Responsive Governments and Responsible Citizens:

An integrated approach to exploring accountability in a school-

feeding programme in Delhi

Araddhya Mehtta *

* araddhyamehtta@gmail.com

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ENGAGING ACCOUNTABILITY:
ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE WORKING PAPER SERIES

Responsive Governments and Responsible Citizens: An integrated

approach to exploring accountability in a school-feeding programme in
Delhi.

Araddhya Mehtta *

*The views and opinions expressed in this document are entirely those of the
author(s). You may choose to reproduce or redistribute the contents in part or in
full to any other person with due acknowledgement of the Accountability
Initiative.

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 Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………...4

List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................5

Introduction.........................................................................................................................6

A framework for analysing accountability in service provision........................8

The Right to Food Campaign (RTFC): Making the state respond.....................16

Co-governance for accountability:

Exploring the functioning of school monitoring committees...........................21

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................34

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 Abstract

Analysis of the new approaches to social accountability indicate that the nature
of local relationships (whether citizens are accountable to each other or not) has
a profound impact on enhancing or obstructing the delivery of basic services. In
other words, in order for ‘co-governance for accountability’ to work, citizens not
only have to participate but participate in a specific way: to not only hold
providers accountable but also each other. The focus on enhancing provider
accountability therefore needs to be combined with efforts to enhance citizen-
citizen accountability; especially under the context of good governance, with the
changing role of the state, where ordinary citizens are being invited to shape the
development processes that directly affect them. For such new accountability
and governance approaches to work, a re-conceptualisation of accountability is
required with a greater focus on citizen-citizen accountability – which implies an
increased emphasis on citizens’ duties, and not just their rights. This argument
warns against unquestioning approaches to ‘transferring the stick’ to
communities – not only because of unequal local power dynamics or problems of
co-option but because citizens – just as governments – can also act self-
interestedly and not for their shared benefit. This paper makes this argument
using the case of Right to Food Campaign and the Mid-Day Meal Programme
implementation in New Delhi, India.

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List of Abbreviations

MCD: Municipal Corporation of Delhi

MDM: Mid-day Meal

NDMC: New Delhi Municipal Corporation

PIL: Public Interest Litigation

PTA: Parent Teacher Association

PUCL: People’s Union of Civil Liberties

RTFC: Right to Food Campaign

RTI: Right to Information

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Introduction:

This paper examines the mid-day meal (MDM) scheme, a key part of the central
Government of India’s attempts to address children’s malnourishment. Enacted
in 1995, the MDM Scheme mandates that cooked mid-day meals be provided in
all government and government-aided schools (Drèze and Goyal 2003).

Assessments of the MDM scheme have consistently focused on the lack of

government accountability, and by extension wholly ignored the critical role of
citizen accountability in the success of such schemes. While the RTFC has drawn
significant attention to short-comings in government efforts to implement the
MDM scheme effectively, little attention has been paid to the importance of local
level accountability relationships in ensuring the success of the scheme. These
local level relationships, which constitute parent-monitoring committees
responsible for oversight of the delivery of the MDM, are an essential factor in
determining whether the scheme is successful on a school-to-school basis.

Based on fieldwork in two schools in Delhi, this paper shows that the parent
participation necessary to generate ‘micro-level’ accountability does not occur
everywhere. Where such parent participation occurs, the MDM scheme
functions well, and where it does not, the scheme delivers poorer results. The
paper therefore argues that scholars and practitioners should pay more
attention to these micro-level actions, and seek to explain why parents engage
actively in holding caterers accountable only in some schools. This paper
suggests that the level of accountability among citizens (parents) determines the
extent of their participation and, to a large degree, the success of the scheme.

In order to conduct a balanced assessment of the MDM Scheme the significance

of both government and citizen level accountability must be considered.
Consequently, this paper’s evaluation of the MDM scheme focuses on two main
questions:

1. How has the Right to Food Campaign (RTFC) been able to pressure the
Government of India (and the Delhi Government) into creating and
implementing the MDM Scheme?

2. How can variations in the implementation of the mid-day meal

scheme between schools be explained?

In answering the first question, this paper examines the role of the RTFC in
establishing the principle of the right to food and the obligation of the State and
Central government in providing meals to school-children. The paper suggests
that the RTFC organised an effective campaign that resulted in the
implementation of the MDM scheme, and continues to improve caterer delivery
through consistent pressure on the government through a range of channels
(such as judicial activism, social mobilisation and media). This provides an
encouraging example of how campaigners can improve government
accountability and suggests that RTF campaign-type strategies could usefully be

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replicated in other democratic settings.

In answering the second question, this paper argues that the presence of citizen-
citizen accountability or accountability amongst the parents explains the
improvement in the delivery of the MDMs in some schools compared to other
schools. In one of the two schools studied, the MDM scheme worked well (i.e.
children typically received food on a daily basis, either directly from the MDM
scheme or from replacement sources organised by parents and teachers). In the
other, the MDM scheme worked very poorly (i.e. delivery was erratic and there
were no replacement sources). Based on focus group discussions and interviews
with teachers, students and parents, the effectiveness of the MDM delivery seems
not to depend solely on the accountability relationships between the
government and citizens. Rather, good implementation depends very
significantly on the level of (historically generated) social cohesion (such as
notions of trust and reciprocity) between parents, and between parents and
teachers. Just as citizens can be considered to have an obligation (in law and
morality) not to destroy public property, they can be considered to have an
obligation to engage positively with the MDM scheme (within the context of local
MDM monitoring committees). The implication of this analysis is that increasing
MDM scheme funds and focusing solely on government accountability will not
fully eliminate implementation problems. Activists (including the RTFC) and
scholars should also focus on citizens’ accountability to each other, and to the
government.

The paper develops these arguments through the following structure. Section 2
provides an analytical framework through which subsequent sections analyse
the MDM scheme. This section suggests that without citizen-citizen
accountability services can fail to be delivered even when government
accountability exists. Section 3 explores the RTFC’s efforts to enhance
government accountability in the delivery of the meals. The section highlights
the RTFC’s use of combined strategies to elicit government accountability.
Furthermore, this section highlights the successes and failures of the Right to
Food campaign in holding the government accountable in the delivery of the
MDMs. Section 4 focuses on the local school monitoring committees. One school
case study indicates that a key problem in meal delivery is the lack of citizen-
citizen accountability, which prevents children from actually consuming the
meals (although schools may receive them). The second case study shows that
social cohesion is central to ensuring citizen-citizen accountability. Section 5
summarises and offers suggestions for broadening the current debate of
accountability.

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Section 2: A framework for analysing accountability in service provision

2.1 New voice-based social accountability approaches

The term accountability is commonly used in different settings to mean different

things, rendering it a much debated and contested term. However, there seems a
consensus that accountability implies a relationship, involving two actors (Flint
1988; Lueng 2008).1 Day and Klein (1987:5) point out that “to talk about
accountability is to define who can call for account, and who owes a duty to
explanation.” Schedler (1999) proposes two elements to accountability: a) the
provision of information or answerability (i.e. the requirement to answer
queries) and b) enforcement (i.e. punishment). Scholars have argued that
holding elections in one way through which government accountability can be
elicited, i.e. – citizens vote against or for a particular government depending
upon the performance of the government.

However, increasing evidence indicates that elections alone are not a powerful
enough tool for holding governments accountable (Przeworski et al1993). This
has generated new and innovative demand focused ‘voice’ based accountability
mechanisms – whereby citizens articulate demands in various ways to the
government and/or providers. Following several scholars (Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz 2000b, Joshi 2008, Newell 2005), these new voice based approaches
are referred to here as ‘social accountability’ approaches. Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz define social accountability as “a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism
of control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens’ associations
and movements and on the media, actions that aim at exposing governmental
wrongdoing, bringing new issues into the public agenda, or activating the
operation of horizontal agencies ” (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006, 2000b: 150,
2002:32).

Though a distinct form of accountability, social accountability is a vital

component of generating overall government accountability, acting to reinforce
and activate vertical accountability (elections) and horizontal accountability
(government oversight agencies such as the judiciary) (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti
2000:151, O’ Donnell 1999). Social accountability works between elections. It
uses multiple channels, principally the media (e.g. shaming the government by
revealing scandals), social mobilization (e.g. organising protests and public
hearings) and the judiciary (for e.g. filing public interest litigations2, through the
discourse of rights) (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). In addition, social
accountability provides a targeted form of accountability, focusing on a
particular set of issues and on a specific set of actors. As Jayal points out ‘it can
be catalysed on demand as and when the situation arises’ (Jayal 2008). Those
who are targets of social accountability are often not required to concede (unlike
political accountability, for example when a government loses elections) (Ibid).
1
Gandhian approaches to accountability suggest that accountability to oneself is important (connoted by
swaraj, or self-rule). This approach is beyond the central argument of this thesis, but may be relevant to
developing further notions of citizen accountability.
2
A public interest litigation is filed in court for the protection of “public interests” such as pollution, road
safety etc.

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Rather it works on the assumption that media, public debate and reputational
damage will have the desired effects (Smulovitz 2006, Joshi 2008) on the
government to enhance the delivery of basic services.

