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In the case of Addison vs. Felix and Tioco (38 Phil.

404, 408), this Court held:

The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is
considered to be delivered when it is "placed in the hands and possession of the vendee."
(Civil Code, Art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in
order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser
theownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.
When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of
the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a
public instrument is sufficient. But if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it
himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed
by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality-the delivery has riot been
effects .(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the purpose of the execution of the sales invoice dated
September 20, 1979 (Exh. B) and the registration of the vehicle in the name of plaintiff-appellee
(private respondent) with the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit C) was not to transfer to
Nepales the ownership and dominion over the motorcycle, but only to comply with the requirements
of the Development Bank of the Philippines for processing private respondent's motorcycle loan.

Under the civil law, delivery (tradition) as a mode of transmission of ownership maybe actual (real
tradition) or constructive (constructive tradition). 2 When the sale of real property is made in a public
instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. 3
In other words, there is symbolic delivery of the property subject of the sale by the execution of the
public instrument, unless from the express terms of the instrument, or by clear inference therefrom,
this was not the intention of the parties. Such would be the case, for instance, when a certain date is
fixed for the purchaser to take possession of the property subject of the conveyance, or where, in
case of sale by installments, it is stipulated that until the last installment is made, the title to the
property should remain with the vendor, or when the vendor reserves the right to use and enjoy the
properties until the gathering of the pending crops, 4 or where the vendor has no control over the thing
sold at the moment of the sale, and, therefore, its material delivery could not have been made. 5
In the case at bar, there is no question that the vendor had actually placed the vendee in possession
and control over the thing sold, even before the date of the sale. The condition that petitioner should
first register the deed of sale and secure a new title in the name of the vendee before the latter shall
pay the balance of the purchase price, did not preclude the transmission of ownership. In the

absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, the payment of the purchase price of the good is
not a condition, precedent to the transfer of title to the buyer, but title passes by the delivery of the
goods. 6
We fail to see the merit in respondent's insistence that, although possession was transferred to the
vendee and the deed of sale was executed in a public instrument on December 29, l960, the vendor
still remains as owner of the property until the deed of sale is actually registered with the Office of
the Register of Deeds, because the land sold is registered under the Torrens System. In a long line
of cases already decided by this Court, the constant doctrine has been that, as between the parties
to a contract of sale, registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is
equivalent to registration. 7 Indeed, Section 50 of the Land Registration Act provides that, even without
the act of registration, a deed purporting to convey or affect registered land shall operate as a contract
between the parties. The registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third persons
arising from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect to the
deed of sale, as between the parties to the contract. 8
The case of Vargas v. Tancioco, 9 cited by respondent, refers to a case involving conflicting rights over registered property and
those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question. It is, therefore, not relevant to the case at bar.

In the case at bar, no rights of third persons are involved, much less is there any subsequent
alienation of the same property. It is undisputed that the property is in the possession of the vendee,
even as early as the first week of June, 1960, or six (6) months prior to the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on December 29, 1960. Since the delivery of possession, coupled with the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, had consummated the sale and transferred the title to the
purchaser, 10 We, therefore, hold that the payment of the real estate tax after such transfer is the
responsibility of the purchaser. However, in the case at bar, the purchaser PHHC is a government entity
not subject to real property tax. 11
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and the real property tax paid under
protest to the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan by petitioner Philippine Suburban Development
Corporation, in the amount of P30,460,90, is hereby ordered refunded. Without any pronouncement
as to costs.