Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2d 371
On January 23, 1979, defendant Jacobson, the unit manager, ordered the
appellant transferred to a different and less desirable cell house. Milhouse
continued to be harassed and intimidated by prison officials after his transfer.
On April 4, 1979, appellant was informed that he was under investigation for
his participation in a plot to assault a correctional officer. On April 6, 1979,
Milhouse was given a copy of a report prepared by defendant Hudson, which
formally charged him with planning the assault on defendant Divers.
Milhouse appeared at a hearing before two members of the U.D.C. on April 12,
1979. Prison officials informed him that the charges against him were based
upon the report of a confidential informant. The U.D.C. found Milhouse guilty
of the offense and recommended disciplinary segregation, forfeiture of good
time credits, and a disciplinary transfer.
Milhouse did not aver specifically that each of the actions described above was
taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Nonetheless, reading the
complaint as a whole, the magistrate observed: "Plaintiff, in effect alleges that
the above actions were taken against him as harassment because of his religious
leadership functions and because of his prior actions in seeking access to the
courts to remedy religious grievances." Appendix for Appellant at 121a. The
magistrate acknowledged that appellant's allegations would state a claim upon
which relief could be granted if the claim were properly pleaded. He analyzed
separately the allegations made against each defendant, concluding that they
were too vague and conclusory to establish a sufficient claim. The magistrate
recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to all defendants
except Fenton, in whose favor he recommended the entry of summary
judgment.3 The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, and
entered judgment following Milhouse's failure to amend his complaint with
respect to defendants Hudson, Jacobson, Divers and Cain. This appeal
followed.
II.
7
10
Accordingly, we believe that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate's
recommendation that appellant's complaint be dismissed with respect to all
defendants but Fenton. The court below should not have considered each
allegation of Milhouse's complaint independently of the others. As the Fourth
Circuit stated in Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 116 (4th Cir. 1977), a liberal
construction of a pro se complaint "requires that the judge view all of (the)
allegations not as isolated incidents, but rather as a unit." Analyzed in this
manner, it is clear that appellant's complaint alleges that various prison officials
engaged in a series of actions designed to punish him for seeking access to the
courts.6
III.
11
12
The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the case remanded to
the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Honorable John M. Wisdom, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit,
sitting by designation
Because this is an appeal from the grant of appellees' motion to dismiss, we are
constrained to treat the facts pleaded in the complaint as true. Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n.2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 2492 n.2, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977);
Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1980)
rights complaint as "broad and conclusory" because of its "failure to state facts
in support of its conclusions."). See Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir.
1976); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972)
5
Bivens held that the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures gave right to a private cause of action for damages arising under
the Constitution. Subsequently, the Court decided that a cause of action for
damages could be implied directly under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846
(1979), and under the eighth amendment's proscription against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468,
64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). The Court has never decided the question of whether a
private cause of action for damages arises out of the first amendment
Because we find that appellant's complaint states a cause of action for damages
arising under the first amendment, we do not reach the question of whether it
also states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (1976), or under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment
Although we are reversing the district court's dismissal with respect to all
defendants, we do not pass on the question of whether certain defendants may
be immune from suit
Cf. Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 31 (9th Cir. 1969) (Pro se plaintiff, "
(l)acking assistance of counsel and obviously lacking knowledge of the
procedure available," given opportunity to amend her complaint following
reversal of district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment.)