2.2 Strategies for social accountability: the role of media, social mobilisation
and judicial activism

Social accountability approaches use a range of tactics to highlight the failure of

the government to deliver or commission services and to pressure the
government to improve service delivery. These strategies include the use of
media, social mobilisation and judicial activism.

In a democratic setting, a free, independent and responsible media can be a

crucial tool through which government authorities can be held accountable. In
India, Sen (1999) and Ram (1990) have argued that a free and responsible media
has been central in preventing famines, indicating its potential as a tool for
exercising social accountability. First, it has provided information (e.g. oncoming
conditions of drought) and given ‘voice to the voiceless’, which can be valued at
an intrinsic and an instrumental level (Sen 2003, Drèze et al 1989). Second, the
media plays the instrumental role of a watchdog, by potentially shaming the
government officials and politicians if they fail to adhere to norms of
accountability and transparency (Sen 1999a, 1999b). Failing to respond could
damage governments’ electoral chances and their legitimacy to govern (Ibid).
Third, the media has also played a constructive role by facilitating public debate
between policy makers on the formulation of policies regarding food security.
This has contributed to building norms of ‘deliberative democracy’ (Crocker
2007, Thussu 2007, UNESCO 2009) by creating a platform for activist groups and
citizens to engage with policy makers to collectively build a consensus on
appropriate policy formulation and implementation (Fung et al 2003).
Furthermore, the media can highlight government corruption, and breaches of
law and morality that can be indirectly connected to poor service delivery
(Thussu 2007). The media can reveal scandals about powerful people that courts
sometimes find ‘innocent’ (Waisbord 2006:227 Jeffery 2002).

Another channel for eliciting government accountability is social mobilisation.

Social mobilisation involves making visible “aggregate public opinion” along with
“imposing threats” to government officials’ reputations (Smulovitz and
Peruzzotti 2006). By highlighting reputation costs, public officials can be
threatened, which in turn encourages them to respond to citizens (Smulovitz and
Peruzzotti 2000a, 2006, Goetz and Gaventa 2001). For example, Viva Rio (an
NGO) in Brazil, has successfully highlighted police abuse and electoral fraud
through intense public mobilisation (Cornwall 2001). Scholars have highlighted
other aspects of social mobilisation such as public hearings – where activist
groups bring people together to highlight problems of government
accountability in poor service delivery (Pande 2008, Drèze and Sen 2002).
Jenkins and Drèze highlight two positive aspects of social mobilisation – it first
informs the public about specific problems and second, it garners public support,
which in turn pressurises government officials to respond favourably. Jenkins
(2001b) gives the example of how the MKSS (an activist group) in India has

9
successfully mobilised ordinary citizens to shame government officials
responsible for the underpayment of wages.

The examples above indicate that media and social mobilisation have proved
effective tools in eliciting government accountability. However, these tools have
been rightly criticised for being ad-hoc (Ackerman 2003, 2005, Joshi 2008),
temporary and expensive, without guaranteed results (Newell 2005, Paul 2002).
In light of these ‘drawbacks’ of media and social mobilisation, institutionalising
social accountability through ‘rights’ and judicial activism is a welcome addition.
The use of legal tools sustains and maintains a culture of accountability and aims
to ‘strengthen the status of citizens from that of beneficiaries of development to
its rightful claimants’ (Cornwall 2000:11). The ‘new accountability agenda’
proposed by Goetz and Jenkins argues that rights lead to ‘bringing citizens into
one of the most exclusive arenas of state decision making’ (Goetz and Jenkins
2001, 2002a, 2000b). In addition, using rights as legal tools tends to have
greater ‘enforcement’ capacity when governments fail to deliver services than
using media and social mobilisation. Rights have greater enforcement capacity
because citizens can refer to specific safeguards in the constitution that protect
the violation of basic rights (Gonsalves 2002) and can therefore trigger other
state apparatus – such as the judiciary. Essentially, through rights, governments
can be held legally accountable – they can be made answerable or punished
(with sanctions) when governments do not adhere to their constitutional duties.

These strategies – media, social mobilisation and judicial activism are not,
however, mutually exclusive and are most effective when they work in concert.
Media or social mobilisation or rights alone cannot fully address government
accountability, because they highlight different aspects of government
accountability and have different enforcement mechanisms. For example, media
and social mobilisation do not carry with them the same enforcement capacity as
rights, but only using rights would fail to bring the issue of campaign into the
public domain. A combination of all would create a strong case for ensuring
government accountability. Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, (2006) document the
combined role of legal action, social mobilisation and media exposure to ensure
the proper operation of the judicial system in two extra-judicial killings in
Argentina, even when the perpetrators are powerful and connected to the
government apparatus.

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Figure 1: A model of social accountability

holding
Government accountable Service
Provider
holding
accountable

Service
Judicial delivery
Media activism
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Social mobilisation

CITIZENS

2.3 When is social accountability effective?

Even where all three approaches are combined, social accountability is only
effective under certain conditions. First, most low-income citizens cannot use
these channels, as it requires a level of literacy, access to journalists and lawyers
and a consistent time commitment. Due to these barriers, elite activists often
spearhead social accountability efforts on behalf of poor citizens. In so doing
activists can impose, mediate and dominate the discourse of the campaigns – to
what they think is of central importance. Who decides whether meals or extra
classes are more important for low- income children? Furthermore, these efforts
assume that low-income citizens share a common goal that social accountability
actors can push for. Conflicts and differences among citizens about which issues
to raise and pursue are subsumed in these channels.

Second, these efforts assume that social accountability efforts are sufficient for
tracking instances of misconduct and negligence (Newell 2005). For example,
rights focus on what agency the poor have in claiming their rights from powerful
government officials through individual and collective means (Houtzager 2008,
Drèze et al 2002 ). However, if the problems are deep and systemic and more
fundamental than poor performance of state institutions, then eliciting
accountability through campaigns, media exposure and judicial activism does not
provide an adequate solution (Newell 2005). For example, if problems pertaining
to poor delivery are not state-centred, and citizens themselves can be a cause of
poor service delivery, how do social accountability efforts address service
delivery problems within communities? For example, if a girl is kept hungry at
home because her parents refuse to feed her, can the state be held responsible?
Social accountability efforts focus primarily on the role of the state, even when
accountability problems could lie beyond the state apparatus.

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Third, social accountability efforts are not able to bridge the state-society gap
(Ackerman 2003). In maintaining a watchdog role, social actors often take an
adversarial approach – viewing the state and society as two monolithic wholes
without contesting elements within these two groups. A consistently adversarial
approach can further erode trust in public officials responsible for service
delivery and the development a professional ethos, which is necessary for a
sustained system of accountable service delivery (Newell 2005). A more
interactive process that bridges the state society divide can perhaps address
some of these problems of social accountability (Ackerman 2003, Blackburn
1999). Direct participation of citizens in monitoring service delivery attempts to
invite citizens into the core of the state. This direct involvement of citizens in the
activities of the state is most commonly referred to as co-governance (Ackerman
2003, 2005). Co-governance implies participatory governance, which involves
direct involvement of actors from the ‘bottom tiers’ (Fung and Wright 2002).

2.4 Social accountability: From Adversarial approaches to co-governance

Co-governance is partly a response to criticisms of approaches that remain only

external to the state (or service provider) i.e. - the use of media, social
mobilisation and judicial activism. Some scholars are critical of the above-
mentioned, often adversarial strategies that are unable to bridge the state-
society divide (Fox 2000, Avritzer 2000). Cunill (2000) and Joshi (2008)
however contend that the effectiveness of social accountability depends directly
on the autonomy of these actors with respect to the state. Both Joshi and Cunill
highlight the dangers of ‘co-option’ by the state and providers in a co-governance
for accountability framework. Though these dangers do exist and can hamper
effective efforts for eliciting government accountability, Ackerman rightly argues
that pressuring governments from outside are effective accountability
mechanisms, albeit only limited unless institutionalised societal participation
occurs at the core of the state (Ackerman 2003).

Increasingly, government authorities have started to include citizens in

monitoring the delivery of basic services to which citizens are entitled. Such
developments have occurred under the rubric of good governance (Chandhoke
2003, Ackerman 2003, 2005), leading to the creation of local monitoring
committees where the citizens are direct ‘stakeholders’ in the provision of
services (Paul 2002, Blair 2000)3. Though some of these approaches have been
viewed as ways of offloading government responsibilities to citizens, increasing
citizen participation has been seen a positive development at many levels -
creating greater awareness about rights, entitlements, holding the government
and service providers accountable, participating in the design and
implementation of service delivery (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000a, Blackburn
1999).

3
It is important to note that these approaches of co-governance for accountability are different from the
public-private partnerships of NGOs and governments in that they operate at a local level, directly
involving citizens in the monitoring of services.

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There have been a number of cases that highlight positive outcomes through the
co-governance approach. For example, Paul highlights cases where public
services have been directly monitored and supervised by local communities. He
gives the example of parent-teacher associations that actively participate in
planning and supervising the school programmes (Paul 2005). The participatory
budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil has also indicated positive results where
citizens directly participate in governance (Cornwall 2001, Ackerman 2005,
Avritzer, 2000). In a similar light, a number of scholars as part of the
“development strategies across the public-private divide” symposium have
argued that “state-society” synergy (Evans 1996a,b) is one of the most effective
ways in ensuring governmental accountability. At the local level there appears to
be growing emphasis on co-management and co-monitoring of services, which
have created spaces for citizen involvement as the ‘owners’ of these services
(Brett 1993, 2003, Ackerman 2003, 2005).

