The court then
ssued the said warrants based on its finding of probable cause against them 21 for lack of probable cause to recall the warrants of
arrest, and to examine the witnesses. The court, however, denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction
over their persons and it had not yet received any resolution from the Secretary of Justice on their petition for review. On February
20, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the petition for bail by Tonion and Soriano, 22 ruling that the evidence of guilt was
strong. In the meantime, Ernesto and Dennis recanted their affidavits.23

During the trial on April 23, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 01-0425, accused Tonion and Soriano presented Dennis as their witness. 24

On April 26, 2002, the trial court issued an Order admitting the second amended Information against the Castillo brothers, Bunda,
and Jimenez and ordering the issuance of warrants for their arrest.25 On April 29, 2002, the said warrants were issued by the court.

On June 11, 2002, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez issued a Joint Resolution reversing the assailed resolution of the public
prosecutor and directing the latter to withdraw the Informations against Santos, Cortez, Bunda, the Castillo brothers, and Jimenez.
The Secretary of Justice found Azarcon, Frias, Dennis, and Ernesto incredible witnesses because of their recantations, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
City Prosecutor of Paraaque City is hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the criminal Informations for murder
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258, Paraaque City, against respondents LIGAYA SANTOS, EDNA
CORTEZ and RONNIE YBAEZ (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against respondents CHRISTOPHER and GIRLIE
CASTILLO and ROBERT BUNDA (I.S. No. 01-H-3410) and to report to this Department the action taken within ten

(10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.26

On June 27, 2002, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. However, the public prosecutor filed a motion to
withdraw the Informations in the two cases on June 20, 2002 in compliance with the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice. On
July 2, 2002, the respondent filed a comment/opposition to the motion to withdraw the Informations filed by the public prosecutor,
contending:
I- THAT COMPLAINANT HEREBY ADOPTS ITS POSITION RAISED IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (COPY ATTACHED AS ANNEX "A"). HENCE, THE
DETERMINATION OF THE INSTANT MOTION IS STILL PREMATURE ESPECIALLY SO THAT ALL THE
ACCUSED-MOVANTS ARE STILL AT LARGE, EVADING SERVICE OF ARREST WARRANT, IN WHICH CASE
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF;
II- THAT THE LATE (SIC) FINDINGS OF NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ACCUSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE IS NOT BINDING;
III- THAT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JUDICIOUSLY AND SOUNDLY ADJUDGED THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE; and,
IV- THAT TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT MOTION WOULD ONLY CREATE CHAOS AND INJUSTICE. 27

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the trial court issued an Order on July 5, 2002 granting the motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the Informations in the interest of justice and equity.28 The trial court ruled that such withdrawal would not
prevent the refiling of the Informations against the accused who would not be able to invoke double jeopardy, considering that the
court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The private complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
which was not opposed by the public prosecutor. Nonetheless, on July 23, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion
on the ground that it could not order the refiling of the Informations if the DOJ and the public prosecutor refused to do so. 29

The respondent forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the orders of the trial court.

On March 19, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition. The appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the withdrawal of the Informations without making an independent evaluation on the merits of the case. Santos
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and a supplement to the said motion, which was opposed by the respondent. On
May 6, 2003, Santos and Cortez were arrested based on the warrants issued by the trial court. On May 22, 2003, the CA issued a
resolution denying the said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Santos filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending as follows:
A.) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND ACTED ARBITRARILY IN NULLIFYING THE ORDER OF
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PROSECUTIONS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 01-0921 AND 01-0425 PURSUANT TO DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION DATED 11 JUNE 2002.
B.) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DIRECTLY REINSTATING THE CRIMINAL
COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE WARRANTS OF ARREST, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE TRIAL COURT THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE OF DETERMINING WHETHER TO PURSUE OR
DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO ITS OWN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AND EVIDENCE IN LIGHT
OF THE DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION FINDING LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.30

The threshold issue is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
urisdiction in granting the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the Informations and in lifting the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner on the Secretary of Justices finding that there was no probable cause for the filing of the said Informations.

The petitioner avers that the trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the public prosecutor to
withdraw the two Informations as ordered by the Secretary of Justice in his Joint Resolution on the finding that there was no probable
cause against the accused therein to be charged with murder. The petitioner asserts that, by allowing the withdrawal of the
Informations without an independent assessment of the merit of the evidence and without prejudice to the refiling thereof, the court
did not thereby order the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner posits that, after all, the trial court had
not yet acquired complete criminal jurisdiction to resolve the cases because it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all
the accused. The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the rulings of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul 31 and Perez v. Hagonoy
Rural Bank, Inc.32 because the said cases involve the withdrawal of the Informations and the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency
of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a motion merely to withdraw the Informations and not to dismiss the cases due to
nsufficiency of evidence.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that the decision of the CA is in conformity with the
rulings of this Court in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 33 Dee v. Court of Appeals,34 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,35 Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals,36 Jalandoni v. Drilon37 and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.38 The OSG asserts that the rulings of this Court apply
whether the motion filed by the public prosecutor was for the withdrawal of the Informations due to lack of probable cause or
nsufficiency of evidence. The OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by
their respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative reliefs.

