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K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:11CV-417, 2011 WL 5008358, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011).
After the District Court granted K.A.s motion for a
preliminary injunction, the School District removed the word
Appropriate from the final paragraph quoted above, and
additionally added to the first paragraph the following
language: An authorized representative of the nonschool
organization or group must issue any and all requests to
distribute and/or post nonschool materials. The request must
be made in writing to the building principal. (Appellees Br.
Addendum 4-5.)
Subsequent to the initiation of this lawsuit, the School
District also revised Policy 220, which deals with Student
Expression.1 (Appellees Br. Addendum 1.) Policy 220
now states, in pertinent part, that:
Only literature and materials
directly related to school district
activities or that contribute
significantly
to
district
instructional programs may be
disseminated to or through
students and staff members.
However, invitations to individual
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1.
First Amendment claims are generally examined
through the lens of forum analysis, under which the
Governments interest in limiting the use of its property to its
intended purpose is weighed against the interest of those
wishing to use the property for other purposes. Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985); see also Christian Legal Socy Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2984 (2010) ([I]n a progression of cases, this Court has
employed forum analysis to determine when a government
entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place
limitations on speech.). Under forum analysis, regulations
of speech in public forums such as sidewalks and parks are
subject to the highest scrutiny and survive only if they are
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest, while
identical regulations in nonpublic forums such as prisons and
public schools must survive only a much more limited
review, and need only be reasonable, as long as the
regulation is not an effort to suppress the speakers activity
due to disagreement with the speakers view. Intl Socy for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992).
In the student-speech context, however, the leading
case is Tinker, where the Supreme Court affirmed that
students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 393 U.S. at
506. The Court held that, while in school, a student may
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and
substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of
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allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student
expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or
interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into one of the
narrow exceptions to this rule (i.e., it is lewd, it promotes
illegal drug use, or it is school-sponsored). See J.S., 650 F.3d
at 926-27.
D.
K.A. also satisfies the other three prongs of the
preliminary injunction test. First, K.A. will suffer irreparable
injury without an injunction, because as the Supreme Court
held in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), [t]he loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Id. at
373-74 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (per curiam)).
Second, we fail to see how any harm results to the
School District because of the preliminary injunction. The
School District claims it would be essentially required to
maintain an open forum for the distribution of nonschool
solicitation materials via an elementary school conduit, and
that nonschool organization[s] would use children for the
distribution of materials to evade School District review and
approval under Policy 913. (Appellants Br. at 39.) We
observe that the School District can still regulate the
distribution of materials under the Tinker standard. If a
student distributed materials during instructional time, for
example, or was otherwise disruptive or interfering with the
rights of other students, the School District would remain free
to regulate such speech. In this particular instance, however,
the School District failed to identify any disruption caused by
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