2.5 When is co-governance effective?

Goetz and Jenkins rightly argue that co-governance for accountability

“represents a shift towards augmenting the limited effectiveness of civil society’s
watchdog function by breaking the state’s monopoly over the responsibility for
official executive oversight” (2001:365). The relevant question here is whether
people are willing to play these oversight roles? And how well do they play these
roles? These are invited spaces (Cornwall 200b, 2005) i.e.- the government
invites (relevant) members of the society to participate in monitoring the
delivery of services. These spaces are mostly imposed on people and not claimed
by them (Ibid). Thus people might not want to participate- for a variety of
reasons ranging from time constraints, lack of a vision for a ‘common good’ to
apathy (Ibid). The second assumption made by Ackerman along with Fung,
Wright, Goetz and Jenkins is on the nature of citizen participation. Citizen
participation is considered to be positive and therefore a ‘good thing’. However,
in reality citizens can participate in monitoring a scheme for personal benefit
and not for a common good.

Most often, critiques of co-governance efforts stem from problems pertaining to

local power dynamics that prevent citizens from engaging in efforts to hold
powerful actors accountable- not only government officials but also elites within
the community (Cook and Kothari 2001, Chambers 2007). Though scholars have
welcomed the inclusion of local citizens in monitoring of services, they have also
criticised these efforts for portraying depoliticised forms of participation
(Cornwall 2001b, Ackerman 2003, 2005). Stirrat (1996) points out the dangers
of romanticising communities as being homogenous and cooperative when
setting up participatory accountability systems. Guijt and Shah (1998) highlight
that the myth of ‘community participation’ further deepens the exclusion of some
actors and therefore prevents communities to ensure accountability from other
higher authorities such as the government (Ibid). Chambers, too, points out the
dangers of ‘handing over the stick’ to the ‘community’, which can result in
benefiting the already powerful and marginalising those with little voice and
agency (Chambers 1997, 2007).

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These are important and accurate criticisms. Nevertheless, in what follows this
paper seeks to critique participatory governance primarily because people are
not always interested in participating in co-governance, and because citizens
lack accountability among themselves, which can be a cause of poor monitoring
of service delivery, and in turn affects the effectiveness of service delivery. While
many scholars have warned participatory approaches as either de-politicising
(Crook and Kothari 2001) or entrenching local elitism (Stirrat 1996, Mosse
2001), problems pertaining to lack of answerability, enforcement and
transparency (key aspects of accountability) amongst “equals” have been largely
over-looked, despite the fact that these problems have rendered such
participation ineffective and at times even obstructive to service delivery. Weak
accountability links between citizens have been a major cause in the obstruction
of basic service delivery and therefore need greater attention while building new
accountability frameworks.

2.6 Missing links of accountability: Citizen-citizen accountability

This section builds on and offers a critique of the above approaches to present an
additional element to accountability. It suggests that just as service providers
have a responsibility to deliver services to the intended recipients, service
recipients also have a responsibility to participate in a specific way in order to
ensure the delivery of basic services. When citizens siphon funds or divert the
flow of services to members of their communities, this directly obstructs the
delivery of services. Several questions therefore arise. How can citizens hold
other citizens accountable for poor service delivery? To what extent should
citizens hold other citizens responsible for poor service delivery? Are social
movements (that focus on rights, media and social mobilisation as a way of
eliciting provider accountability in service delivery) sufficient to deal with
problems of service delivery obstruction caused by citizens? To what extent is
the provider liable for internal community based accountability problems
regarding service delivery?

The difficulties of individuals with their own interests participating in a shared

social resource are well known. Typically, these have been addressed in theory
and practice through institutions, particularly in economics and sociology. This
section suggests that some form of community social cohesion (sharing inter-
personal bonds of trust, solidarity, reciprocity and obligation) is necessary to
make co-governance and service delivery function effectively. In other words the
existence of the idea of a common good is required for citizens to be accountable
to each other and in turn enhance the delivery of basic services to the concerned
recipients of the service,

What then facilitates the idea of a common good? We can identify two
approaches to this. First, some scholars hold that participation in institutions
allows the idea of the common good to develop. For instance, Putnam’s (1993)
famous work on social capital argued that the act of associating together, rather
than the explicitly community-building purpose of the association, facilitates the
social cooperation towards a collective good. ‘Civic-ness’ is viewed as an

14
outcome of social interaction per se. The purpose for which the interaction takes
place is, for Putnam, less important than the fact of the social interaction itself. In
another tradition, Durkhiem also suggests that legal institutions are needed to
rebuild or substitute for collective consciousness that has been broken down by
the dispersal of societies.

However, a reliance on institutions to produce the common good is problematic.

First, people may not wish to participation in institutions because they have
their own ways of dealing with problems. Cornwall et al (2001) point out that
institutions that need citizens to participate can meet a dead end where
‘intended beneficiaries’ choose not to take part, or where powerful interest
groups or gatekeepers within the community turn well-meaning efforts on the
part of community development workers to their own ends. Second, institutions
can also be used as a means to gain individual access to benefits or to improve
their own access to services (Ibid), rather than develop the common good. Thus
the process of generating a common good may be much more complex than mere
participation in institutions.

Anthropologists have typically taken a more critical view of institutions and have
explored a second set of approaches to common good that focus on micro-
interactions around mutual respect or exchange. Ramaswami (2007), for
instance, challenges the idea that any association generates civic action, which,
he argues, can be prevented by the more personal feelings of alienation, distress,
competition, jealously within the poor, deprived classes or a group of “equals”,
not necessarily between the powerful and the weak. Ramaswami deconstructs
the notion of a collective and analyses the concept of accountability by using
inter-personal relationships as a central aspect of citizen accountability. Bonds
between citizens create norms of conduct - in case they are violated then
members of the community can impose informal sanctions (such as public
shame, excommunication etc). Although from a different perspective, Mauss’
(1976) seminal work on gift-exchange also indicates that micro-interactions (in
this case exchanging gifts) can bind society and serve as rules or codes-of-
conduct governing all realms of interaction and social life. For Mauss and
Ramaswami, the channels through which ties of reciprocity and codes of conduct
are built vary, but both scholars argue that these ties and norms of behaviour are
central to solidarity.

This second tradition would treat the generation of ‘positive participation’ in

service delivery as far more problematic than institution-building. Ramaswami
argues that it is politico-ethical dimensions of cooperation, rather than social
capital (contra Putnam), that lead to better development outcomes. He suggests
that communities use saccha taalmel or ‘togetherness’ (autonomous sanctions by
the oppressed themselves for what is right and just) to reconfigure the process
of regenerating society for a vision of a ‘common good’. It is through saccha
taalmel that notions of ‘respect’ and ‘reciprocity’ are instilled. (Ramaswami
2007). These goals, Ramaswami argues, inherently need an ethical dimension,
where there is an over-arching vision of the common good. Where this is absent,
this cannot be easily manifested by introducing institutions; rather,
Ramaswami’s point is that institutions will suffer where saccha taalmel is

15
absent. In some ways, this mirrors Sen (2002), Gasper (2002) and Foster’s
(2008) identification of a moral need to consider ‘imperfect obligations’ –
general obligations of individuals to help each other in an unspecified way
(depending on the circumstance) in order to enhance collective capabilities. In
France, this has legal backing as a ‘Samaritan law’ that requires citizens to assist
those in need of help (after, for instance, an accident). The point is that for truly
successful development, individuals need to assist others, rather than rely on an
institution (or the government) to do their work for them.

The approaches to accountability set out above provide us with important tools
with which to analyse service delivery. For the present purposes, the important
implication to collective action is two fold – and is the central argument of this
paper. First, that we cannot expect the creation of institutions (including co-
governance institutions) to solve problems of positive participation in service
delivery, since these may be undercut by the lack of social cohesion (or
togetherness/ saccha taalmel). Even where institutions are present, individuals
may not participate positively for the collective good. Second, that when societal
actors serve as a vigilant eye on the government and “denunciate non-
obedience” (Smulovitz 2003), they only address channels through which
government accountability can be dealt with. This is certainly important but not
enough for sustained improvements in service delivery, since citizens
themselves can cause problems for service delivery. The remainder of this paper
tests these two propositions by examining a case study of the mid day meal
scheme in Delhi.

Section 3. The Right to Food Campaign (RTFC): Making the state respond

Drawing on the analytical framework, this section examines the RTFC, a

movement that attempts to exercise social accountability in various ways in the
Mid Day Meal (MDM) Scheme in India. This section argues that the RTFC has
taken a largely adversarial (as opposed to cooperative) approach to
accountability in the MDM Scheme, aiming to put pressure on the government
(and to some extent on caterers directly) to improve service delivery. This
adversarial approach is evident in the campaign’s strategies, which involve a
combination of judicial activism (filing cases against the government or
providers), social mobilisation (street protest, public hearings), and using the
media (highlighting deficiencies in the implementation of the MDM). An
adversarial approach is also implicit in the campaign’s intellectual and moral
foundations. These draw strongly on rights enshrined in various documents
(including the Indian constitution and the United Nations Declaration on Rights)
that emphasise and often explicitly set out the responsibility of the government
(rather than the citizen) to ensure that citizens’ rights are met.