In her reply to the comment of the OSG, the petitioner insisted that she did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
filing her motion to quash the Informations for lack of probable cause and to examine the witnesses before the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against her. As the trial court itself held, it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over her person.

In nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court, the appellate court ratiocinated as follows:

To support these assigned errors, petitioner contends that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when he granted the Motion to Withdraw Informations filed by his trial prosecutor based on the Joint Resolution of the
Department of Justice and in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
We resolve to grant this petition considering that this contention is impressed with merit.

The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court,
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation (Crespo v. Mogul, 151
SCRA 462).

However, if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of the merits of the case or make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised
position of the prosecution, the trial court has relinquished the discretion he was duty-bound to exercise because, in
effect, it is the prosecution through the Department of Justice which decides what to do and that the trial court was
reduced into a mere rubber stamp, in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul (Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 237
SCRA 576, 577), which is the situation obtaining in this case considering that the dismissal of the criminal cases
against private respondents was based solely on [the] recommendation of the Secretary of Justice because the

reliance of public respondent Judge was based solely on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary of Justice had
recommended the dismissal of the case against private respondent which is an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of the courts pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul
(Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, 327 SCRA 588).
Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest on private respondents which, in effect,
means that a probable cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an
independent evaluation especially that the bases of the probable cause are the same evidence which mere made the
bases of the Joint Resolution dated June 11, 2002 of the Secretary of Justice.
Consequently, the dismissal order dated July 5, 2002 having been issued upon an erroneous exercise of judicial
discretion, the same must have to be set aside.39

We agree with the appellate court.

In Crespo v. Mogul,40 the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public
prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the
accused.41 The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People or the private complainant to due process of law.42 When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the
case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to
deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound
exercise of its judicial prerogative.43

In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant
to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of
probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice
that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction of the accused. As the Court emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 44 the trial court must make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the prosecution:

Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no libel was
committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance
was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused
to ascertain the allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last
premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy
of the motion to dismiss.

In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judges own
personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the
stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself
be convinced that there was, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived
at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required
was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of
judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the
case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which

decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul.
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainants right to due process as well as upon an
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said dismissal order and
remanding the case to the trial court for arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.
Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an
abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 45

The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits,
documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court;46 or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the
public prosecutor.

In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the
possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court relied
solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order:

For resolution is the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Informations filed on June 21, 2002 by the Office of the City Prosecutor, this
urisdiction, to which a Comment/Opposition thereto was filed by private complainant Domingo I. Orda, Jr. on July 2, 2002.

It appears that the motion is in compliance with the Joint Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated on June 11,
2002 directing said Office to cause the withdrawal of the criminal informations for murder against the accused, Ligaya V. Santos,
Edna Cortez, and Ronnie Ybaez, in Crim. Case No. 01-0921 (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against Christopher Castillo, Girlie Castillo,
and Robert Bunda in Crim. Case No. 01-0425 (I.S. No. 01-H-3410), copy of which was received by this Court on June 19, 2002.

The Court, after going over the Comment/Opposition filed by the private complainant, vis--vis the Joint Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of the DOJ, is of the firm belief and honest opinion and so holds that meanwhile that the Motion for Reconsideration
of the private complainant is pending before the DOJ, justice and equity dictates that this Court has to give due course to the Motion
to Withdraw the Criminal Informations, specially so that warrants for the arrest of all the accused have been issued. No injustice,
prejudice, or damage will be suffered by the private complainant considering that if ever his Motion for Reconsideration will be
granted by the DOJ, said criminal informations may be refiled and the principle of double jeopardy cannot be invoked by all the
accused as the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons. Upon the other hand, the warrants of arrest will serve as
swords of damocles hanging over the heads of the accused if the Court will rule otherwise. 47

In granting the public prosecutors motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary
of Justice.

Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become
final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which
had not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations.
In fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste.

Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits
of Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of
Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail.

Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the pendency of her
petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice.