Inspired by the idea of ‘government obligation’, the People’s Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL)4 (Rajasthan) and members of the RTFC submitted a ‘writ
4
PUCL was created in 1976 as a result of the national emergency that curtailed basic rights to life and
freedom in the name of national security and crisis. This led many hundreds of people to join massive
rallies and protest against the anti-democratic acts of the government and to mobilise public opinion to
safeguard the Indian democracy.

16
petition5’ to the Supreme Court in May 20016, demanding that the country’s
gigantic food stocks should be used without delay to prevent the prevailing
hunger and starvation. The PIL argued that the government was legally liable for
the recurring starvation deaths (Gonsalves 2005). This petition provided an
impetus for the campaign, and formalised in legal proceedings the implicit
assumption that the fault for (and duty to prevent) starvation deaths was the
government’s. The legal merits of the case pushed forward by sustained
campaigning led to the landmark order on the 28th of November 2001.

The Supreme Court interim order directed the state to implement eight nutrition
related programmes, one of these programmes being the MDM7. This order
shows the possibility of bringing some aspects of the right to food within the
ambit of legal enforcement. With the Supreme Court orders the state
governments were compelled to provide the MDMs or else state officials would
be subject to ‘legal sanctions’. These legal sanctions included holding Chief
Secretaries8/Administrators of the States/Union Territories in contempt of court
(Gonsalves 2002, 2005). In addition, all Chief Secretaries/Administrators are
directed to file compliance report in regard to directions No.1 of the Supreme
Court 2001 order (Ibid). These legal sanctions focus on individual government
officials that have not complied with providing the MDMs in their states. For
example, the states of Jharkhand, UP and Bihar failed to provide the MDMs on
time and were given second warnings by the Supreme Court.

The legal sanctions on bureaucrats indicate that the RTFC has been able to move
beyond the common criticism of social accountability efforts that they lack
‘enforcement capacity’ (Schedler 1999) and most often use ‘soft’ methods (Goetz
and Jenkins 2004) such as social mobilisation to elicit government
accountability. The RTFC in this case has been able to create conditions where
government authorities can be held accountable and face ‘punishment’ in case
they fail to deliver the meals. The effects of the order i.e.- making state
governments answerable, and enforcing sanctions in case of non-compliance
indicates a success on the part of the RTFC in partially realising the right to food.
These sanctions can lead to public shame and therefore force the politicians and
bureaucrats to comply. Additionally, sanctions by the court can lead to declining
popularity for the concerned politician, which can reduce the politicians existing
vote bank. The RTFCs success in holding the government accountable resonates
with scholars (Cornwall 2001, Smulovitz and Perruzotti 2006) arguing for the
use of judicial activism as a mode of social accountability to hold the government
accountable.

Campaigners suggest that had the Supreme Court order on mid-day meals been

5
It is a legal instrument of the superior courts for remedies to persons, against the arbitrary or illegal
actions of any authority.
6
PUCL vs Union of India and Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001.
7
These are: Targeted Public Distribution System; Antyodaya Anna Yojana; MDM scheme; National Old
Age Pension Scheme; Annapurna; Integrated Child Development Scheme; National Maternity Benefit
Scheme; National Family Benefit Scheme.
8
State’s senior most civil servant.

17
allowed to take its own course, it is uncertain that it would have been
implemented9. The key explanation for the success of pressuring the government
to implement the MDM has been attributed to the role of social mobilisation.
Social mobilisation is the second strategy deployed by the RTFC. RTFC members
have stressed the importance of social action (in the form of public hearings,
protests and demonstrations, street plays etc) along with judicial action in
realising the right to food. As RTFC member Jean Drèze remarks, “ legal tools
have limitations… the ordinary citizen needs to be mobilised too10”. Similarly,
Mr. Patnaik from the Supreme Court commissioners office adds that “ people
putting pressure on the government is the most effective tool we have in making
the government accountable ... laws are important, but not as important as public
pressure11”.

In this connection, it is worth noting that on the same day as the Court ordered
the government to implement the MDMs (on the 28th of November 2001), the
Supreme Court also issued a similar order relating to the Integrated Child
Development Services (ICDS)12, calling inter alia for the provision of functional
anganwadis (child care centres) in “every habitation” (Jha 2005). This order,
however, has made no impact so far, and the main reason attributed for this
failure has been the lack of public pressure for ICDS - to supplement the court
order13. Similarly, Delhi was one of the later Union territories to implement the
mid day meal programme. The implementation was delayed under the pretext of
lack of funds and resources available to the state government for the programme
implementation14. However, Mid-day meals being the focus of lively campaigns
in many states, including Delhi in the last three years, has led to a steady
progress of the programme15 (Jha 2005).

This situation highlights the limitations of the legal process when it works in
isolation from other forms of social action or political mobilisation16 - a point
made by Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2006) in relation to social accountability. The
RTFC expands well beyond the confines of the Supreme Court, towards a broad-
based popular movement, involving ordinary citizens in the mounting public
pressure On 9 April 2002, a national “day of action on mid-day meals” achieved
success in building “public pressure against the government”, for the
introduction mid-day meals in primary schools17. In relation to the ‘day of action’
for the MDMs , Drèze remarks “… it brought together disparate groups with an
interest in the right to food, creating the way for further concerted action in the
future” (Drèze 2003:6).

9
Interview, Patnaik, Drèze
10
Interview, Drèze
11
Ibid.
12
ICDS is another government of India food based programme for children under the age of six years.
13
Interview, Duru, 23/8/08
14
Interview, Narula; Interview Patnaik
15
Interview, Pande, 16/8/08
16
Interview, Reddy, 14/8/08
17
Interview, Drèze

18
The third RTFC strategy is the media. As pointed out by Drèze, “ without the
media, it makes it much easier for the state to get away with doing nothing”
(Drèze 2007). The RTFC, in this tradition, uses the media to strengthen the
‘demand side’ of the objectives of the campaign18. The media has also played a
key role in building consensus (Fung et al 2003), creating space for deliberative
democracy (Crocker 2007) and in shaping policy reforms (Sen 1999). For
example, it was through the media that the RTFC was able to highlight and even
prevent the attempts of the Minister (of Women and Child Development) to
revert to ‘dry rations’ instead of cooked meals. By bringing this issue of reverting
to dry rations to the public domain a large number of activists, nutritionists,
academics, politicians and bureaucrats were able to prevent the Minister from
issuing the order. Highlighting this issue in the media created active public
debate and discussion of problems and finally building consensus against dry
rations. In addition to building consensus to inform policy changes (Sen 1999)
the RTFC has also used the media to highlight the poor management skills of the
government i.e. – the inability of the government to serve as a ‘vigilant eye’ and
enforce sanctions on the caterers in case of poor or non-delivery of the meals..
Media playing the role of a ‘watchdog’ echoes with Waisbord’s (2000)
proposition of media as an effective tool of generating government
accountability. Additionally the role of the media has increased in scope, scale
and capacity through the use of Right to Information (RTI) Act. The RTI provides
the media with the opportunity to write and report stories with greater
credibility and accuracy19.

It can safely be argued that the RTFC has been a key actor leading to the
implementation of the cooked MDM scheme. Through judicial activism via the
Supreme Court, the RTFC was able to direct all state governments to provide
cooked meals. In addition, it uses the judicial activism, the RTI Act, the media,
and social mobilisation to ensure that the decision of the Supreme Court on the
provision of cooked MDM is actually implemented, rather than remaining
ignored. The success of the campaign in so doing has been unparalleled and has
no doubt led to the improvement in the delivery of the MDMs. Just as important,
the RTFC shows how multiple means for generating accountability can be used in
concert with each other, and in such a way that they act to reinforce each other
and create synergy, as figure 2 indicates. These efforts of the RTFC resonate well
with Smulovitz and Peruzzotti’s (2000a, 2006) support of the use of combined
channels in exercising social accountability. In a wider sense, this chapter also
demonstrates the importance of social accountability in creating overall
accountability and ensuring better service provision.

18
Interview, Lal, RTFC, 18/8/08
19
Interview, khera, RTFC, 18/8/08

19
Figure 2: Social accountability through the RTFC
Government holding
[of India, MCD, MDM, Delhi accountable Caterers
government] Private/NGOs
holding
accountable

Mid-day
Judicial meals
Media activism
RTFC

Social mobilisation

School children [parents]

There are, however, problems with the approach of the RTFC. The strategy of
the RTFC is largely adversarial, where the government is considered to be in the
‘wrong’ and the citizens in the ‘right’. In order to address problems pertaining to
a complex accountability chain of the production and delivery of meals some
scholars hold the view that a more collaborative approach, rather than an
antagonistic one, can yield better results (Ackerman 2003). Protests, media
exposure and judicial activism tend to highlight the distance between the
government and ‘civil society’. However, neither are static, monolithic wholes
but institutions that have internal contending forces and therefore spaces for
negotiations and discussions that could lead to more effective ways of delivering
services and creating accountability in the delivery process. While civil society
has an important role in holding governments to account, through means, which
may often be adversarial, this should not exclude cooperation between
government and civil society, which, at times, could work together to fulfil goals
common to both, such as successful service delivery in the MDM Scheme.

These problems of the RTFC can be remedied. However, when it comes to the
bigger question of ensuring the success of the MDM scheme through generating
greater accountability, on its own the RTFC is able to address only a part of the
problem. The RTFC approach adequately highlights the problems pertaining to
poor service delivery as a result of a lack of government and caterer
accountability alone. However, the current problems pertaining to the poor
delivery of the MDM go beyond government - caterer problems, and are largely a
result of breaks in the chain of accountability, which the RTFC cannot necessarily
remedy. This point is further explored in the next section, which indicates that
efforts to improve service delivery in the MDM Scheme through greater
government and caterer accountability by the RTFC will only be successful if
they are reinforced at the local level by citizen involvement and responsibility – a
point neglected by the campaign. The next section highlights how the lack of

20
accountability among the ‘beneficiaries’20 of the programme can be as central a
cause in the failure of the MDM Scheme to actually deliver regular meals to
children, and, similarly, how the presence of accountability and solidarity among
beneficiary citizens can provide the final links to complete the chain of
accountability at the local, or micro, level, and ensure greater success of the MDM
scheme.

Section 4: Co-governance for accountability: Exploring the functioning of

school monitoring committees

4.1 Introduction

This section explores citizen-citizen accountability (and the lack of it) under a co-
governance for accountability approach to social accountability. Briefly, the ‘co-
governance for accountability’ (Ackerman 2003) approach involves the creation
of ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall 2000, Paul 2002), where the parents of students are
invited by the government to monitor the delivery and distribution of the meals.
In 2006, the Minister of Human Resource Development passed an order for the
establishment in every government primary school of a local monitoring
committee comprised of various ‘stakeholders’ including parents (mothers), the
school head master, a member of the PTA, and a member of the resident welfare
association or a senior citizen living in the vicinity (Mathur et al 2008). The
monitoring committee is responsible for: a) tasting the food before it is served,
b) weighing the food to determine whether the caterers are delivering adequate
quantities of food and c) lodging complaints to the caterers and government
authorities in case of delivery of poor quality meals or failed delivery.

The parents (mothers and PTA members) are chosen through a roster system,
which implies that all parents are required to monitor the meal distribution at
some point in the year. Other members are nominated by the school
administration. The other members are, however, not considered central to the
monitoring committee by the school administration – as they are not seen as
“stakeholders” of the MDM scheme21. In both schools the parents were the main
party involved in the monitoring of the MDM scheme. This section therefore
focuses on the interaction between parents and between parents and teachers of
the school.

In exploring the functioning of the school based monitoring committee I argue

that ‘social cohesion’, (based on a vision for a common good) between members
of a community is an essential ingredient in enhancing the delivery of basic
services, perhaps as important as creating rights vis-à-vis the government. This
chapter suggests that where social cohesion between parents is lacking, links of
accountability with each other can failed to be established, which in turn
obstructs the delivery of the meals. The next section highlights the successful
20
Though the children are the direct beneficiaries of the meals, it is the parents that have been held
responsible for the monitoring of the meal.
21
Interview, Jha, NDMC school principal, 1/8/08

21
operationalisation of co-governance for accountability in the MCD school. Social
cohesion among the parent community ensured accountability between parents,
which played a key role in the proper implementation of the MDM scheme.
Section 5.3 highlights the failure of the co-governance for accountability
approach, due to the lack of social cohesion between parents, leading to the
failure of establishing accountability links between the parents and teachers and
therefore prevented the proper implementation of the MDM scheme.

4.2: Case study one: MCD School – A cohesive community:

The MDM scheme functioned better in the MCD school22 because community
around the MCD school was cohesive. This was for two principal reasons. First,
most of the schoolchildren and their parents in the MCD school live in a slum –
within a kilometre of the school. The dense living conditions within the slum
facilitated a sense of familiarity and the establishment of local codes of conduct
between the parents and the students. These codes of conduct were central to
the parent body operating cohesively, and working together for the benefit of the
entire community. In case of violation of these codes, the violator would be
punished through excommunication or public shaming. For example, one of the
mother’s from the MCD schools expressed dissatisfaction over another mother’s
inability to fulfil her ‘community duties’. She pointed out “Raamuna would never
pick up my children from school…or check the food when she said she
would…we all take turns, she also has to take turns…but now we don’t depend
on her… we have our own group …where everyone takes turns23”. Some of the
other slums I visited also had similar living arrangements but lacked these
informal codes of conduct.

The second and more important reason for their social cohesion was a historical
one. More than six years ago, the people that currently reside in Jaffrabad were
living in a different slum, not far from where they live now. In one of the Delhi
government slum rehabilitation projects, the people of Jaffrabad were removed
from their original settlement24. This process of slum rehabilitation led them to
get collectivised to protect their slum. Though their efforts were not successful in
preventing the rehabilitation of the slum, collective participation in the fight had
positive spill over effects. These spill-over effects included setting up informal
codes and norms of conduct to protect themselves from threats etc, getting
collectivised so as to seek their entitlements – such as the MDM – along with
having a sense of duty and obligation as individuals part of a larger collective.
This made them much more likely and able to hold government teachers
accountable, other parents accountable and themselves accountable to a larger
community. The strength of this collaborative relationship however lay in the
parents being collectivised and sharing a relationship of mutual trust and
reciprocity (Mauss 1976, Ramaswami 2007) that resulted in a sense of
community solidarity. These attributes of the parent community were key in the

22
MCD is a local government authority, responsible for imparting education to poorer sections of society
within its specific geographical boundary.
23
Interview, Ronak, 6/9/08
24
Interview, multiple parents 5/9/08

22
proper implementation of the MDM. Parents participated in the local monitoring
committee and played their roles in holding the government and caterers
accountable for poor delivery. The next section highlights the ways in which
parents fulfilled their duty as monitors of the MDM.

Specifically, this section looks at three aspects of parents’ involvement in the

monitoring of the MDM. These include MDM maintenance registers, complaint
registers, and their role in controlling food poisoning. These channels indicate
the operationalisation of the co-governance for accountability approach.
Box 1: Key facts: MCD school

MCD school (Primary school), Delhi

Key Facts:
School location: North Delhi
Total number of school children: 512 students (boy’s school)
Religious background: Predominantly Muslim
Caste background25: Predominantly Dalits
Language spoken: Urdu (and Hindi)
Student-teacher ratio: 60-80:1
Age-group of students consuming MDM: 4 to 10 years.

School monitoring committee:

Mothers, parent from PTA, Resident welfare Association member,
government official from the NDMC authorities, senior citizen in the locality,
MDM teacher in-charge.

Profile of students’ fathers: predominantly construction workers, others

occupations included working as domestic help, petty shopkeepers,
mechanics, washermen, janitors, tailors and street vendors.

Profile of students’ mothers: predominantly worked as domestic help in other

houses, house based livelihood such as quilt making and cushion making,
vegetable selling, construction workers.

Parents’ literacy rate26: 3%

4.2a Collective responsibility-Maintaining the MDM register

“Some-one has to check the food, since our children are being fed, monitoring
the food is our responsibility”- Parent

Evidence from the maintenance of the MDM register in this school indicates that
parents’ sense of solidarity and common good (deriving from the shared
experience outlined above) and teachers’ trusteeship enabled the community to

25
This information was given to me by the school principal and by the MDM officer for MCD schools
Mr. Kumar.
26
Literacy here means the basic ability to read and write. The literacy rate is limited to the parents I
interviewed in my fieldwork.

23
solve collective action problems and allowed the MDM scheme to function well.
Parents maintained the register in order that all children (not just their own)
would receive meals, and teachers supported their efforts to do this.

In this school, the majority of the parents were extremely active in matters
pertaining to the school – be it school infrastructure, teaching or the mid day
meals. This does not imply that the monitoring committee functioned flawlessly.
The MDM register had gaps indicating that there were days when the parents
had not checked the food. The MDM teacher in-charge explained that there were
occasions when the members of the PTA or mothers assigned to check food were
unable to come due to work commitments. The teacher pointed out “in most
cases the mothers would inform the school beforehand and the school would
make alternative arrangements … other teachers would inspect the food….or
sometimes other parents would step in to check the food…. all the parents know
each other, they take turns between themselves to come and check the food27”.

Interviews with the parents indicated that they would never sign the register
without checking the food. Such flexibility in signing the MDM monitoring
register was primarily because the teachers did not make it mandatory for the
parents to sign the register. When asked whether she feared the wrath of senior
officers if she did submit a fully signed register, the MDM teacher in-charge
replied that the “parents were engaged in monitoring the MDM scheme more or
less regularly, they are making an effort, which is good enough and the senior
officials don’t bother us28”. The parents signed the register when they had
checked the food quality and quantity (by weighing the food containers and
tasting the food themselves). One of the parents from the PTA stated that the
“register was necessary to keep a check on the food, which was needed for
feedback29” she added “monitoring the meals is a way in which we can
contribute to all ‘our children getting good food”. Some parents were unaware
that signing the register was an ‘order’ by senior officers. Instead, they believed
it to part of their ‘duty’ or Zimmedari, and a ‘responsibility of the teachers and
the parents30’. These parents indicated that they were informed about the
monitoring committee from other parents and from the teachers.