The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were
the petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the
Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to
resolve the motion of the public prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits. While it may be true that the accused could be
ncarcerated, as warrants of arrest had already been issued against them pending the resolution of the respondents motion for
reconsideration, the same does not justify ignoring the rules and running roughshod over the rights of the respondent. Justice and
equity is not for the accused alone; the State and the private complainant are entitled thereto, as well. Moreover, the petitioner had
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court when she filed her motion to examine the witnesses, and suspend the proceedings
and the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

The trial court committed another travesty when it denied the motion for reconsideration of its July 5, 2002 Order, on its ratiocination
that
In todays hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the Public Prosecutor informed the Court that
their office will no longer file any opposition thereto, the said Motion for Reconsideration is denied considering that
the filing and the withdrawal of an Information is purely an executive function and the Court cannot order the refiling if
the Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutors Office refuses to do so. 48

This is so because the July 5, 2002 Order of the court had not yet become final and executory when the private complainant filed her
motion for reconsideration of the said order.49 Until and unless the July 5, 2002 Order shall have become final and executory, the
Informations filed with the court were not yet considered withdrawn. On the other hand, if the trial court had granted the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent and set aside its July 5, 2002 Order, there would no longer be a need to refile the Informations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
s AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno*, Austria-Martinez**, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*

**

On official leave.
Acting Chairman.

Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Bennie A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and
Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring.
1

Penned by Judge Raul E. De Leon.

Rollo, p. 263.

Id. at 11.

Id. at 134.

Id. at 136.

Id. at 140-142.

Id. at 139.

Id. at 174-176.

10

Id. at 177.

11

Id. at 179.

12

Id. at 502.

13

Id. at 195-197.

14

Id. at 182-190.

15

Id. at 193-194.

16

Id. at 229.

17

Id. at 233-245.

18

Id. at 246-248.

19

Id. at 249.

20

Id. at 251-252.

21

Id. at 253.

22

Id. at 254-262.

23

Id. at 267-270.

24

Id. at 271-306.

25

Id. at 307.

26

Id. at 321.

27

Id. at 340-341.

28

Id. at 68-69.

29

Id. at 70.

30

Id. at 26.

31

151 SCRA 462 (1987).

32

327 SCRA 588 (2000).

33

176 SCRA 287 (1989).

34

238 SCRA 254 (1994).

35

254 SCRA 307 (1996).

36

278 SCRA 656 (1997).

37

327 SCRA 107 (2000).

38

338 SCRA 511 (2000).

39

Rollo, pp. 62-63.

40

Supra, note 31.

41

Odin Security Agency, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, 365 SCRA 351 (2001).

42

Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575 (1994).

43

Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra.

44

Supra, note 42.

45

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, supra.

46

Section 8, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

47

Rollo, pp. 68-69.

48

Id. at 70.

49

Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 provides:

SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party
and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such service. No second or
further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191752

June 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused.
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian
Cruz Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC
No. 03474. The CA decision affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008 decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 196, Paraaque City, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The prosecutions evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004, Ibaez went to Weapons System
Corporation (WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the companys gun show in SM
Megamall. Ibaez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSCs firing range
and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many
people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSCs only female employee. 3
At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one
opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range was located, and called
Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not
understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he
could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the
companys operations manager, and informed him that Zaldys hands had been tied. After one hour,
the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police
entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the
police that the companys gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered
the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.4 Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the
body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and
abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.5
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that
Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team

and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas
approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of
firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the
police, and gave the names of the other persons involved in the crime. 6
Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the
buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the
buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent
Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and
brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents
inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the
meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms7 from Cachuelas house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial
number T1102-03E000151.8
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibaez whom the asset also contacted. Ibaez directed
the asset to bring the prospective buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to
Imus and there met Ibaez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car bearing plate no. PMN
645. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibaez where the firearms were. Ibaez
brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns
had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibaez when they sensed that he was already
becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibaez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial
number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z. 9
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons
responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex.10 Nabilgas also executed a handwritten
confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime. 11
The prosecution filed an Information12 for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the
appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded
not guilty on arraignment.13 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.14
In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court likewise ordered the appellants to
pay Hector C. Rodriguez, Jr.15 P1,563,300.00, representing the value of the firearms and
ammunitions stolen from WSC. Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted
on ground of reasonable doubt.
The appellants filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. In its decision
of August 7, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications: (a) the
appellants were ordered to pay Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. the amount of P1,093,947.50,
representing the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WSC, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid; and (b) they are likewise ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex P45,000.00 as actual damages with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed
WSC and killed Rex during the course of this robbery: (1) Ibaez visited WSC two days before the
robbery and asked several questions from Henessy; (2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53

firearms and several ammunitions worth P1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3) among the firearms
stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial
number FML 245; (4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range; (5) Rex
sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibaez were caught
trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with
serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate entrapment operations; and (7) Cachuela and
Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms.
The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants defenses of alibi,
denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants
argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that
the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed
to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment
operations.
Our Ruling
In this final review, we deny the appeal, and resolve to increase the amount for restitution by the
appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. from P1,093,947.50 to P1,481,000.00.
"A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either
by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4)
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery." 16
Admissibility of the out-of-court
identification and the extrajudicial
confession
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and
in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note
that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Linos
testimony regarding Zaldys alleged out-of-court identification.
People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the

identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. [italics and emphasis
supplied]
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants
as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the
line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with
the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up
was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate
who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of
prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the
appellants.
To our mind, Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to
evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications,
such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The
absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment
and assessment of Linos testimony.
The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession 18 at the NBI Main
Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he
repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he
was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's
choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing." 19
We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he
executed the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.20
In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the lawyer
should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas confession was not made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who
acted in Nabilgas behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI
itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys investigators
that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed
this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the

alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession.
There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas
confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence
of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An
effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." 22 In addition, the extrajudicial
confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the
witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.
At any rate, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in
view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered
as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.23
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of
evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with
the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be
shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Sufficiency of the proven
circumstantial evidence
In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldys out-of-court identification and Nabilgas extrajudicial
confession, the prosecutions case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be
secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of
the crime to the exclusion of all others."24 There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the
appellants participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed
crime.25
"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main
fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133
of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably

leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with
one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the
accused."26
In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was to rob
WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery: first, Ibaez
went to WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of the
firing range, the amount of the membership fee of the companys gun club, the days when there are
many people in the firing range, and whether she was the only female employee of the company;
second, when Henessy arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2004, Zaldy informed her that he
cannot open the front door because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the companys
operations manager and informed him that Zaldy had been tied; fourth, the police saw Zaldy
handcuffed to the vault when they opened the back gate; fifth, the police saw the lifeless body of Rex
lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when they entered the firing range; sixth, the
operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several ammunitions had been missing from the
gun store, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30
with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI agents caught Cachuela trying to sell the .9 mm
Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 in an entrapment operation in Cavite; eighth, the
NBI agents caught Ibaez trying to sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45
Llama with serial number 04490Z in a follow-up entrapment operation in Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and
Ibaez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms; tenth, Police
Inspector Armin Austria, the PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98 pieces of .45 fired
cartridge cases found at the crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z
recovered from Ibaez;27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found
that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused by a .45
pistol.
From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob
WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an internal act, but may
be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property." 28 Rex was killed to facilitate the
robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to the crime. In People v. De
Leon,29 we held that "homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b)
to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of
the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee Zaldy was not killed, but
merely tied to the vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the
malefactors decision to spare Zaldys life, but we note that Zaldy became one of the accused in this
case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the
robbery could have been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify
during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to be inadmissible) was
the only evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of evidence, we cannot make any definite
conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldys involvement in the crime charged.
We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act."30To recall, Ibaez was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking questions
to the companys secretary. Several days after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell
firearms that were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could not
satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The appellants

likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to
fabricate evidence against them. These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants,
to the exclusion of others, had robbed WSC.
To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body
of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibaez during the
entrapment operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus
between the robbery and the victims killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also came
from the same caliber of gun31 recovered from Ibaez. In the final analysis, the prosecution
sufficiently established the direct and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and
that the death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the same.32
The penalty and the awarded civil
indemnities
Robbery with homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We find that the trial and
appellate courts correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.
1wphi1

We affirm the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages to the heirs of
Rex, as these awards conform to prevailing jurisprudence on robbery with homicide when the
penalty imposed is only reclusion perpetua.33 We also affirm the award of P45,000.00 as actual
damages, as the prosecution successfully proved this amount through a receipt.
The CA ordered the appellants to restitute the amount of P1,093,947.50, representing of the value of
the stolen firearms and ammunitions. We, however, increase this amount to the total amount
of P1,481,000.00 as !his is the value of the stolen items as proven by the evidence on record. 34
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2009
in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be
restituted by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. be increased from P1,093,947.50
to P1,481,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 1460 dated May 29,
2013.
*

Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special
Order No. 1461 dated May 29, 2013.
**

Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, and concurred in by Associate

Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Antonio L. Villamor; rollo, pp. 2-44.
1

CA rollo, pp. 14-35.

TSN, June 9, 2005, pp. 19-23.

Id. at 7-12.

Records, p. 546.

TSN, July 7, 2005, pp. 8-15.

The other firearms recovered from Cachuela were a .22 Cooley Model 600 with serial
number 9196; a .45 Federal Caliber Pistol Receiver with serial number 502173; and a .45
Llama Pistol with serial number 07-04-15949-96.
7

TSN, July 7, 2005, pp. 15-18.

Id. at 24-27.

10

Id. at 29-30.

11

Id. at 31.

12

Records, p. 2.

13

Id. at 166-169.

14

Id. at 620-621.

15

The Branch Manager of Arms Depot Philippines, Inc.