Recurrent use of ‘we’ and ‘our children’ by the teachers and parents indicated a
sense of solidarity and a common concern for the children. Even those parents
that sent food from home were actively involved in the monitoring of the meal.
Ranya, a mother, pointed out “even though my children don’t eat the school food
because I send food from home, I feel it is my duty to check the food on behalf of
those children who don’t get food from home31”. This quote highlights a sense of
joint responsibility with a vision of a common good existed among the parents, a
common feature of a tightly knit community (Mauss 1976). Additionally, many
mothers confirmed that the teachers were very organised – for instance
assigning monitoring dates for the parents in advance and also informing

27
Interview, Shahana, MDM teacher in-charge, 21/9/08
28
Ibid.
29
Interview, Firoza, 23/9/08
30
Interview, Aziz, 29/9/08
31
Interview, Hamja, 19/9/08

24
parents about the importance of the meal – suggesting that teachers felt a sense
of trusteeship and responsibility to ensure that parents fulfilled their
responsibilities.

4.2b Collective activism: Using the complaint register

“Bad caterers need to be told they are bad, if we don’t then who will tell them?
…through complaints the government listened to us and gave us a better
caterer”- parent

Parents and teachers had worked together to submit complaints on poor

delivery to the government and followed up to ensure that their complaints were
heard and the caterers were changed. Parents and teachers were aware of the
importance of joint complaint, and were able to organise together.

The food complaint register was also frequently used. The complaint register
was submitted to the caterers and to MCD government officials of the concerned
zone. Often parents would complain to the principal and to the caterers when the
food was inadequate in quality or quantity. The school principal claimed that a
year ago, the school was able to change the caterers from Manjeet caterers to
Surya welfare caterers because of constantly late and erratic food deliveries by
the former32. The principal indicated that changing the caterers was possible due
to the sustained complaints from the parent community. On inspecting the
complaint register, (maintained by the MDM teacher in charge) there were 76
complaints made by the parents, mainly for non-delivery of food during the time
of Manjeet caterers. The teachers had also signed near the parents’ thumbprints
on their complaints about the non-delivery of the food.

On several occasions, the teacher and the parents jointly lodged complaints. The
complaint register had a complaint formulated and signed by the teacher, and
supported by parents signatures and thumbprints. When one of the parents
monitoring the meals was asked why people complain together she answered,
“…if we complain together then they will listen to us33”. Another parent stated,
“the teachers also feel complaining together will make an impact34”. This is
another example of trusteeship, where the teachers supported the parents in
complaining to the caterers by writing out all the complaints themselves.

Additionally, the parents complained collectively not only to the caterers but also
to the school administration. One of the recurrent complaints made by the
parents was regarding the need for containers for eating the MDM. Finally, the
school responded by providing plates for those schoolchildren unable to bring
containers from home. In reaction to this, one of the mothers remarked “mostly
the teachers listen to us …we wanted plates and a water cooler…. the PTA
decided for plates because more parents wanted plates….I am happy with the

32
Interview, Gaffar 5/9/08
33
Interview, Mohammad, 8/9/08
34
Interview, Laila, 8/9/08

25
decision... 35”. The school principal explained that the recent Delhi government
order to provide each school with Rs 50,000 per year gave him “greater
autonomy36” to use the funds to buy meals when the meals had fallen short, to
keep extra utensils for children that failed to bring their own, or to fix other
infrastructural problems. He further claimed that PTA meetings decide how the
money should be spent.

The teachers supporting the parents in complaining to the caterers and

government officials indicates the operationalisation of teachers’ roles as
(Gandhian) trustees for the parent community – where the teachers guide,
support and advance the cause of the parent community, despite differences in
caste and class. Additionally, parents’ demands for containers and a water cooler
points to a sense of ‘collective consciousness’ (Dukheim 1987) of the parent body
as a whole. Furthermore, the references to the PTA committee’s decision imply
that such a committee does operate and practices ‘deliberative democracy’ (Fung
et al 2003).

4.2c Collective ‘self-governance’: Procuring MDM

“ When the caterers don’t deliver the food we use the PTA fund to buy biscuits”-
father 12/8/09

A final example of the positive participation of the community in the MCD school
comes from a scheme set up by parents and teachers to provide food to children
when MDM delivery failed.

Parents of the Jaffrabad community have been contributing Rs 2/- per month to
the PTA fund to provide food to the children if the caterers failed to deliver. This
was particularly the case when Manjeet caterers were providing the food. The
principal stated that only 34 sets of parents (out of a school of 566 children) did
not contribute to the PTA fund. According to the principal, the parents that didn’t
contribute were either from very poor families or were completely disengaged
with the school administration37. The principal, teachers and the parents all
pointed out on separate occasions that the PTA fund or the principal’s fund was
often used to provide food for all the children (even those children whose
parents did not contribute in the fund) in case the caterers had failed to deliver
the meal. A mother monitoring the meal remarked “when meals don’t come, our
children feel hungry, so we have to make sure somehow they get the food38”.
Another parent said “the children expect the food to come everyday, they study
better if they eat well39”. She further added, “if the caterers failed to deliver the
meal, the teachers, parents and members of the administrative staff would
purchase either bananas or biscuits for the school children40”.

35
Interview, Faiza, 2/9/08
36
Interview, Gaffar
37
Interview, Gaffar.
38
Interview, Renar, 27/8/08
39
Interview, Raina, 27/8/08
40
Ibid.

26
In the past two months there were “more than fifteen cases41” when the caterers
failed to deliver the food. The teachers and the parents stated that in each case
the school was able to provide biscuits or bananas for lunch. Focus group
discussions with the schoolchildren confirmed that there were two days that
they could remember in the past two months when they had not received any
mid day meal. A class four student remarked “the quantity of the cooked meal
was insufficient and sometimes the biscuits were not sweet42”, but they
confirmed that they had “something to eat in school almost everyday43”.

The teachers’ and parents’ success in setting up an alternative system that used
contributions to the PTA fund to ensure that all children were served a meal
everyday was an impressive example of how the MCD school was able to
overcome collective action problems. This was only possible with the parents
and the teachers actively supporting the scheme. Creating alternative systems to
‘prevent children from hunger’ indicates a level of self-governance, possible
through nurturing a vision of a ‘common good’ (Gandhi 1938).

4.3 Case study two: NDMC school – institutions are not enough

4.3a Introduction

The MDM scheme functioned much less well in the NDMC school, and this was
because the community was much less cohesive. In the NDMC school,
schoolchildren and parents lived at varying distances from the school and from
each other. Dispersed living conditions allowed for little interaction between the
parents and restrained the development of meaningful and sustainable
relationships. Furthermore, parents that lived and worked close to the school
were more actively participating in the monitoring of the meals. These parents
that did participate in the monitoring committee, often did so for purposes of
self-interest. In other words, parents participated instrumentally for private
gain. The lack of answerability and enforcement mechanisms within the
monitoring committee allowed some parents to violate their authority as
monitors of meal distribution. In addition, some parents refrained from actively
engaging in school matters. ‘Self-exclusion’ (Cornwall 2000) due to apathy, lack
of concern, and creating individualised coping mechanisms prevented the
monitoring committee from functioning well.

Furthermore, in the NDMC case the parents did not have a common rallying
point to collectivise. Even when the parents did come together to rally for a
particular demand, the lack of social cohesion reduced the sustainability of such
collective demands.

41
Interview, Ali, (father), 14/9/08, Interview Rabida (teacher), 11/9/08
42
Interview, Farheen 4/8/08
43
Interview, multiple students, 4/8/08

27
Box 2: Key facts: NDMC school
NDMC school, (Primary and middle school), New Delhi

Key Facts:
School location: South Delhi
Total number of school children: 322 students (co-ed school)
Religious background: Predominantly Hindu
Caste background44: Predominantly Dalits
Language spoken: Hindi
Student-teacher ratio: 20- 30:1
Age-group of students consuming the MDM: 4 to 10 years

School monitoring committee:

Mothers, parent from PTA, Resident welfare Association member,
government official from the NDMC authorities, senior citizen in the
locality, MDM teacher in charge.

Profile of students’ fathers: predominantly working as domestic help, others

occupations included construction, petty shopkeepers, mechanics, janitors
and street vendors.

Profile of students’ mothers: predominantly worked as domestic help in

other houses, vegetable sellers, petty shopkeepers, massage ladies.

Parents’ literacy rate45: 16%

4.3b Shifting responsibilities and apathy: who will maintain the MDM
register?

“checking the food everyday by a parent is too much work, why doesn’t the school
make sure the teachers check the food” - mother

In the NDMC school the signing of the MDM register was seen to be of paramount
importance, but as an administrative requirement rather than a contribution to
the MDM scheme. The co-governance arrangements designed to empower the
community were viewed as a burden, as parents and teachers declined to
participate positively in the arrangements.