People v. Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 601, 621; citations
omitted.
16

Id. at 617-618, citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249
SCRA 54.
17

18

Records, p. 21.

19

See People v. Bacor, 366 Phil. 197, 212 (1999).

20

See People v. Morial, 415 Phil. 310, 329 (2001); citation omitted, italics supplied.

G.R. No. 169431, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 596, 623-624, citing People v. Deniega, 321
Phil. 1028, 1041-1042 (1995); italics supplied.
21

22

See People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 901 (2004).

23

See People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 313, 332-333.

24

People v. Umayam, 431 Phil. 23, 32 (2002).

25

See People v. Biglete, G.R. No. 182920, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 546, 554.

See People v. Romero, G.R. No. 181041, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 210, 214; citation
omitted.
26

Per Firearms Identification Report No. FAIS-080-A-2004, no conclusion could be rendered

as to whether the seven other .45 fired bullets submitted for examination had been fired from
the Llama .45 pistol with serial number 04490Z.
27

See People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 178, 193, citing
People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 407 (2004).
28

29

Id. at 194.

30

Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(j).

31

The records do not indicate the guns serial number.

32

See People v. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 689, 705-706.

33

See People v. Uy. G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236, 260.

34

Records, pp. 71-73.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 177727

January 19, 2010

HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the November 10, 2006 decision2 and May 18, 2007
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at
around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila.
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced
and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told
him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and
that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo
family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. 4
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor5issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna
and three John Does.6 On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed
against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of
Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail
Franzielle.7 Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to
Manila for detention and trial.8
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he
admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo
Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. 9 The former was the exmayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio
Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private
prosecutor.

Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint
against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 10
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor 11 who subjected
him to clarificatory questions.12
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for
mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his
political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was
their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd
and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were
dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan.13
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited
handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In
the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had
been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings.14 Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May
25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited
letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship
and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any
violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.15
1avvphi1

Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October
29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents
during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He
requested that he be transferred to another detention center.16
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).17 On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the
dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.18 He opined that the March 8, 2004
extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there
was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents.19 Accordingly, the Informations
were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29. 20
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for
reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations.21 This time, he declared that
the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it
was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. 22 As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial
prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez
denied petitioners MR.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in
an order dated October 26, 2005.23 Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself

without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R.
Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She
ruled that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating
prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the
Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC judge
gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was
no probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was
not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no
other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No.
94188. The CA denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a decision dated
August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of respondents Antiporda. 24
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an
amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in CAG.R. SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against
respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable
cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did
not give credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely
disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columnas extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial
court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. 25 It may either
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.26 The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against
the accused.27

We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas affidavit
dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of this
affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4)
the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder
charges.28
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter
to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his participation
in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that
neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and (3) his testimony during the
October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and
May 25, 2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez29 that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to
the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this
would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that, aside
from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them. We quote
with approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to withdraw the
informationseffectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of
the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the accused.
Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to
her at that point of the cases. No less than that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer.
According to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment of the merits
of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce
before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.31
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March 8,
2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter
alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.32 Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her coaccused33 and is considered as hearsay against them.34 The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere

unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.35
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
1avvphi1

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. 36 Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission
relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy.37 Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without
violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to crossexamine them.38
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value
and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through
a full blown court case.39 When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary
investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged
conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the
unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation.40 The rule is all the more significant
here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna.41
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself
whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as coconspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against
respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari of
respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now Supreme Court Justice) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Supreme Court Justice) and
Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 34-60.
2

Id., pp. 63-70.

Id., p. 35. The full text of the September 12, 2003 affidavit read:
1. About a week before August 15, 2003, I was in the house of Lucio Columna at
Battalan, Lasam and there we drank gin together and stayed with him for several
hours since we are close friends. In the course of our conversation we talked about
the chances of Atty. Franklin Tamargo to win his election protest in the election for

mayor of Buguey, Cagayan, and I told him what I heard that Atty. Tamargo was
winning in the protest, Lucio Columna immediately said he could bet that Atty.
Tamargo could not sit and assume as mayor even if he wins. Later I learned that Atty.
Tamargo was killed last August 15.
2. Last week, Lucio Columna and I were again together in the morning in our
Barangay and he asked me to drink gin with him, and we continued drinking until
about noon time. When he had drunk much, he told me "Awanen ni boss mon nga
Tamargon, pinapatay ni Lloyd. Dakami pay ket di ti pimmatay." (Your boss Tamargo is
already gone, he was ordered killed by Lloyd. In fact, we were the ones who killed
him). He also said "Tamargo ka, Antiporda ak, no kayat mo saan ka nga agusubli
diay Buguey yen ta awan met ni boss mon, agdakua ta ti negosyo ditoyen." (You are
for Tamargo and I am for Antiporda; if you want, do not go back to Buguey anymore
since your boss is already gone so that we can be together in business here). I know
he is in the business of selling "shabu" and marijuana.
3. I decided to come to Manila to tell the family what I know. I was shown the sketch
of the face of suspect and I can say that the front side closely resembles that of Lucio
Columna, and I am executing this freely and willingly to attest to its truth in court.
5

Assistant Prosecutor Bernardino R. Camba.