The MDM teacher in-charge stated “the register had to be reported to the zonal
and central municipal office for scrutiny and in case of discrepancies the teachers
feared the officials would hold the school responsible in case the register was left
incomplete46”. The registers were signed at the end of the school day when
parents would come to pick up the children or often at the beginning of the

44
This information was given to me by the school principal and by the NDMC officer Mr. Joshi for
NDMC schools.
45
The literacy rate is limited to the parents I interviewed in my fieldwork.
46
Interview, Shahana.

28
month for the entire month. According to the MDM teacher in-charge, the
register was not signed every day after the food was checked because “...this is
the fastest and most efficient way of getting the register signed, so we don’t
waste time everyday in signing the register47”. Another teachers explained
“parents and other members of the monitoring committee almost never came to
school to actually check the food, which made it difficult to get these registers
signed on a daily basis48”. The MDM teacher in-charge added “burden of
supervising the distribution of the meal took a lot of time, they had enough
responsibilities and found it difficult to cope with new monitoring mechanisms,
especially with a lack of support from the parent community49”. The extra work
involved in supervising the distribution of the meals often led teachers to involve
children from older classes to help the distributors and the teachers in
distributing the food.

Focus group discussions and individual interviews with parents indicated three
reasons why parents signed the register without checking the food, reflecting the
lack of time, interest and resources found in critiques of participation in the
theoretical section above. First, some parents found it difficult to come on time
during the distribution of the food and therefore signed the register whenever it
was convenient for them. One of the mothers signing the register without
checking the food remarked “I can come to pick my child up but not when the
food is served, at that time I have to go for work50”. Second, parents were not
interested in checking meals because their children ate food from home. Another
mother commented that she would send packed food from home for their
children and so there was “no need to check the food” she added “their parents
should come and check the food, why me?51” On inquiring whether her children
tended to consume the MDMs, she responded “they ate the meal when they liked
it but not always … “I don’t know which days they eat it so I cant keep checking
the food according to that52”. Third, other parents felt that it was too much effort
for the school to consistently check food quality and also a “waste of time” for
members of the monitoring committee. One of the parents pointed out that
“checking the food everyday by some parent is too much work, why doesn’t the
school make sure the teachers check the food?53”

Some parents were aware of the implications of falsely signing registers: the
possibility of creating greater quality and quantity control would be reduced.
The rationalisation was that “the school should check the food, why should we
get involved in matters of the school- what are the teachers for?54” Another
parent pointed out that “meals were our right (haq) and the school should be
responsible for poor delivery.55” She further stated “the school should

47
Ibid.
48
Interview, Kunni, 11/9/08
49
Interview, Radha, 11/9/08
50
Interview, Preeti, 2/9/08
51
Interview, Lalitha, 11/9/08
52
Ibid
53
Interview, Jaya, 6/9/08
54
Interview, Harish, 12/9/08
55
Interview, Prerna, 12/9/08

29
complain…what is the need for parents to get involved?” There were some
parents that were unaware of the implications of falsely signing registers, and
considered it to be a new bureaucratic routine that the school has started. This
indicates the teachers perversion of the role of a trustees.

4.3c Individualised complaints

“When there is a problem with the school, sahib tells the teacher, I don’t even have
to get involved”- mother (Chandribai) 12/9/09

Perhaps surprisingly, the parents of students going to NDMC schools were more
aware of their children’s needs and rights in school as compared to the parents
of the MCD school. This awareness can partly be traced to their association with
educated wealthy middle and upper class families, in whose houses the parents
work as domestic help. Also, there were some parents who had had some formal
education in the past and thus a greater awareness of their rights and
entitlements.

However, such awareness very rarely translated to active participation by the

parents in matters pertaining to the mid-day meal and the school in general.
Complaints were mostly made through their employers for individual (rather
than group) problems, even if the issue was relevant for the entire school. 60%
of the parents interviewed at this school (especially those who worked as
domestic servants) felt that they could try to change some of the malpractices of
the school and they did so, through individual complaints made primarily by
their employers about issues that affected their children (even if it was a larger
school based problem).

Being connected to wealthy and educated families allowed them to exert

pressure on the school body through their employers in case of poor quality and
quantity of food delivery and distribution. On a number of occasions parents
complained about the delay in money allotment for uniforms or poor
infrastructure facilities such as lack of clean toilets, or small quantity of food
being served etc. These complaints were made individually, rarely in
conjunction with other parents or the larger student body. Chandribai, a
scheduled caste woman from Jharkhand56 who worked in an army officer’s
house near the school is a good example of individualistic complaints through
employers: “when the money for the school uniforms was late in being given, I
came with sahib to make him ask the teacher to give me the money for my
child…for the teachers to listen to my complaints, I often ask sahib to come with
me, this way the teacher is pressured to listen to my demand and I don’t have to
waste time in arguing with the teacher57”.

Chandribai’s demands included asking for extra school bags, notebooks, pens
and pencils (often beyond the allocated allowance) for her child. Similarly, when
56
Chandribai moved to Dehi four years ago and she found work as a domestic help through an agency
that helped her move to Delhi. Interview, 12/9/09
57
Ibid.

30
there were cases of the meals not being delivered, she complained through her
employer and also started to send food from home. She was aware of the school
complaints system but had never used it because she found it ‘more convenient’
to complain directly through her employer rather than complaining through the
system. She said “when there is a problem with the school, sahib tells the teacher,
I don’t even have to (zaroorat) get involved”.

Chandribai knew about the local monitoring mechanism, where the mother of
each child was required to go to school and monitor the food four times in the
entire course of the year. However, she had not gone to monitor the food even
once, despite the fact that she lived and worked close to the school and would go
the school to pick up her son on a daily basis. She felt that when there was a
problem with the food delivery then she would complain through her employer.
She did not feel the need to engage in the matters of the school herself.

There were two mains reasons for the frequency of individual-based complaints
and complaining through employers. First, many of the parents found it “easier”
and more “convenient” to complain through their employers – if they were in a
position to do so. Parents felt that the teachers were more inclined to listen if
‘powerful and rich’ people came to school. Second, there was a lack of
engagement with the school and parent community in general. Unlike in the MCD
school where parents and teachers complained together for the collective good,
here parents had developed individualised ways to cope with the poor delivery
of the meals – by either sending food from home or complaining to the teacher,
but without using the formal complaint register. The overall outcome was
worse, as Hardin predicts.

In addition, on many occasions when the food would fall short, few complaints
were made to the caterers by the parents or other members of the committee.
Some parents believed that by using the complaints system the private caterers
would further disturb the delivery of the food. This seems a legitimate concern
about the accountability structure where there are very few caterers that cannot
be easily switched. Others didn’t feel the need to complain about the erratic
meal delivery as they had devised individual methods for coping with the
sometimes inconsistent and erratic food delivery – they had opted out. Many of
the parents refused to take responsibility, holding that complaining is the duty of
the teachers, they should be responsible. Yet others believed that the school
should have a mechanism to provide the food, through the various funds
collected by the parents when the caterers failed to provide the food. Parents
who suggested the use of PTA fund for procuring food did not see why they
should be involved in getting the food: “MDM is government’s duty, why should
we have to get the food?58” These parents acknowledged their entitlement, but
not their responsibility.

58
Interview, Anita, 11/9/09

31
4.3d ‘In pursuit of Lakshmi59 ’: Selling MDM

“It is extra food that I sell, there are always left overs… I make sure the children get
enough to eat”- parent buying and selling ‘extra’ meals from distributors.
(9/7/08)

‘The biggest problem in the MDM is poor quantity of food distribution’ – same
parent (18/7/08)

In this school, parents that participated in the MDM scheme (on the monitoring
committee) sold MDM food for their private gain. Other parents did not
participate in the scheme at all.

There were days when some of the more active parents, (the ones living or
working closer to the school, would come to pick up the children after school)
would take or buy what they call ‘extra’ food from the school and then sell the
food in their locality or keep the food for family consumption. This food was not
‘extra’ or leftovers, but food meant for the schoolchildren. The easy access to
schools in terms of distance made it possible for the parents to come and take
‘extra’ food in the middle of the day. Parents who took the food would also turn
up more frequently than other parents during the time for monitoring the meal
distribution.

Parents who took food justified it by stating that most children get food from
home and the food that they were taking was ‘extra’. One of the fathers
rationalised taking food by stating that the “children go home and eat food in any
case, the MDM being just a snack, which is why there was enough of extra food
after the distribution60”. One of the mother’s explained the “food was meant for
the children and that they were taking the food for the children’s evening
meals61”. Yet others simply stated that their children never complained about the
quantity of the food and by taking the ‘extra’ food they were able to earn extra
money by selling the food in their tea-stalls/local shops in their locality. Another
parent pointed out that the ‘food was extra and the distributors made sure the
children get enough62’. On asking the parent whether she had physically checked
the distribution to make sure the children were being served adequately she
replied “that is the distributors’ and teachers’ job”. At other points of my
interviews and informal conversations, the same parents pointed out that the
main problem of the MDM scheme was the un-hygienic food and the small
quantities of the food being delivered by the caterers.