I.S. No. 031-26335. Id., p. 500.

Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 04-223270 and 04-223271. Id., pp. 72, 236-237, 469.

Id., p. 36.

We reproduce here the full text of the March 8, 2004 affidavit:

Na ako po ay humihingi ng tulong upang ibigay ko ang buong katunayan ng
pangyayari sa pagkamatay nila ATTY. FRANKLIN TAMARGO at ng anak na babae
nito habang nakasakay sa kanilang kotse;
Na hindi po ako ang bumaril sa kanila;
Na ang bumaril po ay si ROMULO AWINGAN Aka MUMOY na taga Aparri, Cagayan
at ang nagutos ay sila MAYOR LLOYD ANTIPORDA ng Buguey, Cagayan at ang
TATAY niya na si EX-MAYOR LICERIO ANTIPORDA JR. Aka BOY.
Na noong July 20, 2003 habang nagmamaneho ako ng Multicab biyaheng AparriDugo ay pinara ako ni MUMOY AWINGAN sa Tallungan Aparri at sinabi niya kung
gusto kong sumama sa grupo nila. Sabi ko naman ay ihahatid ko lang ang pasahero
ko sa Dugo. Pagkatapos noon ay binalikan ko sila sa Tallungan. Nang magkausap
na kami ni MUMOY AWINGAN ay sinabi niya na may PROJECT sila at si ATTY.
FRANKLIN TAMARGO na kalaban ni MAYOR ANTIPORDA sa BUGUEY. Kung gusto
ko raw sumama sa PROJECT na yun. Nang sumagot ako ng OO ay isusurvey lang
daw nila ang lugar. Sinabi rin niya na isasama nila ako kay MAYOR ANTIPORDA;
Na noong August 10, 2003 ay inabangan ako nila MUMOY AWINGAN sa Tallungan,
Aparri Cagayan at sinama nila ako, kasama si RICHARD MECATE at isa pa na hindi

ko kilala pero mamumukhaan ko ito kung makikita ko ulit. Pumunta na kami sa bahay
na malaki sa POBLACION ng BUGUEY CAGAYAN. Pagdating [namin] doon ay may
lumabas na lalaki na si MAYOR LLOYD ANTIPORDA at sinabihan ni MUMOY
AWINGAN sa kanya ng SIR? ITO ANG MAKAKASAMA NAMIN, tapos sumagot si
Mayor Antiporda ng GOOD at agad tinanong sa akin kung kilala ko si ATTY.
TAMARGO at sinagot ko ng "OO" naman. Tapos nakita ko na may inabot na sobre
kay MUMOY;
Na noong bumalik na kami sa Aparri Cagayan ay kumuha ng pera si MUMOY at
inabutan ako ng limang libong piso (P5,000.00) at sabi sa akin ay ADVANCE LANG
yun para makaluwas sa Maynila agad;
Na noong ding araw na iyon ay nagpunta kami ng Maynila kasama sina MUMOY
AWINGAN, RICHARD MACATE at yung hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Bumaba kami
bago dumating ng Terminal ng Florida Bus Line;
Na noong August 14, 2003 ay sumakay kami sa isang kotse na minaneho ng isang
lalaki at pumunta kami sa Quezon City Jail at kinausap [namin] si Ex-Mayor
Antiporda na nakakulong doon. Sinabi sa amin ni Ex-Mayor na masamang tao si
Atty. Tamargo dahil ipinakulong siya nito na walang kasalanan at dapat lang siya
maparusahan. Sinabi pa niya dadagdagan ang bayad pag natapos ang misyon
[namin];
Na ang misyong iyon ay para PATAYIN si ATTY. TAMARGO;
Nang humigit kumulang alas dos ng hapon petsa 15 ng August 2003 ay isinama
kami sa isang bahay sa Bago Bantay Quezon City. Na sinabi na bahay ni Mayor
Lloyd Antiporda at doon sa garahe ay may dalawang motorsiklo. Hindi nagtagal ay
umalis din agad kami kasama si Mumoy Awingan, Richard Mecate at yung isa pa na
sakay ng dalawang motorsiklo, magkaangkas sina Mumoy at Richard. Ang
nagmamaneho ay si Richard at dalawa naman kami ng lalaki na hindi ko kilala sa
isang motorsiklo. Nagmaneho ang lalaki na angkas ako. Pagdating [namin] sa
Escolta, Manila ay bumaba si Mumoy at kami naman ay naghintay sa isang lugar na
malapit sa kinaroroonan nila;
Nang pasado alas singko ng hapon ng petsa ding iyon ay nakita [namin] na palapit si
Atty. Tamargo sa kanyang kotse kaya kami ay pumuwesto sa kabilang [kanto];
Nang nasa loob na si Atty. Tamargo at minamaneho na ang kotse ay nakita kong
lumipat na si Mumoy sa may gawing kaliwa ng kotse kung saan pumasok si Atty.
Tamargo at kanya ng pinagbabaril.
Na habang binabaril niya si Atty. Tamargo ay nagsilbing LOOK OUT lang kami at
pagkatapos noon ay tumakas na kami sakay sa dalawang motorsiklo at tumuloy na
kami sa sakayan ng bus papuntang Cagayan;
Na nang dumating na kami sa Cagayan sa Dugo Camalaniugan ay bumaba na kami
at bago kami naghiwalay ay inabutan ako ulit ni MUMOY ng limang libong piso;
Na nakikiusap po ako na dito na lamang makulong (Det. Jail, WPD) para sa aking
proteksyon;