Despite these claims of surplus, students’ most consistent complaint (other than
the tastelessness of the food) was over the food quantity. There were complaints
that the food quantity was insufficient to kill their hunger and that sometimes
the older children (class four and five) would not be given food due to quantity
shortages. In fact, the demand for the meals also came from the middle school
59
This title has been borrowed from the Rudolphs (1987).
60
Interview, Laxman, 9/9/09
61
Interview, Leela, 11/9/09
62
Interview, Neeta, 11/9/09

32
(class six, seven and eight) students. In some other schools when there was extra
food left over after the first round of food distribution, the teachers would either
provide second helpings to the children who were ‘entitled’ to the meal or
distribute it to students from higher classes. This, however, never happened in
this particular NDMC school. Children often complained that when they asked for
second helpings, the teacher/distributor would refuse saying “there is no more
food available63”.

The food being taken away by parents after the caterer’s delivery and
distribution of food to schools thus was a major cause of the obstruction of MDM
delivery to students. The siphoning of the food reduced the quantity of food
being delivered. In buying the ‘extra’ food (for Rs1/- or 2/- in containers that
they had bought from home) they were aware of the fact that students, including
their own children, found the quantities of the meal inadequate. There have been
similar cases of food stealing in other parts of the country, but those highlighted
have concerned either teachers or members of the Panchayat (village council).
For example, in Manaendragarh of Koriya district 50 kg of rice had been pilfered
and sold off by the teacher (Zaidi 2005). This led the parents to form a dekh-rekh
samiti (monitoring committee), which kept a check on the meals being served,
and on teachers’ duties in ensuring the meal was provided on time (Zaidi 2005).
In this case the parents ‘claimed’ the space to monitor the meals. In the NDMC
case, the parents themselves were involved in taking ‘extra’ food from the school,
despite an existing monitoring committee of which they were expected to be
active members.

Some of the parents that were not involved with the buying and reselling of the
meals were unaware of the food being bought and sold. These parents were also
not engaged in the monitoring of the food and had not come for checking the
food when they were required too for reasons ranging from inconvenience to
apathy in school administration matters. One of the mother’s commented “the
school works the way it does, what do I do?” These parents, however they did
often sign registers stating that they had checked the food quality and quantity.
Still others sent food from home and were pleased that the meals were provided
at least three, sometimes four, times a week and were uninterested in matters of
the school as long as they were able to feed their children some-how- from home
or from school. So parents not directly involved in stealing food did not prevent
it or complain about it because they had individual coping mechanisms or were
apathetic. In other words, parents that participated in ‘monitoring’ (buying the
food from the caterers and re-selling it) the MDM were not accountable to the
other parents – those who were aware and unaware of this transaction.
Additionally, parents that were aware of such a transaction refrained from
demanding answerability and/or imposing sanctions on these parents partly
because of the local power dynamics that rendered them ‘powerless and
voiceless’ as compared to the parents ‘monitoring’ the MDM. Such problems
resonate with well with the various critiques of participatory approaches, as
highlighted by Mosse (2001), Stirrat (1996) Crook and Kothari (2001). However,
a stronger theme that emerged from interviews with parents was that the parent

63
Interview, Garima, 22/8/09

33
body were largely satisfied with their individual coping mechanisms and did not
feel the need to elicit accountability from the parents, teachers and the
distributors as the functioning of the MDM did not directly effect them. In other
words, the lack of feeling ‘morally obligated’ (Sen 2003) and envisioning a
‘common good’, prevented some parents from engaging positively for improving
the meal delivery.

4.3f Taking stock

In the NDMC school the local monitoring committee failed to ensure the delivery
of the meals to the students. This was for a number of reasons. First, the NDMC
parent body did not operate as a ‘community’. Elements of reciprocity, trust and
inter-dependence, imperfect obligation (Mauss 1976, Ramaswami 2007, Foster
2008) between the parents did not exist. This was evident by the fact that
parents complained through their ‘rich and powerful’ employers in order to
ensure better service provision for them-selves that is at an individual level. The
nature of the demands made on the school through powerful employees was for
individual gain, without an overall concern for the common good for all. In such a
case, ‘handing over the stick’ (Chambers 1997) to the community benefited some
individuals and marginalised those with little power, voice and agency. This
reflects the common criticism of most top-down development approaches
(Mosse 2001).

Second, some parents were involved in siphoning ‘extra’ food from the school,
despite knowing that many children were hungry and demanded more. These
parents had developed other means through which they made sure that there
own children had sufficient quantities to eat. Some parents sent food from home
whereas others took the ‘extra’ food to feed their children in the evening – in
both cases parents operated at an individual level, without an overall sense of a
common good. In addition, while some of the parents were not aware of this
happening (because of a lack of participation in the monitoring committee),
others were not concerned by it because they had devised their own
individualised methods for coping with erratic meal delivery.

Inviting parents to participate in the monitoring of the meals have blurred lines
of accountability, with the parents holding caterers, officials and teachers
accountable and they are themselves being held accountable by others in the
monitoring committee. In this case the lack of accountability between parents in
monitoring committees indicates a major gap in the accountability chain with
respect to effective service delivery. If not addressed, this case study suggests
that these gaps can lead to a failure of the co-governance for accountability
approach.

Section 5: Conclusion

Although the focus of the paper is on the MDM scheme, broader generalisations
can be drawn about how the delivery of basic services can be improved through
the creation of stronger and more chains of accountability. This paper makes two

34
broad points on the role of ‘voice’ based accountability mechanisms. First, it
argues that the ‘voice’ based social accountability mechanisms exemplified by
the RTFC have been successful in enhancing the delivery of the MDM scheme.
The RTFC’s unparalleled success derives from its combination of strategies –
judicial activism (public interest litigation and Right to Information requests),
social mobilisation and the media – to pressure the government to deliver the
meals, and confirms beliefs in the effectiveness of social accountability
(Smulovitz and Perruzzotti 2000a, 2006). However, the paper indicates that in
deploying these multiple strategies the RTFC has taken an adversarial stance
towards the government, based on the premise that the poor have been victims
of government exploitation (due to corruption, lack of accountability etc). Such a
premise is no doubt partially valid, but it is not sufficient to explain poor service
provision.

Analysis of ‘co-governance for accountability’ approaches highlight absences of

citizen-citizen accountability that have been left unaddressed by the RTFC. These
new approaches to accountability are crucial in bringing citizens to the centre-
stage of their own developments as agents of change as opposed to silent
beneficiaries (of the RTFC’s or the government’s efforts). These new approaches
to social accountability indicate that the nature of local relationships (whether
citizens are accountable to each other or not) has a profound impact on
enhancing or obstructing the delivery of basic services – including mid-day
meals. In other words, in order for ‘co-governance for accountability’ to work,
citizens not only have to participate but participate in a specific way: to
participate to not only hold providers accountable but also each other.

The focus on enhancing provider accountability therefore needs to be combined

with efforts to enhance citizen-citizen accountability; especially under the
context of good governance, with the changing role of the state (World Bank
1997) – where ordinary citizens (along with NGOs and private players) are being
invited to shape the development processes that directly affect them (Chandhoke
2003). For such new accountability and governance approaches to work, a re-
conceptualisation of accountability is required with a greater focus on citizen-
citizen accountability – which implies an increased emphasis on citizens’ duties,
and not just their rights. This argument warns against unquestioning
approaches to ‘transferring the stick’ to communities – not only because of
unequal local power dynamics or problems of co-option but because citizens –
just as governments – can also act self-interestedly and not for their shared
benefit.

35
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49
 Accountability Initiative

The Accountability Initiative is an independent effort to strengthen state

accountability in India by undertaking policy research, creating networks of
stakeholders, exploring new areas and ways to collect and disseminate
information on the quality of public services in India. The initiative’s work is
collaborative. It seeks to strengthen current accountability efforts by
government, civil society, research institutes and the media. Specifically, the
initiative aims to:
• Undertake policy research on the mechanisms of accountability in India’s
governance institutions
• Develop new areas and innovations to enhance accountability
• Support the creation of better quality data on basic public services
• Seek innovative ways to disseminate this data to the public
• Encourage an informed, evidence-based debate on accountability and
improved service delivery outcomes in India
The Center for Policy Research, New Delhi is the institutional anchor for the
initiative.

Visit us at www.accountabilityindia.org

Engaging Accountability: Working Paper Series

In the last decade or so non-state actors- social movements, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) and the media- have emerged as a powerful force through
which demands for state accountability are being articulated. Often referred to
as social accountability, these new accountability claims signal a profound shift
in the accountability discourse both in terms of who demands accountability and
mechanisms through which it is demanded.

Despite the proliferation of these efforts, analytical work on this engagement

remains limited. We know very little about the nature, form, effectiveness and
challenges of these modes of state-society engagement: what are the chief
instruments? What works in what contexts? And what are the lessons that can be
drawn from them?

The ‘Engaging Accountability’ working paper series is an effort to address some

of these questions in the Indian context. It focuses on three main questions:

• What are the factors- institutional and political- that create conditions
under which citizens engage in social accountability? And what are the
policy implications?
• What are instruments and strategies through which social accountability
actors demand accountability?
• How does one measure the effectiveness of social accountability?

50