Na ginawa ko po itong pagtatapat ng kusang loob upang patunayan ang mga

naganap na pangyayari.
Na panunumpaan at pipirmahan ko po iyan patunay na lahat ng sinabi ko ay
[pawang] katotohanan lamang. (Id., pp. 36-38.)
10

Id., pp. 323, 436.

11

Assistant City Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan.

12

Rollo, p. 472.

13

Id., pp. 98-99.

14

The full text of the May 3, 2004 letter read:

DEAR SIR,
SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAKIUSAP AT PAYO NI RET. CORONEL SEVERINO
PURIGAY NA KASAMA KO NGAYON NA NAKAKULONG SA MANILA CITY JAIL SA
QUEZON CITY BLVD. STA. CRUZ, MLA. MINABUTI KONG SUMULAT SA INYO AT
IPARATING ANG AKING PANIG SA KASONG "DOUBLE MURDER" NA KUNG
SAAN KAYO AT ANG INYONG AMANG SI GINOONG LICERIO ANTIPORDA AY
ISINANGKOT SA PAGPATAY SA YUMAONG ATTY. FRANKLIN TAMARGO.
AKO AY SI MANUEL COLUMNA JR. [29] TAONG GULANG DRIVER, AT NAKATIRA
SA BRGY. ZIMINILA CAMALANIUGAN, CAGAYAN. NAARESTO AKO NOONG FEB.
18, 2004 SA SAPPING, CAMALANIUGAN SA BISA NG WARRANT NA GALING SA
BRANCH 27 NG MANILA RTC. SA KASONG DOUBLE MURDER NA IBINASE SA
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI GERALDO GERON NG LASAM, CAGAYAN NA
SIYANG NAGSUMBONG SA AKIN SA PAMILYA NG MGA TAMARGO DITO SA
MANILA ANG PAGSIRA SA AKING PAGKATAO AT KINABUKASAN NG WITNESS
NA ITO. SA [PAMAMAGITAN] NG PAGSISINUNGALING AY DAHIL MARAHIL SA
GALIT O INGGIT SA AKIN. SA BUONG BUHAY KO AY HINDI PA AKO
NAGKAROON NG KASO O NAKULONG KAHIT MINSAN KUNDI NGAYON LANG.
BAGO KO ITO ISINULAT AY INAROK KONG MABUTI ANG KONSENSYA AT HINDI
KO TALAGA KAYANG ITULOY ANG MAGSINUNGALING NA GAYA NG GUSTO
NILANG MANGYARI AT ITURO KAYO BILANG MASTERMIND SA PAGPATAY[.]
AYAW KONG MAGKASALA SA DIYOS SA PAGTESTIGO SA ISANG
KASINUNGALINGAN.
NANIWALA AKO NA MAY DIYOS NA NAKAKAALAM NG KATOTOHANAN AT
BUONG KATAPATAN KONG SABIHIN SA INYO NA NASA LASAM, CAGAYAN, AKO
NOONG AUGUST 15, 2003 NA SINASABI NILANG ARAW NG PAGPATAY KAY
ATTY. TAMARGO. NI MINSAN AY HINDI KO PA NAKITA ANG BIKTIMA AT HINDI
KO ALAM [ANG] KANYANG MUKHA HANGGAT HINDI SINABI SA AKIN NG MGA
PULIS NA DUMAKIP SA AKIN AY HINDI KO ALAM KUNG BAKIT "DOUBLE
MURDER" (KUNG SINO PA ANG NAMATAY) AT KUNG SAAN NANGYARI NA
SINABI NILANG SA BINONDO RAW NA HINDI KO PA NARATING NA LUGAR.

MULA NOONG ARAW NA INARESTO AKO AY MARAMING "TORTURE" ANG

DINAANAN KO SA MGA KAMAY NG MGA TAGA-RSOB NG RECOM NG CAGAYAN
AT SA WPD[.] NARANASAN KONG MAISUPOT ANG ULO, MABUGBOG, AT
MAKURYENTE KAYA NAPILITAN AKONG PIRMAHAN ANG MGA PAPELES NA
INIHANDA NILA BUKOD SA PANANAKOT NA I-SALVAGE DAW (AKO) KUNG
HINDI AKO MAKIKOOPERA SA KANILA.
HUMIHINGI AKO NG UNAWA SA INYO LALO NAT NALATHALA SA DIARYO ANG
PANGALAN NINYO NA NAKAKASIRA SA [INYO] PERO INTINDIHIN NYO AKO, NA
NAUNA NG NASIRA ANG PANGALAN KO AT KINABUKASAN KO SA KASONG
NAKASAMPA NA LABAN SA AKIN.
SANA AY MATUTULUNGAN TAYONG LAHAT PARA MALUTAS ANG KRIMENG
NANGYARI[,] MAPARUSAHAN ANG TOTOONG SALARIN, AT MAKAMITAN NATIN
ANG HUSTISYA. (Id, pp. 38-39.)
15

Id., p. 40.

16

Id., pp. 75, 239-240. The letter read:

October 29, 2004
KAGALANGGALANG NA FISCAL GARCIA:
Ako po ay sumulat sa inyo upang humingi ng tulong sa aking kalagayan dito sa loob
ng Manila City Jail kung saan ang akin pong buhay ay nalalagay sa panganib.
Ito po ay dahil sa aking Sinumpaang Salaysay na kung saan ang mga Antiporda ang
aking itinuro na nagutos sa pagpaslang kay Atty. Tamargo.
Noong nakaraang Biyernes ako po ay ipinatawag ni Fiscal Marzan upang patunayan
kong muli ang aking naunang salaysay at ako po ay [nakahanda] upang ang aking
salaysay ay muli kong mapatunayan at gusto ko rin pong isiwalat ang ginawa sa akin
ng ibang tao dito sa loob ng piitan nang aking pong tanggihan na pumirma sa
inihanda nilang salaysay na pumapabor sa mga Antiporda at nais ko rin pong ibigay
ang aking inihandang salaysay kasama ang Medical Certificate.
Sir, hindi ko po masabi kung ano ang gusto kong sabihin kay Fiscal Marzan dahil
noong gabing iyon ako po ay pinagbantaang papatayin kung muli kong patunayan
ang aking salaysay. Kung kaya sa pagdinig ng kaso kay Fiscal Marzan kung saan ay
naroon din sina Mayor Antiporda at kanyang anak ay aking nasabi kung ano ang
mga sinabi sa [akin] ng mga Antiporda.
Kaya po sana sir ay mailipat po ako sa ibang piitan dahil baka ako po ay mapatay
kung ako ay magsabi ng katotohanan upang mabigyan ng hustisya ang pagkamatay
ni Atty. Tamargo.

17

Id., pp. 320-338.

18

Id., pp. 96-104.

19

Id., p. 102.

20

Id., pp. 236.

21

Criminal Case Nos. 05-237561 and 05-237562.

22

Rollo, pp. 41, 105-107.

23

Id., p. 71.

24

Id., pp. 286-314.

25

Gandarosa v. Flores, G.R. No. 167910, 17 July 2007, 527 SCRA 776, 793.

Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 163741, 7 August
2007, 529 SCRA 274, 282, citing Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, 1 September 2004,
437 SCRA 504, 516..
26

27

Fuentes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 139618, 11 July 2006, 494 SCRA 478, 485.

28

Rollo, pp. 72-75.

29

G.R. No. 158148, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 516.

30

Id., pp. 528-529

31

Rollo, p. 54.

32

This is expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

33

People v. Vda. De Ramos, 451 Phil. 214 , 224 (2003).

People v. Tizon, Jr., G.R. No. 133228-31, 30 July 2002, 385 SCRA 364, 388, citing People
v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193, 28 January 1997, 267 SCRA 119.
34

35

Supra note 33, pp. 224-225.

36

People v. Morial, 415 Phil. 310, 336 (2001).

People v. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 43, 48-49, citing Montoya
v. Baun, 44 O.G. 4382, cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol.
VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 349.
37

People v. Surigawan, G.R. No. 83215, 15 December 1993, 228 SCRA 458, 465,
citing People v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718, 725 (1926) and People v. Ferry, 66 Phil. 310 (1938).
38

R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, 5 March 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395,
citing Salonga v. Cruz Pano, G.R. No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438, 461-462.
39

Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 138 (2002), citing Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 510
(2002).
40

41

Rollo, p. 441.